S/PV.711 Security Council

The Yugoslav delegation has carefully studied the documents submitted to the Council, the statements presented by bath parties and the discussion 50 far conducted in the Security Council on the question which is on our agenda today. AIthough it might appear superftuous to enter into details of the case, since the nature of the last Israel operation has been already clearly established, the Yugoslav deiegation nevertheless considers it necessary to deal with sorne of its basic clements. Î 1 1 ~ .1 2. On the night of Il to 12 December 1955, Israel , anned forces crossed the demilitari7.ed zone, penel ', trated into Syrian territory and launched an attack ; against Syrian positions. The result of this attack, S according to the report submitted by the Chief of Staff ûf û\e United r-.J'ations Trùce Süpervisiûn Organization [S/3516] was shocking. On the Syrian side alone there was a total of 56 soldiers and civilians kilIed, while 9 soldiers were wounded and are missing, prt'sumably taken prisoner. In addition, a considerable amount of material damage was done. 4. The document before us unequivocally points ta several facts which characterize this attack as an utterly unjust and unprovoked aet of retaliation. Among the more important of these facts, in our opinion, are the fonowing. 5. Without dealing at length with the negotiations between the Chaïnnan of the Israel-Syrian Mixee! Armistice Commission and the senior Syrian representative, of which negotiations this Council is aware, 1 should like ta state that, '3Ccording to the report of the Chief of Staff, no Israel fishing boat had been fired at since the beginning of the fishing season. This relative truce was interrupted by the incident of 10 December which occurred between the Syrian positions and one of the Israel police boat!. Bath parties informed the Mixed Armistice Commission of this incident, in the course of which there were no casualties, but neit~er party asked that the Commission shouid he oonvened. 6. Another point which, 1 feel, is essential for the discussion of the mt Israel attack, is the fact that the Mixed Annistice Commission has not yet had an opportunity te consider the incident which took place on 10 Decemher. Accordingly, the Security Council cannot, in the absence of an evaluation by the Commission, consider this incident as relevant to the discussion of the case now before us. 7. A1though the incident of 10 December did not differ in any respect from earlier incidents of a similar nature, with respect to which the Mixed Armistice Commission usually censured bath sides, Israel used this incident as a pretext for the launching of an organized attaek on a vast scale, an attack which, even according to the admission of Israel itself, had the character of reprisais. 8. 1 should like ta stress here that the Yugoslav delegation WQS unpleasantly surprised by the manner in which the representative of Israel attempted to present this act of ret~Ii~tion a.. nam-ral and, in the given circumstanees, justified. In our opinion, the statement that the Israel attack was provoked by the incident of 10 December cannat be accepted. We agree with the sœtement made by General Burns in this respect, and would add that neither this frontier incident nor .. The Israel action on the night of 11 to 12 Decemher was a deliherate violation of the provisions of the General Annistice Agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria." [S/3516, para. .?9] 10. In this particular case, however, the Council is confronted not only br a de1iberate violation of the General Annistice Agreement, 1 but aIso by an act of retaliation. In characterizing this attack, (;eneraI Burns draws attentionl rightly, in our opinion-to the dangers inherent in actions of this nature. One of the dangers, as emphasized in p;-.ragraph 30 of his report, is that the attacker cannot always restrict the range of his actions; and another, far more serious, is that measures of retaliation, no matter what their range, can lead to sharp response on the part of the side attacked and can have, therefore, grave and unforeseen consequences. It is in connexion with this danger that the Yugoslav delegation stresses with sympathy the self-restraint displayed by Syrîa in this case. 11. The Yugoslav Government docs not, of course, approve of frontier incidents or any other acts which may be considered as provocations. However, as 1 have a!ready stated, my Government cannot accept the position that such acts should he used as a pretext for and justification of the use of force and retaliation. In our opinion, the use of such methods t:an only lead to tension in international relations, jeopardizing or preventing the success of the general efforts towards the solution of outstanding questions. ln this particular case, such acts not only disoourage ;; efforts to reach solutions of the numerous problems 11 in that part of the world and, therefore, also the ri possibility of establishing a stable peace and co- ~ operation hetween the countries concerned, but also 1) render more difficult the improvement of the inter- ~ national climate in general. ~ ~~ 12. In considering this case from the point of view of the inadmissibility of the use of force in the settlement of disputes and also bearing in mind the oonsequences which might follow if such a policy were ta he pursued, the Yugoslav delegation considers it necessary that this unprovoked attack should he resolutely censured. Israel, being responsible f.Jr this attack and aIso, therefore, for the loss of life and the material damage to which it led, should he called upon emphatiœUy to take aIl measures to prevent any further aggravation of the situation in the future. We ~1 ~ ro ~ 1 1 OJTu;iGl Records of ~he SecuritJ" Couru:il, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No 2. ~Iabornte upon it :at a .Iater ,stagè' of our debate.. 13. ,The Security Council, in this particular case, is not faced with an act of local and more or less .individual lack of discipline whiçh may or may not always ~. backed by' the taclt or even express approval of tQe .Government. The Council Ï$ undoubtedly faced with an atta.