S/PV.688 Security Council

The Belgian delegation is amtious to become acquainted with the various facets of this matter, and listened attentively to the speeches made here on 4 January last [687th meeting]. Those speeches demt mostly with the principles goveming the situation. My delegation bas Cfxefully verified the aceuracy of those statem.ents cf principle. As a result of its study it bas arrived at the following conclusions. 1. s'informer la qui Elles portaient la fond6 aux 2. n cieUe, international lui a-t-il 2. The S"l1ez canal is an integral part of Egypt. It connecta two open sea&. It is an artificial waterway, and therefore not govemed in an respeets by the rules of ordinary international law conceming natu..~ straits. Iti statua was acc:ordingly· coverecl bya treaty, the Convention respecting the freenavigation -of the Suez 3. With regard to the Suez Canal, no one is maintaining here that the Convention of Constantinople is not applicable. It is consequently necessary to determine the meaning and scope of that Convention. Article 1 reads: "The Suez Maritime Canal shaH always be freeand open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every . 'vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag. ce Consequently, the High Contracting Parties· agree not in aoy way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace. •• The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade." 4. Thejudgment ofthe Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice to' which l'have jùst referred lays down that this provision covers even ships of countries at war with the territorial sovereign. The Court states that in fact, under the régime of the Constantinople Convention, belligerent men-of-war and ships carrying contraband have been permitted to pass freely through the Canal. It adds, however, that the right of self-defence is reserved to the coastal State "up to a certain point ". The Court does not explain what it means by the expression "up to a certain point '~.. This is not surprising,.since its judgment is concemed with the Kiel Canal and deals with the Suez Canal only in passing and for purpose of comparison~" . 5. This being so,'we should apparently refer, first to article, IX. of the Constantinople Convention, which provides tÏ1at the coastal. State shall take the necessary measures for ensuring the execution of the treaty, and secondly to article X, which provides that the provisions of the treaty shaH not interfere with the measures which that State might find it necessary to take for securing the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. But, though articles IX and X are indeed the relevant provisions, we are then faced with article' XI, which expressly provides that: "The measures whîch shaH' be taken' in the cases provided for by articles IX and X of the present treaty shall not interfere with the free use ofthe canal." " 6. Having regard 'to ,these provisions, y;.hich seem clear, the Belgian delegation considers that it was the aim of the C:;0nstantinople Convention to ensure in aU circumstance~ J For .an 'EnaUm traDslation, sec' Sir Edward Hertstlet, ed.", A Complete, Collection of the Tremies œrd .Conventlons•.••between GI'f'Qt Brltaln œrd Foreign POH!us••• London, BUtf.Cl~rth, 1893, voL xvm. p. 369. ··PHb/Jœtlo". of the. PmtillMnt Court of'lnternatlollll1·1l1Stice, &M'A.'No. l, A. W.Sijthoff's PublisbiDJ·COmpany,I:.eydeiJ, 1923:· 8. The resolution of 1 September 1951 calls for the tennination of "the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the 1 Suez Canal wherever bound ", and the cessation of " aIl interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of all the international conventions in force". 9. As has been pointed out, the Security Council is clearly not competent to enforce the observance of the Constantinople Convention as such. It does, however, possess such competence through the Charter, in so far as it has to carry out the provisions ofthe Charter in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and international security. The 1951 resolution was therefore the outcome ofa proper use ofthe Council's powers, and was not ultra vires. It could not, indeed, be represented in that light, sinee it contained nothing new anQ merely restated· the provisions ofthe Convention of 1888. Actually, it restated them on1y in part. for it referred ooly to commercial shipping, whereas the Convention was also applicable to warships. Even ifthe resolution itselfwere not binding, its provisions would be, since they correspond to provisions which have been binding since 1888. 10. At the beginning of the new phase which opened on 4 January 1954, the parties were given an opportunity of informing the Council of their present positions of principle. They preferred not to do so and thus compelled the members of the Council to express views in ignorance ofevidence which might have influenced their conclusions. The parties will no doubt clarify the matter later in the debate. Il. Like the other delegations we have heard during the present month. 1 should like to end on an optimistic note, which seems to be justified by a number of facts. When charges were brought against the crew of the Bat Galim, the Egyptian Government referred the matter to the courts, which found the evidence to be insufficient. The Government bowed to that decision and released the crew members, who have retumed to Israel. That was a significant gesture, a demonstration of good faith, of a desire to avoid arbitrary action and to act in accordance with law. The Egyptian Government has also offieially announced its wiJlingness to release the cargo and the ship.It.has proposed that a sub-committee of the Mixed 12. The Suez Canal is a communication link of woddwide imp,ôrtance, and its free use is vital to aU.nations. As has recently been pointed out here. Egypt is responsible for its protection. It is fully aware that, in doing so, it is rendering a service to the world as a whole, a service which is, moreover, in keeping with its traditions. Under the agreement with the United Kingdom which it signed on 19 October 1954, it affirmed its œsolve to respect the provisions of the Constantinople Convention, which guarantees freedom of navigation in the Canal. 13. Belgium's relations With Egypt are most cordial, and date back a long time. The experience thus acquired 1ills the Belgian delegation with confidence as to the future.

