S/PV.710 Security Council

Before we begin the work of this meeting, 1 have the great pleasure of paying my tribute of admiration and appreciation to our previous President, Sir Leslie Munro, the representative of New Zealand. We weIl remember the judicial talent and infinite diplomatie taet with whiD.1, on two memorable œcasions, he conducted the business of the Security Council. 2. je sœur, mique 2. 1 wish to include in this tribute of affectionate appreciation the representatives of our sister nation Brazil, who represellted their country in the Security Council with a competence befitting the brilliant legal tradition of their noble people and alllO MI'. Sarper, the representative of Turkey, who has long experience of United Nations work, for he has participated in the proceedings not only of the Security Council but also of the Economie and Social Council, and has brilliantly represented Turkey in the General Assembly. 3. Xt is also the President's agreeable task on behalf of the Peruvian delegation and all my col1eagues, to welcome this morning the representative of Australia. Australia is to participate in the Security Council's work for the second time, and we are sure that its present representative will maintain Australia's splendid tradition of service on the different United Nations bodies on which it has been represented since the San Francisco Conference. 1 would remind you, moreover, that. MI'. Walker is an economist who 4. 1 wclcomt~ also the reprcsentatiw of Cuba. Likc Australia, Cuba is participating in the work of the Security Counci! for the second time, and 1 am sure that it will do so as brilHantly as it did the last time. Cuba has an outstanding legal record in Latin America, espeeially in the field of international law. 1 welcome Mr. Niiiiez Portuondo, who has had a splendid parliamentary and diplomatie r.areer and has worked ",5th equal skill in the United Nations General A~'lleI11bry, and my friend Mr. Blanco, another veteran of the stm~le for peace and inte1'llational concord in the United Nation~, n-h05e fine qualities and ability are un;-"'e~Hy appreciated. 5. 1 have equal pleasure in greeting the represcntative of Yugoslavia, which now joins the Cauncil for the second time as tlle brilliant exponent of an cnlightened position in favour of peace and international concord. In saluting the representativc of Yugoslavia, 1 salute his country, and 1 wish Mr, Brilej the success of which, incidentally, he is assured by reason of his fine qualities. Mr. Brilej is a parliamentarian and a diplomat who was his country's Minister in London during the important years of 1950 to 1953, and he bas represented his country in the United Nations, in particular on the Economie and Social Council; 1 am sure he win l~'f' up to his c-ountry's splendid traditions and poiic-y.

It is a grt~at honour for my country to have been elected by the General Assembly to serve a second tenn on the Security Gouncil. We appreciate this recognition of Austtalia's continued devotion to the ideals of tht' United Nations and this renewed mark of confidence in Australia's ability and detennination to discharge the heavy re5JX>nsibilities of membership of the Council. , . For the welcome that the President has extended to me personally 1 should like to express my sincere thanks. It is tr le, as he has said, that 1 have had previous opportun.:ties of participatin{ in the work 01 the United Natil.us, aiùlough ùûs ho ..ne first direct contact that 1 have had, personally, with the work of the Security Gouncil. It is only a few days since 1 left my fonner post as /_'lstralian Ambassador to Japan--a country in which, as representatives \\;ll recognize, the reœnt proceedings of this Council have been foUowed \-ery closely indeed, both in the Press and by the public generally. 8. 1 feel that it is a great privilege for me to take my seat at this Council table under the presïdency of 50 eminent an eIder statesman of the United Nations 9. We AustraHans are deeply conscious of the trust that is reposed in the Security Council by ùle Governments and peoples of the worM. Throughout the term of Australia's membership of the Council, it will be our constant endeavour to carry out OUi duties in accordance with the spirit, as well as the letter, of the United Nations Charter, and to make such contributions as may lie within our power towards upholding the Security Council's authority, so tr.at the trust of the peoples of the world wil! not have been misplaced. 10.' Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) (translated Irorn. Spanish): The Cuban delegation greatly regrets that, owing ta illness, which has àetained him in Havana, Mr. Nunez Portuondo has been unable to return to New York, as he iervently wished, ta attend thill fint meeting of the Security Council. We hope that ,on his recovery he will again be am"lng us. . 11. My Government wishes to express its thanks for the high honour conferred upon it and the confidence shown in it by its election to membei'Ship in the SecuritYCouncil for a term of two years. in place of the sister Republic of BraziI. 1 shall now venture to return my heartfelt thanks for the friendly and kindly words in which the President has welcomed my country, Mr. Nûiiez Portuondo and myse!f. It is a source of particular satisfaction to us that today when Cuba takes its seat in the Council that body is under the chaiJmlanship of the representative of its sister Republic of Pern-an outstanding statesman who combines great qualities of mind with a long experience in the United Nations. 12. As the President pointed uut, this is the second time Cuba has been a member of this Council. While cor.scious of the responsibilities we are to assume, we nevertheless venture to hope that our performance in the past will be a guarantee of our attitude in the future. 13. Cuba, which on more than one occasion in the past has distinguished itseli by the finnness and even vehemence of its defence of the principles of the Charter, considers that the fulfilment of the purposes of the United Nations, and primarily the maintenance of international peace Md securityJ depends on respect for and adherence to those principles on part ("f all Member States.

