S/PV.728 Security Council

The Security Council has before it a draft resolution proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom [S/3600/Rev.2], upon which we have had quite an extended discussion. In the course of this discussion, an amendment has lY~en proposed by the representative of Iran [S/3602] which would involve the deletion of the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution. 2. 1 have no further speakers on my list and 1 would therefore propose, unless any member of the Council desires to speak, that we proceed to a vote on the amendment proposed by the representative of Il'""dJ}. 4. 1 listened, as 1 always do, with the greatest respect to what Mr. Abdoh had to say. At this stage, 1 should simply like ta say that, in the interests of unanimity and in response to the plea from the representative of Iran, at the meeting of the Council on 1 June [727th meeting1 l am willing to accept the lranian amendment. 1 have noted the statements by members of the Couneil that to do this would permit a ummimous vote on the draft resolution. 5. The acceptance of this amendment entails a consequential amendment of the seven~'~ p?~ph, which, if left unamenàed, would not mr',e sense. 1 think that members of the Council will re;.dily agree that the neatest way to accompli.ili the necessary change would be to have the seventh paragraph read as follows: "Believing that further progress should now he made in consolidating the gains resulting from the Seeretary- General's mission and towards full implementatkm by tht" parties of the armistice agreements". 6. 1 hope that the draft resolution will now be put to the vote.

At this final stage of our discussion, my delegation would like to pay a tribute to the representatïve of tt'le United Kingdom for ~'le co-operation and conciliatory spirit he has shown in accepting, earlier, the suggestions and, today, the amendment proposed by this delegation. 8. Though it has somewhat delayed the Council's action, the debate we have had has proved most fruitful, and the discussions between delegations that have taken place outside the Council chamber in the spirit of co-operation by whîch the United Nations in actuated have at last led to a solution of the difiicuities with which the Council was faced and have ensured unanimity in the Council itself. Although at one point this debate became somewhat polemical, we must note with satisfaction that the representatives of the countries concemed have reaffirmecî their determination 1:0 respect the armistice agreemenh' and their intention to collaborate in observing the mea,~ures agreed upon, as lVP!l as to give favourable considera~ion to the action proposed both by the Secretary-General and by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiz?tion. 9. We are therefore able to support the draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom delegation, as amended, in the conviction that the parties will collabo- . rate most sincerely in pursuing the objective we aIl have in view, the objective of reducing tension, eliminating incidents and restoring calm and tranquillity in the Middle East by bringing the machinery of the annistice fully into play. Only ü these conditions are fulfilled shall we see distrust give place to confidence-only then

The United States delegation will vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution, as further amended by the deletion of the sixth preambular paragraph and the consequential change in the seventh preambular paragraph. 11. As 1 explained on 1 June [727th meeting], my deIegation feeIs that the pacagraph in question does not derogate from the resolutions of the General Assembly, that it mereIy states the obvious and that the fears expressed concerning it aïe not justified. For that reason we have a certain amot:nt of regret that it has been found uecessary to delete the paragraph. However, the amended draft resolution remams an important step towards soIidifying the gains made as the resuIt of the Sec _etary-Generars mission, in spite of the differences of opinion that have arisen here. 12. We sincerely trust that the unanimity which we hope wiII now be achieved by the Security CounciI on this matter will be translated into further co-operative action in the area and will continue to develop the conditions for which we have bet;n workinc.: from the beginning. 13. If the Security Council agrees, as 1 am now sure that it will, that the Secrel.3.ry-General should continue to act on its behalf in accordance with the resolutions previously adopted, we shall aIl be able to feel renewed confidence in the prospect of a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in full accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

The French deIegation will vote for the United Kingdom drafl resolulion as just amended. We trust that the passion, or, as Mr. Abdoh called it, the polemics, of this debate have not jeopardized the results of lhe Secretary-General's mission and the prospects it opened up. 15. Every paragraph of the resolution of 4 April 1956 [S/3575] stressed the fact that, in a problem as thorny as the Palestine problem, nothing could he done without the agreement of the parties. At the time, the delegations of the Arab States and Israel urged that the Secretary-General be asked not to propose to the Council measures which were not mutually acceptable. Let me recall the wording of paragraph 3 of that resolution: "Requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he cnnsiders would reduce existing tensions...." 16. If 1 am not mistaken, and 1 do not think 1 am, this wording was introduced in the original draft at the ! 7. The Security .Council and the· Arab and Israel delegations have expressed their satisfaction here with both the methods used and the results achieved. Renee 1 musi: admit frankly that we were surprised at the objections raised in certain quarters against the original sixth paragraph of the preamble, now deleted from the second revision of the United Kingdom dmft resolution. Incredible as it May seem, the words which caused the objections were "on a mutually acceptable basis". 1 will re-read the paragraph: "Conscious of the need to create conditions in which a peaœfuJ seulement on a mutually acceptable basis of the dispute betwen the parties can be made". 18. l humbly confess that we thought that those words, "on a mutually acceptable basis", were a safeguard to bath parties, both the Arab States and Israel. We thOUl'>lt that those words meant merely that the Security ~oun(;il was aware of the obvious fact that the Ideal olJjective which the United Nations must pursue by all tae means at its disposai was the establishment of a reace acceptable to ail. 19. 1 know very weIl that we have been told here that such a formulation cancels out the innumt'rable resoIutions of the General Assembly and the Council. That is certainly not so. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that, even if· it wishec:i to do so, the Security Couneii couId not abI"O/fclte or even alter the resolutions of the General Assembly. Furthermore, 1 am sure that the United Kingdom delegation had no intention of giving the sentence in question the mcaning which has been attached to it in certain quarters, a meaning which it does not have if normally and reasonably interpreted. - 20. Accordmgly, the paragraph in question contained views which are perfectIy correct. and whoUy compatible with the Charter of the United Nations. The two great countries responsible for the phrase in question in the joint communiqué which they issued on theirrecent ta1ks, a phrase reproduced in that paragraph, were certainly of that opinion. The sixth paragraph had therefore been. quite properly included in the United Kingdom draft. 21. Referring as it did to p$ciples which in our view are self-evident, it could pel'haps have been omitted a1together. Nevertheless, the F'rench delegation regrets both the discussion to which it gave cise the resultant withdrawal of the parag:aph. We deplore its· ~th­ drawal because of the interpretation w~JÏch will undoubtedly he placed thereon in certain quarters, and we shoùld like ta forewam against such interpretations. 22. In our opinion, and we are sure that the members of the Council agree with us on this point, the withdrawal of the sixth paragraph does not mean that the Security Council rejects the idea it expresses. 1 urge 23. 1 should also like to caution our {riends against their own intransigence. Itis not good, it is not wise, ta say in advance that one will never he able to accept a solution other than· the particular solution whkh is more acceptable at ~he moment. . To quote a French proverb -which 1 am sure has a parallel in the riei';. folklore of the .Ar3b countries: "One should not say: fountain, 1 shall not drink of your waters." 24. 1 ask the Council to ponder the consequence of so unreasonable a course. It is indeed unbelievable that anyonc should say in advallce that he will he unable to accept a mutually acceptable solution. 25. MI'. NISOT (Belgium) (translated From French) : The .Belgian delegation will vote for the dra(t resolution before us. 1 should add that we could have voted for it in its previous fonn because we are quite certain that the sixth paragraph of the preamble did not have the broad scope attributed to it by the delegations wlûch opposcd it. My delegation is glad that agreement l.las been reached and that the present text meets with general approval.