The complaint submitted by the Government of Israel against Egypt and now before the Security Council constitutes one aspect of the problem of peace in the Middle East, with which all mankind is concerned. In spite of the armistice signed and maintained under the auspices of the United Nations, there is evidence of a state of tension. Incidents such as the one we are concerned with today are symptoms of that tension, and such symptoms may in turn cause the present situation to deteriorate. Hence the fust dutYofthe Security Council is to appeal to the countries involved in this case, pointing out the urgency of doing whatever they can to reduce the tension and to avoid anything that may add to it. 15. As for the substance of the question ·before us, the Peruvian delegation considers that the oost proof of friendship towards the countries concerned and the oost contribution towards a solution would be to make an objective and unbiased study of the case, taking into account the circumstances and the applicable rules oflaw. 16. The principles contained in the Constantinople Convention form a true international statute governing the freedom a.nd, by implication, the neutrality of the Suez Canal. The Canal must remain open to all shipping both in time of war and in time of peace, and may never, under the Convention, be subject to aoy sort of blockade. 17. Article IV stipulates that "no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation ofthe Canal, shall 00 committed in the canal and its ports ofaccess. .. even though the Ottoman Empire should he one of the belligerent Powers ". Tne sole exception to these provisions is contained in article X, which deals with the measures that may 00 taken for securing the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of 19. Although this faet is incontrovertible in theory, it cannot he denied that in the First World War, and to an ~ven greater extent in the second, circumstances created a situation dift"erent from that envisaged at the time by the signatories to the Convention. The very preservation ofthe Canal, which was exposed to enemy action, induéed the allied nations, with the collaboration ofEgypt-which took part on their side in the Second World War-to ~dopt measures which barred passage through the Canal to the vessels of enemy countries. This was really an exceptional situation resulting from the universal and totalitarian nature of the war, its extent and the methods employed in it, and from the measures required to protect the Canal as such. 20. The United Nations Charter establishes a universal lëgaiorder wwchexc1udes the old concept ofbelligerency. The legal organization of the United Nations-in so far as the functioning of its organs, and chietly those which, llke the Security Council and the General Assembly, are intended tosecure the maintenance of peace; is not impeded-implies that the states of belligerency and neutrality are abolished, and consequently the use of force by States or groups ofStates, except ofcourse in the .case of self-defence covered by Article SI of the Charter; and action in self-defence must in any case be taken with the knowledge of the United Nations and without prejudice to its authority. Thus the right ofself-defence creates a preliminary and provisional situation, pending final action by the United Nations to complete and ratify il. 21. This right of self-defence, which authoDzes the use offorce in accordance with the principles which governed such use under the classical system ofintemationallaw, of course also exists when the United Nations is paralysed, that is to say, when for any reason it is unable to discharge its specific functions of defending law and maintaining peàœ.· Thal would be the case if the Security Council were paralysed by the veto, or if the Assembly, when seized of a matter, were unable to secure the effective cOllaboration of the co'untries which it ca11ed upon to render it. s ex.~ised before action is taken by the Security Council or the General Assembly to maintuin peace, or afrer one or other of these organs has proved unable to aet. 23. The Peruvian delegation has maintained on other occasions that the concepts of classica! international law with regard to belligerency, the use of force, Icgitimatc bostilities. volunteers and neuuality are not applicablc wbere the Charter of the United Nations iil in full tbree and operation. Dwing the discussion on the intervention of Communist China in the Korean confliet on the pretext that its· tbrces were volumecrs-permitted by the Hague Convention of 1907-the delegation of Pcru pointet:! out that between 1907 and 1945 lhere had becn a radical change in the outlook of mankind, and especially in ils juridicul concepts. 24. ln 1907 il WllS possible to rctèr to just and unjust wars, or simply la legitimate wars, without refcrence 10 the concepts of justice and injustice. Il was also possible ta retu to neutralily in the strict sense of the term. But sinœ the setting up. in 1945. of an organization of universal sco~ llnd me establishment of standards of law and of the obligation ta maintain peace-an obligation which is binding on ail nations. bath on those which sianed and on thase which did not sign the Charter, becausc wc who signed it consider ourselves entitled, on behalf of mankind as a whole. ta require those who did not do se to respet."t the obligations which we ourselves bave undertaken-the Secunt)' Council and the General Assembly bave been directly rcsponsible for the mainte· nance of peace. Any wu, theœfore, would be an unjust war. sinœ.. should.a contlic.t bœak Qut an~ an appeal he lUde ta the belligerenis. ~ pa.rt.y w~ refu~ to comply with this appeal would pn:sumably he declared the asgressor. 