S/PV.697 Security Council

On assuming the functions of President of the Security Council, I consider it my pleasant duty first of all to thank my predecessor, Mr. Sarper, the representative of Turkey, who guided our deliberations in March so ably and effectively. I trust that all the members of the Security Council will support me when I express my thanks to Mr. Sarper on their behalf. 2. As we all know, last month, thanks to the cooperation of all the delegations, the Security Council unanimously adopted two important resolutions on the Palestine question [8/3378 and 8/3379]. This fact gives me grounds to hope that the spirit of co-operation will President: M. A. A. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Belgique, Bresil, Chine, France, Iran, Nouvelle-Zelande, Perou, Turquie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/697) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question de Palestine: Plainte d'Israel contre l'Egypte, pour attaques repetees, commises par des forces armees egyptiennes, regulieres et irregulieres, et par des maraudeurs armes venus du territoire place sous 1'autorite de l'Egypte, contre les forces armees d'Israel et contre la personne et les biens de civils en !srad, au risque de compromettre la paix et la secu1'ite dans la region et en violation de la Convention d'armistice general et des resolutions du Conseil de securite; i1 s'agit en particulier des attaques suivantes: a) L'assautamain armee commisaPattish, le 24 mars 1955; b) Des attaques repetees, prononcees, entre le 26 mars et le 3 avri11955, au moyen de mines et de coups de feu contre des unites de l'armee d'Israel qui patrouillaient le long de la frontiere egypto~ israelienne dans la zone de Gaza; c) L'attaque commise le 3 avril 1955 contre une patrouille israelienne et contre le village dc Nahal Oz. Remerciements au President 80rtant 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Au moment d'assumer les fonctions de President du Conseil de securite, j'ai tout d'abord l'agreable devoir de remercier mon predecesseur, M. Sarper, le representant de la Turquie, qui a dirige en mars, les debats du Conseil de securite avec tant d'habilete et d'efticacite. Je suis silr que tous les membres du Conseil voudront s'associer aux remerciements que j'adresse a M. Sarper. 2. Comme on le sait, le mois dernier grace ala collaboration de toutes les delegations, le Conseil de securite a adopte a l'unanimite deux resolutions importantes sur la question de Palestine [8/3378 et 8/3379]. Ce fait me permet d'esperer que le Conseil continuera a etre anime Adoption of the agenda The Palestine question Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning repeated attacks by Egyptian regnIar and irregular armed forces and by armed marauders from Egyptian- controlled territory against Israel armed forceB and civilian lives and property in Israel, to the danger of the peace and security of the area and in violation of the General Armistice Agreement and the reso- lutions of the Security Council; with special refe- rence to : (a) the armed assault at Pattish on 24 March 1955 ; (b) repeated attacks by mining and gunfire on Israel army units patrolling the Israel-Egyptian border at the Gaza strip between 26 March and 3 April 1955 ; (c) the attack on an Israel army patrol and on the village of Nahal Oz on 3 April 1955 (S/3376, S/3385, S/3386)

My delegation is grateful for the promptitude with which the President has made it possible for the Security Council to hear Israel's complaint. 5. I am making my submission in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, under which the Security Council may investigate any situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 35 of the Charter, any Member of the United Nations may bring any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council. 6. The situation which confronts us in the area opposite the Gaza strip is aptly reflected in the provisions of the articles to which I have just referred. The assaults upon Israel during the past five weeks have themselves been grave enough to merit review and strong criticism. But the Security Council would, in our view, act wisely if it were not only to consider these attacks as past events, but also to envisage the effects and implications of their continuance. We have come, therefore, to seek the remedies of the Charter for a grave situation the continuance of which would prejudice international peace and security in our region. 7. At its recent meetings, the Security Council discussed events on the Egyptian-Israel frontierbefore 1 March 1955 on the basis of two reports from General Burns, Chief Adoption de l'ordre du jour La question de Palestine Plainte d'Israel contre I'Egypte, pour attaques repetoos, commises par des forces armees egyptiennes, regu- lieres et irregulieres, et par des maraudeurs armes venus du territoire place sous l'auwrite de l'Egypte, contre les forces armees d'Israel et contre la personne et les biens de civils en Israel, au risque de compro- mettre la paix et la securite dans la region et en vio- lation de la Convention d'armistice general et des resolutions du Conseil de securite; n s'agit en parti- culler des attaques suivantes: a) l'assaut a main armee commis a Pattish, le 24 mars 1955; b) des attaques repetees, prononcees, entre le 26 mars et le 3 avril 1955, au moyen de mines et de coups de feu contre des unites de l'armee d'Israel qui patrouillaient le long de la frontiere egypto-israelienne dans la zone de Gaza; c) l'atta1{1le commise le 3 avrill955 contre une patrouille israelienne et contre le village de Nahal Oz (S/3376, S/3385, S/3386) Sur I'invitation du President, M. Loutji, representant de l'Egypte, et M. Eban, representant d'Israel, prennentplacea la table du Conseil. 4. M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de I'anglais): Ma dele- gation remercie le President de la promptitude avec laquclle il a reuni le Conseil de securite pour entendre la plainte d'Israel. 5. le depose cette plainte en application de l'Article 34 -de la Charte des Nations Unies, aux termes duquel le Conseil de secudte peut enqueter sur toute situation dont la prolongation semble devoir menacer le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. Conformement a l'Article 35 de la Charte, tout Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies peut attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur une situation de la nature vis6e aI'Article 34. 6. Les dispositions des Articles que je viens de citer decrivent exactement la situation qui s'est creee dans la region limitrophe de la bande de Gaza: Les attaques dont Israel a ete victime au cours des cinq dernieres semaines sont assez graves en elles-memes pour justifier un examen et de vives critiques. Le Conseil ferait bien, a notre avis, de ne pas considerer ces attaques comme des evenements passes, mais d'envisager aussi les effets et les consequences du fait qu'eUes se poursuivent. C'est pourquoi nous invoquons les dispositions de la Charte qui sont destinees a remooier a une situation grave dont la prolongation compromettrait la paix et la securite dans nDtre region. 7. Au cours de ses dernieres seances, le Conseil de secu- rite a examine, en se fondant sur deux rapports du general Burns, Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la 8. It is now my duty to convey the extreme disquiet and indignation with which we have followed the course of Egyptian provocation during March and the first week of April 1955. In particular, the ten days between 24 March and 3 April have been a period of the most provocative and dangerous character, perhaps one of the most intensively dangerous periods since the armistice was signed. The full record of these ten days is as follows. 9. On 24 March 1955, there took place the outrageous assault at Pattish, which has been the subject of reference in previous discussions of the Security Council. 10. On 26 March, an Israel patrol north-west of Nirim was attacked by automatic and rifle fire from Egyptian positions. The patrol returned the fire, and the exchange of fire continued for one and a half hours. 11. On the same day, 26 March, Egyptian marauders attacked an Israel patrol south-east of the demilitarized zone of Nitsana. In that exchange of fire one soldier was wounded. 12. On 27 March, four Egyptian soldiers from the Gaza strip penetrated into Israel territory north of Sheikh Nabhan. An Israel patrol drove them back across the border. 13. On 27 March, an Israel patrol in the vicinity of Nitsana was attacked by a group of armed marauders. When the patrol returned fire, fire was opened upon it from an Egyptian position across the border. 14. On that very same day, an Israel soldier was wounded in a clash with armed marauders near Beeri. 15. On 28 March, an Israel army command car was blown up by a land mine west of Nirim, and two Israel soldiers were wounded. One of them died later. Egypt, as I shall mention, was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 31 March. 16. On 28 March, the same day, an Israel patrol near Kisufim was attacked by fire by Egyptians from across the demarcation line. 17. On 28 March, in the afternoon, Egyptian positions attacked with automatic fire an Israel patrol south-west of Kisufim in Israel territory. The patrol did not return the fire. 18. On 30 March, an Israel patrol in the vicinity of Baikat Abu Marifa encountered armed marauders prepa- ring to place a land mine, under cover ofarmed Egyptians, across the demarcation line. The marauders opened fire on the patrol. At the same time, an Egyptian army position opened mortar fire. The Israel patrol returned fire and forced the marauders to retreat across the border. 9. Le 24 mars 1955, la localite de Pattish a fait l'objet d'une attaque particulierement revoltante, attaque dont il a d'ailleurs ete question au cours des recents debats du Conseil de securite. 