S/PV.725 Security Council

Now that 1 have the fioor again, allow me to make a general analysis of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom delegation [S/3600/Rev.l]. Before doing so, however, 1 should like to assure the Council that, as a last effort, 1 have purposely decided to refrain from certain observations that 1 have in mind in order to facilitate whatever efforts are being made to produce, in the words of the President, a resolution that will not only receive the unanimous vote of the Council but will be met with general and widespread acceptance by the parties not represented on the Council, since, after aIl, it is that acceptance which ",'ill eventually make a resolution of the Security Council fruitful aud profitable. ':"''':·''·'·'é';::'.:--",!:ië~·.;C:~.:'''~':''''1:",~~~''''''-,",,!>.''·'':?''·?i;;;~ 3. In his statement before the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom said: "1 do not think it would be heipful if the Council were to indulge in a detailed post-mortem on the various aspects of the problem covered in the Secretary-General's report" [7~3rd meeting, para. 14]. 4. To speak of the voblpén or of the report in the context of a post-mo' em discloses-I say this, again, wîth aIl due respecta post-mortem observation. Neither the report nor th(~ problems covered are in astate of death. The report is a living document. The problem is a living one, too. At least one indication of that is the fact that it has engaged the attention of the Security Council fo!' the last eight yearn, as it is doing today. That is why we prefer to address ourseJve5 to Sir Pierson Dixon in particular, and to the whole Councit in general, not in the language of diplomacy but in the language of frankness. Happity enough, th~ English language of Sir Pierson Dixon is a proper vehic1e for both frankness and diplomacy, and is capable of boundless eloquence, too. 5. That is why we can describe the draft resQlution of t'-e United Kingdom as undenninlng the report of the ~cretary-General down to its foundation. If the draft resolution is passed by the Security Coundl, it will amount to a strangulation and mutilation of the Secretary-General's mission. 6. To justify this conclusion, we neecl only ;-ead the draft resolution. The third paragraph of the preamble takes note of a portion of the report dealing 'with the élS.>llI'allces given to observe the cease-fire. 1 do not desire to say that this is a suppression or a misrepresentation of facts, far from that. Suffice it 10 say that this is not a fully correct statement. Indeed, it represents only a minor part of the report of the Secretary-General. i. As 1 explained this IDL'rning, Mr. Hammarskjold dealt at length with the cease-fire assurances, the selfdefence reserve, the general framew"rk outlined by the Arab Governments, the interdependen..:e of the prO\;~­ sions of the armistice agreements, the matters of reciprocity, the independent status of the cease-fire, and finally-which is equally important-the climate under which the cease-fire was operating. These ideas and many oiliers are spread aIl over the main report of the Secrctary-General [8/3596], and also the interim report [8/35941 which has been entirely ignored in the draft resolution of the United Kingdorn. AlI these serious 8, The Syrian Government, as 1 explained in my previous statement, has stressed the general framework within which the assurances were given. For their part, the other Govemments have stated their position beyond any shadow of a doubt. If we are to convey those assurances in any draft resolution-not necessarily the United Kingdom draft resolution as it stands-we need only take note of the whole report in toto. We either take the whole report into <),ccount or ignore the whole, but we cannot reduce it to splinters and rush it to the Security Council on a stretcher. The Security Council, no -:oubt Sir Pierson Dixon will admit, is not an infirmary where mutilared ideas or fractul'f'd conceptions are admitted. ' 9. Parallel to the third paragraph of the preamble, but more dangerous, is the SDI.th :""aragraph, which reads: "Conscious of the need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutuaUy acceptable basis of the dispute between the parties can be made". 10. On the face of it, the idea of a "settlement on a mutually acceptable basis" strikes a melodious note. But in effect it actuaHy brings about no settlement. The United Nations has already adopted a settlement. It decided on the repatriation of the refugees, and Israel opposes their repatriation; it decided on full intemationalization of the Jerusalem area, and Israel opposes intemationalism; it decided on a territorial plan, and Israel refuses to recede one inch from the area in excess of that plan. We would be prepared to hear from Mr. Eban that he is prepared to recede even that one inch in excess of the territorial adjmtnent decided by the United Nations. Sa much for the United Nations stand and the United Nations resolutions. 11. For us, Palestine is part and parcel of the Arab homeland. The Arab world is not prepared to surrender one single atom of its right to this sacred terri· tory, let alone subject it to the acceptance or refusai of Israel or any other party in the world. 12. What is really amazing, however, is for the United Kingdom to come forward now with this idea of a settlement "on a mutually acceptable basis". 1 say "now" for one legitimate reason. As the Mandatory Power, the United Kingdom endeavoured for 13. To advocate the idea of a mutually acceptable solution must inevitably lead to a reversai of aU the resolutions of the United Nations, and aIl the resolutions would include each and every resolution adopted by the United Nations in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. We must begin from the beginning. We must start de novo and on a clean sheet. Everything written by the United Nations should be written off, ever since 29 November 1947, because this is the solution of a mutuaUy-acceptable-basis conception. The establishment of Israel, i15 membership in the United Nations, and all other resolutions, even including the question of the repatriation of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the territorial adjustment, will have to he revo.keà. Then, and only then, can the United Nations look forward to a solution "on a mutually acceptable basis". 14. 1 come next to paragraph 4 of the operative part of tJ.e draft resolution. Here the draft resolution wishes che Security Council to endorse one single view of the Secretary-General regarding the re-establishment of full compliance with the armistice agreements. This is a rather strange course to follow. The report of the Secretary-General forms an integral whole with the annexes and correspondence attached to it. The Secretary-Gen{;ral has advanced a number of valuable views, equally important and of far-reaching signHicance. To seled just one view anà ignore the others is a great injustice ,to the general balance of the report of the Secretary-GeneraI. 15. We can point out many aspects that are worthy of endorsement. But why should we labour in this direction? What views must he endorsed, or what views must be revoked, snould not be our main concern. We should concentrate, as the representative of the United States put it so ably in his statement on 29 May, [723rd meeting], on the measures, not on the views, required to re-establish the armistice agreements. 16. The item before the Council is of a re.;tricted character, thanks to the labours of Ml'. Lodge and his able clarification of the position taken by the United States in placing this item on the agenda of the Security Counci!. 1 should iike to remind the representatives seated around this table that we are dealing with an item inscribed on the agenda in March on the initiative of the United States Government, an item which was fully clarified by Ml'. Lodge in his valuable intervention at the meeting of the Se;:;urity C-:'llllCiJ of 26 March 1956 [717th meeting]. 17. This is not a l.ew item. There is no request to inscribe anything on the agenda of the Security CounciL This is a continuation of the item as inscribed, as explained, as requested, and we must adhere to the limitations of the item. 1 do not want to leave the 18. Finally, 1 should like to deal with paragraph 7 of 18. the draft resolutiun, under which the Security Council projet would request the Secretary-'}eneral "to continue his .. derait good offices with the parties, and to report to the Secubons rity Council as appropriate". rapport 19. It is here that the draft resolv.tion ends, but only 19. ta start on an avenue of vagueness and obscurity, to graphe, put it in the most milcl terms. To begin with, good -termes offices, like ';;Qnciliation and mediation, is a procedure Tout well-Imown in international usage. Is it intended-and la 1 put the question-to appoint the Secretary-General dans as a man of good offices, side by sicle with the United la Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine? In du his statement, Sir Pierson Dixod told the Cou:'1cil that Commission the good offices, as he understood the term in "" draft Palestine? resolution, did not mean a mission or a mandate. Those dit were the very words of the representative of the United son Kingdom. If it is not a mission or a mandate, let me ni ask Sir Piei1>ûn Dixon to tell us what would it be. It sentant becomes, in my humble thinking and understanding, un nothing. What is the Secretary-General supposed to 'Pierson continue if it is nothing? There would be nothing to rien continue. censé 1. 