S/PV.693 Security Council

I wish to thank the President most sincerely for his kind remarks about me; but I feel that I do not yet deserve them. Again, I thank him. 13. M. DE FREITAS-YALLE (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne manquerai pas de transmettre h mOh predeeesseur et vieil ami, M. Leme, les souhaits du President et des membres du Conseil, et je leur ell suis profondement reconnaissant.

I shall not fail to convey to my predecessor and old friend, Mr. Leme, the farewell greetings which the President and the members of the Council send to him, for which I am deeply grateful. 14. Les paroles si aimables avec lesquelles notre President m'a accueilli au Conseil de securite, au nom de tous les membres, me rendent confus. S'il a tant loue des qualites que je ne posserle pas, c'est parce qu'il se souvient des etroites relations que nous avons eues jadis, alors que nous travaillions pour les Nations Unies, relati JOS qui ont fait naitre en moi une amitie sincere a l'egard du President et de certains autres coUegues que je me rejouis de voir autour de cette table. 14. I am overwhelmed by the very kind words which our President has spoken on behalf of all the members in welcoming me to the Security Council. The President could have gone so far in expressing praise of qualities which I do not have only because of the old association we had while working for the United Nations, an association wh;ch has created in my heart sincere friendslLp towar~iI him and towards some other friends whom I aO'. happy to see around this table. 15. Je me souviens tres bien de cette soiree ou, il y a de cela neuf ans, nous nous sommes reunis pour la premiere fois a Londres. Le monde entier attendait de ces ooze hommes qu'ils fassent un miracle en etablissant cette paix durable que souhaite tout etre humain. fis n'ont pt! accomplir ce miracle. Mais ils ont commence le bon combat, et c'est la meme foi qui nous unit aujourd'hui dans cette enceinte. 15. I very well remember the evening nine years ago when we met for the first time in London. All the world was awaiting from those eleven ment he miracle of establishing the enduring peace for which every human being hopes. The miracle could not be accomplished. But the good fight was then begun, and the same -faith unites us here. Adoption of the agenda The Palestine question (a) Complaint by Egypt eoneeroiq : Violent and pftmeditated aggression eommitted on 28 Fehruary 1955 by Israel armed 10_ against EBYPtian armed fOree8 inside Egyptian-eontrolled territory near G.... eawling many euuaJ:'ies, including 39 dead and 32 wounded, and the destrut:tion 01 certain military instal. latiom, in violation 01, inter Alia, artiele I, parapaph 2, and article 11, paragraph 2, of die EBYPtian.Israeli General Armiatiee ~ment (S/3365, S/3367, S/3373); (It) Complaint by IlIrael 01 eontinuoUB nolatioUB by Egypt 01 the General Armistice Agreement and 01 resolutions 01 the Seeurlty Council, to the clanpr 01 international peaee and seeurity, by meaDS 01: (i) attaeks 01 regular and irregular Emtian anned 10_ against Israel armed foreeo; (ii) as..nlh of raiders from Egyptian·eontrolled territory on lives and property in larael; (ill) failure of the sovemment of Ep."pt to adopt and enforce ell'eetive measures asainst sueh aeh of violence; (iv) assertion by Emt of the exiatenee ola state of war and the esercise of aetive bellisereney asainst Israel, partieularly the maintenance and enforcement of ltlookade measures; (v) warlike propaganda and threats against the territorial intesrity and politieal independence of Israel; (vi) ftfusal of Emt to _k qreement by netJ0. tiations for an ell'eetive transition from the Pl'ellMlt armistice io peace (S/3368, S/3373).

As representatives will recall, it was decided at the 692nd meeting of the Council, on 4 March 1955, that General Burns, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, should be invited to report, if possible, in person on the item which we are considering now. General Burns arrived in New York two days ago and is ready to present his report.

For reasons beyond my control I was unable to attend the meeting of the Security Council on 4 March. 19. I therefore hope I may be permitted to use this opportunity by making a brief preliminary statement, as other members of the Council did at the preceding meeting, explaining the attitude of the USSR delegation towards the complaint submitted to the Council by the Egyptian representative. Adoption de I'ordre du jour La question de Palestine a) Plainte de l'EsYpte, ao .ujet de I Apession violente et premeditee eommise le 28 lemer 1955 par la fo_ ~etI isnelieanes eontre les 10..- lIl'IMes esYPtiennes a l'inUirieur du territ@fi MWI eontnlle ~tieu prea de G.... ayant eaWMl de nombreuaea netimes dont 39 morts et 32 bleues, ainsi que la destruet!9n cle certaines installations militaires, et eela en violation notamment de I'article premier. parasraphe 2, et de I'artiele 11. p&I'll8illphe 2, cle la Convention d'armistiee Seneral esYPio.israBieune (S/3365, S/3367, S/3373) ; b) Plainte cI'Israel eontre l'tsYI'te, au sujet de violaltioWl repet_ de la Convention d'armistiee Senew et cia riaolotioWl dn Couaeil de seeuriUi, violatioWl qui mettent en peril la pm et la seeunte intemationalea, do lait : i) d'attaqaee de troupes esYptiennes resuneres et irri(IuIieres eontre la troupes israe. Iiennes; ii) de raids deetues, a partir du territoire sous eontrile esYPtien. eontre des personnes et des biens lie troavaot en temtoire israQien; ill) de I'attitude du Gouvemement esYPtien, qui n'adopte ni ne fait respeeter de mesures ef6eaees eontre la aetes de violenee de cette nature; iv) de l'afIir. mation par I'~pte de l'eDatenee d'un eblt de perre, eomme de la politique de belliseranlle aetive suivie par ee pays eontre Israel, notamment le maintieu et I'exkution de mesl!re& de bloous; v) de la propagande belIiqaeulIe et des menaces eontre I'integrite territoriale et 1'~ndEpendanee politiqae d'I_et ; vi) do refUB par I'~pte de reehereher, par voie de D~tiOn, un aeeord en vue !l'un pa88lI8e ell'eetif de I'armistice aetuel a I'etat de pah (S/3368, S/3373). Sur /'invitation du President, M. £outfi, representant de l'Egypte, et M. Eban, representant d'[srael, prennent place ala table du Conseil. 17. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Les membres du Conseil se souviendront qu'1 la 692e seance du Conseil de securite, le 4 mars 1955, il avait ete decide d'inviter le general Burns, Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine, a pre- senter un rapport, si possible en personne. sur la question que nous examinons en ce moment. Le general Burns est arrive 1 New-York it y a deux jours, et il est pret apre- senter son rapport. Sur l'invitation du President, le general Burns, Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine, prend place a la table du Conseil. 18. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad14it du T/USse): Pour des raisons inde- pendantes de ma volonte, j'ai ete empSche d'assister 1 la seance du Conseil de securite qui s'est tenue le 4 mars. 19. Puisque la parole vient de m'etre accordee, fen profiterai pour exposer brievement et atitre preliminaire, comme ront fait ala seance pr6c6c:lente d'autres membres du Conseil, la position de la delegation de l'Union sovi6- tique en ce qui concerne la plainte dont le representant de l'Egypte a saisi le Conseil. 22. The Soviet delegation expresses its sympathy to the Government and people of Egypt in connexion ,~'ith the Gaza incident and the resulting loss of life. At the same time, the Soviet delegation is bound to point out that the Israel representative's comments on the tension prevailing in this area cannot be disregarded. The facts indicate that this tension results from the policy of certain States, inasmuch as these States pursue a policy in the Near and Middle East not of strengthening peace and cementing friendly relations among the countries in that area, but of forming military blocs, which is bound to create a threat to the national independence and security of those countries. 23. That is all I shall say at the present stage, but I reserve my right to speak on the substance ofthe Egyptian complaint after I have studied the report of the represen- tative of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the state- ments of the representatives of Egypt and Israel.

