S/PV.727 Security Council

Friday, June 1, 1956 — Session None, Meeting 727 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
10
Speeches
7
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions General debate rhetoric Security Council deliberations Global economic relations Peacekeeping support and operations Peace processes and negotiations

ELEVENTH YEAR 727
NEW YORK
(28 p. )
Symbols of United Nations documents with figures. Mention of such a symbol document.
Les cotes des documents de l'Organisation de lettres majwcules et de chiffres. signifie qu'il s'agit d'un document de
The agenda was adopted.
At the invitation ot the President, Mr. Loutfi, representative ot Egypt, M'T. Eban, representative of Israel, Mr. Ri/a'i, representative ot Jordan Mr. Ammoun, representative ot Lebanon, and Mr. Shu- kairy, representative of Syria, took places at the Security Council table.
Mr. Alphand FRA France on behalf of French delegation #185450
1 shaH be very brief in these explanatory remarks. We have heard many doubts and many fears expressed around our Council table. We must certainly take these doubts and these fears into account, because they are entertained by some of the States most deeply concerned with the solution of the problem before us. But at the same time 1 must add, on behalf of the French delegation, that 1 do not share aIl their apprehensions and do not consider them to be entirely justified. explications. la les des qui parlant partage trouve 2. The draft resolution which has been submitted to us by the United Kingdom representative [S/3600/Rev. 2] 2. représentant 3. Contrary to what has been said here, and as the United States representative clearly stated this morning, there is no difference between the spirit of the United Kingdom draft resolution which is before us today and the spirit of the United States draft resolution which was before us on 4 April 1956 [722nd meeting]. 4. In a praiseworthy spirit of conciliation, however, Sir Pierson Dixon was good enn,,~h this morning to orrer certain explanations wb;ch will ~o down in the record and will serve .." ... p'..sis for the implementation of the draft resolutiC' l before us. He also proposed two amendments which clarify certain paragraphs. 5. My delegation wishes to express its agreement with the text as amended. As a famous compatriot of mine used to say: " It goes without saying, but it is even better said ". This spirit of conciliation displayed by Sir Pierson Dixon should, 1 believe, meet with approval and should answer aH the fears and doubts which have been expressed here. Accordingly, the French delegation gives its whole-hearted support to the United Kingdom drait resolution as amended, and hopes that we shall be able to vote on it today.
The Soviet delegation wishes to express its satisfaction with the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation to operative paragraphs 3 and 7 of its original draft resolution. These amendments, in our opinion, substantially improve the draft resolution. 7. The Soviet delegation would like DOW to express its views on the sixth paragraph of the preamble. This paragraph, as we know, has met with serious objections on the part. of the representatives of a number of the parties having a direct interest in the matter-the Arab States-because its terms go beyond the framework of the draft resolution we are considering. 8. My delegation shares this view held by the representatives of the Arab countries. In our opinion, the draft resolution is merely a decision on the Secretary- General's report, in strict accordance with the terms of reference laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 April 1956 [S/3575]. We therefore consider that it would be wrong to go outside the framework of this question. The very wording of the relevant paragraph in the United Kingdom draft resolution, particularly if viewed in the light .~f the general content of the draft 9. If this paragraph was inc1uded in the draft resolution before us, it might be thought that the Couneil wished to derogate in sorne way from previous United Nat:ons decisions on the Palestine question. 10. We consider that this is not an appropriate occasion for the examination of that question; at the same time, we consider that the draft resolution before us must in no way be open to the interpretation that it constitutes a revocation by the Security Couneil of any United Nations decision. 11. In view of the fact that the terms of the sixth paragraph of the preamble have met with opposition from the parties concerned-and that, oÎ course, cannot help to bring about a future settlement of the Palestine problem-the Soviet Union delegation supports the Iranian proposaI [8/3602] for the delegation of that paragraph of the prea::nble. The adoption of the Iranian amendment would enable us, and other delegations too, to support the Udtcd Kingdom draft resolution, as amended.
1 will state the Caban delegation's v::,ws in a few words. When we said in our previous statemenL [723rd meeting] that generally speaking we would support the United Kingdom draft resolution in principle, we did so because we understood that the draft was capable of improvement and that certain doubtful points of the draft would have tû be explained by the United Kingdom representative. 13. The United Kingdom representative has accepted [726tlz meeting] two amendments which greatly improve the draft and has given such a satisfactory explanation regarding the sixth paragraph of the preamble that the Cuban delegation is now fully convinced that it does not alter in any way any previous decision of the United Nations. For this reason, the Cuban delegation will vote for the United KiD~dom draft resolution and regrets that it cannot vote for the amendment submîtted by the representative of Iran.
By the submission of the second revised text of the United Kingdom draft resolution [8/3600/Rev. 2], the debate in the Couneil has been considcrably narrowed. As 1 sense the situation, there remains really only one question before us, namely, whether we should retain or delete the sixth paragraph of the preamble. 15. 1 confess that 1 was much impressed by the statement made this morning by the representative of Iran. Mr. Abdoh rightly stressed the importance of the cooperation of aIl Governments which are parties to the 7'S? ...-, 16. After the explanations of this particular paragraph given this morning by Sir Pierson Dixon, 1 must say, with aIl respect to the United Kingdom representative, that 1 am more convinced than ever that this paragraph might well be deleted. Sir Pierson Dixon toId us that this paragraph did not impose anything on anybody, that it did not force anybody to give up any of his daims or positions. In other words, Sir Pierson Dixon virtually told us that this paragraph was harmless; he did not prove that it was important Why shou!d "Ne retain a paragraph that is not important, although harmless, in the face of the opposition that has been so openly and frankly declared here? 17. As 1 listened to Sir Pierson Dixon's statement this morning, 1 thought 1 heard him say that the sixth paragraph of the preamble was a forward-Iooking element in the draft resolution. 1 should like .0 dwell on this concept of forward looking. 18. First, 1 find a forward-Iooking eleme·Jt in several other paragraphs of the draft resolution. For example, paragraph 4 of the operative part ends with the phrase "in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties". That certainly is forward looking. Then, we find that paragraph 6 ends with the phrase "thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions". That, 1 would say, is also a forward-Iooking clement. 19. The merit of these two paragraphs is that they have been found ta he acceptable tû the Aïab Gûvemments. This merit of being acceptable is not shared by the sixth paragraph of the preamble. In the second place, "forward looking" must mean conducive to the promotion of a peace settlement or an eventual peace settlement. It is agreed that this settlement cannot be imposed from the outside; it must come from the parties directly concerned. The peace that we are trying to promote is peace by agreement and, in fact, the very wording of this partl~ular paragraph is "a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis". When we start the promotion of peace by agreement, let us do it right away. Let us not try to promote a peace settlement on a mutually acceptable basis by a resolution which is not mutually acceptable. We should not contradict ourselves at the very beginning of the process 20. The main purpose of our deliberations and of this resolution is, of course, to consolidate the gains resuIting from the Secretary-General's mission and to promote progress towards the full implementation by the parties of the armistice agreements. 1 humbly submit that the deletion of this paragré-ph would not detract in the least from that main purpose we have in mind. Ol! the contrary, 1 believe its deletion would secure for us and for the Secretary-General fuller and heartier co-operation from the Arab GoverIlT':lents directIy concerned. It is for this reason that my delegation must support the amendment submitted by Iran [8/3602] for the cleletion of this paragraph.