20. le un tout même se ne les pour tâche conventions plement? paroles à l'action de [8/3575] 20. We know that this Council, at is meeting on 4 April 1956 [722nd meeting], entrusted L.'le Secretary-General with a mission and with a mandate which we accepted and with which we are quite prepared to continue. It is understan<1ahle that the same mission under the same mandate should be continued, but to continue something which is unknown, something which is neither a mission nor a mandate, to use the words of Sir Pierson Dixon, is a practice which to us is unknown in international affairs. If this unknown thing is related to the armistice agreement, why not say so in simple words? Why not consult the able words 'of Mr. Lodge at the Council's 723rd meeting, in which he expressed himself in favour of the efforts of the Secretary-General in connexion with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 April J.956 [S/3575]? 1 t QI. du à instamment oublier demande, projets question 21. This item was initially inscribed on the agenda upon the request of the United States, a request which was made with great '::aution. 1 appeal to the members of the Council always tr.J remember that they are now meeting on the basis of that request, otherwise we might find ourselves faced with various draft resolutions which are quite foreign to the item before the Security Council. 23. It was envisaged that the Secretary-General's mission would protect the armistice, and nothing more. As 1 h:we said, the Secretary-General has performed his mission beyond expectation. lt is with this aim in mind that a resolution should bz adopted by the Security Council-a resolution that takes note of the report, thanks the Secretary-General and calls or. the parties to implement the measures proposed by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, with a further request to the Secretary-General that he should be avaHable to use his efforts to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolution of t April 1956. This is the resoiution with which we .Ung; we are not dea1:ng with any other resolution. We louk to a rcsolution that will serve these purposes in plain and simple pnraseology. 24. In his visit to the Middle East, our Secretary- General, as 1 have said, did an excellent job. He was well received everywhere, and he wil! always he well received eveIJ"Nhcre. He took with him the weIlbalanced resolution of 4 April 1956. Ac; the author of that resolution, the United States has taken a clearcut attitude, ~ree from ambiguity and free from matters foreign to the substance of the item. The initiative taken by the United States was well conceived and we should be gratdul for that unbiased p03ition. We never fail to express gratitude when gratitude is due. 2.5. However, 1 regret to say that the position is different with regard to this draft resolution. The United Kingdom proposaI is outside the ambit of the item. 1t cantains uncalled folC' pronouncements. 1 embraces eviJ-I know of no other word to use, and perhaps Sb- Pierson Dixon, with his rich vocabulary, might assist me-it contains evîl without necessity. 26. This draft resolution, if adopted as it stands-and 1 hope it will not be adopted-would bring the matter ta an end. 1t is because we do not want to bring the matter to an end that we do not think this draft resolution should be adopted by the Council. If adopted, the Secretary-General would find destroyed the bridges which he had constructed. His efforts would he frozen; his endeavours would be arrested. AlI prospects would he sealed off and all roads to the Middle East would be blocked. The Secretary-General would f.nd himself unable to proceed. This would be regretted most by us because we desire to see order in the area. In any event, such a course would not be our wish nor our desire ~ 28. So, from the very arguments of Sir Pierson Dixon himself, from his own words and from his own statement. 1 think 1 should appeal to the Cmmcil, including Sir Pierson Dixon. The Council should adopt a different resolution, a resolution that would take full account of the fears, the aspirations and the views stated by the parties mainly concerned. 29. We are here asscmbled to protect the armistice, so let us proceed directIy to that end in tt.e simplest and purest of words. The Council should not be moved from this purpose, for what is at stake is the peace of the Holy Land that has givell the world the Messenger of Peace. .

Israel eAtended its full cooperation tiJ the misJion which the Secretary-General undertock in th'e Middle East, pursuant to the resolution V.Dl\nimously adopted by the Security Council on 4- April 1956 r,~,/3575] on the initiative of the United States. ? 1 31. That resolution was limited in scope. It sought to win a respite in which security might be restoreà to a safer equilibrium and time be g&ined for measures of longer range aiming fust at the prevention of war and then at the establishment of peaceful conditions. This was an important objective. The Se7retary·General went forth on his mission attended by universal hopes for his success and by general confidence in his determinatioù to ward off the dark prospects which seemed to impend. 32. The leaders of my Governmentreceived the Secretary-General with a full mcasure of courtesy and candour. AlI the elements of tension between Israel and its neighbours were brought under careful and reasoned scrutiny. 33. The issues which lay in the balance became graver with every passing day, for while the Secretary-General's . ~iscussion proceeded, armed units from a neighbouring State were operating deep in our territory, taking a to11 of innocent life a'Ud themselves suffering due retribution. À sequence of events was on foot which might well have broadened into general conflict. My Government was conscious that we were dealing with hazards on the highest scale. 34-. In these grave circumstances, our minds were dominated not only by the Security Council's resolution of 4- April 1956, but also by the Charter of the United Nations under which seventy~six States, including our neighbours, are committed to respect the integrity and independence ,.,.,ç aIl other Member States. 36. The most important result of the Secretary-General's mission is that aIl the parties to the annistice agreements have given assurances unconditionally to observe the cease-fire. This confonns with the obligations of the Arab States and Israel under the Charter of the U....;ted Nations to renounce the use of force, except in selfdefence. My Government attaches great importanœ to the unconditional character of the cease-fire assurances. 37. It is deeply regrettable that, since this solemn contract was renewed a few weeks ago, anned attacks have been committed against life and property in Israel. The tension on the Jordan-Israel frontier evokes our deep coIicern. We hope that the sharp admonitions addressed by the Mixed Armistice Commission to the Jordan Government on 9 May, 14 May and 19 May last will meet with an effective response and that my Government will he able to attach good faith ta the unconditional assurances which its four neighbours have given to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 38. It cannot be said that the authority of the ceasefire has been augmented by the speech of the Syrian representative this morning. 1 refer especially to his suggestion that the cease-fire obligation of Syria is affected by whatever may happen in the problem of the Jordan waters. The Charter of the United Nations contains an exhaustive list of the legitimate uses of anned force, but these do not include the right of one State to use anned force to ~nsure that another State should waste its water resources. The doctrine that Syria is entitled to ensure by force the non-utilization of another nation's waters has nu support in world opinion or in international law. There are no resolutions of the Security Council on this subject which have oot been exhaustively implemented. The resolution of 27 October 1953 [S/3128] certainly offers no support to the Syrian position on this subject in 1956. 40. A cease-fire agreement, indispensable as it is, cannot be regarded as an adequate substitute for peaceful conditions. It is urgent that the armistice agreements he restored to their full and reciprocal integrity. We therefore agree that further progress should be made in consolidating the. gains resulting from the Secr· .,.ry- General's mission, with a view to the full implementation of the armistice agreements. Israel will co-operate in any further effort, consistent with its rtghts under the armistice agreements, capable of reducing tension on the frontiers. t1 1 41. Agreement of the parties and full reciprocity are essential conditions for the success of any measures aiming at the consolidation of the cease-fire and the strengthening of armistice observance. The establishment of agreed local arrangements has its due place in the process of armistice consolidation, but in our view these local arrangements are subordinate to the overriding and paramount question itself, the political decision of the signatory parties to maintain the armistice and ta prevent u' .uthorized crossings of the demarcation line. Long experience has proved that, if this political attitude on the part of the signatory Governments is lacking, local arrangements by thems~lves cannot prevai!. 42. Full compliance with the armIstice agreements is the objective defined by the United Kingdom representative and others who have followed him as the purpose of the Security Council's current efforts. It is important that we should understand what is involved in this term "full compliance with the armistice agreements". 