S/PV.724 Security Council

1 wish first of ail to join ail my colleagues who spoke here on 29 May [723rd meeting] in paying my compliments to the Secretary- General for the good work he did in the Middle East. My Government is grateful to Mr. Hammarskjold. The four annistice agreements have been reinvigorated ~nd reinforced through his recent mission. This i! an unportant achievement when we remember the deteriorating situation in March and the beginning of April. And when we reflect on the meaning of the annistice Agreements for the future of peace in the Middle East, we have indeed good reason to say that the Secretary- General's achievement was and is an important event. 3. There are several notable features in the Secretary- General's report [8/3596]. In the fust place, he emphasizes the point that the cease-fire clauses in the armistice agreements stood by themselves and were not to be compromised or conditioned by violations, alleged or real, of other clauses of the agreements. Secondly, the Secretary-General pûinted out tbat the cease-fire was -and, of course, is-a Charter obligation, common to an Member States, whatever the interpretations which Govemments might put on or doubts which they might have about the armistice agreements. Thirdly, the Secretary-General was keenly aware not only of the good possibilities in the situation, but also of the inherent limitations. He did not try to attain the impossible and thercby jeopardize what was possible. This clearsighted and self-imposed moderation was a condition of his SUCC~3S. 4. In the circumstances, my delegation has feIt-and 1 must confess, it is no more than a feeling-that no new resolution was necessary. The mandate which we conferred ,on the Secretary-General has not expired. Without a new resolution, it appears to my delegation that the Secretary-General could still continue to give ta the parties concerned the kind of assistance which he has been giving. 1 say this not in criticism of the delegation which has presented the draft resolution, but as a suggestion that the Security Council might, for the time being, let weIl enough alone. 5. Since the delegation of thp. United Kingdom has put before us a draft resolution [8/3600/Rev.l], it remains for me to indicate the attitude of my delegation. The United Kingdom draft resolution has for its main purpose the consolidation of the results of the Secretary- General's mission. Nobody can object to tha.t. So far as this is concerned, the draft resolution, in its main purpose, has the whole-hearted support of my delegation. As to the detailed paragraphs, my delegation reserves its right to examine them carefully when the time comes for that purpose.

As no other member of the Council wishes to speak at this stage, 1 shall now address the Council in my capacity as the representative of YUGOSLAVIA 7. In the fust place, 1 shoulà like to associate my delegation very warmly indeed with the well-deserved tribute that has been paid here to the dedicated, able and, above all, successful manner in which our Secretary-General 9. What the Secretary-General has provided us with is not merely an enumeration of results achieved, however significant, or of practical suggestions for further progress, however useful these suggestions. He has given us a very valuable analysis-a philosophy, one would almost be tempted to say-of the armistice system and of the present Palestine picture as a whole. He has scrutinized with well-nigh scientific precision the various components-Iegal, political, military, psychological and historical-of the armistice system in their mutual relationship and interplay. He has examined the statics and dynamics of the sys.tem, as it were, and he has done so within the broader setting of the general situation in the Palestine area. 9. pas importants tiques, rieur. cieuse phie situation précision diques, riques mutuels. du la 10. On the basis of such an analysis, the legal foundation of the cease-fire obligation, which is clearly the corner-stone of the encire armistice edifice, has been reinforced, and practical measures to ensure full observance of this obligation have been proposed, sorne of which are in the process of implementation. At the same time, certain conclusions of a more general order have been drawn, and they constitute the essentials of what 1 have, for want of a better term) called the "new approach" to the Palestine situation. 