S/PV.715 Security Council

1 have asked to speak in order to state our final position regarding the various draft resolutions and amendments that are now before the CounciI. 2. 1'0 Union begin with, the draft resolutions of the Soviet [S/3528] and Yugoslavia [S/3536] come to dealing adequately with the merits of the Œ~arest case. 3. The amendments of Iran, in their original formulation [S/3532] reflected the salient facts embodied in the report of General Burns [S/3516 and Add.l]. 4. As for the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (S/3530/ Rev.3], it obliges us to raise certain points which we request the Council to consider in aIl earnestness and seriousness. 5. In the three-Power draft resolution, the Council reminds Israel of the previous condemnation passed by the Security Council in respect of IsraeI's past military attacks. The Council then condemns Israel for the attack of Il December "as a fla~rant violation" of 6. This is the paraphrasing of the draft resolution of the three Powers now before the Counei!. Although not fully adequate to the situation, the pronouncements embodied in this draft reso1'ltion carry with them the resentment of the civilized world angainst the savage attacks committed by Israel against Sydan territory and against the Syrian anny and people. In the main, the sponsors have chosen ta confine tJemsdves in their draft to condemnation for the presen", and a warning for the future. 7. Directcd against a Member of the United Nations other than Israel, certainly such a resolution, certainly such a verdict, wouId be a great deterrent. But Israel's policy is deeply embedded in aggression. Verbal measures are no cure. The ooly remedy is ta apply effective measures to cut the evil out at the root. 8. The verdict of the Council establishing the guilt of Israel is surely not to remain as an international instrument in the archives of the United Nations. For us in the Middle East, the verdict against Israel is an additional ground to prove the COrrectness of the policy we have folIo ed ever since the Palestine question was brought before the United Nations. 9. Yet two points in the draft resolution call for comment. First is the reference to Syrian interference on Lake Tiberias. 1 should say that there has been no interference on our part. Our conduct has not been at fault regarding activities on Lake Tiberias. Our rights of fishing, of navigation and of irrigation in Lake Tiberias and its shores, apart from the Palestine question as a whole, ab antiqua as they are, have been endorsed by international L-eaties. Our peaceful exercise of these rights cannot be described as interierence in any manner. It would be an interference on the part of Israel if Israel hampered the free exercise of Ot~r rights. 10. The second point is the questioTl of prisoners. The Syrian military personnel now held D) Israel were captured by Israel within Syrian territory as the result of an attack on Syrian territory. They werc, so ta speak, kidnapped from their trenches in the course of an attaek. The Israel military personnel in our custody 1 OfJicUd Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, SpeCÙJI SupplemLnt N° 2, Il. On the other hand, the drait resolution has failed to provide for effective measures to deter Israel from committing further aggression. The measures that we have urged the Council to adopt remain undecided. No mention is made of expulsion, of compensation or of economie sanctions. Even the question of economic aid is not dealt with. 12. In aH my statements before the Council, 1 have stressed the necessity-rather, 1 have stressed the lIT::;<èncy-of taking a serious vicw of the whole situa- 1 :..ton. 1 have declared time and <'gain that the issue now in the Middle East, which is an issue equally before the Security Council now, is war or no war. Some may have thought that our warning was a piece of rhetoric. 13. Last evening that warning was corroborated. We learn in this morning's The New Y'Jrk Times that, in a public statement made yesterday by Sir Anthony Eden, the world was warned that the Middle East could spark a third world war. In the words of Sir Anthony Eden, a world war could easily be touched off by hostilities in a eritical region such as the Middle East. This warning came from the lips of a great authority exactly at the time when our efforts and labours in' the Security Council were concerned with whether the draft resolution should exclude or include a bare reference to the Charter and to the provisions of the Charter. de 14. The joint draft resolution, therefore, does not meet the situation. It fails to impose a penalty, to apply sanctions and to arrest Israel's warlike tendencies. The whole question is left to destiny. We therefore suggest that a meeting of minds be achieved. This is the only way to achieve unanimity. Unanirrity is not achieved by addressing an appeal across the table of the Security Council; it must be the outcome of a meeting of minds. 14. répond n'inflige belliqueuses régler que C'est parvient table d'une 15. It is for this reason that we ask that sorne procedure may be found whereby aIl the elements of the draft resolutions and amendments now before the Security Counci! could be recast in one document which could he adopted unanimously by the Security Coullcil, thereby carrying the weight, dignity and authority of the Council against û'1e treacherous and ghast1y attack of Israel committed against the territory of a Member of the United NRtions. 15. une des sommes de ainsi, rité, lancée 1 ganisation 17. With regard to the Yugoslav draft resolution, we fully appreciate the high principles it is designed to serve, and we thank the Yugoslav representative for the efforts he has made with a view to helping the Council to achieve unanimous agreement. In point of fact, his draft resolution is quite close to that of the three Powers. We still prefer the drafting of the latter, however, both in its preamble and in the operative part. 18. Thus, for instance, we prefer the w<-lrding of the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution. General Burns' report recognizes that there has been interference by Syria with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, and that Syria has contravened the Annistice Agreement. The deplorable incident of Il to î2 December must De regardt:d, not as aü isolat17::l act, but as a consequence oZ the situation which has existed .n the area for some time. It must be regarded as one more incident, though of excessive and injustified proportions, in the series of incidents which have taken place there. Hence, we Ceel it is right that the draft resolution should mention interference with the rights of Israel on Lake Tiberias. 19. Moreover, Ùle operative part of the Yugoslav draIt resolution includes a paragraph 1'eferring to the payment of .compensation for the loss ot and damage to life and property. We gave our views on that point in our previous s~atement [712th meeting]. We repeat that the Security Council is a political organ, and is not competent to award compensation rights, a matter which falls within the province of a judicial body. 20. With rep:ard ta the amendments to the three- Power draft résolution submitted by Iran, some of which have been accepted by the sponsors, we must say that they have in no way made us change our favourable attitude to the draft resolution. We still regard it as the most objective and carefully considered text before us, given the circumstances, and we thank the representative of Iran for the efforts he has made to bring about a compromise agreement. 21. The amendement to the fourth paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 7 of the operative part takes the form of a referel"ce to article II, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice AgretilleTlf:, which states that Done of its provisions should "in any way prejudice the rights, daims and positions .of either party... in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question". It would perhaps have been better if the last phrase, on the peacefui settiement of the Palestine question,

