S/PV.686 Security Council

1 take over the presidellcy of the Security Couneil from the representative of France, who presided over our meetings during the month of November. 1 am sure that 1 express the sentiment of all the members of the Couneil when 1 say how greatly we appreciated the gracious and distinguished manner in which he conducted our proceedings throughout the month. His dignity, bis faimess, his impartiality and bis characteristic clarity have maintained the bighest standards not only of French representation at the United Nations, but also ofthe presidency ofthe Couneil. On behalf of the representatives" 1 sincerely and deeply thank Mr. Hoppenot, and 1 shall endeavour. to the best of my ability, to follow bis example. The dignity, authority and prestige of this body transcend all other considerations. 1. Président sentant mois tous les membres apprécié présidé de de élevées sation conviennent sécurité. M. et suivre son e.xemple. ce

2. 1have been deeply touched by the President's kind words. dent They show, once again, that his courtesy is matched by Elles me montrent, une fois bis kindness. gence 3. For the assistance and support it bas given me during 3. this month, 1 thank the entire Sccurity Council, to which l'appui we are a11 so deeply devoted in the fulfilment of our de mission. attachés 4. We are all unhappy at the thought that this is the 4. last month in· which we shall have the pleasure and the mois privilege of having Mr. Malik in our midst. 1 M. 6. We shaH always remember Mr. Vyshinsky~I know 1 shall alwavs remember him-as one of the most distinguished representatives who have come to the United Nations. His humour, his leaflling, his sincerity and his ability to defend ms own ca' ,e with all his force and tenacity will always live in Jur memory. 1 am sure, therefore, that 1 express the feelings of every member present when, once again, 1 tender to the Soviet UrJon delegation and to the Governm~nt of the Soviet Union our most profound and heartfclt condolences on their 10ss.

On behalf of the USSR delegation 1 should lik A to thank the President for bis warm expression of sympathy on the occasion of ~he heavy loss sustained by the Soviet Union and the Soviet delegation to the Security Couneil through the death of Andrei Vyshinsky. Welcome to Mr. Sourdis, Minister for Extemal Relations of Colornhia

1 now wish to welcome to the table of the Council our disti'J.guished friend, His Excellency the Minister for External Relations of Colombia. Many of us have known Mr. Sourdis for many years and we are very happy to have him with us to represent his country. We certainly look forward to a very happy association with him. during his stay here.

The President has been very kind. Once again 1 find myself representing Colombia in the Securlty Councîl. On my own behalf and on "ehalf of my country 1 wish to thank thePresidentfor bis kindwords. He maybe surethat nothing will please me more than to be able to contribute in some measure to the st~ttlementofthe delicate problems before the Council. Ad([lption of the agenda The .Palestine question C6mplainl by Israel ag8inst· Egypt concerning : (a) enforcemelllt by Egypt of restrictions on the passage (Jif sbips trading with Israel through the Snez Canal (8/3296, S/3297 and Ccrr.l, 8/3298, 8/3300, S/3302; 8/3309, 8/3310, S/3311,8:/3315, 8/3323, 8/3325, S/3326). 11. Since 14 October 1954 [682nd meeting], the Security Council has had on its agenda an item which reads : "Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning enforce- ment by Egypt of restrictions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal". The Council has considered that its discussion of this general çomplaint should await the outcome of the investigation by the Mixed Armistice Commission of the specific incident relating to the Bat Galim and its seizure on 28 September 1954. But the Bat Galim incident, for all of its gravity, is but an episode in a broader Gontext of issues which the Security Council, io. adopting its agenda, has agreed to discuss. 12. On Il November 1954 [685th meeting], the Security Council took action which enabled General Burns, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, to overcome the delays and obstacles which had prevented substaùtive discussion of this case at two previous meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Accord- ingly, General Burns has now been able to report, in document Sj3323, that the Bat Galim case has been carried through all the due processes of consideration and judgment laid down in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement,! 13. This report of General Burns fully confirms the authenticity of the account which 1 gave to the Security Council on 3 November 1954 [683rd meeting] with respect to the first two meetings of the Mixed Armistice Com- mission. No one can read that report without reaching the'conclusion that the accusation against the Bat Galim and its crew never reached even the minimal level of what woUld be required even forprimafacie consideration in any court of law. Nevertheless, to our regret, this accusation had been proclaimed in the most categorical terms by Egyptian representatives through the highest tribunals of international law and security, had been conveyed in representations to some of the world's leading governments, and had been disseminated through the world Press. These international tribunals, these governments and the Press of the world can now form theit own judgment of whether they have been treated with due respect in having had this fabrication· offered for theit credit and a~eptance. 14. On 3 November, 1 snmmarized the reasons which Egypt had invoked in the Mixed Armistice Commission -for avoiding that Commission's expediteâ judgment of Egypt's own complaint. This summary is now confirmed 1 O./fù:ial Rècords of the Security Council, FOUfth Year, Special Supplement.No.3. . _ .... .. 15. Two draft resolutions were considered by the Mixed Armistice Commission. The tirst, presented by Egypt, asserted that the entry of the Bat Galim into what was ca11ed" Egyptianterritorialwaters" constituted aviolation of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. This complaint fell fO the ground. It evoked no support except from the Egyptian delegation itself. There is, 1think, double significance in this part of General Burns' report. First, it will be noted that the Egyptian delegation unexpected1y changed its course and refrained even from submitting a resolution asserting aggression by the Bat Galim on 28 September 1954. 16. The position then was that the Government of Egypt had asserted and maintained a grave accusation against an Israel ship for nearly nine weeks. It had filled the whole world with the sound of this a1legation. It had delayed judgment of the accusation for many days, and then, at the last moment, it àeclined to put the accùsation even to the test of a vote. However, as matters turned out, the Egyptian decision to submit a resolution of a general character rather than of specific impurt has had valuable and far-reac1'.Ïng results. 17. By abandoning any c1aim of aggression by the Bat Goiim and substituting the general proposition that the appearance of a ship flying the Israel flag in the Suez Canal is equivalent to trespass in territorial waters and, therefore, a violation ofthe Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt invited the Commission to establish a v~ry important juridical point lying fully and exclusively within its competence. The vote was DOW on a question of major international interest. Can it be said that the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement is violated if a ship flying the Israel flag approaches and enters the Suez Canal? Can Egypt assert that its sovereignty over territorial waters applies to this international waterway? May Egypt behave towards an Israel ship in _the Suez Canal as it is entitled to behave towards an Israel ship violating the sove- teignty of Egyptian territorial waters? The fallure of this Egyptian resolution provides a clear answer to all these questions. 