43. Under the armistice agreements, each party is entitled to respect for its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other. Full implementation of these agreements requires the abolition of belligerent practices, on land or by sea, which have been ruled by the Security Council to be iIïconsistent with the armistice. Full implementation of these agreements is incompatible with the invocation of a state of war, either in theory or in practice. Under these agreements, Israel and the Arab States have agrep.d that any change in the territorial status qlkO shaH be dependent on the consent of the other party. 44. Here let me say that the hist~ry of the demarcation lines and their relationship to demographic or property questions have no bearing whatever upon the duty of the parties to respect their immunity and to avoid any transgression of them. They have more historical background than was indicated this morning, but we feel with great strength that the only useful statements about these armistice lines are thos(; which uphold and reinforce their authority and their full juridical status. This authority and this status are absolute until 46. Re&pect for the armistice agreements involves an understanding of their character as steps towards permanent peace, and accordingly of the obligation of the signatories to extend their scope by the negotiation of a final seulement. It follows that full compliance with the armistice agreements requires far mon' than the maintenance of a cease-fire. We are still remote from the goal of full compliance with the armistice agreements, let alone from progress beyonà the armistice towards the permanent peace which the annistice agreements themselves envisage and require. 47. 1 do not propose to describe or analyse aIl the policies practised by certain Governments in our region which conflict with their undertakings under the armistice agreements. But 1 cannot omit reference to a recent example of a tendency to hold up the armistice agreements and the United Nations Charter to clear violation. 48. On .Tuesday, 29 May 1956, the Security Council assembled to exercise its primary responsibility for international peace and security. At 7.30 that morning, the State-contrclled radio of Cairo broadcast a declaration by the Prime Minister of Egypt calling upon the "Palestinian" troops who had been mobilïzed in the Gaza strip to "take vengeance" for their country, and expressing his deep personal solidarity with the notorious Fe.d~yeen and his pride in the accomplishment of their mission. 49. We are at a loss to understand how this threat can he reconciled with an armistice agreement described in its own text as "an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace". 50. It is no less difficult to understand how any siguatory of the armistice agreements, and indeed of the United Nations Charter, can regard itself as entitled to organize the penetration of armed gangs into the territory of a neighbouring State for purposes of murder, sabotage and terrorÏzation. We are speaking here of formations which have no defensive purpose at aU and whose functions only .commence with the act of invadmg the territory of a neighbouring State for offensive and murderous operations. 1 Ojfû:ial Recorth of the Security Council, Fourlh Year, Special Supplement No 1. 52. The basic question of the attitude of the parties to the cease-fire agreement already achieved and to the annistice agreements of which the cease-fire is a part arose with renewed force as we listened to the observations of the Syrian representative today. His speech has brought us face to face with sorne of the harsh realitics of the situation in the Middle East. 53. If my understanding is correct, the Syrian representallve enunciated three main doctrines: first, that the cease-fire assurance given by bis Government to the Secretary-General on 2 May 1956 [8/3596, annex 3] was not unconditional-in other words, Syrïa daims the right to open fire on Israel on grounds of its own choosing not recognized by the Israel-Sy~ianGeneral Armistice Agreement 3 or by the Charter; second, that the annistice demarcation line should not exist and is in fact a source of tension; and, third, that there is no sovereign State of Israel and that peace in the Middle East is to be envisaged only on the basis of Israel's nonexistence. 54. To these peads of wisdom and moderation Mr, Shukairy added another thought, namely, that Palestine is a part of southern Syria. Thus, he has verbally expressed a desire to extend his country's frontiers to take in the whole territory of Israel and part of the Kingdom of Jordan. .55. As far as we are concemed, this expansion will never get beyond the verbal stage. But the question arises: what use is there in such allusions or in such efforts to prejudice the sovereignty of existing States? As 1 look around this table, 1 see the representatives of seven States which were once part of the sovereign domain of other States. But here they are toclay, in the integrity of their separate sovereignty. If the separate sovereignty of each Member State is not taken as a primary axiom, then there is litde meaning in the United Nations system as a whole. se de souveraineté représentés souveraineté. que l'ensemble Unies 56. vue. enregistrés rité du 56. Let me therefore summarize our appraisal. We are gratified by the gains which have been recorded in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and by dint of the skilful efforts of the Secretary- General. But this satisfaction must be tempered by a 1 Ibid., Special Supplement No. 3. 1 Ibid., Special Supplement No. 2. 58. This is the picture of the Middle East today-a tense and brooding turbulence held back so far from the ultimate point of explosion, but still fraught with great menace to peace-Ioving mankind. 59. It is vitally important in these circumstanct; to sec the Security Couneil invited today, in the United Kindgom draft resolution, to express its consciousness of the "need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis... can be made" between Israel and the Arab States. 60. The Security Council will disperse when its present action is taken, and it is uncertain when further measures will be adopted. Our attention therefore cornes to rest on an important statement in the Secretary-General's report. "The initiative" he writes, "is now in the hands of the Governments parties to the annistice agreements". He goes on to suggest that pcace "should be fostered and encouraged, not by attempts to impose from outside solutions to problems of vital significance to everyone in the region, but by a co-operation which facilitates for the Governments concerned the taking unilaterally of steps to increase confidence and to demonstrate their wish for peaceful conditions" [8/3596, para. 105]. 61. It is appropriatt' in the context of this appeal to their initiative that the parties concerned should declare how they stand on the overriding issue of their mutuai coexistence. 62. Let me make it clear how Israel stands. Israel aspires to a peaceful settlement with its neighbours on a mutually acceptable basis. To that end, the Government of Israel is prepared, as its Prime Minister has recently announced, to negotiate at the highest level of 64. We believe that the Arab nation, in its nine newly liberated States, with a vast inheritance of political and economic opportunity stretching out before it, can welI, afford to live in peace with the smaller State of Israel, ' now resuming the great sequence of its independent national history. 65. Wor!d opinion, which has done much to endow the Arab peoples with their lavish emancipation, may justly exhort and request them to overcome past rancours and open up ... new era of welfare and peace across the expanses of a free Middle East. 66. History decreed long ago, a~d has now re-enacted, that this is a region in which the people of Israel and the Arab peoples must live together for aIl time. The basis for their living together is that laid down in the Charter, namely, sovereign equality of Member States within an organized international community. Between these two peoples there are traditions of kinship far older than the recent hostility which we seek to efface. We have set our hands to agreements, now seven years old, which command us to respect each other's security. But we are also the signatories of another treaty-the Charter of the United Nations-which commits us to courses of co-operation and recognition more far-reaching than the mere avoidance of war. 67. We have stood very close in recent weeks to a chasm of danger which might have engulfed many things precious to us both. We arc still too near that precipice for safety. Israel's most urgent preoccupation is to become sufficiently strong in defence to banish the temptations of violence against it. But, in pursuing this and other indispensable objectives, we know that the true destiny of these two peoples lies not in hostile confrontation, but in the union of their efforts for regional and international peace. 68. If any of these ideas which we hold with earnest conviction raises any echo on the other side, then indeed, in the words of the Secretary-General, "the present situation affords unique possibilities" [8/3596, para. 106],