çk decided and organized on a higher level. This act, therefor.e, eng-aged, no doubt, the responsibili1)' of the ISrael Govenunent. 14. MOl"eover, the last Israel action involved a manifQ1d violation of international instruments. It constituted, without doubt, a violation of ~he oQligations UJ)der the UIljted Nations Charter, a violation of the Ge~eral Armistice Agreement, and a violation of the decision pre~iously adopted by the Security Council, under .which' Israel was censured and called upon to put a stop to its practice of retaliation. 15. In our opinion, it is scarcely necessary to argue that respect for an international treaty cannot De achieved by means of a flagrant violation of that same treaty. And this it exacdy the way followed by Israel sa far. In this connexion, 1 should just like to remind this Council of the Israel communique issued in Jerusalem on 11 Decemher 1955. 16. The last, but by no means the least, important reason for a strong censure of this armed attack lies in the'fact that the attack was launched after several previous condemnations of Israel adopted by the SecurityCouncil. 1/. In connexion with the above-mentioned reasons for the censure of Israel, 1 should like ta invoke, in order to bring out its real scope and significance, the following words of the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Pierson Dixon, who, on the occasion of the consideration of the Israel attack againSt the Egyptian forees near Ga7.a, said: "If we 'were right then in censuring such action" --Sir Pierson Dixon had in mind the '3.ttack on Qibya launched in October 1953-" we must surely make quite dear, after an attack which has cast the lives of 36 members of the Egyptian army and of 2 civilians, what we think of it now. We must do this in the hope, and indeed the belief, that this expression of view by the international organization primarily charged with the maintenance of international peace and security will, if we speak dearly enough, he heeded this time by those responsible for the policy of rctaliation." [595th meeting, paiü. 13] 18. Sir Pierson Dixon's words, which 1 have Just quoted, are, 1 am sure, applicable to an even greater extent in the present case, which is the fourth of this 1 1 19. Coming back to the report of General Burns 1 [S/3516), 1 should ·like to emphasize that it does 1 not confine itself, as the mcmbers of the Council are aware, to a ·'description of the circumstances of the action undertaken on Il December 1955. The report ! aIso cour..tains a series of proposaIs designèd to restore a favourable atmosphere on the Israel-Syrian frontier. We sincerely hope that in these proposaIs both sides will fir)d a suitable basis for the negotiation of a modus vivendi which would 'redlJce the threat of a repetition of incidents tlult endangcr the peace, and thus create conditions for a mo~ acceptable aJiq lasting solution. But, in order to create such a favourable atmosphere, it is no doubt necessary for bath parties to adherc strictly to the provisions of tht; Ceneral Amlistice Agreement. 20. 1 should now like to say a few words about this problcm as a whole. . It is 7;\ot, of course, my intention to provide evidence of its complexity, or to point to the consequences to which its exilStence leads or may lead. 1 should like only to mention that the solution which will he adopted by the Council in this particular case will not at the saine time speU a solution of this problem in its entirety. To achieve such a general solution we must, in our opinion, approach this problem with the necessity of an early solution of this dispute in mind. This solutionshould he based primarily on the interests of the countries in that part of the \vorld. . 21.. Another dear fact to he taken into consideration is that, of course, the settlement of this disputed issue cannot be imposed, certainly not by measures which inherently carry the danger of further tension. 22. Finally, it seems to us that efforts for the seulement of problems amongst the countries in that part of the. world can be successful only if the peoples of thase countries are approached as independent and equaJ factors primarily interested in the solution of thase problems. The voluntary contribution of these nations to the stabilization of peace in that part of the world would he of the greatest importance. , 23. Such a paliey, in our opinion, should find· its expression in the unanimity of the Security Council on the case now before us. The delegation of YugosJavia believes that such unanimity could he reached by increased common endeavours, and is aIlIo convinced that this would enhance the moral weight and vaIue of any decision which the Council in so acting might adopt. 24. It is our conviction that there is a general consensus in the Security Council bath on the evaluation of this 25. It is true that it would not he the first time that the Council had been divided. In .this case, however, we have enough grouhds to agree that the present situation differs in many respects from earlier situations in which the Council dea1t with similar incidents in that same area. We therefore have no doubt that in such a changed situation the division of the Council would.he far more dangerous. 26. We are very much afmid that such. a division of the Council could not only harm the prestige of the Council and weaken the weight of its decisions, but, cotild alsO have precisely the reverse effect from that which the Council intended to acmeve. Instead of eontributmg to the lessening of tension, a decision not 'adopted unanimously would, in present circu.-)- stances, we are convinced, cause the situation to deteriorate. 27. The delegation of Yugoslavia sincerely hopes tmt the Security Council, alive to IUch, possible consequences, will make a.1I the necessary efforts to come to a unanimously adopted decision. 28. In concluding, 1 should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak again at a later stage of our deliberations.