18. The Mixed Armistice Commission has now ruled that the special character of Egyptian-Israel relations, as expressed in the General Armistice Agreement between the two parties, cannot be invoked to justify action against a ship carrying the Israel flag approaching or entering the Suez Canal. The draft resolution which failed in the Mixed Armistice Commissionwa& as follows: 19. Against this draft resolution, Israel argued that the iss'ùe must be decidcd not upon the question of territoria! waters, which is within the jurisdicti'"ln of the Mixed Armistice Commission, but upon the United Nations policy affecting the Suez Canal, which is, of course, governed by the resolution of the Security Council of 1 September 1951 (Sj2322]. This view was upheld, and the Egyptian draft resolution, in each· of its parts and as a whole, feU to the ground. 20. 1 should add that the signatory parties themselves have recognized the Mixed Armistice Commission as the final authority to determine the interpretation of any provision of the General Armistice agreement, and the grounds for the failure of this draft resolution are just as instructive as the rejection itself. The Chairnlan, explaining his inability to support the Egyptian contention that there was trespass into Egyptian territorial waters, stated, "However, in the present instance, the ship Bat Galim was bound for the Sue~ Canal" [8/3323, para. 24]. He went on to point out that'this was a matter of which the Security Council was seized and which was, th~refore, outside \.de competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 21. The fact that Egypt may not now in good faith invoke the General Armistice Agreement as a basis for discriminating against Israel ships approaching or entering the Suez Canal is a matter of very great signi- ficance when we come to consider Egypt's unbounded duty to enable the Bat GaIim to continue and to complete its lawful journey. 22. The j udgment of the Mixed Armistice Com.ri.1Ïssion refusing to assimilate this international waterway to the laws of territorial waters is, of course, sound doctrine. It rests upon many traditions and judgments. It fully conforms to what was said by th~ representative of France in the Security Council on 3 November 1954, when he said: " :•. my.delegation also fuids it difficult to suppose that ... Israel, 'by making use' of the right of freenavigation 25. Now, having rejected Egypt's interpretation of the armistice agreement as justifying action against an Israel ship approacmng or entering the Suez Canal, having rejected the claim of sovereignty over territorial waters, the Mixed Armistice C01DlI'Jssion, as Gene"al Burns' report [8/3323] informs us, returned to the specific question of what had happened on 28 September 1954. 26. The allegation that the Bat Goiim had committed violence on 28 September 1954 emanated from Egypt. It might therefore have been expected that the Egyptian delegation would take the onus of putting its allegation to the test of a vote. Since Egypt took no such action, the Israel delegation assumed the initiative of inviting the Mixed Armistice Commission positively to clear the Bat Goiim and its crew of the charges which had been directed against it. It is, of course, not usual under most legal conceptions for the accused party to be required .to obtain a positive verdict clearing him of a charge, but here there were considerations of principle and of maritime reputation which made it impossible for us merely to benefit from Egy,t's default. 27. The del~gation of Israel therefore submitted a draft resolution setting out the full text of the Egyptian complaint against the Bat Goiim for allegedly opening fire on 28 September 1954, and sought a verdict by vote ofthe' Mïxed Armistice Commission that this accusation 28. This draft resolution was upheld with the full support of the United Nations representatives. Now, the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel contaill", special provi3ions for an appeal against decisions ofprinciple by the Mixed Armistice Commission. The relevant provision is contained in paragraph 4 of article X. Accordingly, a few days after the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Spedal Committee-the appeals committee-eonvened under the chairmanship of General Burns to hear the Egyptian appeal. The report of the pro~eedings of the Special Committee is included in the document now submitted by General Burns [S/3323, para. 48]. 29. The decision whereby the Mixed Armistice Com- mission had ruled that a ship flying the Israel flag did not violate the armistice agreement by the very act of approaching the Suez Canal was not even chailenged. It therefore stands intact, with compelling and paramount force. 1 quote from paragraph 4 of article X of the General Armistice Agreement: " If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week from the date of said decision, that decision shail be taken as final." 30. Similarly, the Special Committee substantively upheld the judgment of the Mixed Armistice Commission vindicating the Bat Galim of the specific charge that it had committed a violation of the armistice agreement on 28 September 1954. This, of course, was pr-:cisely equivltlent to a ruling that the Bat Goiim had not fired on anybody anywhere. The opening of fue, with or without casualties, would certainly have been a direct violation of the General Armistice Agreement. 31. The Special Committee inserted a verbal modi- fication into the decision of the Mixed Armistice Com- mission with the, effect of eliminating a derogatory reference to the motives of the Egyptian complaint. General Burns suggested, as a matter ofjudicial principle, that complaints should not be described as " unfounded " since this might appear to question the right of either party to submit any complaint that it saw fit. He pointed out fllrther in his report that it was especially unnecessary to give such an epithet to a complaint which in any case had been rejected by vote. He said that it would perhaps be more correct from a judicial viewpoint to describe the Egyptian complaint as unsubstantiated. 32. This verbal change, however, gives 110 comfort whatever to the Egyptian assertion of a violation of the' armistice by the Bat Galim, for the Special Committee is careful to point out in its report that this marginal correction should not be taken as a reversaI of the substantive verdict of the Mixed Armistice Commission. That verdict, as amended by. the Special Committee, would still rel).d that the Mixed Armistice Commission, "having ,considered the Egyptian complaint "-the complaint of shooting on 28 September 1954-" finds 34. 01.1 14 October 1954, the representative of Lebanon said: "Mter aIl, it is the Mixed Armistice Commission which is the authoritative organ on the spot and which can tell us, impartially and objectively, what is happenning" [682nd meeting, para. 28]. The Mixed Armistice Commission has told us impartially and objectively what happened. 35. 1 should add that at the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission the Chainnan drew a logical and active conclusion from the judgments which had been recorded. It was a simple and a compelling conclusion. He called upon the parties quickly to agree to the release of the Bat Galim and its crew [8/3323, para. 41]. This, then, was the appea! ofthe Chairman speaking ex cathedra at the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He called upon'the two parties quickly to agree to the release of the Bat Galim and its crew. We do not dispute th~ judicial correctness which impelled the Chainnan to make this request to both parties. The fact is, however, that the Bat Galim and its crew have been forcibly detained by Egypt and not by Israel, and it is within the Egyptian and not the Israeli power to effect their release, so that, as a matter of practical truth, this appeal by the Chairman addressed itself spontaneously to the Govern- ment of Egypt alone. That Israel agrees to-indeed, claims-the release of the Bat Galim and its crew is axiomatic and requires no proof. 