1 wish to thank the President for giving me the opportunity to state my delegation's position with regard to the item on the Council's agenda. 70. At the Security Council's meeting of 28 March 1956; 1 stated with regard to the draft resolution which had been proposed by the United States representative, and which was to be adopted by the Council on 4 April 1956: " ... it appears from the text of the draft resolution ... that the ain of the sponsor of the draft resolution is to find means of eliminating the tension prevailing on the armistice lines with a view to restoring calmand this within the framework of the armistice agreements--and to entrust this delicate task to Mr. Hammarskjold, who enjoys general confidence" [718th meeting, para. 29]. 1 added that 1 was certain that my interpretatioii of the draft resolution coincided exactly with the intention of the sponsor of the dmft resolution, the United States representative. 71. At the same meeting, Mr. Lodge was good enough to confirm my interpretation by stating: "the understanding expressed by the representative of Egypt concerning the draft resolution is fully in accord with my opening remarks at this meeting" [ibid., para. 54J. 72. After the resolution had been adopted, Mr. Hammarskjold undertook his journey to the Middle East and acquitted himself successfully of the delicate task allotted to him, through the exercise of his usual tact and the patience he has shown himself to possess. In order not to e~barrasss our Secretary-General, 1 shaH merely state that 1 associate myself with the words of praise rightly addressed to him by previous speakers. 73. In the report [8/3596] which he has submitted, and which is now before us, Mr. Hammarskjold has kcpt within the bounds of the task which was assigncd to him, and which 1 cndeavoured to define in opening my remarks. Indeed, in my view this is one-and not the least--of the reasons for the success of his mission. Ml'. Hammarskjold states in paragraph 9 of his report tha.t: "My talks with the Governments concerned have, without exception, been conducted on the basis of agreement that their purpose was to explore the possibility of re-establishing the full implementation of the armistice agreements." Thus, the task that the Secretary-General had set himself was ta re-establish total compliance with the armistice agreements. 74. At the 722nd meeting, on 3 April 1956, 1 informed the Council that Egypt was always ready to collaborate with General Burns and Mr. Hammarskjold in seeking 76. We have agreed, for instance, to the establishment on each side of the demarcation line of an equal number of fixed United Nations observer posts. Incidentally, 1 should like to emphasîze that this proposaI of General Burns had been suggested by Egypt. Since February 1955, our delegation on the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had been asking for the co-operation of observers in ascertaining who was responsible for the many exchan6es of fire along the demarcation line. We even agreed to United Nations observers being stationed on the Eg'lptian sicle, and t.1ley have heen so stationcd, since 12 April 1955, on our request, exœpt for a very short period last year. General Burns confirmed my remarks in a recent statement to the Press. 77. Wc are happy, therefore, that agreement on this point has been achicved. At the same time we have to point out that Israel has specified that the agreement should remain in force for six months, whereas the Egyptian Government has set no time limit. 78. Last ycar, we also suggestcd a practical measure to reduce tension in the area of the demarcation Hne, namely, the separation of the armed forces stationed along that line. We therefore had no difficulty in accepting without reservation, as may be seen from the Secretary-General's report, his proposaI to that effect. The report states: "The proposaI that the parties should withdraw their anned forces, especially patrols, observation posts and defensive positions, back from the demarcation line to a distance sufficient to eliminate or greatly reduce provocation which might induce undisciplined individuals to open fire leading to extensive breaches of article II, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement has been accepted by Egypt without reselvations" [8/3596, para. 79]. 79. In his report, the Secretary-General has rightly been careful to define the functions of the obscrvers on the basis of the resolution of 11 August 1949 [8/1376, 11], in which the Security Council took note cf the general armistice agreements. He says that one of the functions of the observers is, together with the authoritics concerned, to ensure compliance with the cease-fire provisions contained in the armistice agreements. The 80. My Government also accepted aIl the other proposaIs which were presented by General Burns and the Secretary-General and which are described in the report. 81. We have not changed our posItIOn. We are still ready to examine any proposaI made by the Secretary- General and by General Burns with a view to eliminating tension along the demarcation Hnes and in the demilitarized zones, within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. 82. 1 should also like to mention that Egypt has acccpted without reservation the principle of the freedom of movement of military observpr<: in the region of El Auja and Gaza. Israel das nu. glVen complete assurances of this tYr-. 83. 1 should like DOW to deal with a matter connected with the Secretary-General's report and the draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom representative [S/3600/ Rev.I], the question of the cease-fire. My Government has given an assurance that it will observe unconditionally the provisions of article II, paragraph 2, of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, while reserving the right of self-defence as stipulated in the United Nations Charter. The exchange of letters between the parties and the Secretary-General on this matter is reproduced in document 8/3584. 84. A matter which is ..·'mnected with this undertaking by my Government, and which is referred to in the report, is that of the diversion of the waters of the Jordan river, with which you are aIl acquainted. On this point, the Secretary-General writes the foIlowing in his report: "It appears from the letters from the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon that the two Governments consider that a resumption of the work might put the situation along the demarcation line under an undue strain. This view has been expressed to me also by the other Governments of the Arab ccuntries. 1 have given this aspect of the question my most serious attention. 1 find that the strain feared in case of a resumption of the work should not be permitted to endanger the cease-fire, but, as stated during my negotiations, l feel, with equal strength, that, legal considerations apart, it is the duty of aIl parties to the present effort to reduce tensions to av~id any action that may create an added strain" [S/3596, para. 98J. 85. My Government, of course, considers that diversion of the Jordan river cannot but dangerously increase tension alongthe demarcation Hnes and may easily have 86. In paragraph 47 of his report, explaining the ceasefire and its relation to the reservation concerning selfdefence, the Secretary-General states: "More important than the legal uncertamtles is the dependence of the cease-fire arrangement on the gencral situation. Strains may develop which will put the arrangement to a test for which the reestablished legal obligations prove too weak. 1t is first of aIl-and 1 want to stress this last sentencea question of the general atmosphere in which the cease-fire is implemented." 1 feel that 1 can add nothing ta the Secretary-General's analysis. 1 will 'not dwell further on this subject, which has been so ably deaIt with by the Syrian representative, and 1 associate myself with his conclusions. 87. My delegation would have preferred the United Kingdom draft resolution Eot to go beyond the Secretary-General's report and the resolution of 4 April 1956 [8/3575] entrusting Mr. Hammarskjold with his mISSIOn. 88. The United Kingdom representative has submitted a revised text, and 1 fully recognize that in it he has made an effort to come closer to our point of view. Unhappily, in respect of sorne points which are of considerable interest to our delegation, we do not find the draft resolution satisfactory. 89. The sixth paragraph of the preamble, in particular, states: "Conscious of the need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis of the dispute between the parties can be made". projet ce soviétique effet, concernent avec Secrétaire déclaration 90. My delegation feels that tOO paragraph in the present draft resolution does not help very mw:h; as 1 have already explained, the draft resolution should remain within the framework of the report to avoid raising controversial questions and leading us into a discussion of thorny issues. The fact that the text of this paragraph was taken from the Anglo-Soviet declaration of 27 April 1956 does not justify its inclusion in the draft resolution. The Anglo-Soviet declaration in fact deals with other questions which concern the Near East and which have a closer relation to the resolution of 4 April 1956 and the Secretary-General's report. For example, the declaration states: "For this purpose, they [that is to say, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union] will give the necessary support to the United Nations in its endeavour to strengthen peace in the region of Palestine and to carry out the appropriate decisions of the Security Council." 92. 1 apologize for having strayed outside the limits of today's debate, but that is not entirely my fault, since the parngraph of the draft resolution which 1 felt 1 had to comment upon is not entirely relevant and leads us away from our subject. It would certainly have been better not to include it Ïn the draft resolution. 93. 