25. This legal position, of course. presupposes the tùll application of the lIUIChinery envisaged in the Charter. and hence the immediate adoption in every case by the Secwity CC"uncil of measures to preserve peace or, failing such action. the taking of tùlIy effeetive action by the General Assembly or by existing regional organizations calle<! upon to restore the status quo. If that condition is o.ot fulfilled. the rigbt of legitimate individual and collee-, tive self·defence and the legitimate use of force, in ~ordan\.-e with the classical principles of law, regains validity, since the 001.y contingency which could deprive it ofvalidity bas failed to <>ecur. 26. The concepts of belligerency. of the use offoa...:, and of legitimate individual or collective self..def.mœ aœ-not ~bl~ if the United Nations machinery is fully in Q.pe .. ratio.n. They are even Jess appücable-save Provi-, sionally and exceptionally-in cases where a conflict bas already given rise to United Nations intervention and where hQStilities bave been terminated as a result of a 28. ft follows from ail thi! that, within the general framework of the armistice and the application of the 1951 resolutlon, Egypt May take certain steps to protect the security of the Canal in accordance with article X of the Constantinople Convention concernlng the defence of Egypt's territorial intègrity, and in accordance with Article SI of the Charter. Itmust, however, take duly into account, fint, the spirit of the Constantinople Con· vention and, socondly, the recommendations made iu the· Security Council resolutions. The correct interpretation . of the arm!stica entails bringing these mcasures to the notice of the organ establlshed by virtue of the armistice !tself. 29. The Peruvian delegation wishes to record the satis· ftu:tion it felt at lcarninl that, by the agreement concluded : ln Cairo on 19 October 1954 with the United Kingdom, Egypt had &8sumed MI control of the Suez Canal Zone .in Ml consciousness that the now situation conferred upon it not ooly an honour but also a now responsibility. 30. Aceordingly, that instrument, which replaces the' Treaty of Alliance concluded between Egypt and the! United Kingdom in 1936, contains the following clause: " The two Contraeting Governments recognize that : t.he Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of : Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategical1y uf international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freerlom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October 1888."3 •,See ~nwrI hetwmr lire Governrnenl oflhe United Kilf6t/om of GretZl Brilain and Nortlrern In1and and lM EgypliOll Govu",.,.t rtgQ1'tlbig tire Suez CturtllBtm. Cmd. 9298, Rer M~ty's Stationery Office, London. ' 32. The delegation of Peru is also very pleased that the Egyptian Govemment, as it stated in its communications to the Couneil of 4 December 1954 [S/3326] and 23 Decemher 1954 (S/3335], and as it repeated through its representative at the 681th meeting of the Couneil, has decided to release the crew ofthe Bat Galim and to retum the ship's cargo to its owners, thereby helping to reduee the existing tension. That decision was taken as soon as the Egyptian judicial authorities had established that the accusations whioo had led to the detention ofthe ship were unfounded. 33. The Peruvian delegation is therefore confident that the two ICOuntries, in thejr wish to diminish international tension and to observe 'the truce strictly, will avoid any action or measure that might prevent the restoration ofa sound and durable peace in the Middle East, and that they will co-operate in any measure designed to restore a normal situation. 34. In this spirit the Peruvian delegation suggests-and hopes that its suggestion will he accepted by the meinbers of the Council and by both parties-that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervisory Organization, as the represcl!tative of the United Nations, should offer his services to the parties to arrange for the delivery of the cargo, the release of the vessel, and any other measure on which the parties mayagree. 35. Mt. ENTEZAM (Iran) (translt:tedfrom French): As a MW member of this Council, 1 do not wish to go into the details of a discussion much of which took place before Iran bccame a member of the ~urity Coùncil. 36. 1shall thereforeconfine myselfto noting with satisfaction the resutts achieved. We have learnt that the members of thecrew of the Bat Galim have been 'freed and happily restored to their homes in Israel. As to the ship .itself, if 1 understood the Egyptian representative correçtly when he spoke at the 687th meeting, he told us that bis Govemment was prepared to discuss with a subcommittee of the Mixed Armistice Commission the procedure for freeing the ship and its cargo. 37. In my delegation's veiw, the Mixed Armistice Commission is the organ best qualified to settle this case, both because it will aet for the Couneil and because the parties Will he represented on il. For that reason 1 consider this suggestion both wise and practical, and 1bave the bonour to support it on my ~legation'sbehalf.