1 am grateful for the opportunity 1 am now given to intervene at this stage of the debate. It is certainly a pleasure and joy to participate in the deliberations of this Council under the pr-esiùency of the representative of Australia. But the purpose of our intervention is not to be found simply in that joy. We have noted, in the brier statements made by our President, the unbiased attitude and dignified position that hp is taking in conducting our business. But it is with the objective of explaining our position still further that 1 i:qtervene at this stage, and it is with that objective in mind that 1 may beg the inciù!?ence and patience of the Council to intervene again at a later stage for a further statement of our position on this highly serious problem. débat, et Conseil me avancé ration culièrement 22. An attempt has been made to rush this matter to a vote, to have the item concluded as soon as possible. We are Ilot against the speedy conduct of business. But 1 should like to remind the Council of the wise words uttered by our Secretary-General at a Press conference when he asked that the Council should not meet until sorne time had passed-time for the Governments and delegations, to use his words, to digest the material of his report. 22. à l'on ne mais le presse pas et propres rapport. 23. We have before the Council a highly important draft resolution, a draft re30lution which does not define procedures and methods but formulates policy. It is for this reason that sufficient time should be given for examining and deliberating upon this draft as it stands, sa that it may be digesterl - if i5 digestible. The report of the Secretary-General [8/3596] has been placed before the various delegations and has been examined for three weeks. No doubt, it has been prop' .y examined-and digested, too. It was weIl received by everybody concerned, and it was really digested. We want this draft resolution also to be digested, and not vornited by the Middle East fOk' any reason. 23. lution procédures C'est suffisant prejet puisse rapport diverses semaines. assimilé accueilli milp. bien à 26. In this regard, 1 shall not put before the Council aIl the information 1 have gained in private and informaI talks with my distinguished colleague and good friend, Sir Pierson Dixon, because these will be kept in confidence and will not be released before the Council. But ït has been stated here by two speakers that the phrase "on a mutuaiiy acceptable basis~~, which appears in the sixth paragraph of the preamble, h's been copied, word for ward, from the Anglo-Soviet declaration issued in connexion ,vith the visit of the leaders of the Soviet Union to London. With aIl due respect to the Soviet Union and to the United Kingdom, 1 humbly submit that the copying of these few words amounts in every sense to a mutilation of the Anglo-Soviet declaration, and 1 think it would be highly regrettable if, on every occasion when there is an international declaration, certain phrases were ta be tom from their context and placed before the Security Council in a different context and for a different purpose. 27. The Soviet Union and the United Kingàom, having negotiated certain international, regional and other questions, have the right to pronounce themselves in the way they wish. But that was a special occasion and in a proper context. 1 think it would ùetract greatly from the faimess of Sir Pierson Dixon to have these few words tom from the context of the Anglo- Soviet declaration and conveyed to the Security Council for its seal to be placed upon them. When 1 say that these words have been tom from their context, 1 do not do so without justification. This is not an arbitrary conclusion that 1 make. Again, this is without any intention of being discourteous to the United Kingdom delegation. 28. Yersterday 1 said that l would invoke only the language of frankness and not the language of diplomacy. 1 was reminded that frankness was rcally the language of diplomacy. 1 hope that this is 50 and that the one who reminded me is right and that 1 am wrong. In fact, we have to address ourselves to the Council with our mind and conscience, and place before it the facts as we know them to be. 29. After aIl, the problem is our problem. It is not the main problem of any ~e!egation here. It is certainly the problem of the Se€urity Council in the discharge of its duties with regard to international security. But in the main it is not the problem of 30. In the main, 1 should say that it is the problem of a party which, unfortunately, is absent from the deliberations of this CounciI. With whom are we deal· ing? With whose rights are we dealing? With what territory are we dealing ? Eventually, the problem is the problem of the people of Palestine and belongs to the territory of Palestine. Where are the people of Palestine? Are they represented here béore the Council? 31. When Sir Pierson Dixon asks in his draft resolution that an agreement should be made on an acceptable hasis between the parties, where is the main party? Is the main party represented here? It!s true that the Arah ?ove.rnments c~n defend the rights of the peopl.e, of th~!r Inth and kln, the refugees, ~vho are now· in r~unps_ But wc cannet relin.quish thcir rights; we rannot negotiate on their behalf. It is their inherent ~ights which arc enshrined in the Charter. 1 think 'hat we should take full notice of the fact that those l'ights for which we are tl'ring ta find a mutually a.cceptable solution belong to a party which is absent from the dcliberations of the CounciI. How this party is absent and how this absence has been caused is another question, with which 1 will not weary the Council at the moment. 32. Even on the strength of the 'Anglo-Soviet declaratian, these few words are a mutilation of the ideas of the Soviet Union as weIl as the ideas of the United Kingdom as far as we ca!'! read them in that declaration. Let me read just a few sentences from that declaration as reported in The New York Times of 27 April 1956, which 1 happen to have with me. This is the only authority available to me, at least at the moment. What does it say? The two Governments, in their dedaration, state: "For this purpose they"-the two Governments- "will give the necessary support to the United Nations in its endeavour to strengthen peace in the region of Palestine and to carry out the appropriate decisions of the Security Council." 33. The first main idea, therefore, that appears in that declaration is to put into effect appropriate Security Council resolutions. Where is this idea in the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the United Kingdom draft resolution? Where does that idea appear in the draft resolution? This is one of the main objectives of the declaration, one of the corner-stones of the combined thinking of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. We see it absent from this draft resolution. Is that not a mutilation of the Anglo-Soviet declaration? The declaration adds: 34. Let us proceed further. "The Governments of the two countries consider ' that effective measures should be undertaken in the immediate future ...". The declaration continues: "to this end in accorclance with the nati.onal aspirations of the people concerned." 35. Let me invite your attention to this portion of the declaration. Here is the idea of the national aspirations of the people concerned. This is not an idea foreign to the United Nations, because the national aspirations of the people concerned constitute one of the fundamental principles enshrined in our Charter. Why is it that the United Kingdom delegation does not find it convenient to include the idea of the national aspirations of the people concerned? 