At the 707th meeting of the Council, on the basis of the preliminary information we had then received, my delegation expressed its regret at the incidents which occurred on the night of Il to 12 December as the result of an unprovoked armed attaek by Israel. However, we reserved our right to lpeak again in this debate after we had seen the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on this matter. 30. We have since listened carefully ta the statements made br the representatives of Syria and Israel, and we have received the report [S135161 which General Burns submitted to the ~cretary-General, and also the supplement to that report [SI3516IAdd.l]. My delegation bas given these documents careful study, and 1 should like to congratulate General Burns on the objectivity he continues to show in carrying out bis delicate task and on the sincere efforts he bas always made to prevent 'he reeurrent incidents we are now considering from deteriorating ioto a large-scale armed conflict. 31. A study of these two reports makes it clear that armed Israel detachme!'!s èntered Syrian territory and attacked military posts, farms and houses, after firing bursts of machine-gun fire and immobilizing the Syna' n' gam'CU\D wh1Je th.. T l 1"."'''''8 ~~..""..l :_..- . ..._ • •••• ....a.... ...ua_ & ._a",,,",, ..l&.UY""'u .I.&....v 32. The report shows that the attacks made by the Israel anned forces caused the death of many soldiers and civilians, including women and children. In addition, equipment and supply store-rCJl"lms and houses were· set on fire; and property helonging to civilians was destroyed. Moreover, the attacks which were made along the north-eastern shore of Lake Tiberias were co-ordinated with those which took place in the soutl,crn area, extendi.ng into the demilitarized zone. 33. In the opinion of General Burns, the operation which was carried ou. by Israel during t!1e night of Il to 12 December constituted a delibcrate violation of the General Armistice Agreement, especiaHy with regard to the demilitarized zone which the Israel forces crossed in order to enter Syria. 34. Although part of General Burns' report is devoted to an explanation of the origins of the incident, and although the Chief of Staff carried out a detailed and very impartial investigation of such events as might ha.ve served as a pretext for this deplorable occurrence, Wf~ have not been able to find any possible justification for such an attack. . 36. However, General Burns states in bis first report: fact of this attack launched against Syrian terntori and Syrian military forces, tried to justify it by asserting that it had foUowed upon a series of attacks organized from Syrian positions against Israel fishing vessels and coastal boats. 36. However, General Burns states in his first report : "No Israel fishing boat bas been fired at since the beginning of the fishing season. The incident of 10 December, which was f Jlowed by the violent retaliatory action against the Syrian positions on the night of Il to 12 December, was again an incident between Israel eraft ct.~e!' than fishing boats and a Syrian position." (S/3516, para. 23] 37. Furthermore, we cannot possibly accept any attempted justification of this inddent on the ground that it was a reprisaI. In the first place, reprisais, as such, have been denounr.ed on more than one occasion by the Security Council. Secondly, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter provides that: "AIl Members shaH refrain in their international relations from the... use of force against the territorial L'1tegrity... of any State". Any act of !'etaliation is consequently quite unjustifiable. Finally, as General Burns says in his report, "there is a striking disparity between the scale of the retaliation and the provocation which was cited by the Israel Government" [ibid., para. 31]. 39. In ourview, we must fully recognize the seriousne~ of these incidents, of which unfortunately, there ha....e been four in the past two years--and in every case the Govemment of Isr-aeI hàS been the accused party-for tht;y could very easily lose their purely local character and sprcad to become an armed conflict As General Burns very rightly says in his report, "there is.. , a risk in such retaliatory action, vk, that the attackers may not be able to limit the extent of the operation to that planned". And he goes on to say: .. Such actions may weil produce a violent reaction by the forces of the attacked country, and what had beenconceived asa limited raid develops into full-scale hostilities.[ ibid., para. 30] 40. 1 should· like ta take this opportunity ta congratulate ·the Govemment of Syria once again on the moderate and conciliatory spirit ithas shown, but for which this incident might very easily have been converted into a Iull-scaie armed conflict. 41. It is now the task of the Security Council to take the necessary measures ta prevent any recurrence of such incidents, and thus ta contribute ta the restoration of peace. and tranquillity in the area. 42. .In this connexion, it must be remembered that this isnot the first time that the Security Council has had to consider acts of aggression of this kind committed by the Govemment of Israel. That Government h~ alre.ady more than once been censured by the Security Council for undertaking similar attacks on the territory of neighbauring countries. The Council has indeed gone 50 far as to condemn Israel, in connexion with the attacks carried out by the Israel Government dunng the Qibya and Gaza incidents. "43. The Imnian delegation pointed out to the members of the Council after the Gaza incident that, in the face of such acts of violence, the Council could not hold itself aloof and content it!elf with a mere moral condemnatinn. The representative of Iran said on that occasion: .. The Securitv Council must shoulder its responsibilities and act aceordingly" [692nd meeting, para. 27]. The representative of France, during the sarDe debate, said: .. From the bottom of our hearts we 'ope LAat Isl"'~! will appreciate the Council's decision at its fvll value, as a final warning.'