S/PV.713 Security Council

My first words must be to apologize for not having opened the meeting at the appointp.d time. 1 was prevented by various circumstances. 2. Before 1 submit the agenda for the Council's approval, 1 have very great pleasure in reminding you that, ten years ago today, the Security Couneil met for the first time to detennine its provisional rules of procedure, thus beginning its fruitful work for peace and international harmony. 3. This is not, of course, the time to dwell on the work that the Council has done, but it is plainly a suitable occasion to paya tribute to those whose have preceded us in fulfilling this primary function of the United Nations, and to regard it as a good augury that we are meeting today with the memory of the Security Council's first meeting in our minds.

It is goocl that we arc observing today the anniversary of the first meeting of the Security Couneil, but 1 would have preferred to have observed it half an hour ago. 1 have no complaints to make, but merely express the desire that in future we should begin the meetings of the Secu;ty Council at approximately the appointed time.

1 am sorry that the Soviet representative has not accepted the excuses 1 made for failing to open the meeting on time. If 1 had not made those excuses, in a11 sincerity Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The Palestine question: letter dated 13 december 1955 !rom the representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Co~cil (S/3S0S)

1 have asked for the floclr in order to explain why my delegation, together with the delegations of France and the United States, are circulating a revised text 1 of the draft resolution [S/3530 and Corr.1] which we submitted to the Council on 12 January [71Oth meeting]. 1 am most grateful te the Presiden~ for giving me this opportunity to speak and 1 shall speak briefly. 7. The only difference between the original three- Power draft resolution and the revised draft which will shortly he circulated is the addition, after the fourth paragraph 'of the preamble, of a new substantive paragraph which reads as follows: "Holds that this intederence in no way justifies the Israel action." 8. The reasons for introdueing this new paragraph are these. 9. When he spoke at the 711th meeting of the Security Couneil, on the afternoon of 12 January, the representative of Iran explained why he thought that the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the three-Power draft resolution should he omitted. That is the paragraph referring to Syrian intederence with Israel activities on Lake Tiherias. Mr. Abdoh's argument was that the inclusion of the preambular paragraph in question would he unfair, not only hecause the conclusion which he drew from General Burns' report [8/3516 and Add.l] was not in his opinion substantiated by the actual content of the report, but also hecause in his view it would not he just to equate the Syrian intederence with the large-scale Israel attack. ln other words, as he put it, "it would he unjust ... to place Syria and Israel on an equal footing in this matter" [711th meeting, para. 48]. 10. At our 710th meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union had gone further. Referring to a state- 1 The revised tex! wu eubsequently reproduced as document S/3530/Rev. 2. 11. 1 think that the representative of the Soviet Union was being less than fair to me. 1 cannot find that 1 even used the ,"'ord "provocation" in my statement. 1 certainly would not have used it; it is a word that has disagreeable connotations. Nor did 1 say that Syrian activities had "caused" Israel ta retaliate. 12, What 1 did say was this, and 1 must apologize to my colleagues for reading a short passage from my earlier speech. After referring to Syrian interference on the lake, 1 went on: "1 do not say, and the three-Power draft resolution docs not say, that this Israel grievance in the least justified the deplorable attack by Israel armed forces on Syrian positions in Syria. Quite the contrary. Our draft resolution brings out that offensive military action is unjustified whether or not it is undertaken by way of retaliation" [71Oth meeting, para. 47]. That is the end of the quotation from mi' statement of 12 January, and surely nothing could be cIearer than that. The representatives of France and the United States were equally emphatic on this point: that the Israel attack was completely unjustified. 13. So much for that part of Ml'. Sobolev's argument. As to Syrian interference on Lake Tiberias, what are the facts? What has General Burns reported to us ? Ml'. Sobolev referred to General Burns' report [S/3516]. He did not refer to the supplementary report [S/3516/Add.1]. If, as we must, we study these two documents together, certain conclusions seem to me inescapable. 1+. There have been incidents on the lake, which lies 0/ course wholly within Israel jurisdiction. There is documentary evidence that on the Syrian side orders have been given, not once but over a period of more than two years, to fire in certain circumstances at vessels on the lake; the order was given to place a bazooka within the lO-metre strip that separates the armistice demarcation line from the lake. The Chief of Staff bas referred - and 1 quote his words - ta "troubles in regard to fishing on Lake Tiberias [S/3516, para. 32]". He reports that "Israel has resented Syrian interference with Israel fishing" [ibid., para. 12]. The Chief of Staff in his report has made sorne practical suggestions, and one of the practical arrangements which he has suggested "should eliminate any interference with Israel fishing boats" [8/3516/Add.1, para. 10]. 16. The question remains whether the three-Power draft resolution in its original form expressed in the best possible way the thoughts of the sponsors. We have naturally reviewed ;;!~ -1raf" in the light of the criticism levelled at it by the representative of Iran. We do not thirK tb",,~ It bears the interpretation ~·.::lt he put upon it, and certainly in the light of our speeches 1 do not see how it could be thought that we were seeking to justify or even to minimize in any way the Israel attacks. But since the objection has been raised, we are wiIling to meet it. Hence the new substantive p-aragr-aph 1 in our revised draft. 17. 1 believe that this paragraph reflects the general opinion of ~embers of the CounciI. 1 sincerely hope that the addition of this paragraph will set at rest any doubts that may have been felt at the fairness of referring in the last preambular paragraph of the draft to Syrian contraventions. 18. The revised text of the three-Power draft resolution will be available to members of the Council later this morning, and they will no doubt wish ta study it before expressing their views on it. It may therefore be thought convenient for us to adjourn after our meeting this moming and meet again tomorrow afternoon. 19. Ml'. SHUKAIRY (Syria) : ln my previous statements before the Council, 1 stated our case against Israel. The facts, the analysis, and the conclusions we conveyed to the Council were supported by the reports submitted by General Burns to the Security Council. 1 say "supported" needlessly, for Israel bas admitted the commission of this international offence. Thus the Security Council is now seized of the case of Syria on its merits and the case of Israel on its demerits. What remains is the final adjudication of the Council-an adjudication which would rise 21. 1 should begin by examining certain aspects in the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. ln his previous statement before the Security Council, and in his statement today, Sir Pierson Dixon has claimed that Israel had a "legitimate grievance in regard to Syrian activities round the north-east corner of Lake Tiberias" [7l0th meeting, para. 33]. Further in his statement he referred to "illegal interference by the Syrian authorities... with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias" [ibid]. 22. 1 must say outright that this contention by Sir Pierson Dixon is not supported by the facts. Syrian authorities have not interfered in any lawful activity on Lake Tiberias. The report of General Burns on this matter, whether the first report or the supplementary report, is crystal clear. 23. Let us, first of aIl, take the incident of 10 December 1955. In his report to the Council, General Burns has made it amply clear that the first complaint on tbis incident was submitted by Syria, to the effect that the said Israel launch had fired at Buteiha farm [8/3516, para. 24]. General Burns did not make a finding as to how the incident started. He stated, however, that there had been no Israel casualties whatsoever. His conclusion was that the Israel launch had suffered a hole, and nothing more. Yet General Burns has provided us with an illuminating example and with evidence which escaped the attention of Sir Pierson Dixon. In the words of General Burns, the Israel launch was of the type converted to carry three turrets carrying a machine-gun each [ibid., para. 25]. Thus this incident, far from proving any interference on our part, was an open violation of the Armistice Agreemp,nt on the part of Israel. 24. 