S/PV.729 Security Council

The representative of the Soviet Union bas asked to speak on a point of order.

Before we begin to discuss the items on our agenda, the Soviet deiegation wishes to submit a formaI proposaI, in accordance with rule 33 of the mIes of procedure of the Security Couneil, to postpone discussion of the question indefinitely. 3. We consider that the question which has been placed before the Council is important and that the members of the Coundl need more time to consider the situation or to collect the necessary additional information. The Sovietdeiegation accordingly proposes, in accordance with rule 33 of the rules of procedure, to postpone discussion of the question indefinitely, on the understanding that the Security Couneil may be convened after consultation between members and the President. 4. The PRESIDENT: In the normal course, in accordance with our rules of procedure, the first question would be the adoption of the agenda. However, under rule 33, a proposaI to postpone discussion of the question indefinitely takes precedence over any other motions. We must therefore deal with the proposaI of the Soviet Union first.

The French deiegation asks that the proposaI for adjoumment sine die of the problem before us he put to the vote, and we shaH oppose such adjoum- 11 1 11. .1 need hardly say that the thirteen countries which asked for the inclusion of this item do not intend ta withdraw the letter which they have already sent to the Couneil. 12. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French): The arguments advanced by the Soviet Union de1egation might be invoked in connexion with consideration

Remarks of a procedural nature have been made against my proposaI that we should postpone discussion of the item on our agenda indefinitely. 14. The French and Belgian representatives said that it was iUogical to ask for a postponement of discussion of an item which had not yet been included in the agenda and that a more suitable time for our proposaI would be after the Security Couneil had included the item in the agenda. 15. 1 should lii<:e to remind you that rule 33 of the rules of procedure does not Iimit the discussion of a proposaI that the discussion of a question should be pr ,::;~poned indefinitely. There are no limitations in this mIe. We have two items on our agenda today and they are Iisted in the provisional agenda which members of the Council have before them. The first item is the adoption of the agenda. VI/e are now discussing the question of adjourning indefinitely the meeting of the Security Council which has this provisional agenda. We are discussing this question and no other. Since rule 33 places no limitation!; OP the Security Council in this respect, our proposaI is in' full conformity with that rule. 16. Another question arises in this connexion. The French representative has said that the question raised in the letter from the thirh:en States must be discussed without delay. But 1 do not quite understand what he has in mind when he speaks of the need to discuss the matter without delay. Does he n!can the immediate discussion of the substance of the question submitted to the Security Coul1eil in the letter from the thirteen States, or docs he mean ûnly the iIiilIleùiale àiscussio:1 of the adoption of the agenda? These are two different matters. 17. 1 should like once again to caIl on the members of the Security Council to consider ~arefuIly the Soviet de1egation's request and to take a dt...:ision to postpone indefinitely discussion of the item before the Council.

The position as 1 see it is as foIlows. We have before us a letter [Sj3609] from the representatives of thirteen countries saying: "... our respective Governments deem it e~sential that the Algerian question should be considered by the Security Couneil without de1ay." That letter was dated 13 June 1956 and received in the Secretariat on 18 June. The Couneil was to have met on 21 June. As the request of the representative of the Soviet Union the meeting was postponed for five days until today. The representative of the Soviet Union nO>l asks for a further postponement. Frankly, 1 do not understand his reasons. Cao it be that he wishes for further time to refiect? Possibly. We aIl like time for reflection, but surely we have aIl had 19. 1 suppose that the representative of the Soviet Union is really asking for a postponement of the meeting, not of the question. In fact, 1 notice that he used that phrase. He used both phrases-postponement of the discussion of the question and postponement of the meeting. As 1 say, 1 tbink he must he asking for a postponement of the meeting. As a matter of lact, that phrase does not exist in the rules. According to rule 33 of t.lle ruIes of procedure we can suspend a meeting or we can adjourn a meeting, but 1 have found nothing th~re which entitles us to postpone a meeting, What we can do-aprl this is what the ruit. says-is postpone discussion of the question. But how can we postpone discussion of a question until we have deeided ta discuss it? 20. That is always the first thing we do. The first quest: Jn before us is the adoption of the proposed age.-.da, which is another way of saying "Daes the CJundi wish to discuss the proposaI which has been 'lUt before it?". Vve have not done that, and 1 do not see how we can possibly postpone discussion of something before we have started to discuss it or befme we have even decided to discuss it. 21. In my view, therefore, the right course would be to deal, as we normally do, with the first item on our agenda, which is the decision on whether we do or do not adopt pur agenda. 22. Mr. NISOT (Bdgiwn) (tra7i,')laîed frûm French): The French representative requests that the propos'!l for adjournment should he put to the vote. 1 heard nothing in the Soviet representative's statement which is incompatible with that request. In these eircumstances 1 see no reason why there should not be an immediate vote on the Soviet n:pn:sentative's motion. Should there, or should there not, be an adjournment?