Having little to add ta what was 50 eloquently and 50 rightly said br the representatives of Australia and Cuba, 1 should like only to express my thanks to the President, for the very kind manner in which he has weicomed my country to a seat at this table and for the very generous words which he has addressed to the delegation of Yugoslavia. 16. It is our conviction that we are witnessing today a relatively improved international situation. The increased strength and influence of the United Nations enab1es this Organization and this high body ta under· taire further efforts towams the e1imination of inteJ.1o natk·~ prohlems either by solving them or by rectucinK and gradually l'ellloving the causes of still existing di!putes by peaceful means, mutual understanding and agreements. 17. My country, fervently adhering to the Charter ot the United Nations and its principles, in serving lm second term on this Couneil is well aware of the responsibilities entailed by its e1ection thereto. 1 should like to assure the President that the representatives of Yugoslavia on the Security Couneil will never fail to join other representatives on the Counci! in efforts directed towards the soiution of still existing ccmplex problems and the promotion of the cause of peace. 18. Finally, 1 wish ta associate myself with the welldeserved tribute paid by the President to the representative of Brazil, to the former President of tb~ Couacil, the representative of New Zealand~ and aIso to Mf. Sarper, the representative of TlU·key, aU of whom have served with such great distinction on thé; CouneiL fAdoption of the agenda ..~ M!tiJi4l!lllt~ The agenda was ~dopted. The Palestine questil')n: letter dated 13 Decemh<er 1955 Rom the repreeentative of Syrïa addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/3505) 19.· Sir PiersO't. DIXON (United Kingdom): When 1 Iast addressed the Security Council, on 16 December 1955 [707th meeting], five days only had passed sine" the shocking attack by Israel armed forces on Syrian sail and against Syrian forces and civilians on the north-eastem shore of Lake Tiberias. The Couneil had not then bf)fore it the reports of the Chief 20. 1 said at that time that we deplored this attack by Israel forces on civilians, bath in itself and also beoause we are most strongiy opposed IlOt only to attacks without provocation, but to the whole idea that anned attack is in any way justified as reta1i~tion for acts of hostility in the past, real or alleged. 21. 1 went cm ta commend the Government of Syria on the attitude of restraint which it had shown in this matter, and 1 pointed out tha': ineidents of that kind only complicated the efforts which my Govern- ment, with others, had ceaselessly been m:lkïng to put an end to the dangerous state of affairs in that area and to replace strife by the conditions of tran- quillity which were so much requîred in the Middle East. 22. Before examining the particular eomplaint now before the Couneil in the light of the Chief of Staff's reports and the statements of the two parties, 1 should iike ta make some furthe1.' general observations on the poliey which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has pursued, and win continue to pursue, with regard to the } Jestine question.· 23. My Government has made, and will oontinue te make, ôtrenuous efforts to bring about a lasting settlement hetween Israel ar.d its neighbours. TInt is our unswerving aim, and it is a policy which we sha1l pursue both inside and outside this Couneil. 24. It is a policy clearIy enunciated by the Prime . Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, in a speech in the House of Commons on 12 December 1955, when he said: "1 believe that a settlement is essential in the interests of both parties·and that the need for a settlenent is more urgent than ever". Sir Anthony went on ta say that the present conditions "could not go on indefinitely as they are going on now at this very hour without a danger of war increasing, and tbat... if attempts are not made to get negotiations going, the whole of that area can at any time fiare up into a blaze, the (',oîlsequences of which none of us can foreten". 25. 1 need hanUy add to this to show how seriously . the United Kingdom GovernzIaent regards this problem and how earnest it is in its determination to do ail in its power to bring about a seulement in the carea. 26. But, to bring about such a settlement, or even to establish the conditions for the negotiations which can lead towards it, there must first he a lessening of tension on the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This aim of lowering tension is one of i i•1 27. AIl of us who are concerned to preserve that peace as the essential prerequisite of a more ,pennanent seulement should give their unstinted support to the patient and courageous efforts of the Chief of Staff. 50 l<i>ng, ,however, as passions are inflaméd between Israel and its neighbours, there can be Httle prospect of lowering tension alC'ug the borders. General Bùrm's efforts to preserve the peace will thus continue in .jeoparoy and will continue to he concentrated on the damping down of flames caused by a series of local co~tions. He should he given, by aU concerned, évery opportunity to move forward ,to the more con- strUctive task of helping Israel and its neighoours to resolve their differences: 28;)t is ootmy in~.:o conduct an historical inquiry iuto the pasto ft is, howevt:.. abundantly tlei!.r ,that therè can he no possibility of caiming these passions and of reducing tension in the area, with a view to a more pennanent settlement between the parties, 50 long as the Government of Israel seeks to impose its policy on its Am.b neighbours by the \lse 9.f IJ)ilitary force. 29. ,'Over the past two years, d.e Security Couneil bas had. to deal with the deplorable incidents at Qibya, N'abhalin and Gaza, and now with that at Lake Tibe- rias; Gill of them calculated militai)' attacks and aIl involving 1055 of civilian lives, in sorne cases on an appalling scale. The Govemment of Israel bas oot atteJ1ipted to disguise the fact that these attacks ,were perpetrated by units of its own anny and were, in ~ect military,operations-relatively small, it is true, but, still military operatif'ns-against its neighbours. 