My delegation thinks there should he !wo votes, as announced by the President. First, we shoulq vote on the amendment submitted by the representative of Iran [S/3602]. 27. If, as is natural and in accordance with the rules, wc vote first on that amendment, my delegation will abstain, for the reasons which it has already explained. We cannot vote in favour of that amendment, because we regard it as a serious matter to insert in a draft resolution a statement on the need for a settlement between the parties, and then ta withdraw it. . 28. If the amendment submitted by the representative of Iran is approved by a majmity in the Security Council, my delegation will vote foi' the draft resolution as a whole, since it is the only ciraft now before the Council. 29. My delegation feels that the draft resolution was more comprehensive and more in keeping with the principles and traditions of the United Nations when it included the statement which the United Kingdom representative has now agreed ta withdraw.

1 should like to remark that the Iranian amendment W'lS accepted and incorporated in the draft resolution propo;:od by the United Kingdom delegation. In these circumstances, the Iranian amendment no longer exists as a separate amendment, and it would not he my intention ta put it to the vote. 31. 1 call upon the representative of Cuba on L point of order. 33. MI'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlies) (trans!ated trf'm Russian) : The delegation of the Soviet Union we1comes the conciliatory step talœn by the United Kingdom delegation in accepting the Iranian amendment to delete the sixth paragraph of the preamble. The èLdetion of this paragraph makes this draft resolution acceptable ta the Soviet delegaî:ion, and we are prepared to vote for it, as amended. 34. MI'. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated trom Spanish): When we discussed the sixth paragraph of the draft resolution before it was amended, my delegation expressed its views quite clearly. T'.cre are two ways of interpreting any provision: eitJ- ~e light of the general context, the spirit of the resoI.HlOn as a ~.,hole, and the policy which it Teflects--in this case the pulicy of the Security Cour.cil-or in the light of the con:;~­ quences of its application, if any. With regard to the fonner, my delegation pointed out that the sixth paragraph was in keeping with the spirit of the resolution of 4- April 1'956 and the United Kingdom draft resolution itself, and, generally speaking, with the Council's steadfast policy of seeking to secure a settlemp.nt between the parties. As far as the consequences are ooncemed, my delegation must also point out that we did not at any time feel that the wording of the sixth paragraph was likely to compromise the resolutions approved by the Council and the Assembly. joJ. But for aIl this, when the representative of Iran presented his amendment, with great intelligence and in a friendly spirit which we aIl appreciated, he adduced reasons of prudence and timeliness. This was, of course, a new angle for the Council to consider, and my delegation had no othe!' course than to wait and see what arguments might be put forward by the United Kingdom representative in view of this new turn of events. 36. As we aIl hoped, and in the spirit of understanding and compromise characteristic of the United Kingdom representative, the reaction 1 was awaiting before taking a decision on the matter has now been expressed. 1 welcome this solution, which will help to secure a unanimous vote for the draft resolution; but at the same time 1 must say-and in this 1 agree with the representative of Fnnce-that the deletion of this paragraph, even in response to justifiable misgivings, must not be interpreted as implying that the provision was contrary to the Council's general policy. It is said that silence speaks volumes, and in Spanish we say that silence gives consent, but neitller saying is true. Silence is no foundation for any kind of attitude. Dl'etions made 37. My de1egation, while adhering to its juridical position as previously stated, accordingly weIcomes the solution at which we have arrived, and trusts that the unanimous approval of this àl'aft resolution, which the vote and the opinion expressed by the Soviet Union lead us to expect, will help to reduce tension in the Middle East and create the peaceful situation fOi' which aH mankind is hoping.