1 must remind the Council that Lake Tiberias is a defensive area, and Israel is expressly prohibited from having on the waters of the lake any naval force of any type or calibre. In the history of war and peace, Lake Tiberias has never witnessed any battles, any naval force or warlike act. Palestine has been a scene of battles since the dawn of history. But combatants of aU creeds have observed the demilitarized status of the lake. Never, never has the lake been a military base. But Israel has chosen to violate this immunity, let alone the Armistice Agreement. From this lake, whence the message for peace has been radiated to the four corners of the globe, Israel guns have inflicted death, destruction and devastation. It is therefore unwarranted for 25. Next comes the question of fishing in Lake Tiberias-a point raised in the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. Here again 1 must declare that we have not interfered with fishing as a peaceful occupation. Our standing orders, which were robbed oy the Israel forces, order in unequivocal terms our military posts not to interfere with fishing in any manner. In his report to the Council, General Burns states as follows: " In most cases, according to the Israel complaints, firing by Syrian positions was directed not at Israel fishing eraft but at Israel police boots. These boats, whether they escort fishing craft or not, often cruise close to the shore, preventing the inhabitants of Syria from crossing the lO-met.re strip to fish in or use the waters of the lake n [8/3516, para. 21]. 26. The truth, therefore, is quite plain. It is Israel which prevenu the inhabitants of Syria from fishing in Lake Tiberias or using its waters. In addition, General Burns has made a specifie reference to the fact that "inhabitants of Syria are no longer exercising the fishing rights which they enjoyed under the Anglo- French Agreement of 7 March 1923" [ibid., para. 12]. Furthermore, General Burns f...lds tt'1at Israel police have not' ooly protected Israel fishermen, but also prevented the inhabitants of Syria from fishing in the Jake. General Burns continues t.l--at "the incident of 10 December. " was again an incident between Isarel craft other than fi.shing boots and a Syrian position n [ibid., para. 23]. 27. General Burns reiterates further that "the Syrian military, after heing informed by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission of the Israel plans for ihe present fishing season ... have not "-and 1 wish to stress this part of the report of General Bu~s­ "interlered with Israel fishing boats" [ibid., para. 33]. These are the very woms of General Burns on the question of fishing. The vibrant reality presents itself to the Security Council with all cIarity. Syria bas not interfered with Israel fishing. On the contrary, it is Israel that has chased Syrian fishermen and interfered in Syrian fishing. 28. It becomes evident that the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom in this respect does not rest on the facts as embodied in the report of General Burns. If Sir Pierson Dixon is anxious to address him.:f'-lf to the question of fishing, only one finding is warranted. It is Israel that has interfered in t.~e fishing in Lake Tiberias, and it is Syria that has provided every facility and avoided every interference in anny manner. This is t.he only conclusion worthy of presentation to the Council. 30. 1 propose to deal now with an issue of substance that has been wrongly introduced and wrongly examined. In his statement before the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom said: " The eastem part of Lake Tiberias, and a lO-metre strip of land on the north-eastem shores, lie to the west of the armistice demarcation line and are, thert'fore, wholly under Israel jurisdiction" [71Oth meeting, para. 33]. 31. This is rather strange to hear from Sir Pierson Dixon. This is an uncalled-for pronouncement. This is not the issue under our consideration. What is within or without the demarcation line is not in dispute. The charge is that Israel has violated the armistice lines. We are not here discussing the Palestine question or the different daims. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United Kingdom cannot go beyond the Armistice Agreement which was endorsed by the Security Council itself. It is wrong for the United Kingdom to say that a certain area is under Israel jurisdiction. 32. The Armistice Agreement does not invest Israel with sovereignty, or even jurisdiction, in any of its provisions. The demarcation Hne, as the Armistice Agreement provides, is not to be construed i.'l any sense as a territorial or political boundary. The provisions of the Armistice Agreement are dictated by military, and not by political, considerations. The truce Iines are intended to s~parate military forces. These "'.re not my words. They are the words of the Armistice Agreement itself. And 1 should only ask the representative of the United Kingdom to consult the Armistice Agreement. Isr",r~'s status in relation to the areas under its control is only one of a military character, possessing no political significance. 33. One word, now, about the Syrian draft resolution. The United Kingdom representative has wondered about the destiny of our draft resolution; he has wondered whether it is a Syrian draft resolution, a 34. It is regrettable that the United Kingdom representative should speak of parenthood and offspring. 1 should like to assure Sir Pierson Dixon that there is no parenthood involved as regards the Soviet Union and Syria, either in the case of the draft resolution or in the case of any other question. Our draft resolutions and our relations stand on the basis of equals, and we take pride in that position. Yet, without unfolding the tragic past, 1 believe that the representative of the United Kingdom is entided to a reminder: it was the Mandatory Power that gave birth to Israel as a .. strange ofi'spring" in the Holy Land-after a thirty years' pregnancy. It is because of that birth that the Security Council is now meeting :md deliberating and dealing with the evils of this .. strange offspring". 35. 1 turn now to certain questions raised by the representative of France. In his statement to the Security Council, Mr. Alphand said that Syria had not recognized Israel's de jure frontier [71Oth meeting, para. 77]. Ail those facts are no doubt true, and we do nots wish to quarre! with the representative of France on them. Of course, there are a numbek' of legitimate grounds for our position, but it is not relevant at this moment to set out our reasons. 1 should, however, li1<e to assure the representative of France, with all due respect, that the ghastly Israel attack and the ghastly previous attacks are additional grounds which go to substantiate our position and to corroborate our policy. 36. Again, the representative of France levelled against Syria a charge which, 1 am afraid, is not supported by evidence. Mr. Alphand said that Syrian armed forces had no right to establish gun or bazooka positions on the Israel side of the armistice lines. No evidence has been produced to show that our positions have been established beyond our demarcation lïnes. The only information before the Security Council is a statement alleged to have been taken from a Syrian cadet during the attack now under consideration by the Council. The statement of that cadet, however, 'is to the effect that the bazooka position was on Syrian territoryand, in this respect, 1 invite the Council's attention to General Burns' supplementary report [S/3516/Add. 1]. 37. If, however, the Council desires to pronounce itself on the matter, 1 would request it to calI upon Israel to produce before the Security Council the Syrian cadet himself, to give an explanation of the whole matter. The evidence taken by Israel from the Syrian 38. 1 would, however, assure the representative of France that our standing orders regarding our military positions are in keeping with the Annistice Agreement. But if he desires to be assured that the Armistice Agreement is being metic'llously observed, 1 urge him, with aIl the earnestness at my command, to penetrate through the heap of violations committed by Israel. Israel has committed 568 violations which are outstanding hefore the Mixed Armistice Commissionand this is not my figure; it is a figure reported to the Security Council by General Burns. 39. Two grave violations may be singled out for the attention of the representative ot France. On 8 December 1954, four Israel soldiers were carrying out an espionage operation on Syrian territory. The Mixed Armistice Commission, in its resolution-which appears as annex 1 to General Burns' report [8/.'3516] --condemned the Israel action as a hostile act and a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement. That is the first of the two grave violations which 1 would single out. This is the secorid: on 22 Octobel' 1955, another Israel military party raided Syrian territory, kilIing 3, wounding 6 and capturing 5 of the Syrian military personnel. This Israel raid was strongly condemned by General Burns, as may he seen from annex II to his report. 40. Mr. Alphand did not refer to the campaign of espionage carried out by Israel soldiers; he did not refer to the existence of Israel naval forces on Lake TiÏJerias, against the provisions of the Armistice Agreement; he did not refer to the Israel flights o'Ver Syrian positions and Syrian territory. No ml:'ntion has been made of these serious violations, either in the statements explaining the three-Power draft resolution or in the original or revised text of the draft resolution itself. AlI that has been done is to single out what is called Syrian interference with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias. 41. But, to use the words introduced by the United Kingdom representative, General Burns has referred to troubles on Lake Tiberias. And" troubles on Lake Tiberias " do not imply Syrian Interference. "Troubles on Lake Tiberias" might, if one chose so to interpret the words, mean Syrian interference, but they certainly mean Israel Interference. Hence, 1 cannot see how Syrian interference with the activities on Lake Tiberias can be singled out either in the statements of the sponsors of the draft resolution or in the draft resolution itself. 