30. It is true that on many occasions there has been provocation. It is also true that Israel has other legitimate causes of complaint. For instance, my Government does not at aU accept the claim by the Government of Egypt that it is still entitled to exer- cise beiligerent rights against Israel nine years after the signature of the General Armistice Agreement be- tween Egypt and Israel. But peace cannot he won by violent means. As 1 :laid at the time of our debate on the Gaza incident [695th meeting], the use of violence not only endangers the armistice regime, but prejudices the prospects of getting something better and is, therefore, doubly to he deplored. 32. Fmt, 1 shouid like ta express my appreciation of the valuable reports of General Burns 'lf 2~ and 30 December 1955 [8/3516 and Add. n They areadmirably clear and weU documented. The case bas been examinoo·with minute care and said impar. tiality, 9.I1d the reports are based on investigatiGrul on the spot, the examination of captured documents and the statements of witnesses. Moreover, General Burns bas not hesitated io give the Security Couneil the henefit of bis vicM on the causes of the general background of tension between Israel and Syria. These reports will, 1 believe, enabJe the Counel to lIKlke a fair and impautial appraisal oi the evidence a."ld to express its vi~ws in clear and unequivocal tenns. We have also listened to a series of statemems and counterstatements from the representatives of the two parties. , 33~ What facts emerge from a sturly of the evidence befrte us? It bas, 1 iliink, been made dear, espe- cÛ'jly by General Burns' supp!ementary report [S/ 3516/Add. 1], that Israel. had a legitimate grievance in regard to Syrian activities round the north-east cornel." of Lake Tiberias, The provisions of the General A&-misti:ce Agreement· between Israel and Syria2 are clear. The eastem part of Lake 'l'iberias, and a 10-metre strip of land on the north..eastem shores, lie to the west of the annistice deIVarcatiOil line and. are, therefore, wholly under Israel jurisdiction. The Chief of Staff's report, however, shows cltat there bas undoubtedly been ;llegal interference by the Syrian authorities, by units of the regular Syrian army a.cting on orders, with Israel activiûes on Lake Tiberias. Members of the Council will, 1 am sure, al! agree that this is wrong and that it mttSt stop. 34. That is one side of the picture, but the mast strAking faet that emêlo€5 fi'ûm the CI--Jef ûf Stêùlf's report is the scale and violence of the Israel attack on the night of 11 to 12 December, which involved such a shocking loss of liie. 35. Whatever may have been the provocation in this case or as a result of the past incidents referred to by the Chief of Staff, there can he no justification for retaliation which is ail the more shocking when on the scale of the attack of the night of Il to 12 De· œmber. Such retaliatory action is totally unjusti- fiable, and 1 have no hesitation in asking the Security Council to condemn it as a flagrant violation of the 1 Ibid., Special Supplement No. 2. 36. Such a ·re~liatory attack is.bad enough in, ~tse1!, but it is aU the more heinous .sinCt:: it eomes as the Jatest in the sen~ of de1iberate. ~taliatory operations ~ 'which l'have âIiesd.y referred and" for which Israel aIready stands condemned by. the. (Jouncil and, by World public opinion. My delegati()ll has, re~te~Uy stated in ..this:Council, a,d the Counëil ~c:self bas for- ma1ly declared·,.in its resoh.Jpns, that the whol~ prin- ciple of retaliation is Vlron, morally and politically, but Israel, has not heeded lhese injl'netio~. The time bas DOW come for Israel to understand that not only is this policy unworthy of it and morally reprehensible, but a1so that it is a mistaken poliey, a poliey that does ÎU)tpay. 37. If another attack of the same kind were to he launched, a still graver situation than now confronts us would arise. The Council might then weÎi consider mat oral injUJlctionsr eveu· of the Most formai kind, were not sufticient to meet the circumstan<:es of' the case. Therefore, the draft resolution subniitted br the French, Unittd Kingdom and Uni~' States dele- gations [8/3530 ami Corr. 1] contaiD.!l 'a warniilg that il the Gowmment, of Israel fâils to comply with Ua obligations· in the' future, the Council will have to œnsider what further meaBUres are tequiI'ed under the Charter to miùntllin or restore the peace. 1 shall not elabOrate On what, might have to he done, since it ÏI my hoPe ?.nd f'Jepectation that' the Govemment of Israel will 'Bee: to il ·iliat that situation does not arise. 38., 1 now tom ta a nuinher of helpful proposais made by the Chief of Staff with a view to reducing tension in this sector of the a.rwistice demarcation line. AsI see it, .~neral B~' ,proposais fan into two categories. On the one band, he suggests that the risk of incidents might he reduœd if Israel pattol boats were kept at a. t~nable distance from the shore. On the other hand, he su~ests that individual inhabitants of Syrla ~g4t,be authorized ta water their. dttle in the lake. artd 50 on, and al50 to appiy for fishing jJennits from the 'Israel authorities, aU this to he· done by' infonnal arrangement and, of course, without pre- judice to Israel's rights in the lake. 39. These ~ to me ta he useful proposais, and 1 regret that ~e representative. of Israel has already int;mated-I refer to bis letter of 29 Doecember 1955 {3/3524]-that ,his Govemment would reject the proposaI abO~t the patrol boats on the ground that it would im~ai~ Israel's rights. 40. Onecan understand that Israel is not prepared to bow to a Syrian threat to fire on patrol boats if they come within a given distance of the shore. But there is nothing unusual or novel in the Chief of 41.. Similarly, it should heIp to reduce tension if the Syrian viIJagers living 10 l'lear the lake could he allowed, Loth by their own Government al!.'" by the Government of Israel, to malte the same use of the lake and its waters that they did in the old days Qf the mandatory regimes, even in advance of a general settlement. 