S/PV.694 Security Council

The tensions on the frontier between Egypt and Israel are revealed with deep gravity in the report presented to the Security Council by General Bums [S/3373]. The armed clash on 28 February 1955 illustrates the dangers arising from those tensions. On that date a series of long-standing antagonisms and immediate provocations· exploded into a coniliet, with regrettably serious loss of life. 2. Such clashes do not spring from t4e empty air. They arise from morbid conditions of intemational relations. In this case, they show a profound weakness in the current operation of the armistice system which Egypt and Israel - established six years ago, on the solemn understanding that they would move forward on its basis towards permanent peace. 3. The relations between Egypt and Israel are always setiSitively reflected at the point where the territories of the two countries me.;,'t near Gaza. There are 166 miles of frontier between Egypt and Israel, but our populated areas confront each other o:,{y opposite the Gaza strip. In one belt of territory 10 mil~ in width, east of Gaza, there are 70 Israel settlem~nts, mainly pioneering communities engaged in an arduous effort to bring water and fertility to the northern Negev. 4. The Gaza strip is an Egyptian-controlled salient pointing as a sharp finger into Israel's coastal plain. In terms of history, it is a relic ofthe aggression of 1948, in which Egyptian for<:es crossed the established international frontier, in defiance of Security Council reso- ~. Ncarite intematiouIe., liD &it. I i) i'aItaIJaM IIIe troapee ~'Y(IIieaneI ~ et ~ ClOIIIre r. II'oaftla iIrae- Beane. J ii) tie niU etl--. 1 parti:r ia tea:itoinl _08 ClOutdle~ mDIre.. penGDDflIJ et cl. wea. le b'oavant ea tenitoln IIra6Iiea J iii) tie l'attitalIe ia GoaTemement .,tieD,.. D'aclopte Id ne fait ...... 1IIe~ eIleaeel eonlre .. aetM IIIe noIence cle eette aatare J i.) IIIe l·afIir. matioa P.'! l't.nte lie l'ailteace i'an ebt IIIe perre, ClOIDDIe de la poIitiIrae'1ti IIelIipnnee aeme ...me pu ee pay. mnlre &rail, nolllmmea.t le maintiea et l'edeutiOll" IIIe meauru cle hloeu * ..) tie la PI'OpIlpDIIIe ~ et cl. menaces eontre l'intlpite tenitoliale et I intUpeaw.ce poIitiqae ..... J 'Vi) ia nfu par IT.ante lie l'tlClh..-.eher. par "ie de ~ an lUlClOIll...."1'1111 ...... eIleetif IIIe l·....m.. lice aet1le! ll'etat IIIe pm (8/asa. 8/SS'ZI). Sur I"invitatian du President, M. £outfi, representant de I'Egypte, M. Eban, representant d'Israel, et le general Bums, Cbe/d'ltat-major de l'Organisme charge de la sur,eillance de la treve, prennentplaceIt la table du Conseil. 1. M. EDAN (Israel) (tradWt de I"anglais): Le rapport que le general Bums a soumis au Conseil de securite [8/3373] montre toute la gravite des tensions qui existent a la frontiere egypto-israelienne. La rencontre armee du 28 fevrier 1955 est une indication des dangers que presentent ces tensions. Ce jour-hi, une s6rie d'antagonismes deja anciens et de provocations r6centes ont fait explosion, et ce conftit regrett~ble a cause des pertes graves en vies humaines. 2. Des echauffour6es de ce genre ne se produisent pas sans ~son. Elles decoulent d'un etat malsain des relations intelnationaies. Dans le cas present, elles r6v~lent une profonde faiblesse dans le fonetionnement aetuel du regime d'armistice que I'Egypte et Israelont etabli. il ya six ans, en convenant solennellement d'en fsire une base de depart vers une pm permanente. 3. Le point sensible des relations entre l'Egypte et Isiaa se revele toujours a l'endroit ou les territoires des deux pays se rencontrent pres de Gaza. 11 y a 265 kilometres de frontieres entre l'Egypte et Israel, mais nos regions peuplees ne se font vis-a-vis qu'a Ia hauteur de la bande de Gaza. Dans une bande de territoire de 16 kilometres de large a l'est de Gaza se trouvent 70 colonies israeliennes, pour la plupart des communautes de pionniers, qui deploient des efforts ardus pour amener l'eau et la fertilite dans le Neguev septentrional. 4. La bande de Gaza est un saillant occup6 par 1'Egypte, qui ~'avance comme un doigt pointu dans la plaine d'IsraSl. Du point de vue bistorique, c'est une survivance de l'agression de 1948, au cams de laquelle des forces egyptiennes ont franchi la frontim-e intemationale 5. Against this complex geographical background, the Security Council will recall the political relationships between the two States whose armed forces clashed at . Gaza on 28 February 1955. The unusual character of these relationships has been revealed to the Security Council in its PlCvious debates on disputes between Egypt and Israel. 6. At the root ofthese tensions lie a 'theory and practice of belligerency. Egypt considers and proclaims that there is " 11 state of war '>. In the nara.e ofthat " state 9f war ", Egypt asserts a " right ,. to perform hostile acts of its choice against Israel. On the other,hand, Egypt claims immunity from an~ hostile response emanating from Israel. This is the doctrine ofunilatera1 belligerency, and it has no parallel or ~entin the jurisprudence of nations. 7. It is another principle of the Egyptian position, and has been so stated at this table, that decisions of the Security Council relating to Israel have no binding force upon Egypt. On the other hand, the Security Counc-il's authority is today· invoked to protect Egypt against any reaction which its active prosecution of the " state of war ". may elicit. 8. It would be strictly and scientifically accurate to describe the essence of the Egyptian position in two sentences: Egypt may b~havetowards Israel as though there were war. Israel must behave towards Egypt as though there were peace. 9. Now this doctrine of a state of war is not a mere juridical theory. It is carried out in practice by relentless hostility on land and sea; by military incursions; byorganized murder, sabotage and theft; by maritime blockade; and by open threats against Israel's territory, integrity and pOlitical independence. These policies, which have been maintained by Egypt in varying measure since 1949, have been aggravated in~the past six months to a degree previously unknown. I shall show that at no time since the signature ofthe armistice has the pressure ofEgyptian hostility been exerted upon Israel with.such provocntive intensity as during this period. One ~dex ofthis increased hostility can be found in the fact that, while in 1953 there were five armed clashes involving regular armed forces between Egypt and Israel, in 1954 there were 71 such clashes. The sourceofthis hostility, the centre from which the violenpe is organized and directed, is the Egyptian military headquarters at· Oaza. 10. The Egyptian representative has spoken as if the Oaza c~h erupted suddenly out ofa serene and peaceful 6. n y'a. lla base de ces te~ons, ~e ~.,rie et·~ pratique de ,la.bellig6rance.. L'Egypte coll;Si~_ ~ proclame qu'll existe _« un.etat. de.~. ~. Au 'DOJIl4e cet « etat de guerre »,I'Egyptes'arroge le .~ droit» de se livrer contre Israel l des aetes hostiles de son chQix. D'un autre cate, .t'Egypte demande l'iDununite contle toute riposte. hostile qui emanerait d'~ n ,'agit donc d'une doctrine de bellig6rance unilatera,le; dans la jwisprudence des nations, une te\le doarine n.'a .ni parall~le, ni precedent. 7. En vertu .d'un autre principe deJa th~ egyptienne, principequi a ete proclam6 llatable du Conseil, lea decisions du Conseil de secunte relativesa-maa'tltrlicnt' pas I'Egypte. En revanche,l'Egypte invoque aujourd'hui meme l'autorite du Conseil de s6curite en demandant .que celui-ci la protege cantre toute reaction qui eau!- terait du fait que ce pays POursuit activement l' « etat de guerre ». ... .. 8. n serait strietement et scientifiquement··exact de resumer l'essence de la position de I'Egypte dans lea deux phrases que voici: I'Egypte peutagir enversISraSl COmme· s'il y avait la guerre. Israel doit agir enven l'igypte comme s'il y avait la paix. . . 9. Or, cette doctrine de I'etat de guerre Ii'est paS simplement une th60rie juridique.iElle est appliquee, clans la pratique, par des hastilites.implacables .sur,terre. et sur mer; par des incursionsmilitaires; par le·meurtre, le sabotage et le vol organises; par un blOC1ABmBritime; et, enfin, par des menaces ouvertementc:liriafiescontre le teI:ritoire, .l'integrite. et l'independance 'PQlitique d'Israel. ('.cUe politique, que I'Egypte poursuit,avec plus ou moins de vigueur, .depuis 1949, a ete· port6e au cours des six derniers mois l un point qui n'avait jamais et6 atteint. le vais mpntrer que iamais .. dep~ la signature de l'armistice, l'Egypte n'avait montrC autant d'hostilite intense ni commis aatantde. Provocations l 1'6gard d"Isrdl que pendant .~derni~ pcSriode..On trouveniuneindication.dec:ettehQStili~ accrue dans le fait qu'au lieu des cinqienCOlitreS~.elltre les forces amiCes reguli6res d'Isd eide"1~E8Y.P1O~q~'o# avait . enregistlies .en 1953,on .comp~ten.·'t9~.. 71 incidents de Ce genre. L'oiigine de~e;:ho~~:' le centre on s'organisent Its violences, 'le centre.d'ou eUes emanent, c'eat le quartier g6n6ral c5gyptienl 0a7JI.. 10. Le repdsent8ntde I'Egypte a JW'l~'Cotp'g,e~si" lencontre de Oaza avaii eclate tout a Coup, 'd8ns'une 12. ,To illustrate this point, .} take the conclusions ofthe MixtdArmistice Commission at a recent meeting on 7},{a!dl19SS. 13. On that date, the CoDllDisSion adopted a gravely worded resolution against Egypt for the outrageous and ~oked attack in 'Rehovot, to which I shall refer Iater~ But it also had under diSCUSSion a complaint of firing by the Egyptian army at an Israel patrol which . manased,' by returning the'.fire;. to 'saveit&elf from 'delItrUdion.The Mixed Armistice CoJrimisSioniesolutiOn duly ,~ .,a· second, verdict, against Egypt, on the pounds that the "Egyptian,army position' fired at the Israel security patrol,with automatic weapons, rfilesand 3-iDch mortars at 0830local time It. So that ~ CO~certifieci·th3 iinte Ofthe firing. ~4.lJl\t anothef ~.utionfound, quiteaccurately,tAAt - "·fJJ.~~J.patrol openecUire atOMS lQCa.rtirit~ It~!hus dle tef~~(.tbe.Is1jeIM3~O! to perishj~as~ as a. \'ioJatioli.of.theGen.~~ce~ent" ~v~Ji ihQughthcf ~ Armistice CommissioAiiselt IWl ~,dearly where.the'original initiative for .iiring 1ay~ '. . U..~rap~rtSq~,Je 84ll6pd.,:QurnS.,;l. !~~.~1l!6s au COnpciA'sec~t6lel6jJ:\'Ov~l1,1.,re19~[SiJ-tJ9,~H::Qrr-.l] et !e'17··~1~SS,~[Sl3.373]doAAc=ilt ~ta})l~u.des plaiJj~q~ta:q>.mm~~ori IJD,xte'4·~ti~.tl'exami~ees au.eollts, cles"4eux j*lQdeS.co~de~~., ,~;de~"es coloJin~ ·de,·ce$,Iis~font,~~tde. q~tQl'Ze4ki$iQ~·<Ians lesquelles' la '. Commissionmixte , d'~S#~bliD1~ rEmte, soit plus,de 4e~ fois l~n9nib~' des .4~sions enreptreescOnttciIsraeli'endaritces' ptrlodes. Ce fait estd6ja assez important enlui-meme.. UdeVientencore plus ~gni~tif IOrsque 1'O'n constate' que les quelques vio~tiOns ~intputees • Isrdlont ete pOUt·1a plupart irispii'c5es'par'-le'd6sit de rep6lidre iD:l'Jnedil:ltement au feu .6gyptien.En:efi"et, s'agissant d'appliquerla Convention' dt~sticegc5~tral,on n'estime pas toujours possible'deeJb,tinguer entre des tirs d'agression' et des tirs effeMues pour r6pondre a une agression. Au'paragraphe23du rapport du 17 mars [S/3373], le general Bums;mennonneceue anomalie;quemongouvernement a· souventmtiquee. ll.en rc5sulte que, si defavorable pOur rEgy.ptequ'elle ·paraissedans:les,r.lpportset les tableaux. la. proportion des. vioIations a imputera ce pays' est encore trOp favorable par rapport a·1a reaponsabilit6 q~ lui incoinbe. 12. Je.prendrai, pour prouver ce .fUe· j'avaoee; les conclusions formulees par la Commission mixte d'armistice lors d'un.e r6union'reeente, le'7mats 1955. 13.'Cejour-la, la Commj~sioi13adbpt6, al'cmcontre de l'Egypte, uner6solution r6digee en termes sevc)res, A propos de -la seandaleuse attaquede~eltovot, dont je paderai plus tard, et qui fut faite sans provocation aueune. Mais elle 6taitegalement saisie d'un.eplainte ~ux termes de·~quelle l'arinee-egyjffi'~-av8it ouvert le feu surune ~patrouille israelienoe. qui avaitr6ussi, en ripostant,a 6chapper aladestnldion.l.a resolution de la CoDunissiGn' mmed'armistice faitd1lm.ent etat d'un deuximne verdict· blitnant l'EgyptC pour les"motifs suivaJits: «A 8 h. ·30 (benre' locaIe)j un groupe de milltaires egyptiens aouvert le feu sur· unepatrouillede s6curit6 isra61ienneaumoyen d'armes automatiques,de fusiIs et de morti~ de·76t2 mm.», " . On voitque la COmrDissi9.n a note ex8ctement le inoment ott lesco. de feu' ont~e.'tir6s. - 14~ ,Mai$lll,Ie a~trer6s0~utioncoDSt8t~,ettoriJustement, que «1a.patrouillei$ra.elienne-aou~Jefeua8~ 4S ~ureJ~e) »!~.l~l.C'f~;~~Ja;P~trQ~{~a6Ii~llIle ~ s.e .laissel' ~ra. 616 w~.c;Q1D.ID,O ~e violationde la COnve!ltiond'~ticegeJJ4ral,We~ .q~lIl Commission mme cl'armistice ait .determine ' avec certitude'quels 6taient ceuxqui avaient' pris l'initiative de tirer. .- -. IS. Au.co~,ct.e,ces 4erJllers{~ois - ~ntre:aoa, 1954 et-mars 1955-:- 1a~~9.n ;nmecl~~.,a • ".. ",- 16.. ,~.A.s it~Jiowever"m;the.~ examined and2djudi• .catedbetweel1'August 19S4andV·M8!Oh't9SS,o:the.wi.'ted .~r£t~~r;~=~Jlft~~~~ , on·ii(flessthan~· OccaSicins,inCludiDjtlie 14~rded' h1the,.iwY~lepO~ :~forethe' securitY,COuq~.w~· cover irij3C1ents oCcufriris betWeen 1 Septembe»:'l9.S48;fiCl llvfarch i955, mainly incidents which were diScUsseci at emergenCy:meetmgs· rather than ~t··re_ tIleetitigs Of the Mixed .Armisti~Commission.' 11~ ··BUt even·thesestatisnesdo notgiv~ all'adequately vivid··pictUre· of the murderous ~~ent ··Ja.uilched ftom'Qaza againstlSrael'in' the perlOd'leadiiig llP~O .28 February 1955. I therefore invite the Security CounCil to. elUlJDine themoJe ~ous ~a.n.violations.organ~ ize4froma. 4~g the plStumontbs, ~,tod"so with ade!!1' percept.ionof tI)e. effects created by' thiS torrent ~. assauI~ on the Jives of pioneeringme~~~ womm ~vinlto 'est&bJisllaild mainmiD'their'lives in the regions easf oftheG8i;l1 zone. TilaveCircuiated a inaP~ to enable' the exaMinatiOil to 'be carliecl)xorwara . moregrap~cany; .: . , 18..'ThestoQ·";p ...~'.•.5·~e!nber.19S4;with"an Egyptianattack{e$ultingn..themurdm:9fan Israeltractor driver at Ruhama. On 13 September', 19S4,.·tI1e Mixed Armistice ~~iop·condCmn~,Egyptfor~~!.··ftagrant violation ,~ ofthe General Aripistice ~ment." . . . ' ~ . - .. ' . " .'., .... ,. - . ,- ~.,' . ' . .' " 1?:..0n, 7 '~~1Jlber J9S4;,th~P:ip&.Qn~wasb1o~ Up i~ the,v1cinity·QC N~' where,. with endless paaenQe, sacrifice.~dtoil, ,'asupply of ·waterbad ~organiz«lto serve an the settlements of the patch~.Nesev.On 13 September 1954, the Mixed Armistice Co~sion ad:Opted'a reSolution which proVided,iJt, part,.asJoHows: ·· ..·D~S:. that )bis~;()fa..~9ia;,JJP~'tilitY ,an" sabOtageaglunst Israel is a..fIagrarit·~;bY ~t of article It paragraph '2,0(tb,e Ge~Mnijst.ice A........w.ent· . '" .. .' '. . ..' ,. ' .. ,. '""6L--, .' .., .,' ... Cal~··· upon Egypt to. Ulke'tIleaSures to stop th~ attaCkSac.rdssthemtematioDa1fiontier;", . '.' ..' ~1 ( . . -. - " . , "_'0', 20. On 1~ Sep_~ '1954, a,¥ouin· camPJlt Ba ~1 Mtl'~gll was-attacked; . On. 16 Noyembetthe MixCd_ AnniStice COmmission condelDiied Egypt for this'vit>- Iatioit;1 . ... .... '. .' 21. .~' 20~ber i,54.a'SrouP·of.atmedinfil. wounded a tractor driver and blew up a ho~ein Hatzav. . ,; ~. ,. . .,;: ' '. . :, . IlIld;tbe,.wo~~goftwootb.ers .•<TheMjxecr'~ 'P!'ovqquC la mort~4e\de~~'sra~liens,tandis que ~eux .~j~QlJ.y,fQrmuJated, .. a,:stJODI,eondf!JDDa$l'n .of a~'Qnl:et6r;bl~~ioJ~'(JobUDi~()n'miXted'arinistice ~~··t9j;~!lP$'~u1J." , :,~ .•. ,,-" " :'1:':_l,C':; a!:se~m~gt~~t~!,l::~mt~P4-lur·~t~,attaque." :24:' :, ~-2~.'-septembetl9S4.;~ ~,·ttOOPs,:· ·ltler24~.·.•.'.J..e .... ::i2~i_se.-pieD.1.:'~te.,... 1.9~;:, ~~:tt . "'l)~~ :6gyp. ,.,.ti~nn.e~, ~'lsmelterrito!j; attaCkedan.ISiael'pafrol.· .'I\'Qr ~~-.-,voirJ~il~ ,entettit0ite.'ismelien.,()ot .a~q1ie ~aftB.Ck,EsYPt WascOndemnectby'the'MiXed Atmistice ~~:-;~~§~ne.!. iSni~lierul~.•.~;.J~;.;d~Dl!'te..1954, la ~.,.~.::)n~~~lionp ~m~ 1954.'. ' COllimliSSionmlXte -d'armtsticeabliin~ "f!gyptepour . . Cettl~ttaq,i~.·;·:.. . . ' , . '. , ~.On 's<<>et0bct'. 19S(the Commission coDdemn~ , ~twice fOr violatioi1$ofthearmisticethrough jnfil~ ~#.9~.ftQ~lt<m.a.cbetweenJl,andJ5A~ 1954., . . ~•. Qn9 Novem~1954, 'the:Mixed Armisti~ Com- JQijjjo.nCQliae,~ed·~tiw.icefor two.separateincidents jr~~n•.m·Augusf1.9S4. ~. :1'@tCOi)tent'-lM>\Vever," With maritU#belligerency, Egypt moved towardS the end of that month to~~\V itsp:essure on Israel'sftontier. Thus, on 25 october 19S4,;EgypDanforeea'blcw'upthePipe-lineat MefatlSim, a ViOlatiolffor whicliEgyptwas condemned by the Mixed ArmiStice·Commission on 28 October. '3O,."'