S/PV.721 Security Council

1 wish to thank the President for letting me speak a second time on the question before the Council today. ln response to his appeal 1 shaH confine myself to T('levant and non-controversial questions. 2. My delegation noted with great satisfaction that in his statement at the Council's meeting on 28 March 1956, the United States representative said: "... 1 quite understand the desire of the -epresentatives of Egypt and Syria for clarity, their ùesire to understand thoroughly, and in sharp focus, just exactly what the intent is. Let me say to both of them that if 1 were in their place, that is what 1 should want" [718th meeting, para. 53]. ..1-. 1 will dl'al first with the answers to our questions. 1';:[, first question, as you know, referred to operative paragraph :l of tIll' Jraft resolution, and more particularly to the IIlt'asures which the Secretal'J- Gencral, aftcr discussion with the parties, considers wouId .l'duce the l'xisting tensions along the armistice demarcation lincs. It appears from Mr. Lodge's reply, and indccd from the draft resolution itself, that these ll1easures w: l \ hl' taken within the framework of the armisticc ~ ,recments. At the morning meeting on 3 April ::156 [ï19th meeting], Mr. Lodge made ckar that the rneasures would be entirely within the framcwork of the general armistice agreements and the rcsolutions under rcferencc. 5. Tht' second question also rderred to paragraph 3, but more specifically to sub-paragraph (a) which pro\-idcd for the "withdrawal of the forces" of the parties from the annisticc demai'cation !ines. Mr. LodgeOs reply is very gratifying because it is obvious to us that the parties could only reach agreement on this question if the withdrawal of forces was possible and certainl)' would not be possible in ail cases and could not in any event be carried out in the case of ail the annistice agreements. Mr. Lodge-I apologize for quoting him again-said that "such measures would of course be applicable where by agreement between the Secretary'-General and the parties they consider that conditions warrant them" [ïl9th meeting, para. 39]. .\S a matter of fact, this question does not directl)' concern Egypt, because, as you know, we have ourselves made proposais designed to secure a separation of the anned forces of the parties. 6. The third question referred to freedom of movement for obsen'ers along the annistice demarcation lines and in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas. 1 note Mr. Lodge's reply, which coincides with our own interpretation. Indeed, he subscribed to our interpretation of the sentence, namely, that the demilitarized zones and the defensive areas are those defined in the armistice agreements. In fact, he said: "The references in the draft resolution to the demi!itarized zones and defensive areas are naturally those defined in the annistice agreements" [719th meeting, para, 39]. 8. The members )f the Council who spoke after Mr. Lodge's last statement have expressed general agreement with him on the purpose of Ml'. Hammarsk- Jold's mission. 1 would refer particularly to the United Kingdom representative, whom ML Lodge has quoted, and the Yugoslav, Iranian and USSR representatives. Ml'. Sobolev has ('ven proposed amendmtnts [S /3574] evidently intended to darify further certain point~ in the United States draft resolution and to improve it. Sorne of these amendments corre~ponded to the questions we had raised. 9. Once more 1 should like to emphasize that the Egyptian authorities are always ready to co-operate ;with General Burns and with ML Hammarskjold in the scarch for suitable measures likely to l'l'duce and ta rIiminate the tension on the demarcation lines. They haH consistently done so. In fact, after the Gaza incident and following the resolution adopted by the Secllrity Council on 29 March 1955 [S/337R], General Burns had made certain proposaIs. Wc have cooperated with him and have done everything in our pO\...er to ensure the successful implementation of these proposaIs. The members of the Council are also aware that the Egyptian authorities proposed a practical measure to reduce tension along the armistice demar- 10. Morl.'ovl'r. as 1 have alrt'ady had occasion to statt', illY ddeg-ation is pn'pal"('d to t'xaminc any proposai from tht" Secn'!ar"-(;f'llNa1 and (~eneral Burns to n,duC(" tension along the annistin' dl'marcation lines within tht' fl'i\nWwOl'k of thl' GfOtlfOml Annistin' Agn"t'ml'nt ht'twt'I'n f:gypt and israrl. 1 Il. We \~ ish the SeCl"('tary-Gcneral sucees! in thr del!- ('ait' mission tn Il(' Ctltrustt'd to him by the Council. Wc for our part will ..to e\'crything in our power to heIp him, Il\' honrst co-opemtion and full assistanct', to 3('hil'\'t' the purposl' fixt'd in the draft rt'solution. 