10. Le 26 mars, au nord-ouest de Nirim, une patrouille israelienne a essuye le feu des positions egyptiennes, qui ont fait usage de leurs fusils et de leurs armes automa- tiques. La patrouille a riposte et I'echange de coups de f«;:u a dure une heure et demie. H. Le meme jour, le 26 mars, des maraudeurs egyptiens ont attaque une patrouille israelienne dans le secteur sud-est de la zone demilitarisee de Nitsana. Au cours de cette fusillade, un soldat a ete blesse. 12. Le 27 mars, quatre soldats egyptiens venus de la bande de Gaza ont penetre sur le territoire israelien au nord de Sheikh Nabhan. Une patrouille israelienne les a repousses au dela de la frontiere. 13. Le 27 mars, une patrouille israelienne a ete attaquee pres de Nitsana par un groupe de maraudeurs en armes. Lorsque la patrouille a riposte, une position egyptienne I'a prise sous son feu par-dessus la frontiere. 14. Le meme jour. un soldat israelien a ete blesse pres de Beeri, dans une rencontre avec des maraudeurs armes. 15. Le 28 mars, un vehicule militaire de l'armee israe- lienne a saute sur une .mine a I'ouest de Nirim: deux soldats israeliens ont ete blesses; I'un d'eux est decede depuis. Le 31 mars, nous le verrons, la Commission mixte d'armistice a blame l'Egypte pour cet incident. 16. Le 28 mars encore, une patrouille israelienne passant aux environs de Kisufim a ete attaquee par des Egyptiens qui tiraient par-dessus la ligne de demarcation. 17. Dans l'apres-midi du 28 mars, des positions egyptiennes ont attaque, avec des armes automatiques, une patrouille israelienne qui se trouvait au sud-ouest de Kisufim, en territoire israelien. La patrouille n'a pas riposte. 18. Le 30 mars, une patrouille israelienne a rencontre. dans le voisinage de Baikat Abu Marifa, des maraudeurs armes qui se preparaient a poser une mine terrestre sous la protection d'Egyptiens armes, qui se tenaient au dela. de la ligne de demarcation. Les maraudeurs ont ouvert le feu sur la patrouille. En meme temps, une position de l'armee egyptienne ouvrait un tir de mortiers. La patrouille israelienne a riposte et a oblige les maraudeurs a. se replier au dela de la frontiere. 20. On 1 April, an Israel command car was blown up and damaged by a land mine north of Kisufim. One Israel soldier was injured. Following the explosion, an Egyptian army position opened fire on the Israel patrol. On 1April, an Israel patrol pursued an Egyptianmarauder attempting to place a land mine on a road west of Nir yits-haq. 21. On 2 April, a very serious incident occurred when an Israel command car was blown up again by a land mine near Nahal Oz. Five Israel soldiers were wounded. After the explosion, three Egyptian arI\1Y positions directed mortar, machine gun and ritle fire at the wreckage, wounding another soldier. Only after returning fire were the Israelis able to reach the wounded and administer first aid. 22. On 3 April, at approximately 1730 hours, machine- gun fire was opened from two Egyptian army positions on an Israel patrol consisting of three command cars, in Israel territory. Israel reinforcements, sent to extricate the patrol, were subjected to heavy Egyptian firing. The Egyptians directed mortar fire against the Israel units and against the village of Nahal Oz. As the heavy Egyptian shelling made withdrawal impossible, and as casualties on the open ground were mounting, the Israel unit com- mander was forced to advance upon the Egyptian post with armoured cars. The engagement lasted until 1905 hours. Israel casualties were 2 soldiers killed and 16'wounded, 4 of them seriously. 23. This intensive campaign of hostility, which seems to have increased since the Security Council last met, has been marked by three separate types of violation. 24. The first is armed marauding; that is, the illegal crossing of the demarcation line by marauders bent on murder and their return to Egyptian shelter after the accomplishment of their purposes. The Pattish case is typical of many others. Such incidents were described by General Burns in his last report as one of the main sources of the present tension [8/3373, para. 13]. 25. The second is the mining of Israel's roads and trans- portation. There have been seven such cases since 12 March. The skills involved in this procedure of mine laying would be beyond the competence of non-military personnel, and there can be no doubt that these are the actions of troops or of other units under Egyptian command. 26. The third is attacks which have become increasingly frequent, in fact almost invariable, by Egyptian forces on Israel patrols whenever they come within Egyptian view. The attack on 3 April, followed by the shelling of Nahal Oz, was at least the fifteenth such attack on an Israel" patrol since 1 March. 21. Le 2 avril, un incident tres grave s'est produit: une fois de plus, une voiture de 1'armee israelienne a saute sur une mine terrestre pres de Nahal Oz. Cinq soldats israe- liens ont ete blesses. Apres l'explosion, trois positions de l'armee egyptienne ont dirige sur les debris de la voiture demolie un feu de mortier, de mitrailleuses et de fusils et ont blesse un autre soldat israelien. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir riposte que les Israeliens ont pu parvenir jusqu'aux blesses et leur donner les premiers soins. 22. Le 3 avril, a 17 h. 30 environ, deux postes militaires egyptiens ont tire a la mitrailleuse sur une patrouille israelienne, composee de trois vehicules militaires, qui circulait en territoire israelien. Des renforts israeliens, envoyes pour degager la patrouiHe, ont essuye un feu nourri de la part des Egyptiens. Ces derniers ont dirige un tir de mortier contre les unites israeliennes et contre le village de Nahal Oz. La violence du bombardement egyptien rendant la retraite impossible et les pertes augmentant sur le terrain, le commandant de l'unite israelienne s'est vu contraint d'avancer sur le poste egyptien avec des voitures blindees. Le tir s'est poursuivi de part et d'autre jusqu'a 19 h. 5. Les pertes israeliennes se sont levees a 2 soldats tues et 16 blesses, dont 4 gravement. 23. Cette campagne hostile, dont l'intensite semble s'etre accrue depuis la derniere reunion du Conseil de securite, a ete marquee par trois sortes de violations: -24. Il s'agit, en premier lieu, d'intrusions armees en territoire israelien, c'est-a-dire du franchissement illegal de la ligne de demarcation par des maraudeurs avides de meurtre, qui regagnent ensuite leur refuge apres avoir accompli leurs desseins. A cet egard. l'attentat de Pattish est typique. Dans son dernier rapport, le general Burns a dit que de tels incidents etaient 1'une des principales causes de la tension actuelle [8/3373, par. 13]. 25. En second lieu, il s'agit de la pose de mines sur les routes et voies de communication israeliennes. Sept viola- tions de ce genre ont ete commises depuis le 12 mars. La pose de mines est une operation delicate qui n'est guere a la portee de non-militaires; il n'y a done aucun doute que ces actes sont le fait de troupes ou d'autres elements places sous le commandement egyptien. 26. En troisieme lieu, il s'agit d'attaques que les forces egyptiennes commettent de plus en plus frequemment, en fait presque regulierement, contre les patrouilles israe- liennes qui se trouvent dans leur champ de vision. L'attaque du 3 avril, suivie du bombardement de Nahal Oz, etait au moins la quinzieme qui ait ete commise contre une patrouille israelienne depuis le 1er mars. 28. This represents a relatively new development. Ofthe 16 serious incidents between 26 March and 3 April 1955, at least 11 have involved action by Egyptian armed units, sometimes in direct co-operation with infiltrators. Since the visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Colonel Nasser, to the Gaza area, the tension has significantly mounted and the attacks by Egyptian troops have become more persistent. It can hardly be doubted that there has been a reinforcement of units engaged in the harassment of Israel, and that Egyptian armed units are acting under a policy designed to maintain the tension and to bring it to an explosive point. 29. I now come to examine the reflection of these events in the discussions and concl'asions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. In the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission during March 1955, six resolutions were adopted ~ondemning Egypt for serious violations of the General Armistice Agreement. In the same period, the single resolution adopted against Israel was for returning fire when fired upon, as the Commission had determined, fifteen minutes earlier. Therefore even the unusually grave ratio of 6 to I underestimates Egypt's responsibility. 30. I would like to state what these six condemnations are, all of them reached by meetings of the Mixed Armis- tice Commission during the month of March 1955. 31. On 7 March 1955, a resolution was adopted against Egypt for firing by troops at an Israel patrol. On 7 March, again, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Egypt for the attack at Rehovot by an armed intelligence unit. These two resolutions have figured in the Security Council's recent discussions. 32. The third resolution to be adopted against Egypt during the month which has just passed was adopted on 20 March (Israel complaints Nos. 59 and 67). The resolu- tion of the Mixed Armistice Commission described the penetration of Israel territory by well trained groups for the purpose of mining Israel communications and trans- portation. The Mixed Armistice Commission resolved: "4. Notes with grave concern that, despite the obliga- tions imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement, the laying of mines within Israel territory has not been terminated; " " 6. Decides that this act of aggression, committed in Israel by the above mentioned grQUP, is in flagrant violation by Egypt of the General Armistice Agreement." 