The Soviet delegation has carefully studied th~ draft resolution presented yesterday by the delegation of Yugoslavia [8/3536], and would like to make sorne comnents on it. 24. That draft resolution contains a number of use"! provisions which accurately refleci: the eircumstances of the incidents which occurred on the Israel-Syrian frontier in the area of Lake Tiberias on the night of 11 to 12 December. The draft reso!ution very rightly condemns the Government of Israel for the absolutely unjustified invasion of Syrian territory by Israel armed forces. Let me draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Yugoslav draft resolution, which quite rightly notes the following finding of the Chief of Staff: " The Israel action on the night of 11 ta 12 December was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the Generai Armistice Agreement, including those: relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria." [8/3516, para. 29] 25. The Yugoslav draft resolution contains not only a condemnation of the Government of Israel, but also a waming to it to refrain from any repetition of the invasion of Arab territory by Israel armed forces. We feel compelled to point out that this warning is not as serious as that contained in the Syrian drait resolution [8/3519], as modified by the delegation of the Soviet Union [8/3528]. We appreciate, however, that the Yugoslav draft. resolution was drawn up. in this form with the object of offering a generally accept.able solution to this very important question. 26. Attention should be given to paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Yugoslav draft resolution, which caUs üpün the Government of Israei Oô to refrain from 28. The wording and tone of the Yugoslav draft resolution reRect the actual situation at lake Tiberias more accurately than the corresponding provision of the three- Power draft re~()lution. 1 still maintain that the events preceding the incident of Il December shoujJ not he mentioned at aIl, because the Security Council is Dot in possession of fuU information on them, and indeed has not proceeded to the necessary discussio':1 of the matter. If, however, the subject is to be referred to in an} way, then in my view the wording of the Yugoslav draft resolution reRects the actual state of affairs far more accurately than doe~ the three-Power draft resolution. 29. The Soviet delegation stlh V) 1....1ers tht' Syrian drll.ft resolution, as modified hy the USSR, best suited to the Security COlmcil's purpose. At the same time, however, we feel that the Yugoslav draft resolution may enable the Security Council to take a unanimous decision, for which many memhers of the Council have called and which they have recognized as important. 30. In our view, such a unanimous decision on the vital question we are now considering-the condemnation of Israel for the completely unprovoked attack by its armed forces on the territory of a ncighbouring State-will serve as a serious warning designed to prevent any repetition of similar acts. ïn order to meet the wishes of other delegations for a unanimous decision by the Security Council, the Soviet delegation is prepared not to press for priority in the voting for the Syrian-Soviet draft resolution, an~ to concede priority to the Yugoslav draft resolution. In that event, the Soviet delegation wouId be prepared to support the Yugoslav draft resolutlon.