As no ather memher of the CoUilCil wishes ta speak, 1 should like, in my capacity as representativc'ofNEW ZEt\LAND, to add my comments to those made by other delegations. 40. The Council received from the representative of Egypt a letter dated 23 Decemher 1954 [8/3335), in which it was stated that the Egyptian authorities were taldng the necessary steps to deliver the crew ofthe Bat Ga/im to the Israel authorities on 1January 1955. We have since been informed that the release bas, in fact, been eft'ected. The letter tùrther stated that the Egyptian Government was prepared to release both the ship and the cargo. 1would recall that the Chaïrman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had specified that the parties should seek agreement on this matter. This would, ofcourse, include àgreement on the manner ofreleaseofship and cargo. We strongly consider that the ship should he released as soon as possible and,. equally, that agreement should be reached without delay on the manner of release, in order that this incident may he terminated. 1hope that both parties will approach this question in a spirit of mutual accommodation. 41. 1tum DOW to the question ofbroad principle which underlies the specific complaint which we have been considering. Thore should be no roomleft for doubt as to the position of my delegation on the principles involved. 1 8JIl glad to note that previous speakers share this position. In the first place, the New Zealand Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance ot' ft'eedom of navigation in recognized international water- . ways, and speclfically in the Suez Canal. As Sir Pierson Dixon pointed out on 7 December last [686th meeting, para. 146),this is a vital principle not merely for his Government or mine but for the Commonwealth as a whole. Indeed, it is a vital matter for aIl nations. 42. In the second place, my· delegation, lite othon which bave spoken before me, regards the Council's resolution of 1 Septem.ber 1951 [8/2322] as in full force and eft'ect. We' have noted the statement by the late Mr. Azmi, on 14 October 1954, that: . • CI Egypt bas...observed absolute silence and bas refrained from any interference with vessels conveying goods to Israel orcoming from Israel ports and passing through the Suez Canal" [682nd meeting, para. 146]. " 45. The representative ofEgypt, it seems to me, seriously weakened his argument that Israel ships were excepted from this injunction by his own admission that .. the fust part of the sentence seems to have a general application" [686th meeting, para. 129]. He then further weakened his case, in my view, by relying on the exception in the second part of the paragraph relative to restrictions .. essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itse1f" as justifying, apparently, the complete exclusion of Israel ships [ibid., paras. 131 and 132]. 46. May 1 say, quite frank1y, that for Israel to set out deliberately to damage the Canal would be an act so patently against its own interests as to put the possibility beyond serious consideration. Let it be remembered that the Canal is not a private, but an international, waterway. An act of sabotage in the Canal would be an act not primarily against any one country but against the international maritime community as a whole. It would certainly merit, and bring about, appropriate international action. It cannot he said, however, that there exists a reasonable apprehension that such an act would be committed. There is no justification, th.erefore, for an Egyptian policy of exclusion against Isram ships desiring to pass through the Canal-a policy which we regard as entirely inconsistent with the intent of the 1951 resolution. 47. My delegation sincerely trusts that in the future all cargoes and ail ships, whatever their nationality and wherever they May he bound, will he permitted to pass through the Canal without let or hindrance. We trust also that a settlement of the Bat- Galim incident will he

Israel's viewpoint on the problem DOW under discussion has been expounded on Many occasions and is amply recorded in the proceedings of the Security Council and the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. .1 would therefore propose to submit Israel's case by way of brief summary rather than exhaustive review. 50. On 1 September 1951, the Security COUDcil recorded its decision calling for the termination by Egypt of ail interference with the passage of international commercial shipping tlù'ough the Suez Canal, with special reference to shipping bound to and from Israel [S/2322]. At the same time, the Security Council categorically denied the Egyptian c1aim to discriminate against Israel ships or cargoes on the grounds of belligerency, and asserted that the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement' far from sanctioning belligerent practices, as Egypt contended, actually required the total cessation of those practices. The importance of this resolution should be envisaged in the light of Article 25 of the Charter, under which the Security Council's decisions on matters affecting international peace and security have a special and unique force, being, indeed, obligatory on ail Member States by virtue of the latter's signature of the 'Charter. 