12, Ikfon' concluding, 1 should like to dispel any misgivinRS which tht' l"('pl"('~entativt' of Iran may havt' with "'RanI to Ill\' countr,,'s attitude. Yesterdav he Sc'\id:' .. . .. We have confidence in the peaccful intenticms of the leaders of tile Arab countries and we are con- \;ncro Ihat, with the wisdom they have shown in the past, they will refrain from aggravating the situation [720th matir/g, para. 31]. i should like to a.ffirm here that Egypt has no aggressive intentions, ln conclusion, l wish to associate myself ,,"-ith the words spoken yesterday by th;: representative of Lebanon: .. On this solemn occasion 1 should like to reAffinn my country's persistent resolve to support any action ;"' ~he United Nations for ~he maintenance of international peace l'll1d security" [719th meeting, 13. MI', SHUKAIRY (Syria): Now that wc are coming to the end of the debate, 1 feel it is my dut ta o..-press our appreciation to MI'. Lodge for the ability he has displayed, not only as President of this Cauncil but a~ as sponsor of the ciraft resolution [8/3562 and. Corr. 1]. His c-xplanations are marked with clari~' of mind worthy of our praise. Of particular importance is the statement he made yesterday catt'~orically denying "that the United States eng-aged in any improper activity, militaristic or uni- lateral or bath ,. [720th meeting, para, 26]. We hope and trust that the United States will continue in this policy. and that other Powers will follow this commendable path. staternent [71Bth meeting1 1 deli- myself to preliminary observations At this meeting 1 propose to deal H. In my first berately confined co..nd clarification.<. S~eOoJ S~pp~TlWnt No. 3. 1S. The task now before the Council is limited in nature. As presented to the Council, the question before us is a specific item arising out of a general item. The title, as fonnulated by the Council, reads: .. Status of compliance givell to the general annistice agreements and the resolutions of the Security Council adopted dur- ing the past year". The measures suggested, as wc understand it, are again limitl'd to a thorough investigation of the l'xtent of the implrmentation cf the armistice agreements and the said resolutions. The aim, as wc n~ad it, is likewisr limited to the relaxation of tension on thl' armistice demarcation lirH'. This is our undf'rstanding of the matter now I)l'fon' th:' COllncil. Jh. At tlu' outset, 1 must state that we WeIc(lfllC the idea of a thorough inquiry into the observance of the gC'nrral armistice agreer.lents. It is now common knowiedge that the agreements have heen violated on l'very occasion. Scarccly a day passes without a hreach of the provillions of the annilltice agreements. It wouId seem that they had been concluded only to be violated. 1 shall not attempt at this stage to expose the perpetrator of those violations. Thl' reports of the r.hief of Staff, the verdicts of tll(' Mixed Armistice (:ommissions and the rl'solutions of 1!J1' Sl'cllrity Council disclose where the guilt lies. Vet, one central factor shoulcl not escape ollr attention: "1' Arah Govl"'rmnc'nts havI"' m'ver hcpn censured or condemned for any military attack sincc the annistice agreements wl"'re signed. None of the fOllr Mixed Armistice Commissions lias l'ver passed a judg-cml"'nt against the Arah-armed forCl's for any raid or military operation. Thus it is only natural that a suggestion for an investigative visit by the Secretary-General will raise no objection on our part. Investigation will ccrtainly reveal where the responsibility rests. We have nothing to fear, wc have nothing to conceal, and we arc ready-here in thl"' CounciJ or on the spot --to set out ail the relevant faets. 17. However, 1 should emphasize that the matter lInder discussion is not only a matter of im·estigation. The facts, the data and ail the pl"'rtinent material on th,:, question are fully in hand. The reports of the Chief of Staff and the records of the Security Council have left nothing hidden or unproved. Likewise, the armistice agreements themselves are exhaustive and comprehensive. There are no gaps and there are no Joopholes in the agreements, as alleged yesterday in sorne of the statements made belore the Council. There is no complaint to be made about the provisions of the agreements themselves. These agreements are not responsible for the present tension. Implementation, rather than investigation, is the core of the whole matter. Our emphasis on this point is intended to 18. In this regard, we have certain suggestions to offer. To begin with, it must be n0ted that the annistice demarcation lines have been violated on several occasions by the regular forces of a party 1 need not mention for the moment-a party to the annistice agreements. The Security Council has in due course adopted resolutions and recommendations. 