28. Il y a la une evolution relativement recente. Sur les 16 incidents graves qui se sont produits du 26 mars au 3 avrill955, 11 au moins ont ete provoques par des unites egyptiennes armees, parfois en collaboration directe avec des infiltres. Depuis que le colonel Nasser, President du Conseil de rEgypte, s'est rendu dans la zone de Gaza, la tension a monte de fa!ton significative et les attaques de troupes egyptiennes se sont faites avec plus de persistance. On ne peut guere douter que les formations chargees de harceler Israel ont ete renforcees et que les unites armees egyptiennes operent en vertu d'une politique qui est destinee a maintenir la tension et a la porter au point critique. 29. Je vais exposer maintenant comment ces evenements se refletent dans les debats et les conclusions de la Commission mixte d'armistice. Dans les reunions qu'elle a tenues en mars 1955, la Commission mixted'armistice a adopte six resolutions qui infligent a 1'Egypte un bl~me pour avoir gravement viole la Convention d'armistice general. Pendant la meme periode, la seule resolution qui ait bl~me Israel se rapportait au fait que des Israeliens avaient riposte apres avoir essuye des coups de feu quinze minutes auparavant, comme la Commission ra etabli. Ainsi done, si defavorable qu'il soit, ce rapport de 6 a 1 sous-estime encore la responsabiiite de l'Egypte. 30. Je voudrais preciser en quoi consistent ces six bl~mes, tous prononces par la Commission mixte d'armis- tice au cours des seances qu'elle a tenues en mars 1955. 31. Le 7 mars 1955, la Commission a adopte une reso- lution qui blame l'Egypte parce que ses troupes avaient ouvert le feu sur une patrouille israelienne. Le 7 mars, encore, la Commission mixte d'armistice a de nouveau blame l'Egypte pour l'attaque commis.e a Rehovot par une unite armee du service de renseignements. Ces deux resolutions ont ete evoquees dans le recent debat du Conseil de securite. 32. La troisieme resolution blamant l'Egypte qui ait ete adoptee le mois dernier, est datee du 20 mars (plaintes israeliennes nOB 59 et 67). Cette resolution de la Commis- sion mixte d'armistice faisait etat de la penetration en territoire israelien de groupes parfaitement entraines pour miner les voies de transports et de communications d'Israel. Voici le dispositif de la resolution adoptee par la Commission: « 4. Releve avec une vive inquietude qu'en depit des obligations que la Convention d'armistice general impose a l'Egypte, la pose de mines El l'interieur du territoire israelien n'a pas cesse; «... «6. Decide que cet acte d'agression commis en Israel par le groupe susmentionne constitue une violation flagrante, par l'Egypte, de la Convention d'armistice general. » " 6. Notes with grave concern the serious situation prevailing along the armistice demarcation line." 34. On 27 March 1955, the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted its resolution on the Pattish- outrage, concerning which many members of the Security Council expressed their horror before the Commission's decision had been reached. The resolution refers in the strongest terms to this" brutal and murderous act ofaggression ", and notes with extremely grave concern the aggravation to the serious situation prevailing along the armistice demarca- tion line. This was the fifth resolution adopted against Egypt by the Mixed Armistice Commission in its meetings during 1955. Egyptian authorities have sought to question the accuracy of this decision and have laid appeal, as is their right, to the Special Committee. It is important, however, for the Security Council to know that the Special Committee has no power to dispute or to question findings of fact by the Mixed Armistice Commission, and these are final. In accordance with article X, paragraph 4, of.the General Armistice Agreement,l the Special Com- mittee may only discuss questions of principle, or of legal procedure, but on the assumption that the facts established by the Mixed Armistice Commission are precisely those so described. 35. On 31 March 1955, the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted its sixth resolution against Egypt within a single month. That resolution " 1. Finds that, during the night of 27-28 March 1955, a group oftrained men armed with a mine crossed the armistice demarcation line from Egyptian-controlled territory into Israel; .. 2. Finds further that the above-mentioned group committed an act of aggression by laying the mine on a track used by Israel routine security patrols in Israel; " 3. Further finds that, as a result ofthis actofaggres- sion, an Israel army command car on routine security patrol, containing an officer and four men, was blown up. .. The command car was thrown 2 metres from the track by the force of the explosion; "4. Finds further that, as a result of this act of aggression: 34. Le 27 mars 1955, la Commission mixte d'annistice a adopte une resolution sur l'attentat de Pattish que plusieurs membres du Conseil de securite avaient evoque avec horreur avant meme que la Commission ne se rut prononcee. Cette resolution parte en termes tres ener- giques de cet « acte d'agression brutal et meurtrier» et constate avec la plus vive inquietude l'aggravation de la situation deja serieuse qui regne le long de la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice. C'est la la cinquieme reso- lution blamant l'Egypte que la Commission mixte d'armistice ait adoptee en 1955. Les autorites egyptiennes ont essaye de contester le bien-fonde de cette resolution et ont interjete appel devant le Comite special, comme c'etait d'ailleurs leur droit. Le Conseil de securite doit savoir, cependant, que le Comite special n'a pas qualite pour contester ou mettre en doute les conclusions de la Commission mixte d'armistice, celles-ci ayant un carac- tere definitif. Conformement au paragraphe 4 de l'article X de la Convention d'annistice general!, le Comite special ne peutstatuer que sur des questions de principe ou de procedure juridique, mais ce faisant, il doit considerer que les faits etablis par la Commission mixte d'armistice sont rigoureusement exacts. 35. Le 31 mars 1955, la Commission mixte d'armistice . a adopte encore une resolution contre l'Egypte - la sixieme en un mols. Aux termes de ce texte, la Com- mission: « 1. Constate qu'au cour!; de la nuit du 27 au 28 mars 1955, un groupe d'hommes entraines, porteurs d'une mine, qui venait du territoire sous contrale egyptien, a franehi la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice et a penetre en Israel; « 2. Constate ensuite que le groupe precite a commis un acte d'agression en posant cette mine sur une piste que les Israeliens suivaient pour effectuer leurs patrouilles regulieres de securite; « 3. Constate egalement que, par suite de cet acte d'agression, un vehicule de l'armee israelienne dans lequel avaient pris place un officier et quatre hommes en patrouille reguliere de securite a saute... L'explosion a projete le vehicule a 2 metres de la piste; « 4. Constate enfin que, par suite de cet acte d'agression: " 5. Notes with grave concern that, despite the obli- gations imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement and numerous decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, these repeated acts of aggression by Egypt against Israel have not been terminated; " 6. Decides that the above-mentioned act of aggres- sion constitutes a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement by Egypt; " 7. Notes with extremely grave concern the aggra- vation caused by repeated acts of aggression by Egypt against Israel to the serious situation already prevailing along the armistice demarcation line; " 8. Call<; upon the Egyptian authorities to put an immediate end to those acts of aggression against Israel." 36. So much for the March meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Egyptian Government, like the Israel Government, is a member of that commission and its representative sits here. He would be quite unable to deny that the Mixed Armistice Commission did adopt these six resolutions or to assert that any resolution was adopted against Israel except that for returning fire, which evoked a moment of diversion in a previous meeting of the Security Council. 37. I should add, however, that the Mixed Armistice Commission is still seized of many of the complaints which are referred to in the memorandum which I have submitted to the Security Council [5/3385]. The Mixed Armistice Commission now has on its agenda complaints by Israel referring to items 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 listed in that document. It is therefore likely, and we believe almost certain, that this toll of six condemnations of Egypt within the month ofMarch will shortly be consider- ably augmented. 38. The scope and gravity of these assaults can only be understood if we perceive the quality ofaccumulation: the effects of a tension created not by a single hard blow but by a steady attrition, by an aggregate of provocation, insecurity and bereavement, mounting day by day. After all, a cup can be filled to overflowing not only by a single sharp jet but also drop by drop. 39. I do not feel that we have managed fully to convey to the Security Council an impression of this form of steady, accumulated, relentless siege. There is surely no legal or moral justification at all for believing that the Security Council may ignore a profound tension if it is put together and composed by patient, constant hosti- lity day by day. 40. We believe-and we hope that the Security Council will confirm the belief-that the Security Council has precisely the same responsibility for acting against a 39. Je ne pense pas que DOUS ayons pleinement reussi a donner au Conseil de securite une idee exacte de ce siege continu, implacable, et de sel> effets cumulatifs. 11 n'y a certainement aucune raison juridique ni morale de croire que le Conseil de securite puisse fermer les yeux sur une tension profonde si celIe-d. est le fruit patiemment accumu16, jour apres jour, d'une hostilite COJ.1s:'ante. 40. Nous sommes convaincus - ;;;t nous c;i,perons que le Conseil nous confirmera dans cette; conviction - que le Conseil de securite assume exactement la meme respon- 41. I should also point out that the violations in March 1955 under these three headings of marauding, attacks on patrols and road mining, have their exact counterparts in similar events which took place in February and January 1955, December 1954, and in the months before. 