51. The Egyptian Govemment, however, opposed the 195f decision and maintained in full force the system of decrees and regulations whereby the greater part of the traffic which would normally have flowed to and from Israel was effectively intimidated and deterred. The . deterrent effect of the Egyptian decrees was reinforced by the occasional'seizure and detention of ships bound for Israel, and sometimes, indeed, by the opening of fire on ships sailing or suspected of sailing to Israel ports. A black list of about 120 vessels, mostly oil tankers, was established. Those vessels have been penalized for having exercised their right of innocent passage through the Canal in order to trade with Israel. The maritime Powers of the world, including most of those which signed the Constantinople Conv~ntion, have repeatedly protested against these restrictions. 52. On '28 September 1954, the Israel merchant vessel Bat Galim, sailing from Massawa to Haifa, was seized by Egyptian authorities aCter having peacefully entered the • Sec ojj;cilll Records o/the Security Coullcil, Fourth Year, Special SlIpplemen No. 3. . ' . S3. The Security Couneil will recall that the charge of shooting on 28 September 1954 was the only cause adduœd by Egypt at that time to justify the seizure ofthe Bat Ga/lm or any interferenœ with its journey. On 14 October 1954 [68211d meeting], the representative of Egypt in the Security Couneil clearly implied that, but for this aUeged incident, there would have been no grounds for im~ng the voyage of the Bat Ga/lm. The Security Council was given evory reason to believe tbat, if the charges were exposed as unfounded, aU interference with or discrimination against the Bat Ga/lm would be brought to an end. 54. On 19 November 1954, the Mixed Armistice Commission ruled and decided, first, that the Bat Ga/lm had committed no violation of the General Armistice Agreement on 28 September 1954, as alleged in the Egyptian .oomplaint, and, secondly, that there was no valic:tity in the Egyptian doctrine that the enny of the Bat GaJim into the Suez Canal was equivalent to the enUy of an Israel vessel into Egyptian territorial waters. ss.. 1 pointed out during a previous Security Council meetiq (lSBtStIt nwtùtg] that this ruling, differendatins sharpIy between the Suez Canal,.on the onc band. and EaJptian territorial waters, on thc othcr, was of great juridical importance and was in full accord with estab1ished international doctrine. Territorial waters arc the n:aJm _of national sovereignty; the Suez Canal is the domain ofintemàtional law, and no siÎlgle· govemment bas a riaht to apply in that intematioDal watcrway the puticuIar sentiments or predilections underl>?nS its na1ioDal poIitical ideas. S6. Now, sinc:e the Mixed Armistice Commission bas ruled tbat the joumey of thc Bal Galim wu legitimate, ÙUlOCI:nt and peaœfuI, thore wa&, again, moral and logicaI RUOIl to expect that Egypt would facilitate the onwud joumey of the BIll Galim to Haifa-a joumey whida should never ba~ been impeded in the mt place. 51. The Egyptian Govenunent on 4 Deœmber 1954 witbd.rew, in ils own courts, the accusation of assault apiDst the crew of the BIll Galim. A subsequent charge tbat the crew of the Bat GtI1im bad trespassed in Egypt's taritorial waters wu also annulJed. Nothing now mnaincd, then, te>distinguish the rights ofthe Bat Galim fivm those betonging te) anyotber sbipe.xercisinSinnocent ,.,... in the Suez OmaL l'he particu1ar incident ofthe 1JIIt Gt1/im shouId therefore have·been assimiJated to the ..,ml priDcipIes of intemationa11aw applying to the 53. The crew of the Bat Galim was separated from its ship. The ship has been held and is still held apart from the control ofits master. Egypt has proclaimed a distinction, specifically rejected by the Security Council in 1951, and again rejected by a majority of the members of tHe Security Couneil at the beginning of 1954, between neutral and belligerent shipping. 59. It is clear from the Security Council resolution of 1951, and, indeed, from a11 intemational instruments affecting the Suez Canal, that the right of free passage belongs to the ships of all nations, to all ftags and to all cargoes, not merely to ships on which Egypt confers this facility at the behest of its own national policy. Free passage for any State is not a function of tbat State's relations with Egypt at any given time; it is an unconditionai intemational right which the coastal State may not modify, least ofall againsl.the express will ofthe Security Couneil and of other maritime nations. 60. The Government of Israel regards free passage in the Suez Canal as an important element of its welfare and security. It cannot in any degree renounce its full right to exercise innocent passage on a level ofequality with aU other nations. 61. On 1 January 1955, the crew of the Bat Galim, still separated from their ship, were brought to the frontier between Israel and Egyptian territory and sent to walk into Israel. The Govemment and people of Israel have had occasion to acclaim the courageous and honourable discharge by those men of their duty in the service of their country and, indeed, of the cause of maritime freedom and intemationallaw. The Egyptian Govemment, prior to 1 January 1955, bad addressed a letter to the ChiefofStaffofthe United Nations Truce Supervision Organization a5king for the co-operation and presence of United Nations observers at the transfer of the Bat Galim crew from Egyptian to Israel territory. The Çbief of Staff of the .United Nations Truce Organization correctIy declined to associate himself with a procedure opposed' to the principles of the Security Council's d~sion of 1951. The presence of United Nations observers at that scene might bave appeared 10 give sanction to the Egyptian refusai to allow the voyage of the Bat Galim, with its çrew' and cargo, to continue northward without hindrance. Thus, the absence of United Nations representatives from the frontier on llanuary' 1955 is a tangible "demonstration that the method proposed by Egypt to terminate the Bat Galim incident was not one that the United Nations cogld endors~ or condone. 