19. The United States draft resolution makes special reference to the resolutions of the Security Council and urges their implementation. It becomes proper and adequa te, therefore, for our Secretary-General to suggest those preventive measures that will ensure the immu- nity-and 1 stress this word-of the dernarcation lines against any violation by military forces. Those preventiœ measures, 1 suggest, should render any party, whoever it mal' be, incapable of committing any aggres- sion. This is a major aspect of the very conception of the armistice. 20. The four armIstIce agreements contain a general prûvision which states that the basic prupose of the armIstIce demarcation line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shaH not move. The purpose of the Annistice Demarcation Line is here strictly related to prohibiting anned forces from crossing the line. This is the basic purpose of the general armistice agreements. Now, if this is the basic purpose, we a~e afraid that we must declare before this C,:mncil that this purpose has been defeated. The armistice demarcation lines have been violated by the anned forces of a party to the annistice agreements, the name of which 1 need not mention. The Security Council is cognizant of this facto It becomes obvious that what remains for the Secretary- General is to undertake a survey of the effective measures that will arres~ the armed forces of this party from carrying out any raid or military operation in violation of the general armistice agreements. To our mind, this is the first objective of the Secretary-General's mission as set out in the draft resolution before the Council because the basic purpose of the general armis- tice agreements, as expressIl' worded in the agreements themselves, is to avoid the crossing of the demarcation lines by armed forces. 22. régions constatera navale, Convention d'armistice Il violations en violations nelles. installées dans militaires. n'est violations, y 22. In the defcnsive area, similar violations are committed. In Lake Tiberias, for instance, the Secretary-General will find a naval force in violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. The Mixed Armistic~ Commission has entered its verdict on this violation. Therefor~, the point is not to inquire into the violation but to r.;move it, wherever it may lie, and ta do sa in every physical sense. Thesc are standing viola'r:ons and not occasional raids. These are violations that are stationed, so to speak, in the area. Those areas should be c!eared of any military establishments and military forces. The object of the Secretary-General's visit is not only to witnes:; and to testify to ihose violations but to propose rneasures to put an end ta them. 23. This is our analysis of the United States draft r::::;!.'lution. Certain specific points, however, caU for a word in passing.. 2:3. résolution certains 24. avec pertinentes. déclarés propositions tension si mettre 24. The preamble of the draft resolution is carefully worded, and the resolutions recaIIed are in their proper context. It is worth-while to note that we have dec1ared our readiness ta implement tho~e resoluti.:ms and to examine the proposais of the Chief of Staff for the relaxation of tension. We are not at fault if the efforts of the Chief of StL;f!' ta lmplement them did not h('ar fruit. 25. In operative paragraph 1, we note with great approval the ment:on of the four armistice agreements in reference to one situation. It has always been our contention that theœ is only one armistice in Palestine and that there is only one armistice demarcation Jine. We have always advocated that, although there are four armistice agreements, the armistice itself is indivisible. and any violation in one sector is in reality a violation of the whole. Likewise, tension in one area means tension in aIl the areas of the armistice. 1 have no doubt that the Secretary-General will keep that general picture of operative paragraph 1 in his mind when he proposes measures for the relaxation of tension. 25. graphe d'armistice avons lin d'armistice. y est cn dans auxquelles suadé du proposera 26. As to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution, we believe that wc have expressed in general terms our views on the meaSllrf'~ that would tend to reduce the existing tension along the armistice demarcation lines. We ha\'e listened with great care 26. pensons sur elle avons 27. As to the Soviet amendments [8/3574], we are glad to note that they merit the attention of the Council. They tend to improve the origiI,:!1 text and facilitate the task of the Secretary-General.. We are grateful to the representative of the Soviet Union for the clarifications he made regardin/S thûse amendments. 