10. de ment édifié plusieurs pour même ont j'ai velle 11. men de tion du kairy, sation douter laquelle tive tion à La Unies avéré n'est sion qui qu'il tion permettent 11. The basic element of this approach would, 1 think, appear to be a redefinition of the active role of the United Nations with regard to the situation in the area. At one of our meetings last month, the representative of Syria, Ml'. Shukairy, spoke of the "re-entry" of the United Nations into this problem. There can be little doubt-to my mind, at least-that the course upon which we embarked in April upon the initiative of the United States really meant a kind of fresh start by the United Nations in relation to a problem with which it has been faced for so many years. While reaffirming the over-all United Nations responsibility in this matter, it denoted an awareness that the role of the Security Council Î:1 the matter was neither solely that of a "fire brigade", to use Sir Pierson Dixon's expression, nor that of a supreme arbiter in the sense of arrogating to itself the right to impose solutions, but rather that its l'ole Was actively to seek the co-operation of the parties i!l the establishment of conditions such that solutions could he found. 13. A fUrfuer important feature of the Secretary- General's report is the emphasis placed upon the active role and the responsibility of the parties themseives, both with regard to the implementation of the cea.se-fire and of the armistice agreements, and with regard to the general improvement of conditio:ns in the area. And the fact that the Secretary- General's mission met with so co-operative a response on the part of the Governments in the area has undoubtedly been one of the major factors in the success of the mission. 1 should like here to join in the appreciation that has been expressed to these Governments for the co-operative and constructive spirit they have shown. 11 1 14. Most important, perhaps, in the approach underîying the Secretary-General's report and his activities in the Middle East is their profound realism. In this particular context, realism implies moving, but moving gradually, at the pace that the parties are prepared for and that the general conditions in the area permit. The Secretq.ry-General has not tried to do aIl things at once, even within the armistice framework. He hasvery prudently, may 1 say?-proceeded in a step-by-step manner. Far from advocating any sweeping blueprints or ready-made patterns, rus report recommends advancing through a series of "related unilateral moves" [8/3596, para. 61] by the Govemments of the area -an eminently flexible, pragmatic, if you will, and certainly realistic line of advance. 1 1 15. AIl these considerations, which 1 have tried to set forth in the light of my understanding of the Secretary- General's report, should, 1 think, help us to find an answer to the immediate question confronting us, to the question: where do we go from here? We are still, admittedly, in the initial stages of our efforts. But our course has been charted, or at least outlined. Much remains to be done, obviously, before a fully satisfactory working of the armistice system is achieved. The foundations, however, have been laid. 16. We should first seek to consO:Il\late them. That means to consolidate, as Sir Pierson Dixon has put it, the gains which have already been made. We should then endeavour to build upon them. In other words, we should both endorse what has ah'eady been achieved and urge the parties to take the further steps, and more especially those recommended by the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, which are required to ensure 17. By so doing, we shaH give further impetus to the encouraging trend that events seem to he taking. We shall aIso help to maintain the momentum that has been achieved. 18. There is one more thing which we must strive to maintain, and that is the unanimity which has been so largely responsibie for the progress reaiized 50 Îar. By "unanimity" 1 mean here both consensus within the Council and concordance of the parties. Anything less than that might weIl impair the value of our effort,;, 19. My delegation will therefore support all efforts which would make it possible for the draft resolution, before us [S/3600/Rev.l] to meet with general acceptance. It is my understanding that such efforts are heing made at the moment, and 1 have advisedly refrained at this stage, in order to assist those efforts, from entering into the details of that drait.

1 have been infonned that Mr. Shukairy is going to be the only other speaker that we are going to hear this morning. Inasmuch as infonnal talks are nOw taking place with. regard to sorne aspects of the United Kingdom draft resolution, 1 would appreciate it if Mr. Shukairy would confine himself this morning to commenting on the report of the Secretary- General. As to the comments which he may have concerning the draft resolution, 1 would appreciate it if he would make them at a later stage.