63. The facts which 1 have enumerated-as dispassionately as 1can-prove, 1 think. a c1ear violation of Israel's international rights, of normal maritime practice, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. and ofthe Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951. 64. The present debate in the Security Council, together with that held early in 1954, has emphatically confirmed and clarified the jurisprudence of the United Nations on the question of Israel's right of free passage in the Suez Canal. The force of the 1951 resolution emerges considerably strengthened from this debate. Several points at issue have been emphasized and made c1ear. It has been made abundantly evident that freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal is a right wbich belongs to Israel shipping and cargoes, as well as to the sbipping and cargoes ofother ilatïons. ,65. In tbis spirit, the representative of the United States told the Security Council on 4 January 1955: "We cannot fail to state our view that Egyptian restrictions on ships passing through the Suez Canal, whether bound to or from Israel, or whether tIying the Israel or'some other tIag, are inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, contrary to the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, and a retrogression from the stated objectives to wbich both sides committOO themselves in signing the armistice agreement" [687th meeting, para. 68]. . . 66. In the same spirit, the representative of France said that there was no doubt in bis mind ·that "the exercise by one of the parties, on the high seas, of the right of visit, search and seizure of vessels of the other party, would constitute a serious breach of the armistice agreements " [ibid., para. S7). He went on to point out how the spirit of this doctrine applied also to seizure in the international waterway. 67. Another point which has been made abundantly . clear is that, in the view ofa majority of the members of the Security Council......the body qualified to interpret the general armistice agreements- -the practice of these restrictions is a·violation of those agreements. In that spirit, the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out; at thela~\Î, meeting of the Security Council. that the fact that the Government of Egypt had not yet secn its way to'complying fully withthe Council's resolutionof 1951 was not ooly regrettable; but even dangerous [687th meetb,g, para. 42). He went on to say that if the authority of the.Council were underminOO, "by the action cc In any case we cannot accept a breach of the Constantinople Convention, any more than we can pass over in silence the fact that a Security Couneil resolution is being ignored" [687th meeting, para. 81]. 70. In discussing the question of the Constantinople Convention, my Government is convinced that decisive weight must be attached not to the unilateral interpretation, however sincere, ofone ofthe interested parties, but to the volume, the consensus of opinion, of the majority of the extant governments wbich established and signed the Constantinople Convention. If the Government of Egypt, as has been reported, has recently, in an international treaty, reaffirmed its fidelity to the Constantinople Convention, !hen surely that means fidelity to the Convention as interpreted by a majority of its members, and not as interpreted in a dissident opinion by the Govemment of Egypt alone. 71. My Govemment expresses the earnest hope that this impressive volume of international opinion and jurisprudence will have a decisive effect on Egypt's attitude and will inft.uence that Government in favour of ' abolishing and eliminating these restrictions on the innocent passage of commercial sbipping of ail nations through the Suez Canal. 72. The weight of this international opinion is not completely comprehended by reference only to the past two meetings of the Security Council. This discussion ois in itself a continuation of a debate wbich had its origin a few months ago. From that discussion, in its early stages, there comes the recollection of the following view expressed by the representative of Denmark on 2S March 1954: cc In the view of my Government, the measures .decided upon by the Egyptian Government and the practice applied by it cannot be reconeiled with the armistice agreement, with the general rules of internationallaw conceming the freedom of navigation and commerce, with the Convention of 1888 respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, with the Security Couneil resolution of 1 September 1951, or, finally, with the Charter" [663rd meeting, para.l7j. 73. On 29 March 1954, the representative of Colombia expressed bis view as follows: cc The principle of international law which was -'reaffirmed in the Sccurity Council resolution of 77. In the light of these issues, my Government hopes that the Sccurity Couneil will decide to reaffirm its 1951 resolution and will continue to oppose any interference with or discrimination aga~st the ships or cargoes of any nation or fiag, including Israel. In so doing, the Sccurity Couneil would manifest its desire·to see peaceful relations emerge, on land and sea, between two neighbouring countries whose national collaboration could bring such abundant blessings to the tormented Middle East. 78. We have been encouraged by the messages of solidarity and support which have reached us from so Many maritime countries outside the Security Council. In our view, maritime nations everywhere will contribute to a solution of this problem by actually exercising the right of free passage to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. The juridica1 rights which have been established and confirmed can best he vindicated by their normal and çanstant exercise and by the cessation of obedience to Egypt's restrictions, which have been so emphatically rejected by the community ofnations. 