28. May 1 now be permitted to comment on certain ideas that appeared in the statement made by the representative of Cuba. In the course of his able analysis of the prevalent situation in Palestine, he said: "It is possible-and 1 throw this idea into the discussion without any polemical intention, simply as a suggestion to the Secretary-General for his conside- ration and study-that it may be necessary for the United Nations itself to guarantee the territorial integrity of the States involved in the dispute. Ways and means will also have to be found of solving the refugee problem, and we consider in this connexion that it would be helpful to obtain reliable data on the numbers of genuine refugees, those who wish to return to Israel and ,hose who hope to settle elsewhere; we feel that this would provide a useful foundation for any type of negotiations" [718th meeting, para. 12]. 29. Without in any way questioning the noble motives onf the representative of Cuba, 1 must make it cIear, for purposes of record in the Council, that the territorial integrity of the Arab States is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the territorial situation in Palestine, and nothing more. The Arab States are parties only as regards the problem of PalestiI,e and within the ambit of the Palestine area. Thus the United Nations has never been seized of the question of the territorial integrity of the Arab States. This is not the issue; the issue is Palestine and not the Arab States. Again, territorial integrity within Palestine can only be guaranteed when the territorial situation in Palestine becomes legitimate, but not before that. 30. As to the question of refugees, we must state that the term "genuine refugees "-and this is the term used by the representative of Cuba-is not warranted. AlI refugees are refugees entitled to repatriation. 31. principe point Nous par apporter question problème recourant sation qu'il 31. Further in this statement, the representative of Cuba enunciated a very important principle of general policy. He said: "We must no. forget that the only pos~"lible use of force which can he sanctioned by our Charter, by the rules of international law and by morality is the use of force to preserve peace. This is a truth we cannat disregard, and we must shape our actions accordingly" [718th meeting, para. 13]. We cannat disagree with this general fonnulation of the rcpresentative of Cuba. Yet an important qualification is necessary. In the Palestine qu~stion, just as in any intcTnatio;,al problem, peace cannot be aLi:;ved by the use of force, whether it is a United Nations force or any other force, except when force aims at establishing justice. When force is used to defeat fundamental principles of justice, to deny rights or to destroy national existence, peace cannot he achic\·ed. It must he borne in mind, once and for aIl, that the Cnited Nations can maintain peace in Palestine on!y by justice, and not by force. recour~ fondamentaux l'existence faut l'Organisation paix 32. Unis devons déposé façon la de dis pleine expression. Palestine Unies, la elle au sont questions si régional ne lesquelles Etats-Unis sation une dehors 32. One aspect of the United States draft resolution deserves our great appreciation. We must con- gratulate the United States delegation for the draft resolution and particularly the President of the Council, the United States representative, for his presentation of it; it is a step in the right direction. We submit that this step is a re-entry to the United Nations, and 1 say "re-entry to the United Nations" with full meaning, purpose and emphasis. For a time the Palestine question was treated in the suburbs, so to speak, outside the United Nations. If the Palestine question is one of international concern. it must he deait with on an international level: in' the Security Council, when questions, of security are at stake, or in the General Assembly, when political matters are at issue. If on the other hand the Palestine question is one of a regional concern, not of an international concern, then the great Powers must keep their hands off. It is for these reasons that we trust that this step by the United' States will always he on the high road leading back to the United Nations, divorcing all policies and aIl actions made outside our universal Organization. 33. Finally, may 1 assure the SeclIrity Council that the Secretary-General is leaving in the nex.. few days not only on the strength of the draft resolution before us, but with our best wishes. When he arrives in our land, he will be received with a warm we!come, with the best wishes for success. 33. c'est la vœux, jours. chaleureux de 34. soviétiques)