I take pleasure in introducing to the members of the Security Council General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who will now present his report. 25. General BURNS (Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization): I have the honour to submit the following report, in accordance with the Security Council's invitation. General Burns read document Sj3373.

I wish to thank the President for calling on me to explain to the Council the complaint by Egypt which appears on the agenda. 27. Before be"8inning my statement, I wish to reserve the right to comment at a later meeting on General Burns' detailed report, which covers more than the question we are discussing today and calls for detailed study. 28. I wish to thank those members of the Council who have extended their sympathy to Egypt and expressed deep concern at Israel's aggression. 29. Egypt's complaint reads as follows: "Violent and premeditated aggression committed on 28 February 1955 by Israel armed forces against Egyptian armed forces inside Egyptian-controlled 24. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'anglais): J'ai le plaisir de presenter aux membres du Conseil de securite le general E. L. M. Bums, Chef d'etat-major de I'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve, qui va presenter son rapport. 25. Le general BURNS (Chef d'etat-major de I'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil de securite le rapport qu'il m'a demande. Le general Burns donne lecture du document S/3373. 26. M. LOUTFI (Egypte): Je remercie le President d'avoir bien voulu me donner la parole pour exposer au Conseilla plainte de l'Egypte qui a ete inscrite aI'ordre dujour. 27. Avant de commencer mon expose, je voudrais me reserver le droit de commenter - et ce a une autre seance - le rapport detaille du general Burns, qui ne se rapporte pas uniquement ala question que nollS discutons aujourd'hui et qui exige une etude approfondie. 28. Je voudrais remercier les membres du Conseil qui ont pris la parole pour cxprimer leur syrnpathie al'egard de I'Egypte et manifester leurs vives preoccupations du fait de l'agression ;sraelienne. 29. La plainte de l'Egypte est con~ue en ces termes: «Agression violente et premeditee commise le 28 fevrier 1955 par les forces armees israeliennes contre les forces armees egyptiennes aI'interieur du territoire 30. This aggression was of an exceptional kind and has engendered acute feeling and aroused general indignation. It is likely to have serilJus and nu-reaching repercussions whose magnit\~de has not escared the Council. 31. At a1".'\11 8.30 r.m. on 28 February 1955, an armed Ismel detachment \.If an estimated strength of two sl.'Ctions ~n'ssC\i the demarcation line east of Gilza and advanced ahout three kilometres into Egyptian-controlled territory to the site ofan Egyptian military call1p. The Israel armed fon.'Cs were in three colulllns. The first column advanced along the main Gaza road and the second across :lIt orange plantation: the third moved round the railway station. The three l.'Olumns surrounded the Egyptian camp and breached the harbed wire in several plal.'Cs with b.·mgalore torpedoes. They attacked the camp. using light m:tchine-guns. grenades, incendiary bombs and rockets. They detonated a huge explosive charge. completely destroying the huilding housing a water motor pump. The Israel forces also attacked the station building and wQunded the SQn Qf one of the employees. At the same time, 6 kilometres to the south-east of Gaza, another ~up using grenades and light machinenguns attacked a lorry which carried a lieutenant and 34 soldiers. This ambush cost the lives of 22 soldiers and caused serious damage to the lorry. After this attack the Israel awessors \\;thdrew. 3~. The attack, which lasted three hours, resulted in the death of one officer. 35 soldiers. one civilian and onc seven-\Tear-old child. A lieutenant. 28 soldiers, one ci\;lian and one child of nine were wounded. The military cunp buildings and the water motor pump building Vi'ere destroyed. 33. Wl'.en they withdrew. Lie Israel aggressors left behind the following arms and equipment: some hand grenades Viith Israel markings, two magazines for Browning guns loaded Viith Israel bullets. some bangalore torpedoes (found near the barbed wire fence), some une.~oded Israel ammunition and cartridges. and some rocket fra£IIlents. A sack containinl! about 40 kilogrammf'; Of explosives was also found ;t the scene of the incident. Tracks of Israel soldiers leading in both directions across the demarcation line were discovered. 34. The facts I have just presented are pertinent and DeOd no oomment. This act of aggression, commifi'ed in the manner I have described, waz characterized by an arrocity and a repulsive savagery from which world public opinion c:annot but recoil. The indignation aroused by this aggression is heightened by two attendant elements; premeditation, and the use of a complete armoury of weapons of viOO:1lt destruction. :l0. Cette agression, qui revet un caractere exceptionnel, a provoque une vive emotion et a souleve I'indignation generalc. Elle est susceptible d'entrainer des repercussions graves et lointaines dont I'importance n'a point echappe au Conseil. 31. Dans la nuit du 28 fevrier 1955, vers 20 h. 30, un de.achement israelien en armes, dont I'effectif a ISte evalue a deux sections, a franchi la ligne de demarcation a rest de Gaza et a penetre d 'cnviron trois kilometres en territ(lire place sous I'autorite de I'Egypte, jusqu'a I'emplacement d'un camp mititaire egyptien. Les forces armees israelicnnes ctaient divisces en trois colonnes. La premiere s'est avancee sur la route principale de Gaza. la seconde s'est avancee a travers une orangcrie, et la troisieme a contourne la gare du chemin de fer. Les trois colonnes ont encercle le camp egyptien et ont fait plusieurs breches dans les Iigne~ de fils de fer barbeles en utitisant des bengalores. ElIes ont attaque le camp au moyen de mitraillettes, de grenades, de bombes incendiaires et de fusees. En faisant detoner une forte charge explosive, elles ont detruit complc~tement la station de pompage. Lcs forces israeliennes ont egalement attaque le biitiment de la gare, blessant le fils d'un des agents. En meme temps, a6 kilometres au sud-est de Gaza, un autre detachement a aUaque un camion transportant un lieutenant et 34 soldats, en utitisant des grenades et des mitraillettes. Vingt-deux soldats ont trouve la mort dans cette embuscade, et le camion a subi de graves degats. A la suite de cette aUaque, les agresseurs israeliens ont rebrousse chemin. 32. L'attaque, qL: a dure trois heures, a cause la mort d'un officier, de 35 soldats, d'un civil et d'un enfant de 7 ans. Un lieutenant, 28 soldats, un civil et un enfant de 9 ans ont ete blesses. Les batiments du camp mititaire et la stdtion de pompage ont ete detruits. 33. Les agresseurs israeliens, en se retirant, ont laisse derriere eux tes armes et le materie! suivants: un lot de grenades a main israeliennes, deux chargeurs de fusHmitrail!eur Browning pleins de balles israeliennes, des bengalores trouves a proximite du reseau de barbeles, un lot de munitions israeliennes non explosees et de cartouches israeliennes, ainsi que des fragments de fusees. Un sac contenant pres de 40 kilogrammes de matieres explosives a ete egalement trouve sur tes Heux de I'incident. On a retrouve des traces de passage de militaires israeliens alIant dans les deux directions atravel'S la ligne de demarcation. 