36. Thus, since the meeting of the Special Committee, the Government of Egypt has been seized of three specifie international facts: fust, that the armistice agreement is not violated when a ship flying the Israel flag peacefully approaches and enters the Suez Canal; secondly, that the Bat Galim crew committed no violation of the mmistice agreement on 28 September 1954; thirdly, that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission has called upon Egypt to release the Bat Galim and its crew. 37. There can, of course, be no doubt as to what is meant by " releasing a ship and its cr~w ". The phrase has only one meaning, both in law and in language. It means that the ship and the crew should be released, that is to say, set free; that the ship should be restored to the 38. spécial sont nationale mêmes à qlÙ internationales 38. Thus, in the view of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion, of the Special Committee and of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, it is Egypt's inter- national dutY to ensure that there shall be restored to the Bat Galim and its crew the same attributes and faci- lities as belong to any other ship of any nation cxercising innocent passage in this international waterway, the duez Canal. 39. de a 4 constatons par répétée Conseil citons, égyptien de libérer le capitaine et 39. It is against this background that 1 wish to refer to the letter which the representative of Egypt has addressed to the Security Council President dated 4 December 1954 [8/3326]. We welcome the Egyptian admission that the charges made by the Egyptian Government on 28 Sep- tember 1954, and repeatedly affirmed in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, are without sub- stance. Wenatu raDy welcome the declared intention to release the captain and crew of the Bat Galim and to restore the cargo to its rightful owners. 40. nement du ration dont ils témoignent dans l'épreuve qu'ils subissent; il l'héroïsme de libération, lettre n'aurait jamais les formalités régulières prescrites la 40. From its place in the United Nh.ions, the Govern- ment of Israel wishes to greet the captain and crew of the Bat Galim; it commends \heir patience and restraint in their ordeal and sympathizes with the injury infiicted upon them and hails tl"e skill and chivalry oftheir seaman- ship. With the best will in the world, however, it is impos- sible for me to accompany this satisfaction at their release with any words of general praise for the letter under discussion. The hard fact is that the accusation should never have been made, that the crew should never have been detained beyond the routine investigation prescribed by Canal regulations; still less should this crew have been carted about from one jail to another and deprived of its liberty for ten consecutive weeks. 41. If all nations attributed to themselves the right to act towards the ships of other nations as Egypt has acted towards the Bat Galim these last ten weeks, little would be left ofthe great traditions ofmaritime freedom which have governed the intercourse of nations for a longer period than have any other precepts of internationallaw. The ships of a nation embody that nation's sovereignty, scarcely less than does the territory of the nation itself. To use force against a ship is to use force against the sovereign State whose flag flies at its masthead. 42. The issue here is the integrity of this entire journey; the ship, the crew and the cargo altogether represent a unity-a single legal facto The point at issue is the utter legitimacy of the claim for the journey to be (aherently and unitedly pursued after it had been unjustifiably interrupted.. 44. 1 think there is little need for any lengthy argument to justify the grounds on which my Government bases this attitude. The perfect right of the Bat Galim to sail with its full crew and cargo directly to Haifâ shines forth clearly beyond any challenge or reproach. 45. Let me just briefly recount in all their accumulation the facts which give the Bat Galim an undisputed right to pursue its northward journey. First, on 1 September 1951 [558th meeting], the Security Council called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods througli. the Suez Canal wherever bound". Secondly, on the same date, the Security Council requested Egypt ta "desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel". Third1y, the Security Council determined that Egypt could not "reasonably assertthat itis actively a belligerent or requires to exerCÏse the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose ofself-defence ". Fourthly, the Security Council determined that interference with shipping destined for Israel through the Suez Canal-aIl and any shipping destined for Israel through the Suez Canal-was inconsistent with the objectives ofthe General Armistice Agreement, that it was "an abuse of the exer- asl': of the right of visit, search and seizure", that it cc cannot..•be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence", and that it represent.ed "unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another ". Fifthly, the Mixed Armistice Commission has ruled that the armistice agree- ment is not violated when an Israel ship approaches or enters the Suez·Canal, and this is not the same as if an Israel ship entered Egyptian territorial waters. Sixth1y, the Mixed Armistice Commission has found, and the Special Committee has confirmed, that the Bat Galim committed no violation of the armistice aqreement on 28 September 1954. Seventhly, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who is the agent of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security in our region, has called for the release of the Bat Galim and its crew. 46. 1 find it hard to imagine that the right of any ship tn complete its destined journey can ever have been vindi- cated by such a heavy accumulation of specific legal rights and judgments. 1 am not overstating the case in any degree \Vhen 1 assert that the completion of the journey of the Bat Galim, small and humble vessel that it is, is an important issue of maritime history. AlI nations 49. What is the use of having meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee if, in respect of the Bat Galim, Egypt, having lost its case, behaves exactly as though it had won it? Why appeal for the judgment if you Wfl not accept its conclusions? Why sign the treaty if you will not fulfil its obligations? Why adhere to the Charter system in whi.ch, under Article 25, Members accept the decisions ofthe Security Council, ifa decision so clear and emphatic as that of 1951 is persis- tently set aside-set aside for four years without any reason that can be discerned in Egypt's welfare or interest? 50. We are unable to comprehend what accrues to Egypt from this abusive practice. !ts maintenance is necessary neither for the defence of territorial integrity nor for political independence; its abandonment would cost nothing but the stroke of a pen. Conversely, the cessation ofthese restrictions, beginning with the uncondi- tional liberation of the Bat Galim, would repair the damage or breach in the armistice structure, would generate impressive goodwill and would have a pro- foundly positive and alleviating effect on my Govern- ment's attitude to Egypt in every domain. 51. No less important to us than Egypt's action, which, we hope, wm progress very considerably beyond its present is stage, the attitude of this august tribunal itself. The Security Council has invariably in the past 'poken out unequivocally for compliance with the judgments of the Mixed Annistice Commission, the requestsof the "Reaffirms that it is essential ... that the parties abide by their obligations under the General Armistice Agreementand the resolutions ofthe SecurityCouncil." 