The Soviet dele- 35. Our amendment on this point had exactly the same purpose as the new version of the United States draft resolution, namely to make the wording more precise. We merely approached the matter from a different angle. We feIt that it would be better to eliminate altogether a vague reference to defensive areas which might lend itself to excessively wide interpretation. 36. If the United States representative and aIl the members of the Sœurity Council prefer to retain the reference to the defensive areas but so to amend it as to refer to the defensive areas as defined in the armistice agreements, the Soviet delegat:on will have no objection to this and we shall not press our amendment, the purpose of which was the same, namely to make the wording clearer on this very important point. 37. The purpose of another Soviet amendment is likewise to clarify the wording of paragraph 3, which refers to the measures which the Secretary-General must try to bring about in order to reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines. We thought it necessary to make this paragraph state cIearly that the Secretary-General should endeavour to secure the adoption of measures which would be acceptable to both parties to this conflict or situation. 38. In his statement on the Soviet amendments yesterday, Mr. Lodge said that the draft resolution definitely took into account the fact that agreement between the parties was absolutely essential if measures for reducing the tension were to be carried out. There is thus no disagreement on substance among us. Both the United States delegation and we ourseIves consider that if measures for the reduction of tension are to be carried out, agreement between the parties participating in their implementation is necessary. The difference consists merely in the facthat we consider that we ought to say so plainly in the draft resolution. The draft resolution, however, does not say so cIearly. It does not say in simple, plain language that for the implementation of the appropriate measures it is necessary that the parties directly concerned in their implementation should agree to them. 39. If we agree on this point, why not amend the wording of the draft resolution-before it is adopted- 40. Another of our amendments says that it wouId he advisable ta mention in the draft resolution other resolutions previously adopted by the CounciI on this question and directly related to it. After aIl, the purpose of the draft resolution is ta request the Secretary-General to undertake on the spot "a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four general armistice agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference". In other words, there is a direct reference to the Council's resolutions mentioned in the preamble. Anything outside that reference, as it were, does not commit the Secretary-General. 41. Why, therefore, should we not clarify the point and make it the Secretary-General's duty also to look into the extent to which certain other resolutions are being complied with? 1 have in mind in particular two resolutions referred (0 in our amendment: the resolution of 24 November 1953 [S/3139/Rev.2] and the resolution of 29 March 1955 [S/3378]. Why this should be undesirable 1 fail to understand. 42. We have also introduced an amendment to paragraph 1 which would seem to be one of the basic paragraphs of the draft resolution. Paragraph 1 reads: .. Considers that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the armistice agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". 43. 1 would draw the Council's attention to the fact that the end of that paragraph is a quotation from the Charter showing that the Security Council attaches very great importance to the situation in the Middle East, in the Palestine area, and it states specifically that continuance of this situation may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. -t3. dernière Charte, sécurité affirmerait prolonge, de 44. 1 wonder precisely on what grounds we should introduce such a resolution in the Securify Council at the present moment. Have we heard the parties directly concerned which have played their part in creating this situation? No, we have not heard these parties. Nor did we hear a report from the United 44. disposons-nous au Avons-nous cette Non, entendu dirige cette tels et ~ations organ headed by General Burns on the present sItuation in this area. 1 do not think we have at our disposaI facts which the Security Council could analyse and take as the basis for a decision which would have serious consequences. And we have heard no report -4-5. Then why is the Security Council in such a hurry to take a decision of this kind? What is our purpose? 