34. Les faits que je viens de vous soumettre sont pertinents et se passent de commentaires. Cette agression, perpetree dans les circonstances que je viens de relateI', revet un caractere d'atrocite et d'odieuse sauvagerie qui ne peut que revolter I'opinion publique mondiale. La conjonction de deux elements qui ont accompagne cette agression ajoute au sentiment d'indignation qu'elIe inspire: premeditation et mise en reuvre de tout un appareil de destruction violente. 36. This region of Gaza, which but yesterday was peaceful, has been plunged into turmoil by the most horrible aggression ever known, and is seething with a reaction of indignation and horror to the atrocity of this act of war. This region, where thousands of refugees were peacefully going about their work, was transformed overnight by the Israel aggression into a place of desolation and mourning. The situation is given added poignancy by the fact that these thousands of refugees, who were driven from their homes by Israel and who were already leading a precarious and miserable existence, are among the victims of this outbreak of violence. Not even the water pump station, which the refugees in this region need so badly, was spared. It was as though Israel, by committing an act of war in this region thronged with refugees, was deliberately seeking to persecute these unfortunates and increase their sufferings. 36. Cette region de Gaza, qui hier encore etait paisible, se trouve, par le fait de la plus odieuse agression qui ait jamais ete enregistree, en pleine effervescence, sous le contre-coup de I'indignation et de I'horreur inspirees par 1'atrocite de cet aete de guerre. Cette region, OU des milliers de refugies vaquaient paisiblement a leurs travaux, s'est trouvee, du jour au lendemain, par le fait de I'agression israelienne, transformee en lieu de desolation et de deuil. Ce qui rend la situation plus poignante, ce sont ces milliers de refugies chasses de leur foyer par l'arbitraire d'IsratH et qui menent deja une vie precaire et miserable, qui se trouvent parmi les victimes de ce debordement de violence. Meme la station de pompage, si neeessaire aux refugies dans cette region, n'a pas ete epargnee. On dirait qu'!srael, en perpetrant cet acte de guerre dans cette region ou sont masses les refugies, a voulu encore deliberement s'acharner sur ces malheureux et aggraver leur misere. 37. As the New Zealand representative stated on 4 March 1955: .. .., the incident took place in an area where the United Nations has a special responsibility in regard to Arab refugee camps. The unfortunate riots which occurred in these camps are directly attributable to passions inflamed by this incident" [692nd meeting, para. 39]. 37. Comme l'a declare le representant de la Nouvelle- Zc51ande le 4 mars 1955: « '" 1'incident s'est produit dans une zone oil l'Organisation des Nations Unies assume une responsabilite speciale a cause des camps de refugies arabes. Les emeutes qui ont malheureusement eclate dans ces camps sont directement attribuables aux passions attisees par cet incident» [69.ze seance, par. 39]. 38. This act of war committed in the Gaza area is the latest of the already long series of systematic acts of aggression committed by Israel against the Arabs. The names of Qibya, Nahhalin and now Gaza will for long be particularly remembered in history as living examples of crimes committed against the elementary principles of humanity and justice. This latest aggression is certainly the most serious of Israel's violations of the provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949.1 This new act 38. Cet acte de guerre perpc5tre dans la region de Gaza s'insere d'ailleurs dans la serie deja longue d'actes systematiques d'agression commis par Israel contre les Arabes. L'histoire retiendra longtemps et particulierement les noms de Qibya, de Nahhalin, et, dernierement, celui de Gaza, comme autant d'exemples vivants de crimes commis contre les principes elementaires d'humanite et de justice. Cette derniere agression constitue certainement la plus grave des violations par Israe1 des dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general conclue a Rhodes le 24 fevrier 1949 entre l'Egypte et IsraelI. Ce nouvel acte de guerre israe~ien suffit par lui-meme a indiquer elairement qu'Israel persiste a se livrer a des agressions sauvages contre les pays arabes et, partant, a ne pas respecter les conventions d'armistic.e conclues avec ces pays. <>f aggression by Israel is itself a clear indication that Israel is persisting in its savage aggressions against the Arab countries, and hence in its failure to respect the armistice agreements concluded with those countries. I 39. With coolness and self-control, the Egyptian authorities placed the matter before the Mixed Armistice Commission as soon as they had been informed of this act of aggression, thus appealing to the body established to deal with violations of the General Armistice Agreement. We have noted with satisfaction that this attitude of our Government has been appreciated by world public opinion and favourably commented upon by the members of the Security Council. 39. Les autorites egyptiennes, des qu'elles eurent connaissance de cette agression, faisant preuve de sangfroid et de maitrise, ont saisi immediatement la Commission mixte d'armistice de la question, recourant ainsi a I'organisme qui a ete cree pour connaitre des violations de la Convention d'armistice general. Nous avons constate avec satisfaction que cette attitude de notre gouvernement a ete appreciee par I'opinion publique mondiale et commentee favorablement par les membres du Conseil de securite. I ~ 1 See Official Rec(ll'ds ofthe Security Council, Fourth Year, Special 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sleuritl, quatriiml Supplement No. 3. annee, Supplement special nO 3. 41. I should nevertheless like lo draw attention to the summary of the nl1tin evidence proving this aggression, tt' be found at the cnd of the report prepared by Major Rosenius of the Swedish army. Captain Muller of the Danish army and Captain Hue of the Belgian army. With your permissit'". 1 will read it: SUMMARY OF MAIN EVIDENCE \. ATTACK AGAINST MILITARY CAMP ~a.) RtSNlt df rhe attack I E&1'ptian captain and 13 soldiers killed, 15 soldiers wounded, 2 chi\ians killed {l'ne of them a sevcn-year-old boy), I civilian wounded; 1 military stone building blown up; 1 ro~'TCte pump house blown up: .. Ni~~n hu~ with brick walls blown up. (b) lrtms fimrtd at rh, romp o",i alOTtg rht trach to tit, demo,.. Mff,'1t liM S \Inexploded banplore torpedoes with Israel markinp: 9 u1te.'J)loded Mills hand grenades with Israel markings; 3 une.xplodeJ bazooka projectiles 73 mm with Israel markinp; 2 ram of bazooka ",ro.i«til~ with Israel markings; 5 TNT Nocl..-s "ith attached detonator of about I lb. each; I sad; "ith TNT: 1 Browning light machine-gun "ith Israel markinp; 4 light machine-gun magazines: .. Sten gun masazines: 1 bl~' jacket containing a purse with Ismei money; SC\-eral empty ammunition packages "ith Israel letters; Mam' Israel cartridges with Israel l1llU'!tings; 1 tOTd\ \\ith batteries "ith Israel letters. (c) 1hJck.~ Tracks of at least SO persons with heavy boots, crossing the demarcation line from IsraeL leading to the spot of the attack and back again to Israel. 