43. Again, the representative of France referred to our standing orders as heing wrong. This very point bas been brought up, too) in the statement made this morning bl' the United Kingdom representative. 1 therefore think that it is our duty to explain our position on the question. 1 am afraid that the conclusion drawn bl' the representatives of France and the United Kingdom is quite wrong. General Burns bas examined these documents and found them, in general, to he of an ordinary character. Read together, these orders-as expressll' worded-are aimed at avoiding clashes and facilitating fishing. As an illustration, 1 propose to examine onll' two documents, in order to clarify the position for the Council. 44. First, let us take the text, dated 14 Marcl1 1954, which appears as aunex 1 to the letter from the representative of Israel [8/3518]. This is an order aimed at avoiding-and 1 quote the words of t'le order- "clashes between our outposts ... and Israel military warcraft". 1 repeat: those are the words of our order, which is intended to avoid clashes hetvieen our posts and Israel military warcraft. Tha.; discloses that the foundation, the crux, of our order rests on one single objective: to avoid clashes. In the light of this fact, how on eart.h can anyone charge that the Syrian standing orders have the contrary effect? 45. Agam, the order states that "tire is to he opened at Israel war vessels "-and 1 shall explain this question of opening fire on Israel war vessels--" on entering the 250-metre limit". 1 say that the mere presence of Israel military war vessels on Lake Tiherias is a violation of the Armistice Agreement. As a matter of fact, General Burns bas reported ta the Security Council that, in the Israel military attack now under consideration, these vessels participated in the operation. It is only natura! that such vessels should be disabled when they approach the shore, for the danger of landing becomes highly imminent. 46. As ta fishing boats, the Syrian order states--and 1 want ta invite the attention of representatives of the United Kingdom and France ta what our order says with regard ta those boats-that they "should not he fired at except when participating in landing operations ". The translation of this (.wder as produced 47. What a great difference-between fishing boats attempting to land and fishing boats participating in landing operations. Landing operations are an act of war. The President of the Council will certainly agree that a landing operation under any law, international or otherwise, is an act of war. Fishing boats participating in sueh operations cease to be fishing boats. They becomc war vessels and weapons of aggression. As such, these boats should he fired at in order to repel aggression. 48. 1 will take the text dated 8 November 1955, another standing order which was seized by Israel forces on the night of the incident, which appears as annex II to the same document. This is an order whose objectives are better deseribed in its own words. The order forbids Syrian fishennen from fishing, "in order ta prevent incidents between [Syrian] fishennen and the Israel police." Could anything be more clear tha.n the intentions of the order as expressed in the words 1 have just read to the Council ? The order furluer instructs that Syrian fishennen should offer no "opposition to Israel fishennen."· This order, again, speaks for itself. It is simply a measure ta maintain security under the letter and spirit of the ~..rmistice Agreement. 49. Thsese are oUr düCüfiïents. Nût ûrJy dû we admit their authenticity, but we take pride in their validit"y. They are top secret rccords; t.ltey revC21 our poliey, for which we take full responsibilit}r. They reveal no aggression. They aim at repelling aggression. This is our inherent right and sacred duty. This is the minimum of self-defence which ail members of the Council would no doubt invoke in similar circumstances. 50. AlI this goes to show that our conduct, our standing orders and our record since the Armistice Agreement have been based ou non-interference in the normal peaceful activities in Lake Tiberias. Interference has been committed by Israel against Syrians, against Palc5tinians, in the exercise of their inherent rights in Lake Tiberias. It is Israel that has chased them, harassed them and shot at them when they attempted to fish, to drink, to water their cattle and to irrigate their lands in accordance with rights exercised sinee the lake Wall first utilized in the service of manrights that existed befon: Israel came into being. 51. There is a very important point to which 1 think 1 ought to make reference. The representative of France referred to the range of 250 metres on Lake Tiberias which he described as having been unilate- 52. The best 1 can do is to place this decision befote the Council. 1t reads as follows: "From: The Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Annistice Commission " T 0: Commandant Sabbagh, Head of the Syrian Delegation "Subject: Fishing on Lake Tiberias by Israelis " 1 have the honour to bring to your attention that the Israelis have again raised the question of fishing on Lake Tiberias. " In view of the existing tension between the two parties and in order to avoid any further provocative ineidents, 1 have asked the Israelis to keep their fishing boats 250 metres from the eastern and northern shores of the lake. The Israelis have assured me that they would respect this order. " As a result, 1 have the honour to inform you that the Israel fishermen will fish in the waters of Lake Tiberias, mostly at night, from El Koursi ta Buteiha, keeping at aIl times approximately 250 metres away f~m the eastern and northern shores of the lake. (Signed) S. G. TAXIS Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission" 53. Israel thus agreed to the 250-metre range, and the Chaïnnan of the Commission ruled accordingly. Our standing orders, therefore, stand in full legality and on all füuIs wiû'ï the Armistice Agreement. The question of this strip of 250 l''letres is not our invention. It is only the result of agreement hetween the Chairman of the Commission and Israel, and when our standing orders refer to 250 metres they are based on the decision of the Chaïnnan of the Mixed Annistice Commission. 54. 1 propose now to deal with the question of compensation. Memhers of the Security Couneil have reacted favourably to the matter. Reference has heen made, however, to certain legal and practical aspects. For our part, we remain sure that the ordering of compensation is one of those measures that falls within the competence of the Security Couneil. It seems to us that the consensus is in favour of the principle of compensation, but that opinion is at variance with regard to the procedure to he followed. The representative of the United States suggested [71Oth meeting, para. 60] requestillg the Secretary-General, in a separate resolution, to study ways and means of equitable assessment and payment of compensation. 56. This brings me to the main issue, the most striking issue, that should engage the mind of the Council and direci: its action. Now that the Council has reached this stage of its deliberations, let us ask what action the Council is seeking to decide. This a genuine question, which calls for an honest answer. 57. The Council has before it two draft resolutions and a set of amendments. Certainly the draft resolution of the Soviet Union and the lranian amendments come doser to the merits of the case. Regarding condemnation of Israel, aIl the drafts speak the same language. But Israel does not seem to understand this language, even when it is expressed in the strongest tenns of censure and condemnation. The evidence is not lacking. In the words of Mr. Lodge, Israel, a creation of the United Nations, is now "before this Council for the fourth offence of this kind in two years" [71Oth meeting, para. 55]. In all these offences, the Council has condemned Israel, with a demand to refrain from such acts in the future. But Israel has turned a deaf ear to the Security Council and continued a policy of aggression, best described by û'le representative of Belgium as simiiar to a Nazi policy. 58. The Security Council is thus faced with a highly senous situation. Hele is Israel, guilty of violating the Charter, the Armistice Agreement, the resolutions of the Security Council and the standards accepted by the civilized world. Here is Israel condemned, ooly to commit one heinous offence after another. What is the end ? What should the Security Council do about it? You have commended our restraint--eommended the conduct and the behaviour of the Syrian army, the Syrian Govemment and the Syrian people. You say that we should not take the law into our own hands because the Security Council, with the Charter in its hand, is mainly responsible for international peace and security. 