36. Can we betray the principle of self-determination and our respect for the national aspirations of the people concerned, wherever they may be, whether they are in camps, in the desert or living in caves? After aIl, they are the people meant by the Charter. The Charter does not designate those people who are living in Palestine or in the capitals or territories of the big Powers. The people are the people wherever they live, whether they are refugees in camps or otherwise, whose national aspirations must he respected. If they are ignored, then the draft resolution wo;.rld certainly be a betrayal of the Charter of the United Nations, to say nothing of a betrayal of the Anglo-Soviet declaration itself. 37. If we proceed a bit further, we find that the declaration says: "They recognize the importance of the problem of the refugees and accordingly will support action of the United Nations directed towards the alleviation of their hardships." This was specifically provided for in the Anglo-Soviet declaration, and not in general terms. The declaration was not speaking about pronouncements of policy or about principles of the United Nations in a vacuum. This is a specific problem which was weIl taken care of in L'le Anglo-Soviet declaration by the statement that measures should be taken by the United Nations in order ta a11eviate "their hardships". 38. In a moment, 1 will tell you what is the position with regard to the problem of the refugees in order to show you that this draft resolution is against action ta alleviate their hardships. Bear this in mind for a moment. At a later stage, 1 will explain how this particular wording of the draft resolution is contrary to the very specLfic sentences in the Anglo-Soviet declaration. 39. But should the United Kingdom be gukled, really, sincerely and honestly, by the Anglo-Soviet declaration? ~PIY put ~ que.tioo. ~ Umt~ ~= ~ 40. What is that declaration? 1 am not going into the merits of it and 1 am not going to bring in a foreign subject as regards the matter. 1 am not making any comment pro or con in connexion with this question, but 1 am simply putting the question for clarification before the United Klngdom delegation. Why is it that the United Kingdom has chosen a phrase from the Anglo-Soviet declaration and not phrases which appear ta be in the Baghdad Pact, to which pact the United Kingdom is a party, and a worthy party? 41. 1 am not going to make any reference to that pact in any manner at aIl. But 1 have here a United Nations document in respect of which the request has been made that it should be registered as part of the Pact in the archives of the United Nations; it is a proto.':ol to tqe Baghdad Pact, to which the United Kingdom has become a party. It is the basis of that Pact, and 1 assume that it would form the basis of the membership of the United Kingdom to that Pact. 42. The docwnent is from the Prime Minister of Iraq ". •. ",'.1....... 'ff'.. '1 "1 ....1 IIi conneXiOn wun rnar racr. 1t IS aooresseo ro me Prime Minister of Turkey. This is not an ordinary letter that may appear in the newspapers. It is contained in the archives of the United Nations at this very moment, with a rcquest to be registered as a protocol to the Pact, to which, as 1 said, the United Kingdom is a party. May 1 be permitted to read the foIlowing passage: "In connexion with the Pact signed by us today, 1 have the honour to place on record our understanding that this Pact will enable our two countries to cooperate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them, and that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions conceming Palestine." 43. This is the protocol of the Prime Minister of Iraq, one of the founders of the Baghdad Pact. 1 also have the answer from the Prime Minister of Turkey, another founder of the Baghdad Pact, which says the foIlowing: "1 have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter of today's date"-this is in connexion with the Pact and l.ùntains ail the information in the letter that 1 have read, to the effect that the parties to the Pact have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions conceminb Palestine. 1 1 45. If the United Kingdom is a party to that Pact, certainly it should be a party to this policy, namely that peace in the Middle East can onIy be secured by the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. If the United Kingdom is anxious to offer certain quotations from international declarations, 1 think it would he better advised tü üffer a qUûtation from its own Pact, being the great architeët and the great engineer of that Pact-this without reference or reflection as to the merits or demerits of that arrangement in the sense of being a regional arrangement or otherwise 1 wish that Sir Pierson Dixon, in his clarification-if he is kind enough to make such clarification-will show us why he has referred to a quotation from the Anglo- Soviet declaration and not to a quotation from the United Kingdom's own Pact, from its own alliance, and from the very organization it has created itself. 46. Let me now move to another point which has been referred to by Sir Pierson Dixon. His argument with regard to the sixth paragraph, if 1 understood him correctly, ~ that, legal considerations apart, in fact and in practice how can one hope for the settlement of any international question without the agreement of the parties? This is Ùle main question which Sir Pierson Dixon has placed before the Council-with eloquence a:ld with ability, 1 admit. 1 would not quarrel with him on the point that, generally speaking, one can hardly hope to have a peaceful settlement without the acceptance of the parties. ln general, in international dealings and relations, this is a correct statement. 47. But let us examine it for a moment and see how far it applies to the Palestine problem and to Israel as a party. 1 venture to submit that the problem of Palestine is not an ordinary problem, as the Council knows. It doe-s not come de noua to the United Nations. It has a lengthy history in the records of the United Nations, which 1 need not refer to or repeat. But 1 would like to suggest-and this is my humble submission -that the Palestine problem is not one of those international problems to which that general statement of Sir Pierson Dixon can apply. Why? 48. The answer is quite clear. When there is a dispute between two States, an acceptable solution would normally have to be sought. This will in no sense apply to Israel. The problem of Palestine is a United Nations problem. The problem of Palestine, at least now, is not a problem of the agreement of the 49. When the problem was brought up in 1947, what was our point of view? We said, "What about the will of the people?" The United Nations overruled us; the United Nations said that the country would have to he partitioned. In 1947, wher.e was the concept that a solution should be acceptable to the parties? Where was that wisdom hidden? Where was that statement of international practice concealed? We stated that a solution couId not be arrived at without the agreement of th!'" Arnbs as a party, and we were cveIT'.lled. 50. Now, after nine years, we are again faced with the statement that it is necessary to have a mutually acceptable solution. This position might be correct for a problem about which no solution had been decreed by the United Nations. 1 invite the attention of those who think that our fears and apprehensions are not justificd to the following analysis. 51. The draft resc!ution refers te "a peaceful settiement on a mutually acceptable basis". That would mean that the United Nations had not embarked on a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. But that is wrong. There have been almost fifty resolutions of the United Nations dealing with Palestine. There is a lengthy record of resolutions which decree solutions for the various aspects of the Palestine problem. There are many resolutions for the solution of the Jerusalem question; there are numerous resolutions for the solution of the question of the refugees; there are numerous resolutions for the solution of territorial matters. Ail these resolutions have been decreed by the United Nations in the interests of a peaceful settlement of the problem. 