2. ATTAC% AG."lNST A MIUTA1\Y TllUCK (a) kswlt of eN attod 22 soldiers killed: 13 soldie:'s wounded (including I lieutenant): 1 EcYptian r:rock dcstro)'Cd. (0) 1¥:m1 jOJlNi on r1Je spor of the i~UkllJ 1 Mills hand grenade with Israel markings; 1 ~ ba200ka projectile 73 mm with Israel markings; Some small items with Israel letters. (e) Trarks Tt1IIIXs of about IS persons with boots, aossing the demarcation 1iDe from Israd, leading to the spot of the attack and back again iD 1f;ratl {S,J37J, Q1I1teX I, sect. DJ. 42. This summary of the main evidence set fJrth by the oboservers in their admirable report emphasizes the resu..lts of the at:tack against the military camp and the military truck, as well as the on-the-spot check which 41. Je voudrais toutefois attirer l'attention sur le resume des principales preuves etablissant cette agression. resume qui eonclut le rapport qui a ettS dresstS par le commandant Rosenius, de I'armee suedoise, le capitaine Muller, de l'armee danoise, et le eapitaine Hue, de I'armee beIge. Je m'en excuse, mais je erois utile d'en donner iecture: RESUME DES PRINCIPAUX ELEMENTS DE PREUVE I. - ATTAQUE CONTRE LE CAMP MlLITAIRF. a) Resultat ,ie l'attaque I capitaine et 13 soldats egyptiens tues, IS soldats blesses, 2 civils tu~~ (dont un ga~on de 7 ans), t civil blesse; 1 blltiment miElaire, en pierre, detruit par explosion; I hangar a pompe, en ciment, detruit par explosion; 4 baraques Nissen, avec murs en brique, detruites par explosion. b) Objtts frOUI'€.f da"s le camp d le long des traces It la IIgne de demarcation S bengalores non eltploses, portant des marques israelicnnes; 9 grenades a main MiDs, non explosees, portant des marques israeliennes; 3 projectiles de 73 mm pour bazooka, non exploses, portant de.~ marques israeliennes; 2 morceaux de projectiles pour bazooka, portant des marques israeliennes; S blocs de TNT avec detonateur, pesant chacun I livre environ; I sac conter-ant du TNT; I fusil-mitraiUeur Browning, portant des marques israelienne.~; 4 chargeurs de fusil-mitrailleur; 4 chargeurs de pistolet-mitrailleur Sten; I veste tachee de sang, contenant un porte-monnaie et de l'argent israelien; Plusieurs paquets de munitions, vides, portant des inscriptions israeliennes; Plusieurs cartouchea israeliennes, portant des marques israeliennes I lampe de poche dont les piles portent des inscriptions israeliennes. c) Traces du passage Traces du passage d'au moins SO personnes, challssees de brodequins, qui ont traverse la ligne de demarcation en venant d'!srael pour se rendre au lieu de I'attaque et qui sont retournees en Israel. 2. - ATIAQUB CONTRE UN CA....ION MIUTAlRB a) Resultat tU fattoque 22 soldats tues; 13 soldats blesses (12 soldats et I lieutenant); I camion egyptien dCtruit. b) Objets tramls sur le lieu de I'incident I grenade a\ main 'Mills, portant des marques israiliennes; I projectile de 73 mm pour bazooka, non explose, portant d~ marques israeliennes; Divers petits objets portant des inscriptions israeliennes. c) Traas du passage Traces du passage d'environ IS personnes, chaussCes de brodequins, qui ont traverse la lignc de demarcation en venant d'lsrael pour se rendre au lieu de l'attaque et qui sont retoumees en Israel [S/3373, annexe I, sect. DJ. 42. Ce resume des principales preuves, dresse par les observateu!S dans leur remarquable rapport, a mis l'accent sur les resultats de l'attaque eontre le camp militaire et contre le camion militaire, ainsi que sur le 44. Je voudrais seulement faire observer que ceUe resolution, qui a entcrine le rapport des observateurs des Nations Unies qui ont procooe a I'enquete. a. en condamnant Israel, retenu notamment que cette attaque avait ete con~ue et preparee par les autorites israeliennes et executee par les forces armees regulieres israeliennes contre les forces armees egyptiennes. De plus, cette agression brutale - pour employer les termes utilises dans la resolution adoptee par la Commission mixte d'armistice - a ete consideree par la Commission comme ul)e violation flagrante de la Convention d'armistice general signee aRhodes le 24 fevrier 1949. 44. I would simply point out that this resolution, which confirms the report of the United Nations observers who carried out an investigation, condemns Israel and emphasizes, in particular, that this atta~k was prearranged and planned by Israel authorities and committed by Israel regular army forces against the Egyptian regular army force. Moreover, this brutal aggression-to use the wo.·ds in the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission-was considered by the Commission to be a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949. 45. At the same meeting, the Israel delegation, in order to create confusion, as usual tried to assert that this Israel military action had been carried out only in selfdefence, because the Egyptians had ambushed an Israel patrol on Israel territory. However, the Mixed Armistice Commission rejected this Israel complaint and the Chairman of the Commission stated that the report of the United Nations observers had not established that hostilities had taken place in this area; he added that he could not consider the attack against the Gaza military camp to be a result of a pursuit of Egyptian forces by Israel patrols [S13373, annex Ill]. 45. A la meme seance, la deIegation d'Israel a essaye, comme d'habitude, dans le but de troubler les esprits, de faire croire que cette action militaire israeIienne n'a ete lancee que par legitime defense, etant donne que les Egyptiens avaient tendu ane embuscade en territoire israeIien aune patrouille israeIienne. Mais la Commission mixte d'armistice a rejete cette plainte israeIienne et, a cette occasion, le President de la Commission a declare que le rapport des observateurs des Nations Unies n'avait pas etabli qu'it y avait eu un combat dans cette region; it a ajoute qu'it ne pouvait considerer l'attaque dirigee contre le camp militaire de Gaza comme la consequence d'une poursuite des forces egyptiennes par des patrouilles israeIiennes [S13373, annexe Ill]. 46. Israel a interjete appel contre la decision de la Commission mixte d'armistice aupres du Comite special, conformement d'ailleurs al'article X, paragraphe 4, de la Convention d'armistice general, qui dispose: « En ce qui concerne les questions de principe, it pourra etre interjete appel aupres d'un comite sp6cial.» 46. Israel appealed to the Special Committee against the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in accordance with 8.rticle X, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement, which provides: "On questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a special committee." 47. Si vous exarninez cet appel d'Israel, vous trouvez qu'it voulait, notamment, que le terme « agression brutale » soit supprime. Pour Israel, en dIet, cet acte de guerre commis contre les forces egyptiennes ne peut pas etre quaIifie de brutal. Israel trouvait aussi deplace qu'on ait pu parler d'une enorme quantite d'explosifs lorsqu'il s'agissait, a son avis, seulement de 120 kilogrammes d'explosifs. Cela demontre, encore une fois, l'esprit agressif d'Israel, et cela montre la legerete avec laquelle Israel apprecie les aetes tragiques de violence auxquels it ne cesse de se livrer. Israel trouvait aussi qu'il n'etait pas juste que la Commission mixte d'armistice considere, comme eUe l'a fait au paragraphe 6 de sa resolution, la situation serieuse qui regne actuellement dans la region de Gaza comme resultant de !'attaque d'IsraeI. En effet, Israel soutenait gratuitement qu'une situation serieuse existait aGaza avant cette demiere agression. Le Comite special a enterine, sur ce point, la d6cision de la Commission mixte d'armistice. 