59. Let us see what the Charter provides. To begin with, Article 6 of the Charter provides for expulsion in 60. Our President, as one of the ablest founders of our Organization, rememhers ooly too well the laborious efforts of the committee which, at the San Francisco Conference, incorporated the idea of expulsion in the Charter. In the committee, it was declared: " A memher engaged in persistantly violating the Charter ... would be like a cancerous growth which it would be hetter to remove completely than to allow to remain in the body of the organization." This is the statement made in the committee which recommended the incorporation of Article 6 in the Charter. 61. With this in mind, we can safely say that Israel is a classical illustration of the correctness of the statement enunciated at San Francisco. It may he observed, however, that Article 6 has never been invoked. 1 admit there is no precedent. With aU the labour 1 have expended in the archives of the Secretary-Gencral, 1 have been unable to find a precedent. But the reason is simple. No Member of the United Nations in this whole decade bas been condemned by the Security Council. No Member bas been found guilty of massacre, of aggression, and of plunder, four times within two years. There is no case precedent because there is no guilt precedent. 62. Israel's expulsion from the United Nations is not, however, without existing background. Israel's conduct has brought about its political and moral excommunication from international life. In the Middle East, at least, nine States have no relation whatsoever with Israel. In regional conferences of any character, Israel bas been refused admission. At the Bandung Conference, representing more than half the peoples of the globe, Israel's participation was rejected. Many leading statesmen in the world have stigmatized Israel for its aggression. Most recently there was the Statement of a great international figure, leading a great people. In his statement hefore the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Krushchev declared: " From the first days of its existence, the State of Israel has been taking a hostile and threatening attitude against its neighbours." 63. It is therefore evident that the expulsion of Israel is not ooly in keeping with the Charter, but that it is 65. Economie aid, unlike economic relations, is breakable at will-and no doubt our President would agree with this legal conception-for it does not involve any treaty obligations nor does it arise from binding undertakings. Economie aid is a voluntary act that begins at pleasure and ends at pleasure. It is fo:" this reason that cessation of economic aid does not create any contractual or legal difficulty for the State donating. Thus a recommendation to stop economic aid is feasible at will, and feasible at any time. 66. Now in this particular case there is every reason to deprive Israel of every fonn of economic aid from whatever source. Charity, aid and assistance should only be extended to those with a decent international conduct. This is a well-established principle. Charity donated to any aggressor ceases to be a charity. It becomes a factor in the crime. It may be excused as innocent at the beginning, but it is unforgivable when the Security Couneil issues its verdict for the first time, for t.~e second tilne and for the third time. deuxième 67. It is common knowledge now to the Governments and peoples of the world that Israel has been condemned on more than one occasion. and that Israel is persistently following a poliey of a:ggression. We cannot see how economic assistance, grants-in-aid and contributions can be extended to Israel, when Israel is committing a series of massacres, pillage and plunder in our lands and against our people. If Israel is to commit any offence, Israel should commit it on its own, with no aid in its hand. We are justified in seeing in this economic assistance an assistance in the commission of the crime. peut tions maraudage seul, cette 68. It is a well-known fact that Israel's viability has been maintained so far by foreign aid from various sources. Since 1948, a stream of $1,500 million has been flowing from the United States to Israel in the fonn of contributions. grants-in-aid. bonds and loans. From other countries,-i;:;' lesser amo'unts, similar assistance has been granted to Israel. We have no right to interfere in the wishes of those assisting, of those donating or granting. Theil' will is their own; their emotions are their own. But certainly we take it as an unfriendly act when the party receiving the assistance is engaged 1 1 68. économique grâce diverses. subventions, ont importante. ventions. émotions. 69. That is why we urge the Security Council, with all the power at our disposaI, to recommend to the :Hember States of the United Nations to cease extending t(j, ;;rael any form of economic aid, of economic assistance. We suggest that the Council should consider a time-limit of not less than one year, renewable upon further aggression. 70. 1 should like to point out in this connexîon that the measure 1 have suggested to the Council is not without precedent. In October 1953, the United States decided to withhold from Israel a $50 million grant-inaid, be~use Israel had defied the order of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Commission regarding a dispute, again with Syria, on the River Jordan. This cessation by the United States was only lifted by it when Israel submitted to the directives, the orders, of the Chief of Staff. In an official statement, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, referred to the matter as fol1ows, and 1 quote a portion of that official statement of the United States: ,. The policy of the United States to support the United Nations Truce Supervision Commission in this matter has thus been realized"-he lS referring to the obedience, after defiance, of Israel to the orders of the Chief of Staff-" and the impediment to the present grant of economic aid to Israel has been removed." 71. That. is a precedent, and a successful one too. The United States stopped the aid and Israel stopped violation. 72. Vve are now, however, in a more serious situation. The issue at present is not only the defying of the orders of the Chief of Staff, but the f1:outing of the resolutions of the Security Council, the highest organ entrusted with international security. That is why we believe that the Secunt)' Council, faithful to its task, should calI upon Member States to suspend every form of aid and assistance to Israel, as 1 suggested earlier. 73. In conclusion, 1 feel 1 should address myself to Mr. Lodge, for the United States will he chiefly concerned should our suggestion he adopted by the ('rOuncil. 74-. 1 was deeply impressed by the eloquent and able words of Mr. Lodge when he said : "We do not advocate the cause of one side or the other" [71Oth meeting, para. 54]. We were glad to hear that statement from Mr. Lodge. Although the justice of our cause demands from a great Power and the great people of the United States to be on our side, because it is the side of justice, still we are content if the United States takes this attitude in words and deeds; that is, not siding with one or the other. 76. Again, Ml'. Lodge, in his first statement ta the Council, Feeited the noble words of President Eisenhower in favour of a just peace in the Middle East and of friendship for aB the peoples of the area. 1 can hardly find enough words ta express our respect for President Eisenhower. This great man does not belong only ta the United States, for he has hecome the international man of the age. It is for this very same reason that the United States should not hesitate to agree to our suggestion as a measure to maintain peace and security in the area. 77. As ta friendship for the Middle East, the matter is too conspicuous to require any explanations. It seems that our friendship has reached a stage where it needs to be restored rather than maintainl'd. The only way to achieve that objective is to act in justice, to condemn aggression, and to keep away from aggressors. 78. We therefore urge the Council in aIl sincerity and earnestness to make a serious consideration of our suggestions that we have submitted to it. 79. ~yk EBAN (Israel): 1 have aiready had the opportunity of making preliminary statements of my Government's views to the Couneil at the 707th and 709th meetings. 1 should DOW like to develop these considerations in the light of statements made by memhers of the Couneil in the course of these debates. The extraordinary performance with which the previous speaker has consumed the patience of the Couneil also merits certain comment. 80. A discussion confined to the framework of the engagement af Il December 1955 creates inherent difficulties for the understanding of Israel's position, and indeed most representatives have dealt with the broader theme, into which 1 shaH briefly foHow them. 81. To ::naintain any semblance of peaceful life, tll0se responsible for Israel's national defence are called upon daily to face tragic choices and complex dilemmas. On the one hand, we must be faithful to a paramount duty for which Governments are instituteà-to protect the life of citizens from violent assault and to conserve the nation's integrity against lawless challenge. On the other hand, the impulse to merit the comprehension of world opinion is felt with special force by a people such as ours, with its long universal tradition and its broad network of sympathies and friendships reaching into the hearts of multitudes throughout the world. 