·J11e.'n~d&y,29 Octo))er 1954, an attack was launChed. at.Shivtil.and three men were wounded. on-tile Israelside~ .The MhedADnistice ComrDissioncondemned Egypt for tJii$violatiOri,i~again for anatiaCk with automaticw.pons . nearNniIn '. the foHowing day, ~Qmber. . . 31•.' The ..JIlOnthof November19S4 opened with .an a~ b.Yl!BYPtian. fcnws on Patqsh. wbere,hoU$e8 were blOwilUp, teSU1ti1lg'iil the Cond~tionofEgypt by the ),fixed. Armistice CoDlDlission -on 5 November.' . 32.~ ."Qn'1'N~\,em~ ·i9S4,a..~()USc;htshtOOkpJace . ~anIsrae(pat(Oland agto~p ofar1JleClmarauders WlioJuUf"ClOssedthe.den1arcationline. AnOtherserious cJashWith ~ marauders ~kpJace three:~yS later. 3f iOii2400m~; 19S4;.al1'Wanpjitoonin~ the demilitarized zone of NitZanaand.entrenched .itself t1left;. •,F()J' ~aetof..mvam9P ,E8f1't. ,w~,~n~ bY'thcfMiXed'ArDlisticeCOmmiSSionorf3 :Jariuary·195S. ~s..i~s ,QCto,hi-e 1954~laC~nunission at~e l'Egypte .a. 4e\1X reprises ',Pout.·avojr· viole" l'armistice .par des infiltrations commisesapartir de Gaza, entre le 13 et le 15 aodt 1954. 2(j. Le;~~~Ye~bre 1954,.Ill.C9nunis.sion mixte .d~armis­ ti~ a,. par d~uxf()is, blime,l'Egyptepour deux cas d'infiltrati9n dilfcSrentsqui re~ontaient au D)ois d~aotit 1954. . 27.' Le 13d6cembre 1954,'la Co~ssioninhte d:'armistiee'a blame l'Egypte· paUfcinq violations} ditferentes . ae l'atmistice;qui 's'ewent prOduites en septeinbre 1954. 28.~u CO~de'~ .premiere quinzaine (b)(~tobre, l'hostiijtcSgue l'~gyptet6moipe~ Isra~a trouve son e~oJlla.plu:s .violente. dags.racte; de .pirclter.i~qui a pi'is la forme de la saisiedu Bat Galim, Mte.auqui est toujours c.tetenu iI16ga1ement, de m8me que sa cargaison, par ,les .autorites egyptiennes. Le Conseil de s6curite teste toujourssaisi decette aft'aIre;danslaquelle l'Egypte a-tem.Oiglie le mepriS. qu~elle eprouve pour I'autorite duCo_t. . .'. . /. 29.:L()in.dese contenter.de ~a~ de ~l1iieran~ sur mer, l'Egypte II recommence, ven la fin du mois, a exercer sa pression' sur la frontim d'IsraQ. Ainsi, le 2S octobte:1954, a' Mefallsbri,' des troupes egyptiennes Ont faitsautet le pine-line,violation l'Outlaquelle l'Egypte aete blini6e'le 28 octobre par la.Commission DriXte d!arinistice.' . 30. .Le len~main, 29 QCtobre 1954, une llttaque.declench6e a Shivta'a fait trois blesses du c6t6 israetieD..La Commissjon nnxu, d'armi~tice a. bJ!m~l'Egypte pour cette. violation;. elle apronollce un~nouvelle'.condamnationaht:s~t~'d'unc;attaque fai~.a l'arm~ auiomatique le lendemain, 3Ooctobre, pr~.de Nirim. 31. Le moi$ de no~br~ 19S4s'estouvert par une attaquedes troupes egypqeJilles!firjPC conttePattish, oil elles ont fait sauter des maisons; la Commissionmixte d'armistice a b1im6 l':Egypte pour cc fait le 5 ·nov~mbre. 32~ ..Le7 n(Jv~~1954, un grav~ i~ci4ent's'C$t.~oduit entre .•unepatfO,uiUe .isra6lienne .et un grou'pccie· .mal'lludeurs en armes qui avaient franchi.la ligne de d6mar.. c:ation.Tr~ jours plus tard, it Yaeu une autre tebcontre assez~~1R avectteiFritaraudeursarmes: .33. •Le 24 d~bre i954, tme' seCtio~ 6gyptienne .~ pcSn6trC dans la zone d6militaris6e de Nitzana et s'y est ~traJrebee.k .. 3. jaJiJier.l~~S.•.la,ConunissiQn.e d'armistice a-blAme l'~gypte poUr cette·invaSion.. ano~er.·:..,~ql)~,~p18~~~':l~mt'~~n~U:u.l~·mthe strongestterin8on 24JJanuary:1955. '. :'0 ..... '. . . , 35:; ~ ':that ~,v;;:wi),v24"JanuarY~.;l9SS~ ~"however, Egy-ptian·(orces:IaUllchectanother,attaek·<This.'time-,':the targetwaS Bin Hashe!QSha,One IsraeH.r~fo driver was kill~and. ,one w9up.de4.Qn 27 J~uary,J~gyptw;iS condemned b ·tJieMiX~ ArmiStice commiSSion for'this a~k..''1 ..:....... ~ 'U'., 36; On 1 February 19S5, an EgypiianattaCk;tOOkpl8ce 36.'· Le, lertevner,49SS,,4es>EjyptieDs·oJit-~"Jds near-Nahal·Gz,., where~one'Israel >SGldier~was ..w.1unded; deT-N~tiIf.'Sotd8t:cistIQieD'1l":'et6~h~­ The Mixed ·,·Armistice·Commission' condemned1his mi$sionc·mixte'd·ariDisti~a·bJAm6·JSEgypte-po1it'•. Egyptian assault. ..' a~~~.>,;;. .';;'J.i',.:',,<~''','' ,,: :,.::.,c· 37.0n22F~1955, an,Egyptianarmypostfu.ect 37.U~22:,fevrierlS55;les so.~~ml'~~ on aQ. Israel·patrol which ~·approachinga large, gro~p ont··ouver.t .le,,feu3ur.1l1Jo~ ~> .israaieJ;me;quha'ap. of jnjiltrators \Vh(}.~erepl1D.1deling~~harve$t· in··tile PIOChaitd,'un .'$I'0llpe .··..im~t; ~!Il9p~·tM r.~gion ofNlJ1.Yi~lum.~&yptian·trooPSQpenedfir.e.witll .~~nt en train4e·pil1erla~lte.~1eS;cb~t~ automatic rifles an4·3~i.nc~.mortars.0n.l March 1.~S5; .' dOb{'1l Yits-haq. J.£stroupes egyptie&Dtll: ~,~,~ Egypt WascondeDined for" this vio13~o~•. I have•~y ,. coupsdefllsi1S..mitri@.eurs et demo~~~,16~lI:iDL.I.e pointed out that the,Mixe4 Armistice CommiSsion deter- 7,JD.8.J'S l~~~,XE.gypt,e,a..~)b~,'..e9!'f~~,~tion. miIiedtbaton. tbiS'oCC8SiontheisJieltrOIW'returned J'aii6·1dit ue la Commission,Iiliited'armiI\..'ice.aYUt ~~t.~~::~=-~ ~j.i~~!~~~ offiriri is 'however establish~ in the:MiXea Armistice ~laic5. lie .;~etait.Ia,a.UsSi une Violation.'En tout -la CotnDJi~d611~tuj{i)~~ .',.,' .' . ". "" ' "; .. ' ". .. ~=fes'~~"CO~ion'OiiXte~pe#tii:jlf~ . . 38. :.On2S ·February;1955" a bicycle riderin:Israelwas killed by an Emtian intelligence·sa~~,wiit,abOut oqemihtwest :ofRehovot,24 miI~,fr~liltheEgypr'>~ f!~n~~.: .This .ultwastr,acedto·~e~$YPtian a~.,. nUI$- '1~) Gaza,&Dd ...:the;Mixed:Armi8tice~eotmDlfJS10n issued a, veh~ent>resollltion 'c<)ndemniIli;Egypt-,on 7 March 1955., <h.lly~odays previously, on 23Feb~, tliis·Egyptiali intelJi~nce: gi'ouphadpenetrafed as faro Rishon 'le'ZiOD;'29 ':rirllesiDside ·Ishl~I;. and' had· stolen d~ents. jusqu'l.RJshOn-lC;.~on.~t46~(rkDi~':1a. ~)t~y. . av8.ii'voI6desdcl'cWnentS>.·i.~: ;'::":' .;'-,. '." .; 3'9. The list which' 'lbaveread is surely isufficient in itselfto dis~ofanyextraordinary·vers~9nwhich·w()u1d assert that,the period leadingc:uptq thea.,claShwas one.of com~tive·.quiet.· :The Egyptian·objective~ clearly to create an infernoof:sUSpeilSe.aild;-inseclllityin the.:northen1 Negev, to'blow~ur" farm homes;when ibuilt and water-pipes when laid...,-in short, to.prevent the ~fulsettlementandbabitatic;)D Qfthe,noI1hern:Negev area. , .;~ : ,I. . " ,'~.; '. ~~nCf.~~~; ;~ur,;~!~ir!~~~~~t ~~,.y,i~~ 35.,' ·.·cecm8meijoUl',1e :24!jm!iet19~S,~1eS:~~-!~DS'~ lance une autre. ;a~r'·:,Blie··'.t~:~.'.confre""1!in Hashelosha. Uil cond~11r·de.n-4eur.~israeliena ete· . ~~t ~ autr~J16t6 bl~.... ~KieA',Ia~rn,isai. ~'~~~t!cea:~W~~t'~.·· ';;YP~:~<~~~~, ~ .:',: ~'>:.....:,~-;~,,-, j 1 /r<"'~, ~f' ~ ; _ Ji ";- • ~ _: '.,:~ ',~., ',.;'~~';){. '," ~ 38~·:Q2S·r6m~i:>~S,·.·~,··cJitach_f.;~de renlieignements .et .de~bo~'a~tu8~cjCli~tt;:iiliillien·i. l' ':km~a:l~ouestde,Rohov.ot'et&'386kmcJeiJaftoDtiare , ," ..':.--:- ..... '_.. , ""~'~-., .-' ..-'-:.---"'~ ..~.:"::., ',' "':' ":''-"' ',' "",' .:. ','; -".-~ 6gyptienne.ltae~e.tat)liqueles;8l1to~~:de Gaza;ewent RspOiIslibles,de;C'ct~d.eD(et;·Je~~.... 1955,la .ColIUDission JDixtedl;a,rn;U$tlC:e 'a;~:~ ~:~~&i~~:wJl'~"~~~;.,~~ . :~me;mti~:J6&VPtte~Pf~~8P~~~~V8i~'~;~ ~~; ",'~ cl:' ;:~'~:,::1:_). ..~,:~ '; :", '.~!:.:" .'~,.~,::-Lf:~5'} ":;;~ -;1 :';',~-"":~~ ~.~:.' ':~.,;.;. ~~";i ~ i=-, Cl CtI1ls on the Egyptian authorities to take immediate ateps to stop at once such or other violations of the Oeneral Armistice Agreement." 41. On the same daYt the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted a resolution concerning the blowing up of the mainwaterpipe-lineinthe Negev. The SecurityCouncilis doubtless aware of the importance attached to the water system in Isrul, especially in the arid area of the Negcv. A sense of deep shock and indignation runs tbrough our faqning co~unity and. indeed. through the countryt when large volumes ofwaterarewasted throughdeliberate and purposeful sabotage. The Mixed Armistice Commission caught something of the spirit in which water problems arise in the farming communities of the south whenit adopted a rewlution on 13 September .954 in the following terms: II Nota Ogee apint with great concern. that. despite the obliptions imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement and a number of decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. acts of agressioa. hostility and sabotage against Israel have not been put to a stop; •• Not. furthert with extremely grave concel'llg the serious condition prevailiug along th., demarcation line Raulting from theseaets; II ConiknuI8 Egypt for the above aggressive acts apinst Israel and calls on the Egyptian authorities to terminate finally and immediately an such acts of agsreaaion... 42. How little the Egyptian Government was influenced by this authoritative appeal against its policy can be deduced from the text which the Mixed Armistice·Commissionhad"to adopt on 28 October 1954t when an·armed and well-trained group apin. in the Commissionts words: Cl blew up (the water line) by heavy charge ofhigh explo- . lives .•. resultiq in very serious damage to the pipe-line, inata1bJtion and water supply". On that occasion. the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted a resolution as follows: .. Not.t with great concern. the repeated acts of planned demolition of main water pipe-lines in Israel by well-trained and organized armed groups coming from Egyptian-controlled territory; .. Further 1IOtut with extremely great concern. the serious situation prevailing along the demarcation line resulting from repeated aggressive acts by Egypt against latael; Cl Notu ouce asaint with great conc:eru. that. despite the obJiptions imposed on Egypt by the General «Invite lea autori~ egyptiennes a prendre des meaores imm6diates pour ureter sans d6Iai cos violations ou toutes aqtre8 violations de la Convention dtarmiatice aenerat.» 41. Le mbe jourt la Commission mixte d'armistice a adopte une Rsolution sur l'incident au cours duquel on avait fait sauter la principale canalisation dteau du NCguev. Le Conseil de skuriiC ntignore pas rimportance quepr6lente le s~me dtadduction dteau en Isra!I, notamment dans la Rgion &ride du Neguev. Nos agriculteurs - et. en fait. le pays tout entler - sont profondement emus et indignes lorsque de granl.!f,~ quantites d'eau sont perdues par suite de sabotages deliWrCs et premedites. La Commission mixte d'armistice a rendu dans une certaine mesure lea sentimentll avec lesquels les colonies agricoles du Sud envisagent les probl~mes de reau lorsqu'elle a adoptct le 13 septembre 1954, une risolution ainsi con~e: « COIIState une fois de plus avec une grande inquietude quten depit des obliptions qutimposentaItagypte la Convention dtannistice generat et un certain nambre de d6cisions de la Commission mixte dtarmisticct it nta pas encore 6te mis fin aox aetes dtasression. dthostilite et de sabotage dirig6s contre IsraS; « Considire en outre avec une ~ grande inquietude la situation grave que cos aetes ont cr66e le long de la ligne de demarcation; « BI4me l'agypte pour avoir commis ceaaetes dtagression contre Isra!I et demande aox autorites egyptiennes de mettre fin definitivement et imm6diatement atous actes dtagression de ce genre.» 42. On se rendra compte combien le Gouvemement 6gyptien stest peu soucle de cette voix autorisee qui· condamnait sa politique, en lisant le texte que la Commission mixte dtarmistice a dO adopter le 28 actobre 1954. Cc jour-lA. un groupe d'hommes arm6s et bien entratn6s - jeciteles termes memes employes parlaCommission- «a fait sauter (la conduite dteau) au moyen dtune forte quantite dtexplosifs puissants... ce qui a endommag6 tr& gravement le pipe-line ctle! inStallations connexes, en entraval\t rapprovisionnement en eau ». Acetteoccasion. la Commission mixte dtarmistice a adopte la Rsolution suivante: « Considhe avec une vive inquietude la ame dtactes par leaquels des groupes armCst bien entratnes et bien organisest venant du territoire contrale par ragyptet ont m6thodiquement demoli dtimportantes cana1isations dteau en territoire israelien; « Considh'e en outre avec une inquietude particulim-ement grande la situation grave qui existe le long de la ligne de demarcation du fait de la sCrie d'aetes d'agression aoxquela l'~te steat IivrcSe contre IardI; « Note encore one foil avec une profonde inqui6tude . quet malgre lea obligations qui incombent1 ragypte en ~n Israel, d6fendu par trois soldats isra6liens... dont run a Ctc tuc... et les deux autres blesses; « Releve que la ligne de d6marcation 6tait elairement indiquee dans la region oil eut lieu l'attaque; «Decide que eet acte d'agression commis par ladite uniteS de liarmee egyptienne, sous le commandement d'un officier, constitue une violation flagrante, par 1'Egypte, des dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'artiele n de la Convention d'armistiee general; «Considere avec une tMs grande inquietude cet acte d'agression; et «Fait appel aux autoritc5s egyptiennes pour qu'elles fassent cesser ces aetes d'agression contre Israel.» 44. Le 27 janvier 1955, la Commission mixte d'armistice a de nouveau complete le blAmequ'elle inftigeaita l'Egypte par une critique generale: « Considere avec une vive inquic5tude la grave situation qui existe le long de la bande de Gaza et qui est la consequence de ces.attaques repet6es; « Constate une fois de plus avec la plus vive iilquietude qu'en depit de l'obligation que la Convention d'armistice gen6ral et plusieurs resolutions de la Commission mixte d'&rmistice imposent a l'Egypte, cos penctrations et ces meurtres de citoyens isra6liens n'ont. pas cesse.» 44. On 27 January 1955, the Mixed Armistice Commission again developed its condemnation of Egypt into a generalized criticism: c. Notes with grave concern the' serious situation prevailing along the Gaza strip resulting from these repeated attacks; " Notes once again, with extremely grave concern, that despite the obligation imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement and a number of Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions, these penetrations and killings of Israel citizens have not been terminated." 45. The Security Council, in our judgIt'ent, would do well to consider the language in which the Mixed Armis.- tice Commission interpreted the situation on the days immediately preceding the Gaza clash. On 7 March 1955, the Commission adopted and pUblished its resolution on the incidents which had taken place in the third week of February. Now this is surely the authoritative answer to the question which arises in many minds as to the immediate situation and atmosphere out of which the Gaza clash developed. This is how the Mixed Armistice Commission describes the position which faced Israel in the Gaza area in the last week ofFebruary 1955: 1 45. A notre avis, le Conseil de securite ferait bien d'etudier les termes daDs lesquels la Commission mixte d'armistice d6crivait la situation, quelques jours avant l'incident de Gaza. Le 7 mars 1955, la Commission a adopte et publie une resolution sur les incidents qui s'6taient produits pendant la troisi!me semaine de fevrier. Cette resolution constitue, sans aucun doute, une n;ponse autoris6e ala question qui a surgi dans beaucoup d'esprits et qui est de savoir quels ctaient les antecedents immCdiats de cet incident de Ga7a. Voici comment la' Commission mixte d'armistice d6crit la situation a laquelle Isd devait fairo face, daDs la zone de Gaza, pendant la derni!re semaine de f6vrier 1955: «Releve une fois de plus !lvec inquietude les incursions constantes a travers la ligne de d6DUU'C8.tion de 1'armistice auxquelles se livrent des elements qui s'infiltrent en Israijl a partir du tenaitoire contrale par l'~te, et les actes illigaux que ces infiltr6s commettent en Isrdl; cc Notes once again, with concern, the continuous crossings of the armistice demarcation line from Egyptian-controlled territory into Israel by infiltraton and their illegal actions in Israel; U Decides that these aggressive actiont; constitute a flagrant violation by Egypt of article 11, paragraph 2, and article V, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement; . U Calls upon the Egyptian authorities to terminate immediately these aggressive actions by Egyptian military positions and the continuous infiltration into Israel." 