79. Dy reaffirming its established policy in tbis matter, the Sccurity Couneil would be upholding rights which are of great moment to the security, the enterprise and the welfare ofail nations in the world community. 82. At the 687th meeting of the Councll. we stated that we had no objection to a sub-committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission discussing the question. This method is often employed to settle questions concerning ships seized by one or other party. Since this. which was put forward purely as a suggestion. bas not met with the reception 1expected. 1 shall not insist on it. My Govemment seen;t8 to have gone to the limit of conciliation to settle this problem. 83. With regard to the question of navigation in the Suez Canal. 1would remind the Councll that my Govemment bas recently confirmed. through the new agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom signed at Cairo on 19 October 1954. its intention to respect the provisions of the Convention of Constantinople of 29 October 1888. Tbus we too uphold the principle offree navigation in the Canal established by tbat Convention. My delegation cannot but regret, however. the existence of a disagreement between ourselves and the representatives of the great maritime Powers as.to the interpretation of this convention. 84. The representative of France made the following statement on 4 January 1955: ..In bis statements to the Security Council, the representative of Egypt based this position of the Egyptian Govemment on article X of the Constantinople Convention. Under that article. 'the provisions of articles IV, V, VII and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which [the Egyptian Govemment] might find it necessary to take for securing by lits] own forœs the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order'. "1 shall confine myselfto pointing out, as the French delegation has a1ready done in the Councll on several occasions, that in our view article XI of the .same Constantinople Convention seemsto us to seUle the question in a sense opposed to the Egyptian argument. Article XI, in fact, says: "Themeasurea which shall be taken in the cases provided for by articles IX and X ofthe present Treaty shall not' interfere with the Cree ~ of the Canal.' " The provisions to which1have referred contain no limitation on such free use U [687th meetlng,ptUos.53 to 5j]. 87. It is -true that, to uphold its contention, Egypt invokes articles IX and X of the Constantinople Convention. Under article lof the Convention, admittedly, the Canal" shall always he free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every'vessel of commerce or of war "; andunder article IV of the Convention "no right ofwar, no act ofhostility, nor any act having for its cbject to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall he committed in the Canal"; but articles IX and X of the Convention provide for exceptions. 88. Article IX provides that " the Egyptian Government shall; within the limits ofits powers..., take the necess~'ry measures for ensuring,olhe executiou' of the... treaty", andhence the securiîy'of the Canal. This article also stipulàtes that the provisions of articles IV, V, VII and VIII shall-not interfere with the measures which shan be taken in virtue of article IX. Article X provides for the same exception when the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order are at stake. 89. Consequently the Egyptian Government is entitled, in exceptional circumstances, to take measures prohibited -to other States to ensure its own security and tbat of the Canal. These exceptions have been provided for Egypt, the territorial sovereign. As the representative of France -has pointed out, article XI provides that such measures shall not interfere with the free use ofthe Canal. Although the text of the article seems to set no limîts on the free use'ofthe Canal, Egypt could not rc:asonably he required to permit the free use of the Canal by enemy shipping, sinee thesecurity of the Canal would be threatened together with· that of Egypt. Under the Convention of Constantinople. no formai obligation is imposed on Egypt to grant freepassage to enemy shipping. In view of the serio.us. ~nsequences it might.entail, such an obligation would have had to be expressly included in the Convention, which is not the case. In those circumstances, is Egypt not entitled to invoke the right of self-defence, since it fears that.the security of the Canal and its own security are endangered? 90. At the 686th meeting, on 7 December 1954, we gave examples· to illustrate this point. We pointed out that a mine could he laid and a ship deliberately sunk. This could he done, evenwithout the knowledge of the Israel Government,. by Israeli extremists or terrorists, who can eailly. infiltrateinto Egyptian territory and commit acts of espionage and sabotage. In the interests of the maritime'Powei's, we are anxious to prevent obstruction or damage to the Canai. 