As there are no ft::rther speakers on my list, 1 shall now put to the vote the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/3600IRev.2] as amended taday.

1 did not wi~h to obstruct the Security Council on its progress to a unanimous vote and have therefOre postponed until this stage, with the President's indulgence, certain reflections on the resolution which has JUS! been adopted. 52. Since 1 addressed the Security Council on the 1 original draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom, three changes have been introduced, and the records of the Security Council should perhaps appropriately contain my Government's refleetions on th05(, changes. 53. Paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution was changed in order to relate the freedom of movement of United Nations observers to the appropriate provisions of the armistice agreements. This, in 55. 1 should like to make it clear that, from our political and juridical viewpoint, the office of the Secretary- General !!gures in this subject on three different levels. 56. The Secretary-General is requested by the currently adopted resolution to work along the lines of the resolution of 4 April 1956 tm.·..ards a full compliance with the armistice agreements. 57. As a principal organ of the United Nations under its Charter, the Secretariat, like ail other principal organs, is no doubt available, in the person of the Secretary-General, for the use of good offices between the parties whenever there is a mutual desire that his good offices should be used in matters either within or beyond the context of the armistice agreements. 58. Thirdly, in the anmstIce agreements themselves, under article XII of the agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, and under article VIII of the agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon, the Secretary-General is requested by the signatory parties to assume a special obligation. In the event that either signatory wishes to revise or suspend or modify the agreement in the light of its transitional character as a step towards permanent peace, the Secretary-General is empowered to convene a conference of the two signatories for the purpose of considering such changes or modifications or instituting such a review, and the attendance of the other party in that instance is mandatory. If 1 am right in saying that Arab representatives have he:-e asserted their full compliance with the armistice agreements, then full compliance would doubtless cover the articles of review and development to which 1 have referred. 59. 1 should, however, like ta say something rather more substantive on the amendment which, to our regret, has just been accepted for reasons which the representative of the United Kingdom has so clearly explained. 60. This bas, 1 think, been one of the mast instructive and revealing debates ever held by the Security Council. The past hour in that debate, with its strong emphasis on the need for a mutually acceptable peace settlement, bas exalted the Security Council to a high level of moral authority. 62. World opinion has indeed, in the past few days, reacted with shock and with evident regret to the passion \Vith which certain representatives, at the meeting of 1 June, violated the dignity of the highest tribunal of international security. We do not doubt that the universaI conscience does demand an agreed settlement bctween Israel and its Arab neighbours in order to liquidate the fears and sterile rancours which disfigure th~ Middle East. - 63. That peace is the objective and ambition of the Government and people of Israel is universally recognized by friend and foe alike. That peace on a mutually agrced basis is the aim and objective of the Security CounciI has become abundantly clear within the past hour. It is regrettable, therefore, that there is a rebellion against the concept of peace, that there is a dream of war, a frenzied passion for the destruction of a small Statc in order that a vast Arab empire shouL further expand. And this dream and this passion have unfortunately had their spokesmen around this table. 64. There are those who, pretending to uphold the Charter, ignore the primary principle of the Charter, under which Israel's statehood and sovereignty are absolutely sacrosanct and inviolate, as are the sovereignty and statehood of every other Member of the United Nations. There are those who profess a zeal for the policies of the General Assembly, but these are the very States which overthrew the General Assembly's original policy by armed force. Having taken up arms to violate that recommendation; having denied its legal forces; having asserted its entirely optional character: having drowned it in the blood of thousands and buried it in the anguish and misery of thousands of others; having secured its replacement by new policies and situations now sevrn years old; havin!! kiUed that resolution and danced uron its g-ra\"C, they now piously d{'mand iti resurrection. 65. 1 will only savon this point that there is nothing in the international history of our times which can, in our view, compare with the cynicism of this attempt by Governments to invoke their rights under proposais which were set asideviolently under the impact of their OWn destructive fury. 67. With reference to the first question, we rise from this debate fully conv.\nced that the Security Council desires a settlement on a mutually acceptable basis. Indeed, this was the jurisprudence of the Security Council and of the General Assembly before this debate was ever initiated. The resolution now voted recails the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949 [8/1376. II]. What does that resolution say? It says this: "The Security Council " "Expresses the hope that the Governments and authorities concemed, having undertaken by means of . .. negotiations ... to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiaticns and to seek agreement by negotiations. .. will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of aU questions outstanding between them." Thus, seven years ago, this Security Council expressed its desire for a solution by agreement and by negotiation, the very thing which certain non-members of the CouDcil argued against being repeated this week. 68. It is also the jurisprudence of the General Assembly that there should be a settlement by agreement and negotiation. Here the matter is gO';erned by General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 calling upon the parties to extend the scope of the annistice negotiations and to seek agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. 69. Need 1 say that agreement and mutual acceptance of solutions are synonymous, or that agreement on anything eIse than a mutuaIly acceptable basis is a contradiction in terms? The doctrine that a settlement between Israel and the Arab States must be one that overrides the agreement of the parties, the extraordinary doctrine that the parties in the future can achieve agreement only on the basis which has been the source of their disagreements in the past-this doctrine of an imposed settlement or of a settlement dogmatically anchored to past recommendations, was rejected by the General Assembly by its vote in 1952. 70. When 1 say that the policy of Member States favours the concept of a settlement by consent, 1 have recourse not only to the records of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but aIso to important statements outside the United Nations framework. On 17 April 1956, the Government of the Soviet Union published a statement inc1uding a reference in favour of L__:,:~<~'."-namu~y a~~. ~mer dm, 12 71. Around this table, those who were not in favour of \'oting for this paragraph on grounds of expediency have made it clear that they did not question the central \alidity of this theme. The observations of the representative of Yugoslavia were of special intérest in that context. .' t. ï2. The political position which we face is therefore clear. There is an established relationship between IErael and the Arab States governed by agreements which have treaty force. There are only three possibilities in relation to that situation. Either it can be changed by agreement; or it can he changed by war; or it cannot be changed at aH. 73. The prospect and possibility of a change by war must, of course, he ruled out entirely. The use of armed force under the Charter is strictly regulated by the terms of the Charter itself, and is limited to contingencies of a breach of the peace and an act of aggression. It is obviously not a breach of the peace to maintain a treaty duly registered as governing the relations between Member States. 