46. In summarizing' Egyptian violations, I referred especially to the :assault near Rehovot, where an Israel citizen was killed by an Egyptian armed group within the heart of Israel, 24 miles from the Egyptian frontier. That was at the beginning of the last week of February 1955. This came two days after the penetration of an Egyptian intelligence unit, the same unit which had penetrated into Rishon le Zion, 29 miles within Israel. This is the northernmost thrust from Gaza into Israel which is marked on the map. 47. It is difficult for me to find words. with which to portray the degree of horror and alarm which this attack evoked. A unit ofthe Egyptian headquarters at Gaza had penetrated 29 miles into Israel and spent four days indulging in espionage and murder at Rishon le Zion and Rehovot. Never since the armistice was signed had there been a penetration ofsuch depth by an ft!med group of one party into the territory of another. It revealed an audacious quality of dynamic, purposeful hostility and of utter contempt for Israel's territorial integrity. Not a single citizen ofIsrael could fail, on reading ofthis event, to feel the cold wind of his own vulnerability. If the Rehovot episode could be repeated, then no life in Israel was safe from a farranging Egyptian assault. . 48. When we think of the soleIIm.~ty with which the Mixed Armistice Commission had urged Egypt to desist from these acts, and the contempt which those decisions had encountered; when we reflect that Egypt was known by everybody in Israel after the Bat Galim affair to have at least an equal contempt for the Security Council, whose decisions Egypt has frankly declared to be nonbinding upon itself, it is not surprising that our people should have become permeated by the strong resolve to resist further assaults launched under the directing hand ofEgyptian headquarters operating a few miles across the frontier. 49. The Rehovot attack is described in a Mixed Armistice Commission·resolution in' the following terms: (~ Dlcide que ces'actions agressi~es constituent une violation flagrante, par l'Egypte, de l'article 11, paragraphe 2, et de l'article V, paragraphe 4, de la Convention d'armistice general; « Fait appel aux autorites egyptiennes pour que celles-ci mettent fin sans tarder aces actions agressives commises a partir de positions militaires egyptiennes, et aux infiltrations continuelles en territoire israelien. » 46. En resumant les violations commises par I'Egypte, j'ai fait mention notamment de l'attaque qui a eu lieu pm de Rehovot, Oll un citoyen israelien a ete tue par un groupe arme egyptien au ~ur meme d'lsrael, a 38,6 km de la fronti~reegyptienne. C'cStait au debut de la derni~re semaine de fevrier 1955. Le fait 5".,est produit deux jours apres la penetration d'une unite du service de renseignements, la meme unite qui avait p6netre a Rishon-le-Zion, localite situee a 46,6 km des fronti~re!l d'Israel. n s'agit de la plus forte poussee vers le nord, de Gaza en territoire israelien, qui soit indiquCe sur la carte. 47. 11 m'est difficile de trouver des mots propres a depeindre l'horreur et l'alarme que cette attaque a soulevees: une unite du quartier general egyptien de Gaza. avait penetre en territoire israelien sur une profondeur de 46,6 km et y avait passe quatre jours, en se livrant a l'espionnage et au meurtre, tant a Rishon-le-Zion qu'a Rehovot. Depuis la signature meme de l'armistice, jamais un groupe arme de ~'une des parties n'avait penetre aussi loin sur le territoire de l'autre. Cet 3ete revelait une agressivite impudente, en meme temps que l'hostilite delibCree que l'Egypte eprouve a l'egard d'lsrael et son mepris total pour l'integrite territoriale de ce pays. En lisant les depeches relatives acet incident, aucun citoyen israelien n'a pu s'empScher de sentir a quel point it etait vulnerable. Si 1'incident de Rehovot pouvait se reproduire, personne en Israel ne se sentirait plus a l'abri d'une attaque egyptienne en profondeur. 48. Si on pense a l'appel solennel par lequel la Commission mixte d'armistice avait enjoint a I'Egyp~e de s'abstenir d'actes de ce genre, si on pense a l'accueil meprisant'que l'Egypte avait reserve aces resolutions, si on pense que depuis l'incident du Bat Galim, tout le monde en Israel sait que I'Egypte traite avec le m8me mepris les decisions du Conseil de securite, dont elle a conteste formellement le caract~re obligatoire, it il'est pas etonnant que notre peuple ait pris la ferme resolution de 1.'~ister a toute nouvelle attaque qui pounait etre declenchee par un quartier general e~!ptien installe a quelques lieues seulement de Il0tre fronti~re. 49. Dans la resolution qu'ellea adoptee a ce sujet,.la Commission mixte d'armistice decrit ainsi l'attaque de Rebovot: .. Finds further that the above-mentioned armed group, at approximately 1930 hours local time, on 25 February 1955, wantonly murdered an unarmed Israel civilian riding a bicycle on a main road near Rehovot, 40 kilometres inside Israel; .. Decides that the above aggressive acts against' Israel constitute a flagrant viomtion by Egypt of the General Armistice Agreement; .. Notes with grave concern the serious situation prevailing along the demarcation line; .. Ca/Is upon the Egyptian authorities to terminate finally and immediately all such acts of aggression and hostility against Israel and fully to respect and implement the General Armistice Agreement." SO. Is it seriously possible for anyone in full knowledge of these denunciations of Egypt by the Mixed Armistice Commission to assert that the Egyptian military headquarters on 28 February 1955 was the innocent victim of an attack which it had done nothing to provoke? If the Mixed Armistice Commission is held to be an authority on the Gaza incident itself, we cannot ignore the authority of its voice when it sP'"...aks to us time and time again of Egyptian aggression before the Gaza incident. SI. And what the Mixed Armistice Commission tells us is tragically clear. It tells us that the perioo immediately preceding the Gaza outbreak was marked by .. repeated firing from permanent Egyptian military positions on Israel patrols operating within Israel tenitory "; was marked by "continuous crossings from Egyptiancontrolled territory into Israel by infiltrators and their illegal actions in Israel "; by actions in which Egyptian armed groups" crossed the line and penetrated to a great depth into Israel "; by " repeated acts of aggression and hostility against Israel " which the Commission " called upon Egypt "-on 13 September 1954, 28 October 1954, 24 January 1955, 27 January 1955 and 7 March 1955- " to terminate finally and immediately ". 52. We are also informed by the Mixed Armistice Com- 52. La Commission mixte d'armistice nous declare mission, at its meeting on 7 March 1955, that " despite egalement. a sa s6anc6 du 7 mars 1955, que « malgr6 les the obligations imposed on Egypt by the General Armisobligations que la Convention d'armistice gen6ra1 et de tice Agreement and many decisions of the Mixed Armisnombreuses decisions de la Commission mixte imposent tice Commission, an end has not yet been put to the a l'Egypte, on n'a pas encore mis un terme aux actes aggressive and hostile acts by Egypt against Israel n. So d'agression et d'hostilite que l'Egypte comm.et a l'egard much for the language ofthe reports ofthe Mixed Armisd'Istael». Voila ce que la COmmission miXte d'armistice tice Comssion. dit dans ses rapports. 53. _ The Security Council also has before it two reports 53. Le Conseil de securite est egalement saisi de deux from the Chief of Staffof the Truce Supervision Organirapports du Chef d'ctat-major de l'Organisme chargeS de zation. The first refers to " a recrudescence of incidents, la sUrveillance de la treve. Le premier signale « surtout en mostly in Israel-controlled tenitory "-i.e., from Egypttenitoire sous contrale israelien, [c'est-a-mre a partir de " some ofthem of a serious nature" {S/3319 tJiiul Corr.l, l'Egypte] une recrudescence d'incidents dont certains ~'~~~~1~C~~~~'~~'~'~~.B~~~m.~~1~:~~~:~:~~~~~·~~~:~unm4m~~;R¥mAm~.:~~_~.~R~.~.~.3.1.9.e.ta.~.r.J.'~.'_~~.'.i~ SO. Peut-on serieusement pr6tendre, a~ tous ces blimes infIig6s a l'Egypte par la Commission mixte d'armistice, que le quartier gen6ra1 egyptien de Gaza a et6,le 28 fimer 1955,la victime innocente d'une attaque qu'il n'aurait provoqu6e en rien? Si 1'0n reconnait que la Commission mixte d'armistice peut se prononcer ~vec autorit6 sur l'incident de Gaza lui-meme, on ne saurait affirmer qu'elle n'a aucune autorite 10rsqu'elle evoque, maintes et maintes fois,les aetes d'agression commis par l'Egypte avant l'incident de Gaza. 51. Ce que la Commission mixte d'armistice nous dit a cc sujet est tragiquement clair. Elle nous dit que la p6riode qui a pr6c6d6 l'incident de Gaza a ete marquee par «les tirs r6p6t6s que des positions militaires egyptiennes fixes executent sur des patrouilles isra61iennes op6rant a l'int6rieur du tenitoire israelien»; par «115 incursions constantes... auxquelles se livrent des elements qui s'infiltrent en Israel a partir du terriioire contral6 par I'Egypte et les actes illegaux que ces infiltr6s commettent en Israel »; que pendant cette periode des groupes armes egyptiens avaient franchi la ligne de demarcationet « p6netr6 profonch;ment dans le tenitoire israelien»; que l'Egypte ne cessait en outre de commettre « des actes d'agression et d'hostilite a l'egard d'lsraCl», actes auxquels la Commission mixte d'armistice a invit61'Egypte « a mettre imm6diatement et definitivement fin » - par ses decisions du 13 septembre 1954, d1i 28 octobrc 1954, du 24 janvier 1955, du 27janvier 1955 et du? mars 1955. " The Gaza incident could appear in this context as retaliation for the spying, sabotage and murders for which the Egyptian military intelligence was said to be responsible " [ibid."para. 33]. The report advocates that the Egyptian authorities should take certain concrete and specific measures against infiltrators, since" otherwise it is understandable that ... the Israelis refuse to believe that a serious attempt is being made to prevent the depradations which eventually build up tension to a dangerous point " [ibid., para. 46]. 55. With all this accumulated evidence of Egyptian ~ggression before us, inscribed in the Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions and in the reports of the Chief ofStaff of the Truce Supervision Organization, is it not incredible to hear an Egyptian suggestion that the ~urity Council should ignore everything that the Mixed Armistiee Commission and the Chief <of Staff have said about this persistent Egyptian responsibility, and should deplore or condemn only the response which these Egyptian violations elicited, after they had been patiently endured week by week and month upon month? 56. The Security Council will note that there is nothing in the records of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in its consideration of Israel's attitude, to compare with its generalized criticism of Egypt for a constant and well sustained policy of military pressures against Israel. Indeed, the Egyptian representative himself was unable to make out any case against Israel for the te~sions existing in the Gaza region before 28 February 1955. He therefore went shopping around all the other parts of the Middle East. reaching back four years in an effort to concoct a selection of Isra.eli actions which might balance the story of recent Egyptian provocations in the Gaza region. The Egyptian representative would not have let his feet stray into the Huleh marshes in 1951 if he could have found any serious break in Israel restraint on the Egyptian frontier in the period under review. 57. Indeed, the one-sided character of Egyptian violations emerges clearly from an analysis of the 36 complaints listed n General Bums' report of 17 March 1955 [S/3371j. 58. Nine ofthese concern alleged overflights ofEgyptian territory. The. col,Dplaints were so inconseq~en~al and SS. Devant l'accumulation des faits qui sont relates dans les resolutions de la Commission mixte d'anmstice et dans les rapports du Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, et qui prouvent les actes d'agression de I'Egypte, n'est-il pas incroyable que le representant de 1'Egypte ait pu inviter le Conseil de securite A oublier tout ce que la Commission mixte d'armistice et le Chef d'etat-major avaient dit de ces fautes repetees de 1'Egypte, et a se contenter de deplorer ou de bUimer la riposte que ees violations egyptiennes se sont attire, apres avoir ete patiemment subies, des semaines et des mois durant? 56. Le Conseil de securite constatera qu'a I'egard d'Israel, les proces-verbaux de la Commission mixte d'armistice ne contiennent riee de comparable aux critiques generales que l'Egypte avait meritees par sa politique constante de pression militaire dirigee contre Israel. En fait, le representant de l'Egypte lui-meme n'a pu trouver de motif d'accuser Israel de la tension qui regnait dans la region de Gaza avant le 28 fevrier 1955. C'est pourquoi il a dQ fouiller toutes les autres regions du Moyen-Orient et revenir de quatre ans en amere, pour essayer de decouvrir quelque acte israelien que l'on puisse opposer au recit des provocations reeemment commises par I'Egypte dans la region de Gaza. Le representant de l'Egypte ne se serait pas egare dans les marais de Huleh, en remontantjusqu'en 1951, s'il avait pu trouver, sur la frontiere egyptienne, un seul attentat grave a imputeraIsrael, pendant la periode en question. 57. A vrai dire, l'examen des 36 plaintes egyptiennes enumerees dans le rapport du general Burns en date du 17 mars 1955 [S/3373] montre egalement que les violations de l'armistice ne viennent que de l'Egypte. 58. New de ces plaintes ont trait a de pretendus survols du territoire egyptien. Ces plaintes sont si anodines.et si ~ssion. At the end of September 1954, a group sent from Gaza to commit sabotage was caught after it had sniped at farmers and blown up holk.oq:s in the border settlements. In December 1954, four youths were caught trying to gather military information in Israel. They admitted that they had been trained and instructed by Egyptian intelligence officers in Gaza. For the second time within a month, the pipe-line near Nir Am was blown up on 7 September 1954 by a group of trained saboteurs. On 25 October, as I have already recorded, a similar attack on the pipe-line took place near Mefallsim. These incidents gave rise to the Mixed Armistice Commission's expression of" grave concern over the repeated acts of planned demoijtion in Israel by wen trained, organized and armed groups coming from Egyptian-controlled territory ". 66. The report of the Chief of Staff refers to a list of intelligence operations conducted from Egyptian territory against Israel, as published in the Hebrew newspaper Lame,Iun. I should like to make clear that this is not a mere newspaper publication, but an authorized statement by the General Staffofthe Israel defence forces. It therefore has a far greater official status than would belong merely to a newspaper publication. 67. On many occasions duriilg the latter months of 1954 and the early part of this year the Government of Israel sought remedy for this situation by diplomatic mearis. Our leaders and representatives constantly enpged the Chief of Staffofthe Truce Supervision Organization in discussions of Egyptian aggression, and pointed out the impossibility ofsuffering these assaults indefinitely without RSpOnse. We heard periodically from General Burns that he had duly transmitted our expressions of deep concern and his own desire to see armed marauding brought to an end. 68. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom also considered the. problem serious enough to warrant the use of their good offices within recent. months; and the Government of Israel received information from each of those. two Governments, as well as from the Government of Turkey, during the period between October 1954 and February 1955, concerning the representations which they had made in Cairo in support of the appeals of the Mixed Armistice Commission calling for the cessation of assaults and sabotage apinst Israel from the Oaza strip. 