52. These are the obligatory contractual obligations which the parties in the Middle East have undertaken. If this basis is weakened, there is hope neither for progress nol' even for the conservation of such stability as now prevails. The readiness of my Government to accept the impact and weight ofthese obligations under the armistice agreements and Security Council decisions must surely be directly affected by whether or not the Se(;urity Council imposes those obligations with equal weight and impact upon the other side. 53. On more than one occasion we have yielded what we regarded as legitimate interests in order to safeguard the integrity of this armistice system, responding to the verdicts either of the Mixed Armistice Commission or of the S~~urity Council. We have withdrawn armed forces from exposed villages in the south. We have twice within a few years interrupted vital and legitimate development projects. Such actions, involving sacrifice, and others involving constructive helpfulness, have been carried out by my Government on the strict assumption, which now faces a crucial test, that the armistice agreements, the calls ofthe Chairman orthe Mixed Armistice Commission, the decisions of the Security Council, are binding upon the other party as well. Whether or not Egypt fulfils its obligations-and we hope that it will-it is vitally im- portant that we should be told whether or not the Govern- ments primarily responsible for international peace and security regard these obligations as equally compelling whether their burden falls upon an Atab State or upon Israel. 54. Are we governed here by objective criteria of law, or by subjective calculations of politics and strategy? If the armistice system is to flourish, then the absolute fidelity of the Security Council to its principle is a. matter of importance in itself, quite apart from the question of eventual Egyptian action. That is why we are confident that the Security Council will surely not be satisfied with anything less than the unconditional release of the Bat Galim, with its cargo and crew, in circumstances which would permit its full freedom to complete its lawful journey. That is why this restrictive practice, described by the Chiefof Staff of the United Nations Trucc Super- vision Organization at the time as an act ofblockade-and it is commonly held that an act of blockade is an act of war-should again come under international criticism. 56. Itis therefore, 1repeat, vitally necessarythat weshould hear from representatives on the Security Council whether they adhere to the verdict of September 1951. Shall we have belligerency or peaceful maritime relations? Shall there persist a virtual blockade, meaning an act of war, or shaIl relations between Egypt and Israel be dominated by the duties of peace? Shall the verdicts of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the call of its Chairman for the first time 1ack Security Council endorsement? 57. A hundred years ago tbis very week, the illustrious de Lesseps changed the map of the pbysical world by obtaining the Suez Canal concession, thus bringing remote continents into sudden proximity and multiplying many times aIl the existing and subsequent potentialities of world trade and navigation. His vision and that of bis Government and of other Governments of Europe which helped him to realize its fulfilment was that of a doctrine of complete universality in the use of tbis vital interna- tional artery. Internationallaw has recognized that the ships ofaIl nations possess an unqualified right to navigate freely upon and between the bigh seas. It would be a strange centennial anniversary indeed if this universal right were now to be replaced by a new doctrine whereby the riparian State, at the whim of its own changing sentiment or policy, can accord or withhold tbis freedom, which has hitherto been unconditionally maintained. As they look upon tbis case and at the broad perspectives which open out from it, the members of the Security Council, especially the maritime countries amongst them, will surely uot fail to see the importance of a correct and vigorous juridical approach. 58. The Government of Israel accordingly expresses its earnest hope that the Security Council will upholé ,·I:te judgments of the Mixed Armistice Commission, enOl,.se the request of its Chairman, reaffirm the dutY of the parties to abide by the judgments of the Mixed Armistice Commission and of the Security Council, calI upon Egypt to release the Bat Galim with its crew and its cargo, so that they may complete their journey through the Suez Canal to Haifa, reaffirm its desire to see the 1951 reso- lution implemented, and call again in stronger terms

1 wish to thank the President for giving me the opportunity, in accordance with rule 37 ofthe Security Council's rules ofprocedure, to state to the Council my delegation's views on the question on the agenda. 60. The Council is familiar with the Bat Galim incident. 1 shall not dwell on the facts. The Council has before it the report by the Chief of Staffofthe Truce Supervision Organization [S/3323]. 1 shall merely remind the Council that, during the night of 27-28 September 1954, the Bat Gaiim entered Egyptian territorial waters and proceeded towards the port of Suez in order to pass through the Canal. By the time it reached Suez, the police had learnt that an incident had occurred in the Gulf of Suez, that two Egyptian fishing vessels had been attacked, that one of them had sunk, and that two Egyptian fishermen had disappeared. 61. The Egyptian Government informed the Security Council of the incident [S/3302J and lodged a complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission. An investigation was opened by the Egyptian judicial authorities and, at the Egyptian Government's request, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization also arranged for an investigation to be conducted by United Nations observers with a view to ascertaining whether the incident constituted a violation of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agr~ement of24 February1949.2 62. Those are the facts of the case. 63. This question has twice been discussed in the Security Council, on 14 October and 3 November this year, and on those occasions procedural questions were discussed at length. 1see no point in going back to those discussions or to the procedural discussions which took place in the Mixed Armistice Commission. 64. We were accused of obstructiveness. An attempt was made to prove that Egypt wanted at aIl costs to prevent the consideration of this question in the Mixed Armistice Commission. Our delegation, however, agreed to regard the matter as urgent and to give it priority over other questions of undoubted importance to us. It was thanks to our co-operation that, after the question of the Bat Galim had been submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission on 16 November 1954, a decision was adopted by the Commission on 19 November. In the Special Committee to which, in accordance with the General Armistice Agreement, we appealed, our delegation adopted the same co-operative attitude. Thanks to our collaboration, the Committee was convened on 25 November, on which date the parties agreed to consider our delegation's appeal immediately. 