47. If you examine this Israel appeal, you will find that it requested the deletion of the words "brutal aggression ". Israel does not feel that this warlike act committed against Egyptian forces can be described as brutal. Israel also objected to the reference to a huge amount of explosives, maintaining that only 120 kilogrammes of explosives were used. That illustrates once again Israel's aggressive attitude. and shows the levity with which Israel regards the tragic acts of violence which it continually perpetrates. Israel also felt that the Mixed Armistice Commission was unfair in holding, as it did in paragraph 6 of its resolution, that the present serious situation in the Gaza area was the result of the Israel attack. Israel gratuitously asserted that the situation at Gaza had been serious before this last act of aggression. The Special Committee confirmed the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter. 48. Le Comite special a tenu une seance le II mars 1955, sous la presidence du general Bums; il a confirme acette 48. The Special Committee held a meeting on 11 March 1955, with General Burns in the chair, and confirmed the 50. My delegation would here like to stress a very important point: that this criminal aggression was committed by the regular armed forces of Israel. In our opinion that point is of capital importance. The use of regular Israel armed forces has always been a feature of the Israel aggressions, which must therefore have been organized and prepared by the responsible leaders of the Israel Government. 51. That is what happened, in particular, on 11 August 1950, when the Israel authorities, in expelling the Azazme Bedouins from the Negev and the demilitarized zone of El Auja, carried out a large-scale military operation, using troops, mechanized armaments and armoured vehicles and even a reconnaissance aircraft. The Mixed Armistice Commission, and also the Special Committee, condemned Israel for that aggression and asked that the Bedouins should be repatriated. 52. You must also remember the aggression committed by Israel on the Syrian frontier near El Hamma, which was condemned by the Security Council resolution of 18 May 1951, adopted at the Council's 547th meeting [S/2157J. In particular, the Council held that the Israel action conducted by the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951 constituted" a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 January 1948 and [wasJ inconsistent with the terms ofthe armistice agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter by all States Members ". 53. Similarly, on 28 and 29 January 1953, Israel armed forces estimated at between 120 and ]50 men, using 2-inch and 3-inch mortars, bangalore torpedoes, machineguns, grenades and small arms, crossed the demarcation line between Jordan and Israel and attacked the villages of Falameh and Rantis. The Mixed. Armistice Commission condemned Israel for this act. 54. Similarly, on the night of 11 August 1953, Israel military forces using mines, bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch mortars, machine-guns and small arms, crossed the demarcation line between Jordan and Israel and attacked the villages of Idna, Surif and Wadi Fukin, wounding several of the inhabitants and destroying dwellings. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel for that attack. 55. Furthermore, during the night of 28 August 1953, Israel forces launched an attack against several buildings and huts in the Arab refugee camp at Bureij. This camp, which was organized and is administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, is situated about 2 kilometres west of the demarcation line. Bombs were thrown through the windows of the huts in which the refugees were sleeping. When these fled, they were attacked with small arms and automatic weapons. Twenty persons werr killed, 27 seriously wounded 50. Ma delegation voudrait souligner ici un point tres important: c'est que cette agression criminelle a ete commise par les forces armees regulieres d'Israel. Ce point presente, a notre avis, une importance capitale. Les agressions israeliennes se sont toujours caracterisees par I'emploi des forces regulieres d'Israel; par consequent, elIes ont ete organisees et mises au point par les dirigeants responsables du Gouvernement israelien. 51. C'est ce qui a eu lieu notamment le 11 aout 1950, quand les autorites israeliennes, pour chasser les B6douins Azazme du Neguevet de la zone demilitarisee d'EI-Auja, ont entrepris une operation militaire sur une grande echelle, utilisant troupes, armes automatiques et voitures blindees, et meme un avion de reconnaissance. La Commission mixte d'armistice, ainsi que le Comite special, ont condamne Israel pour cette agression et ont demande que ces Bedouins soient rapatries. 52. Vous devez vous souvenir egalement de l'agression commise par Israel sur la frontiere syrienne pres de El- Hamma, qui a ete condamnee par la resolution du Conseil de securite du 18 mai 1951, adoptee a la 547e seance du Conseil [S/2157/Rev.1J. Le Conseil a notamment retenu que I'action israelienne menee par le Gouvernement d'Israelle 5 avriII951 constitue « une violation de I'ordre de cesser le feu donne par la resolution du Conseil de securite du ]5 juillet 1948 et [est] incompatible avec les termes de la convention d'armistice et les obligations imposees par la Charte achacun des Etats Membres )). 53. De meme, les 28 et 29janvier 1953, des forces armees israeliennes evaIuees a 120 ou 150 hommes, utilisant des mortiers de 50,8 mm et de 76,2 mm, des bengalores, des mitrailleuses, des grenades et des armes legeres, ont franchi la ligne de demarcation entre la Jordanie et IFaeI et ont attaque les villages de Falame et de Rantis. La Commission mixte d'armistice a condamne·Israel pour cet acte. 54. De meme, dans la nuit du 11 aout 1953, des forces militaires israeliennes, utilisant des mines, des bengalores, des mortiers de 50,8 mm, des mitrailleuses et des armes legeres ont franchi la ligne de demarcation entre la Jordanie et Israel et ont attaque lesvillages d'Idna, de Surifet de Wadi-Fukin, y blessant plusieurs habitants et y detruisant des habitations. La Commission mixte d'armistice a condamne Israel pour cette attaque. 55. En outre, durant la nuit du 28 aout 1953, les Israeliens ont lance une attaque contre plusieurs maisons et baraques du camp de refugies arabes de Bureij. Ce camp, organise et administre par l'Office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies, se trouve a 2 kilometres environ aI'ouest de la ligne de demarcation. Des bombes ont ete lancees par les fenetres des baraques dans lesqueIles dormaient des refugies, qui,lorsqu'ils ont pris la fuite, ont ete attaques au moyen d'armes legeres et d'armes automatiques. Il y a eu 20 morts, 27 blesses graves et 35 blesses " The method of attack. The evidence noted indicated that this raid was well planned and carried out by men expertly trained in the fundamentals of sudden and sustained attack... " "In my estimation, between 250 and 300 well trained Israel soldiers carried OUt this operation. As a break-down ofthis figure, I would say that at least 225 men took part in the actual raid inside Qibya. This figure would account for the men used to bring the demolition bombs into the area, the unit handling the 2-inch mortars, the infantry units used to protect the demolition groups and the units engaging the guards at different points throughout this village of approximately 1,500 inhabitants. The figure of 225 is considered an absolute minimum, as, it must be noted, the statement of the witnesses and the evidence found pointed out that the village was simultaneously attacked from three sides" [630th meeting, para. 26]. 