1 do not think such a decision is necessary before we can send the Secretary-General to Palestine and empower him to carry out the mission recommended in this draft resolution. To send the Secretary-General to Palestine and ask him to survey the situation, we do not have to take a decision of the type which the Security Council would, in reality, be obliged to consider later on, namely a decision as to what measures must be adopted in order to ease and improve the dangerous situation in Palestine. AlI that is needed in order to send the Secretary-General there is to note that the armistice agreement'! are not being complied with satisfactorily, that the situation in this area is unsatisfactory, ,"Id that it is necessary for the Secretary- General to go there in order to evaluate the situation on the spot and report to the Security Council. 46. Would not the right procedure be for the Security Council to receive that report and to hear the parties which have contributed to the creation of this situation, belore making its own appraisal and deciding whether the continuance of this situation is really likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and, what is most important of aIl. what must he done to improve that situation? 4i. The Security Council is not taking note of the existence of a dangerous situation merely to file the matter in its official records and do no more about it. If the Security Council takes a decision of this type is ohliged to adopt measures of sorne sort. Yet the sponsors of the draft resolution do not at present envisage the adoption of any measures except that of asking the Secretary-General to give a survey of what happening in the area and then of discussing the situation. 48. If the Security Couneil does not intend to discuss DOW a situatio1l the continuance of which, as stated in the draft resolution, "is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security", the Security Council bas no intention whatever of taking any measures now for improving this situation, why should such a paragraph he necessary in the draft resolution? The question inevitably arises whether the paragraph is perhaps necessary because it is to be used at a later stage for the justification of measures taken in a different context and by-passing the Security Council. If it is needed for such a purpose, the Soviet delegation would not wish to take part in the adoption of the paragraph which might he used as an excuse for l'eparate action. l think that other members of the Security Council, too. would hardly agree to that. 49. The Soviet delegation therefore proposes that the pre~ent draft resolution, which sets itself limited purposes and tasks, should confine itself to the statement 50. gation résistent rien en partant, la plus sécurité 50. 1 must therefore say that the reasons adduced by the United States delegation for rejecting our amendments will not withstand criticism. Our amendments do not impair the draft resolution but, on the contrary, improve it by making its wording more concise and the task of the Secretary-General consequently clearer and more deflnite. They aIso make more precise the position of the Security Council in this extremely important question. 51. l'allteur Conseil amendements tique point de 51. 1 therefore again ask the sponsor of the draft resolution and the members of the Securit'y Council to give their attention to the amendments introduced by the Soviet delegation and in examining them to ask themselves to what extent they improve the Council's draft resolution.

As the representative of the Soviet Union has just made an appeal bath to the sponsor of the draft resolution under discussion and to the other members of the Council, 1 feel 1 should infor.tll the President that if he wishes to speak now to clear up some of the points mentioned by the f('presentative of the Soviet Union, 1 should have great pleasure in standing down to allow him to do so. But if he wishes to speak at some other time,1 am prepared to speak now. 52. Etant soviétique du tour tenant cissements Président parole 53. la j'ai propose seront représentant la y sairement

1 appreciate the courtesy of the representative of Peru. However, there are three other speakers on the list, and 1 propose to follow the normal practice of waiting until they have finished before 1 speak. It will therefore he entirely in order for the representative of Peru to speak now. 1 might add that the fact that there are three more speakers on the list makes it clear that we will have an afternoon meeting.