The general attitude of the Government of Israel was fulfy outlined in the address which 1 made to the Council at the 713th me(;ting. At this stage, 1 should like to confine myself to sorne comments on the draft resolutions hefore the Security Council and on the observations of the representative of Syria and of members of the Council concerning them. 32. The remarks just made by the representative of Syria ev(>~e our profound disquiet whit regard to the prospects of restoring peacc in the Lake Galilee area. The Syrian representative, in the course of this debate, has drawn across our horizon many fantastic and extremist proposaIs-about expulsion, about sanctions, about 33. If 1 understood Mr. Shukairy correctly, L" has stated th~ t the adoption of the draft resolution submitted by Franl'e, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3530/Rev.3] would be taken by him as an endorsement of the correctness of the poIl.cy which the Arab States have foUowed in respect of the Palestine question. In other words, there has been a policy of war and of aggression, oi btlligerency, of boycott, of blockade, of incursion, of marauding, of the causing of a dreadful toU of human life on both sides, ~nd Syria interprets this draft resolution as an endol1lement 'Jf the policies which have led to these results. . 34. Whether the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States desire their draft resolution to be interpreted as an endorsement of the policies followed by the Arab States towards Israel for these seven years is, of course, a consideration whicn must arise in their minds. My delegation would like to beIieve th(3 t that is not the intention, but that is clearly the effec'., and the observations which 1 made at the 713ih I!teeting about the effects of this draft resolution haw; bcen strikingly borne out by the observations of the representative of Syria. 3.'>. This is of far more than theoretical importance, because it brings our attention to bear on the basic problem of Syrian interventions in contravention of the Armistice Agreement against activities on Lake Tiberias. 36. In thi3 connexion, 1 have noticed that th~ œpresentative of Syria gave an indication that Syria, or Syrians, would continue with the "peaceful exercise of... rights" upon the lake. 1 am therefore compelled to point out that Syria and Syrians have no rights whatever, whether peaceful or non-peaceful, upon LaKe Tiberias, which, as has been pointed out by the representacives of the United Kingdom and Australia and others, lies totally and unreservedly within Israel jurisdiction under the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. 37. Quite clearly, Israel would be compelied and entitIed to take measures of law against any Syrian who intruded for any purpose upon Lake "': iberias, unless, of cour::e, an agreement regu!ating (~rtain activities is made upon the lines which my Government is prepared to endorse and in support of which 1 spoke at the 713th meeting. But the jurisdiction of Israel upon the lak~ and its shores applies without any reservatioD, and it is extremcly disquieting to hear a!1 implication that, without any prior agreement, Syria regards itself as entitled to intrude Ïts activities into an area of Israel jurisdiction. This would constitute a violation of several provisions of the Annistiee Agreement. ! 39. 1 should like to comment, ln the context of the Soviet draft resolution [8/3528], upon certain observations which the representative of the Soviet Union made in his remarks yesterday [714th meeting]. At the 713th meeting, 1 expressed concern at the situation created by the lack of objectivity in the Soviet J.t":lft resolution, and a1so commented upon the effects of unobjective attitudes, when they are linked with the possession of a privileged voring status, upon the freedi'nt of the Security Council to adopt resolutions during the past two years in accordance with majorit)' vote. 40. The concern which 1 expressed related not so much to resolutions which the Security Council had adopted, but to draft resolutions which the Security Council wished to adopt and was prevented from adopting owing to the application of these voting provisions of the Charter. But 1 would like to m~!-~ it quite clear that the concern which 1 expressed about the developing effects of this position over the past iwo years, and the tactical influences which it had exercised upon the freedom of the Security Council to give impartial satisfaction to aU parties concerned, was not expressed in any personal sense, but on hehalf of the Govemment and the people of Israel. 41. In this connexion, my delegation heard with regret that the repI'eSentative of the Soviet Union had expressed a charge against Israel whieh goes far beyond the context of recent incidents on Lake Tiberias. 1 quote from the verbatim record. The Soviet representative s:oid: "A number of representatives have pointed out in the Council that, in view of the fact that the State of Israel, since the very first days of its existence, has pursued a threatening pt)licy towards its neighbours, the Security Council cannot confine itself merely to noting the facts. [714 the meeing, para. 52]" 42. First, it is in my view and impression inaccura~e to state that a number of representatives of the Security Council have committed themselves to the extraordinary view that. since the verv first davs of its existence. Israel has pursu'ed a threatening policy towards its neighbours. As far as 1 know, only one member of the Security Council has ever said-and that very recently-that view that, since the very first days of its existence, Israel pursued a threatening policy towards its neighbours. 1 doubt whethpl' the representative of the Soviet Union would be able to quote and to specify which are the other members of the Security Council that have ever committed themselves to that st:atement. 43. It is, however, sufficiently grave for us to hear that statement-that, since the very first days of its existence, Israel has taken a threatening attitude, a threatening This, then, ls the definition of the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs of the value of the statement that, since the very first days of its existence, Israel has pursued a threatening policy towards its neighbours. 45. The question of what has happcned to the State of Israel ·nd what has been done by it sinee the very first days of its existence, aIl these matters are engraved upon the record and memory of the Security Council itLelf, and l would paya tribute to the Soviet Union and to its representatives over the past years, inasmuch as those representatives have played a leading part in defining the record of the origin of this conillct in accurate and compelling tenns. 46. Therefore, if the Soviet representative addressed us yesterday on what has happened since the first days of Israel's existence, our minds naturaIly go back to those very turbulent, decisive and for us eternally glorious days. During those days, there sat two members of Soviet delegations at the table of the Security CounciI, and this is what they said about the responsibility for violence in the very first days of Israel's existence. 47. On 15 May 1948, Mr. Tarasenko, the repre~en­ tative of the Ukrainian SSR, spoke as follows: "What does the Govemment of Egypt consider to he its objective in invading Palestine? At the end of the declaration by Egypt, the assertion was made that the intervention had no other object in view than the restoration of security and order to Palestine." [292nd meeting, p. 25] Two days later, on 20 May 1948, Mr. Tarasenko said: "We are concerned with the plain fact that a number of Palestine's neighbour States have sent their troops into Palestine. Our knowledge of that fact is not based on rumours, or on newspaper reports, .. 1 should like to point out in passing that none of the States whose troops have entered Palestine can clai.-n that Palestine fom15 part üf ils territory. It is an altogether separate territory without any relationship tel the territories of the States whic" have sent their troops into Palestine." [297th m.eting,] [pp. 4 and 5]. 48. In the same discu:>sion, Mc. Gromyko, speaking for the Soviet Union, said: .. The USSR delegation cannot but express surprise at the position adopted by the Arab States.. [which] have resorted to such action as sending their troops ioto Palestine and ~ng out military operations aimed at the suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine." [229th meeting, p. 7] 49. On 28 May 1948, Mr. Tarasenko said : .. 1 would point out, in the first place, that we do not know of a single case of the invasion of the territory of another State by the anned forces of Israel, except in self-defence, where they had to beat off attacks by the anned forces of other States on Israel territory. That was self-defence in the fuB sense of the word" [307th meeting, p. 15] 50. Finally, on l4 July 1948, in a discussion concluded on the Securitv Council's detennination that Arah action had cn'ated a'threat to the peace, Mr. Gromyko said: .. The Arab States have no reason to consider the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine as a threat to themselves. Seven hundred thousand or 1 million Jews cannot represent any danger to 26 million Arabs. A Jewish State cannot he a threat to the Arab East." [336th meeting, pp. 29 and 30] 51. During the discussion of the same problem in another context, Mr. Jacob Malik, the representative of the USSR, said : •• Ever since its birth, this State declared that it wished to live in peace and entertain peacefpl relations with aH its neighbours and with all the nations of the world. It is not to blame for the fact that this appeal did not meet with any response.... from its neighbours." [383rd meeting, p. 22] 52. If those statements were truc then, as a description of the origins of the conflict which the Security Council is still discussing, they do not become untrue today. And those statements themselves compel us to express our regret and surprise at any indication that the Soviet Government believes that "the State of Israel, since the very first days of its existence, has pursued a threatening policy towards its neighbours". It is difficult to think of a more àirect and total collision than that which has 53. 1 pass to the explanation of my Government's views on some of the amendments which have arisen in this discussion, and especially those which have been embudied in one of the main draft resolutions. 54. Following the submission of an amendment by the representative of Iran, a new language now appears in the preamble of the three-Power draft resolution [8/3530jRev.3]. The fourth paragraph of the preamble reads now: " Noting also, without prejudice to the uItimate rights, daims and positions of the parties, that, according to the reports of the Chief of Staff, there has been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the tenus of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syrîa". 55. 1 confess that my delegation is unable to understand -and 1 use that word in the most elementary sense of language-the relevance of the addition to the centraI thought of the paragraph. 1 do not understand how the noting of a fact c?n be considered to prejudice ' . not to prejudice the provisions of an international agreement. It seems to me to be a non sequitur in the sharpest sense of that term. The provisions of the Armistice Agreement bind Israel and Syria and, obviously, no reference to some episode or to some fact can possibly prejudice the provisions of that agreement. Therefore my comment and conclusion is that the addition of those words adds nothing to and subtracts nothing from the content of the paragraph. Ali that it does is to create a defect of language and of logic, and 1 simply leave the paragraph in an expression of sincere inability to understand what those particular words mean in the context to which they are here related. 56. If such words had any value in clarifying the draft resolution, my delegation could perhaps have understood a direct quotation from the language of the Armistice Agreement. The representatives of France and Cuba have stated that it is to the text of the Armistice Agreement that this particular reference applies. The Armistice Agreement, in article II, paragraph 2, says : "No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, daims and positions of either party hereto in [he uItimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. . . . " l'article 58. While wc criticize that insertion as adding nothing and subtracting nothing, but as i.•troducing a certain linguistic and juridical confusion, 1 should like to comment in a different approach upon the other amendment by Iran which has been embodied in the tripartite draft resolution. 59. Paragraph'7 now J'l'ads: "Requests the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias without prejudice to the rights, c1aims and positions of the parties, and to rep.ort to the Council as appropriate...." Here the injunction to respect the provisions of the Annistice Agreement and not (0 prejudice them arises in the context of the suggestions of the Chief of Staff. 60. 1 have stated that certain suggestions, such as that for leaving 250 metres of the surface of Lake Tiberias free from Israel activity, would, in our view, require us to go beyond our obligations under the General Annistice Agreement. We have e;~pressed the fear that certain infonnal arrangements suggested would prejudice our rights under existing provisions of the General Annistice Agreement. It is our hope and desire that the Chief of Staff will make efforts to improve the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias, but in full understanding of the paramountcy of the provisions of the General Annistice Agreement. 61. In respect of this view, the Iranian amendment is helpful to both parties in so far as they wish to preserve fully their rights under the General Annistice Agreement; therefore this amendment does represent an objective improvement of the text. 62. 1 should now like to refer to the draft resolution proposed by the delegation of Yugoslavia [8/3536]. 1 believe that a more careful and leisurely examination of this text will show that it possesses serious defects both in equity and in logic, and 1 should be less than frank if 1 were not to say that its adoption would, in our view, contribute to an increase of tension in the Middle ,1 ference~ Therefore the first criticism \vhich 1 offeT of the Yugoslav draft resolution is that the omission of a specifie reference to the Syrian contraventions seriously disturbs its balance in equity and in logic, and would make it a most unsatisfactory basis for approaching the future task of pacification in the Lake Tiberias area. 64. Secondly, we note that the Yugoslav draft resolution does not caU upon Syria, or cali upon both parties, to comply with their obligations, under article V of the General Armistice Agreement, to respect the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarized zone. The armistice demarcation line has not been respected; shooting across the demarcation !ine upon Israel vessels on the lake has been affirmed and attested by the Chief of Staff to have been a regular feature of tension in the area concerned. Therefore, any resolution emerging from this Council would be seriously defective if it did not illustrate the seriousness with which the Security Council regards the immunity of the demarcation line and the inadmissibility of shooting across it on to Lake Tiberias for any purpose at aIl. 65. One delegation, referring to the incidents of 10 December, described them as insignificant. We do not regard shooting across the armistice demarcation line as insignificant. The workers and fishermen on Lake Tiberias would be surprised to hear that it couId be said to be "insignificant" whether they were murdered lIpon their own lake or not. This is not an insignificant matter, and therefore 1 again would say that the omission of any such provision from the Yugoslav draft l'l'solution is a serious and substantive defect in the balance of that text. 66. Thirdly, on the question of prisouers, which figures in paragraph 4 of the Yugoslav draft, 1 simply wish to draw attention to what seems to be a clerical error. 1 have not reached the stage of believing that anybody wishes the Council to say that, whereas Syrian prisoners should be reIeased-and for this we haveexpressed our full readiness-Israel prisoners held in Syrian gaols against the injunctions of the Mixed Armistice Commission should continue to rot away there. 1 am sure that that is not the intention, but the language of paragraph 4 as formulated is open, 1 am sure inadvertentfy, to the interpretation that Yugoslavia proposes only the release déclaré la d'armistice syriennes. mais 67. Finally, there is the passage on compensation, paragraph 3. 1 would suggest to the delegation of Yugoslavia that it should consider the juridical aspects of this recommendation. 1 believe that this passage is ultra vires and unconstitutional. It states that the "violation of the General Armistice Agreement entails compensation by the party responsible for the loss of and damage to life and property ". 68. 1 should like to speak on the purely legal aspects of that statement. What is the General Armistice Agreement? It is a bilateral contract between two sovereign States-nameley, Syria and Israel. The terms of that Agreement set out what it does entail and what it does not entail. 1 cannot understand how anyone not a party to that Agreement can inform us that it entails what is not written in it. The General Armistice Agreement cannot be said to entail anything that Israel and S}Tia have not mutually agreed that it should entail. 69. This legal principle is borne out by the jurisprudence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Mixed Armistice Commission bas determined that the Agreement cannot he held to entail anything which is not specifically provided for in its text, and for that very reason has refused ta rule on the questioh of mutual claims, holding by implication that such matters rest within the domain of the bilateral relationships between Israel and Syria. 1 suggest that the terms of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria should be respected by aIl other parties, and 1 fear that this juridical respect for treaties would not be sustained if, ouside the consent of the parties concerned, the Armistice Agreement were determined to entail something not contained in its text. That, then, is a legal consideration. 70. 1 think that the practical implications of this paragraph 3 should also be considered. This paragraph would state: "Considers that an established violation of the General Armistice Agreement entails compensation by the party responsible for the loss of and damage to life and property.... " 71. This is an extremely far-reaching statement in its practical implications. Under it, for example, the Government of Israel would be entitled, and 1 am sure that is part of its intention, to present claims for the 84{) cases of death and serious mutilation arising thro11gh violations of the Armistice Agreement by Syria or by other Arab States. Similarly, this text would he open to this interpretation: an established violation of 73. It is not for me to state whether unanimity is an important consideration, but 1 would seriously suggest in aIl earnestnf'SS to members of the Council that padiamentary unanimity cannot take precedence over substantive considerations of justice, of law, of the sanctity of agreements and of the absolute need to establish complete objectivity in the policies of the Security Council in our region.