74. There is, of course, the possibility that there will he no change in the established situation. This is a legal possibility, and either party is fully entitled to maintain its full rights under the armistice and to withhold its consent from any settlement which prejudices those rights. But it was certainly envisaged when we set our hands to these agreements that they would be transitional steps leading to a final peace settlement, and nohOOy can fully uphold the spirit and letter of the armistice agreements without aspiring to their development into more durable settlements. . " 75. If we therefoi'e discard change by force entirely and discard the concept of an eternal, enduring, armistice system, we are left, by elimination, with the only alternative, which is that these agreements must one day -and preferably saon-be developed into peace agreements by processes of consent. 4 . 76. This political situation is fully reflected by the juridical position. There were three rewllutionary l'vents in the year 1949 which govern OUi juridical situation today: the signature of the armistice agree- ' ments, the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations and the resolution of Il August 1949 [S/1376, II], whereby the Security Couneil lent its <,luthority to the. armistice agreements which the parties had signed. "This Agreement, having been ... concluded .. ta faciIitate the transition from the present truce ta permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved."1 78. Here, then, we establish the immutability of these agreements except in so far as they are developed towards peace. We can move only forward, never backward. 79. How can this peaceful settlement be achieved in accordance with the agreements themselves? The parties to this agreement may, by mutual consent, and only by mutuaI consent, revise this agreement, or any of its provisions, or suspend their application. Therefore, in so far as the States in our region are sincerely dedicated to fuII compliance with the armistice agreements, they are committec! to the concept of a peace settlement by mutual consent. 80. To sUffi up the position: a settlement based on the consent of the parties conforma with the jurisprudence of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the general armistice agreements themselves. 81. The other problem which the Council faced in recent days was whether it should give articulation and utterance to its evident belief in a mutually agreed settlement, and whether this idea should find expression in its resolution. My delegation deeply regrets that the original intention to express this in resolution form was rescinded under the hostility with which the idea was greeted. It is grave enough if there are certain States in the Middle East which oppose a peace seulement themselves, but the question arises: should they he able so frequently, should they he so frequently indulged in their efforts, to silence the voice of others uplifted for peace? Does not the Security Council possess its independent right to express the results of its own coilsciousness as it sees fit? 82. Our disappointment at this omission has, however, heen considerably aIleviated by a somewhat fortunate ; 1 Official' Ruorœ of the Security Couneil, Fourth Y.tlr" Sp.cit.!l Supplement No. 3, p. 8. 83. If there is any other element of consolation, it is that the exigent need for an agreed settlement is 50 strong that it cannot be entireIy silenced; and indeed, that need appears from the wording of the resolution itself. The resolution still recalls the re5Olution of Il August 1949, one of whose central provisions is an expression of hc~)e that the parties will negotiate a final settlement by agreement of aIl questions outstanding between them. The resolution does commit the Security Council to a calI to the parties to take the steps necessary to carry it out, thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish fol' peaceful conditions. Above all, the resolution calls for full oompliance with the armistice agreements, and that includes compliance whith those provisions which require a transition to peace and with those provisions which lay it èown that only by mutuaI consent can the armistice agreements be developed into peace settlements. 84. In the opinion of the Government of Israel, the amendment accepted today has reduced the prospects of success by the Secretary-General in the continuation of his mission. The more the Security Council is prevented from asserting the dynamic qualities of its policy, the more it is restricted to the static concept of remaining fixed within the armistice framework without progress towards a more durable settlement, the harder it is for good offices and conciliation to take the position in the Middle East beyond its present context of danger and tension. 85. The debate has, 1 think, induce': a sober mood in other respects. A reading of the Arab speeches raises serious questions whether the absolutely unconditional character of the cease-fire agreement is understood, and it is deplorable that today, again, there has been an attack upon the territory and population of Israel from Jordan, notwithstanding the three admonitions of the Security Council addressed to that Govemment within the month of May. 86. My Government is, therefore, fortified in the mixed impressions which it expressed at the outset of this debate: deep satisfaction at the unconditional cease- ~ fire and at the immediate results achieved by the Secretary-General, and deep continuing concern for the situation in the Middle East, which we regard as still very acute. ~,? 88. The avoidanee of war, so long as this rests with us, is, therefore, the basic premise of our poliey. 1 89. The maintenance of the armistice agreements and their restoration to their full integrity is a second element of our policy. Despite the non-inclusion of any clear reference in the resolution now adopted, it eontinues to be our view that inte' !latlOl.~l "t':nion should 1 find greater eonvictior 'lnd courage in articulating strongly the desire for a fOlward movement away from the armistice towards an agreed settlement of outstanding disputes. If the Securi,ty Coundl's discussions have induced a mood of greater sobrîety than existed before, then this realism is in itself a contribution to the international cause. 90. The Government of Israel does not see any fault in the resolution now adopted in respect of what it contains. It does, however, regret that which it omits. 91. Mr. S.OBüLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated Irom Russian): 1 had not intended to speak in explanation of the Soviet ielegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution just adopted: the text speaks for itself, and 1 had no need to say exactly why we voted for it. In his last speech, however, Sir Pierson Dixon referred to the position taken by the Soviet delegation on the former sixth paragraph of the preamble, and expressed his surprise at it. In this connexion, 1 must say a few words. 92. The Soviet delegation's position in this matter is very c1ear and consistent. We consider it n~essary to emphasize that we regard the resolution adopted just now as a decision on the Secretary-General's repOi.'t, strictly within the scope of the powers defined in the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 [8/3575]. Today's resolution can in no circumstances be regarded as a decision affecting or changing decisions previously adopted by the United Nations. 93. As we understand it, the discussion which has just taken place concerns ooly "one aspect of the whole Palestine problem-the instructions which the Security Council gave the Secretary-General in its, resolution of 4 April 1956. Hence there is no justification at the present time for widening the scope of the present problem, sinee that wo;, do nothing to promot.e the 95. It was this consideration and nothing eIse that prompted the Soviet delegation's efforts to ensure the adoption by the Security Council of a draft resolution acceptable to the parties directly concerned. This is what prompted our efforts to ensure the amendment of opcrative paragraph 7 and the deletion of the sixth paragraph of the preamble. 96. We are glad that in the end the United Kingdom representative took the same position and thereby enabled the Security Council to ;, 10pt unanimously a resolution on a matter of ;.mch importance as the Palestine question.