52. When a member of the Security Council cornes before us now, after nine years, and states that we must seek a peaccful settlement on a mutually acceptable ba~is, we are entitled to ask him, "What about the settlement that has already been accepted by the United Nations? Ts it still valiù?" J I 53. The United States delegation has said with courage and the French delegation has said with eIoquence that they think that it docs not derogate from the validity of the United Nations resolutions. Our fears are ours, not Yo'lrs; our fears rest in our mind, not in your minds. If they do not rest in your minds, that does not mean that they are not legitimate fears; that does not mean that they are absent from our minds and from our hearts. If you do not share our view, that does not mean that the view is not strongly expressed by the 54. Let me examine the question from another angle. The resolutions of the United Nations have created rights and obligations. With regard to these rights, 1 would say that they would exist even without the resolutions of the General Assembly. Let me assume for a moment, however, that those rights were established by the resolutions of the General Assembly. What are those rights? 55. Let us take one illustration: the right of the refugees to repatriation or to choose compensation if they do not wish to return. Is this not a right? It is certainly an inherent right to be found in the Charter. But everv citizen in the world is entitled to return to his homeland, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights points out, aside from the granting of that right by the Charter or by any international organization. This is a right which exists and this right is not subjeet to acceptance or refusaI by Israel. It is not subject to acceptance or refusaI by the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union or the United States or France or any other member of the Seeurity Couneil, whether permanent or non-permanent. 56. Sir Pierson Dixon is subjeeting these rights to aeceptanee or refusaI by IsraeL 1 know that he does not intend to go so far, but that is the clear interpretation of this paragraph of the draft resolution wmch states, in the name of the Seeurity Council, that we must seek "a péaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis". 1 say that those rights are destroyed when you subject t.l}em to the aceeptance of a party. 57. The rights of the refugees to their homeland preexisted the establishment of Israel. Those people have been the legitimate inhabitants of the country since time immemorial-long before the United Nations recommendation for partition and for the establishment of Israel. Those rights, which existed even before the birth of Israel-which took place here in the United Nations--cannot be subjected to the dangers of the phraseology used in the United Kingdom draft resolution. 58. Let me examine the matter from another angle, and there are many angles to this question because the draft resolution has opened many avenues of thought. The fault is not ours. The fault can be attributed to the fact that this draft resolution attempts to go beyond the mission of the Secretary-General and beyond the Security Council resolution of 4 April 1956. 59. 1 know that the objective of the Security Council is to finish what is unfinished, and not to start a new task. If the Council's objective is to finish what is unfinished, the Council should just say so in simple words. Let the Secretary-General exert his best endeavours and be available to the parties, and We shaH f L 60. The Secunty Council is a principal organ of the United Nations. It has powers that have been carefully set out in the Charter. The General Assembly is also a principal organ of the United Nations, with powers which have been weIl defined in the Charter. We cannot ignore the fact that the United Nations has dealt wlth the Palestine question from 1947 until the last sessiûn of the General Assembly. It will probably continue to deal with it at forthcoming sessions until the rebellion against the resolutions of the lJnited Nations is broken. - . Lr 61. What has the General Assembly done? The General Assembly has adopted resolutions of major policy. Beginning in 1947, the General Assembly made recommendations which were not mere1y of an ordinary character. 1 invite the attention of the members of the Council to the seriousness of the rôle assumed by the General Assembly. The rôle adopted by the General Assembly was not an ordinary rôle; it was an exceptional one. 62. The General Assembly partitioned a territory. Whether or not it was justified, its resolution 181 (II) was not a simple resolution. The Assembly established thereby aState which it declared independent. It declared the relinquishment of a mandate. It established powers of legislation in the area. It gave in general terms the provisions for the statute of Israel and for the statute of an Arab State. It became not only a legislative body, but an executorial, an administrative body. The United Nations is supposed to administer Jerusalem as a corpus separatum. It has legislated a constitution for Israel and stated what Israel should and should not do and what the Arab State should and should not do. o::S. This is a resolution which is the size of h'lenty resolutions put together. The United Nations assumed that exceptional rôle and now, ten years after it assumed that rôle, aIl of a sudden we are confronted by a statement that this is not our rôle, wc just wash our hands of the problem and we must seek a mutuaUy acceptable basis for the solution of the problem, as though it had come de novo before you, as though you had never heard of the Palestine question. r 64. This is not worthy of the intelligence and the dignity of the Security Council and the Members of the United Nations. The General Assembly did not only pronounce itself on a major policy, but it expressly said that the settlement should be made on the basis of the resolutions 65. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 512 (VI) the Ge ,' J neral Assembly urges the Governments concernt'd to seek agreement"-you see, the very same words are used here in the draft resolution with "on a mutually acceptable basis"-"with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the re:SüluüoIls of the Generai Assembly on Palestine". This is something which cannot be denied. This is a resolution of the General Assembly which expressly declares that even the agreement of the parties on the settlement of the Palestine question must be in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly. 66. Why was that done? What was the wisdom of that? Was that a trespass by the United Nations on the freedom of the parties, a rider to the agreement of the parties? No, originally that was the policy of the United Nations because it was a United Nations problem, because this is the rôle that has been assumed by the United Nations, because the United Nations is seized of the problem and is handling the problem. It is because of that assumption, because of that jurisprudence of the General Assembly, that the United Nations always says to the parties that they must seek agreement in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly. But the draft resolution now before the Security Council says that the parties should seek agret'mt'nt between themselves. 67. What about the resolutions of the General Assembly? Will Sir Pierson Dixon be prepared-and this is a question to which 1 require an answer-to accept paragraph 4 as it stands in resolution 512 (VI), which carries his thoughts? He says that an agreement should not be imposed, and paragraph 4 also states that it should not be imposed but that the parties must seek agreement. 1 should like to know whether the Security Council is ready to go so far as to derogate from the General Assembly resolutions. Does the Securty Council find itself empowered to issue a recommendation or a decision against the very intention and wording of the General Assembly? 