57. Cette agression contre Qibya a ete condamnee par le Conseil de securite le 24 novembre 1953 [S/3139/Rev.2], ce qui n'a pas empeehe qu'une autre agression, qui a pris les memes proportions de brutalite et de violence, a eu lieu les 28 et 29 mars 1954 sur le village de Nahhalin, et je me permets de vous rappeler une partie de III resolution adoptee par la Commission mixte d'armistice le 30 mars 1954: « I. Le franchissement de la ligne de demarcation par une importante formation d'lsraeliens ayant r~u un entrainement militaire, qui ont mis au point et execute, les 28 et 29 mars 1954, une attaque contre le village de Nahhalin, faisant usage a'armes automatiques et d'explosifs, jetant des grenades a main et des bombes incendiaires, et provoquant ainsi : « a) La mort de 5 gardes nationaux et d'une femme, des blessures etant infligees a 14 villageois, hommes Oll femmes, « b) La mort de 3 If5gionnaires arabes, due au fait que les envahisseurs ont fait sauter un camion dans lequel des renforts se dirigeaient vers le village de Nahhalin, I'officier qui eommandait et 4 autres legionnaires etant blesses, « constitue une violation absolument flagrante du paragraphe 2 de I'article III de la Convention d'armistice general » [S/3251, par. 11]. 57. The Security Council condemned this aggression against Qibya on 24 November 1953 [S/3139/Rev.2], but that did not prevent another act of aggression, attaining a similar degree of brutality and violence, against the village of Nahhalin, on 28 and 29 March 1954. I venture to quote to you part of the resolution adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 30 March 1954: "1. The crossing of the demarcation line by a large group of militarily trained Israelis who planned and carried out an attack on Nahhalin village on 28-29 March ]954, firing automatic weapons, detonating explosives, throwing hand grenades and incen- . diary bombs, which resulted in: " (a) The killing of.5 National Guards and 1woman, and the wounding of 14 villagers, men and women, " (b) The killing of 3 Arab legionaries by the blowing up of a truck which was proceeding to Nahhalin village with reinforcements, and the wounding of the officer in charge and of 4 other legionaries, "constitutes a most flagrant breach of article HI, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement " [S/3251, para. 11]. 58. I have described only the main acts of aggression committed by Israel; they were carried out by regular Israel forces, and therefore prepared and organized by responsible Israel leaders, precisely like what has just happened at Gaza. 58. Je n'ai fait que rt ..lter les principales agressions israeliennes: elles ont ete commises par les forces regulieres israeliennes, done prcSparees et organisees par les dirigeants responsables israeliens, exactement comme ee qui vient de se passer aGaza. 60. Even Israel cannot claim that military forces can participate in an act of aggression like the one committed against Gaza without instructions and formal orders from their Government. No doubt that is why the Mixed Armistice Commission decided that this premeditated .attack had been organized by the Israel authorities. 61. Besides, as the New Zealand representative stated at the meeting of the Council on 4 March: " It is described to us as a military attack. Therefore, if one side is exclusively at fault, it is at fault not as a result of the lawlessness of its citizens, but as a result of a deliberate. planned and disciplined act which must be regarded as carrying governmental responsibility .. [692nd meeting, para. 37]. 62. It is needless to emphasize that this Israel aggression constitutes a grave violation of article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, article n. paragraph 2. and article V. paragraph 3, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. 63. I wish to draw particular attention to article 11, paragrarh 2, of this agreement. which reads as follows: .. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either party, including nonregular forces. shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that party: or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the armistice demarcation line set forth in article VI of this agreement ... 64. Furthermore. article 1, paragraph 2. reads as follows: .. No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea, or air-of either party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other... " 65. These articles are the very foundation ofthe armistice agreement, which can be applied only ifthey are respected. It is precisely these articles which Israel has just violated in such flagrant fashion, as indeed the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee have held. 60. Meme Israel ne peut pretendre que des forces militaires peuvent prendre part a une agression comme celle qui a ete commise contre Gaza sans instructions et ordre formel de leur gouvernement. C'est sans doute ce qui a amene la Commission mixtc d'armistice aretenir que cette attaque premeditee avait ete organisee par les autorites israeliennes. 61. D'ailleurs, le representant de la Nouvelle-Z6lande avait deja declare au Conseil le 4 mars dernier: « On nous dit qu'il s'agit d'une attaque militaire. Par consequent, si une seule des parties est reconnue coupable, sa culpabilite resulte non pas de I'indiscipline de ses citoyens, mais bien d'un acte delibere, e:ltecute avec discipline et qui doit etre considere comme engageant la responsabilite du gouvernement » [6926 seance, par. 37]. 62. II est inutile de souligner que cette agression israelienne constitue une grave violation des paragraphes 2 et 3 de I'article premier ainsi que du paragraphe 2 de I'article II et du paragraphe 3 de I'article V de la Convention d'armistice general egypto-israeIienne. 63. Je voudrais toutefois attirer particuMrement I'attention sur le paragraphe 2 de I'article II de la convention precitee, qui dispose: « Aucun eIement des forces militaires ou paramilitaires terrestres, aeriennes ou navales de l'une ou I'autre partie, y compris les forces irregulieres, ne commettra d'actes de guerre ou d'hostilite contre les forces militaires ou paramilitaires de I'autre partie, ou contre les civils du territoire sur lequell'autre partie exerce son autorite; ni n'avancera, pour quelque motif que ce soit, au dela de la ligne de demarcation de I'armistice, definie a I'article VI de la presente con· vention...» 64. En outre, le paragraphe 2 de I'article premier dispose que: « Les forces armees terrestres, aeriennes et navaIes de I'une et de I'autre partie n'entreprendront ni ne prepareront aucune action agressive contre la population ou les forces armees de I'autre partie, ni ne les en menaceront...» 65. Ces articles constituent la base meme de la con· vention d'armistice, et de leur respect depend la mise en reuvre de cette convention. Or, c'est precisement et particulierement les dispositions de ces articles qu'Israel vient de violer d'une fa~on si flagrante, comme I'ont retenu d'ailleurs la Commission mixte d'armistice et le Comite special. 67. Il est evident que cette agression nouvelle commise dans la region de Gaza constitue eUe aussi une violation des dispositions de la resolution du Conseil de securite du 15 juillet 1948 [S/902], en meme temps que de la resolution du 24 nov~mbre 1953. 67. It is plain that this new aggression committed in the Gaza region is also a violation ofthe Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 [S/902] and of the resolution of 24 November 1953. 68. Furthermore, this bloody incident is clearly also a violation of the United Nations Charter. which Israel, on its admission to the United Nations, undertook to respect and which binds it in particular to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. 