66. j\1though the El Auja question. which has now been on the Special Committee's agenda for some time. is of great impoliance to us. we raised no objections in the Special Committee when it was suggested thatthe Bat Galim incident should be considered fust. We took that position in order to demonstrate to the Security Council and to world public opinion that we were not afraid of debates and that we had no intention ofbeing obstructive, as the representative of Israel has claimed on several occasions here. 67. The draft resolution which Egypt submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission was rejected, since the Chairman ofthe Commission abstained from voting on it. The draft stated that, during the night of27-28 September 1954, the Bat Galim had entered Egyptian territorial waters, thus violating article II. paragraph 2. of the General Armistice Agreement and the'shipping agreement signëd by bath parties on 23 July 1953 and witnessed by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 68. Clarifying his position, the Chairman of the Commission said that he did not think that article II. paragraph 2. of the General Armistice Agreement should apply to that case. He further expressed the view that it was not for the Mixed Armistice Commission to decide whether the shipping agreement had been respected or not. 69. On the other hand, the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted by a majority vote a draft resolution submitted by the Israel delegation. The Chairman of the Commission voted for that draft resolution. which stated that the Egyptian complaint regarding the Bat Galim was unfounded and that Israel 'had not violated any of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. ' The Chairman stated that he had voted in favour ofthe Israel draft resolution because conclusive evidence had not been produced that the Bat Galim had attacked the Egyptian fishermen in the Gulf of Suez. 70. As the Council 1S aware, the Egyptian delegation lodged an appeal against that decision \\'ith the Special Committee, in accordance with article X. paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement. 71. The Special Committee decided that the words "the Egyptian complaint regarding the Bat Galim tlase to be unfounded .. should be omitted. That amendment to the resolution adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission is justified. we feel. because one cannot consider a com· plaint to be "unfounded" and then. inthesamedocument, explain one's vote in favour of the text which provides that the complaint is unfounded by saying that no conclusive evidence has been produced that the Bat Galim a~tacked Egyptian fi~lhermen in the GulfofSuez. 1S - 74. Tt is clear from the foregoing text of the agreement that if a vessel is in the territorial wàters of one of the parties, and if it cannot be established that the vessel had been forced to seek refuge in those territorial waters for reasons beyond its control, that vessel may be seized. 75. This agreement was reached as part ofthe Egyptian- Israeli General Armistice Agreement, and it was witnessed and signed by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 76. Accordingly, it would seem that the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission that it lacked competence to pass on or interpret the shipping agreement of 1953 was not entirely in conformity with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, to which the shipping agreement was complementary, especially as it must be remembered that, under article X, paragraph 8, of the General Armistice Agreement, the Commission. "as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the parties modificationsinthe provisions ofthis agreement". 77. As to the comments on the investigation conducted by the observers and the Egyptian judicial authorities, we consider them to have no bearing on the present discussion. It is unnecessary to mention that neither the Mixed Armistice Commission, nor the Special Committee, nor the Security Council itself has any control over an investigation conducted by the Egyptian judicial authorities, and that the United Nations observers were authorized to conduct their investigation solely under the General Armistice Agreement and the complementary shipping agreement. 78. The Council is, of course, aware that the Egyptian judicial authorities had begun an investigation of the activities of the Bat Galim's crew and the charges brought against them of murder, attempted murder and unlawful carrying of weapons. 79. The Egyptian judicial authorities, as l have already had the honour to inform the Council, have decided to set aside the charges, owing to insufficient evidence. In the absence ofsufficient evidence, the crew will not be brought to trial and will be released. We had already stated, on 140ctober 1954 [682nd meeting, para. 153], that, if there was no evidence against those seamen, they would he 80. Those, objectively, are the facts. 81. My delegation cannot understand the commotion which has been ndsed in connexion with this case, and is at a loss to explain the violence ofthe opposing speeches and the insulting observations which the Israel delegation has seen fit to make on this occasion. It notes with regret that Israel has adopted a well-defined Hne of conduct: to use the Security Council, which is the highest authority in our Organization, for propaganda purposes with a view to distorting the truth, spreading confusion and inflaming public opinion for purposes which are weIl known. 82. An example of that propaganda is the Israel delegation's continuai useofthe word" blockade" inreferring to the right of visit and search exercised by Egypt, despite the fact that in international law-and the Israel delegation is certainly not unaware, of this-the word " blockade" has a very precise meaning. The fact is that no one is trying'to eut off all communication with Israel by sea. We have already shown that Egypt has never imposed a blockade against Israel. Perhaps Mr. Eban calls a blockade the refusaI of Egypt and the Arab countries to enter into commercial relations with Israel. 83. 1 should like to remind the Council of Israel's behaviour in a case similar to the one now before it. 1refer to the case of the Egyptian vessel, the Samir, which was seized by Israel on 4 January 1953. 1 find myself obliged to describe the various stages of that incident, and 1 ask your indulgence. 84. On 4 January 1953, the senior Egyptian delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission received from the senior Israel delegate a communication, of which a copy had also been sent to the Chairman of the Commission, informlng him that an Egyptian vessel called the Samir had entered Israel territorial waters and had been held by the Israel authorities for investigation. 85. The Egyptian authorities gave the following information: the vessel had been returning from Latakia via Beirut, where it had taken on board a cargo of 530 bags of flour and 880 boxes ofsoap, dispatched by sea for refugees in the Rafall-Gaza area. Onits way, and whiIe outside Israel territorial waters off the port of Jaffa, it had been attacked by an Israel armed cutter, which had forced it to enter the port of Jaffa. 86. On 25 January 1953, the senior Egyptian delegate addressed a protest concerning this incident to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, asking him to arrange for an investigation to be conducted by United Nations observers to ascertain whether the complaint' was valid. 87. On 18 February 1953, the senior Egyptian delegate, not yet having received a reply, sent a' further detailed 89. On 7 March 1953, the senior Egyptian delegate sent to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission a .detailed note on the incident, asking him what action he contemplated in view of the Israel refusaI to permit the investigation. On 10 March 1953, the senior Egyptian delegate received from the Chairman ofthe Mixed Arnùstice Commission a communication informing him that he regarded the Israel refusaI to permit an investigation ofthe incident as a failure on Israel's part to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, and stating that he was convinced that if the Israelis had allowed the investigation to be held, it would have facilitated collaboration between the two parties. 90. On 24 March 1953, Israel announced that the crew of the Samir had been brought before the Tel Aviv court and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the term to run from 23. March 1953. On 9 April 1953, the Jerusalem Post published an article on the conditions put forward by Israel for the return of the Samir. On 7 July 1953, the Egyptian delegation sent a message to the Mixed Armistice Commission requesting the return of the seamen of the Samir, who had served their sentences. On 5 July 1953, the Israelis handed over the Samir to the Egyptians outside the port of Gaza. On 23 July 1953, the sbipping agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. On 10 September 1953, the Egyptian seamen were released and delivered to the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission. 