69. It is impossible for us to imagine that representatives on the Security Council, or the Security Council itself, can fail to include in their expressions of view a. strong condemnation of this campaign of hostility, organized in Gaza, to which Israel was subjected between the summer 69. :1: nous est impossible d'imaginer que des representants au Conseil de securlte, ou le Conseil de s6curite lui-mbe, puissent, en exprimant leur opinion, ne pas bllmer sevarement cette campagne d'hostilite organisCe A Gaza et dont Isra!l a ete I'objet depuis l'ete de 1954 70. On 28 January 1955, Major Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, stated publicly: . " Egypt will strive to erase the shame ofthe Palestine war. Even if Israel shoUld fulfil all United Nations resolutions, it will not sign a peace with her. Even if Israel should consist only of Tel Aviv, we shall never put up with that." . 71. On 15 October 1954, the official mouthpiece of the Egyptian regime, Al Gomhouriya, wrote: . "Egypt and the Arabs must turn in the name of humanity and culture to all nations of the world who will aid in wiping Israel offthe face ofthe map because ofits barbarism." 72. 00'16 November 1954, the" Saut el Arab "-the "Voice ofthe Arabs "-the official broadcasting station, . declared: " Egypt sees Israel as a cancer endangering the Arab peoples. Egypt is the physician who can uproot this cancer. Egypt does not forget thaiifis her obligation to take revenge, and she is ~obilizing an her forces in antici~tion of the hoped-for day." 73. A most important and conspicuous development took place only three days ago, on 20 March 1955, when Major Salem, a leading member ofthe Egyptian Govemment~indeed, the· Minister of National Guidancerevealed the underlying purpose of Egyptian harassment in the Negev. The object is to impede the development of the' Negev in order to bring about its annexation to Egypt. This insolent territorial claim put forward by Major Salem in the clear light of day ,is perhaps the ultimate source oftension on our southern frontier. 1 74. Let me say that neither Egypt, nor any other Arab ~tate, will get the Negev, nor is our territory available for bargaining in discussions of,regional·defenceorpnizations. The only·result of this 'aggi'elisive Egyptian insti~teurs m!mes de ces attaques egyptiennes. . 70. Le 28 janviCt 1955, le commandant Salem; MiniatIe egyptien de 1'0rientationnationale,.d6clarait ,ubtiqmmem: . « L'aS}rpte deploiera touS ses efforts'enVue'a"effacer la honte de la guerre de.Palestine. Metne si Isrdl appliquait toutesles molutions de l"OrganiS8ti01l,~ Nations Unies, l'Etel1esigneraitpas·1a,·paiX~.wc cc pays. M8me si lfifat d'Isra!l·neCompre~~~,.. seule vine de Tel-Aviv,nous ne tol~obi jamiis:SOIi existence.» . ..,. 71. Le 15 actobre 1954, le journalA1Gomllourlytz; organe oiRciel du regime egyptien, =yait: . '., .. « L'Egypte. et lesArabes doivelJ.t, ..f~" a~·.~ nom de I'humanit6 et ~ ~ cUlture" a to"les.i¥\t:t~ ' de l'univers aQn q~ ~~l'ai~nt.i,r.a~ "~.~.lf. ·carte du ~onde en ~()n ~ sa barbarie.» '.. ,..'.':,' 72. Le 16 novembre 1954,"la «SaUtel Arab »';':""18 « Voix des Arabes »- station de radiodiftUsion ofIideDe; d6cbifait: . . . «L'Egypte voit cri Isr8e1.un,~c~ Jijet)i:piilea populations arabes. L'~tc est m1il~~~Ltij po~e~ (;ecancer•.~.~te !l"o~b1i~.p;!lSqu,,~ lui incombe 'cJe prendre. sa reY8ncho,eJ.ceJIe i9Q~ toutes ses forces en a~a.nt le SraDd jCJur~:'" ,,0.' .-: ~- I - ~ 73. Un fait des plusimportantset_plusfelllarquables s~estprodUitvoici.~'joutS,'-I~·20,mars~ 1955iC €.!est~ . , jour-li. que ·le colimlaitdatitSaleDi, un·dei'ipril1cipa1li membres du Gouvemementemuen ..;..;,;..;pUisqG~ilexe.rce lesfonctions de Ministte de'I"Orientation ·natiOo8le~'. . rev61ele butq1iel':igyptevisait en:harcelaDtain'si.popiFlation du N~. n s'agit d~entraver,le'd6ve~t . du N6gueVaful que cette Rgioli ~;:paretre __ Al'Emte.Cette iJnpudentorevendieatiott _~ qui a·ete mise en avant;par aeComn\it.ii_t;8a1f:ID,c;~, vu et au su ~ tout'lemonde,iest '~~I&_uso':cIer.. niue de la tensionqqiseDumifestei 1lOf.l'lJ(ii""Qtl_ mendionale. .. 74. Permettez-moi de dire que ni l':Agypte, niaucun aUtre <&a.tarabe,n'aura lIe N6guev;noils.n"actmettrofIj jamais quenotreterritOirepuissefairerobjetde'~_ dages dans,lea n6goQiatiOllS'relati_ idel CqaDilatiODl, inte1'Dati~~life.roraState o~Y. to assert a ;claim to halt ~e tmitOl'Y onts neishbour, to Ia~h'dozens of ,,~~,uPon tHat territory against .~. inteinatioDat condemnation and, on the first oc:casion whenlt provokes RSistance, to run for protection to the Security Council- ~ veiy Security Council whOse authority it had repudiated a few weeks before? . 76. .My Government, ~.it listens to Egyptian leaders constantly maiDg .Israel's d~on,.often faces the question wJieth'etit can .pOSsibly owe obligations to a IOvemm~nt wliichenvisages its relationship with. us in those terms. No other State in the world-I repeat: no ~ S~teinthe w"=~.:'-has "ur experience of hearing its'emnctionorm\lfJlatioQ threatened and promised from neighbouriLg ~~-:tory but a few miles away. These sta~~t, and territori~ cblims represent the political motive of the viOlent incursions by Egyptian fon:es and arm~ groups. ,1'he,reverbetations,of these statements, which;are very wide and deep.in Israel and the Middle East, evoke in our. mind, wiUUn every specific armed itssaUlt,by· Egypt,.the basic .questions of Israel's survival and territorial integrity. 71.. 'nere is in~ ~methingso unique in Israel's PQsition, slirrOundedon rour sides by hostile neighbours W!iose cODVerging BSSalJ1ts.take. a toD of Israel'8 citizens anctthe mum onts·soittJiat it Iba!reqUire a special eft'ort of the imagination for other countries with more nortnal IliCurityattribUtes .to enVisage theinselfts in Israel's p61ition. . " . 78... Todo 80, you mustimasin~thattbe headq~of ahO$tile ~y'is mtua~ a few. Jbilesaway: from your mlJ8tpqpulousc:ntrts~,thatth~.•v~entwhi~h holds sway over-tbjsarmy fi1lnkly aspires to the-emQtiOnof -your statehOo<1 and the annexation of'yOur territorY; that from this headquatters, and at its behest,atDiedassaUlts ate' carried.-out .against .1our ,territ~ea into the!ftI'Y heart of'yourcountry..-..ofa kind which. neuttil bodycteacribes as "agresaion", II wen..plannecl military/assaults· ~'_and ~Iiabptage "; that aroupss8Dy forth at-the,'behest:of this headquarters af. miIesawayaDd blow'oqHhfH:entl'al W8teriupplies on whichyollt sute.- Dance and very survivaldepend; that this military hariIs- Jilent. is '_ accompanied' by, a maritimeb1ockade,·aIso denounced by intetnational authority; .anettbatthe,pace and.·intellsityof these hoUilepressurea mount week by weet;.wlule· all' diplomatic eft'orts to half them prove Uliliwiling.,; , . 79. ;What ·wouldyou do'i ,How' would'you respond? WoUld !the aniWet be to allow the oft'endiDg llI'Qly.the iacfefinite-use of!ita privilqed 1BIietUary"?'. ' 76. Enecoutalit les dirigeants egypti,ens;quine cessent de ~er la destructiond~sraa,mc:!ngo.1iverneJittdt se demande souvent stil doit se sentirlie par des obJjptions envers un gouvernement qUienl'isage ainm.soS"relations avec nous. Aucun autre Etat au monde-je r~te:a1Jcun autre Etat au monde - nes'est trouve dans le cas d'entendre un Etat dont le territoire n'est distant que de quelques kilom~tres Proferer a sonegard des menaces qui signifient son aneantissement ou sa~utilation. Cos cl6clarations etces revendications territoriales constituent le mobile politiquedesviolentes. incUrsions auxque1les se Iivrent les troupes et 108 &rQu.,pes armis de I'egypt~. Ces declarations etleurs.repercUssions, qui sont extr&nement profondes et vastes en Israel et dans tout le Moycn-orient, posent dans notre esprit, apres chaque attaque armee commise par I'egypte, la question de la survie meme et de I'in~&rite te1Titoti~e d'IsmeJ. 77. La position d'Isra!t -.- P!l~ entom de quatre cates par des.voisins hostiles dont les asSauts .convergents imposent a Isra!l des sacrifices e~ vies humaines et des pertes mateneUes - est a co Point uniq\1e que. d'4lutres pays, dont la sc5curite repose sur des bases plus nomuiles, devroDt faire un effort special d'imagination 'pour la comptendre. 78. ' Pource faire,. vous devrez imaginer que le quartier general d'une armee hostile est insta1le.a quelq1ies 1dI0- mil~ . de V08 cen~ Ies plus. peuples; que le. 89uverneinent quic-dirige cette .~. aspire.ouv~rtement a I'aneantissemenf de ',Otre etat et al'anneXion de votre tenitoire; qu'a partirde ce quaitier aeneral~ sur un mot d'ordre duditgouvemement, des forcesarmeesse·livrent contrewtretemtoire--- f~P.Pl.nt parfois le <8Utmtme de votrepays' ~ A des attaquos qu~un 'o~ileutre qualifie d'« aareision»; d'« attaques militaiRs bien pr6par6es' »et de «sabotage »; que, sur I'otdte.de ce quartier·aenerat siwe a quelq~ ~m6tres de distance, des'groupes s'eJancentet font sauter dans votre.tenitoire lea principales condUites d'eau, dontd6pendvotre su~ tance, Yotre viemllile; .que ce~leinent'Jnilitaire s'ac;compagne,d'unblocus '-tDariti_,~jlui·tussi par ~e autorite internationale;. enfin,.~ue l'aDure et l'intcnsite de ces incursions hostiles' augmententde semaine en semaine,tandis que tous les eft'orts diplo- ~tiq~ te~"-nt ales con~n.ir ser4Y~lel)tinfructJleux. 79•.':Que -feriez-vousen ce" cas'1.CO_ent· rij;osteriez- VOUI 'l~ttriez.VOlll 11'Il'!Me·de l'envahilieur.dc se JriWloit indBniJnent cte SOD immUniti?·· ' 82. '.B\1t,'.until sucli •.#me ~ •.progreSs'.~ ma,de towards peace, itbecome$increasitigly urgent to'correcttbe defects ~d ·maperf~9~,gfJh~ ,~ticesYstem~ . the n1ain ~h .in this, ~telJ1'~.t1urproommation()fa"s~~cjf ~UigerenCy'~d 'the a,pplic:atidn of ~t doCtrine in 8Ct$ ofwar by sea and land. , . ' ..... . 83. My Government is prepared to: give an.ass.ance tbat,if no hop'Ue &et is.cartiedout by Egypt against 1Itae1, then· DO.hostiIe.aetofanykiad will.J~eatriecl'out by lan&el'against EJ1Pt." Indeed, thisjso.tminirilaJ·plea ,to'Egypt: prevent yout armedfon:es and'armecf,sroups ~ er~goUi'frontiers.;.8topfuingonour patrols and viJlaps;oease blowing,up ourwatersuppJiee; 'abolisll these activities of sabotage, ·demolition and murder; do ,not .dpec)pl~ eith~int() Uie lJ.eart.of,ourco~try or =:r:t~r:J't:=··t:~~:o~eti~Jictla:: ,()r 1aying'~.to, o~,~t9q;reflO1Jll~~eibloqka,de t.o wlUc4yo~ ~shthas ~nintematiC)n,~nY~~i ~9P J.iJWI;'8 .t.he~~flt ;.ao.d P1'ov~ti~n •.()f~~.r a tlleme of.Y01U'J;latiODI,'Jpollcy.. JJy sU~iaimple) ,re~j}-. dation, of. useless hostiliJ,Egypt c;&n:ODS~,:Q~OJir pan.• profound, un~rjg.a.nd .univers.al,~ .tot its Peace and intepity.· .','. '.''',' ", ' 8S.The acceptance of such a code of Bmtian-Israel relati,G~PS would not take us beyoDd our existing ~mmitn1eDts; under the armistice agreement and the Charter of th~ l,Jnited Nations. These ~e all things that ~Jlave:agreed to do already. But under the burdeD of belli~Dt doctrines the ,,pacific obligations which we haveundertakeD have 1:iecome lost to sight, and the u.sidic;»us fallacy ofa. stateofwar has. spread its CODtagion both to the thcoJ'Y andto the practice ofour relationships. If theGo~entof Egypt, through its· delegatiol4 is able at any stage to give an affirmative answer to these questioDs, my Government would make whol&.hearted reaponse:, . .' 86., .. The,~urity Council,in ourjtidgQ1ent, can do ~uch to wi~<lthe distortion of the lltmistice agr~lDeDt by ~e4~e. ofUIJilatetai ~llige~ncy. It 'must be clear . to everybOdy studying the reports'and !be tables and the Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions which I have Q1io~liereth&trorthe COuncil to CGillin~ its judgment or·aiticismtotbe GazaincideDt alone would be gravely prejUdiCial and inequitable.' It would certain1ybean mapPi'Opriilte COnmtetltaryOD official reports which show Egyptian:; violatiollS to have beeD more Dumerous and more" .in~liUd ·bnaDy·Israel reactions which'have foHowedthem. 8?: 'My deleglluon feels justified iD. seekin'ga c»ndem- Il&.ti~~by tHeSecittity CQimcj1 ofthe Egyptian incursions, m~' demolition and sabota' aetivities describec.tin ., '. . '.' ,.,se .. ' ,. <ieJ1erat BUrnS's report [8/3371] as ace main cause'" of pre&eDttension,aDd in the MiXed Armistice Commission feSC)IUtions'as cc repeated aggreSsive acts by Egypt agaiDst ISrael ". .... .. . . . SS. We ,~kcollfirmation o(theSecurity Council,s view thatth~. ,c~m .or ~ce of active. ~11igerency by land and sea is 'iDconsisteDt with the General Armistice A~entand the qtarter of'the UDited.~atioDs. ~ .0"; .~.... ~ • ~~:i,"; We,lIr8~ a reassertion' bY'the.p8rtiesof tHeir obJi- .ii~J;lS .to~IiOthermtehDs ofnon;'belligerency, pacific ~~~t',ancl'~ for. politiCal. independence and ~.tOri8l int~gritY, 'and .we await the" Egyptian reply·to .tIlIS ~po.l~ ; . 90.:'" We advOcate, after six years ofarmistice, a serious ,~ff'ort.to lD,ake a traDsiti~n towards~neDt peace.' 93. I must confess, that ,I listened to 'the speech with great attention. . Whatstruek.me ,was-that it was' very eaSy t~ count the few brief passages relating to our agenda, namely, th~' complaint subtnitted by Egypt.to .theSecurity Council. Today the representative of Israel once more,:-attempted to smother the precise and definite complaint which the' Couitcilis discussing now in a general debate on the Palestine question. It is not the first time Mr. Ebanhas used this procedure.· He resorted to the same method when the SecurityCouitcil was discussing the Qibya question. Today he attemp~,and . with good reason, to leave on one side the bloody aggression at Gaza, as if that were not the subject of 011r discussion. He evaded ,any discussion of this act·, of war. He carefully avoided touching upon the fully w.ablished responsibility of his Government,. He d.i~ not say why the culprits had not been punisbed. .He expressed·no .regret. Furthermore, his speech, which as 'usual was intended for propaganda purposes, was full of omissions, inaccuracies and slanderous obser.. vations, which Israel has seen:fit to make on the occasion ·of the most heinous. of an the acts of aggression which have been committed. 94: My,deleption '!ill ref~n from 'fonowing Israel in this course. Whatever Mr. Eban's arguments to cover up the Gaza incident, the facts are there. Theyare relevant. No one can deny that Israel has Committed a brutal· Bet ofoutrighf' aggression,· prepared, andperpetrated with the assent of Israel's responsible leaders and carried out by means of its regular armed forceS: 95. I shouldlike now to make a few comments, chiefiy on General Burns' report [8/3373]. I shall begin with a general observation on the report; 96. That report goes far beyond the Urgent colJSider· 9(1. 'CerapPort 'a; debord~larsemebtle c.me'des,~.. ations relating to the aggression agilinst Gazaon which derations urgehtes cOncernanfl'agfession~Il",: ~, the CoUncil has to decide when it discusS:es tlte Egyptian SW laquelleleCOnsei1'estappeleAse-Pton0iH¥~;~is­ Complaint, whi~h,as you bow, is. worded as'folloWs: CUtantla:p18.inteegyptiennequi,·tomme!o'im,le_~'cst "Violent and. ptemeditat.ed a.w..', ~ss.i.on,..... co.·· ••·.tn.tn~tt,··.·.'ed li~ll~;;:o¥~~t~nte,. ~et::'~i;~~:~;i~;·le on 28 February 1955, by Israel.,armedfotcesapiDst 28 f6Vrier I~S5 par les f()~satmeesiStaelieDneSconm Egyptian anned. forces , illside~gyptian-<:Qntt9ned lea fo'-"Ces armees egypticWles ,8 l~int6rieurdu territerritory J'I.e:-.r G~ causing.many ~wUtie~,inclH<ling toire sous contr61e 6gyptien ~ de Gaza, ayant caUse 39 d~d and 32 woUnded, and thcdesttucuoii. of d.enombreuses victimes dont 39 marts .et 32 ,bleil6st certain 'D}ilitaryiilstallations~invi0b!tlonof,inter alia, , ...:8illsjque lad~~(i~.cie~!f~~t)"ffiiJi. article' I,paragraph 2, ~d article~, parasrai'lf 2, i"~taii'es,·ert~ta~',c·lio..ta~~~;i19?'m~f,de;J~~ of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armis.tice Agreement."; premi,er.~p'alP~I'.~~.e.t~·l:~C:le.,~'~pl.i2, . ,.j1e, la., Con~ention ~'~~tiqe, ~6I:aI, "~oisraelieilD.e.»' . - -. ,- ." ~ , ....~ -,. 97.. My delegationis of.theopinion thatGeneraU~urns did not stay within the limits laid down for hitn by:the i Council. The fact is; that the members' of th,,·Security ! 93. J'm ecoute, je dois ravouer, ce discOurs a~beau· coup d'attennon.-Ceqi!rm'a~'fm~p6;--C"est,qu'oll:peut comptei' lescourts passages qUi se:mpP9rteilt Anotie ,nrdre du jour, a savoir la plainte d.e rEgypte qui 'est soumise .au C0nSeil d.~ securite. i\,1ijourd'hlii,le ,representant d'lsrael aessaye unefoisencore de ",oye1" ~ un d.ebatgen~rahurlaquestiond.e Paleatme~noue plainte cOncr~te etpr6cisc, que le Conseildisctrte~l1joUtd'hui.Ce n'est~la premi~efoisque M.EbaJfempl()i~.ceprotede. Deja au moment des discussionS duCoitseilae skurite sur,laquestion de.QibYa,il a eu recours ab m8me moyen. D. s'est efforce'aujourd'hui, et pOQl', cause~ de ~.