· [695th meeting, para. 25j #. It is clear, however, that Israel bas not ooly disregarded the Council's final waming, but bas penisted in violatillg the sp~rit of the resolutions in question, br launching the unprovoked attack of the night of 45. Furthermore, sinee it has been shown, on the facts, that the attack of the night of Il to 12 December must he classed not as a spontaneous raid but rather as a premeditated aCt of aggression by the Israel Government, which must thus bear full respansibility, the Israel ÜQvernment must dearly be held liapie for the 1055 of life and material damage caused by that a~tack. We believe, therefore, that the draft resolution to.œ adopted by the Council should provide for the payment by Israel of adequate compensation for those losses. 46. At the same time, the Council should try to reduee, indeed to eliminate, the areas of friction between the two parties. In that connexion, General Burns boas reconunended certain mcasures in his report, and my delegation is prepared to give them its support in principle. 47. The Council has hefore it two draft resolutions, one submitted by Syria [S/3519] and amended by the Soviet Union [S/3528], and the other submitted jointly by the ddegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (S/3530 and Corr. 1]. Genemlly speaking, if 1 may say so, my delegation approves the draft resolution framed by the three Powers, except for certain points on which 1 propose to submit amenrlments in a moment. In addition, we are in no way opposed, in principle, to the Soviet draft resolution. In point of fact, the differenees between the two draft resolutions do not appear to us to be very important, and what We should do, my delegation believes, is to find the common ground between them. 48. In view of this fact, and of our geographical situation in the area in question, and because of the importance we attach to the maintenance of peace and stabilitY in the area, wc are naturally eage. to ~ ·ve ail the help we can towards finding a solution along those Hnes. It;: in this spirit that my delegation ventures to 3ubmit a number of amendments [S/3532] to the text of the draft resolution llubmitted jointly by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the 49. My delegation considers Ùlat the inclusion of such a statement would be unfair, not only because the conclusion thus drawn in the draft resolution is not in our opinion substantiated hy the aetuaI content of the report, but also because it would not he just to treat identically a large-scale attack which caused the death of fifty-six soldiers and civilians, not to mention material damage, and the incident mentioned, by referring to the att:"..~k and the incident in the body of a single resolution. 50. After 6111, what the Council has met to consider is the serious matter of the attack of Il of 12 December, the grave consequences of which are not to he compared with the very mincI' incident alleged, which should he considered in the nonnal course of its business by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 51. My delegation therefore proposes the deletion of the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution, and also of paragraph 5, which is drafted along similar lines. Paragraph 5 caUs upon the parties .. to comply with their obligations under article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the annisticé demarcation line and the demilitarized zone". In our view, however, the important question we have to oonsider-the violation involved in the case hefore us--is the senous attack launched by the Government of Israel. There again, it would he unfair to treat the Government of Israel and the Government of Syria in identical fashion by inviting them bath, in the body of a single resolution, to respect the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. 52. Accordingly, we are introducing an amendment calling for the deletion of paragraph 5 of the joint draft resolution. 53. Further, my delegation considers that the tenns wed in paragraph 4 do not indicate in a sufficiently cleu and precise manner the Council's intention to take strong and appropriate action, should there he any repetition of acts of violation of this kind. My delegation therefore sugg~sts that paragmph 4 should he deleted and replaced by the following: •• Declares that the commission of such acts in the future wili constitute a breach of the peace within the mcaning of Article 39 of the Charter, requiring consideration by th.e Securit)" Council of the measures provided for in Chapter VII 011 the Charter." 55. il suivant 55. Finally, for the reasons 1 have just explained, we propose that the following paragraph should be added to the joint draft resolution: U Decides that Israe! should pay adequate com~ pen.'lation for the loss of and damage to life and property caused by the attack." de ont ~ In conclUSÏQnj we $hould like 10 express the hope that, because of the gravity of the question hefore us, the members of the Council win appreciate the reasons which have prompted my delegation to submit these amendments, and that they will consider them with aIl the attention they ment, with a view to producing a just, cleu and strong resolution, one which we eamestly hope will he adopted unanirnously. 57. We believe that such a resolution will also help to prevent the resort to force which bas become habituaI in the area, and to restore peace and stability in that part of the world.