91. The facts speak for themselves and require no comment. The Egyptian seamen were sentenced, and were not released until they had served their sentences. 92. That is an example of the behaviour of the Israel Government: it seizes a boat, finds that the crew have penetrated into the territorial waters of Israel, sentences them to prison; and then Mr. Eban is astonished and indignant that Egypt should take the liberty of seizing an Israel vessel in its own territorial waters, for Suez and Port Said are still Egyptian ports. 93. I could mention other cases, and give you further examples of Israel's attitude towards vessels passing through its territorial waters. In its statement before the Cauncil on 3 November 1954, the Egyptian delegation mentioned the case of three. ~ther ves~els: v:essel NÇ>. 467, 95. 1 leave it to the Council to judge the conduct of the two Governments in similar cases. In the case of the Samit, we preferred to settle the question without fuss or propaganda through the machinery of the Mixed Armistice Commission. We considered it more desirable and appropriate to use the agency established by the General Armistice Agreement to settle tm3 question. 96. There is no need to remind the Council that the Bat Galim incident was created by Israel so as to reintroduce before the Security Council the question of the free passage of ships through the Suez Canal. Mr. Eban frankly said so in his statements, particlùarly during the meetings of 14 October and 3 November last. 97. Israel also chose the moment when negotiations between Egypt and the United Kingdom were in progress to reintroduce the question of the free passage of ships through the Suez Canal; it did so, as 1 have just said, by instigating the Bat Galim incident in the hope of embarrassing the British and Egyptian negotiators. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement, however. concerns only the Canal Zone itself, and not the Suez Canal. Moreover -and Mr. Eban must be weIl aware of the fact-the presence of British forces in the Canal Zone has never had any influence on the Egyptian Government's attitude in this matter. 98. Article 8 of the new Anglo-Egyptian agreement, signed in Cairo on 190ctober 1954, merely reaffirms the intention of the two parties to respect the provisions of the Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed in Constantinople on 29 October 1888, while stressing the fact that the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt.3 99. The Council is familiar with the Egyptian position on this important question. During the debates in this chamber in 1951, and more recently in February and 3 For an English translation,-see Sir Edward HertsIet, ed., A Complete Collection of the:- Treaties and ,Conventions...between Great Brilain and ForeÏf:n Powers.. .London, Butterworth, 1893, vol. xvm, p. 369. 100. The Egyptian delegation has maintained and continues to maintain that a state ofbelligerence continues tu exist between Egypt and Israel. We have shown that the scope of the military operations in Palestine in 1948 transiormed the Palestine conflict into a war between the Arab S'ates and Israel. The existence of this state of belligerence between Egypt and Israel is confirmed inter a/ia by the very terms ofthe General Armistice Agreement which put an end to hostilities and which was accepted as an indispensable step towards the liquidation of the armed conflict. Accordingly, the Arab States and Israel are still in a state of belligerence. We have pointed out that an armistice does not end a war since, legally at any rate, a war ends only through the conclusion of a peace treaty. Ali that an armistice agreement actually does is to suspend hostilities and regulate the relations of the belligerents until a peace treaty is concluded. 101. In support of our contention, we hale cited legal theory and practice, which are unanimous in upholding this principle of intem:itional law. 102. Our delegation has also maintained that, during the period of the armistice-which, as we have just said, does not endthe war-the belligerents' right to visit ships and seize objects deemed to be contraband of war is recogcized. Moreover, the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement did not refer either explicitly or implicitly to this right of visit, and consequently did not prohibit it. The fact must not be overlooked that this agreement is a ~trictly military agreement which has never taken questions of a political or economic character into consideration, for it is clear from article 1 and from paragraph2 ofarticle II that, in orderto invcke these articles, it must be established not only that some hostile act has been perpetrated, butalso that it is an act committed bythemilitary or paramilitary forces ofone ofthe parties. However, all the inspections and seizures carried out by Egypt \vere effected by the Egyptian civil authorities. That, incidentally, explains why the Special Committee under the chairmanship of General Riley did not consider, at its meeting on 12 June 1951, that there "had been a violation of the General Armistice Agreement, and declared itself incompetent to take up the question. 103. It follows, then, from the foregoing that the inspection ofships and the seizure ofcontraband by the Egyptian authorïties constitute neither a breach of the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949, nor a breach ofintemationallaw, which, as we have established, authorizes the exercise ofthis right during the period of the armistice. 104. Lastly, my delegation bas explained that the system of inspection and search, which is designed to ensure t:'" defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public ordel there, cannot be construed as an infringement of the provisions of the Convention signed in 1888 concerning the Suez Canal. 107. Article X states that the provisions of the aforementioned article IV shall not interfere with the measures which the Egyptian Government might find it necessary to take for securing the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. 108. Those exceptions were made in fàvour of Egypt, which holds sovereign rights over the territory. 109. Consequently, in conformity with these two articles, and for the purpose of taking the necessary measures for ensuring the execution of the Convention in accordance with article IX and the measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order in accordance with article X, the Egyptian Government alone, by way of exception, has the right to take measures forbidden to other States, including the exercise of certain belligerent rights which may include the right of visit and seizure of contraband notwithstanding the provisions of article IV. 110. Article XI provides nevertheless that the measures in question shall not interfere with the free use of.the Canal. However, it is difficult to maintain that in carrying out these measures, that is, by searching vessels and seizing objects deemed to be contraband of war, the Egyptian Government is not complying with the provisions of article XI, since the free use of the Canal has never excluded certain formalities or restrictions, police measures with regard to ships and their crews, health inspections and the like. Ill. In practice, the Egyptian Government has never tried to prohibit the passage of ships through the Suez Canal. If there is no prohibition of passage, it cannot be said that use of the Canal is being obstructed. Moreover, we have proved by statistics that need not be repeated here that traffic through the Catlal has been constantly increasing. 