•4e cate la sangiante agression de ~ COmnt~ si 'el1e~*~~t pas le'.sujet'denotre debat., Daesquive,ladisCUSSion sur eet acte de guerre~ D a evit6 soigneuseinel1t'det1'aitet'cIc 1& responsabilite de son gouvernementsj responsabi~qu! est pleinement etablie. D n'a pas dit pourquoi les cou· pables n'avaientpasete cbiti6s.Do,'a exprime',-,JICUn regret. ',De ·plus,ce discOurs,destin6 ....... comme ,d'habi· tude-- a lapropagande,·est'remplid'o!niisions, d~inexac­ titudes et' d'observationsinjurieusesqu'IsraeIs'eIt 'cru oblige de Pl'oferera l'~ioll de la'pIu odieuse ,des agressioDs'qui .~ent ja.tnai$ete commises. ~.' Ma d61eg&tlQIl~'abS#~ij~'4esuiVreISr8$~ur:i;e terrain.. Quels que soi~nt les argUments de'M. Eban pour noy.er l'incident 4e Gaza, les f~ts sont lA. nssont perti. nents~' Pel'8'ofu;l.e ne peut Dierqu~Israaa. CODIlDis. agressioncaract6risee, ~tptepa.'ef~ 'WC 1'8SSentimelltc de~'seB:diti~tsrespQnSables' et,·~tee par ses forces armees r6guli~: . . .. .' 95. le vou~mainte~t formuter queicll~_n. ta,i.l'es, principale~bt~ur lerappcttt ,du.~el'af.IlJir"!';; [8/33'13].. Je coJl;UJlence~,par une obsetvation'cf'orcire general cOnceptant le.rap~n.. '.<,;, • ..:t ,,",~LJ·;:. ...1 .... ··" 97; Ma d61egation estimeque le.g6n6ralBums..,.1eat pas confin-e _lea limitea qui.lui·.amentete,,_.... parle ConseiJ. En tiret, lea membres duConseildeI6curite 99. At the Council's 693rd meeting, on 17 Marc14 I cIiIcussecl the ciR:umstances of this atrocious aggression in cIetaiI, and I do·not think that any useful purpose would be served by reverting to that point today. 100. In his report, General Burns refers to the situation, during the four months preceding the aggression, on the dOllWaltion line which separates· the Gaza area ~der Egyptjan control from territory under Israel control. 101. -Before I·refer -to -GeneraL.Bums· repo~ 1 should like to tecall what General Bennike said in his report to the Security Council at its 630th meeting, on 27 October Im: .... "The Egyptian-eontrolled area known as the • Qaza strip' is about 4 kilometres wide and 50 kilometres long. It has a population of approximately 2SO,OOO, of whi~h 200,000 are Palestine refugees.. The majority of Israel complaints in connexion with that area refer· toinfiltratiQn into Israel. Water pipes, pumps, cattle and crops Julve been stolen from the IsraelseUleQl(mts in the Nesev. The Is~lis have re~ted by shooting at Arabs seen crossing the demarcation line. They have ~o sent motor patrols along the line, and shot.at Arabs working on their lands in Egyptian-eontrolled territory... f " One ofthe latest and gravest incidents in the Gaza $trip hp ~nth~attaekupon severalhouses and huts in the Arab refugee ~p of Bureij on the night of 28 August... Bombs were thrClWD.through the windows of huts in which refugees were sleeping and, as they led, they were attacked by small arms and automatic weapons. The casualties were 20 killed, 27 seriously .wounded and ·35 less seriously wounded... prc5mc5di~c5e, ordonnee par les autoritts israeliennes, contre des forces de l'armc5e reguIim egyptienne, en violation de la Convention d'armistice general et de la Charte des Nations Uries. 99. Je me suis etendu, dans l"intervention que i'ai faite 1 la 693· seance, tenue le 17 man, sur les circonstances de cette atrace agression, et je crois inutile d'y revenir aujourd'hui. 100. Dans son rapport, le general Bums nous a parle de la situation Ala tigne de demarcation qui sc5pare la zone de Gaza souscontrale egyptien du territoire sous contral" israc5lien, au cours des quatre mois qui ont prc5ec5de l"agression. 101. . AV8Jlt d~mc: refererau rapport du genc5raI Bums,je voudrais rappeler ce que mentionnait le genc5raI Bennike dans son rappolt pr6sentc5 au Conseil de securitc5, Asa 630e seance, le 27 octobre 1953: « La region qui est occupc5e par les Egyptiens et qui est connue sous le nom de « bande de Gaza »'est une bande de terre large de 4 kilom~tres et longue de 50kilom~tres environ. Elle a une population d'errviron 250.000 personnes, dont 200.000 sont des rc5fugits palestiniens. La plupart des plaintes formulc5es par lesIsraeliens au sujet 4e cette region ont trait Ades infiltrations dans rEtat d'Israel. Des conduites d'adduction d'eau, des pompes, du b6tail et. des rc5coltes ont c5tc5 derobts aux colons israeliens du Neguev. A titre de reprc5sailles, les Israeliens ont tire sm'les Arabos qu'lls voyaient rranchir la ligne de demarcation. lis ont egalement envoye, le long de la ligne, des patrouilles motorisc5es, et lls ont tire sur les Arabos qui travaillaient leurs terres situc5es dans le territoire occupc5 par rEgypte..• «L'un des incidents 108 plus r6cents et les plus graVes qui. se .soient, produits dans la bande de Gaza est l'attaque lan. contre plusieurs maisons et baraques du camp de refugits arabos de Bureij pendant la nuit du 28 aodt... Des bombos ontete lancc5es par 105 fen!tres des baraques dans lesquelles dormaient des refugits qui, lonqu'ils ont pris la fuite, ont c5t6 att&qu6s au moyen .d'annes 16g6res et d'armes automatiques. n y·a eu 20 morts, 27 bleH6s graves et 35 bIeua moins ....ves... 102. The Egyptian authorities are having the demar- 102. Les autorites egyptiennes font circuler des pacation line Patrolled to prevent infiltration. As you trouilles sur la ligne de demarcation pour empScher les know, a severe law has been promulgated which provides infiltrations. Comme vous le savez, une loi severe It c5te heavy penalties, including up to five years' imprisonment, promulguee, qui prevoit des peines tres lourdes, allant for infiltrators. This law has been enforced rigorously. jusqu'l\ cinq ans de prison, pour les infiltres. Cetteloi est since 1950. Furthermore, it must be remembered that rigoureusement mise en ~uvredepuis 1950. En outre, il ne a very large number of infiltrators are captured by tile faut pas oublier qu'un tRs grand nombre d'infiltrcSs sont Israel authorities and given heavy sentences. Many other captures par lesautorites israeliennes et condamn6s l\ des infiltratoR are killed by Israel troops in attempting to peines sev~res. D'auu'e8 sont tRs souvent tues par les cross the demarcation line. Only a few days ago, 0':;' troupes israeliennes lorsqu'ils essaient de franchir la ligne 18 March, a boy of 13 and a girl of 12 were gathering de demarcation. Pas plus tard que le 18 de ce mois, c'estgrass and crossed the demarcation line by mistake. They , l\-dire il y a quelques joms, un ~n de 13 ans et une were both killed by Israel soldieR. Egypt has lodged a fillette de 12 ans qui ramassaient de l'herbe ont par erreur complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission. franchi la ligne de demarcation. I1s ont ete tues taus les . deux ~ les soldats israeliens. Une plainte a ete soUmise par I'Egypte l\ la Commission mixte d'armistice. 103. In the list of compJaints included in General Burns' report, there are 99 complaints by Israel against Egypt [SI33?3, annex JI]. These complaints included 80 cases ofinfiltration from Egyptian-controlled t~tory, 10 cases of crossing of the demarcation line by armed groups, 4 cases of firing across the demarcation line and 3 cases of crossing of the line by armed units. No request for an investigation was made by Israel in respect of 48 of the 99 complaints it had brought against Egypt. The complaints in respect of which no investigation was requested are thus meaningless and have no probative value. What should be stressed here is that of the ~ complaints presented by Israel agaillst Egypt, 80, submitted during the last four months, concern infiltrations. 104. The 36 Egyptian complaints against Israel [813373, annex IVl. on the other band, include 9 cases of firing across the demarcation line, 9 over-flights of Egyptiancontrolled territory, 6 cases of crossing of the line by armed groups, and 3 cases of crossing of the line by armed units. 105. In going over the list of Israel complaints against Egypt which appear in annex V of General Burns' report, and which relate to the months of November and December 1954, and January and February 1955, we find that most of them are minor complaints, With your permission, I shall cite a few examples: Complaint No. 1-119, of IS November 1954: an infiltrator named Mohamed Rahtivi Abu Wadi was captured inside Israel territory. Complaint No. 1-126, of 22 November 1954: an infiltrator, Musala Abu Jargal El Organi, was captured in Israel. Complaint No. 1-130, of 24 and 2S November 1954: infiltratOR ettempted tMft. 103. Dans le tableau des plaintes que renferme le rapport du general Burns, il y a 99 plaintes d'lsrael contre I'Egypte [S13373, annexe V). Sur ces 99 plaintes, il y a eu 80 cas d'infiltration en provenance du territoiresous controle egyptien, 10 cas de francbissement de la ligne de demarcation par des groupes en armes, 4 cas de coups de feu tires par-dessus la ligne de demarcation, 3 cas de franchissement de la ligne de demarcation par des detachemeilts en aones. Sur les 99 plaintes presentees contre l'~gypte, 48 n'ont fait I'objet d'aucune demande d'enquale par Israel, si bien que ces plaintes, l'O.ur lesquelles aucune investigation n'a ete demandee, n'ont aucune valeur Oil force probante. Ce qu'il importe donc de sou- ~f~::P;':~i~0,S~9Ie~]=:~~~e:~~~0~~~~ trait a des infiltrations. 104. Par contre, sur les 36 plaintes de rEgypte contre Israel [SI33?3, annexe IV], il Ya eu 9 cas de coups de feu tires par-dessus la ligne de demarcation, 9 cas de survol du territoire SOllS controle egyptien, 6 cas de franchissement de la ligne par des gtoupes en armes et 3 cas de francbilisement de la ligne par des detachements en armes. . 105. En parcourant la liste des plaintes formulees-par Israel contre l'Egypte qui figurent dans l'annexe V au rapport du general Burns, et qui concement les mois de novembre et deeembre 1954 et de janvier et fevrier 1955, nous constatons que la plupart d'entre eUes sont des pJaintes lc5gm-es et je vais me permettre de·vous citer quelques exemples: Plainte nO 1-119, du 15 novembre 1954: un individu du nom de Mohamed Rahtivi Abu Wadi, qui s'etait infilue, a ete capture en territoire israelien. Plainte nO 1-126, du 22 novembre 1954: un individu, Musala Abu Jargal El Organi, qui s'etait infiltr6, a' 6te capture en Israel. Plainte nO 1-130. des 24 et 2S novembre 19S4: des maraudeun ont commis une tentative de vol. ~ group of infiltrators were encountered by an Israel patrol. Fire was opened and one of the infiltrators was killed. Complaint No. 1-148, of 18 and 19 December 1954: infiltrators crossed the demarcation line and stole a horse. Complaint No. 1-150, of 19 and 20 December 1954: an infiltrator crossing the demarcation line attempted theft. He was intercepted, but escaped. 106. 1 do not wish to deal at greater length with this subject; all these complaints are listed in the annex to ~e report. 107. 1 cited these few Israel complaints against Egypt in order to show that these complaints, in particular those concerning infiltrators, are of a very minor nature and concern incidents which certainly do not threaten peace and security in the Middle East. Mr. Eban was careful not to mention these minor complaints; he confined himself to the more important border incidents. 107. Si je me suis permis de· vous citer ces quelques plaintes d'lsrael contre l'Egypte, c'est pour vous donner une idee que ces plaintes, surtout ceIles qui concernent les infiltrateurs, sont des plaintes tres legeres qui, certainement, se rapportent ades faits qui ne menacent pas la paix et la securite au Moyen-Orient. M. Eban s'est bien gard6 de citer ces plaintes legeres; it s'eat contente de citer les incidents de frontiere les plus importants. 108. Je voudrais egalement souligner que la Commission mixte d'armistice n'a pas rendu de decision concernant des questions d'infiltration avant le 3 aoftt 1954. Depuis cette date, eUe a pris quelques decisions co~cernant des questions d'infiltration, dans lesquelles eIle a considere que la Convention d'armistice general avait ete violee, et je vais me permettre de vous donner deux exemples de ces condamnations: « La Commission mixte d'armistice « Constate que, le 10 juillet 1954, un civil, Labad Salem Salama Abou Dahban, a franchi la ligne de demarcation dans la region de Gaza et a penetre en territoire israelien, « Decide que cet acte, commis par un civil venant du territoire sous contr6le egyptien, est incompatible avec les dispositions de l'article V, paragraphe 4, de la Convention d'armistice general. » De m8me: «La Commission mixte d'armistice « Constate que, le 23 juillet 1954, un civil nomme Riza Mohamed Hamd El Najjar a franchi la ligne de demarcation dans la region de Gaza et a penetre dans le territoire sous contr61e israelien, «Decide· que cet acte est incompatible avec l'article V, paragraphe 4, de la Convention d'armistice general. » 109. Je pourrais vous citer aussi d'autres cas semblables, mais ce que je voudrais mettre en relief, c'est que la delegation de l'Egypte ala Commission mixte d'armistice a, sur la question de princi.pe, interjete appel contre toutes les decisions (loncernant l'infiltration devant le Comite 108. I should aiso like to stress that the Mixed Armistice Commission took no decision on the alleged infiltrations prior to 3 August 1954. Since that time, it has taken some 'decisions concerning cases of infiltration where it felt that the General Armistice Agreement had been violated, and I should like to quote two examples of these condemnations: " The Mixed Armistice Commission " Notes that, on 10 July 1954, LabadSalem Salama Abu Dahban, a civilian, crossed the demarcation line in the Gaza region and penetrated into Israel territory, "Decides that this act, committed by a civilian comingfrom Egyptian-controlled territory, is incompatible with the provisions of article V, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement." And similarly: " The Mixed A~mistice Commission "Notes that, on 23 July 1954, a civilian named Riza Mohamed Hamd El Najjar crossed the demarcation line in the Gaza region and penetrated into Israel-controlled territory, "Decides that this act is incompatible with the provisions of article V, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement." 109•. I could quote you other similar cases, but wl-at I wanted to emphasize was that the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission has appealed to the Special Committee, on the question of principle, against every decision on a·case of infiltration.· The 110. In this connexion, I should like to refer to what Mr. S. Roscnne, legal adviser to the Israel Ministry for Foteign Affairs, states in his book, Israel's A.rmistice Agreements with the A.rab States.1 The following passage appears on pages 45 and 46: .. On 12 September 1949 the attention of the Israel' Minister of Defence was drawn to the increase in the number of incidents of armed robbery caused by Arab infiltrators coming across the armistice demarcation lines, and a parliamentary question on the subject was asked. Mr. Ben Gurion replied that the relations between Israel and her neighbours were established by the armistice agreements which forbid all warlike or hostile acts. For this reason such acts ofrobbery were to be regarded as criminal offences under the ordinary law, no different from any other thefts. This answer seems to conform with the accepted practice in Europe, at all events. There it is now recognized that as an armistice falls into the .category of acts of State, individuals acting on their own responsibility and in circumstances in which the authority of a State cannot be established or is not implied, cannot be guilty of a breach of armistice, however much they may be guilty of an ordinary criminal offence. There is no reason why the same rule should not apply to the armistices which were negotiated under the direction of the Security Council." 111. I should add that it is Dot Egypt'S fault if these appeals· are still pending before the Special Committee. The Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission officially asked the Chiefof Staffofthe Truce Supervision Organization not to convene any meeting of the Special Committee. In a communication to the Egyptian representative on 7 February 1955, the Chiefof Staffexpressed regret at the delay in convening the. Committee and the hope that meetings could be resumed shortly. 