1 have a comment to make on paragraph 3 of the operative part, which rearls: "Declares that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected in aIl areas along the armistice dcmarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas as defined in the armistice agreements ..." 94. This paragraph is not word for word the same as the text ~dopted by the Council at its meeting of 4 April 1956. The phrase "in aIl areas" does not appear in that text, which was originally proposed by the United States. 1 wonder ""hat purpose this addition is intended to serve, and whether it adds anything to the resolution of 4 April 1956. 1 should be grateful if the United Kingdom representative could enlighten me on this point. 95. Another point on which some explanation is needed is paragraph 7 of the operative part of the draft resolution, which reads: "Requests the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, and to report to the Securit.y Council as appropriate". 96. This paragraph requires explanation. It does not state whether the Secretary-General's good offices relate to the application of the resolution of 4 April 1956 or even to the recommendations contained h. his j;'eport; hence, this paragraph can be interpreted as conferring another mission on Ml'. Hammarskjold and even as giving him instructions to seek other solutions to the Palestine probJem, instructic!ls which Ml'. Hammarskjold himself has never sought. 97. But, according to Sir Pierson Dixon's statement yesterday: "This is not a mission. It is not a mandate. It is not proposed that the Council should ask the 98. In these circumstances, my delegation cannot understand why the paragraph could not be amended on the lines of the explanation and intcrpretation giV€!l by the United Kingdom representative. 99. In his statement yesterday, Ml'. Lodge, who introduced the text adopted on 4 April 1956, gave the United Kingdom resolution an interpretation identical with that given by Sir Piersoll Dixon. He saiel: "The draft resolution sponsored by the representative of the United Kingdom has a basic purpose, which is to emphasize the Security Council's wish first that the agreements already arrived at should be speedily put into effect and, secondly, that the remaining measures called for in: the Security Council's re.sohltions and not yet fully agreed upon should be ad<;?pted without delay" [723rd meeting, para. 79]. He stated further: "Thus the task before the Security Council today is to consolidate the gains made by the Secretary- General in the agreements he has reached with the parties to prevent a recurrence of a situation such as prcvailed earlier in the year. It seems fitting-in fact, it seems wise-to calI upon the Secretary-General to make further effort~ with the parties to that end" [ibid., para. 83]. confirmer davantage menti: soulevés, 100. 1 think the interpretation 1 have just placed upon this paragraph coincides with that given by the United Kingdom and United States representatives. 1 should he grateful if the sponsor of the draft resolution would confirm this. ' 101. That is what 1 wanted to say about the draft resolution. 1 hope that my remarks, which have been made purely in order tû throw more light on the draft, will be taken into account, and that the points to which 1 have referred will be alnended as necessary, so that the text can be adopted unanirnously. fois taire chargé l'application dans l'Egypte signée 102. In conclusioZ'l, 1 should like to slate once more that my delegation will co-operate with the Secrctary-General and the Chief of Staff of the Truce ~upervision Organization in order to make possible the application of the practical measures proposed under the General Armistice Agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949, which we signed and which we are accordingly prepared to apply. 104. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): In a sincere expression of appreciation before this Council, 1 should like to compliment the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on his report and on the skilful manner in which he camed out the mission delegated ID him by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 April 1956. 105. Apart from the official aspect of his successful achievement, he personaHy won the admiration of the political leaders with whom he dealt in that region. This is the impression that he made in my country, which impression, 1 believe, he aIso left in other countries of the area. In conductinrz his discussions. he was led ail the way through by his si~ce:"ity and intcÏligence with a great reserve of diplomacy. The good report which he has written and which has been submitted to this Council is a true example of his ability. This, however, should not he construed to mean that my delegation fully subscribes to all his findings. 106. Li.rniting himsdf to Ll}e scope of the reso!ution of 4 April 1956, he tried to he as comprehensive as possible. His report gives a complete 5urvey of the conditions along the armistice demarcation Unes in the Palestine area and an analytical study of the question of compliance or non-compliance with the general armistice agreements. His main task was to reduce tension along the armistice lines; and, as he puts it, he devoted aIl his attention to the limited task of re-establishing, first of aIl, a cease-fire and, based on the cease-fire, a state of full compliance with the armistice agreements. 107. Perhaps the main objective which he achieved was the assurances he received from the parties concerned that they would observe the cea.c;e-6_re, with the reservation on self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. My Government, having given such an assurance, made another strong reservation by drawir.g the Secretary-Gener-al's special attention to the grave consequences that would ensue if the Jordan river diversion works were resumed by Israel. 108. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to refer to the Secretary-General's stand on this particular matter, and to my Government's reaction to it, as stated in the report. In his report, the Secretary- General says : "... 1 have found that my formaI stand under the terms of my manà..i;ë must be to request the parties to abide by decisions concerning the matter taken by the Security Council or under the armistice agreements, and, as indicated in a previous section, to 109. It is a matter of major significance to my Government to reiteratc what our Prime Ministel wrote to the Sccretary-General ln his letter dated 29 Aprii i 956. He said : "Our agreement is hereby confirmed [8/35!16, annex 1]." The reference is 10 the agreement between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General with regard to the unconditional observance of obligations under article III, paragraph 2, of the !srae!.Jordan General Armistice Agreement, on the basis of reciprocity and reserving our right to self·defence. In the same letter, the Prime Minister wcnt on to say: sans de danie, lement légitime "On the slrength of your statemcnt to me that the Security Council resolution affecting this problem can only be interpreted by the Security Council alone, it becomes evident that any unilateral action by Israel \4fould mean not on!y vicIation of the said rcsolution" -that is, the resolution of 27 Oetober 1953 [8/3128]- "but also defiance of the principle indicated by you." 110. That is mv Government's poSltlOn in respect to the cease·fire assurances which w~ have given. . Thus, we have added to our dean record a new assurance that we shall observe the obligations concerning a cease-fire laid down in the armistice agreement, subject to the above-mentioned rcscrvations. 110. l'égard vement à les dans mentionnées. 111. Having secured such assurances from aIl the parties concerned, the Secretary-General accomplished the primary object of his mission, thereby making it possible te bring about the present conditions of quietness along the armistice !ines. In other words, he succeeded ln reducing the tension that had prevailed prior to his visit to the area and at the time of his arriva!. 111. même essentiel caL-ne démarcaiÏon taire dans 112. The reprcsentative of the United Kingdom was quite right when he said, the day before yesterday: "Thus, the primary object of the Secretary-General's mission was to reduce tension along the armistice demarcation lines" [723rd meeting, para. 17]. 112. fait Cette que de le M. This remark is in full conformity with the understanding of the Secretary-General of the limitations and dimensions of his mandate. He did not accep~ LO go beyond the defined scope of the resolution of 4 April 1956. Mr. Hammarskjold says: "My mandate ... is directIy concerned with the state of tension along the armistice demarcation lines and the state of compliance or non-complia.nce with the 114. Now the Security Council bas heen summoned again to discuss the report of the Secretary-General and 1:0 L-f te pass a further resolutioll on t.~e S3..TIle problem. In the light of the fulfilment of the immediate purpose of the previous resolution and the success of the Secretary-General in reducing tension and maintaining order on the armistice demarcation lines, the natural method in drafting a new resolution would be to keep within the limits of the resolution of 4 April 1956 and not create ncw issues that might influence the situation obtained by the re-establishment of a cease-fire. The Secretary-General says: "1 said in my repon that 1 had stayed stricdy within the scope of my mandate. This means that 1 have left aside those fundamental issues which so deeply.influence the present situation ..." [8/3596, para. 102]. 115. The present draft resolution of the United Kingdom brings up, 1 am afraid, such new issues. 