Now that we have heard the partif's, and the members of the Council have given their views, 1 feel that the time has come to make a clear and definite statement of the attitude of the three Powers which, some time ago, submitted the draft resolution before the Council. 75. 1 have listened with great attention to the arguments put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union. If 1 understood him correctly, while he would, of course, prefer the amendments [8i3528] that he has himself made to the Syrian draft resolution [8/3519], failing that, he would support the Yugoslav draft resolution [8/3536]. 76. 1 must sayat once that, whatever the advantages of that draft resolution, we could not accept it. 1 should like to pay a tribute to the Yugoslav representative's efforts to achieve his purpose, namel), unanimity in the Security Council, but 9 fuI that his proposaI is somerwhat late. ï would remind the Council that ours was submitted as long ago as 11 January 1956. The differences of stress and balance between the two drafts should be borne in mind. 77. The Yugoslav draft resolution does not mention, as we do in the fourth paragraph of our preamble, the Chief of Staff's reports concerning interference by the Syrian authoritieG. Neither does it say anything about the appeal which 1 think we should make to the two parties to respect the annistice demarcation line, as we 78. For aU these reasons, 1 believe that the three- Power draft resolution, as amended, is preferable to the Yugüslav draft. 79. l should like to stress the fact that we have amended the three-Power draft resolution four times already to take account of all the views that have been expressed around this table and, in particular, to take account of the amendments submitted by the representative of Iran and the amendments and wishes of the Soviet delegation. We have stated that there is no prejudice ta the ultimate rights, daims and positions of the parties; this is stipulated both in the fourth paragraph of the preamble and in paragraph 7 of the operative part of our draft resolution. This represents two amendments. 80. Next, iinmediately after referring to the inter· ference by the Syrian autpJ.iw...: w r point out, as we did in our speeches. that 'le hold that such interference in no way justifie' the :~rael action. This is the tt':-d amendment. provIsIOn that an immediate 81. Lastly, we have accepted the arrangements should be made for exchange of aIl prisoners. This amendment. 18 the fourth 82. 1 must state on behalf of the tluee Powers that this represents the extreme limit of the concessions we can make. A time cornes when we JIlUst finish with the matter, and 1 must remind you that this important question has been before members of the Council for discussion and negotiation for over a month. 1 think the three-Power draft resolution, as amended [S135301 Rev.3] represents a maximum of compromise, intended to enable as many of us as possible to vote for it. This draft resolution condemns the action of Il December 1955, but establishes a certain necessary balance. It draws attention to the rights and obligations of the parties and is, 1 think, the strongest resolution ever adopted by the Council on such a subject. 1 appeal to all my colleagues to ensure that this draft resolution receives the vote of every member of the Council or, failing that, a heavy majority. 83. The Syrian representative said a little while ago that we had before us a question of considerable importance. Emphasizing this point, the Syrian representative quoted the words of the United Kingdom Prime Minister. We are seized with a problem which may have serious consequences and must settle it, as we propose, with the least possible delay. 84. 1 would add that, among the concessions which the three Powers have made, and which we accepted straight away, there is one which is important and which meets a request by the Soviet delegation for a