At the opening of this debate [717th meeting] my delegation expressed its general approval of the draIt rC'solution submitted by the United States representativC' (S/3562 and Corr. 1], and reserved the right to givc its views on the details of the draft resolution after hearing the statements of the parties concerned. The time has now come when my delegation must take a final position on the draft resolution as a whole and not only on its spirit and purposes. We have much pleasure in doing sa. 54. Au Pérou du réservant de désirable moment se fonne le 55. Of course, my delegation deeply appreciates the high tone of the debate and the value of the contributions of the representatives of the countries concerned. Although from the tide of the questior "'('fore us and from the very text of the United States ct....ft resolution, 55. une débat représentants la 56. That being the case, there was no occasion to doubt the importance of the powers to be oonferred upon our Secretary-General-powers limited to conciliation and fact-finding, reminiscent of one of the most important institutions in the Americas namely, the fact-finding commissions and conciliation commissions which have been set up in Latin America. 57. The Secretary-General is going ta seek information to make a report on the situation and at the same time to try to conciliate the parties. 58. In my view, paragraph 3 of the United States draft resolution could hardly be clearer. The Secretary-General is requested to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considers would reduce existing tensions; that means that the terms of reference which we shaH give to the ,Secretary-General are concerned purely with investigation and information. At the same time, it is very noble mission which the Security Council is conferring upon the Secretary-General in preference to taking any of the genera! measures which it could take under the Charter. In a way, the Secretary-General is going to act as an extension of the United Nations in the work of bringing the parties together. The United Nations would prefer to see peace consolidated by the will of the parties and with their co-operation, rather than take measures which, under the Charter, might in certain cases he binding upon the parties l'ven without their consent. 59. 1 think that from this point of view the United States delegation deserves my warmest praise for its proposaI, for it is plain that, in dealing with a given situation, two courses were open to the CounciJ. On ascertaining the facts, before resorting to Article 39 which deals with breaches of the peace-as provided by Article 4D-it might prescribe provisional measures which would be binding on the parties l'ven without their consent, with the pro\'ision that the rejection of or 60. Hence, 1 find that the study we have aIl made, and which 1 too have made with great interest, of the various aspects of the problem, and the exchange of ideas between the parties and the sponsor of the draft resolution, confirm m'y view that in the United States cIraft resolution we have found the best and most impartial course for a survey of the facts, and also the best, most humane and most effective course for the attainment of what we all desire: a rapprochement between the parties; for an agreed peace is obviously better than one which is imposed. 60. nous part blème, les confirme des plus façon, parvenir atteindre: évident imposée. 61. For these l'casons 1 shall gi\-e my enthusiastic support to the United States draft resolution. As a matter of courtesy, and to a certain extent as a legal ohligation in view of the important points which have been discussed, 1 must express my opinion on the amendments submitted by the USSR representative. 1 am glad that the USSR representati\·e does not insist on maintaining his fourth amendment, as the sponsor of the draft resolution the United States representati\-e, in his replies to the questions of the parties, made it cIcar that the term "defensive areas" refers to those defined in the armistice agreements; the whole structure of the draft resolution can be based on nothing else but the armistice agreements, as its sole purpose is to ensure compliance vvith them. 61. siasme courtoisie gation l'importance me sentant M. dements, Unis, intéressées celles D'ailleurs, termes d'assurer 62. 1 also think that the USSR representative might abandon his first amendment, which consists of adding the resolutions of 24 November 1953 and 29 March 1955 to those listed in the United States text. If we are going into th~ matter as thoroug-hly as that, we should have to refer to a great many other resolutions as weIl. For the purposes of this drait resolution we have eno.ugh and to spare with the reference to the three resolutlOns already mentioned in the present United States text. 1 do not consider this point of fundamental importance. 62. soviétique dements, lutions résolutions En peler n'ajouterait que du fondamental. 63. The principal argument in the USSR repres~n­ tative's speech refers to operative paragraph 1 whlch he considers very important, although 1 really do not 63. de dispositif. 