42. Thus the sense of the accumulation of tension, of impatience and of apprehension is further deepened and reinforced when we take our minds back to the period covered by General Burns' two reports [Sj33I9 and Corr.l, and S/3373]. 43. I should like. to deal frankly with the question which must arise in many minds, the question whether there is here a case sufficiently grave for Security Council concern and action, and I should like to summarize the reasons for an emphatically affirmative answer. 44. . First, the tension in the northern Negev is running very high. These villages-Nahal Oz, Pattish, Kisufim, Nirim, and others-have all been victims of more than one assault, and each day, and especially each night, brooding suspense overhangs the scene. There is a strong and legitimate expectation of protection by the Govern- ment of Israel of life, property and the opportunities for peaceful labour. The fact that one resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission has succeeded another, with no evidence of any change in Egyptian practice, has undermined the authority of the Mixed Armistice Commission and of the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization. Evidence that the Security Council is not apathetic to this concern would steady the nerves of many and would encourage counsels of restraint. 45. Secondly, the frequency of these Egyptian violations i~ by any standards and by any precedent unusually high. So also is this clear preponderance-of6 to 1or more-of Egypt'S responsibility. Now surely the Security Council will not say that this is a normal situation, that it is not particularly disturbing if dozens of attacks take place, that six resolutions against Egypt. in a single month constitute a normal monthiy quota, that the 5 dead and 50 wounded on the Israel side in incidents discussed by the Mixed Armistice Commission in March is a reasonable exaction of the armistice system. The Security Council surely must not say this, for ifthis is a reasonable situation for March, then it cannot be unreasonable·for April or Mayor June; and if the period of March is normal, then 44. En premier lieu, la situation est extr~mement tendue dans le Neguev septentrional. Les villages de Nahal Oz, Pattish, Kisufim, Nirim et d'autres ont tous ete attaques plus d'une fois; chaque jour, et surtout chaque nuit, 1'inquietude plane sur leur population. Celle-ci compte fermement, et a juste titre, que le Gouvernement d'Israel protegera la vie et les biens des habitants et leur assurera la possibHite de travailler en paix. Le fait que les resolutions de la Commission mixte d'armistice se sont succede sans qu'it y ait eu aucun changement d'attitude de la part de 1'Egypte a min61'autorite de la Commission mixte d'armistice et de l'Organisme charge de la sur- veillance de la tr~ve. En montrant que cette situation ne le laisse pas indifferent, le Conseil de securite calmera bien des esprits et encouragera les appels a la moderation. 45. En second lieu, a enjuger d'apres tous les precedents, les violations coinmises par l'Egypte sont exceptionnel- lement frequentes. 11 est clair, d'autre part, que pour chaque acte imputable a Israel, on en compte 6 ou plus dont 1'Egypte porte manifestement la responsabilite. Le Conseil de securite ne voudra donc pas dire qu'il s'agit la d'une situation normale, que ces attaques commises par douzaines ne sont pas un motif d'inqui6tude parti- culiere, que l'adoption de six resulutiom, blamant l'Egypte en un mois n'a rien d'exceptionnel, et que si les incidents examines par la Commission mixte d'armistice en mars ont fait 5 morts et 50 blesses du cote israelien, c'est la le cout normal de l'armistice. Le Conseil de securite ne doit certainement pas dire cela. Si cette situation doit ~tre 46. A third reason for such an expression of concern is that we interpret the will ofthe Security Council. as it has been recently expressed, to be in favour of seeking remedy by peaceful actiol. rather than by direct response. Ifa peaceful remedy is s~.tght, then the quest for it should not be rebuffed. 47. The resolutions of the Mixed Armistice Commission have six times in a month been ignored. A new and purposeful military design is emerging in the Egyptian assaults. 48. 11 est clair que nous n'allons pas interrompre les communications entre nos villages simplement parce que les routes sont minees; nous ne pouvons pas cesser nos patrouilles dans les villages israeliens. 11 est tout a fait impossible d'etablir un systeme de defense statique dans chaque village et entre les villages. Au reste, une concen- tration de troupes aussi importante ne diminuerait pas necessairement la tension. 11 s'ensuit que la seule fa~on d'assurer un minimum de securite aux habitations et aux fermes et aux canalisations d'eau est d'effectuer regu- lierement des patrouilles de securite dans la region. Sans ces patrouilles, les pertes que nous avons subies au cours des derniers mois auraient ete bien plus graves encore. 49. Tel est donc Je probleme. Il est clair que si l'Egypte continue a perpetrer des actes de provocation, c'est-a-dire si les Egyptiens continuent a poser des mines sur les routes d'Israel et a ouvrir le feu sur les patrouilles et sur les villages, nous pourrions bien nous trouver dans une situation qui marquerait la fin de la Convention d'armis- tice general. 48. We obviously shall not cease to communicate be- tween our villages in deference to land mining; we cannot give up our patrols ofIsrael villages. It is quite impossible to have static defence forces in and between each village. Nor would such a formidable concentration necessarily relieve tension. Thus the only way of assuring minimal security to homes and farms and waterpipes is by regular security patrols. But for these patrols, our casualties in recent months would have reached even more disquieting levels. 49. This, then, is the position that we face. It is clear that ifthis incessant Egyptian provocation continues, that is to say, if the Egyptians continue to lay mines on roads in ISrael and to open fire on patrols and villages, then the situation may well arise in which the General Armistice Agreement will in effect have ceased to exist. 50. Thus the only way of preventing the further rise of tension is by prevailing on the Egyptian Government to stop these incursions, penetrations, mine layings, assaults and bombardments of villages. The doctrine that these problems should be solved by peaceful recourse and by prevention rather than by explosion is now in crucial test. SO. Ainsi, le seul moyen d'empeeher la tension de s'aggraver est de convaincre le Gouvernement egyptien qu'il doit mettre un terme a ces incursions, a ces infil- trations, a la pose de mines, aux attaques et aux bombar- dements diriges contre les villages. Le cas qui nous occupe montrera de fa~on decisive si nous avons raison de vouloir resoudre ces problemes par des moyens pacifiques et des mesures preventives plutot que par le recours a la force. 51. Dne quatrieme raison qui nous fait penser que le Conseil doit des maintenant prendre des mesures et exprimer son inquietude, c'est que nous avons l'impres- sion que le Gouvernement de I'E.gypte ne prend pas ces evenements tres au serieux. N'en deplaise au representant de l'Egypte, on ne peut s'empeeher de tirer cette conclusion regrettable des discours qu'il a prononces aux 51. A fourth reason why we thinTr that action and an expression ofconcern are already cal.,;d for is that we have the impression that the Egyptian Government does not talce this matter very seriously. With all respect, anybody who reads the speeches made by the representative of Egypt at our recent meetings is entitled to draw this sombre conclusion. This aggregate ofviolence tends to be 52. We can discuss any problem in a moderate spirit with an Egyptian government which admits and under- stands the gravity of this problem. But, as I have said, we have the impression that the Egyptian Government does not regard this matter gravely. Therefore we cannot overemphasize the importance of a clear statement by the Security Council, in incisive terms. 53. The question which we face this morning, and the continuation of this discussion, can be summarized as follows: Is the Security Council opposed to actions such as the one which took place at Pattish? Is the Security Council opposed to the constant mining of Israel roads and transportation, so emphatically condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission? Is the Security Council opposed to armed assaults on Israel patrols from Egyptian-controlled territory, and to the shelling orIsrael villages from across the armistice demarcation Line? Is the Security Council not disturbed by the fact that six grave resolutions in a single month have been adopted against Egypt by the Mixed Armistice Commission? 54. . These are the issues on which we have come by peaceful process to seek the utterance of action of the body charged by the sixty Members ofthe United Nations with responsibility fo~ the maintenance of international peace and security. 55. We would ask the Security Council to examine this problem with a true appreciation of the grave tensions which exist on our frontier, exemplified very vividly by the assault at Nahal Oz. It is clear from that assault that attacks on patrols and on villages invite responsive action, that Article 51 of the Charter does not deprive any Government of its inherent rights of self-defence, and that therefore the only way to ensure that accumulated incidents do not develop into a broader tension is to reduce and eliminate the incidents themselves, and thereby to re-establish the effectiveness of the General Armistice Agreement as the governing factor in the life ofour region.