68. En outre, cet incident sanglant ne peut que constituer aussi une violation de la Charte des Nations Unies, qu'Israel s'est oblige de respecter le jour Oll il a ete admis dans cette Organisation et Oll il s'est engage notamment a s'abstenir, dans ses relations internationales, de toute menace ou emploi de la force. 69. To justify its attitude, the Israel Government has as usual attempted to distort the facts, in order to fill our minds with disorder and confusion and to represent this aggression, which was so clearly premeditated, as the outcome of an alleged attack by Egyptian forces. 69. Le Gouvernement israelien, pour jw ifier son attitude, a essaye, comme d'habitude, de d6former les faits pour jeter le trouble et la confusion dans les esprits et demont!"!':r que cette agression, dont la premeditation est teUement evidente, a ete perpetree a la suite d'une pretendue attaque lancee par les forces egyptiennes. 70. The purpose of this gratuitous allegation-made, as usual, for propaganda purposes-is to turn the tables. This time it met witll opposition on the very first day, in the form of a Press release from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which stated in particular that on "28 February 1955, Israel armed forces violently attacked the Egyptian military position near the Gaza railway station "; after which came the investigation made by the United Nations observers, and the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee. 70. Cette afiIirmation gratuite, destinee comme d'habitude ala propagande, a pour but de renverser la situation. Cette fois, dIe s'est heurtee, des le premier jour, au communiqut': de presse de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de !.a surveillance de la treve, qui a retenu notamment que «le 28 fevrier 1955, des forces armees israeliennes ont violemment attaque les positions militaires 6gyptiennes pres de la gare de Gaza ». EIle s'est heurtee ensuite a l'enquete des observateurs des Nations Unies et ala decision de la Commission mixte d'armistice et du Comite special. 71. Il resulte clairement de ce qui precede que les Israeliens viennent de commettre dans le secteur egyptien de Gaza la plus grave et la plus odieuse des agressions depuis la signature de la Convention d'armistice general 6gypto-israelienne, agression premeditee et organis6e par les autorites israeliennes responsables. Ces faits sont indeniables et ne peuvent faire l'objet d'aucun doute, malgre les denegations d'Israel. 71. It is clear from what I have said that the Irsaelis have just committed in the Egyptian sector of Gaza the most serious, the most vile act of aggression perpetrated since the General Armistice Agreement was signed by Egypt and Israel, an act planned in advance and organized by the responsible Israel authorities. These facts are incontrovertible and, despite Israel denials, leave no room for doubt. 72. Israel still seeks to distort the facts by endeavouring, as the statements of its responsibleleaders show, to divert discussion to the situation in the Near East in order to draw the general attention away from this savage aggression. 72. Israel tente encore de deformer les faits en s'effor- ~ant, comme il decoule des declarations de ses dirigeants responsables, de faire porter la discussion sur la situation dans le Proche-Orient pour detourner 1'attention generate de cette sauvage agression. 73. Furthermore, the Israel Government, which for propaganda purposes unceasingly proclaims its desire for peace, is perpetrating armed attacks which are welldefined acts of war. This attitude exactly corresponds 73. En outre, le Gouvernement israelien, qui ne fait que'proclamer son desir de paix, dans des buts de propagande, se livre a des attaques armees qui sont des actes de guerre bien caractenses. Certe attitude correspond 74. Israel believes that it can impose peace by force. It was probably in the hope of bringing the Arabs to the peace table that such incidents as those of Qibya, Nahhalin and G~ were deliberately provoked. In this conne~ion,. the ~nited States r.epresentative. made th~ fullon·lng lnterest:ng statement In the SecU!!tyCouncIl on 4 March 1955: " In all of our experience in this Council with the Palestine question, one thing has remained clear; it is that the use of armed force will not produce peace negotiations" [692nd meeting, para. 10]. Similarly, the other representatives who spoke at the 692nd meeting without exception condemned this attack, this resort to force, which is incompatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 75. I apologize for this digression. We are not discussing this subject today. The question before us is what attitude the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, will take to affirm its authority and put an end to the constant aggression by Israel. That is the question now being considered with particular anxiety by the Arab world, which is expecting the highest authority of our Organization to show that it is equal to its noble task of maintaining peace and security. 76. I take the liberty of recalling that the Security Council has already condemned Israel in connexion with the Qibya incident. Unfortunately, the condemnation bore no fruit. Only a few months after Qibya we witnessed the dramatic events at Nahhalin, which were no less violent than the Qibya raid. Now, a few months later, we are faced with this new and odious act of aggression at Gaza. 77. The attitude and behaviour of Israel show plainly that disapproval or condemnation of its action by the Council cannot suffice. In that connexion, the representative of Iran said at the meeting of the Security Council of 4 March 1955: " It is the Security Council's duty to condemn all acts of aggression. Indeed, mere condemnation is not enough when aggression has caused so many deaths. The Security Council must shoulder its responsibilities and act accordingly" [692nd meeting, para. 27]. 78. The truth is that the Israel Government, although the Security Council, in its resolution of 24 November 1953 on the Qibya incident [S/3139/Rev.2], enjoined it to take effective measures to prevent any similar action, has not changed its behaviour. On the contrary, it has maintained its attitude of provocation and continued to commit serious acts of aggression. 79. In the circumstances, my delegation hopes that the Security Council will find that there has been a flagrant violation ofthe provisions ofthe Egyptian-Israeli General 83. We also hope that the States which furnish Israel with financial or military aid, and which therefore exert great influence upon it, will consider whether it would not be wise to suspend such aid after this terrible act of war on Israel's part, an act which flagrantly violates the General Armistice Agreement, the resolutions of the United Nations and the United Nations Charter. 84. Despite the heinous aggression committed against us, the Egyptian leaders have retained their calm and self-control. They have resorted to the procedure provided by the General Armistice Agreement for the purpose of dealing with violations of the armistice. In accordance with the Charter, they have appealed to the Security Council. 85. It must not be forgotten, however, that self-control and calm have their limits. It is for the Security Council to take appropriate action to prevent the recurrence of such acts of aggression, which seriously impair peace and security in the Middle East. 86. We are fully confident that the Council, aroused by the repetition of such acts of war by Israel, will ~ondemn the aggressor and take such action as is necessary under the Charter to prevent similar acts of war in future.