When 1 asked.for the adjournment of the debate yesterday evening to allow time for the study of the counter-amendments proposed by the three great Powers, 1 had no intention of prolonging the discussion, the outcome of which is of deep concern to my delegation. My main purpcse v,ras to compare the tlu'ee-Power draft resolution, including the amendments accepted, with the last part of my amendment [8/3537] to the fourth paragraph of the preamble. 1 wished also to consider whether or not to press my proposaI. After long reflection, 1 reached the conclusion that it would be better for my delegation, even if not completely satisfied, to do nothing to hinder the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution. It was in this spirit that 1 took my decision; and, continuîng my efforts to arrive at a compromise, 1 decided-not, 1 must admit, without reluctance-to accept the French representative's counter-amendment to the fourth paragraph of the preamble and the United States amendment to operative paragraph 8 concerning the exchange of prisoners. 86. We consider that the amended draft resolution should strengthen the Securify Council's prestige, for it proves that, if Israel were ta renew its attacks, the Council would not rest content with a mere condemnation, but would consider what further measures under the Charter were required to maintain or restore the peace. If 1 construe this provision correctly, this refers to the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, by accepting my amendment to operative paragraph 7 and to the fourth paragraph of the preamble, the Council would remove any possibility of misinterpretation prejudicial to the rights of the Syrians under resolution 181 (II) adopted by the General Assembly in 1947. 87. 1 also accept the counter-amendment submitted by the United States representative concerning the release of prisoners, whether Syrian or Israeli. This means prisoners in the sense in which this term is defined, and not spies; at any rate, that would be my delegation's . interpretation of such a provision. Where the release of prisoners is concerned, my delegation feels that humanitarian considerations must prevail over political considerations. My delegation would therefore be the last to oppose the release of the Israel prisoners. 1 am firmty convinced that agreement on the exchange of prisoners will reduce tension between Syria and Israel; 89. These circumstances incline us to believe that the incident of 10 December was only a manoeuvre on the part of Israel to justify the large-scale attack of Il December. Moreover the onlv conclusion that could be drawn from the doc~ents in' question is that the Syrian military authorities had given orders t ,'open fire on any Israel military craft approaching within less than 250 metres from the shores of Lake Tiberias. It is also apparent that the Syrian military forces had been ordered not to fire on Israel fishing boats. Furthermore, as General Burns' report shows, no incident of that kind had occurred for sorne time before the largescale attack by the Israel military forces. 90. The mere intention, however-and that is aIl of which these documents provide evidence-is far from constituting interference, as stated in the three-Power draft resolution. Interference presupposes action, whereas mere intention implies no action whatever and cannot be regarded as interference in the sense of the fourth paragraph of the preamble. 91. We realize that the three Powers may have allowed political considerations to prevail over legal considerations, particularly in a political body of the United Nations, and that it is these political considerations that may have led them to press for the maintenance of the fourth paragn.ph nf the preamble as it now stands. In the opinion of my delegation, it should be borne in mind that this paragraph is of quite secondary importance in comparison with other provisions of the draft resolution, which deal with the condemnation of Israel and the

In view of the important and constructive declaration just made by the representative of Iran, it now seems probable that the Security Council will be able to adopt a resolution with a very large measure of agreement, if not complete agreement. 94. The sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution have made a great contribution towards the achievement of that unanimity which we aIl recognize to be desirable. They have shown, 1 believe, a readiness to accept several amendments put forward by other members of the CounciI. The representative of Iran, too, has shown an encouraging spirit of accommodation. 95. My delegation also appreàltes the constructive efforts of the Yugoslav delegation in preparing an alternative drait resolution with a view to facilitating the reaching of agreement in the Security Counci!. In view, however, of the progress made in revising the three-Power draft resolution, so that it now appears likely to command general support, we consider that the later text should retain its priority. 1 believe that the three-Power draft resolution offers a more balanced statement of the issues in this case. That, indeed, was cIearly demonstrated in the very lucid exposition given the Council a few minutes ago by the representative of France. The Australian delegation is prepared to vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution, as now revised. 96. 1 consider it necessary, however, to make a further observation, following the statements which have been made here. 97. 1 ùo not sec how anyone can fail to have bccn impressed by the description that the representative of Israel has given of the atmosphere of hostility to which the people of Israel have been continually subjected by their neighbours-a hostility which, 1 fear, was reflected in sorne of the remarks made by the representative of Syria. In order to avoir] any misunderstanding, let me say again that thp !.u:;Lralian delegation does not find even in this sustained hostility of Israel's neighbours any justification for the Israel attack which is the subject of Syria's present complaint to the Council. But 1 must express the Australian delegation's concern at the lack of progress in resolving the fundamental issues between Israel and its neighbours. 99. 1 also wish to make it c1ear that, as we now join in supporting a draft resciution that condemns Israel's action on this occasion, anù in issuing to Israel a solemn warning with regard to the measures which the Security Council might be obliged to take in the event of further violations of the Armistice Agreement by Israel, we do 50 becausc we firmly believe that ail States should carry out their international obligations. No State, and abO\'e aU no Member of the United Nations, is entitled to take aggressive action against its neighbours, even if there be provocation. Consequently, in the event of further violations of the Armistice Agreement by any of the parties, we hope that appropriate action will be taken by the Securit'y Council.