112. I should also like to add that in paragraph 6 of its resolution concerning the aggression at Gaza [8/3373, annex 111), the Mixed Armistice Commission found that the terious situation prevailing at Gaza was the result of the Israel aggression. . 113. The insignificance of these complaints, which relate in particular to infiltration, is also shown by the fact that the Israel delegation agreed to withdraw all complaints1ofthis nature lodged with the Mixed Armistice Commission between November 1952 and 3 August 1954. 114. Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that the .. infiltrators " who cross the demarcation line sometimes I. Sbabtai Rosenne, lsrul's Armistice Agreements with the Arab I Sbabtai Rosenne, lsraerll Armilltice Agree".nt with the Arab Statu; Blumstein's Booklltores Ltd.; TeI Aviv, 1951. Statu, Blumstein's Bookstores Limited, Tel-Aviv, 1~" -. 113. Ce qui demontre aussi le peu d'importance de ces plaintes concemant particulierement l'infiltratiOQ,c~est que la delegation d'Israel a accepte deretirer touteS leS plaintes relatives acette question et qui ont ete presentees de novembre 1952 au 3 aodt 1954ala Commission mixte d'armistice. - 114. En outre, il ne faut-pas perdre de vue que les «infil;. trateurs » qui franchissent la ligne de demarcation le font 116. It cannot be forgotten, however, that Israel created the refugee problem, and that it did so by failing to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions. 117. The mere comparison between individual and isolated acts of infiltration and the attacks by regular Israel'forces makes it clear that the Israel aggressions are of a violent and horribly brutal character. The armed expeditions against Bureij and Gaza, Which took place in Egyptian-controlled territory, are striking examples of Israel acts of war, which constitute a definite threat to peace and security in this part of the world.. 118. It is probably for these reasons that General Burns expressed himself as follows: .. The number ofcasualties prior to the Gaza incident reflects the comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line during the greater part of the period November 1954 to February 1955. According to the complaints received from both sides there were, during these four months: 4 Israelis killed and 4 Israelis wounded; 1 Egyptian killed and 7 Egyptians wounded. There were more casualties among Arab infiltrators into Israel territory: 8 were killed, 2 wounded and 13 captured .. [S/3373, para. 11]. 119. Furthermore, this comparative tranquillity was emphasized by most of the delegations which took part in the discussion at the Security Council's 692nd meeting, on4 March 1955. 120. The United States representative said, among other things: .. We had felt that, since the last meeting of the Security Council on the Palestine border situation-in fact, for almost a year now, despite a num~r oC effor~ons de fBite observer, c'est que, sur le plan individuel, le probl~me se pose pour de nombreuses raiaons d'ordre purement humanitaire. Ces raisons existeront tant que les gens vivront, souffriront et se souviendront » [638e seance, par. 63]. 116. On ne peut quand m8me pas oublier qu'Isra~na cr66 le probleme des refugies, et cela, en ne mettant pas en ~uvre lea resolutions des Nations Unies qui les concernent. 117. Une simple comparaison entre les actes individueis et isoles d'infiltration et les attaques des forces reguli~res israeliennes etablit que les agressions israeliennes revetent un caract~re de violence et d'odieuse brutalite. Les expeditions arm6cs de Bureij et de Gua, qui ont eu lieu dans les territoires sous controle egyptien, sont un exemple vivant des actes de guerre israeliens, qui portent sOrement atteinte a la paix et a la securite dans cette partie du monde. 118. C'est sans doute pour ces raisons que le general Burns a retenu que: « Le nombre des pertes subies avant l'incident de Gaza donne une idee de la tranquillite relative qui a regne au voisinage de la ligne de demarcation pendant la plus grande partie de la periode allant de novembre 1954 a fevrier 1955. D'apr6s les plaintes r~ues des deux parties, les pertes durant ces quatre mois ont ete les suivantes: 4 tues et 4 blesses israeliens; un tue et 7 blesses egyptiens. 11 y a eu aussi des pertes parmi les Arabes qui se sont infiltres en territoire israelien: 8 tues, 2 blesses et 13 prisonniers» [S/3373, par. 11]. 119. De plus, cette tranquillite relative' a ete d'ailleuts soulignee par la plupart des delegations qui ont pris la parole a la 692e seance du Conseil de s6curit6, tenue le 4 mars dernier. 120. Le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique a declare notaIllIltent: « Nous avions I'impression que, depuis la derni6re seance ou le Conseil s'est occupe de la situation qui r~gne sur les fronti~res. de la Palestine - c'est-a-dirc 122. And the representative of the United Kingdom said: " Her Majesty's Government regards this incident as all the more deplorable in that, according to our information. the situation on this demarcation line, though never so q.uiet as all ofus would wish, had not deteriorated in the past few months .. [ibid., para. 20]. 123. It is obvious from these statements that the infiltrations and frontier incidents which took place during those last four months, and which are described in General Burns' report, had. not reached such a degree of seriousness as to threaten peace and security in the Middle East. On the other hand, it is the savage and brutal aggressions carried out by the regular forces of the Israel army, and prepared and organized by the responsible Israel authorities, which constitute a serious threat to peace. 124. As he himselfsays, General Burns has endeavoured in his report to find out whether there was a special. immediate cause'for the Gaza aggression on 28 February 1955; and he has spoken of the responsibility of the Egyptian military intelligence service, in the context of whose actions the Gaza aggre~sion might appear to be an act of reprisal. 125. In this connexion, I shall point out that in the Press on 1 March 1955, the morning following the Gaza aggression, the Israel army spokesman, with a propaganda purpose in view, and in order to secure, in one way or another, the acceptance of that horrible act of aggression by public opinion, disseminated certain .statements which General Bums has described in his report and which claimed that the Egyptian authorities at Gala had been engaging in espionage. General Bums states, in his report: " [The Israel army SpOkesman] claimed that Egyptian agents had been caught by the Israel army and sentenced to prison terms; ten had been killed in clashes with Israel patrols, five had escaped. The army spokesman added that the Egyptian military authorities in the Gaze strip were conducting spying and sabotage operations in Israel territory. 'C The above officially released information about Egyptian intelligence patrols was supplemented in the Hebrew newspapers of 1 March by details on alleged Egyptian espionage and intelligence activities since January 1954. Annex VU to this report contains a translation of the most complete list published to 122. Et le representant du Royaume-Uni a d1t: . « Le Gouvemement de Sa Majeste trouve l'incident d'autant plus deplorable que, d'apres les renseignements qui nous sont parvenus, la situation n'avait pas empire ces derniers mois le long de cette ligne de dem.llrcation - meme si elle n'a jamais et6 aussi Calme que nous l'aurions souhaite tous » [Ibid., par. 20]. 123. n resulte clairement de ce qui precMe que les infiltrations et les incidents de fronti~re qui. se sont deroules pendant les quatre derniers mois et qui sont relates daDs le rapport du genCral Burns n'avaient pas atteint un degre de gravite de nature amenacer la paix et la s6curite dans le Moyen-Orient. Par contre, ce sont ces agressions sauvages et brutales exercees par les forces rc5guli.n de l'armee israelienne - et prc5parc5es et organis6es par les autorites responsables israeliennes - qui constituent une menace sc5rieuse ala paix. 124. Dans son rapport, le general Burns a essaye, comme itl'a dit d'ailleurs, de determiner si l'agression qui s'est produite aGaza le 28 fevrier 1955 avait une cause imm6- diate et precise et, dans ce cadre, it a parle de la responsabilite du Service de renseignements militaires egyptien, dont les agissements auraient pu faire apparaitre l'agression de Gaza comme un acte de repr6sailles. 125. Je ferai observer ace sujet que, daDs lapiesse.du ler mars 1955, dans la matinee qui a suivi l'agression de· Gaza, le porte-parole de l'armee d'!srael, dans un but de propagande et pour pouvoir, d'une mani~ ou d'une autre, faire accepter par l'opinion pubIique. mondiale ~.t horrible acte d'agression, a diffuse.certaines declarationS que le general Burns a relat6es daDs son rapport et oil it est pretendu que les autorites egyptiennes·a Gaza se livraient a l'espionnage. Le general Bllri1s declare notamment dans son rapport: « [Le porte-parole de l'armee isra6lienne] a affirm6 que l'armee israelienne avait saisi des agents egyptiens, qui avaient ete condamnes a des peines d'emprisonnement. Dix autres agents avaient ete tues auooursde rencontres avec des patrouilles is~elienneset cinq s'ewent echappes.Le porte-parole de l'amee· aajoute que les autorites militaires egyptiennes de la bande de Gaza se livtaient 1 l'espionnage et au ubotage en territoire israelien. « A cc comm~queofficiel, qui donnaitdes indi;. cations. sur les patrouilles egyptiennes charg6es de recueillir des renseignements, les journaux ista6liens du 1er ID8I'$ ont ajoute des details -sur l'espiOflDage auquelles Egyptiens se·livteraient depuis janvier 1954. Onttouvera daJlS l'annexe· VU au pr6seilt rapport· la 126. General Burns himself admits in his report that the Israel military authorities have never produced any evidence for these alleged Egyptian activities. Furthermore, Israel addressed no complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission against the Egyptian intelligence services, except in two cases. One of those complaints was withdrawn by Israel and the other is under consideration by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 127. It clearly follows from all this that the statements of this Israel spokesman were without foundation. The mere fact that they were made the day following the Gaza aggression clearly shows that they were made for propaganda purposes, in order to prove that Egypt was committing acts of sabotage in territory under Israel control. 128. Moreover, the information given us in General Burns' report was taken from the Israel Press, particularly the newspaper Lmnerhav, which claimed that there had been a dozen acts of espionage committed by Egypt during the year 1954. There is no other evidence of these alleged acts of espionage and sabotage, since the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee took no decision with regard to them, and neither dealt with them in substance nor expressed any opinion about them. 129. I am surprised that importance should have been . attached to this question of alleged Egyptian espionage, which is not supported by any evidence and which is only the echo of the propaganda conducted by Israel newspapers, which have every interest in reversing the picture in the hope ofjustifying this shocking aggression. 130. General Burns also mentions in his report that he has made certain proposals to the two parties with a view to improving the situation on the demarcation line. 131. Egypt has always given favourable consideration to all proposals designed to remove tension in that area. For example, the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission proposed at a sub-committee meeting, on 12 May 1952, that patrols should be set up along the demarcation line. 132. With regard to General Burns' proposals, it is my belief that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization is very well aware of the Egyptian delegation's co-operative attitude during the discussion of these proposals. I believe that at present, and at this stage of our discussion-which, as you know, concerns exclusively the Egyptian complaint about the Gaza aggression-there is no reason to carry the consideration of these proposals any further. 133. In conclusion, it follows from General Burns' report, and especially"from the parts which we have just analysed today, that the incidents mentioned in that report, whether or"not they relate directly to the Gaza 129. Je suis etonne de constater qu'on ait donne de rimportance a cette question du pretendu espionnage egyptien, qui n'est etayee d'aucune preuve et qui n'est que l'echo de la propagande des journaux israeliens, qui ont tout inter!t a renverser la situation dans l'espoir de justifier une atroce"agression. 130. Le ~e!!6ral Burns mentionne aussi dans son rapport ~u'i1 avait, pour ameliorerla situation sur la ligne de demarcation, presente certaines propositions aux deux pmies. 131. L'Egypte a toujours examine favorablement toutes les propositions de nature aeliminer la tension dans cette region. Par exemple,la delegation de l'Egypte aupres de la Commission mixte d'armistice, durant la reunion d'un sous-comite,le 12 mai 1952, a propose que des patrouilles soient creees sur la tigne de demarcation. 132. Concernant les propositions du general Bums, je crois que le Chefd'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve connait tfes bien l'attitude cooperative de la delegation de l'Egypte durant la discussion de ces propositions. Je crois qu'a l'heure actuelle, et 1 ce stade de notre discussion - qui, comme vous le savez, conceme seulement la plainte egyptienne sur l'agression de Gaza - it n'y a pas lieu d'aller plus loin dans l'examen de ces propositions. 133. En <;anclusion, Jl resulte du rapport du general Burns, et surtout des parties de ce rapport que nous venons d'analyser aujourd'hui, que les faits qui y sont mentionnes, qu'its concernent directement ou non I'in- 135. I~ is time for the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities and take the necessary action to prevent the recurrence of similar acts of aggression. Egypt and the Arab countries ~wait the decision of the members of the SecUrity Council.

If there are questions to be directed to General Burns; the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, I should very much appreciate it if the members of the Council would· put them today, in written form or otherwise, so that General Burns may be in a position to answer them either today or at 'our meeting tomorrow afternoon.

Would it be correct for the members of the Council to ask questions of General Bums about his report at an open meeting? I am not making a motion for a closed meeting; I should like to know if that is the precedent.

I am in the hands of the Council on this question. I merely wish· to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that there was a previous case when questions were put and answers given at an open meeting.

The question raised by the Brazilian representative is pertinent and deserves some thought. The first point is whether some members of the Council have questions to put, and; in this connexion, whether they feel that such questions could be more usefully put and more effectively answered at a·closed otatan open meeting. With this reservation, I personally would have no objection if the Council held a closed meeting in order to hear some questions that members of the Cou.ncil might·wish to put in an atmosphere of greater privacy. 139. M. HOPPENOT (France): La question'~Pat le representant du BrcSsi1 est pertinente·etenemCrite r6ftexion. Le premier point coQSiste.a,SIlvQ4;si~ membres du Conseil enteildent pOser' 4es--q1J!:Sti~J,1i"et; . subSidiairement, s'ils.Cfoient que cesquesti~~~~ent etre.posees.plus utilem:ent et.s'ilpourraity-.etrer6p04du plus efficacementen seante~privee-qu'eitseanRO.-p:~, Sous cette reserve, je n'aurais personnelleDiel1t' a~e objection ace que le Conseil se r6unisse en sianeepriv6e pour entendre certaines questionsqu'il p~t'~~C$ membres du Conseil de poser dans des conditionscW1'lus, grande discretion.

I merely wish to associate myself with the observations made. by the representative of 'France. 141. I wonder whether the President could at the outset ascertain whether, in the circumstances, any members of the Council do desire to ask any questions, either in open or in closed meeting.