1 cannot fail to respond to the appeal made by MI'. Abdoh, who i5 weIl known for his eloquent and able in.terventions in the Security Council. 1 would therefore suggest, with the approval of the President, that 1 speak now on the report. It so happens that my statement is divided into two parts: the first deals with the report and the second with the United Kingdom draft re5Olution. In order to meet the request of the representative of Iran, 1 will confine myself now to the report, and, with the approval of the President and the Council, 1 will continue in the afternoon with my statement on th~ dl'aIt resolution. 22. 1 hope that the President will not role me out of order if 1 begin by expressing my admiration of his presidency. Mr. Brilej brings to this Council the great traditions of his country, traditions of justice, impartialhyand objectivity. We need only recall the great efforts of President Tito to promote the cause of peace based on justice. Moreover, Mr. Brilej, in presiding over this Council, is weIl equipped with a vast knowledge of international affairs, particularly on the Palestine question by reason of his service as a member of the United Nations Special ComInittee on Palestine. We hope that, ~der his guidance, the Council will not fail to discharge lts duty and its responsibility in accordance with the 24,. We take this meeting as neither fonnal nor confined to an exchange of compliments. The Secretary-General has shouldered a duty of paramount importance. He has re-established a cease-fire in an area that was almost on the brink of war, to borrow the phraseology of Mr. Dulles. This is no metaphor. For when the Security Council was adopting its resolution, the town of Gaza, with its refugee concentrations, was subjected to heavy bombardment resulting in tragic casualties. 25. As for the report of the S~çretary-General, the Security Council has before it a document worthy of careful consideration. In tbis report, the Secretary- General has not only displayed ability and resourcefulness, but he has also shown a courageous understanding of certain aspects of the problem. It is saddening for the United Nations that Mr. Hammarskjold was not our Secretary-General in November 1947, a tragic landmark in the catastrophe of Palestine. In the past, Sweden had the honour of providing a martyr of peace in the person of the late Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator. . Today, the flag is handed .1gain to a fellow countryman, Ml'. Hammarskjoid, an ardent believer in the cause of peace and justice. 26. Wc say this, not to avalanche the Secretary-General with courtesy or to injure his humility with praise, but in aIl earnestness and sincerity. For the envoy of the Security Council has undoubtedly made an achievement. In its decision of 4 April 1956, th~ Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a survey of compliance with the four annistice agreements and to arrange for the adoption of certain measures that would lead to the relaxation of tension along the annistice demarcation Hnes. That is aIl that the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General. He was not asked, expressly or by implication, to obtain fonnal pledges for the observance of a cease-fire. 27. Yet the Secretary-Gt::.l, ra', a man -:{ imagination and penetration, found it imperat;"'e to re-establish the armistice as a starting point. The situation in the area was highly explosive and the incessant raicl~ of agression had indicated almost the absence oi an annistice. This is the picture in miniature that reflected the general climate prevailing in the area when the Secretary- General anlved at the scene of bis mandate. 29. faire qu'il condamnées des a objectif d'armes. le au utilisés qu'il lution pas d'armistice sujet, un tique 29. No doubt the Security Council can get a glimpse of this situation from its past resolutions, condemning military attacks against Arab towns and villages. This is how the Secretary-General was inspired to channel rus endeavours first and foremost towards one main objective, the strict observance of the cease-fire. Further, tlùs explains the Secretary-General's central theme in his interim report ~S/3594] to the Security Council. In the words of that report, the Secretary-General considered it appropriate to interpret the Security Couneil resolution [S/3575] as not only empowering him to survey and report on the state of compliance with the armistice agreements, but also as giving him a mandate to negotiate for the re-establishment of such compliance. 30. en général dont Conseil seule donner 30. This inteIpretation, followed by action, was an achievement by itself. The Secretary-Genercll's efforts in this direction have materialized. The Secretary- General's reading of the Couneil's resolution was not merely an interpretation; it was the only reading that would make it understandable and meaningful. 31. insisté accûmplir certains taire relatives engagements ne données futiles. qu;une la arrangements nombreux Conseil pu cernant dans et violations. 31. Although the Secretary-General, from the star( has stressed again and again that his mission would Dot accomplish miracles, ccrtai"-l quarters have attemptcd to devaluate what gains the' Secretary-General has realized. It has been said that the cease-fire declarations are paper pledges. It has been said, too, that they are nothing more than a repetition of similar assurances solemnly made in the pasto Those critidsms are frivolous. Our United Nations Charter is a paper pledge to those who take it as a pledge on paper. Again, it is true that the cease-fire arrangements in Palestine have numerous precedents. Following the tracks of the Security Council-and the tracks are lengthy-I have been able to trace sorne fifteen resolutions calling for a cease-fire. The Council is fully aware of the background of those resolutions and of the party condemned for violations. 