42. Surely with a little goodwill, a little give and 1 take on bath sides, sorne arrangementl of the kind suggested b)' the Chief of Staff could he made. It would he most ..tmfortunate fo~ the unhappy commu- nities concemed if an excessive rigidity on one side or the other thwarted General Burns' desire· ta secure for them an easing..of their position. It seems to me tbat we can reasonably aIk bath parties to c:o-operate with the Chief of Staff in pursuing these sensible and ~odf'!!t proposaIs. 43. FillaUy, 1 wish to addres.i myself to the letter ~teQ' 9' January 1956 from the representative of the Sovi~t Union [S;3528]. New 1 confess that 1 am not at ail clearabout the statU! of this document. Is it .a Soviet p~pœaI? Is it a Syrian proposai? Or is it perhaps a Syrian-&;wiet proposai? Nor am 1 at aU certain whetber this proposai, whatever its paternity, is strictly speaking in arder, according ta the ruJes of procedure of this CounciJ. 44. In bis letter of 9 January, the Soviet represen- tative cites tuIe 38 of the ruIes of procedure as the basis on which he œquests that what he caUs a draft res61ution, in the form set out in bis letter, shouId he put to the vote. If he hadrequested that the Syrian draft resolunon 1S/3519] should he put to the vote in the form in which'it was presented by the ~resentative of Syrla, then of course bis request would he' weil' founded on roJe 38. But this he does not do. He proposes a seria of amendments to the Syrian draft resolution and then requests the C~unciJ to put the amended form of the draft resolution to the vote. 1 question whether such a request is in oroer under rule 38. 1 hope that we shalI receive some clarification on the ~nthood of thÏ$ rather strange offspring.. . 45. 1 can, of' course, well undentand why the Soviet representative wished ta amend the Syrian draft resolu- tion in such drastic fashion. That draft resolution was couched in very extreme terms. But if the Soviet representative thought fit to present hi! own reccmmen- dation to the Council in the form of a draft resolution, 47. In particular it win be noted that that draft says nothing about the Syrian interference with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, to which the Chief of Staff ha! dmwn our attention. 1 do not say, and the three- Powu draft resolution does not say, that this Israel grievance in the least justified the deplorable attack by Israel anned forces on Syrian positions in Syria. Quite the conhary. Our draft resolution brings out that offensive military action is unjustified whether or not it is undertaken by way of retaliation. But it would be one-sided not ta mention the fact that there have been irregularities on the Syrian side, just as wc men- tioned, when wc condemned the Qibya attack, that there had becn irregularities on the Jordan side. 4:8. That is one reason why 1 do not consider that the Syrian draft resolutiol1 as amended by the Soviet representative, represents the sort of conclusion which 1 consider the Security Council should, after due comi- deration,reach, and why, when the time cornes for us to VO«:, 1 shall ask that priority he given to the three- Power draft resolution. Anotber reason is that the Syrian dmIt resolution as amended makes no mention at an of the interesting and helpful suggestions of the Chief of Staff for lessening tension in the area. 49. ï have aireaày expiaineà my point of view on tbese suggestions and need not go inta them again. In Dying this, and in seeking priority for the three- Power draft resolution, 1 do not wish to exaggerate the points of ditTerenœ between our draft resolution and the Syrian draft resolution as amended. Indeed, apart from the points 1 have mentioned, the two draft ~lutions art' in many respects close to one another. 50. In our draft resolution, it is true that we have Dot seen fit to incIude a provision whert'by the Government of Israel wouid be asked to pay compensation. Such a proposaI did, of course, appear in the Syrian draft resolution of 22 Deœmber [S/35191 and we have naturally given it care{ul consideration. 1 will admit 10 the Council that we were much attracted by the idea of introducing such a provision as an additional means of bringing home to the Governrnent of Israel the seriousness with which we view its offence. 52. However, there cao be no denying that it is right in general that compensation should he paid for injury and damage resulting from illegal acts of violence. The difficulty is to see how the principle could he iairly enforced on bath sides. 1 should be greatly interested ta hear such views as other members of the Council might wish to expresS on this question. 53. AIl in aIl, therefore, given the comparative close- ness between the three-Power dmft and the Syrian draft as amended, 1 hope that it will not prove difticult to reach a meeting of minds. If, as 1 hope, the Council can adopt a unanimous resolution, it will undoubtedly have a very beneficial effect and make an important contribution towards the immediate goal, th~ preservation of peace in the Middle East. 54. MI'. LODGE (United States of America): The United States bas joined in sponsoring the three-Power draft .resolution [8/3530 and Corr. 1] which is 1l0W before the Council on the Syrian complaint against Israel. In doing 80, we emphasize the serious purpose and· grave ooncern that motivates the United States Government. We do not advocate the cause of one side or the other. Our sole desire is to prevent the recurrence of the kind of action undertaken '., the Government of Israel on 11 December 1955 and ta Secure for the peoples of the Palestine area and the Near East a peaceful settlement. Wc believe that the three-Power draft resolution can contribute to such a result. But whether or not thilJ is true, we cannat stand aside and fail to condemn the action of the Government of Israel in that incident of Il December. 