1 wish to make a very brief observation on the stateme••t by the Israel representative which we have just heard. 101. In the course of his remarks, Mr. Eban correctly quoted my remark yesterday to the eErect that Israel was carrying on a policy of threats towards its neighbours. But Mr. Eban also attributed to me 50mething 1 did not say. In particular, 1 said nothing about the origins of the Palestine conflict, nor is that question under consideration at the present moment. 102. At the same time, Mr. Eban qu6ted a number of statements· made by Soviet represcntatives in the Security Council on various occasions, during discussions on the Palestine question. 1 do not propose to alter anything in those statements, nor do 1 sec any need to do 50. Moreover, 1 wouId point out that those statements in no wa;' conflict with what the Soviet representative is saying in the present instance. 103. For very understandable reasons, Mr. Eban did not mention Ùiat, since then, Israei had been responsible for incidents such as that at Qibya in 1953 and at Gaza at the beginning of 1955. As we aIl know, those two incidents were condemned by the Security Couneil as utterly unjustified violations by Israel of the provisions of the Charter and the armistice agreements. ~04. The Security Council is now considering the case of an attack by Israel armed forces on the territory of Syrla, on the night of 11 to 12 December 1955. It has already becn pointed out here in the Security Council that this is the fourth time in two years that Israel has appeared before the Council to answer for violations of the provisions of the Charter and the armistice agreements concluded with its neighbours. 105. Mr. Eban was also silent with regard to the statements he himself had made in the Securify Council in defending bis " policy of retaliation" against Israel's neighbours. 108. Sir Pierson nIXON (United Kingdom): 1 associate myself and agree with the statement made earlier this moming by Mr. Alphand, in which he explained the position of the three Powers in regard to the tripartite draft resolution which is before the Council in its final form in document S/3530/Rev.3. 1 should like to express my recognition of the desire to smooth the path of unanimity which animated the representative of Yugoslavia in submitting the draft resolution submitted by his delegation. 109. Mr. Alphand has explained why the sponsors do n~ consider that it would be practicable for the Council to reopen its discussion on ilie basis of that draft resolution. 1 should like to explain briefiy, before we come to the vote, why we hold, with confidence, that the three-Power draft resolution as revised should represent the conclusion of the Council on the item before it. 110. Mr. Alphand, Mr. Lodge and 1 submitted the draft resolution contained in document S/3530 and Cord on 12 January [71Oth meeting]. The Gouncil has dealt extensively and intensively with the Syrian complaint on its agenda. The debate bas, it seems to me, been in many respects useful and constructive. As my colleagues are aware, the sponsors have had prolonged discussions with the representative of Iran, who has in the course of the Council's proeeedings submitted two sets of amendments [S/3532 and S/3537]. 1JJ. The central features of the three-Power draft resolution are, of course, the condemnation, in strong terms, of the Israel action on the night of Il to 12 Decernber 1955, and the waming to the Govemment of Israel of the consequences here in the Council of anv TPpetition of such action. . 112. The terms of the condemnation have bef'n generally agreed upon, and the sponsors stand firmly by the waming which they think that the Council should give. In order to clarify the position for the representative of the Soviet Union, we have agreed to add to this section the words "under the Charter". We have not considered that it would he right to omit the last paragraph of the preamble, as the representative of Iran first proposed, nor have we feIt able to accept the whole of his subsequent amendment. We have, however, inserted in the operative part a new paragrap 1 of importance, making clear that interference on the lake in no way justified the Israel attack. J13. We have also added the "without prejudice" clause, both in the last paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 7. In the preambular paragraph this 'Will, 1 hope, serve 10 dispel misconceptions. In paragraph 7 it seems to me of considerable importance. The efforts of the Chief of 114. Aiter the uscful discussion of the subject here in the Council, the representative of Iran has not felt it necessary ta maintain his earlier arllendment dealing with the difficult question of the right of compensation by the Council. On the other hand, thanks to ms initiative, the draft resolution, in its third revision, now contains a useful paragraph calling for an immediate exchange of prisoners. In view of what MI'. Abdoh said this morning on that subject, 1 should emphasize that, in the view of the sponsors, this paragraph deals, as it expressly says, with al! military personnel on bath sides. 115. In its new form, 1 have no hesitation in recommending the three-Power draft resolution to the Council, and 1 hope that it will receive unanimous support. It is severe in regard to the Government of Israel, hecause severity in this case was necessary, but we believe that it ;5 also just and fair. ï 16. MI'. BRILEJ (Yugosiavia): :1 shouid Hke to make a few comments concerning the remarks of the representative of Israel in regard to the draft resolution submitted by my delegation [8/3536]. 1 do not believe that it is necessary for me ta go into the details of his observations with regard to certain points on which my delegation has already expressed its views dearly, such as the question of so-caHed Syrian interference and the question whether an established vic:ation -and 1 stress the words "established violation "-of the General Armistice Agreement entails, or dlJes not entail, compensation by the parties responsible. Il i. There is, however, one poiT't which 1 should like to take up. This concerns the question of military prisoners. There is no doubt of my delegation's desire to see aIl military prisoners liberated; this was one of the purposes of our draft resolution. Paragraph 4 of our text refers to the release of prisoners taken .. in this action" for a very simple reason, namely, that the latter is the item on our agenda. We are dealing in the Council at present with the Israel attack of 11 to 12 December. 118. On the other hand, by requesting the Chief of Staff to take the necessary steps to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation, we have covered, 1 think, ail the military prisoners held by one side or the other. 119. As the representative of Israel knows very weIl, the Chief of Staff has suggested the exchange of ail prisoners, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and, in requesting the Chief of Staff to pursue these suggestions, my delegation wholly endorses them and hopes that aIl prisoners will b( released at the earliest possible moment.

