S/PV.720 Security Council

l wish to make a brief observation on the problem before the Security Council, reserving the privilege of speaking again only if a more detailed discussion should develop. voudrais blème le où 2. Israel's approach to the d~:J.it resolution submitted by the United States [S/3562] is governed by •.ntain basic principles of its international policy. First we have often advocated the fuller utilization of the office and person of the Secretary-General for the examination of international tensions. Mr. Hammarskjold's repeated efforts to help remove sorne of the specific sources of tension in the Middle East have always received, and wilI continue to encounter, Israel's whole-hearted co-operation. Second, we understand that the problem before us is that of compliance with the general armistice agreements. This is an important international objective. Each agreement is defined in its first article as an indispensable step towards the restoration of peace. In their preambles they calI upon certains En faire des déterminées coopération bien celui général. ments ", 3. In the meamime, grave event~ outside the purview of this discussion have increased the perils of conflict beyond any measure or degree heretofore known. In order to save security in the Midd~e East it is necessary to do more than is envisaged here. But that which is envisaged here might 'well sen'e as a valuable contribution. The Government of Israel advocates early measures to l'l'store the operation of the gencra! armistice agreements to their full integrity. Everything provided for in those agreements should be literally and meticulously observed. There is reason to fear, as many speakers have noticed, that wide gaps have arisen in their structures so that their basic stability is threatened. 4. The Gm'errunent of Israel will be prepared to engage the attention of the Secretary-General to sorne of the questions arising from these imperfections. These questions can be formulated objectively and without any controversial spirit: (a) Docs each party feel at this moment that it is exercising the right to its security and freedom from fear of attack, as provided in article 1 of each agreement? (b) Is it fully understood that signatory Governments are resppnsible for preventing crossings cf the demarcation lines or infiltration, or marauding or violence for any purpose whatsoever? (c) Are practices being maintained by any party on land or by sea which the Security Council has defined to be in violation of the general armistice agreements? (d) Are aIl parties fully aware of their mandatory obl~g~tions un~er the articles calling for conferences of tevision cr rev!ew? (e) Has enough been done to put into practice the article i)f one of the agreements which would open up access to the Holy Places and to cultural and educational centres in the Jerusalem area? (f) Are there concentrations of troops in any defensive area which exceed the limits prescribed in the relevant artic!ee of the Armistice Agreement? These are some of the questions ta which any party might l.egitimatcly draw the attention of the appropriate United Nations aU~~'..>.rir;i 5. If, as we have reason to fear, such breaches do exist in the citadel of these agreements, i.hen the agreements are not in effective operation and measures should be taken to restore their integrity. 7. soviétiques) est d'armistice arabes dernièrement tine.