64. In the first place, 1 must say with aIl sincerity that when we are dealing with the documents of the Security Council, whieh is indeed a political body, but whose structure, orientation and foundation are legal, it better always to use words with clear meanings rather than those which are slightly vague, as aU negative expressions must, from their very nature, be. "UnsatisfactoI)' situation" is a vague expression on acount of its very grammatical character. What is an unsatisfactory situation? How can we, merely by stating that the situation is unsatisfactory, justify so important a step as sending the Secretary-General, who must abandon his normal duties as the Head of the Secretariat and travel to the Near East, to gather infonnation and to check facts, and 00 propose, or to arrange with the parties, measures for '.uûlpliance with the armistice agreements whieh are the work of the United Nations and which depend on the Orga.1zation? 1 truly believe that an expression which is negative, and therefore vague. couId not justify any snch measure. 65. But jt will be said that the words .. likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" are weighty words, words with a disquieting legal implication, carrying serious consequences as they appear in the Charter, consequences to which, in the absence of an agreement reached under that Article of the Charter where these words are set fOlih in their strictest a.'d most serious meaning, the USSR representative qUl:~ rightly could not agree. 66. But the case is not exactly like that, and, in aIl respect and friendship, 1 would suggest to the USSR representative that he must realize that the position taken by the Council, in undertaking conciliation proceedings through a plenipotentiary, does not imply the taking of any of the measures required for the application of Article 39. Moreover, 1 think that Article 39 cannot he held to be involved in any Council resolution, if it is not expressly invoked. It cannot he said to be implicitly invoked. An article establishing the jurisdiction of the United Nations and the Security Council as provided in Chapter VII, the most important innovation introduced by the United Nations Charter in respect of the United Nations, can never he held to have been invoked, if there is no direct reference, no specific quotation, no indisputable and indubitable reference to the spirit and the letter of Article 39. For measures to he taken-not under Artcile 40 but under the subsequent articles-the Security Council must find 67. Moreover, the expression is in fact taken from other articles refening to conciliation. Yet even so 1 should like to say that the expression-although it is of course used in the United Nations Charter, does not here carry the grave implications it has in Article 39, because the case is different: it is not a breach of the peace, a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. It is a situation whose continuance may possibly-and the United Nations is setting up mediation machinery to ensure that it does not continue--endanger the peace; its continuance would be likely to endanger peace. The draft resolution refers to a possible future contingency, and to ensure that the situation does not continue, the United Nations is introducing conciliation machine!)' in connexion with the annistice, for which it is responsible and compliance with which it has to ensure. 67. dans pense du vité autre contre situation pour entament de donc éventuel, ne procédure relève la 68. 1 do not understand why this sentence should in any way commit any Power to subsequent action. The obligations of the Powers could be derived only, in the first place from an explicit vote, including that of a great Power which has the right to abstain where the others are unanimous-I am not using the word " veto ", because 1 regard the veto as a privilege contrary to the spirit and 1 would even say ta the letter of the Charter. The great Powers have such a right and, in case one of them exercised it, not only would that Power be failing to commit itself but the draft resolution could not he approved. No other measure could be taken without unanimity between the great Powers. 68. question ou pourrait préalable possibilité pourrait constitue lettre droit seulement résolution mesures Puissances 69. So 1 would, with aIl due respect, describe the USSR representative's objection as over-careful and over-prudent. Naturally, my words carry no authority beyond the legal principles on which they are based. 1 am sure that he will receive the same assurance from one who can add to the legal bases for his argument the moral authority derived from his sponsorship of the proposaI. 69. l'Union soulève picion d'autre suis recevra, ments qualité 70. grande Puissance Nous envisageant sommes conscience impondérables moment l'histoire. 70. Moreover, there is one fact of great importance which must be faced, a fact which it is the duty of the representative of a small Power to mention. It is our privilege to exercise a certain impartiality in dealing with matters of peace and war, and to feel sorne awareness of the universal conscience and of public opinion. Public opinion exists, and is the imponderable factor, mentioned by Bismarck, which may be decisive in history. But there is another imponderable factor, a weighty moral factor which public opinion and 71. And 50 l am indulging the hope that, when the case has been put as clearly as possible, the USSR delegation will feel able to withdraw its amendments, and we may adopt unanimously this draft resolution, which is designed ta bring peace to an area where should exist because the very life, comfort, prosperity and the happy future of the peoples concemed demand it. Furthermore, there are groups of human beings who find it inconceivable that peace should not prevail there, when it was from that very region that there came the O1ost sublime message of peace ever proc1aimed to the ages. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.rn. Printed in France Priee: V.S. ~~ 0,20; (or equivalent