1 should like the Security Council to deal with this point also and to ponder upon it, because it will have serious implications for the future business of the Security Council and for its powers and for the conflict which may arise b~tween the powers of the General Assembly as a principal organ of the United Nations and the powers of the Security Council as it stands. 69. The representative of China, with exemplary ability, has told the Security Council plainly that this draft resolution advocates a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis, but that the Council is starting with a resolutian which is not acceptable to the parties. What is the net result? The Council is unnnl!' a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis, but still i t will not take full note of the fears, and the legitimatc fears, of the principal parties in the question. How can on proceed to achieve a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis when the basis of the resolution itself is not acceptable? 70. The clarifications of the United States representative are certainly worthy of consideration. We have been told that this draft resolution does not derogate from the General Assembly resolutions. The representative of France has said the same thing. However, clarifications do not become the eventual resolution, although no doubt they are on record. 71. In this connexion, 1 must say with all frankness that 1 did Dot hear Sir Pierson Dixon say that this draft resolution did not derogate from the General Assembly resolutions. Ail he said was that it was no derogation and was no prejudice to the positions which the parties might wish to take. But that is one thing, and saying that the authority of the United Nations is still there, that the resolutions are still valid, is another thing. . We are not now dealing with the positions of the parties. That is another matter entirely. We are free to take whatever positions we wish, as we may be advised, but the positions are not the question. 72. 1 did not hear the United Kingdom representative say that his delegation supported the idea that û'1e resolutions of the General AssemblYJ adopted by a majority vote and properly adopted by the United Nations, had authority and validity. It is for this reasonJ because 1 did not hear him say that, that 1 am quite justified in continuing to be deeply entrenched in my fears and apprehensions. 73. As 1 have said, our fcars are ours. We have lived with this problem for many years. It is our kith and kin. We are greatly and deeply gratified that you are taking this concern about them, but eventually the problem is ours, and the peace of the area, first and 74. It has been said that this Palestine question may cause a conflagration. It may and it may not; I do not know. However, there is one thing that you may be sure of: that the people in the Middle East whom we represent here are keen for peace. But what sort of peace? Not a peace which would liquidate the rights of the peopl~ to their homeland and to their property. That would certainiy be no peace. That is aggression, pure and simple-and aggression against the rights of the people. Aggression cannot be made the basis of peace. 75. Those who conduct the orchestra of peace should know that peacc is a matter of deeds, not dedaïations; it is a matter of action, not a matter of words. Those who throw people out ta live in exik, in their tents, for eight yeats, and who then CüŒe here· to speak of pcacc, certainly do not give evidence of a peaceful mind and a peaceful attitude. It is not !lufficient ta make a declaration before the Securitv Council that vou are for peace when at the same tm;.e you declare 'before the Palestine Conciliation Commission, before the General Assembly, in aIl Press conferences and in the Knesset, that you are against the repatriation of a single refugee to his homeland. Those who conduct an orchestra of peace must meet this test before the Securi1:} Council. 76. The Council has heard the representative of the Soviet Union. What did he say? He told the Council that the sixth paragraph of the preamble was not acceptable to the parties mainly concerned, and that it was no use trying to force a resolution when the parties had grievous and serious criticisms to make of it. 1 think that this valuable advice of the Soviet Union should be heeded at least by the United Kingdom delegation, which has quoted from a declaration described as the Anglo-Soviet declaration. If you like the Anglo- Soviet declaration-weIl, then, accept the advice of your neighbour in this case too. This is a Soviet declaration made in the Security Council: that you should pay heed to those around this table who represent the Arab Governments and the people of the area. 77. 1 do not understand why you limit yourself to Soviet declarations in London and why you do not accept Soviet declarations here in the Security Council. 1 think you would he weIl advised to heed t..lJ.e counsel of the Soviet Union, because on this question the Soviet Union has given valuable advice to the Security Council. Ml'. Sobolev, with his clear mind and cool calculation, with his eloquent approach to the proble""" has given the Security Council this warning. There 1S no use in sending the Secretary-General under the umbrella of this resolution. 78. That is not only the warning of China or of the Soviet Union; let me tell you, as a representative of one of the Governments in that are;;L, that the Secretary- General cannot go to the Middle East under the umbrella of this resolution. ~ boat. 1 was told that there were two boats-and 1 ~ rcmarked that there were two boats, but tied together. 80. Let us do business. This is not the time ta try ta make statements and resolutions. If you want solutions, you have to look at the background of this question. This is not a new matter before the Security Couneil. This is not a warning that 1 am issuing. Far from that. It is simply advice that 1 should like ta offer ta the Security Council. For the sake of the dignity of the Sccurity Council and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Holy Land, for the sake aI the Secretary-General's efforts, which have been praised by everybody, and for tne sake of the confidence that he has been able ta gain a"'1d the ground that he has been able to caver, do not adopt this draft resolution. 81. If you do, everything will collapse. 1 do not think that this is the result intended by anybody. But, if it is the result intended, it will be a very sad result. We will certainly be very sarry not ta see the Secretary- General in the Middle East ta finish what has remained unfinished within the armistice agreements, ta reduce whatever factors of tension exist along the demarcation lines. But if you embark on a policy solution, on a political matter, if you seek other objectives than the objective of protecting the armistice, then you are going nowhere: you are protecting neither the objectives you have in mind nor the objectives of the armistice agreements. 82. 1 pray that 1 shaH not have to take the floor again, that 1 shall not have to intervene at another stage ta state before the Security Couneil a position which really reflects the deep feeling of the Arab world on this queftion. 1 should like ta address an appeal ta Sir Pierson Dixon, in a coneiliatory spirit and in a spirit of great respect, that he review and revise his attitude and his draft resolution. There is still ample time ta do it. If it is not done, and if it is not done at the rhrht moment, then 1 am afraid that the Secretary-General wi1! find himself in a position of great Îrustration and altogether unable ta serve the cause of p~ace and justice in this thorny question which has been a recurring item on the agenda of the United Nations from year ta year. 83. 1 thank the Couneil for its patience. 1 hope that the representative of the United Kingdom will answer my questions, will clarify the ambiguities that 1 have pointed out, will remove the fears and doubts that 1 have expressed, and 1 hope that he will reconsider his position.