1 do not intend to ,'tir up the debate on this matter now that the Securit) Council has reached the conclusion it should reach on this item. Certain remarks have been made here in the Council, some of them by members of the Council and others by Mr. Eban. 1 Q 'lement acceptables !Ce 98. With regard to the rema!'!-'.s made by the members, 1 do not propose to make any comment, because our position on this question bas been made crystal clear in the records of the Security Council. 1 wonder whether some of them would agree to mutually acceptable solutions to certain international problems in which they are involved-in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Far East or other places. Anyhow 1 do not want to deal with this matter at length. 99. With regard to certain distortions that have just been made at this table-and 1 sav this with aU d<1e respect to the dignity of the Securit-f Council-in order to rectify misstatements of fact and to bring before the Council the true position regarding the matters that have been dealt with by it, 1 think it is my duty to put before this body objectively and briefly our position on those observations. faisant de :les 100. Mr. Eban has said with full courage, and 1 am amazed at that courage and at that fmnkness, too-and perhaps this is the only virtue in those statements made by Mr. Eban, that they display courage and frankness although they are based on misrepresentations of the actual situation regarding the matter-that the Arab Governments have displayed a rebellion against peace, that the Arab Govemments are not desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. 1 need not describe those distortions as being a faIIacy or suis - déclarations faits contre un à fausses derai 101. The representatives of the Arab Governments assembled around this table represent their countries, the interests of their homelands, the interests of their people and their territories. Is it acceptable that those peoples would act against their own interests? If a conflagration takes place in the Middle East, who is to be directly concerned and deeply concerned and gravely moved and affected? The people of the Middle East, the Governments of the Middle East, the territories of the Middle East. 102. Here we represent our peoples and our interests. We are always for peace, just because peace by itself is one of our principles, one of our traditions, and because it relates to our peoples, to our countries, to our newly won independence, and to our newly won sovereignty. People who have fought for their liberty and who have newly won that liberty, people who have fought for their independence and who have newly won independence, would not in any sense accept to have their countries become a scene of war, a scene of confJ.agration, to see what they have accomplished in the field oi economy, in the field of culture and in the field of agriculture destroyed because of war. It is those who have littIe in the Middle East that want war, but those who han much in the Middle East are eager to have neace and they are dctermined to have peace. 103. Peace is not a claim that can be put forward before the Security Council just in a statement in black and white, devoid of evidence, devoid of genuine policy, devoid of honest action, devoid of sincere policy which can only lead to peace, which can only bring about peace. 104. Who has been condemned by the Security Council four times in three years for committing aggression, violations of the armistice agreements, attacks against open villages and towns, slaughter against innocent refugees living in their camps? No Arab Government-and 1 say this without fcar of being contradicted-has been convicted by the Security Council for any aggression, for any violation. It is Israel that has been condemned by the Security Council four times within the span of three years. 105. What is Israel, after aIl? The creation of the General Assembly, the creation of the Security Council. Remembering your resolution, once you accepted the membership of Israel and recommended to the General Assemblj that it join the United Nations, you expressed yourselves to the effect that it was a peace-loving State. How can a peace-loving State he really and genuinely 106. Let us examine this charge more carefully and more objectively. 1 shall examine it from the recorrls of the Securitv Council and from the records of the United Nation~not from my ~',:atements, not allegations that 1 can throw on the tabk of the Council lavishly and generously, but from facts borne out by the records of the Security Council. 107. In 1948, the General Assembly appointed a mediator [resolution 186 (S-2)], the late Count Bernadotte, 10 arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. The mediation was murdered because the mediator was murdered. 1 shall not make any reference as to who committed the murder and under whose ftag the murder was committed, because that is a fact which is quite obvious; it does not need any pmof or any reference. 108. After the mediation had been frustrated, the General Assembly adopted a resolution [194 (III)] to bring about conciliation, another process of international practice. The Conciliation Commission for Palestine, which was appointed by the General Assembly, held meetings in Beirut, Geneva, Paris and here, at Headquarters, !fi New York. It sought every means to have Israel accept the resolutions of the General Assembly, but in vain. The Conciliation Commission is now frozen at the Headquarters of the United Nations, and the resolutions of the General Assembly remain unimplemented. 109. It has been suggested that a peaceful settlement must be on a mutually acceptable basis and that the fundamental issues between the parties should be peacefully solved. What are those fundamental issues? First, there is the question of refugees, a subject which has engaged the attention of the General Assembl,;' for years, a subject which has aIso engaged the attention of the international community. What has taken place with regard to the refugees? 110. 1 shaH not state my verdict on th1s question but 1 shaH state the words of the Conciliation Commission which said, in its third progress report that) on the question of repatriation, the result had been negative and that no single refugee had been repatriated or compensated. "The Commissio~/'-andhere 1 invite the attention of the Councii-"has not succeeded in achieving the acceptance of this principle [of repatriation] by the Government of Israel".2 111. That is the verdict of the Conciliation Commission, which IS composed of representatives of the United 112, Let me put the question: who is obstructing the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question? Is it the Arab Governments that are obstmcting that settlement, or is it Israel that is really obstructing the settlement? We can reply to that in the Iight of the unequivocal statement bv the Conciliation Commission that Israel did not eve~ accept the principle of repatriation. 113. 1 cannot think of the settlement of anv international dispute in the wodd that could œ' resolved without the repatriation of the people to their land, the people who have lived on that land and who have left behind the graves of their fathers and their grandfathers, \vho have left behind thcir towns and their villages, eV'ery sacred treasure of remembrance and all posa~ssions and properties, How can one expect any peaceful settlement to take place when a refugee people are not allowed to return to live at peace in their land? 1H, The PRESIDENT: 1 very much regret to interflIpt the representative of Syria. The Security Council im'ited the parties to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council. We aHowed the representative of Israel, as we are now allowing the representative of Syria, to make a statement following the adoption of the resolution by the CounciJ. 115. 1 think it would be mast desirable for the representatives of the parties to confine their remarks very strictly to the question which has been the subject of discussion before the Council, in accordance with the terms of the resolution that the Council has adopted. 1 very much regret to interrupt the ïepresentative ûf 8yria, but 1 hope he will accept my advice in this matter.