I am grateful to the President for giving me the floor to explain my delegation's attitude. 57. I do not intend to reply today· to the Israel representative's statement. I reserve the rieht to do so at another meeting, when the Council his the necessary information to enable it to m~e a decision on the question hefore it. I shall confine myself today to some general comments. 52. Nons pourrions aborder avec moderation n'importe quel probleme, pourvu que le Gouvernement egyptien en reconnaisse et en comprenne la gravite. Mais, comme je l'ai deja dit, nous avons l'impression que le Gouvernement de 1'Egypte prend cette question a la legere. On ne saurait donc surestimer 1'importance qu'il y a a ce que le Conseil de securite se prononce sur cette question en termes clairs et energiques. 53. On peut resumer comme suit la question et tout le debat qui nous occupe aujourd'hui: Le Conseil de securite est-il contre des attentats comme celui qui s'est produit a Pattish? Le Conseil de securite desapprouve-t-il le fait que l'on pose constamment des mines sur les routes israeliennes, malgre les blames formels de la Commission mixte d'armistice? Le Conseil de securite est-il contre les attaques dirigees, a partir du territoire sous controle egyptien, contre des patrouilles israeliennes, et contre le bombardement de villages israeliens par des troupes stationnees de l'autre cote de la ligne de demarcation? Le Conseil de securite ne voit-il pas avec inquietude que la Commission mixte d'armistice ait ell a blamer severement l'Egypte six fois en un mois? 54. Voila les questions sur lesquelles nollS demandons, pacifiquement, que se prononce l'organe que les soixante Membres des Nations Unies ont charge de maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. 55. Nous demandons au Conseil de securite d'examiner ce probleme en mesurant exactement la grave tension qui existe sur nos frontieres et dont l'attaque de Nahal Oz constitue un exemple frappant. Cet incident montre que les attaques commises contre des patrouilles et des villages provoquent une riposte, que l'Article 51 de la Charte ne prive aucun gouvernement de son droit naturel de legitime defense et qu'en consequence, le seul moyen d'eviter que des incidents accumules n'engendrent une tension generalisee est de reduire et d'eliminer ces incidents euxmemes, et, ce faisant, de retablir l'efficacite de la Convention d'armistice general, qui doit etre le facteur dominant dans la vie de noire region. 56. M. LOUTFI (Egypte): Je remercie le President d'avoir bien voulu me donner la parole pour exposer la position de ma delegation. 57. Je n'ai pas l'intention de repliquer aujourd'hui au discours du representant d'Israel. Je me reserve le droit de le faire a une autre seance, lorsque le Conseil aura devant lui les elements d'information necessaires qui lui permettront de se prononcer sur la question qui lui est soumisG. Je me bornerai aujourd'hui a faire quelques observations d'ordre general. 59. The Israel representative quoted the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission which we already know and of which he has already informed the Council. Only a few days have passed since the Council unanimously adopted the two resolutions to which I have just referred, the first relating to the attack against Gaza and the second relating to General Burns' report, and yet we are again called upon to discuss the same questions. I must apologize for being obliged to repeat some arguments which are already known to you. 60. A question of principle is involved here, to which I should like to draw the Council's attention. It concerns the use of the procedures provided for in the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 between Egypt and Israel.1! Indeed, if the Council were to consider these questions, which are still on the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee, it might give the impression that it was ignoring those bodies and was not taking their decisions into account. How can the Council take decisions or examine facts in connexion with questions which are still under consideration by the Mixed Armistice Commission or by the Special CommitteeZ 61. In submitting its complaint, Israel wishes to reverse the situation and to destroy the effect ofthe condemnation pronounced against it by the Council barely a week ago. It is regrettable to see that, once again, the Israel delegation has chosen the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, for the dissemination of its propaganda. This new complaint too is designed as part of the propaganda which has become a common feature of the statements by-Israel leaders. ' 62. A glance at the Israel complaint shows that it refers first of all to the Pattish incident of 24 March 1955, with which you are all familiar. At the Security Council meeting on 30 March 1955 [696th meeting], I had occasion to inform you that it had not been established that the two armed individuals believed to have committed the crime had come from the Gaza area, or that they had crossed the demarcation line between Israel and Egypt. For that reason, the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission appealed to ,the Special Committee from that decision. The question of principle which the Special Committee has to decide may be summarized in these words: can the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission blame Egypt for these incidents if it is not established that the criminals came from the Gaza area, from Egyptian-controlled territory, and that they crossed I Officicl Records 0/ the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special I Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, quatrieme tlIIMe, Supplement No 3. Supplement special N° 3. 60. Il se pose ici une question de principe sur laquelle je me permets d'attirer 1'attention du Conseil. Elle concerne le recours aux procedures prevues par la Convention d'armistice general signee le 24 fevrier 1949 entre l'Egypte et Israel 2. En effet, si le Conseil examinait ces questions, qui sont encore pendantes devant ces organismes - je veux parIer de la Commission mixte d'armistice et du Comite special - on pourrait penser que le Conseil neglige ces organismes et ne tient pas compte de leurs decisions. Comment le Conseil peut-il prendre des decisions ou apprecier des faits concernant des questions qui sont encore examinees par la Commission mixte d'armistice Oll par le Comite special? 61. En presentant cette plainte, Israel veut renverser la situation et annihiler l'effet de la condamnation dont il a ete l'objet par le Conseil, it y a a peine huit jours. Il est regrettable de constater, une fois de plus, que la delegation israelienne a choisi le Conseil de securite, qui assume la responsabilite principale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, pour diffuser sa propagande. En effet, cette nouvelle plainte est destinee, elle aussi, a cette propagande qui est devenue monnaie courante dans.les declarations des respons.ables israeliens. 62. Si nous jetons un coup d'reil sur la plainte israelienne, nous voyons qu'elle se refere d'abord a l'incident de Pattish, du 24 mars 1955, que vous connaissez tous. J'ai eu, ala seance du Conseil de securite tenue le 30 mars 1955 [696e seance], l'opportunite de vous informer qu'il n'etait nullement etabli que les deux individus armes qui sont censes avoir commis ce crime venaient de la region de Gaza et qu'ils ont franchi la ligne de demarcation qui separe Israel de 1'Egypte. Pour cette raison, la delegation de l'Egypte a la Commission mixte d'armistice a interjete appel de la decision aupres du Comite special. La question de principe que le Comite special doit resoudre peut se resumer de la maniere suivante: le President de la Commission rnixte d'armistice peut-il blamer l'Egypte au sujet de cet incident s'il n'est pas etabli que les criminels sont venus de la region de Gaza, du territoire souscontrole 64. I should also like to draw the Council's attention to the fact that the Egyptian delegation might easily have submitted to it a number of similar complaints. But we see no point in wasting the Council's time by bringing before it questions which are within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 65. Several of these alleged Egyptian attacks have been the subject of complaints by Egypt itself to the Mixed Armistice Commission. 66. For example, I would refer to case No. 1in the list of attacks submitted by Israel, which reads as follows: " On 26 March, an Israel patrol north-west of Nirim was attacked by automatic and rifle fire from Egyptian positions. The patrol returned the fire. The exchange of fir~ continued for one and a half hours" [S/3385]. For its part, the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission submitted the following complaint concerning this incident: " On 26 March, at approximately 5 a.m., an Egyptian army patrol stationed on the demarcation line encountered an Israel army patrol. An exchange of fire continued for one and a half hours. At the same time, another unit of the Israel army. consisting of approximately 100 men, arrived in 5 vehicles and opened automatic fire on the Egyptian demarcation line post. The Egyptian troops retaliated with rifle fire and the skirmish lasted for approximately one and a half hours." 