1 thank the President for again giving me the floor. 86. In operative paragraph 3 he has deleted the phrase "in ail areas". Consequently this parag.aph is couched in the same terms as the resolution of 4 April 1956 [8/3575] and is thus not amenable to any Other interpretation. Furthermore, in paragraph 7 he has added the phrase "with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the armistice agreements". We now lmow what the Secretary-General can accomplish in this sphere. There can now be no question of the clarity of paragraph 7, and the members of the Council and the parties can have no doubt that the Secretary-General's mission is within the scope of the resolution of 4 April 1956, which was proposed by the United States and adopted unanimously by the Council. We fully appreciate Sir Pierson Dixon's efforts. Moreover, the phrase that he has added coincides perfectly with his interpretation of that paragraph, an interpretation confirmed by the majority of the members of the Council including the United States and Soviet Union representatives. 87. Unfortunately, there remains one point on which agreement has not been reached; 1 refer to the sixth paragraph of the preamble. In the statement which 1 made before the Council on 31 May 1956 [725th meeting], 1 explained my delegation's views on this delicate question. 1 said, inter fJ:ùa, that this paragraph was open to varying interpretations, and that it would considerably exceed the terms of the Secretary- General's mandate and of the report [8/3596] which he had submitted to us. 1 went 50 far as to ask the United Kingdom representative how that paragraph would affect the United Nations resolutions relating to Palestine. 1 also pointed out that the paragraph was not at aIl in line with our discussions, with the Secretary'- General's report or with the resolution of 4 April 1956. Today 1 would add that 1 do not understand why it has been included in the draft resolution, particularly as it can in nG way help the Secretary-General in his delicate task and, if it were adopted, would mean that our resolution did not enjoy the unanimous approval of the Security Council and the parties concemed. 88. Yesterday the Yugoslav representative rightly emphasized how important it was that we should have a unanimously adopted resolution. In his statement this moming, the United States rep:~~entativo said that this paragraph in no way impIied ar:y departure by the Security Council from the C.~neral Assembly resolutions. In his opinion, the stress that had been laid :)0 the conditions for a peaceful settlement meant that those conditions were identical with those mentioned in the resolutiol1 of 4 April 1956, in other words, the absence of incidents, the reduction of tension and the application of the annistice machinery. 1 wonder if Sir Pierson 90. Accordingly, my delegation appeals to the members of the Council to vote for the amendment which has been submitted by th Iranian representative [8/3602], bath for the reasons which the latter explained in his long statement this morning, and which 1 need not repeat, and for the reasons which 1 have had the honour to present to you. 91. If the paragraph should unfortunately be adopted, 1 shall make the most definite reservations concerning it and concerning our attitude to this question. We have always co-operated with the Secretary-General as we have promised; we have made every possible effort to make his delicate mission easier. It is in this spirit that we urge th;:; Council to adopt the amendment submitted by the lranian delegation. 92. In conclusion, 1 should like to remind you of what the lranian representative said this morning: "We must try t ù consolidate the Secretary-General's achievements and at the same time to eliminate the causes of tension and refrain from including in the Council's resolution controversiaI ideas which, instead of helping tc' maintain the present favourable climate, would increase tension and regrettably close the door to any prospect of future progress" [726th meeting, para. 23]. ln my view, these words of the lranian representative are really most pertinent. 93. 1 have confidence in your wisdomj 1 am sure that tI1P. appeal that 1 am making to you to vote for the amendment submitted by the lranian delegation will be heard and that you will not come to a decision on this important question affecting the interests of the Arab countries until you have reflected deeply and taken the l"94tim.e nMec r essary . .AMtM o GO"OUsN°' no (Lebanon) (translated trom French) : 1 have listened carefully to the additionaI explanation which the United Kingdom representl\tive has been good enough ta provide in order to justify the 1 adoption of his draft resolution. 1 thank him for havmg deferred ta the arguments put forward by my delegation and the other Arab delegations with regard to operative paragraph 7, and for having agreed that that 1 paragraph would have to be amended in order to enable 96. Sir Pierson Dixon explained his reasons for defending bis text. In 50 doing, he felt constrained to explain it more fully, ta clarify it and ta present it in a new light. A twofold question thus naturally arises: do his expianatians supplement the text in question and, if so, why not insert them in the text itself? 97. What we fear is the objection-whether in the Security Council or outside, and whether tomorrow or in the future-that whatever was not incorporated in the text at the proper time, even if put fOIward by the author of the text) does not have legal force. A consistent attitude is called for here, for have we not been told that the resexvations ta the cease-fire undertakings were not a part of thase undertakings so long as they were not actually incorporated in them? The similarity between the two situations compels us ta be dissatisfied with the United Kingdom representative's explanations, even though they may he satisfactory in substance, unless they are embodied in an amendment. 98. 1 regret that the Peruvian representative who, as he said, represents a small Power, added the weight of his opinion in support of the sixth paragraph on the ground that the great Powers bear the responsibility for the maintenance of peace. Peace, for countries like ours, which are smaller than his own, depends equally as much on the application of the principles of the Charter ta which we have ail, both large and small, subscribed. 99. If J. may now revert to the substance of the question, 1 would like to point out that the paragraph in question in its present form, far from promoting peace, is fraught with danger to peace. It is fraught with danger hecause it encourages Israel in its openly hostile attitude to the resolutions of the United Nations and, more particularly, to those relating to the settlement of the Palestine question. This danger to peace arising from failure to cornply with the resolutions of the United Nations is, let me repeat, dearly demonstrated by the General Assembly resolution of 3 November 1950 (resolution 377 (V)]. 100 W ha he Id d . th th . e ve en to over an over agam at e text in question does not infringe upon the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. If that is so, why not eliminate it from the decision about ta he taken by the Council? If that is not done, the world at large will he given the impression that. the Security Council is, at least implicitly, endorsing non-compliance with the ...oIuti.,", on Pal..tioe ;n the event that an agreement 101. Such an attitude would, moreover, have the effect of giving certain States, namely, the Arab States and Israel, the right to settle questions, such as those concerning refugees and Jerusalem, which had already been acted upon by the United Nations General Assembly. Those questions were referred to by me yesterday. As the representative of Syria discussed them at length a few moments ago, 1 shall not revert to them. 102. 1 shaH refrain from a further discussion of the reasons which would force us to make the most emphatic reservations if the draft resolution before you were adopted without the elimination of the sixth paragraph of the preamble. 