116. In paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution it is stated that the Council: "Endorses the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the armistice agreements represents a stage which bas to he passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues hetween the parties". 117. This paragraph, as it stands, goes far heyond the simple indication borne out by the conclusions of the Secretary-General. In the report of the Secretary- General, the statement to which this paragraph refers represents the views of the Secretary-General and his own understanding. It is a conclusion introduced by him along with severai other conclusions. Whether those conclusions are perfectIy correct or questionable, they should not necessarily he included in a Security Council resolution. 118. Moreover, 1 do not think that when the Secretary- General presented these views he actually meant to see them incorporated in a resolution. The theories of the Secretary-Generai could he of help to everyone, for private meditation, or to draw one's own conclusions 119. Why should not the Security Council endorse t"'~ view of the Secretary-General that the general will to peace in the region should be encouraged, but not by attempts to impose from outside solutions to problems of vital significance to everyûne in the region? Or why should the Security Counci1 not endorse the opinion of the Secretary-General that the final settlement is probably still far off? 1 can see no reason for inserting any conclusions, and especially that in paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom draft resolution, in any resolution which ihe present discussions might produce. It is greatly preferable to limit ourseives to the specific requirements of the resolution of 4 April 1956 which was adopted after a great deal of thorough and detailed discussion. 120. My delegation, therefore, takes a critical stand on the aforementioneddause, and hopes that the resolution adopted by the Council will deal only with the practical measures that could be taken for fulfilling the limited objectives of the previous resolution. We are therefore in full agreement with the vjews expressed in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution and in the statements of sorne of the members .of tP;c: Council that measures which have been agrced upon should he put into effect by the parties without delay, and that the parties should co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization for putting into effect further practical proposaIs, pursuant to the resolution of 4 April 1956. t J 121. In other words, the resolution of 4 April 1956 is an adequate instrument for the Secretary-General ta continue his efforts to attain all its objectives. In tbis connexion, 1 would like to compliment the representative of China for his masterly argument on this poiat. My delegation could not agree with him more that the present draft resolution should be set aside and that the purpose of this meeting should be limited to renewing the Council's mandate to the Secretary-General in accordance with the previous resolution. 122. It is quite clear from the report of the Secretary- General that the attitude of the Arab Governments was very co-operative in facilitating his task. The specific matters in which they showed snch co-operation are enumerated in the report. Negotiations for the local commanders' agreement, which the Secretary-General feels should take place betweèn the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan and Israel, were expected to be proposed to both parties by the Chief of Staff. My Government would weIcome the continuation of the Secretary- General's efforts to reach practical arrangements that eould he carried out pursuant to the resolution of 4 April 1956. 123. While we favour the continuation of the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement the parts of that 124. 1 submit that this clause lacks clarity and that it is somehow incomplete, despite the fact that the author of the draft resolution tried to give it adequate explanation in his statement on 29 May [723rd meeting]. 1 do not think the term "to continue his good offices" is the right term to he used for the nature of the activities of th.e Secretary-General. What ,...,ou!d be 3. more accurate tenu in this respect would be very simple language that accurately applied to the mission of the Secretary-General; that is, "to continue to arrange with the parties for the adoption of practical measures further te reduce tensions on the annistice deUlâfcâtion lines". Or we could say instead, "to continue his efforts with the parties for the implementation of the resolution of 4 April 1956". 125. The reason 1 have for demanding such clarification is that the present draft resolution attempts to deai with issues which go far beyond the limited scope of the resolution of 4 April 1956. This fact would cause ambiguity in the meaningof such clauses if thev were not fully' explained. - , 126. In expressing my thoughts with such frankness, 1 wish to assure the Council that l, as a representative of my country, do not have the slightest suspicion about the honesty and truthfulness of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold. On the contrary, 1 hold him in the highest esteem. But we are dealing with a resolution which will have its outcome and effect on the future of the problems that we are considering and on the interests and right" of the people concerned. Therefore we have to make a careful approach and an accurate appraisal of every step that might be taken. 127. The provisions of paragraph 7 of the United Kingdom draft resolution constitute a part of the approach towards a new concept of a peaceful settlement between the parties. The paragraph could therefore be interpreted in the light of that contemplated settlement. Perhaps the representative of the United Kingdom does not agree with me on this interpretation. If that is the case, then 1 request him to use in his draft resolution a more explicit and simple wording of the clause in question in order to wipe out any misunderstanding, and 1 am confident that Sir Pierson Dixon, in his wise judgement, will agree to my request. 128. 1 have said that there is a trend in the present draft resolution towards a new concept of a peaceful settlement between the parties in the dispute. This appears clearly in the sixth paragraph of the preamble, which reads as follows: 130. Moreover, the peaceful settlement for which the present draft resolution wishes to create the conditions is not a settlement based on equity and justice, as this Council should recommend it to be; it is not a settlement established on the restoration of the legitimate rights of the original inhabitants of Palestine; it is not a settlement based on the resolutions of the United Nations, resolutions which have been confirmed and reaffirmed on every occasion, but a settlement of the dispute on a mutually acceptable basis between the parties. This is a new approach to a peaceful settlement of which the Arabs did not dream, and a new basis for the solution to the Palestine problem. It marks the start of a change in the political thinking of those who might support these views in respect to the solution of the Palestine question. 131. We trust that the Security Counci.l will advocate one settlement, and only one, a settlement that preserves the prestige of the United Nations first and foremost, a settlement that calls upon Israel to abide by the United Nations resolutions which brought Israel itself into existence, a settlement which defends human rights and upholds international moral obligations, a settlement which puts an end to the miseries of one million Palestine Arab refugees who are living in despair, despite their recognized rights to their homeland. partisan sauvegarde des les qui droits la de le patrie. 132. This is the kind of settlement that should be introduced, if we mean to secure peace and achieve permanent stability; not a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis between the parties, thus preconditioning the acceptance of Israel by its vietims. Then, what is that peaceful settlement which could be acceptable to both parties? What is the common denominator between the Arabs and Israel? The Secretary-General 132. poser lité mutuellement parties, bation ment Quel t 133. The result of this calculation, as it looks to me, wll1 end in nought. Thus the new theory of introducing a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis is very unrealistic. But if the Security Council wishes to seek a real solution to the Palestine question and to establish peace and restore confidence, then the ooly way would he to take action for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. 134-. My delegation takes a strong stand against this clause, and 1 humbly request its deletion. If it is meant to build a bridge between the gains of the Secretary- General and the future hopes for better condition.;;, then the bridge should be büilt on safe foundations to ensure a safe crossing; not on hollow ground that will saon give way. 135. This concludes the views of my delegation on the sixth paragraph of the preamble, and on paragraphs 4 and 7 of the operative part of the United Kingdom ciraft resolution. It will be observed that we objected to three paragraphs of the whole draft. Needless to say that, in doing so, we are prompted by the spirit of co-operation that has always guided my Government's actions in the international field. 136. 1 reserve my right to speak at a later stage in the debate if the occasion arises.