The USSR delegation cannot agree with the United Kingdom representative's proposaI that the draft resolution submitted ta the Security Council by France, the United Kingdom and the United States should he given priority. According to the rules of procedure and to established practice, draft resolutions are put to the vote in the order of their. submission to the Council. 122. As we aIl know, the Syrian draft resolution [8/3519] was submitted to the Council long before the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States presented their draft resolution. In accordance with rule 38 of the rules of procedure, the Soviet Union endorsed the Syrian draft resolution, with certain additions that it thought necessary. In a letter to the President of the Council [8/3528], the USSR delegation requested that that amended draft should be put to the vote. The text of the draft is set forth in our letter oi 9 january; if you insist on giving it a name, you may call it the Syrian-Soviet draft resolution. The draft reso!ution in my letter was submitted to the members of the Security Council !~r their consideration on 10 Janual'Y, whereas the first version of the draft resolution of the three Western Powers was submitted on Il January. Consequently, there are no legal grounds for giving priority in the voting to the draft resolution introduced by France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

1 must point out ta the Soviet representative, with ail due respect, that, while we have a rule of priority by chronological arder, wc also have the established practice of the Council and of the General Assembly, under which, if priority is requested, the decision is left to the members' discretion. Therefore, as a request for priority has been made by the three Powers, 1 shaH have to put that motion to the vote, so that the Council itself may decide whether it wishes to give priority to the draft resolution in question.

1 am sarry, but 1 {eel compelled to quote the rules of procedure in order to re-establish the facts. 125. There is no provision in the Security Council's mIes of procedure for arranging an order of priority in the voting on draft resolutions. Rule 32 leaves no room fOT doubt on that point. It reads as foHows: .. Principal moti-:ns and dr-aft resolutions shaH have precedence in the order of their sumission." And that is ail, on that point.

1 have no wish to embark on a procedural discussion with the Soviet representative. Such discussions are always lengthy. 1 must point out to him, however, that the rules of procedure are not exhaustive, and that il: is established practice--and indeed a general rule--for a body to he master of its own rules of procedure, which may be amended if a request to that effect is made in advance. 128. In the circumstanccs, the be&t course will be to treat the Soviet representative's objection as a challenge to the President's ruling. That being so, 1 caU upon the Security Council to take a decision on that challenge. 129. 1 have just learned that the Soviet representative's remarks did not constitute a challenl!e to the President's ruling. 1 thank him for the info~ation. 130. 1 accordingly put to the vote the pro}X>sal that priority he given to the three-Power draft resolution [S/3530/ Rev.3]. A vote was taken by show of hands-. ln favour: Belgium, Cuba, Cpina, France, Australia, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Yugoslavia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: Iran. The proposaI was adopted by 8 votes ta 2~ with 1 abstention.

First, 1 should like to explain why my delegation voted against priority for the three-Power draft resolution. Since my delegation submitted its own draft resolution and believes that this draft corresponds much more closely to a just and adequate evaluation of the case, it is very logical for my delegation to be opposed to the request for priority. ln the present situation, with the President's permission, 1 should like to make another statement regarding the Yugoslav draft resolution. 132. i feel that there is no need for me to explain again why my delegation deemed it necessary to submit its draft resolution and why we were and still are convinced that our draft would he a much more adequate expression of the debate here in the Council. My delegation explained all these reasons in its two previous statements. 134. The three-Power draft resolution has been improved by the acceptance of sorne amendments submitted by the representative of Iran and by improvements of the text by its original authors. This bas not made the text completely satisfactory; nevertheless, 1 feel it has made it more acceptable for aIl of us. maintenant dire 135. In addition to this general consensus, there is another important point, namely, the fact of having a unanimously adopted decision of the Council. The debate in the Council has c1early shown that any future action of the kind which wc have been discussing during the last week will mect not only \Y-ith conàcmnation by this Couneil but perhaps with other measures provided for in the Charter. The fact that this is not suffieiently cIearly expressed in the three-Power drait resolution will not change the effect which our consideration of the case will have on public opinion, and especiaIly on public opinion in the two countries concerned. 136. For aIl these reasons. mv dele!!'ation will find it , possible to vote, in a spirit ~f c~mpro~ise, for the three- Power draft resolution, even though it is not entirely satisfactory owing to certain shortcomings.

Under rule 32 of the rules of procedure of the Council, a vote may he taken not only on a proposaI as a whole, but also on parts of a proposaI. 138. 1 request that a separate vote be taken on the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the three-Power draft resolution. This will enable those memhers of the Security Couneil which do not share the view set forth in that paragraph to express their position on it directly and unambiguously.

The relevant provision is contained in mIe 32 of the mIes of procedure, and reads as follows: "Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall he voted on separate1y at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects."

As the original mover, on behalf of the three Powers, of the draft resolution now before us, 1 must raise objection to the proposaI of the representative of the Soviet Union. My reason is this. The three-Pover draft resolution is a carefulty drafted document embodying a number of significant amendments. To omit or to amend any

ln application of rule 32, and in compliance with the request made on behalf of the sponsors that the draft resolution should be voted on as a whole, 1 put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [8/3530/Rev.3]. A vote was taken by show 01 hands. In lavour: Australi::t, Belgium, China, Cuba, France, Iran, Pero, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northcrn lreland, United States of America, Yugoslavia. The dralt resolution was adopted unanimously.