1 thank the President for the observation he has made. 1 also regret that we are now roaming over rather a wide range of the merits of the problem. But 1 should Iike, with all due respect, to remind the President that 1 am replying to observations that were made by Mr, Eban before the Security Council. For purposes of the record, and in the discharge of our duty to reply to the distortions and criticisms that have been unjustly levelIed against our Governments, 1 find it necessary to mc::ntion these matters. However, 1 shaH proceed wiù brevity in ordeî' that the matter may appear quite clear in the records of the Security Council. 117. In order to reply to Mr. Eban's charge that we have obstructed a peaceful settlement, it is necessary to examine the various parts of the problem. The Palestine question can be sub-divided into three main issues: first, the question of the refugees, secondly, the territorial question, and thirdly, the question of Jerusalem. A ptaceful settlement cannot be made in general terms; a peaceful settlement cannot he made in a vacuum. The Security Council and the Secretary-General in his 1 : "'. Who is it that is now frustrating the peaceful ~, .lement of the Palestine question when one party states in advance: "1 shaH not recede one inch from the territory 1 hold"? 120. The third question concerns the internationalization of Jerusalem. Again, 1 shaIllet Ml'. Eban speak here on this question. Ml'. Eban has circulated as a United Nations document a policy-making speech ~ade by Ml'. Ben Gurion, in wbieh he said, with regard to internationalization, that the decision "is utterly incapable of implementation". 121. On these three fundamental issues which go to fOTm the Palestine question, there is a negative attitude on the part of Israel: no repatriation; no recession from the territorial demarcation line; no implementation whatsoever of internationalization. Who, on the.se three counts, is frustrating the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question? 122. We for our part say: we are quite ready to cooperate, with the Conciliation Commission, with mediation, with the Security Council, with the General Assembly and, if you please, with the Secretary-General himself. We are quite prepared to co-operate with the Secretary-General with a view to implementing the resolutions of the General Assemhly on these three counts. It is for Israel-which now voices pronouncements of peace and declarations with regard to peace here in the Security Council-to come forward and say: "We accept the Secretary-General as the United Nations chief in order to promote measures leading to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly." Short of that, the Security Council and the world at large would know who is obstructing the peacefuI settlement of the Palestine question. 123. We are for peace, a peace based on justice, a peace that does not ignore the rights of the people to their homeland. If Israel is reaIly determined to achieve peace, it depends upon Israel taking action, not just uûng words, to pursue a policy that will lead to peace, at least in its initial stages. 125. This is not a policy of peace. It certainly destroys friendly relations among peoples. If we just whip up those decent Jewish citizens into believing that thev are Israelis, that their fla!!" is the fla!!" of Israel and that their natio~al anthem is the Israel ;nthem, then 1 submit that this is a policy of aggression. This is a policy which destroys the possibilities of peace, and if there is any attempt for peace, there must be a basic change. But why should we speak in big terms about peace? Let us get down to the level of the annistice. 'l'hase who make these big daims could be tested by very narrow and small measures. 126. Israel, as we note frm'l the report of the Secretary-General, has rejected measures which would tend to lessen tension. Yet Ml'. Eban finds himself free ta come here and clflim peace in large terms. But if Israel is really genuine with regard ta its daim for peace, why is it not ready to accept the proposais of General Bpms and of the Secretary-General for the relaxation of tension on the demarcation iines? 12i. Here is what the Secretary-General says in unequivocal terms: "Israel does not agree ta the ~ovement of a United Nations military observer boat on Lake Tiberias nor to the establishment of a military observer post on Israel territory [S/3596, para. 87]". The Secretary-General tells us, in black and white, that Israel does not agree to the movement of United Nations observers nor to a United Nations boat on Lake Tiberias. 128. May 1 be permitted ta remind the Council that the question of a United Nations boat on Lake Tiberias is a very essential one, because Lake Tiberias was the scene of an aggression by Israel which was condemned and censured by the Security Council in the strongest terms [S/3538]. 129. The Chief of Staff, General Burns, and the Secretary-General come forward, in implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, to tell Israel: you have to acc~pt the freedom of movement of United Nations observers and a United Nations boat on Lake Tiberias. Israel, as may be understood from the report of the Secretary-General, resists that proposaI. How 130. 1 say that this is only a test of Israel's big claims about peace. Let those who daim that they are for peace come to the Security Council with clean hands. Let them come to the Security Council with a clear record. The record of Israel in the Security Council is a record of condem'l1ation in the strongest terms of censure. It is a record that has been rebellious even against the Secretary-General and even against General Burns, and so recently, with regard to proposais for the relaxation of tension. 131. 1 am not bringing up these charges from my mind or from my files. This is the charge that has been prefcrred by the Secretary-General, aIthough he did not put it in tenns of a charge or a criticism. But this is still the fact to which the Secretary-General is testifying: that Israel is obstructing even the object of relaxation of tension. 132. 1 do not wish to take up too much time of the Council on this matter, but 1 felt it my duty to explain our position because a great deal of distortion in this matter has been placed in the record here, as weU as in sorne of the newspapers abroad. We are for peace, but we want a peace based on justice and nothing but justice. A peace which is dictated by the terms of Israel is no peace; it is aggression, and we are always against aggression in any sense. 133. l ",!sIl to thank our President for giving me this opportunity to explain our position. 1 hope that MI'. Eban will not find the courage again to place such distortions before the Security Council or the United Nations, in the belief that, due to the forgetfulness of sorne of the Member States or of sorne of the intemational organizations in the worId, the background of the Palestine question will escape our attention and our memory. We are not forgetful because the tragedy is still alive there and the people who are now in the camps are looking to the Security Council to find out whether justice can eventually be done to them.