67. Similarly, if we look at case No. 3 in the list submitted by Israel, we read the following: " On 27 March, 4 Egyptian soldiers from the Gaza strip penetrated into Israel territory north of Sheikh Nabhan. An Israel patrol drove them back ~'SW$S the border" [S/3385]. These facts also formed the subject of a complaint submitted by Egypt to the Mixed Armistice Commission. I shall take the liberty of reading you this complaint: "With regard to the third complaint, Egypt submitted its own complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission on 27 March 1955. Six field pieces situated in Israel-controlled territory opened fire on the Eg-iPtian 65. Plusieurs de ces pretendues attaques egyptiennes ont fait l'objet de plaintes presentees par l'Egypte elle-meme a la Commission mixte d'armistice. 66. Comme exemple, je citerai le cas qui fait l'objet du nO 1 dans la liste des attaques presentee par Israel, OU nous lisons: « Le 26 mars, une patrouille israelienne a essuye, au nord-ouest de Nirim, le feu d'armes automatiques et de fusils, qui venait de positions egyptiennes. La patrouille a riposte. La fusillade a dure une heure et demie» [S/3385]. Or, la delegation egyptienne a la Commission mixte d'armistice a presente une plainte concernant ce fait. Voici le texte de la plainte egyptienne : « Le 26 mars, vers 5 heures, une patrouille de l'arnlee egyptienne qui etait de service le long de la ligne -de demarcation a rencontre une patrouille de l'armee israelienne. Des coups de feu ont ete echanges pendant une heure et demie. En meme temps, une autre force armee israelienne comprenan.t environ 100 hommes, groupes dans 5 voitures, est arrivee et a ouvert un feu de mitraillettes sur le poste egyptien. a la ligne de demarcation. Les troupes egyptiennes ont riposte en tirant des coups de feu. L'escarmouche a dure une heure et demie environ. » 67. De meme, si, dans la liste presentee par Israel, nous ,prenons le numero 3, nous lisons ce qui suit: « Le 27 mars, 4 soldats egyptiens venus de la bande de Gaza ont penetre en territoire israelien au nord de Sheikh Nabhan. Une patrouille israelienne les a repou!llies de l'autre cote de la frontiere» [S/3385]. Ces f~i.~s ont egalement ete l'objet d'une plainte presentee par nSgypte a la Commission mixte d'armistice. Je me permets de vous donner lecture du texte de cette plainte: « En ce qui a trait ala troisieme plainte, l'Egypte a porte·plainte devant la Commission mixte d'armistice le 27 mars 1955. Six canons places a l'interieur du territoire sous controle israelien ont ouvert le feu sur 69. Similarly, in a letter of 22 February 1955 to General Burns, the Director of the Palestine Affairs Department of the Ministry of War asked that United Nations observers should patrol the demarcation lines Oh ~~le Egyptian side. We made those proposals because the system adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission of dividing responsibility between the two parties was not likely to prevent exchanges of fire, since it was not possible to determine which party was responsible. OUi' armed forces do not start these exchanges, and our delegation requested the co-operation of the observers in determining who was responsible. We even pointed out that there had been eight such exchanges of fire since 1 March 1955. 70. Finally, the Israel delegation refers to an " attack on an Israel army patrol and on the village ofNahal Oz on 3April 1955 ". I should like to point out first of all, with regard to this alleged attack by Egyptian forces, that exactly the opposite occurred. This act of war was perpetrated by Israel. Only a few days after the adoption ofthe United Nations resolution requesting Israel to refrain from using force, we find a typical act of war committed against Egyptian outposts. 71. Here is a brief summary of the Egyptian version of this incident. On 3 April, at 5.30 p.m. Egyptian time, 10 Israel half-tracks, which were in the area in contravention of annex HI of the General Armistice Agreement, approached an Egyptian advanced post near kilometre 95 in the vicinity ofthe demarcation line. The Israel soldiers, 80 in number, took up firing positions and opened heavy fire with 120 mm. mortars and automatic weapons. That was a further violation of annex III of the General Armistice Agreement, which prescribes that there may be no mortars of a calibre larger than 76.2 mm. in the area. Later, the Israel soldiers crossed the demarcation line, continued their fire and attacked the Egyptian outpost. The Egyptians were obliged to fire back. Egypt submitted a complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The United Nations observer went at once to the spot. He came under fire but fortunately was not hit. The exchange of fire lasted about two hours. As a result of this brazen attack, 2 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 4 injured, including one captain. 69. De meme dans une lettre adressee au general Burns le 22 fevrier 1955, le Directeur du Departement des affaires palestiniennes du Ministere de la guerre demandait aussi que des observateurs des Nations Unies patrouillent sur les lignes de demarcation ducoteegyptien. Nousavions fait ces propositions parce que le systeme adopte par la Commission mixte d'armistice de rendre les deux parties responsables ne nous paraissait pas susceptible de prevenir ces echanges de coups de feu, la partie responsable ne pouvant etre determinee. Nos forces armees ne prenant pas 1'initiative de ces coups de feu, notre delegation a demande la cooperation des observateurs pour determiner a qui lncombaient les responsabilites. Nous avions meme signale que ces echanges de coups de feu s'etaient eleves a huit depuis le ler mars 1955. 70. Finalement, la delegation d'Israel nous parle d'une « attaque commise le 3 avril 1955 contre une patrouille israelienne et contre le village de Nahal Oz ». Je voudrais faire observer tout d'abord qu'en ce qui concerne cette pretendue attaque des forces egyptiennes, c'est le contraire exactement qui s'est produit. Cet acte de guerre a ete perpetre par les Israeliens. En effet, quelques jours apeine apres I'adoption de la resolution des Nations Unies qui demandait a Israel de cesser d'avoir recours a la force, nous sommes en presence d'un acte de guerre caracterise dirige contre les avant-postes egyptiens. 71. Voici le resume succinct de la version egyptienne de l'incident. Le 3 avrill955, a 17 h. 30 (heure de l'Egypte), 10 vehicules semi-chenilles israeliem - qui se trouvaient la en violation de l'annexe III de la Convention d'armistice general - se sont approches d'un avant-poste egyptien, pres du kilometre 95, a proximite de la ligne de demarcation. Les soldats israeliens, au nombre de 80, se sont mis en batterie et ont ouvert un feu violent de mortiers de 120 mm et d'armes automatiques. La encore, il y a eu violation de l'annexe III de la Convention d'armistice general, qui stipule qu'it ne doit pas y avoir dans la region de mortiers d'un calibre superieur a 76,2 mm. Plus tard, les Israeliens ont franchi la ligne de demarcation, ont continueatirer et sont montes aI'assaut de l'avant-poste egyptien. Les Egyptiens ont ete obliges de riposter. L'Egypte a adl'"esse une plainte ala Commission mixte d'armistice. L'observateur des Nations Unies s'est aussitot rendu sur les lieux - il a ete pris sous le feu, mais n'a heureusement pas ete atteint. L'echange de coups de feu a dure environ deux heures. Du fait de cette attaque flagrante, 2 militaires egyptiens ont ete tues et 4 blesses, dont un capitaine. 73. Before concluding, I should like to be spedflc and to remind you that a state of relative calm prevailed in the neighbourhood ofthe demarcation line, as General Burns noted in his report and as many delegations pointed out in their statements on the Gaza attack. It is obvious that the attack on Gaza could not fail to create a readily understandable state of. tension. The attack took place in an area where, as the United Kingdom representative said, " the original inhabitants are outnumbered by more than 2 to 1 by Arab refugees living under the supervision of an agency created by the United Nations itself. That this a..-med attack should have created a wave of emotion among the refugees is regrettable but very understandable" [695th meeting, paras. 8 and 9]. Thus Israel has provoked and created the tension prevailing in that area by its behaviour, its bellicose attitude and its premeditated and brutal acts of aggression. 74. The Mixed Armistice Commission, in its decision of6 March 1955 condemning Israel for its attack on Gaza, noted" with grave concern the serious situation prevailing along the Gaza strip resulting from this attack" [5/7373, annex Ill]. Israel has not only created the refugee problem by failing to implement the United Nations resolutions but, by its armed attacks on the area where the refugeas are massed together, has provoked the state of tension on the demarcation line about which the Israel representative spoke to us at such length today. 75. Our relations with Israel are still governed by the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. We have undertaken to observe the agreement and we shall continue to do so.