55. gouvernement - 55. We have repeatedly said in the past that no Government has the right ta take the law into its own hands. It is always deplorable for any Government deliberately and wilfully ta plan and carry out an attack &gainst its neighbour in violation of its solemn international commitments. What makes these parti- cular deliberatiolU more serious is the fact that a Member of the United Nations, indeed, a Member created by the United Nations, should now he before this Council for the fourth offence of this kind in two years. gouvernement 56. We have therefore had to consider weIl how best to impress upon that Government not only the fact that its actions ought to he condemned, but that the Council will he faced with having to consider other steps which should be taken if unfortunately another such offence is committed. Il 58. No amount of protestations of desire for negotia- tion and peace can overcome the loss of gronne! caused by such action. Israel's deed is 50 out of proportion to the provocation that it cannot he accurately descrihed as a retaliatory raid. Even assuming that it couid he calleà a retaliatory raid, we would condemn it. The Security Couneil mu!)t do more than condemn; it must warn the Government of Israel that another transgres- sion will compel it to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace. 59... The United States Government, in conjunction with the other sponsors, bas given most careful thought to the wisdom of calling upon Israel to pay compensation. We considered this requirement in the light of the fact that there should he reparation for such a ~eed. But we were ourselves unable, hecause of aU of the compli- cations involved, to fonnulate a procedure which would he .equitable for assessing compensation fOi this act which we condemn Or fol' any act in the future which this .Council might unfortunately have to condemn. 60. To prop6se something without there being in existence any established means for carrying it out wQuld, by nùsîng false hopes, add ta the troubles of those who œve been hurt. Nor would such a course con~ribute, to say the least, to a lessening of tension. This dues not mean that we· disagree with the prineiple of éompensation, IlOr does it meanthat we are not pre- pared to establish machinery for the future. On the contrary, we .frankly feel that it would he desirable, Should other members of the Cauncil concur, to request the Secretary-General in a separate resolution to study ways and means of equitable assessment and payment of c~mpensation for such offences. 61. Of utmost importance, however, as regards the future, is'that the parties should live up to the annis- tice AgI'eement, that they should respect the annistice demarcation Hnes and the demilitarized zones, and that they should co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff. 62. The .Syrian-Israel Mixed Annistice Commission machinery does not· function. The responsibility for this rests squarely on bath parties. The Commission was b~Hshed br bath parties for the specific purpose of resolving differences between them. There are 63. ,Let me state that the United States is impressed by the ,Chief of Staff's suggestions, set forth in his report, for improving the situation in the Lake Tiberias area. The Couneil, MaY 1 say, is ludy ta have such a capable Chief' of Staff as General Burns. He has the full backing of the United States Government and we are confident that he has the full backing of this Council. Wenope that we may soon have a report from him that he has been successful in carrying out his own suggestions Qlld that we may once again look forward io .an era of greater stability and peace in the Near EaSt. M. We earnestly hope that the Couneil will approve unanimously, as a necessary step in this direction, the draft resolution of which my d~legation is a co-sponsar. We aIso hope that the parties will be impressed with the concern of the members of the Council about the present state of tension and insecurity in that part of th.e world. They must surely realize that they will not ~nefit by..its continuance. The United States stands iëady to assist them, in any way it can, towards a better and saler future for the Near East. 65. In conclusion, let me recall the statement which l', made, as United States representative on the Security Council, on 29 March 1955, conceming the Gaza incident. At that time, 1 stated the bellef of the United States that the Gaza incident had interrupted significant .progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Palestineproblem and that, had it not been for the Gaza incident, the time would not have been too distant "when the intermittent fighting that characterized the situation on the borders of Israel and the Arab States would have become a thing of the past" (695th meeting, para. 36]. '~. ',1 slso stated at that time that one conclusion only could he drawn from the report of the Chief of Staff and the statements of the parties, namely, that: ·'armed attack, planned and directed as it has heen in this case, is no answer to the problerr which rightly concern and distress the people of IsrL.. It is no semce to tbem to increase internaI teruiion, to bring the wea to the brink of war, and to discourage and frustrate honest and sincere efforts to build a constructive peace" [ibid., parf). 42]. 68. The conclusions to oe drawn are obvious. Each of the incidents-from Qibya in 1953 through Nahhalin, Ga:m and now in the Tiberias area-has resulted in a deterioration of the situation in Palestine. This is something that neither the Security Council nor the Governments which we here represent can ignore. The United States Government has made the most serious representations to the Government of Israel, pointing out the imprudence-from Israel's own standpoint-of the action Israel has taken. Neither as a Government nor as a member of the Security Council can we effec- tively help to bring about the settlement Israel states it desires if ail our efforts are to be frustrated by those we seek to help. We stand ready to help both sides attain a. just and lasting settlement, but the parties themselves must aIso help. 69. Il .is in that spirit that wc have joined in spon- soring the draft resolution which has been submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [8/3530 and Corr. 1].