83. Surrounded by hostile armies on aU its land frontiers; besieged by savage and relentless hostility; subjected to penetrations, raids and assaults by day and by night; suffering constant toll of life and limb amongst its peaceful citizenrv; bombarded by threats of neighbouring Governments to encompass its extinction by armed force; overshadowed by a new menace of irresponsible rearmament; denied the most elementary forms. of tranquillity prescribed by the existing international agreements; embattled, blockaded, besieged, Israel alone among the nations faces the battle for its security anew with every rising dawn and with every approaching nightfall. 84. In a coun~ry of small area and iD~ricate configuration, the proximity of enemy guns is a constant and haunting theme. If a man went through life with a Ioaded pistoi constantly pointed at his family's throat, and sometjmes going off, for how long would he resist the opportunity to push it away? The tensions of this hostility challenge us in every region at every time. Nowhere in Israel can a man live and work beyond the close range of enemy fire. 85. These fears and provocations hover over us everywhere. But they fall upon us with special intensity in the. frontier areas, where development projects vital to the nation's destiny can be interrupted or paralysed by eur adversaries from a position of dominating geographical advantage. Here every activity of farmers or fuhennen is a test of physical and moral courage. The Government of Israel cannot betray the valour of its frontier population by illdifference to the acute perils which they confront. 86. The Arab Governments, by deliberate policy, ensure that this suspense shall never be relaxed. When, as happens so often, the threat becomes reality, when the menace of neighbouring ouns gives way to active fue, then there arise the fatetul choices which Israel, unlike any other Government, is compelled to face. Either peaceful life must be abandoned in the threatened area, and Israel's jurisdiction be compromi'Jed or renounced; or else a path must be cleared for peaceful enterprise and a breathing space won from murderous assault. 88. These are not easy choices. Either life and property must he left in peril, territorial jurisdiction and maritiule rights surrendered; or else action must be taken which, in its uncontrollable evolution, brings us to this table. On innumerable occasions-far more frequent than the Security Council can ever know-the active defence of Israel life and territory has been compromised in deference to international considerations. We know that Israel is most popular when it does not hit back, and world opinion is profoundly important to us. So on these occasions we bury our dead, tend our wounded, denchour teeth in suppressed resentment and hope that tlùs very moderation will deter a repetition of the offence. But sometimes the right and duty of self-preservation, the need to avoirl expanding encroachments, the sentiment that if rightful daims are not defended they will be forever lost, prevail in the final and reluctant decision. 89. Arab Governr.l1ents should have hetter things to do than to face us with these cho:Ces. The Arab world, with its nine sovereign States, eight of them now Members of the United Nations, with its vast resources, its huge, tranquil hinterland, utterly remote from frontier tensions, still makes it the central objective of its policy to ensure that the people of Israel shaH not have a month or a week of peace without sorne violent assault upon their life and territory. 89. chose monde sont ressources, tensions ver seul qui leur 90. This dilemPla confronts us in many border areas; it confronts us if. the Suez Canal; at Banat Ya'coub; in the Gulf of Aqaba and on Lake Tiberias: to abandon rights in deference to the threat of Arab guns, or to challenge the guns in order that peaceful life and development may go forward. 90. frontières: le renoncer soit loppement 91. Some members of the Security Council ha....e referred to an apparent disproportion between the effects of the Israel response and the dimensions of the simple incident immediatp.ly preceding it. This, however, is not the true or the valid comparison. The dimensions of Israel's occasiu~a1 reaction!: are more than matched by the accumulated effect of repeated incidents, of a constant state of tension, of hostility and of aggression. 91. état réaction qui. 92. When the armistice agreements were signed, we had reason to expect a different course. Those agreements, it is true, did not seem to offer a genuinely affirmative relationship between Israel and its neighbours. But, even at their most modest evaluation, they did seem to portend a minimal tranquiIlity, in which we would at least leave each other alone. It is Israel's absolute right under these agreements that, on every inch of territory and water on the Israel side of the armistice border, any Israel citizen may peacefully tiIl evcry inch of Israel soil and navigate every metre of 93. How tragically remote from this duty of passive tranquillity is the policy pursued by Arab Governments up to this day. AlI the Arab States, including Syria, have followed their sustained aggression against Israel seveZl years ago by the maintenance of active hostility up to the present time. These acts of hostility have taken the form of military assaults and encroachments, maritime blockades and interceptions, commando raids, sabotage, espionage, destruction of life and property, illegal invocation and practice of a "state of war", , and constant threats agaînst Israel's independence and territorial integrity. 94. On this question of threats against Israel's very existence, the Council will have read how only yesterday the Egyptian dictator, in proclaiming to the world the hlueprint of his despotism, summoned the Arab world frankly and explicitly to IsraeI's destruction. What does he think that he is talking awut ? Can he possibly imagine that these words are not read in Israel, or can he conceive that we drnw no conclusions from such insolent menace? This, then, is the problem of Israel embattled by violence and threat. 95. The representatives of the United Kingdom and Peru have appro!>riatety called attention to the problem of "belligerency ". This ward "belligerency " is the key to the understanding of the whole Middle Eastern problem. It bas a profound meaning, far beyond the specific context of maritime freedom in which it was first authoritatively discussed .four years ago. Belligerency in every form, by land and sea and en inland waters, belligerency in threat and belligerency in action, is the doctrine and practice of Arab Governments along the whole range of their relations with Israel. 96. It is the unilateral daim of the Governments that they have sorne peculiar right to deny peace in any area of Israel :al1d or water which they can dominate by fire or ~o!ltroi by interception. The historie resolution of the Security Council of 1 September 1951 against beUigel..~ncy and the theory of a "state of war " {8/2322] deprive this claim of any legal basis. But while they invoke the Security Gouncil on their own behalf, these Govern1.l.1ents treat the central doctrirle of the Security Council against belligerency with contempt and hold its basic resolution up to lidicule. 97. Even today, while dedaiming elQGJently, or at least loudly, against the violation of Security Council resolutions, Mr. Shukairy invited ua to regard him al! the custodian of orthodoxy in this respect. But he 98. Having spoken of the Security Council verdict on belligerency, 1 must say that it is impossible to imagine how anything less couId have been done in support of a Secunty Council resolution than what has been done by the Council and the Powers to vindicate the 1951 decision, both in its specifie maritime context and as a general judgement on inter-State relations in the Middle East. A practice has grown up of accepting Arab belligerency in aIl its forms with indulgence and of insisting only that Israel should never hit back. It is our apprehension that more influence is used to prevent Israel's reactions than is exercised to prevent the provocations which give rise to them. 99. As a result of acts of aggression organized and executed on the responsibility of Arab Govemments, Israeli men, women and children have been ki11ed and maimed in the fol1O'iNing numbers: 1951-137; 1952- 147; 1953-162; 1954-180; 1955-258. The Counci1 will note the progressively mounting aggregate. 