In once more addressing the Security Council, 1 should like to reaffirm my Government's determination to collaborate with United Nations organs in safeguarding the peace and removing causes of tension and anxiety which might disturb or threaten the peace. This is the spirit in which the Secretary-General was welcomed in Lebanon, where he set up bis headquarters, and was afforded aIl the assistance he required for the complete accomplishment of the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council. Having witnessed the efforts he made to discharge his responsibility, so far as was humanly possible, my Government cannot praise him too highly. 138. We believe that the best way to express our feelings conc:erning the Secretary-General and the work he has so brilliantly accomplished is to help him to consolidate the results he has obtained and to assure him of our continued co-operation in the implementation of other practical measures designed to ensure compliance with the armistice agreements and the elimination of the causes of tension along the demarcation lines. 140. The resolution of 4 April 1956 [8/3575] contained references to the resolutions of 30 March 1955 [S/3379], 8 September 1955 [8/3435] and 19 January 1956 [8/3538] regarding the acts of aggression committed by Israel at Gaza and Lake Tiberias; but the greatest danger to peace and security lies in the threat of the Israel leaders to appropriate the waters of the Jordan. 141. 1 would ask you to recall the t(;Dsion resulting from these threats and the detennination of the Arnbs to oppose them, the intervention of the Govemments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in an endeavour to dissuade Israel from carrying out these threats, and, lastly, the admission that the only result of this triple intervention was to postpone by two months the Israel ultimatum-a true ultimatum addressed not lancé to Syria, not to Jordan or Lebanon, the primary beneficiaries of the waters of the Jordan, because it rises and flows most abundantly in théir territory, but to the Security Council and the United Nations. àu attitude lier essuyé avoir exécution deux le de à ne moins des propagande, comte la la Conseil 144. avaient pas hautes trop 142. When the Security Council met on 26 March 1956 [717th meeting] at the request of the United States Govemment, it was largely because the consequences of Israel's threatening attitude had been foreseen. How can we fail to connect that praiseworthy initiative of the United States Government, motivated by a sincere desire for peace, with the' failum of the intervention it had undertaken jointly with the French and United Kingdom Govemments? 143. There was reason to fear that, after rejecting this triple request and merely postponing the date of their ultimatum, the Israelis would soon proceed to carry out the serious threat it contained. There were only two possibilities: either the statements in question meant that those who made them were determined to proceed from words to deeds, as they had done two years earHer at Qibya, and that they must be stopped; or those statements were nothing but blackmail, but were a menace nevertheless as· they were Hable to over-excite people constantly exposed to dangerous propaganda, as in the case of the assassination of Count Bernadotte; in this case also preventive action had to be taken, and, after the three Western Powers had failed, an aPPLal was made to the Security Council. 144. The qu~stion arises whether, when the Secretary- General was entrused with a task in which these Powers had failed, the Security Couneil did not overestimate the authority he exercised by virtue of bis high office or rather, if it did not overestimate Israel's goodwill. 146. In view of this serious situation, the Arab States could not but make express reservations lest Israel should, as it has clearly stated it would do, violate the clauses of the armistice agreements and, in defiance of the Security Council's decisions, embark on a course of action endangering security and seriousry compromising the situation created by the armistice agreements. 147. For this is not a mere economic scheme-undertaken, 1 might add, in violation of the age-oId rights of the Arabs to these waters; its unavowed purpose is in fact to destroy the equilibrium of the opposing forces and to secure for Israel a strategie and political advantage prohibited by the general armistice agreements, as the representative of Syria pointed out this morning. The Israelis are no doubt cageT to make use of the waters of the Jordan, but their daims must not take the waters away from the millions of refugees who have been driven into our territories and who have from time immemorial been the legitimate beneficiaries. How can the rights of the refugees be reconciled with the unlawful undertaking with which the Israelis are threatening them? If the waters of the Jordan were diverted for purposes of rnilitary and political expansion, it would in fact be at the expense of the refugees. 148. It must also be pointed out that the works planned by Israel would drastically change the terrain, thereby violating the provision of the general armistice agreements prohibiting any act which might affect the rights, daims or positions of either party in the final settlement. 149. In other words, what Israel is still seeking is a fait accompli-a situation which has always worked to its advantage, and which we can no longer tolerate. 150. 1 have dwelt on this point in order to show that it must be taken into consideration in assessing the practical value of the assurances obtained from the parties regarding the unconditional observance of the cease-fire order. The Secretary-General's success in this connexion, 50 warmly welcomed, might prove ta he illusory and the assurances themselves might be reduced to mere formaI and theoretical-and consequently ineffective--dedarations, if the real cause of the present tension were to remain. This is no doubt the possibility that the Secretary-General had in mind when he stated in his report: "More important than the legal uncertainties is the dependence of the cease-fire arrangement on the general situation. Strains may develop which wiII put the arrangement to a test for which the reestablished legal obligations prove too weak" [8/3596, para. 47]. 152. However, while one of the main causes, if not the main cause, of the tension remains, leaving uncompleted the mission defined by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 April 1956, the United Kingdom draft resolution seeks to extend the mission to new fields. Before contemplating such an extension it would have been desirable to see the original mission wholly fulfilled by observance of the armistice agreements and the aforementioned decisions of the Council, as the real interests of peace require. de inachevée mitée le l'étendre à intégralement d'armistice mément vement, du sité ment, poursuivre dans penser de économique avons dentes extension s'attache général tions convenu. 153. Is it not indeed an extension of the mission which is intended, when the draft resolution refers to a peacefuI settlement of the dispute between the parties, emphasizes the need to create conditions for such a settlement, and at the same time instructs the Secretary- General to continue his good offices? The absence of any indication of the purpose these good offices are to serve seems to imply that the Secretary-General is required to deal with every problem, be it political, economic or legal, which may calI for settlement. Yet we demonstrated clearly enough, at previous meetings of the Council, the danger of extending the Secretary- General's mandate in this way in present circumstances and the desirability of confining his action to matters within the scope of the armistice agreements. The Council unanimously agreed to this. 154. sur dérant blèmes quels [181 11 On prévoit figurant la parties, requises n'en l'objectif efforts tel, inspirer nous que portée. 154. Furthermore, by providing for a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis, the sixth para~aph of the preamble invites the Council to raise problems with which the General Assembly has already dealt, and for which it provided solutions in its resolutions of 29 November 1947 [resolution 181 (II)], 11 December 1948 [resolution 194 (Ill)] and 9 December 1949 [resolution 303 (IV)]. It may be argued against us that, as this paragraph providing for a peacefuI settlement on a mutually acceptable basis appears in the preamble, it is designed merely to preclude the possibility of a settlement being imposed on the parties and is not intended to define the necessary conditions for the settlement of the Palestine question. It is nevertheless true that this paragraph states the final objective towards which aU the efforts of the United Nations should be directed. It thus amounts to a statement of the principle on which those efforts should be based and by which they should be guided; that is why we consider it so important, and why, both for our sake ar.d for that of the members of the Council, its scope must be made clear. 155. on s'il blée la établie. 155. When we examine the text of this paragraph closely, we must admit that, in principle at least, while it does not expressly deviate from the General Assembly's resolutions, it nevertheless does not consider them as the basis on which the solution of these questions must rest. In other words, it opens the door to any other concep- 157. Should the Governments of the Arab States and Israel be free to decide jointIy on the future of the refugees, whose rights and legal status have been detennined by General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of Il December 1948? The text cf the sixth paragraph of the preamble gives them the right of sovereign decision on this question. Is the fate of Jerusalem, whose international status was established by General Assembry resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949, also to be left to the pleasure of the Arab and Israei Governments? The proposed text invites us to settle this problem without the participation of the persons concerned, who number about haIf of the world's population. The world community, through the General Assembiy, has expressed its wiH to place the Holy City under international authority. Is it for the Arab States and Israel, constituted as a sort of court of appeal superior to the General Assembly, to revoke the latter's historie decision? Such would be the consequences of the adoption of the sixth paragraph of the preamble. 158. We are looking for the causes of the tension which the Israel representative has described in such sûmbrc colours. According to him, there is a veritable plot indîcated by staff and troop concentrations, intensive armament, invasions of Israel territory-all of them signs of imminent hostilities. Meanwhile, Israel is yearning for a peaceful settlement of aIl the problems which divide it from the Arab States. We are told that the Prime Minister of Israel would even be ready to meet the Arab leaders to negotiate the peace he so fervently desires. However, the Secretary-General has just returned from the Arab countries and Israel which he visited on a peace mission. 