The Security Council has before 1t the question of the compliance with the general amâstice agreements between Israel and the Arab States and with the resolutions recently adopted by the Secul'ity Council on the Palestine question. 8. The Soviet delegation shares the view that the Security Council shollid keep incessant watch on the way In which its decislOns are being camed out, especially in those areas in wmch a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security may easily arise. Consequently, we have no objection to the prineiple on which the United States draft resolution is based especially since the dmft is basically acceptable to a!l the countries immediately concerned. 8. aussi, relâche surtout des nationales. aux Etats-Unis, directement quant 9. In our opinion, it would be appropriate for the Security Couneil to invite the Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the extent to which both the armistice agfPpments and the relevant SecU!ity Couneil resolutions are being camed out by the parties. Such a mission may be helpful in the stl.dy of the situation in the area of the demarcation line between Israel and the AraL States. Wc also consider that it would be appropriate for the Security Council to empower the Secretary-General of the United Nations to reach agreement with the parties concerning the adoption and implementation of such me:>...l!ures as might he needed to reduce tensions along the armistice demarcation lines. 9. invit~ laquelle d'annistice sécurité. situation démarcation. estimons charger Nations l'adoption nécessaires démarcation 10. We are, however, fuEy in agreement with those who consider that aIl the measures adopted in tms area to relieve the existing tension should be carried out only by agreement with the parties concerned and with due regard to their interests. 10. vue appliquées actuelle avec intérêts. Il. We deem it essential to stress the importance of this provision because certain Western Powers have recently developed a pronounced tendency, on the pretext of preventing an Arab-Israel war, to work out plans for direct anned intervention in the affairs of the Arab States, in violation of their sovereign rights. l'importance nous dentales plans affaires verains venir 12. In this connexion, 1 should like to draw the attention of members of the Security Couneil to the report which appeared in the Press-and not in the membres parues 13. There are various other reports indicating that not only English but United States forces, too, are being transferred to this area. ln particular, there is infonnation-widely publicized in the Press-that the United States Sixth Fleet has been ordered to patrol the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea along the Arab and Israel coasts and that detachments of the United States Marines have been sent to reinforce it. 14. It is also known that simultaneously with this activity, in February and March of this year, a series of consultations was held in Washington between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France regarding separate action in the Near and Middle East, as a result of which, as everyone knows, the position in the area has deteriorated. 15. Furthennore, at the initiative of the French Government, a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Mairs of the United States, the United Kingdom and France is to be held in May. That conference, we are told, is also going to discuss the :::'tuation in the countries of the Near and Middle East. So far as we know, representative!3 of the countries in that area have not bee'n invited to the conference. Thus, the affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East are to be discussed and settled without the participation of the parties immediately concerned in these mattersthat is to say, the countries in that area. Such a procedure, and any other steps that may be taken without the participation of the Near Eastern States, cannot possibly help to reduce tension in the area. To decide any question without the participation of the parties concerned is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 16. The Soviet delegation continues to he of the opinion that any action affecting the interests of the countries of the Near East must be disct!SSed and decided with the participation of these countries and with due regard to their interests. We also wish to emphasize that questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security in the Near and Middie East cannot be discussed outside the United Nations but must be considered in the first place by the Security Council, which, under the United Nations Charter, bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. 17. In view of these considerations. and taking also into account the opinions on the United States draft resolution [8/3562] expressed at meetings of the Security Council by the parties concerned, the dele- 18. For these reasons, we propose in our amendments that the words "after ùiscussion" in operative paragraph 3 should be replaced by the words "after concordance". 19. We aIso propose that the words "and in the defensive areas" should be deleted from paragraph 3 (b ), which speaks of full freedom of movement for observers along the armistice demarcation lines and in the demilitarized zones. This amendment is intended to meet the wishes expressed at previous meetings of the Couneil by the representatives of the countries concerned. The inclusion in the United States draft resolution of vague reference to defensive areas might unduly extend the functions of inspection and be interpreted as intervention in the domestic affairs of States. 1 do not exclude the possibility that it might be enough merely to accept the amendment which the United States representative proposed this morning, namely, that the draft resolution should state explicitly that in this case the term "defensive areas" applies to the arcas dcnncd in the amlistice agreements, if this amendment will satisfy the parties concerned. 20. We also propose that operative paragraph 1 should be made more specifie. If that paragraph were adopted in the form proposed by the United States delegation it would, in our opinion. force the Security Council to decide, prematurely and without a thorough study, that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning compliance with the armistice agreements and the Security Council's resolutions is likely to endanger international peace and security. We consider that the Council should first hear the Secretary-General's report on his return from his visit to the countries in the Near East and the report of the Chief of Staff, General Burns: only then should it voice its conclusions about the situation in the area and say whether or not the situation with regard to compliance with the armistice agreements and the Security Council's resolutions is such that it is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This is the purpose of our amendment to operative paragraph 1. 21. We also propose that mention of the Security Coundl's resolution of 24 November 1953 [8/3139/ Rev. 2J and 29 March 1955 [8/3378] should also he 23. In conclusion, we should also like to stress 'that, in agreeing to the adoption of this or any other draft resolution, the USSR delegation is of the opinion, first of all, that any activities which the Secretary-General empowered to take with a view to reducing international tension in the area should be taken within the framework of the armistice agreements and that they should be strictly in accord with the national interests of the countries in the region.