100. During the same period, the materiaJ damage done to Israel by me illegitimate blockade of the Suez Canal and by acts of theft, robbery, sabotage and destruction on our borders has run into enonnous sums. This fantastic burden of death and havoc bas fallen predominantl} upon our civilian population. The areas, towns and villages on which this anguish bas been inflicted extend from Dan to Beersheba and southwards towards the Red Sea. No community bas been spared the close impact of this grief. The Arab countries, on the other hand, are in no such situation. Behind their frontiers with Israel, which are just as peaceful or turbulent as their Govemment wish them to be, there stretch vast hinterlands of temtory and population which are utterly remote from the suspense and tension of frontier life. But whenever murderous violence strikes anywhere in Israel, every single citizen fecls the icy wind of bis own vulnerability, 101. In the broad perspective of history, men may weil determine that Israel in its first embattled decade ~aced and survived these hazards, if not with pedect )udgement, then at least with no greater fallibility than attends all human decision. One thing is quite certain: there exists no Government in the world which would passively accept the munier of its citizens, the terrorization of its countryside, the destruction of its 102. Since no other Government shares our problem, it is perhaps not surprising that other Governments have not always been able to identify themselves with our solution'>. It requires an unusual measure of imagination and humility for anyone else to detennine how he would have acted in our place. Nobody else is in our place. We therefore have no complaint against those who, sometimes from the refuge of an enviable 5Ccurity, havé poüïed a sL-ong vocabulary of criticism upon their smallest and most vulnerable colleague in the United Nations. 103. Yet 1 confess that in the numerous discussions held in this Council we have felt entitled to a greater volume of comprehension than we have received. After aIl, sorne Governments in their various international capacities have faced security problems similar in kind, although not in degree, to those which confront us. They have not always found better solutions than we have. 104. Sorne, IlOt .satisfied with their cntlclSJIl of this specific incident, have exhorted us as a matter of total dogma to eliminate military deterrence from amongst the instruments of our security. But it is not clear that they have been able to eliminate it from their own concept of international security elsewhere in the world. Sometimes a Government which but lately experienced turbulence on all iu frontiers forgets its recent ordeal in order to launch an uncritical attack upon Israel, which is not yet liherated from a far graver encirelement. 105. Thase whose have sponsored one-sided draft resolutions and st2ltements will not he surprised if their words have a lesser impact by l'CaSon of these considerations. Thase who have seen fit ta compare a small people, and this people in particular, fighting for ib IUl'VÎval in arduous conditions, with the monstrous tyranny which oppressed the weak and defenceless during the Nazi decade will, on cooler refiection, fervently wish that thase things, at least, had becn left unsaid. 106. The position is reaIly far less simple than the speeches made and the draft resolutions submitted during titis debaœ would imply. Our situation is pemaps tao unimaginable for us to expect others to imagine it. AlI the more is our appreciation due to such undertones of comprehension and friendly counsel 107. The best answer would obviously he that those who sincerely cntiche our judgement, and we who aIone bear the bmden of the dilemma, should draw eloser together in an effort of mutual understanding. The more world opinion shows an active understanding of our legitimate grievances, the more will Israel he in a position to measure the weight of world opinion in the balance of its own calculations. 108. The policy of the Israel Government is to refrain from any acts of force so long as its territory and population are not assaulted by force. The discussion on the justification of Israel's response to provocation can best be ended by bringing the provocations themselves to an end; by abandoning helligerency; by honouring the agreements under which the Arab Governments are pledged to ensure that not a single human being shall suffer hann on a single inch of Israel soil through violent action from across the annistice Me. 109. Let me give a simple example. Only a few weeks aga, Egyptian forces entered Israel territory in strength and established themselves there. They were righteously repulsed. Not a single memher of the Security Council would have dreamt of criticizing this action against Egyptian forces; and, to do it credit, the Egyptian Government did not even conceive that it had a right to invoke the Security Council's support. This in itself proves that the problem hefore us is not one to he solved by wholesale dogmatic judgements. Bach case bas its own independent merits. In the specific case of El Auja, the Secretary-GeneraI of the United Nations proposed a solution to the parties at the begIDning of last November, a solution which Israel has accepted and which Egypt still evacles and ignores. Are members of the Security Council now acting purposefully to secure Egyptian compliance with this proposai ? 110. The Galilee incident well ilIustrates the general themes which 1 have here discussed. Few members of the Security Council at its first meeting on this question could have had such a elear picture of Syrian provocation as that which bas since emerged. Let me summarize what has been established on this subject. 111. First, under the tenns of the General Annistice Agreement hetween Israel and Syria, the whole of Lake Tiberias and the narrow strip on lU north-eastem shore are Israel territory. 112. Secondly, it bas been estabiished that Syrïa bas installed gun positions, partly in Israel territory itself, dominating this Israel Jake for the purpose of exerclsing Syrian control over a part of hrael territory. 114. Fourthly, it bas been established that the clash on Lake Tiberias on Il December followed a Syrian action on 10 December in opening fire on Israel territory. 115. Fifthly, the Chief of Staff has reported [S/3516/ Add. 1] that these orders under which Syrian forces operate, and their execution on 10 December, are contraventions of the General Armistice Agreement. 116. Mr. Shukairy has told us that these orders, in which he takes such pride, are in accordance with the General Armistice Agreement. General Burns has reported to the Council that they are not in accordance with the General Armistice Agreement. 1t is for the Council to decide on whose judgement to rely. Syria bas told us that it has not interfered with any legal Israel activity on Lake Tiberias. The reports in the documents before the Council show that Syria has unilaterally established 250 metres as Syrian "territorial waters" and bas given precise instructions ta its forces as to the conditions in which Israel vessels shall or shaH not operate upon the Israei lake, shaH or shaH not land upon the Israel shore. 117. What a monstrous distortion it is of facts and of international judgements to say that no problem of interference exists, when the in~erference is persistent, deliberate, provocative and violent, and-above everything else-when we are told that it will continue. 118. In order that the Security Council may understand clearly what kind of standards belong to the adv~q which we have just heard, let me give this illustration. Mr. Shukairy bas toId the CounciJ that he bas General Burns' authority for stating that there are 568 Israel violations of the Syrian Armistice Agreement outstanding. To that statement he has committed bis name and hi'! honour. What do we find when we compare the statement with General Burns' report? This is wnat General Burns says: of the 568 Syrian complaints still outstanding on the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission-and what does the Security Council make of this confusion between unilateral Syrian complaints and what Mr. Shukairy called and implied to be established Israel violations?-abollt a half concern fictitious overBights by Israel pt.mes, Syrian complaints which have apparently been submitted by Syria with the object of balancing the 401 Israel complaints lodged with the Mixed Armistice Commission. That is an illustration of a standard foHowed in many parts of Mr. Shukairy's address. 119. For the moment, let me say ooly that it is clear that the Galilee incident of Il December foHows a pattern invariably present in aU otner conflicts in the pasto There bas never been a single military action by Israel which did not follow an act of illicit force by an Arab State llgainst Israel. 121. On 30 December, General Burns reported [S/3516/ Add. 1] that Syrian garrisons on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias were still operating under orders to open fire on Israel vessels under conditions unilaterally determined by Syria. So far as 1 know, that is still the position. Today, on 17 January 1956, while the Security Council approaches the conclusion of its debate, Syrian outposts on Lake Tiberias are under instructions from their Government to contravene the Armistice Agreement by opening lire on Israel boats approaching within 250 metres of the Israel shore. 122. May 1 inquire, through the President, whether the representative of Syria, or of any other State, or the Secretary-General, has information to the effect that these orders which violate the Armistice Agreement have been rescinded or set aside s:nce General Burns reported their existence on 30 December 1955? 1 received a completely contrary impression from the Syrian address. 123. The matter is aIl the graver when we recall that the Syrian representative has this morning reiterated these illegal orders and declared that his Government accepts responsibility for them. These are grave words: the Syrian Government accepts respOllSibility for a system of regulated interference with movements on Lake Tiberias which have been certified as violations of the Armistice Agreement. The Security Council can hardly wish to deal with past violations and then to disperse, leaving an existing violation intact. 