112. Our position may therefore be summed up as follows: 113. A state of belligerence exists between Egypt and Israel. The General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949, which did not put an end to the conflict and contains no provision concerning the right of visit and inspection, cannot prevent the exercise -of that right. The principles of internationallr,w uphold 116. After that resolution was adopted, the Egyptian Government restricted the exercise of its right wherever it could, in so far as such restriction was compatible \Vith its security and that of the Arab countries. We have produced statistics to prove the truth of this statement. 117. In 1954 the question of the free passage of shipping through the Canal again arose, On Israel's request, the Council examined h. in February and March of this year. The New Zealand delegation proposed a draft reso1ution [S/3188 alld Corr.I] which in effect reiterated the 1951 resolution. The Soviet Union representative, who voted against that draft resolution, st~ted on 29 March 1954 that " international1aw is law sui generis and that international disputes must be settled otherwise than by imposing a decision on either party in contravention of aU its arguments, without any attempt to refute those arguments-- whereas 1 must admit that the arguments submitted here by the defender of the Egyptian position seemed to me to be quite convincing" [664tlz meeting, para. 49]. 118. At the end of the debate, the Egyptian representative said that Egypt would of its own free will move towards tolerance [Ibid., para. 157]. During the discussion which took place here on 14 October 1954, we produced statistics [682nd meetillg, paras. 147and 148] to show the tolerance which the Egyptian Government had exercised since the previous March. 119. 1 must crave the Council's indulgence for lengthening the discussion in order to make it quite clear where my de1egation stands on this delicate and comp1ex problem, which better qualified speakers than 1 have a1ready explained to you. 120. 1 am obliged to emphasize a point which concems the Bat Goiim incident. The vessel involved is an Israel on{:. Hence, the question is whether an Israel vessel can make free use of Egyptian territorial waters, use Egyptian ports and pass through the Suez Canal without let or hindrance. 121. The discussions that took place here in 1951 and resulted in the resolution invoked by Israel concerned other matters. They concerned the right to visit and inspect merchant vessels belonging to States trading with Israel, but those vessels and-this is the important point we wish to emphasize-were not Israel vessels, but 122. 1 should like to emphasize here that the question before us today, and above all the facts with which we have to deal, are not like those which were submitted for our consideration in 1951 and early in 1954. 123. Ifwe consider the discussions that took place in the Security Council in 1951 and that resulted in the adoption ofthe resolution of 1 September ofthat year, and particulJ.r1y the statements made by the representatives who presented the draft resolution and by those who voted for it, we shall find that all had in mind the passage ofneutral merchant vessels through the Canal for the purpose of trading with Israel, and not the passage of Israel vessels. The same observation applies to the discussions that took place here in February and March ofthis year. Moreover, it is quite logical that this should be so, for the facts which were submitted for the Council's consideration concemed only the visit and inspection by Egypt of neutral merchant vessels passing through the Canal on their way to or from Israel, in order to make sure that they were not carrying goods regarded as contrabanà of war. 124. The question before us today, however, concems the passage of an Israel vesse!. 125. If we glance at the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 [S/2322), we shall find tliat it aIso confirms our contention, namely, that the authors of the text themselves, as weIl as the members of the Security Council, have always dealt with the problem on the assumption that what was at issue was the freedom of passage of neutral merchant vessels trading with Israel, and not ofIsrael vessels. 126. Paragraph 5 of tha.t resolution states: "Collsidering that. ..neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence." The question at issue, therefore, was Egypt's right under intemationallaw to visit, search and seize neutral vessels proceeding to Israel by way of the Suez Canal. 127. In paragraph 7, the Council: "Finds furtlzer that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure." 129. It might perhaps be said that this paragraph implies that even the restrictions on the passage ofIsrael merchant vessels should be lifted, since the first part of the sentence seems to have a general application. However, the question submitted to the Security Council, as we said before, was whether or not Egypt had the right to visit, seurch and seize merchant vessels passing through the Canal to trade with Israel. At thllt time there was never any question of Israel vessels using the Suez Canal. Moreover, the restrictions which Egypt imposed on the passage of merchant shipping-restrictions which are part of Egyptian law--concerned only, and referred only to the right to visit neutral merchant ships to make sure that they \Vere not carrying contraband of \Var. 130. It is cl~\r from the foregoing that the whole discussion before this Council in 1951 and in February and Mareh 1954 concerned only the right of visit, search and seizure exercised by Egypt, in legitimate self-defence, in respect of vessels passing through the Canal to trade with Israel; the passage of Israel ships through the Suez Canal never arose. 131. Furthermore, paragraph 10 ofthe resolution calling on Egypt to terminate the restrictions was not wordOO categoricaUy. Egypt was calied upon to cease aU interference \Vith such shipping " beyonû :.hat essential to the safety ofshipping in the Canal itselfand to the observance ofthe international conventions in force". This resolution of 1 September 1951, which Israel is invoking, actually recognizes that, in any case involving the safety of shipping ~n the Canal, ~t has the right to interfere with such shipping. 132. But in the present situation, in the state of belligerency which in our opinion still exists between Egypt and Israel, how can we allow Israel vessels to pass through the Suez Canal without interference, as the Israel representative demands? 133. What guarantee have we that an Israel merchant vessel passing through the Canal will not be tempted to scuttle itself and thus obstruct the Canal for a considerable period, causing materiallosses and gravely damaging the interests ofmaritime Powers in generai? Who can say that Israel vessels passing through the Canal will not be tempted even to lay mines in Egyptian territorial waters, either before reaching the Suez Canal or in the Canal itseIf? Lastly, who can say that Israel nationals on such a vessel will not try to find a way of landing in Egypt in order to damage the Canal or to commit nets of sabotage in Egyptian territory? cc The sixteen Zionists recently arrested by the Egyptian Government belong to a Tel Aviv gang, MOst of whose members entered Egypt iUegaUy through certain European countries in order to commit acts of destruction and sabotage on public buildings. They have perpetrated attacks on the premises of the United States Information Service, places ofentertainment and the like, to say nothing of acts of espionage against the security ofthe country." 135. My delegation has indicated to the Council the danger to which Egypt would expose itself by allowing freedom of passage through the Suez Canal to Israel vessels. It has also shown that the danger wculd threaten not Egypt alone, but the Canal itself, which might be damaged, since passage through it niight be obstructed. We have already shown that, under the provisions of articles IV, IX and X of the Constantinople Convention, considered together, Egypt May, in order to ensure the execution of the Convention-and hence the security ofthe Canal-or in order to s€!cure its own defence and the maintenance of public order, exercise certain rights, including the right to visit and search vessels and to seize goods bound for Israel and regarded as contraband of war. 136. These fears are justified by the atmosphere of the relations between the Aîab States alld Israel. Israel's conduct towards the A,'ab States since the signing of the armistice agreements has created an atmosphere which has compeUed Egypt to adopt this attitude for reasons of self-defence and in order to safeguard the security of the Arab States, of Egypt, and, hence, of the Suez Canal. Israel, indeed, has done nothiug but violate the armistice agreements. The Israelis have deliberately engaged in numerous acts of aggression, in sorne cases by the use of their armed forces. 