It is with serious concern that the French delegation has noted the recurrence of violent incidents in areas of Palestine which had been comparatively calm for the past two yeats. On the Syrian-Israel border, the demarcation lines laid down by the Armistice Agreement coincide with the former international frontiers, and on that account have becn more readily respected from the st'art. Moreover, they are fringed, or very closely fol1owed, by natural faults of the land, the course of the River Jordan and lakes Huleh and Tiberias. The specific case of the demilitari.zed zones aside, it should he easy to Q.void the irritating incidents which result from chance contact between hostile groups. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the authorities concerned should deliberately have let themselves he carried away so far as to necessitate the Security Council's intervention. 71. The complaint filed by the Syrian Government refers expressly to military action by regular forces of the Israel army, engaging in a carefully prepared operation aimed at the destruction of positions prepared and occupied by the Syrian army. This was certainly an aggressive act by its very nature, irrespective of the 72.. It is fortunate, certainly, that wc have not been reduced to that extremity. The S~:curity Council must nevertheless draw the inference of this case, and give the ·parties a salemn warning of the serious danger ta peace which further incidents like those just past would invoh"t'. 73. The three-Power draft resolution Ix'fore the Council condemns Israel for the military action of 12 December; it terms that action a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of 15 July 1948 [Sj902], of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter; and, lastly, it expresses concern for the future and calls upon the Government of Israel to cornply scropulously with its obligations.. 74. Ail this is expressed in clear tenns which leave no room for ambiguity; the draft resolution likewise makcs it quite clear that military action of this kind is to he condemned, whether or not undertoaken by way of retaliation. 75. This position being c1early stated, the Council, whose function is to preserve the peace rather than ta dispense justice or distribute a posteriori condemnation and blame, wouId be faiiing in its duty if it àid not try to find ways of making it more difficult for such incidents to recur. General Burns, under the enlightened guidance of the Secretary-General, is striving to improvc the situation in the areoa of Lake Tiberias; he has made \'arious useful suggestions to the Council in his previous reports; and the three-Power draft resolution gives him the Council's full support in the task he has undertaken. We should like ta think that this task will bear froit. It cannat, however, if the parties-Syria as weil as Israel--continue to regard the demarcation Hne '3.S a barrier which only the adversary is forbidden to cross but which in no way hampers any incursions they themselves ma\' wish to make into the territorv of others. ' . 76. My delegation was very distresscd by sorne statements made in the Council last month and by sorne documents which were introduced during our discussions. 78. Accordingly, the dmft resolution before the Council, taking into consideration the particular importance for the peace of the area of scrupulous respect for the demarcation line fixed by the Annistice Agreement, caUs upon the parties, in a separate provision, to comply with their obligations under article V of that Agreement, which establishes the demarcation line and the demilitarized ZOl' ~s. 79. One -{uestion that bas been raised hen:: by previous speakers is that of the compensation to be awarded to the victims of the incident of 12 December. This compensation is not mentioned in the three-Power draft resolution. That does not mean that we do not consider it necessary: on the ~ontra.ry we fully subscribe to the principle that States bear financial responsibility for damage caused by the unlawful acts of their agents. We do not believe, however, that the SeC'l1rity Council is legally competent, or that it is the organ hest equipped, to arra~ge for fair compensation in this instance. 80. The Security Council has no competence in this respect oand has hitherto acknowledged the facto In aIl previous cases-even that of Qibya-it bas refused to award compensation. The Security Council is required under the Charter to maintain or restore peace; it would lose both in efi'ectiveness and in prestige if it allowed itself ta be diverted from its main task. Might it not come to follow a line of too little resistance, that of compensation instead of prevention; and, once the price of blood had been fixed and paid, might not the guilty party itself be tempted to feel that it had been let off too lightly? 81. Even if we could disregard these objections of principle, the fact remains that the Security Council is not a court, and any order it made to pay compensa.tion would remain a dead letter. There œ.n be no question of making the Council itself responsible for fixing the amount of c:\amages to he paid, for determining who is entitled to receive it, or for deciding how payment is to be effecteà.. The Mixed Armistice Commissions have always maintained that they were incompetent to do this; the Chief of Staff bas other, more urgent tasks to pedonn. Furthennore, there is the International Court of Justice, to which the parties may have recourse at any time. 83. 1 would add that the three-Power draft resolution is concerned not only with the past but also· with the future. It is designed to prevent the recurrence of the regrettable incidents which led to the complaint now before us. This is one of our reasons for thinking that this text is better than the one espoused by the Soviet delegation, and that it should receive priority in our discussions. 83. puissances à regrettables saisis. que la 84. That is what 1 wished to sayat this juncture; 1 reserve the right to malte further observations on hehalf of the French delegation later in the debate. 84. stade rieurement, délégation 85. soviétiques) les la qui le