124. In his report to the Security Council, General Burns discusses measures on which he will attempt to secure the agreement of the parties with a view to the relaxation of tension in the Lake Tiberias region. My Government will co-operate fully in a frank and constructive discussion of these proposaIs. 125. We share, in particular, General Burns' view that an exchange of prisoners would do much to relieve tension between the two countries, and that this relaxation might weIl have its reflection on the frontier where the two countries meet. The Government of Israel is prepared immediately to carry out an exchange between Israelis detained by Syria and Syrians detained by Israel. 126. Similarly, the Government of Israel reiterates its willingness to conclude an agreement authorizing individuals residing in Syria to apply to it for fishing 127. 1 should now like to comment frankly on another proposaI-the proposaI that Israel police vt~els should abstain, under a gentlemen's agreement, from patrolling a certain area of the lake. 128. In order to clarify the history of this problem, 1 should like to point out that at no cime has the Israel Government ever entered into such an agreement. The problem arose in 1951 and again in 1953. On each occasion it was made clear by the Israel delegates ta the Mixed Armistice Commission that Israel fishermen would fish and Israel police boats would patrol wherever it was necessary t.hat they should fish and patrol in this entirely Israel lake, bordered whony by Israel territory. 129. The Syrian representative has made reference to a communication from the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He has not, however, followed that discussion through its subsequent stages of evolution. 130. At the Mixed Armistice Commission's meeting on 27 December 1951, in a discussion of an incident on 16 December, when the Syrian army post at El Koursi had fired on an Israel fishing boat, killing two people, Colonel Taxis' letter was read by the Syrian delegate. The Israel delegate reacted as follows: "The Israel delegation did not make any agreement, nor did it agree that Israelis should he restricted in fishing. The Israel delegation informed the Chainnan that the intention [at present] is, because of the season, to work at 250 metres from the shore. Later, this distance might he changed, depending on the season." . The Israel delegate further clarified the position as follows: " In reply to the Syrian declaration as regards the so-ca1led agreement, we must again point out that all that actually happened was that we requested the Chairman to infqrm the Syrian delegation that fishing operations would he carried out. It must he quite clear that neither now nor at any cime did we have the intention of asking anyone's pennission to carry out work in our own territory; our only consideration in giving the above information was to prevent Syrian forces from worrying about the proximity of boats close to their outposts. We cannot possibly 131. The Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission confinned Israel's view that his letter of 15 August had been for infonnation only. He stated: "Prior to sending my letter of 15 August ... 1 was approached by the Israel delegate... and given to understand that Israel intended to conduct the fishing operations along the northern and eastern shores of Lake Tiberias. The Israel delegation asked me to take the matter up with the Syrian delegation, in order to obviate, in so far as practicable, the occurrence of any incident. The Israel delegation further expressed to me the belief that fishing operations not closer than approxîmately 250 metres from the shore line would meet the needs of the Israel fishennen at that time and agreed that 1 ask for assurances from the Syrian delegatioil of no interference with Israel fishing boats in Lake Tiberias." encouragé 132. The poSItIOn, then, is clear. As a matter of law, Israel fishing boats, accompanied by patrol boats of the kind authorized by the Chief of Staff, can approach within 250 metres, or 2,000 metres, or 2 metrc, of the shore. It is one tiûng to give infonnation about the intention to come close to the shore: it is another thing to have that helpful information interpreted as a renunciation of rights. 1 fear that the fact that the Syrian reprerentative bas today given that interpretation to what was a helpful act of infonnation will encourage my Government to tighten its vigilance, in its reaction to these proposais. 133. It is, frankly, difficult for us to envisage that, because Syria illegally ch~enges Israel jurisdiction by anned force, we should effectively abandon that jurisdiction. Is it not better that Syria should abandon the threat? If it is feh that conflicts arise through the proximity of Syrian guns ID Israel fishennen, would it not be morally and practically more effective for Syrian guns to remove themselves from the fishennen, r-ather than for the fishennen to remove themselves from the guns? simplement galement force à Syrie conflits trouvent il point éloignés s'éloigner 134. It is disconcerting to find that, whenever an Arab gun tbrea: Jns a peaceful Israel activity, it is suggested that the guns must prevail and the peaceful activity must cease. The application of this practice, even temporarily, ID the international waterways leading to Israel ports, has never been condoned by Israel or by the Security Council. Here, then, we have a position on Lake Tiberias where someone pushes a gun through your front window, and it is suggested that, by gentlemen's agreement, you should avoid using the 134-. qu'un Israël, l'emportent paisible. tique ports ni lac introduirait 136. If that is the case, should not the Security Council favour the doctrine that the instruments of force and violence should yield to the pursuits of peace, and that if the Syrian guns and the Israel fishermen must be separated, this should be done by the removal of the former rather than of tI1e latter? 1 wonder if the United Kingdom representative, who dwelt on this matter in a speech containing many thoughtful and balanced observations, can see an}" defect in the logic or morality of this idea. 137. But, failing the acceptance of such an approach, the best solution is that both parties should maintain their legal rights in their full plenitude, but should also rigidly observe the exhortation which does arise in the draft resolution of the Western Powers under which Syrian gun positions would be forbiciden, as they already are by the Annistice Agreement, to fire across the demarcation line in any circumstances at aIl. 138. 1 am confident that these considerations will appeal to General Burns' sense of objectivity and equity, and it is in that spirit that we shaH explain our reservations on this particular proposaI. 139. Suggestions have been made on the question of indemnities for losses incurred by civiIians in the engagement of Il December. It is a general feature of recent frontier incidents that Arab attacks maraudings and so-calIed commando raids are sped: fically directed against unarmed civilians, whereas Israel defensive responscs are a:med at the military or paramilitary units which undertake assaults and depredations upon Israel life and property. On Il December, the obj<f.oCt was to engage Syrian armed forces which sought to establish a de facto control over a part of Israel territory by organizing assaults upon Israel vessels on the lake. It is a tragic and regrettable circumstance that eight Syrian civilians lost their lives taking refuge in a Syrian machine-gun post. 140. Now this is not the first time that a discussion on compensation has arisen in the operation of the Syrian- Israel General Armistice Agreement. On the first occasion when the questiOit Glro:;e, in June 1954, an Israel ofrer to indemnify ..~.~. ~".IIlilies of two Arabs 141. The starting-point of my Government's approach is the equality of rights and obligations between the parties subscribing to the armistice agreements. When we deal with something as tragic as the loss vf civilian life, the need to preserve equality is absolutely paramount. It is one thing to establish a general principle and procedure under which compensation would be due in respect of civilian losses suffered by any party through action by another party, in violation of the armistice agreements. It is something quite different to suggest the application of such a procedure in one p'llticular case. 142. A general arrangement, whatever its merits or defects on practical grounds. would fall with absolute equality both on Israel and on its neighbours. Sometimes it would constitue a penalty against one party, sometimes against the other. The purposes of the arrangement, both of deterrence and of compensation, would be available to both par..ies in complete equity and with no hint of discrimination. 143. A greater number of Israel civilians have lost their lives through armistice violations ascribed by the mixed armistice commissions to Arab States than have citizens of Arab countries through violations ascrihed to Israel. Beth for this specifie reason and on general grounds of conscience, it would surely he wrong to attempt a selective application of the compensation principle to the victims of a particular cIash-while making no corresponding provision for the scores and hundreds of Israelis who have l08t their lives at Arab hands in violation of the armistice agreements. 