Before 1 call on the represen· tative of Lebanon, who has asked for the Hoor, 1 should like to repeat what 1 said previously when it was unfortunately necessary to interrupt the representative of Syria. 135. 1 should like to remind the parties that the decision of the Security Council on this matter has been reached, and 1 do not think it desirable that the Council should be reyuested to listen to further controversies on val"Ïous aspects of this subject. It is true that only two 136. Before calling on the three other representatives who have asked to speak, the representatives of Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, 1 would request them to restrict their remarks solely to statements that are appropriate following the conclusion of the Council's consideration of this matter of compliance with the armistice agreements. 137. Mr. .\MMOUN (Lebanon) (translated trom French): 1 should like to assure the President at once that my sole concern in taking the floor is to facilitate the Council's task and to try to àfford it aIl the means at niY Govenunent's command ta ensure that the resolution just adopted is put into effect and to enable the Secretary-General to carry out the task it has been given. 138. l had not intended to take the floor; it was only when the representative of Israel asked to speak and did not confine his remarks to the resolution just adopted that 1 decided to speak again. 139. }tirst, we should like to thank the Council for having taken into account the point of view expressed by the deIegations of the Arab States and also to thank those members of the Council who saw fit to support that . . Vlew. 140. It 15 because the representative of Israel, when speaking later, went beyond the bounds he should have respe'::ted that we feh it our duty to speak in our tum and to state our position. 141. The rt"'presentative of Israel has tried to prove, contrary to the facts, that the Arab Governments are themselves inspired by that spirit of aggression with which we justly charge him. But was it we who refused the Secretary-General, when he visited our countries, the assistance necessary to enable him to carry out bis task of red'lcing tension? AlI necessary assistance was given to him. It must he admitted, on the other hand, that the Secretary-General was unable to obtain from the Israel Govemment an assurance that it would respect the Security Council's decision prohibiting the resumption of the wcrk on the Jordan river diversion scheme. And yet that was the essential element in the peace mission with which the Secretary-General was entrusted by the CounciI. 142. That being 50, we may wonder which are the countries genuinely in favour of peace. The representative of Syria has just stated at sorne length the peacefuI intentions of the Arab Govemments. If the desired result had been obtained when the Secretary-General visited our countries in discharge of the mission given him by the Security Council, we should not now he 144. There were weighty reasons for our refusai to accept that provision in the resolution and for our efforts to secure its deletion from the text. 145. The first reason, as has aiready been said, was that the resolution, if that paragraph was maintained, seemed to go counter to the resolutions already adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, which provide solutions for problems which cannot he dealt with by the parties themselves, problems affecting third parties like the inhabitants of Palestine itself, in other words, the refugees. Then there is the question of Jerusalemanother reason why we considered that the adoption of a provision requiring thé agreement of the parties would be incompatible with the resolutions of the General Assembly. 146. Secondly, when mutual agreement is desired, it is also necessary that the dispute which is the subject of the agreement should he a normal dispute, and, above aIl, that the parties to the dispute should both be trustworthy. We already have the example of a first agreement being reached-the Lausanne Protocol, which was signed by the parties concerned, both Israel and the Arab countries. But the Protocol was no sooner signed than Israel dedined to honour its signature. Since then, Israel bas incessantly protested against the resolutions oi the United Nations, as what the Protocol provided for was precisely the implementation of the resolutions designed to promote a solution of the Palestine problem. The resolutions in question were the General Assembly resolutions of 1947, providing for partition [resolution 181 (11)], of 1948, concerning the refugees and their rights [resolution 194 (111)], of 1949, on an international regime for Jerusalem (resolution 303 (IV)]. 147. The Lausanne Protocol, which was signed by oUi'Selves and by Israel, provided for the solution of those questions on the basis of the resolutions in question. Admittedly, as has subsequently transpired, Israel gave its signature oruy because it was about to he admitted to membership of the United Nations and wished to make a gesture that would inspire confidence. But, the very day after its admission to the United Nations, it went back on its signature. Israel, therefore, was merely play-acting for the sole purpose of achieving its aims. 148. And after that, we are to he asked to agree that a solution of our differences should be established on a mutually acceptable basis. What confidence can we have in a solution of this kind when, as 1 have said, we are primarily concerned with problems which have re- 150. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): Now that the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom has been adopted unanimously, 1 wish to express to the representative of the United K:'ngdom the appreciation of my delegation for the conciliatory attitude he took in accepting the amendment of the representative of Iran calling for the deletion of the sixth preambular paragraph, which had caused much anxiety. This conciliatory attitude not only brought about a unanimous vote by the members oi the Council, but also secured the co-operation of the parties most vitally concerned in the Palestine question. We shall continue to facilitate, as we have already done, the mission of the Secretary-General as stated in the resolution of 4 April 1956. 151. 1 wish to make it dear that the statements made by me and by the other Arab representatives around this table were not meant to oppose the efforts to achieve peace in Palestine or to establish the foundations of peace. Any assumption that they were so intended is untrue. On the contrary the Arabs, who enjoyed peace in Palestine for ages before the creation of Israel, are most eager to restore peace to their homeland. But the peace which they seek is a peace based on justice and on the recognition of the legitimate rights of th/" original inhabitants of Palestine. 152. The main points of difference hetween the Arabs and Israel are in fact the problems confronting the Arabs themselves. The settlement of those problems is completely in the interests of the Arabs. It is therefore ridiculous to daim that the Arabs do not wish to solve their own problems. It is we who want peace and who wish to live, and to have our people live, a peacefullife.