The question should be put not only to the members of the Council, but also to the representatives of the two States invited to take part in our discussion. .143. The PRESIDENT: I . shall put the following question: do any members of the Security Council or the 1,3S~ n~t temp,s. que ;le,~~~t!e"~~~p~nn~~l!!'§. responsabilit6s et ad9pte les mesures nmsail'es .po~ ~~=;:'~~el~es;:::~~~~:::::~~:r:; Conseit 136. Le PREsIDENT (tradult de l'anglaiS):Si ,les membres du Conseil: veulent poser des questions ail general Bums, Chef d'etat..major de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la tr!ve, je leur seraisreconnaissant de le faire d~ aujourd'h'Ui, par ecrit ou oralement, pour que le genc5ra1 Burns puisse leur r6pondre~soitaujourd'hui meme, soit a la seance qui aura lieu demain·apmidi. 137. M. DE FREITAS-VALLE (BrcSsil) (tradultde l'iJ,a.. glais): Les membres'du Conseil peuven~-ils interroger.le general Bums sur son rapport au cam d'uoe ~ce publique? Je ne propose pas de tenir une seance privee: je vcudrais simplement savoir sOil existe un ~ilt a cetegard. ' 138. Le PREsIDENT (tr.t cfe l'ang14is):.Je li1;'en remets au Conseil sur ce point~ Je voudrais. sbnpleDJ.e~t rappeler au Conseil que, dans un cas an.atosue~.4es questions ont ete posees,et il y a ete repol1c;l~~e~~ publiqu~. . '., '.' . 140. SirLeslie Mt]NRO (Nouvelle-Utande)(tra4u/t. l'anglQ;s): le voudrais n1·associer_.'~i)))so~ti9ijSrqJJe vient de formuler le representant de la 'Ftance~. ""'. 141. Jeme demande.si· le Presilkrit nepoumut pas s'enquerir d~ maintenant .~. danacesconditiO~It~es membres du Conseil d6sirent poser des q~tio~-4ue ce soit en seance publique ou en seance·privee. . , 142: M. HOPPENoT(Francc): taq~()n"~t etre pos6enon seUlement au membres·duCODSeil,"nuus aux repr6sentants des deux Etats invit6s .a.participer 1 nos discussions. . ". ,c:"o:'7"; ;;;c+''''''·~. 143. Le PmIDENT (tradult de l'"",1ai.f):Jevaild~riC poser la question suivante: run quelconque desntembres

The representative of Israel may ask his questions. 147.:Mr~EBAN (J;srael):'I sho1dd like-to receive 'information on findings .of the Mixed Armistice COmmiSsion during the period which has elapsed siilcethe l'eport now 'before the Security Council. Sp:cifica1ly, could the Chief of Staff bring to the knowledge of the Security CoUncil the full text of the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission 'COncerning' the mining incident at Kisufim, which OCCUqedon 12 March 1955?Secondly, could the Chief of Staff make available the full text of the ml91ution adopted by the Mixed Armistice COmmission relating to the incident at Kisufim on 19 March 19S5? 148. 'The PRESIDENT: Does General Bums wish to answer these questions today, or would he prefer tQ answer them tomorrow? 149. General BURNS: I have the texts of those res0- lutions here. ISO. The Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commiss on held an emergency meeting at kilometre 9S,'on 20 March 19S5.to consider Egyptian complaint No. E-4O im.d Israel ~mpl8ints Nos. 'I-S9 and 1-67. The resolution referred to by the representative of Israel' was the fonowing: cc The Mixed A.rmistice Commission, cc Having comidered Is~el comrtaint No. I-59-55, cc 1., Finds that, during the early hours of 12 March . 19.5S, a trained groupofthree men crosSed the armistice . ,demarcation line from Egyptian-controlled territory into Israel; cc 2. Further .finds that the above-mentioned group laid 1J mine on the routine patrol track ~thin Israel; cc 3. Finds further that, as a result of this act of aggression, an army vehicle of a routine Israel security patrol was blown up and ~troyed; - cc 4. Notes with g,tne concern that, despite the obligations imposed 9n Egypt.by the General Armistice Agreement, the laying of mines within Israel territory has not been terminated; cc S. Notes with grave concern the serious situatio~ prevailing along the armistice demarcation line; .. 6• .Decides that this act of aggression committed in Israel by the above-mentioned group is a fiagrant violation, . by Egypt" of the General Armistie:e Agreement; .147:-M~'BBAN'o:sriialY(i,.tiiJtiinie-i'aliilQiY1~ ie·~~iidlais avoir des. renseign~~en~ sur'.es Constatations que la Commission mixte d'amu.suce.a. faites depuis qu'ene a redige le rapport dont le Conseilde sCcurite est saisi. En particuJier, le Chefd'etat-major pOurrait-il f&ire connaitre au CauseD de seeurite'le texte complet de la resolution que la COmmission'mixte d'armistice a adoptee ala suite de l'explosion d'une 'mine qui a eu lieu le 12 mars 19S5a Kisufim?En deuxi~melieu, leChefd'etat-Jitajorpourrait-jJ communiquerle texte complet de la risolution.que la COmmission mixte d'armistice a adoptee au sujet de l'incident qui s"est produit le 19 mars 1955 a Kisufim? 148, u PREsIDENT (tradult de l'Qllglais): Legenc5ral Burns desire-t-il r6p0ndre aces questions aujourd'hui, 00 pref6rerait-il y repondre demain? 149. Le general BURNS (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai ici le texte de ces risolutions. ISO. La Commission mixte d'armiStice egypto-isra6- lienne a tenu une reunion extraordinaire au kilom~95, le 20 man 19S5, poUr examiner la plainte egyptienne nO E-4O et les pfaintes ismeliennes nOli I-59 et 1~7. La resolution dont le representant d'IsraeJ a parIea la teneur suivante: «lA Commission mlxte d'armistice, « AJ'Qllt exmnine la plainte israelienne nO I-59-SS, « 1. Comttlte qu'aux premi~res heures de la joumee du 12 mars 1955, un groupe de trois hommes elltraines a franchi la ligne, de cl6marcation de .l'armistice en venant duterritoire sous contr61e egyptien et apenetre en Israel; ,« 2.. Comtate emuite que le groupe en'question a pose une mine sur l'itin6raireque suiwnt habituellement les patrouilles en territoire israelien; « 3. Consttlteen outre que, par suite de cet acte d'agression, un vehicule miJitaire d'une patrouille reguJim de securite d'Israel a 6t6 detruit par une explosion; , , « 4, Relhe avec une ,ive inquietude qU'en d6pit des obliaatioDS que la Convention d'armistice g6n6ral impose a l'Egyp1e; la pose, de mines l'l'interieur du territoire imelien n'a pas tesse; « 5. ConsidAre Qvec une vive,intJuUtude la situatio~ grave qui existe le long de la ligne de dmnarcauon de l'armistic:e; . «6. Dkide que cetaete d'agression commis en Israel par le grouP; susmentionn6 constitue une violation'8agrante,par 1'~8YPte~ deIaConventiolidt~stice pncSral; , , . , . 2t .'. "n'The MtXeiiAinristice Comn1i$stiJn . . •..•_', __ --'7_ "" •..:.. :.••._ _-_..• ,••_••• -'.,~.•••.. "'.• ', .••. .. ." RtIVing considered ISrael co.mplailltNo. 1-69-55, " 1. Finds that, .during' the night of 18-19 March 1955, a group of two trained men armed with a mine crossed the armistice.demarcation line from Egyptiancontroned territory into Israel; . «La Commission ·mixted'iUmiS'. . .'~ , ,'_."':;.•.~:- ....,,'-. ""-.--C::::.'" ':"'===-'::'C::~'~'----~= ''':=-';;:'~,=-~: «Ayant examine laplajnte.isra6lienne nO.I-69-S5• « 1. Constatequ'aucoursdelanuit"du18ali 19111ats 1955, un groupe de.dewthomes·entratnes, porteurs d'unemin«i.qui venaitdu territoire pJace'lOUS-lecontrale de rEgypte, ." franchi la.·tigne de demarcati91l de l'armistice et a p6netreenIsra!l;·(!; «2. Constate'en 'outre que'le gfc:lupe' pr6Ci~; a .~ une mine' sUi'-l'itin6raireemprunt6 par 106 patro1ii1les israetietmes de secunte aecomplissant. ·leUr.to1irnc5e regu1iaR;en territomfisraetien; . ".. ~ .'. « 3. Constateega1ement qu'A la suite de·ce;t'aete d'agression, une voiture de l'arinc5eislaelietine'tran8- pommt quake solciats enservicereplier~; saut6, avCl() ". les co~uences suivantes:.lquatte~Id.ats~ellS ont ete leprement b~;b)la.vQi~.IbUi~'.a~ gravement endommagc5e,.une.p8.rtie du veJtjmlle aYIP.t 6t6 .lanc:eea une distance de 70 D~; cr,.lescriptloJl des d6gits causes au vehiCule:' i) roue aVAliltc ~&, il) pneu ai'rach6, ill) moteur coD1pl~_eilt ..dCtndt; iv) vittes bris6es; ;: c ,' •• «4. Constate ,~,ec une profomle iiuJu!ltude'q:ue~ 'ma1gr6 les' '()bliptioD$-qw"mcom6ent A·.·.l'Egypte,·.::eQ. vertu de la Conveliltion d'armistice :g6n~etJle:~OIll'" breuses decisions dl.'l Ia.. Commissiollmixte4~MJDistiCe; cette sc5rie d'acte& d'agression commis par 'l'~ contreIsraeln'apas pris fin; . . " . . «S. InVite lr.:sautoii~·· e8)'Pti~iles.,a;tafre-j~i' imm6diatemeJlit tous ~es d 'qressi0il ..d.iriges. c:f;)qtft? Israa1; . .' ". '. ." 2. Finds further that the above-mentioned·group laid a mine on a track used by Israel routine security patrols in Israel; . " 3•.Further finds that, as a result of this act of aggression, an Israel army command car with four soldierson routine.duty' was bolwn 'up, with the following co~uences: (a) four Israel soldiers were slightly wounded; (b) the command car was ~rious1y damaged, part of the vehicle being blown to a distance of 70 metres; (c) 'description of damage to vehicle: (1) front wheel blown .ofi'; (il) tyre blown'away; (ill) motor completely destroyed; (iv) glass shattered; " 4. Notes with extremely gra,e concemthat, despite ·thecbligations Cimposedon'Egypt'by'the' General Armistice Agreement and the numerous decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commissio~ such repeate<t acts of aggression against Israel by Egypt have not been terminated; " 5. Callslipon the Egyptian authorities to terminate immediately all acts of aggression against l$rael; ".6.1{otes lVith grare t;t!~ "~ ~~l:I:S.situa#on prevailing along the .armistice demarcation line; .; I' 7. Decides that tbisact of aggression carried out .by the above-menf,ioJled group isa ftagrant violatioJl by Egypt of the General Armisti~ Agreement." 153. Mr. ·LOUTFI (Egypt) (trtl1lofloteil from French): I should like to ask the Chiefof Stilft' to read the teXt ofthedecision taken by the Mixed AnDistice Commission at a special meeting on 7 March 1955. '.. 1504. General BURNS: }4jght I ask whether the representative of Egypt could give me the number of the complaint?, 155. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt): The numbel' is E-22-'5. 156. General BURNS: The resolution ad.optccCai the meeting of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission held at kilometre 95 on 7 March 1955 was as funmn:' . , « 6. '. Ctinsidere. aretil1lep'oftiI.UJe. ··/:L··/·':~}'"~ii.~ '.~~.~ situati()~:Stave qufeiisfC..1e:IOY~~ ~.. c.o~. .cation 4ie. rarmistice~'" '. ';~"" ;..;:" . «7;' Dkide.que eet•acte:dPasreSsic>it:Cotnriiii8~4o­ groupe pr6clte constitueune·Yi()Wi()Do·ft8gr81l~,~pU.: . l'Egypte, de la 'Conventiond'armisti~;gen~.»'h..:.., .. :~t:,~J':t~~~~&6:'~~~" ... ~.' :4:;;~··~~r~~t,· qUivientd'etl'e prise patla COJDDij~c)n~.. le 7'mars 19S5~ I:f .·alitd'lJri(fstari~:~Xtta§tiJi~~~; ..... 1S4~ . Lep6mi aURNS~(t;4dIIit:'de.'i~~~)~i~~ demander au rep.ntant cJel'£~4.c!"Q1!~~q_'(" cote de cette plainte? . .. ;:, ISS. M.t.QtJ1'Fl; ~gypte) .(t,adllitde":·r-Qnj/Qlil:,·]jj documentpo~lacoteBo22';S5. ..••>t;?·:t!:([lf·',;?··. :.: • • ; ' .-1.-••" ';'" ";11 l,i'.;..;:~·~·_..~\.• :;':~~, •.:t,'.· 156. Le g6nmdBuRNS (tradult de rang1ab):~~ lution que la· Commission mixted'aI'Q1istice~~ isrdliennea ~o~a Ja~·qu'eIle.;tenue.1e(7iD8ii: [955 a.utilOtDttte 95;emt·aiinSjCb~:::c'J:s5~. =!t01'''''::;' . cc 2. Further finds that, as a result of this firing and shelling directed 'by<the Israel.unit against the Egyptian position, four Egyptian soldiers' were wounded and another was shell-shocked; , cc 3. Notes. again,with grave concern, that, despite the obligations imposed on Israel, by the General Armistice Agreement and a number of decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, an end has not yet been put to the hostile acts against Egypt; . ; cc 4. Decides that the above aggressive action carried out by the above-mentioned Israel unit is a flagrant violation of article n, para. 2, of the General Armistice Agreement." 157. This resolution was adopted, the Egyptian representative and the Chairman voting in favour,and the Israel representative voting against.

I should like to ask the representative of Israel whether he is going to ask a question or give an explanation in connexion with the reply. which General Bums has just given to the representative of Egypt. 159: Mr. EBAN (Israel): I would siinply like to ask two more questions, and that will conclude any requests for information that my delegation will make to General Burns. 160. My firstq~tion relates to the JIl~qng of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 7·March 1955. I should not'like to take up the time of the Chief of Staft" with reading the whole text of the resolution, but could he confinll whether or not it is true to say that the resolution which he has just read, condemmng Israel for firing at 8.45 a.m., was adopted together with a resolution condemning Egypt for firing at 8.30 a.m. on the same day? That is my first question. 161. General BURNS: The resolution based on the Israel complaint de8ling with the same inci~ent has a finding in it: cc that at 0830 local time the same day, whe~ an Israel security patrol on routine duty approached the infiltrators at the above-meptioned location, the patrol was fired upon, by the infiltrators and by the above-mentioned Egyptian army position ... '. ,. . 162. Mr.EBAN (Israel): This is my final question. I refer to the question of military intelligence.which is discussed by the Chief of Staff in his report. 163•.General Burns observes in his rc:port ihateviden<:e proving that the .responsibilityof·the .Egyp~ military cinqui~me a 'eu une commotion grave; « 3. Constate uneIou de plus avec une vive Inquietu~e qu'en depit des obligations que la Convention d'armistice general et plusieurs decisions de· la Commission mixte d'armistice im"posent a Israel, les actes d'hostilite diriges contre l'Egypte n'ont pas encore cesse; «4. 'Decide que cet acte d'agression commis par l'unite israelienne precitc5e constitue une violation flagrante du paragraphe 2 de 1'article IJ de la Convention d'armistice general.» 157. Cette resolution a ete adoptee par deux voix, ceDe du representant de l'Egypte et celle du President, alors que le representant d'Israel ·a vote contre. 158. Le PRESIDENT (tradult de /'ang/ais): le voudrais demander au representant d'lsrael s'il tient a pOser une question ou a fournir des explications au sujet de la reponse que le general Burns vient de donner au representant de l'Egypte. 159. M. EBAN (lsrael)(traduit de l'ang/ais): le voudrais. simplement poser deux autres questions; c'est tout ce qu~ ma delegation desire demander au general Burns. 160. Ma premiere question a trait a la seance de la CoD1filission mixte~d'armistice qui s'est tenue le 7 mars 1955. le n'abuserai pas des moments precieuX~'au Chef d'etat-major en donnant lecture du texte integral de la resolution. le lui demanderai cependant de preciser s'il est exactou non que la resolution.dontit vientde donner lecture, et qui blame Israel pour avoir ouvert le feu a 8 h.AS, a ete adoptee en m8me temps qu'une resolution qui blamait l'Egypte pour avoir ouvert leJeu le m8me jour a 8 h. 30. Voila ma p!emiere question. 161. ~ general BURNS (traduitde l'ang/ais): La resolution adoptee a.la suite de laplainte d'Israel relative au m!me incident contient le passage suivant: «que le m8me jour, a 8 h. 30 (heure locale), au moment Oll une patrouille de securite israelienne en toumee reguliere s'estapprochee des infiltres. a l'endroit precite, cette patrouille a essuy6 le feu des infiltres et de la position precitee de l'armee egyptienne.» 162. 'M. EBAN(lsrael) (traduit de /'ang/ais): Voici ma derniere question. Elle porte sur la question du Service de renseignements militaires dont le Chef d'etat-major parle dans son rapport. 163.n·est dit en eft"et dans le r~pport que le Chefd'etat-: major n'a pas eu connaissance de documents prouvant la . . 165. General BURNS: The answer is yes; in this particular case there was present at the interrogation of an infiltrator a United Nations observer, and the report, as I recall it, substantially contained the statements which have been made by the representative of Israel~

I have only two questions to put to.General Burns, and they are very simple. First, I should ask him whether the .Special Committee finally condemned Egypt in connexion with the decisions taken by the Mixed Armistice Commission on the infiltrations. - 167. General BURNS: There is a series ofappea1s dealing with the question of infiltration and wheth.er it is to be considered a breach of theGeneralJ\n11isti~ Agreement. Those appeals have not been dealt with by the Sp~al Committee because it has been difficult to arrange for meetings of that Committee within the last four or five months. - 168; Mr; LOUTFI(Egypt) (trans/ated from French): General Burns quotes in his report passages from Israel newspapers of,I March'19S.5, ~ealing with alleged acts of espionage. I should like to know whatcaused General Burns to include those statements in his report. If he . cannot reply today, I shalt not press my'question. 16~~ General BURNS: The reason, (or quoting the newspaper accountis given in paragraph 29 ofmy report. In that paragraph, I state that: "I have endeayoured to find out'whether there was a special, immediat~ cause for the Gaza incident 01) 28 February 1955.", It seemed to me that, appearing when it did, the statement o_n espionage published in the Israel newspapers was something which would assist the Security Council in coming to a·decision on the facts of the case.