1 look in vain in bis report for any information which might justify the Israel representative's daims; are we to believe that the Secretary-General has betrayed his mission and distorted the facts? 159. Yet, if the truce observers had been rcceived in Israel as other than tourists or visitors, they would have observed more than statements of intention and appeals to peace. They would have discovered the arsenal Israel has been building up in the Middle East for ten years aIready, which enables it to t1v'eaten its neighbours and, over their heads, the United l';ations itselJ:, with such undertakings as the diversion of the Jordan. It is true that these threats, from which even the Security Couneil is not immune, are coupled with invocations of peace. The Prime Minister of Israel had only to replace one record by another for us to hear now a war chant, now a sweet pastorale. ' ~arning that any resolution on Palestine which was not in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the concepts of justice would endanger international securit)r. c ~ .~ . 161. Events were to prove us right. A so-called political solution was chosen in preference to a just solution, and that is the mot of the evil. That solution, which was based on expediency, we later accepted, but it was never carried out and the failure to carry it out, resulting as it did in insecurity and encouraging successive infringements of law and justice, could not but lead us to the situation in which we find ourselves today. (, r t -''' 162. Although, as the United States representative has pointed out, the Security Council has devoted ninety meetings to the Palestine question over the past seven years, the United Nations has done nothing to implement the resoluiÏons which it has adopted and which aIl the parties concerned accepted in the Lausanne Protocol -an acceptance which was to be rendered ineffective, however, by the opposition which Israel, one of the signatories, expressed then and has continued to maintain up to the present. , , 163. It is no mere coincidence that the Lausanne Protocol was signed and immediately repudiated seven years ago by one of tre parties, and that the Security Council has had to devote so many meetings to the question during the past seven years. 164. One who seeks the reasons for the dangerous state of stagnation of the Palestine problem since that time, or who wishes to discover the causes of the clashes that have shaken the region from time to time, shoulû not look to the Arabs for the answer. 165. Surely it must be admitted that the situation which we deplore and which originated in the systematic opposition to the wishe.3 of the international community embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations, and to the implementation of the Lausanne Protocol, is due, in the first place, to the increasingly hostile attitude towards the Security Council's decisions, and particulady the decision of 27 October 1953 [S/3128] which prohibited any interference with the natural course of the Jordan. Surely it was against the failure to observe the decisions of the United Nations-whether of the Gr,neral Assembly or the Security Council-that the General Assembly resolutions of 3 November 1950, entitled "Uniting for peace" [resolution 377 (V)] were directed. It is pertinent to recall that, in the terms of section E of resolution 377 A (V), which was adopted unanimously, "a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of aIl the principles and purposes established in the Charter of the United 167. 1 have endeavoured to show that the retention of the sixth paragraph of the preamble in its present terms would not only serve no uscful purpose but, 1 would even say, would constitute '\ threat to pcace. 1 hope that this apprehension, which is shared by ail the Arab Governments, will he taken into consideration by the Couneil in order to enable the Secretary-General to pursue his mission effectively. 168. With regard to that mission, 1 have already stressed the importance of explaining the scope of paragraph 7 of the draft resolution by speeifying that the Secret:lry-General is requested to continue to fulfil it within the terms of reference laid down by the resolution of 4 April 1956. Those terms of reference have been one of the reasons for the success lhe Secretary- General has already achieved in his mission, and thcy should he retained in order to assure him of further success, with the collaboration of the Arab Govemments and in conformity with the United Nations resolutions. 169. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republies) [translated from Russian]: In a resolution adopted unanimously on 4 April 1956 [8/3575], almost two months ago, the Security Couneil requested the Secretary-GeI!eral to undertake a survey of the various aspect; of enforcement of the armistice agreements between the Arab States and Israel and to arrange with the parties for the adoption of possible measures to reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines. 170. We are gratified to note that th~ Secretary- General's visit to the Middle East has resulted in agreement being reached on the cease-fire. That is important. No less important are the assurances given to the Secretary-Gene,,:,;a by tl-- Governments of the States signatories tl) the ',rmistice agreements of their desire to comply v:~th those agreements. 171. It is still too early to express any view on the consequences of what the Secretary-General really achieved by his visit to the Middle East. It can, howeve~, he affinned with full confidence that there is every possibility of avoiding an armed conflict in the 173. It is quite obvious that the success of the measures taken by the United Nations to strengthen pcace in the Palestine area depends primariIy on the co-operation of the parties in the implementation of those measures. That is why it would he right for the Security Council to lay particular stress on that fact and to ca1l upon the parties to refrain from any actions that would constitute violations of the annistice agreements and the relevant United Nations decisions, for such violations would inevitably aggravate the situation in that region. We hope that the parties will approach the consideration and settlement of the questions that arise from the point of view of the preservation and strengthening of peace. 174. It is our firm conviction that the effectivenes of United Nations measures to secure peace in the area will aIso depend on the extent to "which the other States Memhers of the United Nations, and particularly the memhers of the Security Council, do everything possible 10 assist the United Nations in achieving a k-'eaceful settlement of the differences hetween the A.ra.b States and Israel. So far as the Soviet Government is concemed, it is ready to give the United Nations the necessary support in its efforts in that direction, on the understanding that measures to relax the present tension in the Palestine area will he taken with due regard for the wishes of the States of the Middle East and without interference in their domestic affairs. 175. In our oplDl0n, the Security Council should he guided by these principles in drafting its resolutions. The preparation of the Security Council's resolutions, and of other measures which the United Nations will take with a view to strengthe11ing peace in that region, should he preceded by careful consultation, particularly with the countries concemèd and aIso among the memhers of the Security Council, which bears the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace. 176. Unfortunate1y, the preparation of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom [S/3600/ R«v. 1] in connexion with the Secretary-General'~r-~port which is now before the Councll, was not in fact preceded by consultations between the sponsors and the representatives of the parties concemed, or between the sponsol'l and certain other memben of the Security Council, although there wu sufficient time for such consultatiPD. As Sir Pierson Dixon admitted in bis 177. We should like to make a few preliminary remarks about the United Kingdom draft resoiution. The draft contains a number of important provisions with which the Soviet Union delegation is in agreement. It aIso contains sorne provisions which give rise to doubt. There are also, in our opinion, certain points in the draft resolution which still require elucidation. This applies in particular to paragraph 7, in which the Secretary- General is requested ta continue his "good offices" with the parties. The meaning of this paragraph became clearer after the statment made by Sir Pierson Dixon. ln the light of his explanation, we understand this paragraph to mean that the Secretary-General's terms of reference in rendering his good offices will not exceed those conferred on him by the Security Council resolution of 4 April 1956. 178. In his statement, Sir Pierson Dixon said that the Secretary-General "would he available to help [the parties] now to make progress towards the full implementation of the resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the armistice agreements" [723rd meeting, para. 52]. 1 think ail membf>~ of the Council agree with this interpretation of the Secretary- General's task at this stage. If that îs so, why should we not state this clearly in the draft resolution, by making paragraph 7 more specifie? The Council's resolution could only gain from this clarification, and would take on additional authority. 1 appeal to the ~ponsors of the draft resolution to introduce the necessary clarification into paragraph 7. ~ 79. We note with satisfaction the other amendments which the United Kingdom delegation made to its draft resolution at the 723rd meeting, which clarify the text and makc it more precise; and we hope the United Kingdom delegation will take into account the desire expressed at the Council's meeting that a resolution should be drafted in a form which the Council could approve unanimously and which would he acceptable to the parties concerned. In particular, we must draw attention to what the Egyptian representative said with reference to paragraph 3, namely, that the wording of that paragraph departed somewhat from the wording used in the resolution of 4 April 1956, although both paragraphs dealt with the same subject and there would appear to be no reason for any change in wording. 180. It seems to us that the Council still needs sorne time in which to continu,. the consultations to which the representative of Iran, in particular, has referred here. ln our view, these consultations may lead to the production of a draft resolution acceptable to ail the parties directIy concerned.