103. We are always ready to welcome the Secretary- General in the continuance of the task which he has embarked upon so successfuUy, but reservations must be made if this draft resolution is adopted in its present form. Should that happen, 1 could only refer to my Govemment for instructions on the decision to be taken with regard to the resolution, and more particularly to the paragraph in question. 104. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): Yesterday and today, the representatives of the four Arab $tates sitting around this table expressed their views in respect of the present draft resolution of the United Kingdom [S/3600/Rev. 2]. Those views were put in the most sincere and frank manner. leurs la 1 actuelle, la et autant sentiment 105. We believe that this draft resolution in its present form is not an adequate instrument to be used for achieving peace in the Palestine area, and that, on the contrary, it obstructs any endeavours in that direction. The statements that we made represent not only the views of our respective Governments or of the other Arab Governments that are equal1y concerned about Palestine, but those of aIl the Arab peoples wherever they may be.· It is the genuine feeling of every Arab not to surrender to any political expediency at the expense of his people's rights and national aspirations. 106. To the Araos, the tragedy of Palestine is a big wound that goes deep into their hearts. It demonstrates itself every day and every minute in the misery wruch is spread in the camps of the Arab refugees, in the conarabes, tinued attacks on the Arab frontier viIlages along the demarcation line and in the national and international ligne difficulties that face the Arabs as a result of the creation national of Israel. faire 107. The problem of Palestine is a highly sensitive one, that should he approached with a great deal of eare and mement caution. We want to invite the attention of the sponsor de of the present draft resolution and the Couneil to the à fact that if this draft resolution, with the new kind of qu'adopter settlement it envisages, is passed, then the bridges nouvelle towards peace in Palestine wi1l he destroyed. If there couper ould he a mention of a setrlement of the Palestine21 dmt 109. This paragraph is the reason for the conflict in the present deliberations. Whether it is interpreted in this way or that, and whether it contradicts United Nations resolutions or does not, are not the only points which we value. The point is, why should this paragraph he included in the draft resolution ? Why does not the sponsor agree to omit the paragraph? Since the Arab representatives have a strong feeling against this paragraph, and since their consent to the draEt resolution is required for the c..rrying out of the mission of the Secretary-General, then there is no justification for keeping it in the draft resolution. 110. This paragraph envisages a settlement where the acceptance of Israel is conditional, thus compromising the legitimate Arab rights in Palestine, which rights have continually been confirmed in United Nations resolntions. It is to· this particular principle, the principle of compromise at the expense of legitimate rights, that we objec~ iu this paragraph. 111. 1 do not like ta feel that our views in respect of the necessity of deleting it are underestimated, nor would 1 like to say that our appraisal of the situation in our area interestimates the situation. The least 1 could submit to the Council is that, if the present draft resolution is adopted, then the efforts for reducing tension in the region and maintaining order and security will be paralysed. It is for the Council, in its wise judgement, to decide on this matter. 112. 1 should aiso like to bring to the attention of the big Powers, which are trying to set a new basis for the settlement of the Palestine question of the kind mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the preamble to this draft resolution, that international responsibility should make it imperative for them to have a better appreciation of the mounting awakening among the masses of the people in ollr region. People there are no longer tied to old mIe! and limitations, nor do they adhere any more to the political concept of force. The spirit of liberation is as!erting itself vehemently among them. What is decided in the capitals of the big Powers in the West and in the East alike does not d~tennine their dcstiny. They believe that right cornes before might, and on this theme they fonn their <!ecisions. 114. The representative of Iran has submitted an amendment [8/3602] deleting the sixth paragraph of the preamble. ln doing so, he is trying to end the conffict of views in our discussions and to remove the ambiguity under which we have been labouring. 1 e"tend to him and to his Government the deep appreciation of the Jordan delegation for his helpful attitude. 1 should like to see the Council adopt this amendment. 1 hope that the representative of the United Kingdom can also accept it. 115. Ml'. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): As my delegation and manl' other delegations have pointed out in the course of our debate, the success obtained so far in pursuance of the course upon which we embarked on 4 Apri11956 was due to a very large, indeed, to an essential, degree to the fact that it had both the unanimous support of the Securitl' Council and was generally acceptable to the parties most directIl' concerned. 116. As 1 said in ml' previous statement [724th meeting], anything short of such general agreement might weIl impair the value of our further efforts. It has clearll' emerged from the discussion so far, and especially this afternoon, that such general agreement is not forthcoming in this case, although the area of disagreement has been considerably narrowed, and that the one remaining stumbling black is the sixth paragra!Jh of the preamble. 117. Even if sorne of us mal' regret that a number of parties direr:tll' conc('rned have not been able to find a wal' to accept the clarifications that have been offered by the sponsor, and that thel' have not been convinced bl' the very able legal analysis of the representative of Peru, Ml'. Belaunde, the fact remains that thel'. still very definitell' object to this paragraph. This objection would appear to make it impossible for them 10 accept the draft resolution as a whole, and would certainl)' impair the value of our future efforts. 118. We, for our part, agree that it is the duty of the Council to endeavour to help bring about conditions in which the parties will be able to achieve a mutually ...cceptable settlement of their differences. We cannot see, however, how a mutually acceptable settlement could he reached if the starting point of our efforts towards such a settIement were to be anything less than a mutually acceptable one. 119. My delegation, therefore, will. vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the representative of Iran [8/3602] to delete the sixth paragraph of the preamble. 120. Mr ABDOH (Iran) (translated {rom French): 1 have asked to speak in order to propose that the meeting be adjourned until Monday 4 June 1956, at 3 p.m.; but before doing so 1 should like to express ml' gratitude to the delegations of the Soviet Union, China, 122. In these CÎrcU..TIlstances, 1 should like once more ta appeal most strongly to the United Kingdom t'epresentative to reconsider his position in the light of the discussion that has taken place here today, for our debate this afternoon has clearly shown that no general agreement has been reached on the sixth paragraph of the preamble. Four delegations have already declared themselves in support of the de1etion of that paragraph. Moreover, the parties concerned are not in agreement concerning the retention of the paragraph, and wc aIl know that their attitude is of particular importance, for upon it depends the turn of events in the Middle East and the success of the task to be entrusted to the Secretary-General. 123. 1 should therefore like to ask the Council to adjourn this meeting until Monday, 4- June 1956, so as to give representatives the necessary time to consider, and in particular to weigh the consequences of, the Council's action. 1 hope that in the meantime the United Kingdom representative will have been able to reconsider his position, and that he will be in a position to accept the amendment which 1 have proposed.