Mr. Eban, the representative of Israel, has asked to make some amendments to his statement. If there are no objections, I shall call upon him.

I should like to clarify one observation that I made concerning the present status of the discussions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. I mentioned five cases-items 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 listed in document S/3385-which are now under consideration by the Mixed Armistice Commission. I was referring to emergency meetings which have been called by the Mixed Armistice Commission to consider those complaints. It is, however, also true that some of the other complaints referred to in the same submission are pending before the Mixed Armistice Commission, but in its regular meetings. 73. Avant de terminer, je v('udrais preciser et vous rappeler en meme temps qu'un etat de tranquillite tout au moins relatif regnait au voisinage de la ligne de demarcation, comme 1'0nt retenu d'ailleurs le general Burns . dans son rapport et de nombreuses delegations dans les interventions qu'elles ont faites a propos de l'attaque sur Gaza. 11 est evident que l'attaque sur Gaza ne pouvait que creer un etat de tension, qu'il est tres facile d'expliquer. Cette attaque a eu lieu dans une region dont la population a, comme l'a declare le representant du Royaume-Uni, «triple par suite de l'affiux des refugies arabes, qui vivent actuellement sous la surveillance d'une institution creee par I'Organisation des Nations Unies elle-meme. 11 est regrettable, mais fort comprehensible, que cette attaque armee ait souleve l'emotion des refugies» [695e seance, par. 8 et 9]. Donc, Israel, par son comportement, son attitude belliqueuse, ses agressions premeditees et brutales, a provoque et cree l'etat de tension qui regne dans cette region. 74. La Commission mixte d'armistice, dans sa decision du 6 mars 1955 condamnant Israel pour son agression sur Gaza, a retenu qu'elle considere « avec une vive inquietude la grave situation que cette attaque a creee tout le long de la bande de Gaza» [S/3373, annexe Ill]. Non seulement Israel, en. ne mettant pas en reuvre les resolutions des Nations Unies, a cree le probleme des refugies, mais, par ses attaques armees sur la region Oll sont masses les refugies, il a provoque sur la ligne de demarcation un etat de tension - dont nous a parte longuement aujourd~hui le representant d'Israel. 75. Nos relations avec Israel demeurent regies par la Convention d'armistice general signee le 24 fevrier 1949. Nous nous sommes engages a appliquer cette convention: nous continuerons a le faire. 76. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): M. Eban, le representant d'Israel, a demande la parole pour apporter quelques rectifications a la declaration qu'il a faite tout a l'heure. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, je lui donne la parole. 77. M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de l'anglais): le voudrais preciser une observation que j'ai formulee au sujet de l'etat actuel des questions dont est saisie la Commission mixte d'armistice. J'ai mentionne cinq cas - ceux qui portent les nOS 9, 10, 12, 14 et 15 dans le document S/3385 - que la Commission mixte d 'armistice etudie en ce moment. Ceci visait les reunions extraordinaires de la Commission mixte d'armistice qui ont ete convoquees en vue de l'examen de ces plaintes. 11 n'empeche que certaines des alltres plaintes citees dans le men-,e document sont pendantes devant la Commission I:11xte d'armistice, qui les :xaminera en seance ordinaire. s~pported on one single occasion by the Mixed Armistice Commission, whereas what I have said ~o the Council on the subject of these tensions has been supported on six occasions by the Mixed Armistice Commission, and that support has been recorded in resolutions which I have quoted.

Last week, after full debate and careful consideration, the Security Council on consecutive days unanimously adopted two resolutions relating to the situation along the edges of the Gaza strip. In the second of those resolutions [8/3379], we asked the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to pursue with the Governments of Egypt and Israel the practical suggestions which he had made for improving conditions in this section of the armistice demarcation line, and we called upon the two Governments to collaborate with General Burns in that task. 80. In the few days since the Security Council last met, there have been a number ofincidents, the last of which has led to some loss of life on both sides and to a number offurther casualties which might easily have proved fatal, also. I am sure that all of us round this table most sincerely deplore this further bloodshed. Only too easily it may increase the tension which it was, and must be, our aim to relieve. But, if it is only too plain that further acts of violence have taken place, the fact is that, on the evidence at present before us, there is almost complete disagreement as to who was responsible for those acts. Both Israel and Egypt, however, have seized the Mixed Armistice Commission of the incident which occurred at Nahal Oz on 3 April. The Commission's findings should undoubtedly throw light on this incident, which, from the facts already available, is clearly a serious one. 81. I therefore propose that this meeting should now be adjourned and that the President should call a further meeting when the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission are available. We should then be in a better position than we are now to judge whether the action which the Council took under its resolution of 30 March 1955 [8/3379] needs to be supplemented in any way. 82. In making this proposal for adjournment, which I do formally, I should like to address through the Security Council-and I feel sure that other members wHl share this view-a most earnest appeal to the Governments of Egypt and Israel for the greatest vigilance and the utmost restraint so tha,~ this short interval in our work will not be marred on either side by renewed acts of aggression.

La semaine derniere, apres un large debat et un examen attentif, le Conseil de securite, siegeant deux jours de suite, a adopte a l'unanimite deux rc::olutions au sujet de la situation qui regne le long de la bande de Gaza. Par la seconde de ces resolutions [S/3379], le Conseil a prie le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve d'elaborer avec les Gouvernements d'Egypte et d'!srael les propositions concretes qu'il avait faites en vue d'ameliorer la situation sur ce tron~on de la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice; d'autre part, le Conseil a demande aux deux gouvernements de cooptSrer avec le general Burns pour lui permettre de s'acquitter de cette tache. 80, Pendant les quelques jours qui se sont ecoules depuis la derniere seance du Conseil de securite, it s'est produit un certain nombre d'incidents, dont le dernier a cause, des deux cotes, des pertes en vies humaines et inflige des blessures qui auraient pu etre fatales. Je suis convaincu que tous les membres siegeant autour de cette table deplorent sincerement cette nouvelle effusion de sang. Cet incident ne risque que trop d'aggraver la tension que nous entendons, et que nollS devons, reduire. Mais, s'il n'est que trop clair qu'il y a eu de nouveaux actes de violence, il faut bien constater que les renseignements dont nous disposons revelent une divergence de vues presque absolue en ce qui concerne la responsabilite de ces actes. Quoi qu'il en soit, Israel et l'Egypte ont egalement saisi la Commission mixte d'armistice de l'incident survenu a Nahal Oz le 3 avril dernier. Les constatations de la Commission jetteront certainement plus de lurniere sur cet incident - qui, comme l'indiquent les faits connus, etait manifestement grave. 