32. Vet, for our part, we find that the effo.rts of the Secretary-General have brought about a lessening of tension marked by definite relaxation. We applaud this result, limited as it may he described, first bcause we are for peace-peace based on justice-and secondly because we do not make capital out of tension. In fact-and this is nothing to conceal-tension is exploited to stimulate a campaign for the flow of dollars and for 32. Secrétaire tension. soit, une n'exploitons raison pour de double ~e release of arms. On these two counts the campaign IS not ours and the tension is not in our interest. 1 34. My Government has placed the matter in its proper context. In his letter dated 2 May 1956, which is reproduced as annex 3 to the report of the Secretary- General [8/3596], our Prime Minister has made it crystal clear that the declaration of cease-fire was given within the framework of the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council, with particular reference to Article 25 of the Charter and the resolution of 27 October 1953 dealing with the question of the river Jordan [8/3128]. 35. This declaration of the Syrian Government is not a reservation nor is it a qualification. In law and in fact it is an integral part of the cease-fire declaration itself. The matter is foreign neither to the Charter, to the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement 1 or to the resolutions of the Security Council. l'or how can we conceive of a cease-fire declaration outside the ambit of the Charter and partir.ularly the provisions of Article 25, wmch call for the acceptance and implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council? And again, how can we conceive of a ccasc-fire contrary te the resclutians of the Security Cauncil, particularly the injunction embodied in the resolution of 27 October 1953, dealing with the diversion of the river Jordan? 36. It is not by arbitrary selection that the Syrian Governrnent bas made special mention of one article of the Charter or of one resolution of the Security Council. The relation that exi.!1ts between the cease-fire and the diversion of the river Jordan called for the citation. 1 admit that this is no time for me to state our case on the river Jordan. Neither is the matter in essence a project to he accepted, modified or rejected. The question is far more important. It is as significant as the ceasefire itself is significant. It is the corneNtone upon wmch is based the armistice agreement in its entirety. The real issue is not the diversion of one river or of another lake; the main issue is the inviolability of the demilitarized zone, a zone that has not heen established for pleasure but as a measure of security and self-defence. 1 OfIidol Recorcb of'''. Seeurily CouRdl, Foun" YeaT, Special Supplmaenl No. Z. - démilitarisée Convention flagrante ment. ne flagrantes» d'hostilité, de toriales, régissant été La tionnée est 38. Article V, inter alia, defines the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarîzed zone. Paragraph 5 (b) of article V declares-and this is the point-that an infringement of the demilitarized zone is a flagrant violation of the axmistice agreements. 1 stress the phrase "flagrant violation", for this is the point 1 am making. Nowhere in the armistice agreements has any violation been described as a "flagrant violation" of the agreements. A warlike act, a hostile act, an advancement beyond the lines, or entering into the air space or the territorial waters, aIl these are acts expressly prohibited by the cease-fire clause, but they have not been described as "flagrant violations" of the agreements. The one, single, flagrant violation specifically provided for in the aImistice agreement is the violation of the demilitarized zone. . 39. rement, de d'annes revient esprit engagé que la 39. The intention becomes very clear, beyond any shadow of doubt. To violate the demilitarized zone is to violate the ccasc-firc, and te divert th.e river Jordan is te liquidate the. demilitarized zonc. This is how our Prime Minister has given his formaI assurance to observe the cease-fire, and how the other Arab Governments view the seriousness of the problem. 40. Having re-established the armistice agreements in general and the cease-fire in particular, the Secretary- General proceeds in his report to examine the general framework of the measures intended to ensure fun compliance and implementation. Here again, the Secretary- General's ability has found an occasion for vivid expression. Like the cease-fue clauses, the Truce Supervision Organization has a special status and special functions. The Secretary-General has made a great contribution in elucidating the matter. He has refused to consider the Truce Supervision Organization as subordinate exclusively to the Mixed Armistice Commission. This is a welcome refusaI, worthy of a Secretary.('!"~eral and an esteemed envoy of the Security Council. 40. en culier, d'examiner objet des taire de d'aImes, trêve particulières. à chargé exclusive refus Secrétaire pecté 41. de conclusion 41. The Truce Supervision Organization was established by the Security Council some time before the armistice agreements. The United Nations observers are the 42. In this regard, the report of the Secretary-General is more cIear than ever. The Secretary-General has informed the Security Council that Syria has accepted the measures proposed with regard ta the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias. The proposaI envisages the placing of fixed observation posts on both sides of the demarcation lines with a United Nations observer boat on Lake Tiberias. These measures have been proposed in implementation of the Securil.Y Council resolution of 19 January 1956 [8/35381 a resolution referred to in the resolution of 4 April 1956 [8/3575], which was so weIl conœived and so ably presented and defended by the United States delegation. 