Before an opinion cao he formed on the operation of Il Decemœr, it must be placed in its context and the reasons given for it must he examÏned. Several representatives have already done so, and 1 can accordingly he brief. 59. For several years, there have been exchanges of tire between both shores of Lake Tiberias, and the Mixed Annistice Commission, unable to ascertain who fired Mt, has been attributing the responsibility to both sides indiscrirninately. According to the Chief of Staff, the Syrian authorities have been intcrfering with Israel activities in that area. The incidents which have occurred are in contravention of the General Annistice Agreement. There have been casuaIties on both sides and in the past, acoording to the statements of the Israel representative, these have included four Israel fishermen. 60. A furtber incident occurred on 10 December, during which the parties once more fired on each other, and it was impossible to detennine which had opened lire. But it has been establi!hecl that the Syrian positions did not fire on fishing boats in the course of that incident. They fired on a police boat which was hit by a bazooka and by a bunt of machinegun lire. There were no casualties on either side that day. 61. In bis '. ~er to the Secretary-General, dated 19 Det:ember 1955 [8/3524], the representative of brael states that the action of Il December was directed exclusively against Syrian positions which had been attacking Israel fishennen on the lake. Going back to 1950, he added that three fishennen had been kilIed 62. Thosc were the circumstances in which, during the night of Il December, an armed Israel detachment, estimated by the United Nations Chief of Staff at company strength, crossed the demarcation line, entered Syrian territory and attacked severaI SYrian positions. 63. In reading the impartial account of the facts, it is impossible not to he struck by the disparity between the military operation of Il December and the incidents aUeged to have causcd it. Similar operations carried out in Jordan, at Qibya, in October 1953, and in Egypt, at Gaza, in February 1955, had previously led to ,lIe same conclusion. The impression given is that they are aU three the outcome of a continuous and deliberate poHcy. The objective is to prevent, by large-scale reprisaIs, the repetition of isolated acts in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. There appears to be some idea that the more violent and brutal the reprisais, the more effective they will be. 64. That is a policy of violence contrary to the basic principles of the Charter. It is also contrary to the General Armistice Agreement, of which it is a flagrant violation. It is further contrary to Security Council resolutions, by which it has been condemned on two occasions. It is, finaUy, contrary to the moral principles accepted by aIl civilized peoples. 65. Such a policy is not only inadmissible, but is also ineffectual. During the last war, the Nazi forces pursued it in Belgium as they did in other occupied countries; its only effect was to arouse and stiffen resistance. The policy of reprisais, if continued by Israel, would only have the effect of building up a wall of hatred around it, and it is open to question whether a small State could continue to survive if such conditions were to persist. 66. The State of Israel came into being partIy as a result of the sympathy and pity aroused in the world by the sufferings inflicted .:>0 the Jews. It is difficult to understand how the Government of Israel can continue to resort to military operations similar to those already condemned by the Security Couneil and how it can continue to act as if it cared nothing for world opinion and believed only in force. 67. Wc think that the suggestions made by the Chief of Staff with a view to improving the position in the Lake Tiherias area are reasonable, and we hope that they will he unanimousry approved by the Couneil. 69. In addition to the question with which we are now dealing, reference has been made to the wider subject of strengthening peace in the Near East. All members of the Council are undoubtedly aware of the need for intensified efforts to remedy a situation fraught with dangers which have become increasingly apparent from recent events. For the time being, however, the scope of our discussion is more limited; we are dealing with the incidents at Lake Tiberias. 70. As far as this is concerned, the draft resolution presented by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States is consistent with the views which 1 have had the honour to put before the Council. The Belgian delegation will support this draft resolution. 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