144. The public sentiment of Israel, and 1 should think of any nation, would he affronted by such a slight, however inadvertent, to the memory of hundreds of victims of these tragic clashes. Thus, if the principle of indemnification is to he applied to the past then it must he applied to the past comprehensiv~ly and equally. If it is applied to ~b future, then it must he applied to the future comprehensively and equally. 1 am certain that Mr. Tsiang must have had such a general principle of equality in mind when he spoke [712th meeting] movingly on this subject out of what he called ua sense of justice". 146. These broad considerations of principle and conscience will determine my Government's approach to any problem of indemnification in which it might appear, whether as a daimant or a respondent. 147. Two draft resolutions now stand before the Security Council. We believe that the tone and content of the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States do inadequate justice to the tormenting conditions under which Israel pursues its quest for peaceful development and for freedom from constant menace. The expressi.ons of condemnation, concern and warning are, in our view, wholly "isproportionate to the action to which they refer. 148. Members of the Security Council will doubtless recall the tragic events of 1947 and 1948, when the regular annies of six Arab States invaded Israel in order to destroy it in the very hour of its birth. In the bitter fighting that followed, over 6,000-not 56, not 60, not 600, but 6,000-young Israelis were killed, and much of the country was laid waste. Yet the student of history will not find in the many resolutions which were adopted by this Council at that time any condemnation or censure of the aggressors, who made no secret of their responsibility and, indeed, gloried in it, or any clear expression of the Council's view that open war undertaken in defiance of the will of the United Nations was reprehensible. 149. How, then, can France, how can the United Kingdom, how can the United States, justify the idea that the murder of thousands in an attempt to destroy a country is less serious in the literature and jurisprudence of the Security Council than one single episode with infinitely lesser loss of life and without any attempt to change an established international situation by force? These considerations should weigh with the sponsors of this draft resolution in bringing their language into some due proportion with the past record of the Security Council. 151. The saving merit of the tripartite draft resolution is that it contains a minimal reference to Syrian violations, and caUs upon both parties to respect the demarcation line. The vital necessity of this last provision has been vividly illustrated by the Syrian representative, who has made statements of unbelievable extremism, such as the foUowing, which 1 quote. He said at a previous meeting: "1 must state that there are no frontiers between Syria and Israel, and 1 make this decIaration irom the table of the Security Council. .. 1 should like ta tell Israel, from the table of the Cauncil, that Israel has no legal or political status, not only on Lake Tiberias, but on any inch that now lies under its control" [709th meeting, paras. 27 and 29]. 152. Can it be conceived that any other Member, or at least any non-Arab Member, of the United Nations would ever make a statement totally denying the jurisdiction of a Member State of the United Nations? Can there be a more vivid praof that the real problem . before us is the aspiration of Syria and of other Arab States to encompass the destruction of a neighbouring State? These ominous statements by the Syrian representative show a complete disregard for Israd's rights as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. If Syria has no frontier with Israel, t!len Israel has no frontier with Syria. 153. If such a sinister conclusion were to be accepted for a single moment, we would reach the grotesque conclusion that there are two neighbouring Members of the United Nations which are not bound, one ta each other, by the system of mutual rights and obligations defined in our Charter. 1 have never heard any doctrine which 50 offended the spirit of the Charter, with the exception of the equally discredited Arab theory of belligerency and a "state of war." 156. The Security Council will sure1y understand the iignificance which we attach to the opening of fire against us ftom across the Syrian frontier, when that Gre is directed on the authority of a Gcvemment which bas such o' rt claims against our sovereignty and integrity. r-.. call to S}lria to respect the armistice border is perhaps the most fundamentallUld important· measure which the Security Council CM take. 157. 1 DOW turn to the document p"'eSented on behalf of the Soviet Union [8/3528]. This draft resolution does not make any claim to obje&tivity. The Soviet representative bas simply copied down certain extreme and partisan views of the Syrian Govemment, and bas put the name of bis delegation to Syrian views. 158. The Soviet dra!t resolution oompletely ignores the important passages of the Chief of Staff's. report which refer to contraventions of the Armistice Agreement by Syria. Here we have a remarkable paradox. Syria establishes a gun position in Israel's territory. Syr.~ opens fire on Israel vessels in Israel~ waten. Syria defines 250 metres of Israel territory as Syrian "territorial waten" and instructs its armed forces ta extend thek contrais beyond the Syrian frontier into an area of Israel jurisdiction. Ali these things are established by the Chief of Staff's report. Yet a permanent member of the Security Council finds it possible to formulate proposais which completery disregard these findings. 159. Similariy, the Soviet draft resolution refuses to RY anything re.quiring Syria to respect the armiitiee d~.ation line and to avoid firing across it, as ha., happened so frequently in the pasto 160. Ignoring the eqm:1i~f of lighta of Israel and S}'ria under the Armîstiœ Agreement, and thereby discriminating against hundredi of Israelis who have 161. Israel deeply regretl this unbalanced approach. We see here the unfortunate extension of an attiv.!de previoualy expreued in the vetoing of two important draft resolutions before the' Security Council for no other reason than that they emplwized an kb duty to observe Charter obligations and treaty <lbligations towards Ilrael. We are here acutely reminded of th~ in~uitable diladvantage under which Israel laboun in 1 the Security Council. Ever aiDce the veto frustrated two basic Security OJuncil decisions in 1954, we have been gràvely aware of the effects of. this imbalance. Iln&ei here comes before a tribunal where the only alternative, whatever the meriu ôf the case, is a ve.'l'diet for the Arabs or no verdict at ail.

Will me representative of l,rael please weigh the gr..vlty of the words he bas just spoken? .

1 think.1 baye weighed my wordl careful1y and 1 am accurately describing the position created by a habit of vetoing draft resolutions whenevel' they seem te give indulgence to lamel's case. And 1 ask whether any citœen in any country would find satisfaction in recourse to a court where the oillly available verdict was a verdict against mm? ln the light of what happened in the :&nat Ya'coub and Suez discussions, what weigh~ can ~ attach to Syrian or Soviet contentions that, if Israel bas a grievanœ its best course is to submit it to the Security Couneil? \Ve fear that the doctrine that a Security Council resolution should not: contain material which raises Arab objections now finds expression in the Soviet draft resolution, ~hich .in ~y Government's view is not based on objectIVe cntena. 164. Israel will give serious consideration to the views ~xpressed by memhers nf th~ Security Couneil. But ~e ~ope. that the COUl•...il, in its tum, will make an lDlagmative effort to comp.ehend the difficuIties and burdens of a small people which bas no other aspiration but to be left alone to cultivate itl garden; to pursue the ways of peace; to develop its society and culture within its modest domain of sovereigntyj to he free from the illicit hcstility which has besieged it for seveD years; ~d to testify in its new mdependence to the deep VltaÜty and grandeur of its immortal traditions.

1 will he very bried at this late hour. 1 wish solely, if 1 may, to make a small correction te what 1 said earlier thi3 morning. 1 then said that in an earlier mtervention 1 faite " Whatever may have been the provocation in thia eue or u a reault of the put incidents referred to by the Chief of SWi, there cao he no justification for retaliation which ~ all the more shocking when 011 the acale of the attack of the night of Il to 12 December" [710th m.eting, para. 35]. 166. My colleaguea will note that 1 laid "Whatever may have been the provocation." 1 wu referring of course to the argument that there had been provocation as a justification in thia case. Thil of course wu not my argwnent; precisely the contrary. 1 ahould, of course, have made it clear that 1 WU speaking of alleged provocation or wu, as it were, UJing the word within quotation marks. 167. 1 hope that thia explanation will serve to clarify a point on which my attitude cannot poIIibly he in doubt, more eapecÎlilly alter the amendmeiilt which 1 introduccd earlier thia moming. Til, metting rose tJt 1.40 p.".. Piiated iD Franœ ~ri:o:c : tU.S. 0.30 ; (or eqwvalent in