1 should like very briefly to make a necessary clarification. Owing, perhaps, to the speed of the simultaneous interpretation, an error occurred which allowed-or explains--an erroneous interpretation of my statement on two points. The first has to do with the effect of a paragraph in the preamble of the resolution on the force of General Assemblv resolutions. 1 should like to make an unequivocal stat~ment in that connexion by reading out once again, slowly, so as to ensure correct interpretation, what 1 saie! in my first statement : "Still less, of course, can a statement contained in the prearnble to a resolution of the Council affect in the slightest degree the resolutions of another, independent body such as the General Assembly of the United Nations. The resolutions of the General Assembly can be modified only by the Assembly itself. And this applies, a fortiori, not only to resolutions contaîning recommendations which irnply consequences of a moral character, but also to what might be called structural or constitutional resolutions which deal with matters in which the Assembly's intervention has been complete, final and effective" [726th meeting, para. 37]. 125. Whatever the decision on 'the sixth paragraph of the preamble, Peru's position will be on record. Nothing can affect the resolutions of the General Assembly 126. The second point has to do with the position of small countries with regard to peace. 1 declared that that position was the same for all and entailed the same responsibilities for aIl. Peace is an obligation incumbent on everyone. That is why 1 believed that those two points should be made absolutely clear. 127. Lastly, 1 drew attention to a new point of view that had been presented for the Council's consideration. Whether or not we discuss the legal implications of the sixth paragraph of the preamble, we must recognize that the lranian representative has put the question in a new light: whether that paragraph is wise, desirable, or opportune.
The President unattributed #185472
Out of courtesy to the representative of Peru, 1 did net wish to interrupt him in the course of what 1 took to he a clarification in the interests of the interpretation and the record. However, 1 had some doubt, 1 must say frankly, as to whether it was in order for him to complete his statement, interesting though the statement was. We are required to consider at this stage only the question of whether the meeting should be adjourned until Monday, 4 June 1956. 1 would be grateful to other speakers if thev would confine thems€' 'es strictly to that point at this dtage of our proceedings.
1 should like to support the lranian delegation's proposai that the Security Council should adjoum until 4 June 1956. ! feel that at the present stage of the discussions our best course would he to adjourn the meeting and consider our situation. In any event it is late. i
The President unattributed #185478
Since there is no opposition ta the proposaI, 1 shall declare the meeting adjoumed until Monday, 4 June 1956, at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 6 p.m. FINLAND - FINLANDE kauppa, 2 Keskuskalu, AUSTRALIA - AUSTRAUE : H. A. Goddard Ply., Lld., 2SSa George Street, Sydney. N.S .... 90 Queen Street, Melbourne, Victoria. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N. 3, Victoria. FRANCE : Editions A. Pari. V'. GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE Kaiserstrasse 49, Fraokfurt/Main. BuchhandJung Elwert 101. Berlin-8cbllneberg. Alexander Hom, Spiegelgasse W. E. Saarbach, G.m.b.H., Ï'lanùci, Kom i. AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE : Gerold &; Co. Graben 31, Wien 1. B. WWlerstorff, Book Import and Subscription Allency, Markus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. BELGIUM - BELGIQUE: Agence et Messagerie• de la Presse, S. A., 14-22 ruc du Persil, Bruxelles, W. H. Smith &; Son, 71-75 bd Adolphe-Max' Bruxellel. GREECE - GRECE Siadion Street, Athens. GUATEMALA : Sociedad Edf. Briz, Do. 207, 60 maia City. BOUVIA - BOLIVIE : Libreria Selecciones, Empresa Editora " La Razon ". Casilla 972. La Pax. HAITI : Max Bouchereau, velle ", Boite postale BRAZIL - BRÉSIL : Livraria AlIir, Rua Mexico 98-Ili, Caixa Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. D.F. ; et à Sao Paulo et Belo Horizonte. HONDURAS : Libreria Fuen!e, Tegucigalpa. HONG KONG : Swindon Road, Kowloon. CAMBODIA - CAMBODGE : Papeterie-Librairie nouvelle, Albert Portail, 14 av. Boullocliët Pno.PfiIh. ICELANO - ISLANDE Eymundsonnar, Austurstreti CANADA : The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Streel We=t, Toronto, Ontario. INDIA - INDE : Orient Bombay, Madru and Stationery Company. and at Calcutta. P. Varadachary Chetty Street, Madru CEYLON- CEYLAN: The Associaled Newspapers of Ceylon, Ltd., Lake House, P.O. Box 244. Colombo. CIDLE - CHILI : Libreria Ivens, Casilla 205 SutiaIO. Editorial dei Pacifico. Ahumada 57, Santiaco. INDONESIA - INDO~IE 1l\lIl1lD. Gununl Sahari IRAN : " Guity ", 482 CHINA - CHINE : The World Book Co., Lld. 99. Chunll Kinll Road, ht Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. IRAQ - IRAK : Mackenzie's seilers and Stationers. The Commercial Press, Ltd.• 211 Honan Rd., Shanghai. ISRAEL, Blumsteln's Bookstores, Road, P.O.B. 4154, Tel COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE : Libreria América, Sr. Jaime Navarro R., 49-58 Calle SI, Medellill' Libreria Buchholz Galeria, Av. Jiménez de Quesada 8-40, BolotA. Libreria Nacional, Uda•• 20 de Julio, San Jiiiin Jesüs, BlIlllUIquilla. ITALY - ITAUE : Sansoni, Via Gino Capponi JAPAN - JAPON: Nichome, Nihonbasbi, JORDAN - JORDANIE Company, Der-EI-Kutub, COSTA RICA: Trejos Hecmanos, Apartado 1313, San JOIé. LEBANON - LIBAN Beyroutb. CUBA : La Casa Belaa, René de Smedt, O'Reilly 455, La Hahana. LIBERIA : Mr. Jacob and Front Streets, Monrovia. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHItCOSLOVAQUJE : Ceskoslovensky Spisovate1, Nârodni Trlda 9, Praha 1. LUXEMBOURG : Librairie Guillaume, Luxembourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE: IJPlllCÏo Mariscal 41, DENMARK - DANEMARK : Messrs. Einar Munksgaard, Lld., Norregade 6, Kobenham. NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BAS: Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - RItPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE : Libreri.. Dominicana, Calle Mercedes 49, Apartado 656, Ciudad Trujillo. NEW ZEAUND - The Uniled Nations Association G.P.O. 1011, Wellington. ECUADOR - ItQUATEUR : Libreria Cientiflca Bruno Moritz, Casilla 362, Guayaquil; el a Quito. EGYPT - roYPTE : Librairie " La Renaissance d'ElIYPte ", 9 Sharia Adly Pasha, Cairo. NORWAY - NORVEGE Forlas, Kr Augustslll Ortkr8 rom countrl~8 wh~r~ sale8 agents have not yel bun appolnt~d may b~ 8~nt to Sales Section, Europea.. OIIIce of the Unitad Nati:ID', Palail da Nation., GENEVA, Switzer1aod, or Saîeo and CircaIatioo SectJon, United Nation. NEW YORK. U.SA.
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