The Council has heard the statements of the pllrtÏes concerning the Syrian complaint against Israel ':iUising out of the incident which took place on 11 to 12 December 1955 on the frontier between Syria and Israel. 86. major trêve l'attaque dans syrien, contient quête taires gatoire 86. The Council also has before it for consideration the report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization [Sl'3516 and .A.dd. 1] on the attack by Israel cmned forces against Syrian territory in the area of Lake Tiberias which took place during the night of 11 ta 12 December 1955. This report contains infonnation based on the investigations of the incident made on the spot by United Nations military observers, including the examination of witnesses. 87. This infonnat;'on confirms the fact that, in the night of Il to 12 December 1955, Israel anned forces carried out a premeditated surprise att~ck on Syrian territory east of Lake Tiberias. TLe report also confions the fact that this attack by Israel cmned forces was carefully prepared and that the invasion of Syrian territory by powerful Israel anny units was carried out simultaneously from different directions. 1t should be noted that Israel cmned forces violated the demilitarized zone established by the General Annistice Agreement between Syria and Israel. 87. 12 intentionnellement l'est dans liennes portants territoire directions. liennes été conclue 88. justifiée Syriens Comme Chef 88. This completely unjustified surprise attack by Israel armed forces against Syrian territory caused considerable loss of life on the Syrian side. As indicated in paragraph 9 of the Chief of Staff's report, 56 soldiers and civilians on the Syrian side were killed, and in 90. It is clear from paragraph 29 of the report by the Chief of Staff that these actions by Israel were a serious violation of the provisions of the Annistice Agreement between Syria and Israel, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which the Israel armed forces crossed in their invasion of Syrian territory. It is clear that these actions by Israel were a grass violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and that their effect is to exacerbate the situation on the Arab- Israel frontier. 91. At rect:nt meetings of the Security Council [707t/z and 709th meetings], the Israel representative attempted to explain this attack by Israel anned forces against Syrian territory as reprisais which Israel was entitled to take as retaliation for action which Syria is supposed to have taken against Israel fishing boats in the Lake Tiberias area. 92. This explanation of the actions of the Israel armed forces cannot be accepted. The Chief of Staff's report clearly indicates that, after the Syrian side was informed that the fishing season had begun, not a single Israel fishing boa- A was fired at. The insignificant incident of 10 J?ecember involving an Israel police boat and a Syrian post in that area, referred to by Mr. Eban, the Israel representative, at the last meeting of the Council, can in no way serve as a justification for the actions of Israel on the night of Il to 12 December. This is specificaUy recognized in the Chief of Staff's report. The report states unequivocally that "there is a striking disparity between the scale of the retaliation and the provocation". 93. This is not the first time that Israel has attempted to justify its utterly unjustifiable attacks by claiming the right of retaliation. However, the Security Council, in its resolutions of 24 November 1953 [S/3139/Rev. 2] and 29 March 1955 [S/3378], expressed the strongest censure of Israel's actions against Jordan in the region of Qibya and against Egypt in the region of Gaza, actions which Israel attempted to justify by claiming the right of retaliation precisely as it is now d!)ing in connexion with the incident in the Lake Tiberias area. That the Security Council on those occasions adopted resoluti<ins censuring Israel for its actions ought to have been a serious waming to Israel. and it was to be expected that Israel would take those resolutions into acoount. Unfortunately, the incident in the Lake Tiberias area testifies to the contrary. 95. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation wishes to pay a tribute to the restraint shown by the Syrian Government, which, instead of aggravating the conflict in the area of Lake Tiberias, submitted a complaint to the Security Council, thm acting in the manner prescribed by the Charter. 96. We have consistently held that the parties must use every available means to settle their disputes, eschewing threats and certainly refraining from the use of anned force ; this will do much to strengthen peace and security in the area. 97. The Soviet délcgation considers that the Security Council should strongly condemn Israel for its atrack of 11 te 12 December in the area of Lake Tiberias. sement de la article prendre internationales ou qu'il 98. Bearing in mind that Israel has in fact, disregarded the Security Council's earlier l'esolutions censuring Israel for its attacks in the regions of Gaza and Qibya, and considering that the military actions of the Israel anned forces are aggravating the situation on the Arab- Israel frontier, the Soviet Union delegation believes that the Sccurity Council should cali upon Israel to take ail necessary measures to prevent such actions in the future and should solemnly warn Israel that any recurrence of such actions could bring about a situation requiring the Security Council to consider the question of the application of Article 39 of the Charter. It will he recalled that this article speaks of action by the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in connexion with breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Security Counc1l should cali upon to Israel observe scrupulously the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolutions. 99. Inasmuch as the Syrian Government has suffered materialloss as a result ~f the entirely unjustified attack on Syrian territory by the Israel anned forces, we fcel that the Sccurify Council should invite Israel to pay compensation to Syria for the losses caused by the anned attack carried out b:' Israel on 11 to 12 Dccem'Jer. 99. matérielles les syrien, demander pour l'attaque dans 100. The Syrian draft resolution [8/3519], with the USSR amendments [8/3528], which we have submittOO to the Security Council, fully meets these purposes. The Soviet delegation assumes that a stern warning by the Security Couneil will be given very serious conside- 100. les soviétique répondent de 102. The USSR delegation wishes to adcl IDat it is not in sympathy with the attempts of sorne delegations ta persuade the Security Council in its resolution to iay the blame for the incident of Il December on Syria as well. The facts cited in the Chief of Staff's report are clear evidence that Syria and its territory were attacked by the Israel anned forces. Consequently, the Security Council would not he justified in, and cannot agree to, shifting sorne of the blame to