Since neith~r of the parties to this case has any further questions to.put to G~meral BurnS, I shall now call upon any members ofthe Council who may wish to ask questions. 171. SirLeslie MUNRO (New Zealand): There is one question which I should like to have answered for the sake'of the· record. 165. Le general BURNS (traduit de l'anglaia): le repondrai que c'est exact. Dans ce cas, un observateur' des Nations Unies a assiste a l'interrogatoire d'un infiltr6 et, si rai bonne memoire, le 'rapport CODtenait·enslJb.. stance les declarations qu'a citees le representant d'Israel. l~(i. M. LOUTFI (Egypte): J'ai deux questions seulement a poser au general B~, et elles sont tRs simples. Tout d'abord,je voudrais le prier de nous dire si l~~~ a ete finalement condanm,ee par le Comite sp6cial ausuj:t des decisions prises par 1<8. Commission mixte d"armistice en ce qui concerne les infiltrations. 167. Le general BUP.NS (traduit de l'ang/aia): n y aeu toute une serie d'app~lsconcemant la question de l'infil~ ix:~tjonet le point de s,woir s'ils'agiS§lli!Ia .~'~e viola,p(JIl 'de la Convention d'armistice general. Le CoriUte special n'a pas examine ces appels, car il etait difficile de le convoquer au cours des quatre ou cinq demiers mois. .' 168; M; .LOUTFI (Egypte): Le,general Burns reproclUit dans son rapport des passages tires de journaux israelienS publies le Ier mars 1955, lesquels se rearent l. de pt6- te!1<lus actes d'espionnage. n me serait agreablede saVoit cequfaamenele generalBJlI1lsa incl~redansso.n ~rt ces declarations. S"il ne peut l'asc'repondre.aui01!l'd"hui, je n'insisterai pas sur ma question.- "- 169•. Le general BURNS (tratJuit de /'ang/ais): I"ai ~t au paragraphe 29 de mon rapport pourquoi j'ai cit6 un extrait de journal. Dans ce paragraphe j'cScrivais. «j'ai voulu determiner si l'incident qui s'est produitaQaza le 28 feYrie! J9~5 .avait une•cause imm~iate P~».·n m'a semble que la declaration relative a l'espiollll8P qUi avait paru alors dans la presse israelienne aiderait le Conseil de securit6 a se prononcer sur les faits. 170.' Le PRESIDENr(traduit de /'anglais): Fuisque aucune dC$parti~sn"a de queStions Aposer au g6n6tal. Burns, je 4o@e la parole a~ membres du CoD$CilqQi desireraient le faire. " : .. 171. SirLeSlie MUNRO (NouveUe-Ulande)(1rtItiIllt de fang/aia): .I'al one question aposer, etje voudtais que la reponsesoit consign~ auprcds-verbal:.· 173.·. General BURNS: 1bedraft reoolutions are fonmdatecl by one or other ofthe parties. The Chairman "'not haw the· pOwer to present draft resolutions or amendments. Sometimes, he can persuade the parties to c:haDae the wordinS of their draft resolutions, if he feels. that that is desirable. Hence. the Chairman must vote on draft. resolutions presented by the parties. " 174. 'The draft resolutions are voted on sometimes as a whole'andlOmetimes··paragraph·~ parapaph. lbat is up to the parties.

I should like to ask General Burns whether there is. any lepl or practical objectiOn to giving some pUbJiCityto the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commiasion and, •more'particularly, to coimnunicating those decisions to the mem1fers of·the Councll. 1.76.1Ddeed, whHe .we are primarily responsible for the maintenaliee of' peace .and for the obServance of the claUses of the .Umistic:einthe PalestinefiOntier region, ~'~ De.'iDfOlQledofthe action taken ~nthe incidents whiCh thfaten tIiis security. We 1eanl of such action ..0D1y .wheD anincideilt' basbroken' out and generally through thestatemeJiis made·by 'the parties concerned. It woUld certainly be desiiable for us to be able to. follow dlwdeveIOPJlC'.-tsday by daY, 10 ~ lobe better and ~.fUIIy ijI(~ed,."8Dd 'a1s0: to. ~ve. at regular ~~ aieP()rtor.a ~~ of the co~Pwnts brollght before theMiXcd AnnisticeCoilimissionlor the Special ~ttOe. and ottheclecisions taken'by those two bOdieS.' . -', .' .' .' . . '<~." f77:- I~Jiowir~ie.tOa8k·Gen~ra1B~ Whether he . 177. Je voudrais de~derau gWral BUfDS s'n voit tw'~Y o1;~on' to • rf=CqJDmeIidation to that effect. des objecti~ Ala recommandation d'une telle procedure. i78.·~'~JtEsIbEN1"Jtr-QllS1aied from French): If 178. ~ pdsmENT: Si le representant de la France .~~,,~ve.ofF~·1W'ilO ()b,jettion, the 8ecren'a pas d'objection A presenter. le Secr6taire pn'" ~~.woUldUketo~weftIUs.question. I call voudrait bien r6p0ndre Acette question. le lui donne la . b, "'di~-aenetal .' . . . parole. ~',e..;"., .,: ..: .' ..'.".. .... 119.• The'$EoItE:l'AltY:;(jENERAL:lthinki(may 179. Le SECImrAIRE G:ANtRAL (tradult. "tIII- ~~ifIreply totJ.je q_Jtion, because it is partly glab): n sera saDS doute utile que je r6p0nde A cette ~mpo~~n-Of . the.. _Secretaria '...................•... ~...•.'~.',.;8,~~.uarters.c-:' ..J.•........' to...... , q~q~n. car. c'eateD partieau Secr6tariat du si. qu'll .;~ .c.".. htatiVeS in .the: 5eCurlty CollIicilare ~r.gm~)',ov~et. ,coqJ1e Ies ~embresdu eonseH de .", ,-~,:~.r:!lc)',~·~~yJe81·;~$~Q~)9 .' vuedCl'iri .... ·...'..··.J·..:un·.·.f' ....•·di.'~ ..·.q·.·.;ue~ ....·,l....1I'!.·inf1 ..·'.n··.o_·e··~···o'·,IsI8.•.. COMma··.ucuo·, ..···· ..··.·ein.u.·:·co ·.. co.·n.··.·~··.;'l.·e:.....n·ilt.,·t .~ ..··ce··.po.·q.uein.t. I~.e .' . ..... .··of'ffiCOrffijtion m'the"sense'iDdicatea . . .• ,,_ y' • .y~aw; • • - f~#~a =r5:Ea~ \te·40.·is;so~.,Yi.~J-;f~·.·J~~gJ4,.tcJ··,...y ~t l.savoir daDS quelle mesure n.coDviendrait d·... 114. Parfois, le vote a lieu sur I'Clllemble du projet de resolution; parfois, n se fait parasraplle par parapaphe. Cc semt lea parties qui en cWcident. 175. M. HOPPENOT (France): Je voudrais demander an am-eraI Bums s'n exise quelque objection, juridique. I"e ou matmeDe, Ace qu'une certaine publicit'soit donn6e aox dkisioDS de la Commission mixte d'armistice et, en particulier, Ace que ces dkisioDS soient COm.IDUniqu6:s aox membres du Conseil. 176. En efl'et, alors que nous avons une responsabilit' primordiale pour le maintien de la paix, et pour I'observation des clauses de I'armistice daDS la region frontim de .Palestine, nous n!avoDS jamais communication de tontes les ~ures relati'¥es aox incidents qui·troublent cette .securitf. Nous n'en avoDS connaissance qu'au DlOD1eIltou un incident 6clate et ce. pneraIement, par Ies r6fhences qu'y font Ies parties. Nous aurions certainement inta'et Apouvoir suivre cos questions-lA au jour le jour, de f89Qn Ales connaltre plus compl~ent et de f~n plus approprife, de mtme que nous aurions certainement inthftA recevoir, Ainterva1les r6guliers, une communication ou un prods-verbal des plaintes adressees a la Commission mixte d'armistice ou au Comitf sJ*ial, ainsi que des d6cisiODS prises par cos deux instances. 181. Le PREsIDENT (traduit de l'ang!ais): S'il n'y a .plus d'autres questions, noDS alIons lever la seance.

If there are no further questions, the meeting will now be adjourned. La siance est levie d 17 h. 10. 71Ie meetillg ~ Qt S.10 p.m. lIINLAND - IIINLANDE: Alcateemlnen Kirja. tauppa, 2 Kelkuskatu, HeIIWd. AUSTRAUA - AUSTIlALIE : H. A. Goddard Ply•• Ltd.. 2550 oeorae Street. ~, N.s.W. Melbourne UDivcrslty Prus. c.INa N. 3 (Vidoria). JlltANCE : Editions A. Padone, 13 rue Soul!lot, Paris V'. AUSTRIA. - AlJTRlCHE : GeroId a: Co.. I. GnbeD :U. wt.. I. B. WIIBentortI'. Book Import aad Sub!criplion AacDcY. Markul SiUlltusstraue 10, Sa....... 6DMANY - ALLEMAGNE: B"..bblndluaa Elwvt a: M_, Hauptstruse 101. ..... Sd''III'.IIC. W. Eo SUrbacb, G.m.b.H•• Ausland-Zeitunasbandcl, GereonItruIe, 25-29. KlIIIl 1 (22c). AIellander Hom, S~ 9. w...-.. BELGRlM - BELGIQlJE : Apn:e et Meuqeries de la Pr.- S. A.. 14-22 rue du ~ 1InuI... W. H. Smith a: Son, 71-75 bel Adolpbc-Max. ....... GREECE - GUCE : Kautrmann Bookshop, 28 Stadion Suect. AdIIa. BOLIVIA - BOUVIE: Lt'brerla SeIecdonn. Em.... Editora .. La RazOn ". CasI1Ia 972, La'" HAIr.: i Mu Bouc:bcreall, L1bralrie .. A b Cam. will ". &lte poatalo 1118, ~PriIee. HONDtmAS : 1JbnJta Panamericana, CaIlo de la Fuente,T........ .RAZIL - B1l£SJL : Uvraria ABir. ~ Mexico 911-B. CaiD Postal 3291. Ililt .. J..... D.F. CAMilODIA - CAMBODGE : Papclerie-Lt1lnirie nouYClle, AIbIn Portai\,14 a". BouUoc:be. .....,... HONG KONG: Swindon Book Co., 2S NathaD Road,Ko~ ICELAND - ISLANDE: Bokaverzlun Slsfusar EymundsoDll&r, AustllJ'lltreti 18. RaJlQaYik. CANADA : Tbo Rycnon Press, 299 Quoen Street West, T...m, Ontario. PcriodIl:a, 5112 av. Papineau, M...... 34. INDIA - INDE: Oxford Book a: Stadonery Company, Sclndia House, NIIW DIIld. P. Varadachary a: Co., 8 Uashi CbcUy Street. MMnaI. CEYLON- CEYlAN: Tbo Assoc:llted Newspapcn of c.,1oa" Ltd.. Lab HOlIIO, c.a-IIo. ~ - CHW : Libnlda 1-. CaIlo Moneda 122,~ I!df&MIl del PacIIk:o. Ahwnada 57. SudaIo. INDONBSIA - 1NDON£sIE : Isjuan Pembail- IUftIII, GuDuaa s.hari 84. J)iaIluta. IRAN : Ketab KhaDeh Dmesh, 293 SUdi A¥ellue, T...... CHINA - aDNZ : Tt. World Book Co.• Ltd.. 99. CIIIIIIa ICiq Road. Id Section, TaipIII. Taiwan. Tbo CcJn.-dal !'nu, Ltd.. 170 Uu U Cbaq, ....... IRAQ - IRA)[: MlICbnzie's Bookshop. Book. seIJen and StAtlolllft, ......... ISRAEL : Bhamstdn'I 8ookstonIt, Ltd•• 35 Allenby Road. P.O.B. 4154, Te1 Am. COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE : LibrerIa NlICionaI. Ltda•• 20 III Ju1Io. San Juan·.hIuI, .......... IJbnrta BudIboI:: Galerla, Av. JimeDez de QuCIada 1-40, ....... U1InrIa AIDIrb, Sr. JaIme Navarro R., 49-58 CaIlo 51. MaMIa. ITALY - ITALIE: L1brerla Commlssioaarla SansoDi, Via 0iD0 CappoDi 26, ~ JAPAN - JAPaN: MIl'IIZIIlD Co•• Ltd.. 6 Tori· N"1Chomc, Nlhonbuhi. P.O.B. 605. Tulip CentraL LEBANON - LD!AN: Lt1lralrie 1.1Diversalle, ..,....... COSTA RICA : Trejoa IIerJDana, .\partado 1313. S88lo16. LI8BIlIA: Mr. JlICOb MOlllOlu Kamara, GurfJ and Front Streets. ~ ClJBA : La ea.. BcIp. Ren6 de Smedt, O'ReilJy 455.La~ L11XEMBOlJRG: IJbraIrio J. Sc:IwmnIw. Place Gui11aum:, 1+,l*I!'oaq, CZBCROSLOVADA - TCIdcOSLOVAQ1JIE : CeakoIIoYeasty Spilovatel, Nirodnl Tltda 9. PnIIaL MEXICO - MEXlQlJE : EdItorial Hennes, S. A., Ipado Marisc:al41. Maic:e. D.F. NE'l'IIBIILANDS - PAY8-BAS : N. V. Mardnus Nijholf. Lante Voorbout 9. '1 Gra~ DIlNMHK - DANEMAU: Mours. EiDar MlIIIbpard, Ltd.. NOJrepde 6. U ••aII,'L DOMINICAN· UPVaUC - UPllBUQlJE DOMlNICAINB: U1InJta Domiail:ana, Ca1le M~ 49. Apartado 656, CWM TniIUe. NEW ZEALAND - NOtJVElLE.zlIANDs: Tbo 1.1aitecl Nations Assodadoft ofNew 7M1aod, 0".0. 1011. WeJ1IIIItaL NICAIlAGUA : Dr. RamIro Ramlrez V. Apada do PlIblicadoaes, M....- D.N. ECUADOR - £QUATEUR : U1InJta Ceat1flca BnIIIo MoriIz, CuIIIa 362, ~ EGYPT -1GYPTK : LIbnirie .. La P-IIn,,..., d'Eppte ". 9 SIwIa AdIJ PIIIla" CaiN. NORWAY - NORViGS : Johan Orundt Tanum FodIa. Kr A\IIaIlIIt 7.. OIIe, 0rtJ.n/,.. -'FIu •.,.....,_ fIrM _ :I" 6mJ "".",. IIIq ,..., to SaIls 8IdiIa, 11..... N..... ......... N GD'QWA (SwiIwJlaM) or SeIII .. CItaIIdIa SIdiIa, v.IW N..... NEW YOU (U.I.A.) Price: tU,S. 0.30 ; 2/- sta; 1.20 Sw. fr, (or equivalent in other eurreocies) Printed in Fnmc:e PANAMA: JOI6 MealillDdcz, Aa-:ia InlenlldoDal de PIlll~ P!ua de Araaao....... PAllAGU~Y : Yoreoa Humanoa, ea.. ADWica. PaIma y Alberdi, ~ PERU - PDOU : UbnrIs latemaeiODll del Penl S. A., Cui11a 1417, u-. PIIILIPPINES : Alemar's Book Store. 749 RizaI A¥ell1IO, MaiIa. PORTUGAL: Uvraria Rodriaues. Rua Aurea 186- IU.L!IIIN. . SINGAPORE - SINGAPOUR : Tbo City Book. stole, Ltd•• WiIIcMIter ROlIIO, Caber Quay, s-...-. SPAIN - ESPAGNE: Librerla M\IDdiOPrensa, Lapsc:a 38, MalIricI. Lt1lrerla J0!6 Bosc:b, Ronda UDivenidad 11. BuaIou. SWEDEN- SUeE : C. Eo FriUiO KunaI. Hovbok· hande1, Fredlptan 2, ~ 16. SWI'I'ZEIUAND- SllISSE: Libralrie Pa,yol, SA. 1. rue de 8ourI. u-. et 1 BIle...... GtMR, ~ NedIW, V-r. z.riet. UbralrIe HaDI RanD1Iardt. KirdIpue 17. z.net I. SYRIA - SDIE : LIbnirie UniwneIle, Da-. TRAIL.\ND - THAliANDE : Pramuan M1t. Lld.. 55. 57, 59 Chilkrawat Road, Wat Tuk, ....... TOaDY - T1JRQ1JIE : LIbnirie Hac:hette. 469 IstIidal CaddeII, """'1ICMiIuL UNION OP SOUTH AIIRICA - UNION SVD- AllIlICAINE: Van SchaIk·. Bookstore (PlY.), P.O. Box 724. PncoriL tJNlTBD DNGDOM - ROYAVME-UNI : H.M. Stationery 0fIlce, P.O. Box 569.~.S.I!.I. : aad at H.M-S.O. Sl!opa iD ....... 1Ialfut. ......... BriItlII, CaNllr. ~ and Me +.... lJNlTED STATES OPAMDICA-£TATS-UNIS D'AMbIQlJE : Intemadona1 ~lI SIr- YiI:e, Columbia UDiwnity Preu, 2KO Broadwar. ~Y_27.N.Y. URUGUAY : 06dDa de Reprafttad6D de EditoriI1ea, Prof. R6l:tor d'lllla, 11 de JuUo Im. PaIado DIu, ~ VENIZlJBIA : L1bnlda del BIte. Av. Miranda 52, Edf. GaUpu, ea-. YUGOSLAVIA - YOUGOSlAVD:: Drzawo PrIdlIace, J\IIOIIowilska Knjlp. T«aZIjfJ 27/B. ..... CanIwa Eado_t (CanIwj6va ZaIDaba), ~ (Slovenil). VIET·NAM : UbraIrio A11Iert Portai\, 115-193. 11II CatlDat, SIJaR, Lu COIfI1IIII1IIIu -.-, • ".,.,. IIIii du "..",. tItfIIN. If'",. -.hI--'"...", Itn III SIdiIa ... V 0lI0a ...,. N.-. v.III. ..... N GDitVB {SIIIIIe) 111I SIdiIa.. V It. la DIIa N.... U.... NEW.YOB ~U ) 14738-July 1955-1,250