137. 1 feel compeUed to mention certain acts of aggression committed by Israel. 138. It cannot be forgotten that, in 1950, 7,000 Arabs were expeUed from their homes in the El Majdal area and the El Auja demilitarized zone, after being stripped of their possessions. The Mixed Armistice Commission, which was instructed by the Security Council to examine thatcomplaint, decided in 1951 [S/2388,para. 2] to permit the Arabs to return home, but, alas, that decision has remained a dead letter in the Commission's archives. 139. Nor can anyone, 1 am sure, have yet forgotten Israel's bombing of the Syrian frontier in 1951. 140. The members of the Council will doubtless well remember the particularly revolting acts of aggression committed on 14 and 15 October 1953 against the village ofQibya in the tenitory,QfJordan. That act ofaggression was the subject of the resolution of 24 November 1953 [SI3139IRev.2], which categorically censured Israel and ·recommended that effective measures should be taken to prevent aU such .actions in the future. 142. 1shall not expatinte ou these violations, as 1do not wish to take up the CouncU's tinle, but r shan remind the Council of document S/3186, whicJt was drculated on 12 Mareh 1954 nt our delegntion's request. 143. Furthermore, Israel, which alleges that Bgypt is not implementing the resolution of 1 Septembèr 1951 [S/2322], persists in violating the many differet.1t resolutions which the United Nations has adopted. 1venture to remind the Council of those resolutions: (l) Resolution 181 (11), adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, cOllcerning the plan of partition and the establishment ofan international régime for 1erusalem; (2) Resolution 194 (III), adopted on Il December 1948 by the General Assembly, concerning the establishment of a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area, the repatriation as soon as possible of refugees desiring to return to thdr homes and the compensation due to those who decided not to return: (3) Resolution 303 (IV), adopted on 9 December 1949 by the General Assembly, concerning the establishment of an international régime for Jerusalem, in which the General Assemb~v invited the "1Crusteeship Council to complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem; (4) Resolution 394 (V), adopted on 14 December 1950, in which the General Assembly noted that the repatriation of and payment of compensation to refugees had not been affected and recognized that, in the interests of peace and stability of the Near East, the refugee question should 00 dealt with as a matter ofurgency; (5) The various resolutions adopted by the Security Council on 19 August, 19 October, 4 November, 16 November and 29 December 1948 [S/983, 8/1045, S/I070, S/1080, S/II69]; (6) Resolution 232 (VI), adopted on 4 April 1950 by the Trusteeship Council, on the Statute of Jerusalem. 144. The Council will no doubt have noted the attitude of moderation and tolerance we have demonstrated, by contrast with the provocative attitude of the other party. We shall maintain the same attitude throughout the discussion on this question. 145. No one, hO\vever, who is guided by the principles of jùstice and equity, can possibly ask us to waive our right to take interim mensures and our right to self-defence by .affording free passage through the Suez Canal ta enemy vessels which may threaten the security of Egypt and of the Canal. 146. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom); We have now heard the parties, and we must now consider whether we wish to proceed further with the discussion of this matter today. The members ofthe Counci1will know what importance Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom bas always attached and continues to attach to the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal as enshrined in the Constantinople Convention of 1888. 147. The question with which we have been dealing in the Council at our most recent meetings has two aspects, the general question of principle relating to freedom of navigation through the canal, and the particular question relating to the Bat Galim. As to the general question, of which the representative of Egypt had a good deal to say in his speech, 1 do not consider it necessary for the Purposes of the present discussion for me to enlarge on the remarks which 1 have just made. 148. With regard to the Ba..! GaUm, there has been a new development to which the representatives of Israel and Egypt have ofcourse bcth Teferred. As stated in the letter of 4 December 1954 from the representative of Egypt [S/3326], the judicial authorities in Egypt have, for lack of sufficient evidence, set aside the very serious charges brought against the crew of the ship, and the Egyptian Govemmenthas decided to release the crew and the cargo. 149. In the charged atmosphere which surrounds all questions connected with Palestine, it is gratifying to note that at least one very seriouscomplicating element has been disposed of. The law has taken its course and, since the charges against the crew could not be substantiated for lack of sufficient evidence, they have been frankly withdrawn. That is one welcome development. As for the rlecision to release the crew and the cargo, that step too, must, so far as it goes, be welcomed by us all. 150. Of course, there are other questions involved, and my delegation for one would like to take stock of the position in the light of the new development recorded in the letter of4 December from the representative ofEgypt. This letter has only been in our possession for forty-eight hours. Indeed, 1 would have thought it would be helpful to us all if we could have a little time to refiect on what we should do next. 151. My suggestion, therefore, is that it might be well if we adjourned now and if the President kept in touch with tht.: members of the Council and called us together again when there was a general feeling that we were in a position to pursue our discussions usefully. 152. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United Kingdom bas made a suggestion, wmch is still in the informal stage, regarding the possible advisability of adjou.."11Ïng our meeting at this point and leaving it to the President ofthe Counci1 to keep in touch withrepresentatives and to call a meeting as soon as there is a general feeling !hat it should be called. 155. We are here face to face with an exceedingly important example of the absolute fairness of the processes ofjustice in Egypt, a situation wbich can hearten all of us here in the Council, and certainly aIl of us in the Middle East. 1wish, once more, to pay bigh tribute to the fairness and the exhaustive character of the procedures of justice in the Egyptian Government. 156. Speaking aga:tl as PRESIDENT of the Council, 1 retum to the informaI suggestion of the representative of the United Kingdom. If there is no objection on the part of any repr~sentative on the Council, 1 take it that it would be a sensible procedure to adjoum at this point. 1 shall certainly keep in touch with every member of the Couneil conceming developments and shall caU a meeting as soon as it is warranted. 157. In the absence of any apparent objection to the suggestion, 1 declare the meeting adjoumed. FINLAND - FINLANDE kauppa, 2 Keskuskatu, AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE : H. A. 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