ask the indulgence of the members of the Council to make a statement. 143. This question came before the Security Couneil in the form of a complaint by the Government of Syria against the Government of Israel. As the representative of Peru, 1 had occasion to praise the moderation shown by the Government of Syria in face of the attack made upon it; instead of reacting in a way which would have produced a general conflict in the area, it preferred a restrained attitude which enabled it to come before the Security Council as the victim of an attack. 144. The representative of Iran pointed out that the Perovian representative's opinion had also been expressed by other delegations. Accordingly, it seems to me that, since it was not considered appropriate to make any reference to that point in the resolution, it is the Council's moral duty to record its approval of this temperate conduct on the part of the Government of Syria; and 1 accept with much l;j~asure the Iranian representative's invitation to me ta \ oke that approval. 145. We have just adopted, by a signih-:antl)' unanimous vote, a resolution whose greatest merit ,'ests on the two circumstances to which 1 am about to refer. 146. It is now almost a month since the Security Council began giving this problem its most zealous attention; and we have held eight meetings to study the question thoroughly. Three draft resolutions were presented, and there was constant negotiation on the amendments presented by the representative of Iran, who, in his turn, modified and improved his amendments with a perseverance and a competence which 1 can only praise. The outcome is a resolution of a somewhat melancholy nature, it is true; a resolution inspired by justice with a view to the strict fulfilment of the painful duty which the condemnation of an act done by a member of the United Nations must be. But, at the same time, while condemnation is a painful matter, 147. 1 should like to stress this note of hope. We hope that both parties will regard the armistice line as sacred and inviolable, not merely because they accepted it, but also because it was created by the solemn intervention of the United Nations. We aIso trust that they will regard as sacred the duty implied in our appeal to them to co-operate with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, who represents the United Nations not only in a purely administrative capacity, but also in thp. interest of peace, and endowed with full moral powers. Sometimes the mere discharge of a duty, the halting of certain actions at a particular linesteps which may appear simple and insignificant-have incalculable consequences; but what is still more important than this negative legal attitude is a positive policy of effective co-operation for peace and international harmony. parties et mais nisation. la le major ment qui les de chose conséquences encore négative, collaboration l'harmonie 148. These words of mine are of more than purely formai significanee; tooay, after the Syrian represen. tative's reference to the recent statements made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, they have a human and very immediate meaning. The geographical position of the Middle East makes it a sensitive area in the politica1 life of mankind. Important political interests clash there, and, as far as the United • Nations is concerned, the sacred interests of peoples living under the aegis of the Organization. And not merely the geographica1 position of the Middle East, but its history, one of great profundity and imposing majesty, leads us to believe that the fate of humanity may be decided in that area. seulement après déclarations sens situation gique s'affrontent qui vivent seulement tive humaines toute du paix tenu établir dation 149. It is true that peace is indivisible, and that a violation of peace in one area to some extent endangers the peace of the world; but today, in the present world situation, and aware of the events of the past, we are able to draw up an order of intensity of dangers, and of hopes too. 150. 1 should like to conclude with a sincere appeal for moderation and self-control; for, while certain strong feelings on either sicle may he legitimate, the higher interests of humanity sometimes demand sacrifices and toleerance. 1 therefore sincerely appeal for such a spirit of co-operation, based on the awareness that not modération de fait 1 only the interests of humanity, but also the interests of the countries themselves, are at stake; for peace opens up a vista of most glorious possibilities, while war, hostility and hatred can lead only te death, destruction and min.

1 have asked for permission to speak in order to express to the President our great appreciation for the dignity, patience and impartiality which he has displayed in conducting the 153. In this resolution the Council further, and in the strongest terms of censure, condemns the attack of Il to L~ December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the relolutions of the Security Council, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement and of the provisions of the Charter, and expresses its grave concern at the failure of Israel to comply with its obligations to respect the provisions of the Charter and to respect the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The Council has expressed itself very c1early and in unequivocal terms in calling upon Israel ta refrain from committing any aggressions hi. the fut....li"e, and to carry out its obligations under Llte Armistice Agreement, in default of which it will consider what further measures under the Charter will be required to maintain peace, to restore the tranquillity of the area and to prohibit any act of aggression or violation. 154. These are the achievements in the resolution. The matter is not, however, at an end. Measures of expulsion, of economic sanctions and of compensation have not been dealt with. 1 shall, therefore, keep these deman':ls standing before the Council to be invoked at the appropriate time. 155. The most fitting way for me ta conclude is to thank the President of the Council, a man of great prestige and integrity, for the statement he has just made on behalf of the Council commending the restraint of Syria, its Government, its army and its people, and condemning the attack of Israel on our army, on our people and on our territory. 156. 1 should like to seize this opportunity ta state that the deliberations of the Council have reinforced our conviction that preaching, sermons, or even condemnations and warnings are, by themselves, no security against aggression. Aggression is repelled by all measures of self-defence, as declared in the Charter. This is the message which 1 shall convey to my country as an additional experience in support of our sublime cause. It goes without saying that, when aggression is launched, we shaH defend our country by aH the means at our disposaI. Yet we are for peace-a peace based upon right, upon justice and upon human dignity.

The Soviet delegation wishes ta explain its vote on the resolution we have just adopted. 159. Our vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution does not mean that we share the view expressed therein that the Syrian authorities have interfered with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias. From the facts brought out in statements made in the Security Council, and from the report ot the Chief of Staff, it is quite evident that Israel anned forces invaded Syrian territory on the night of 11 ta 12 December, and that Syria was the victim of an invasion. There were and could be no ext~nuating circumstances surrounding Israel's action; hence there can be no question, as sorne speakers maintained, of dividing the respective responsibilities of Israel and Syria. 160. In this connexion, we would emphasize that, in effect, operative paragraph 1 of the resolution just adopted recognizes that there was no interference by Syria, such as several speakers had alleged. 161. We should like ta address an appeal to the Security Councîl ,vith due attention and seriousness, and accordingly ta take aIl necessary steps ta end hostile action on the Israel-Arab frontier. 162. We draw attention to paragraph 5 of the resolution just adopted, wmch expressly states that, if Israel fails ta comply with its obligations, the Security Council will have ta consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace; it will he remembered that the Charter provides for the application of the provisions of Ardcle 39 in the event of a threat ta peace and security in anyarea. 163. We hope the Government of Israel will give serious thought to the decision which the Security Council has adopted today, and will take appropriate steps to prevent such intolerable incidents in the future. 164. Since the thr~e-Power draft resolution has been adopted unanimously, and as the Security Council also has before it the Syrian draft resolution as amplified by the Soviet delegation, 1 should like ta ask whether the representative of Syria still considers a vote on this draft resolution necessary.

1 need not lead the Council again through the resolution which has just been unanimously adopted. It speaks for itself and it stands as a whole. AIl 1 wish to say is that those who have voted for it must be assumed to have voted for it as a whole, for aU its contents, and the parties to whom it is addressed must be expected similady to accept it for what it is with aIl its contentsthis resolution which has behind it the unanimous voice of the Security Council. 167. The Coundl has adopted a resolution unanimously and we have observed that, in accordance with its right, the Council has reversed the order of precedence between our draft resolution and that of the three Powers. In the circumstances, 1 would not press for a vote on our draft resolution at this meeting; 1 should prefer it to remain standing in the Security Council until an opportune moment. That is why 1 request the representative of the Soviet Union not to press for a vote on this draft resolution; nor is it my desire that the remaining parts of our draft resolution as originally fonnulated should be considered at the present time. Prlnted in France Priee: D.S. $ 0.30; (or equivalent in