Syria, even in a disguised fonn. 103. In this connexion, 1 should like ta comment on the statement made by Sir Pierson Dixon, the United Kingdom representative. In his statement, he mentioned alleged provocations by Syria in that region which supposedly caused Israel to retaliate. lM. 1 must say that there is nothing in the Chief of Staff's report to bear out that assertion. It may be useful to consult this report in order to establish the facts. The report states: "In a statement issued on the night of Il December, the Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman linked the attacks on the Syrian positions with the shelling of Israel fishing boats and thcir police escort on Lake Tiberias on 10 December. After referring ta. thi'! • unprovoked attack " the spokesman stated: • Tonight, Israel forces advanced against Syrian positions to silence the batteries'-please note the tenn • batteries '-' responsible for this attack in arder ta avert furthel" Syrian aggression and ta ensure the security of Israel citiziens engaged in their lawful occupations.. " Syrian batteries east of Lake Kinneret (Tiberias) have on repeated occasions attacked Israel fishing and police boat ..." [8/3516. para. Il]. 105. The report also contains a statement issued by the Israel Press Office to the effect that, during the fust Aen months of 1955, .. there occurred at least twenty-five incidents on the lake following the opening of fire by Syrian outposts on Israel fishermen and police launches, causing loss of life and property" [ibid., para. 20]. 106. The Chief of Staff, however, adds the following: "According ta the records of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Annistice Commission, the Israel delegation, during tbat period, submitted twenty-two complaints 107. The Chief of Staff continues as follows: •• The Chainnan of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Annistice Commission, in order to prc\'Cnt incidents during the fishing season, wrote to the senior Syrian delegate on 2 Novemher 1955 to infonn him that, in the El Koursi arca, about sixty Israelis wouId fish pennanently between the middle of November and the middle of April, espeeially at night. They would in certain places get as close as 200 metres from the shore. In the Buteiha area, the fishing season would last from mid-November to June. During that period, about sixty Israelis would fish, especially at night, between the mouth of the Jordan and the mouth of Wadi Massadiya. This infonnation had been given by the senior Israel dei~gate, and the Chailman requested that, in order to avoid regrettable mistakes, it should he passed on to aIl Syrian echelons concerned" [ibid., para. 22]. 108. The Chief of Staff writes further: Cette Chef 109. Dans des J'ajoute Le tE The senior Syrian delegate acted on the information received from the Chairman. No Israel fishing boat has been fired at since the beginning of the fishing season" [ibid., para. 23]. That is not my statement. It is a statement by the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff continues : .. The incident of 10 Decemher, which was followed by the violent retaliatory action against the Syrian positions on the night of 11 to 12 Decemher, was again an incident hetween Israel craft oL~er than fishingboats and a Syrian position" [ibid.]. 109. What was this incident of 10 December? The Chief of Staff's report gives a complete and exhaustive account of it. The Chief of Staff writes: "The first comphint received about the incident of 10 Decemher was a Syrian verbal complaint received by the Chairman on the morning of Il Decembcr. It was followed by a Syrian written complaint received on the morning of 12 December. An Israel verbal complaint made on the morning of 12 December was folIoweè by a written complaint received on 13 Decemher. As in previous complaints, each party alleged that the other had opencd fire. According to the Syrian complaint, at about 14-.20 GMT, two Israel launches stopped at approximately MR 2800- 2540 and for twent)' minutes fired with automatic weapons at Buteiha fann and Douga village" [ibid., para. 24]. 1 add, on Syrian territory. The report continues: .. According to the Israel complaint, small arms and bazooka fire was opened from MR 2105-2520 at an Israel police boat on routine patrol '3.t MR 2104 1 emphasize that., according, to the stat..;ment by the Israel delegate, .. small arms and bazooka fire was opened ", whereas the statement by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which 1 rcferred earlier, spoke of attacks by batterles, that is to say, of artillery fire. 110. The essential point is contained in the foliowing observation by the Chief of Staff concerning this incident: "There were no Israel or Syrian casualties during the incident, and neither party requested an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission" [ibid. para. 25]. 111. That being sa, 1 should like to ask Sir Pierson Dixon to what provocation he refers. Which side was guilty of provocation ~n the area of Lake Tiberias? 112. From the Chief of Staff's report, 1 see th-:lt, on the basis of facts which are better known to him than to anyone else, the Chief of Staff is of another opinion. And quite logical1y, the Chief of Staff draws the following conclusion: "The Israel action on the night of Il to 12 December was a deliberate "-" deliberate", Sir Pierson Dixon, and not in answer to the provocation of which Vou spoke-"violation of the provisiom of the General Annistice Agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the llirael forces whiô entered Syria " [ibid., para. 29]. 113. Thus it is dear from the Chief of Staff's report -and in this case ',[ have no doubt that the Chief nf Staff k.iOWS what he is talking about and is adducing facts which are at bis disposal-that there is no justification for stating, as did Sir Pierson Dixon, that there was any provocation by Syria. 114. It is incumbent upon the Security Council to state clearly in its resolution that a completely unprovoked and deliberate attack was committed by Israel armed forces on Syrian territory and that the Israel Govemment must be solemnly warned of the dangerous consequences of such attacks. Only in this way can the Security Council help to prevent such incidents in the future and strengthen peace in that area. 115. 1 reselVe the right to speak at a later stage of the discussion of this item, among other things on the order in which particular draft resolutions are to be considered. The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m. Printed in France Price: $ U.S. 0'25; (or equivalcnt in