43. We have agreed to the proposaI without any reservation. We have agreed to the freedom of movement of these military observers, as specified in the report [8/3596, para. 86]. The other side, on the other hand, at; expressly declared in the report-this is not my finding of fact, it is not a charge that 1 am attempting to place before the Council, 1 am simply introducing the very findings of fact that are embodied in the report of the Secretary-General-'--<1oes not agree to the movement of a United Nations military boat on Lake Tiberias nor to the establishment of a military observer post, considering these measures as a derogation from its sovereignty [Ibid., para. 81]. 1 will not say to whom 1 refer, because it is quite cIear and the reference is quite obvious. 44. This is an amazing plea to make. When 5Overeignty is cIaimed, a reminder becomes imperative. It is common knowledge that Palestine is nothing but southern Syria. The whole question of sovereignty, however, bas been definitely suppressed in the armistice agreements. The daim of sovereignty has been guarded against in every form and in every dimension, and paragraph 1 of article II of the Israel.Syrian General Armistice Agreement itself has a.ffirmed the principle that no political advantage should be gained under the truce. Parngraph 2 of article II declares that the armistice agreement is exclusively dictated by military and not br political considerations. Paragraph 1 of article V. ""hasizes that the arrangements 45. Thus, in five portions of an armIstice agrecment comprising eight articles, we find that stress is repeatedly placed against any claim of sovereignty. The existing lines are armistice demarcation lines and not international boundaries. In reading the armistice agreement word for word, 1 have come across the word "territory" three times, only three times, and in each and every case the phrase reads "territory under the control of that party" or "territory controlled by one of the parties". This is the territorial situation. It is a control, a military control, having no political significanee, and nothing more. 46. We have placed these views in det.JI before the Security Council not, as in a university, for purposes of academic research, but in order to sweep away an obstacle that has so far been impeding the implementation of the resoluûons of the Security Council, namely, the daim that is made every now and then of sovereignty here or there around the demarcation lines or in the demilitarized zone. 47. So far for the flesh and bone of the Secretary- General's mission. The general climate, which has been alluded to by the Secretary-General in his report, calls for a bird's-eye view. In his report Mr. Hammarskjold could not ignore certain considerations that weigh heavily on the existence of the armistice àemarcation lines. In his words, these lines-and 1 invite his attention as well as that of the members of the Council to these words--"had, in many cases, no basis in history or in the distribution of population or private property" [S/3596, para. 12]. We must warmly congratulate the Secretary-General on this finding of fact, which is pregnant with great significance. These few words are wore voluminous than a volume} and in each word lies a fundamental issue by itself. 48. That the demarcation line bas no basis in history, ancient, medieval or modem, is oommon knowledge. That it bas no basis in the distribution of property is amply proved by official records of the United Nations and of its commissions, of one of which our President was a member. Jewish-owned property in the area amounts to only 6 per cent. In the Negev, for instance, Jewish property amounts te only 1 per cent. These are the figures of the United Nations Commission. 1 bring forward these facts to show that the armistice demarca- 50. Yet this is ooly a side view of the general conditions under which the armistice agreements are labouring. The Seeretary-General bas delicate1y touched upon the fundamental issues that make up the whole problem. 1 dare say that the issue in the main is not the repatriation of the refugees, it is not the intemationalization of Jerusalem, it is not the territorial adjustment or settlement. The issue is primarily one of full respect for a people's right to its homeland. The Arabs of Palestine are not parties to the armistice agreements, yet it is in their fatherland that the armistice line bas been drawn. The Secretary-General bas been able, with great patience and ability, to push the situation baek from the brink of war, but the injustices that lead to war are still there. 1 11 51. A homeland is the saered possession of its people, of its legitimate people, and the legitimate people are the lords and Iilasters in their homeland. When 1 say "people" in regard to Palestine, 1 mean the legitimate citizens of the country, be they Jews, Moslems or Christians, without any disçrimination. 1 mean the legitimate citizens belonging to these, the three great religious faiths. This is the high road, not to proteet an armistice, not to ensure compliance with an armistice, but to go further and achieve peace--and an everlasting peace. 52. This concludes t-he first part of my statement, relat~ ing to the able and worthy report of the Secretary- General. In response ta the appeal made by the representative of Iran, and with the permission of the President, 1 shall defer the second part of my statement, dealing with the United Kingdom draft resolution, until the next meeting of the Council. The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.