It unfortunate, to my mind, that, alone of aIl the speakers whom we have so far heard, the representative of the Soviet Union has seen fit to go outside the immediate and practical scope of the proposai now before us. If the Council were to cl ~bate the rcsponsibilities and actions of other countries in the Middle Eastern area, therc would be much to be said. Such a far-ranging debate in the present context would certainly not advance our present aim, which is the relaxation of tension along the demarcation Hnes between Israel and the Arab States. l, for one, do not propose to follow Mr. Sobolev along the Hne he has taken, tempting thoue:h this mav be. 1 prefer to maintain the selfdenyIng ordinance which the Council has imposed on itself during the discussion of this particular item and to do nothing which will imperil the practical and helpful step which we hope to take as a consequence of the United States draft resolution [S/3562]. 25. 1 reserve my right ta speak at a later stage, if necessary, on the subject of the Soviet Union amendments [S/3574]. 1 will only observe that our Soviet colleague seems to have taken a sledgehammer to crack some of the nuts to which he takes objection in the United States draft resolution.

:Refere recogmzmg th <: representative of Iran, let me say that in my opildon the debate thus far has been a model of what a debate on a very serious subject like this should he. As the representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 will certainly try to do everything that 1 can to maintain that tone. Therefore, 1 will confine myself to a simple denial that the United States is engaged in any improper activity, militaristic or unilateral or both, and to expreaing regret that sueb an intemperate note should have been ,truck. 1! ~ 1 1 ! 1 28. From the turn which the discussion has taken it is evident that the Council was right in prolonging its deliberations; as a consequence the parties had an opportunity of asking for the particulars concerning the purpose and scope of the draft resolution which they wanted to know and, similarly, its author was able to add the necessary exp!anations and to dispel whatever misunderstanding may have existed concerning the draft. 29. 1 should also like to say that my delegation never entertained any doubts about the United States delegation's intentions: on the contrary, we were aware that this happy initiative was prompted by good faith and by the wish to reduce the growing uneasiness in that part of the world. Indeed, it. is clear from the dis.cussion that the ever-worsening situation along the demarcation lines in Palestine and the growing number of incidents in the area make it imperative to take steps to reduce the tension particularly in the neighbourhood ûf the demarcatiûn Iines; and a furtheI' l'easûn fûI' action is the fact that the existing machinery has not proved effective, despite the praiseworthy efforts of the Chief of the Truce Observation Commission. Hence it is surely proper that the Council should not wait for the incidents to degenerate into large-scale hostilities; constructive measures must he taken to restore peace and calm in this critical region of the Middle East. parler De la soupçons ce 30. 1 cannot help remarking in passing, however, that it would he a mistake to exaggerate the situation and to speak of the imminent possibility of war in the Middle East. Such statements would have the effect of aggravating an already serious situation and in particular of strengthening the suspicions of one camp concerning the intentions of another. That, of course, would not serve the cause of peace and tranquillity in the area. 31. We have confidence in the peaceful intentions of the leaders of the Arab countries and we are convinced that, with the wisdom they have shown in the pasi;, they will refrain from aggravating the situation. We are also inclined to think that the leaders of Israel will never permit themselves to he swayed by the extremist elements which are urging the country to launch sacalled military operations-operations which wou1d he 31. pacifiques persuadés comme J'aggravation enclins jamais s'efforcent 33. Having listened to the United States representative's explanations, my delegation considers the United States draft resolution to be constructive. It caUs for fresh efforts to ensure better compliance with the provisions of the armistice agreements and so to remove the causes of friction along the demarcation lines and in the demilitarized zones. Moreover, no one is better qualified than the Secretary-General to carry out this important mission, for not only is he, as head of the United Nations Secretariat, more familiar than anybody else with the complexity of the problems involved, but also he possesses great wisdom and objectivity and enjoys in the Middle East a prestige which has been yet further enhanced since his felicitous visit to the area. The successful outcome of his recent visit to Peking and the subsequent release of the American prisoners encourage us to entrust this mission to him and to hope that his efforts will be crowned with success. 34. My .delegation wishes to add that this attitudp. in no way indicates any lessening of our continued confidence in the person of General Burns, te whose untiring efforts it is in part to be attributed that the situation in Palestine has not grown worse and become an even greater danger to world peace. 35. We are very happy to note that the representatives of the Arab countries have emphasized their desire to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the accom· plishment of his mission. Naturally, we have no illusions and do not expect observance of the armistice agreements and compliance with the Council's resolutions to he in themselves sufficient to afford a permanent solution of the remaining difficulties in the way of a lasting peace in the area. We know that lasting peace cannot be re-established in this part of the world as long as the parties do not address themselves directIy to the source of the present troubles, foremost among which is the tragic plight of one million Palestine refugees. We are nevertheless convinced that if we succeed in saving the peace and, in particular, if we use every means at our disposaI to assist the Secretary- General in carrying out the measures provided for in the draft resolution, we shall have made it possible to eliminate the remaining obstacles in the way of a permanent solution of the Palestine problem. 37. We have confidence in Mr. Hammarskjold and we are certain that what has heen said in this debate will help him to select the appropriate measures. It will then, of course, he the Security Council's function, in the discharge of its responsibility, to study the measures proposed by the Secretary-General and to take decisions which will restore tranquillity to the region and prepare the ground for a permanent solution of the Palestine question. 37. apportées à manente 38. le délégation stade et, représentant résolution. 38, With reference to the USSR representative's amendments [8/3574] my delegation wishes to reserve its right to speak at a later stage, after having examined the amendments and especiaJ.ly after having heard the comments of the sponsor of the resolution, the United States representative.