81. Je proposerai donc d'ajourner la seance et de prier le President de convoquer le Conseil lorsque la Commission mixte d'armistice lui aura transmis ses conclusions. A ce moment, il nous sera plus facile de juger si le Conseil doit prendre d'autres mesures pour completer la resolution qu'il a adoptee le 30 mars 1955 [8/3379]. 82. En presentant cette proposition formelle d'ajournement, je voudrais, par l'organe du Conseil de securite - car je suis convaincu que d'autres membres du Conseil partagent ce sentiment - presser les Gouvernements de l'Egypte et d'lsrael d'exercer la plus grande vigilance et la plus grande moderation, afin d'empeeher que de nouveaux actes d'agression emanant de l'une ou de l'autre partie ne The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m. La seance est levee a 11 h. 45. FINLAND - FlNLANDE : Akateeminen Kirja· kauppa, 2 Keskuskatu, He1linld. AUSTRAUA - AUSTRAIJE : H. A. Goddard Ply., Ltd., 15Sa Gcorge Street, Sydney, N.S.W. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N. 3 (Victoria). FRANCE: Edition! A. Pedone. 13 rue Soumot, Paris V·. AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE : Gerold &; Co., I. Graben 31, Wita I. GER.'YfANY - ALLEMAGNE: Bucbhandluna Elwert &; Meurer. Hauplstraslo 101. ....iiDo Schllnoberl- W. E. Saarbach, G.m.b.H., AusJand·Zeitunashandcl, Gereonstruso. 15·29. Killn 1 (220). Alexander Horn. Spiea:elpsse 9. Wielbadea. ~. Willlerstorff, Book Import and Subscription Aaeat:Y, Markus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzbara. BELGIUM - BELGIQUE : Asence et Messageries de la Presse S. A., 14-22 rue du Persil, BruuI1eL w. H. Smith &; Son, 71·75 bd Adolphe-Max, Braxelles. GREECE - GR~CE : Kauffmann Bookshop. 20 Stadion Stnet, AtheaI. BOLIVIA - BOLIVIE : Librerla Selccciones, Bmpresa Editora .. La Razbn", Casilla 972, LaPu. . HAITI : Max Bouchereau, L1bBirie .. A la Carave1le ". Bolto postalo lUB, Port·aa-PriDee. HONDURAS : Lib_la Pamamcricana, CaJle de la Fucntc, ToauciPJpa. BllAZIL - BRt.sIL : Livraria Aair, Rna 'Mexico 98-B, Caiu Postal 3291, Rio de Jueiro, D.F. HONG KONG : Swindon Book Co.. 15 Nathan Road, Kowlooo. CAMBODIA - CAMBODGE : Papeterie-·Librairie nouve11e, Albcrt Portai1, 14 ay. Boulloche, PDom-Penh. ICELAND - ISLANDE : BokavorzJun Siafusar Eymundsonnar, Austuntroti 18. Reykjarik. CANADA : The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario. Pcriodica, S1l2 ay. Papincau, Montreal 34. INDIA - INDE: Oxford Book &; Stationery Company, SCindia House, New Da1hi. P. Varadachary &; Co., 8 Linabi Chotty Street, Madru.I. CEYLON - CEYLAN: The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Ltd., Lake House, Colombo. INDONESIA - INDONtsIE : Jajasan Pemhanaunan. GUDlma Sahari 84. Djakarta. CIDLE - CHILl : Librcria Ivens, Calle Moneda 822, SaDtiqo. Editorial del Paclfico, Ahumada 51, Santiqo. IRAN : Kotab Khaneh DanOlh, 293 SUdi Avenue, Teheran. CHINA - CHINE : The World Book Co., Ltd., 99. Chuna KinII Road, lit section, Taipeb, Taiwan. The Commercial Press. Ltd•• 170 Liu Li CI1an&. PIkiDc. IRAQ - JRAK: Mackenzie'S Bookshop. Booksellers and Stationen, 8aQbdad. ISRAEL: Blumstein·s Bookstores, Ltd., 35 AlJenby Road, P.O.B. 4154. TeJ Am. COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE : Libreria Nacional, Ltd&.. 20 de Julio. san Juan·Jesus. Ba:ranqaiJJa. Librerla BudIholz Galcria, Av. Jimcncz de Quesada 8-40. Bo.otL Librerm America, Sr. Jaime Navarro R.,49-S8 CaI1e SI. MedIIIiD. ITALY - rrALJE: Librcria Commissionaria Sansoni, Via Oino Capponi 26. Fu.a. JAPAN - JAPON : Maruzen Co•• Ltd.• 6 Tori. Nichome. Nihonbashi, P.O.B. 60S, TokJo Central. LEBANON - LIBAN: Librairie Universelle, Beyroulh. COSTA RICA: Trcios Hennanos. Apartado 1313. SaDJ_ LIBERlA: Mr. Jacob Momolu Kamara, Gurly and Front Streets, MonroYia. CUBA : La Casa Belp, Ren6 de Smedt, O'Reilly 455. La Habana. LUXEMBOURG: Librairie J. SChummer, Place GuiJ1aume, Luxembouq. CZECHOSJ OVAKIA - TCH£COSLOVAQUIE : Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel, Nlu:odni Trida 9, Pnha I. MEXICO - MEXIQUE : Editorial Hermes. S. A., Ianacio Marisca141. Mesico. D.F. DENMARK - DANEMARK: Messrs. Einar Munkspard. Ltd.. Nilrrepde 6. Kilbenbavu. NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BAS : N. V. Martinus Nijh,olf. Lanp Voorhout 9. 's Grayeahap. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - RtPUBLIQUE DOMlNICAINE: Librcria Dominicana, CaIle Merccdes 49, Apartado 656. Ciudad Trujillo. NEW ZEALAND - NOUVELLE-zm.ANDE: The United Nations Assoc1ation of New Zealand, G.P.O. 1011. WeJIinItoD. ECUADOR - tQUATEUR: Librcr'la Cientlfica Bruno Moritz, CasiJ1a 362, GaaJaquiL NICARAGUA: Dr. Ramiro Ram1rez V. Aacncia de PubJicacionos, Manqua D.N. EGYPT - tGYPl'E : Librairie .. La Renaissance d'I!IYPte ". 9 Sharia Adly Pub&, Cairo. NORWAY - NORVWE: Johan Orundt Tanum Forlag, Kr AUlUStsat 7a. 0lIo. SaNs SectIoa. European Office CIf tlIa Uait8d Na&.. Pa1aia des Nations. GENEVA (SwitRrJand) or S8I. and Circo1atioll Sec:tion. United NatioM. NEW YORK U.s.A.) Price: $U.S. 0.20; 1/6- stg ; 0.75 Sw. fr. (or equivalent in other currencies) Printed in France PANAMA: JOI6 Men6endcz, Aa=cia IntemaeionaJ de Publicaciones, Plaza de Aranao, Panami. PARAGUAY: Morono Hcrmanos, Casa Am6rica, Palma y Albcrdi, Asuncl6n. PERU - ptROU : Librerla intemacional del PerU S. A•• Casilla 1417. Lima. PHILIPPINES : Alemar's Book Store, 749 RizaJ Avenue, Manila. PORTUGAL: Livraria Rodripcs. Rna AIIrell 186- 188. LiIboa. SINGAPORE - SINGAPOUR : The City Book· store, Ltd., Winchester House, Colyer Quay SiDppore. SPAIN - ESPAGNE: Librcria Mundi-Prensa. Lapsca, 38. Madrid. Librcria J0s6 Bosch, Ronda Universidad 11. Barce1ooa. SWEDEN- SUIDE : C. E. Fritze Kunal. Hovbok· handel, Fredsptan 2, Stockholm 16. SWITZERLAND - SUISSE: Librairie Payot, S.A., I, rue de Boura. 1.:1_. et ai Bl1e. Beme. Geo6Ye, Montreux. NeuchlteJ, VeYeY. Zurich. Librairie Hans Raunhardt, Kircbaasac 17, Zurich 1. SYRIA - SYRIE : Librairie UniverseJJe. n.mu. THAILAND - THAi'I..ANI>E : Pramuan Mit. Ltd., 55. S7. 59 Chakrawat Road. Wat Tuk, Baqkok. TURKEY - TURQUIE : Librairio Hachette. 469 Istiklal Caddesi, BoYlII1a-JatanbaL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA - UNION Sun- AFRICAINE: Van S<:haik's Bookstore (Ply.), P.O. Box 724. Pretoria. UNITED KINGDOM - ROYAUME-UNI : H.M. Stationery Office, P.O. Box 569. Loadoa, S.E.I. ; and at H.M.s.O. Shops in London, Balfut, BirminIham. Bristol. CarcJjff. Edinburah and Mand1eItar. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -llTATS-UNIS D'AMtRIQUE: International Documents ser· vice. Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. URUGUAY: Oficina de Representaci6n de Edito- rialos, Prof. H6ctor d'EJia, 18 de JuJio 1333, Palacio Dlaz, MooteYideo. VENEZUELA I Librerla del Este, Av. Miranda 52, Edf. GaJipan, Canu:u. VIET·NAM : Librairi" Albert Portall, 18S-193. rue Catinat, SaiaOD. YUGOSLAVIA - YOUGOSLAVIE: Drzavno Preduzecc, luaoslovenska Knjip, Terazije 27/U, B80aracL Cankan Endowment (Cankarj6va Zalozba), LjabJjana (SJovcnia). V.5S Lu COIIIIIUl1Ide. ellllmllnt de pay. oil de. at/enU tlttllrU n'ont pIU encore ele nomme. pellVent lire adreuee. d III SectioD .se. V.... Offi~~ .se. NatioM V.... Pa1alll .se. Natiooa. G~ (SW-) ou SeotiOl'I .se. V... et de la Diatribatioa. Natioaa U.... NEW·YORK (EtaU-Uaia) 16241-August 1955-1,600