Many of 'the observations which I propose to make touch on the matters authoritatively described in the report submitted by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization [S/3373]. Accordingly, with the President's permission, I should like to address the Security Council at its next meeting and to give a complete account of my Government's position on all the matters dealt with in that report and in the statement of the representative of Egypt.

Since no member of the Council wishes to speak, this meeting will now be adjourned. 85. Toutefois, it ne faut pas perdre de vue que la maitrise et le sang-froid ont des limites. I1 appartient au Conseil de securite de prendre les mesures appropriees pour prevenir le retour de pareilles agressions, qui portent une grave atteinteala paixetala securitedansle Moyen-Orient. 86. Nous avons pleine confiance que le Conseil, alerte par la repetition de tels actes de guerre de la part d'Israel. condamnera l'agresseur et prendra, conformement a la Charte, les mesures qui s'imposent pour prevenir de pareils actes de guerre dans l'avenir. 87. M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de /'anglais): Un grand nombre des observations que je me propose de presenter ont trait aux questions que le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve expose avec competence dans son rapport [S/3373]. Avec la permission du President, je demanderai donc la parole a la prochaine seance du Conseil, pour lui faire un expose complet de la position de mon gouvemement touchant toutes les questions traitees dans le rapport du Chef d'etat-major et dans la declaration du repre- sentant de l'Egypte. 88. Le PRESIDENT (tradu;t de i'anglais): Puisque aucun membre du Conseil ne demande la parole, je vais lever la seance. La seance est levee cl /6 h. 4tJ. PINLAND - FlNLANDE: Akatccminen Kirja· kauppa. ::! Kcskuskalu, He1IiBki. AUSTRAUA - AUSTRALlE : H. A. Goddard Pty.• Ud., 2550 Gcorae Slreel. SY_Y. N.S.W. Melboume University Press. Carllott N. 3 (Victoria). FRANCE : Editions A. redone. 13 rue Soulllol, Paris V·. AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE : Gcrold et Co.. I. Grabcn 31. Wiea I. 8. WlIIlcrstorlf. Book Import and Subscriplion A.acncy. Markus Sittikusstrassc 10, Sab1IuI. GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE: BuchhandlllDl Elwcrt et Meurer, Hauptstrassc 101. BerIiII- SdIilMtIeI'l. W. E. 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ECUADOR - iQUATEUR : UbrcrI.:::icndfica Bruno Moritz, Cum. 362, ~i1. NICARAGUA: Dr. Ramiro Ramirez V. Aacncia de Pub\icl;cioncs, Maapa D.N. EGYPT - IGYPTE : Labrairle .. La Rcnaiuancc d'l!IYPtc '\' £ £ibarla Adiy Pub&, Cairo. NORWAY - NORV£GE: Joban Grundt Tanum ForJaa, Kr AlJIUItII\ 7a. 0lIo. ---.._----------------------------------------- 0,."fr- CDIIIIIrIu"'M'.""••"..111. Ittne 11(1' ye' beell lllll/OlIIIetI -., be JleII' '0 SaIee ~........ 0I8ce er ... Umted N..... ....... N.*-. GENEVA (SwIbwIuiI) or ...... ~ SectiIa. U.w N..... NEW YOU (U,s.A..) Price: $U.S. 0.20; 1/6 stS. ; 0.75 Sw. fr. (or eqUivalent in other currencies) Printed in France PANAMA. : JOI6 Mcn6endcz, A.aencia Inleroacional de PubUc:aeioncs, Plaza de Aranao. P....Id. PARAGUAY: Moreno Hermanos, Casa Amera, Palm. y Albcrdi. A.-cilIa. PERU - ptR,ou : Librcrl. inlcmacional del Per. S. A., Cum. 1417. U... PHlUPPINES : Alemar's Book Store. 749 RizaI Avenue, Manila. 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EUtIlaqlt IIId MIuleIIIetar, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -ttATS-UNIS D'AM2IUQUE: Intcrutional Documents SCr· vice, Columbia University Pr-. 2960 BroadtrQ, New York 27. N.Y. URUGUAY: Oflcina de Rep_lad6n de Edi\oo ria\cs, Prof. H6ctor d'E1Ia, 18 de JoUo 1333, Pa1acio DIu, MOlIterideo. VENEZUELA : Librcrl. del Eslc, Av. Miranda 52, Edf. Galipan, Cancu. VIEr·NAM : Ubrairie Albcrt Portail, 185-193, rue Catinat, SaiaeL YUGOSLAVIA - YOUGOSLAVIE: DrzaYDO Preduzec:c, Juaoslovenska Knjip. Tcraziic 27/11, Beopad. Cankan Endowment (Cankarj6va Za1ozba), Lfabljua (510VCltia). La COIMUIIIdu 11IttMItIlII de pay. H du ".ellll1II"trU 1J'0fII pG ellCOre 1'11IDIItIfIh pelnelll '"e tlIIrulle. aItJ Sect-. .. V__• 0lIIc:e ......... N.*- U... PaIaiI .. N..... GE1BVE (sm-) _ Sect-... V.... et de la DiIb..... N.... U.... NEW·YOU (ECldI-U.)