ln a statement which, it seemed to me, as it did to the President, went beyond. the scope of this discussion, the Soviet Union representative chose to refer to the actions of my Govemment. 1 should not like my silence to he interpreted as acceptance oi what he said. AlI States Members of the United Nations have the right to consult each other on topies of common interest. There is nothing in the Charter to prevent their doing so, and such consultations have not caused or aggravated tension in any part of the world. On ; the contrary, it was the existence of the tension which 39. qui, du soviétique gouvernement. être a des questions leur créé monde. tension Aussi, cadre sentant le actuellement. Etats-Unis sentant voudrait Il' made suffi consultations necessary. As the President suggested, therefore, 1 shall confine myself to the subject ! of the present discussion. The remarks of the Soviet a '1:; Union representative are wholly unrelated to the draft 1 resolution proposed to the Council br the United States ! delegation, which is now under discussion. 1 shalI not l, allow myself, any more than my colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom alIowed them- 1 selves, to he dragged into an argument of the kind in 1 which the Soviet Union representative was trying to 1 involve ua. ii !, ' 40. moment, amendements discussion. 40. That is all 1 wish to say for the moment; 1 reserve the right to speak again when the Soviet Union arnendments are heing discussed. 1i 1 1

The President would like to know whether any memher of the Council or any one of the parties ta the armistice agreements wishes to speak at this time. 41. savoir parties parole

1 heg leave to speak tomorrow. 42. Je 46. The mt amendment goes back into the past without accomplishing anything constructive thereby. 47. The second amendment is fallacious because it is clear that failure ta comply with three unanimous resolutions of the Security Council is, in the words of the resolution, "likely" to endanger peace. Surely it i5 not an exaggeration to say that non-compliance with three unanimous resolutions is likely to endanger peace. It seems none too strong. 48. The third amendment seems to us to put the cart before the horse. Obviously, there must be discussion before there is concordance. To say that concordance must precede discussion seems to us to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3, as drafted, clearly meé:i.nf: that agreement of the parties will be necessary for the adoption of measures for reducing tensions. 49. The words "in the defensive areas ", as now included in the draft resolution, make it quite clear that the defensive areas are those areas provided for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet representative's fourth amendment is unnecessary, 1 submit, and 1 understood him to say that he would not insist upon it. 50. The objectives of the draft resolution have, 1 think, been made clear beyond any shadow of a doubt. The draft resolutiüti i8 addressed ta a clear and present danger. Our sole intent is to dispatch the Secretary- General to the area so as to reduce the growing tension. We believe that the present text of the draft resolution is sufficient and, as every member here knows, it was very carefu!1y drafted. We also believe that the Governments in the area are prepared to accept the text as it is, and we think that the debate that has taken place here today and on preceding days has made that clear. As the sponsor of the draft resolution, therefore, we believe that it is desirable not ta accept amendments. The meeting rose al 4.35 p.rn. Printed in France Priee: $ U.S. 0.15; 1/- (or equivalent in