1 had no intention of speaking, but certain remarks made by the Israel representative oblige me to take the floor. 154. 1 should first like to paya tribute to the President, as weIl as to the members of the Council, for the patience they have displayed throughout this long discussion. 1 would also like to paya tribute to the spirit of conciliation shown by members of the Council, which has made it possible to arrive at a unanimous resolution. 155. Every time the Security Council meets, Mr. Eban speaks to us, for propaganda purposes, about peace. Peace is not made with words. It is a pattern of behaviour, an attitude that Israel shows no sign of adopting. The Syrian representative has spoken at length on 156. My country, which signed the United Nations Charter, has no aggressive intentions. It is a peaceful country, as we nave proved over a lengthy period of time. We have done everything possible to eliminate tension along the demarcation lines. 157. As you know, and 1 would again re-emphasize this fact, the Egyptian authorities are still ready to co-operate with the Secretary-General and with General Burns, as they have always done, to eliminate tension along the demarcation lines and in the demilitarized zone. within the framework of the armistice agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel. We have already supported sorne of the measures proposed by Mr. Hammarskjold. We shaH continue to co-operate with him actively and loyally so that he can continue his difficult task successfully.

1 invite the Secretary-General to address the Council.

The mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council in the resolution of 4 April 1956 is weIl known. There Ï!l certainly no reason for me to recapitulate the terms of reference. In the resolution passed by the Council this afternoon, the Couneil has requested me to continue my good offices with the parties in pursuance of the said resolution and with a view to the full implementation of the armistice agreements. 160. 1 wish to say that it is with the best hopes that 1 shall try to meet this request of the Security Council. The deeision of the Security Council gives me the privilege to continue in the spirit in which the work has been begun, thanks largely to the co-operative attitude of aIl the parties concerned. The analysis of the problems and the reactions to the difficuIties and possibilities which 1 will take as the frame for my work are fully explained in my report to the Security Council on the fust part of the Middle East assignment. The debate fol1owing the vote of the Council has highlighted points on which deep differences of view exist. It is my firm hope that neither these differences nor any of the expressions they have found here will be permitted to harm the effort on which the United Nations, in co-operation with the parties, has embarked.

The Security Council 'has adopted unanblously a resolution commending the Secretary-General and the parties On the progress already ac~eved in the direction of securing more complete compliance with the armistice agreements, and calling for further steps in the same direction. 163. In conclusion, 1 wish to paya tribute to the statesmanship of the United Kingdom delegation which, by its submission of the text of this resolution, has given a lead that the Security Council has unanimously agreed ta follow. 1 am sure that aIl representatives on the Council would desire me to convey to Sir Pierson DL'!:on our admiration for the remarkable patience which he bas displayed in such testing eircumstances, and our gratitude for his. readiness to allay the suspieions and doubts expressed by some of the parties by cIarifying most carefully the meaning of the language used in the draft resolution, and also by marking certain changes in wording which have faeilitated the reaching of unanimity. 1 should, therefore, like to express our appreciation of Sir Pierson Dixon's handling of this important matter. 164. 1 also desire, on behalf of the Council, to thank the Secretary-General for his declaration before us and ta extend to him our best wishes in the continuance of his task, and to· ask hirrn to convey similar good wishes to the Chief of Staff. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m. - ~r.".