91. 1 regret that the New Zealand representative does not share our view$oll tins matter and, above aU, our apprehensions. ·Details were recently given in the Press of an accident wbichoccurred on 31. DecéJilber'1954 and which delayed traflic in the Canal for several days. _It 92. In our view, therefore, Egypt has not violated the CoID.vention ofConstantinople, which regulates navigation in the Suez Canal. It is difficult to maintain that in observing the Constantinople Convention we are violating the spirit of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 and even the resolution adopted by the Security Counci1 on 1 September 1951 (S/2322]. Paragraph 10 ofthat resolution caUs upon Egypt "to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that eSSential to the safety clf shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the inteinational conventions in force ". 93. 1do not think it will serve any purpose to explain our position, which is known to all, at any greater length. 1 must, .however, make one more observation. 94. In his statement on 4 January (687th meeting], the representative of Brazil spoke of an error committed, of the deprivation of liberty suffered by the members of the crew, ofmaterial damage, and ofthe nght ofblockade.I would remind the Brazilian representative that our attitude on the Bat Ga/im question is in sharp contrast with that adopted by Israel in the similar situations which we described at the 686th meeting, on 7 December 1954. As to the term "blockade", 1 hàve already expJained in a previous statement that this has a vel'Y, definite meaning in internationallaw; that Egypt has neverblockaded, the ~uez Canal; and that no one is seeking to cut all.Israel's sea col1ll11unications, which would he the case if any sort of blockade were imposed. It is plain that the Brazilian representative, who speaks for a coûntry with which we enjoy friendly relations, has appraised the Bat Ga/im case separately from the Palestine problem, even though he expressed the desire tofin~ a final solution to the Palestine ~uestion. . 95. 1should also ~ke te make an observation with regard to the statementjust mad.e by th~ Israel representative. He mmntained that the Mixed Armistice CommisSion had found against Egypt on this matter. But the Mixeci Annistice.Commiss.ion d~laredjtself inçqmpetent'in the case. 1have no intention ofreading aU the deçisions which appear in the report, but will merely quote the paragraph which states: .. However, in the present instance the SS Bat Galim was bound for the Suez Canal. But the Security Counci1 is seized ofa compIaint by Israel concerning this general question, which is outside the competence ofthis Mixee! Armistice Commission" (S/3323, para. 24]. 97. During this discussion we have taken a conciliatory attitude. We have done our utmost to co..:>perate with the Security Council in order to find a suitable solution to this problem. We propose to continue doing so. We shall always strive after tolerance. We shaU maintain"the same attitude in so far as our security and that of the Canal permit. 98. The J:lRESIDENT: The debate on this item appears to be exhausted, Since that is the case, and sinee there is no draft resolution before the Couneil, 1 think it might be useful for me as President to smn up the general trend of the discussion before we adjoum. 99. In addition to the statements of the parties, we have heard statements from eight members of the Council. Although not aU members of the Couneil have spoken, and although it must be recognized that the' representative of Iran has limited himselfto the Bat Galim incident, it is evident that most representatives bere regard the resolutionof 1 September 1951 as having continuing va1i~ty and eft'ect, and it is in this context and that ofthe Constantinople Convention that they have considcred the Bat Galim case. 100. In so far as steps have been taken by Egypt towards a settlement...;...for example, the release ofthe crew and the announcement by the Egyptian Govemment of its willingness to release the cargo and the ship itself-these steps have been welcomed by representâtives round this table. Hope has been expressed mat a continued attitude of conciliation on both sides will speedily bring about an agreement on the arrangements for the retease ofthe ship and the cargo. lOI. It has been suggested by the representative of Peru that, if this is desired by the parties, the Chief of Staff ofthe Truce Supervision Organization might bè prepared to extend bis good offices to expedite the conclusion of loch arrangements. 1 have no doubt that, if requested by the parties, he would be prepared to do this. 102. On this note ofhope and expectation, 1 propose to adjoum ti'-lÎS meeting of the Couneil. The meetbtg rose at 5./5 p.m. FINLAND - kauppa, 2 Kesku,katu. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE : H. A. Goddard Pty" Ltd.. 2550 George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N. 3 (Victoria). FRANCE; Editions Pnris V'. GERMANY - Blwert 8< Scbllneberg. W. E. Saarbacb, handel, Gereonslrasse. Alexander AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE : Gerold & Co., I. Graben 3t, Wien I. B. WUllerstorff, Book Import and Subscription Asency, Mnrkus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. BELGIUM - BELGIQUE : Agenee et Mcssageries de la Presse S. A.• 14-22 rue du Persil, BruxeUes. W. H. 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