1 take it there are no further speakers on this procedural point, and 1 will therefore put to the vote the Soviet proposaI.

Not aIl the members of the Council have expressed their views on this question as yet, and it may be a little too early to put the Soviet Union proposaI to the vote. 25. It goes without s.1ying that aU proposaIs made in the Security Council must ultimate1y be decided by a vote. 1 therefore have no objection to the French reptesentative's request. He is not, of course, departing from the rules of procedure in requesting that the Soviet Union proposaI should be put to the vote. The question, 1l0wever, is this: What is the opinion of the other members of the Security Couneil? 26. The PRESIDENT: 1 have no furtheT speakers on my list, and unless any members of this Couneil A vote was ta,~en by show of hands. In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics. Against: Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Fram.:e, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain ana Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: China, Iran, Yugoslavia. The proposa! was rejt. cted by 1 vote zn fa'llour, 7 against, with 3 abstentio'i'IrS.

The Council will now proceed to the first item on the provisional agenda, which is the adoption of the agenda. The representative of t France has asked to speak, but !:lefore we enter into this discussion of the adoption of the agenda, I would like to say for the guidance o{ ail members of the Council that at this stage our discussion should be primarily a procedural one, directed not 'iO the 5ubstance of the questions raised 'in the communication to the Council [5/3609], LJut to the simple question of whether or not the Council should adopt \ ' provisional agenda. 1

The French delegation requests the Security Council not to incl1-1de in its agenda the thirteen-delegation çomplaint contained in the letter of 13 June 1956. It consequently hopes that the provisional agenda now before 11S will not be adopted. The French Government considers that Algerian affairs are matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. 30. Mr. ABDOH (Iran) (translated tram French): The delegation of ïran, lCi;f'ther with i~ve1ve other ~sian. and !\frican h States, .has attel Ld S ' retul. consideratlon, brought to t e attentlOn of the ecunty Council the grave situation prevailing in Algeria, in accordance with their right under Article 3S of the United Nations Charter. We have asked the CouDcil to examine this serious situiltion urgeritly, because we feel that it is of a nature to give rise to a dispute between nations, and that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 31. Before elaborating further on the reasons why we believe that the Council should include this ques- 1 tion in its agenda, my delegation would like to make a few preliminary remarks. f J 32. To begin \,rith, we fully understand that today's debate should be cudfined to the procedural aspect of the question, that is, whether the Algerian question should be included in the Council's agenda or not. 1 do not intend, therefore, to deal with the substance of the problem, which can be discussed at a later stage of our debate, when the Algerian question has been included in the agenda. However, sÏl.,ce the French delegation disputes the competence of the Council, my ld::t::~o~~:~::~o~:-:':.~:.~~~:,~.:,,:::~==:::: 33. Secomllv, 1 w;sh to emphasize that, in taking the Boor today, my delegation is far from being inspired by any spirit of animosity towards France, with which wc have always enjoyed the most cordial relations. French CL:ture has greatly influenced our education and our laws, and we owe the french people an immense intellectual debt. If we have joined with other nations in requesting the inscription of the Aigerian question in the Council's agenda, we do 50 because we firmly believe that a Council debate on the matter would he1C the French Government, as weIl as the Algerian people, to find a Just and equitable solution -a solution which would reflect the well-established traditions of France founded on the - -inciples of liberty, equality and fraternity. The i_ _ _ ~ we are requestin:;: the inclusion of this question in the agtnda in no way diminishes our respect aad our friendship for France; indeed, French opinion itself is divided on the question of policy in Algeria. As we aU know, there are eminent men in France who are no less disquieted than we, and who feel that the policy of extreme repression now being carried out in Algeria is far from serving French interests and runs the risk of intensifying the existingdifficuWes, which will no doubt estrange the Aigerian people more and more from France. These eminent men rightly feel that i.mmediate stéps should be taken ta dress the gaping wounds and to prepare the ground for greater cooperation between the two people:>. My de1el>dtiûn hopes, therefore, that its attitude will be understood by other Member States as weIl as hy France and that our statement may help France to understand better the trend of events in Algeria. 34. Finally, 1 should like to express my Government's satisfaction regarding the French Government's liberal attitude in connexion with Morocco and Tunisia. We wish to emphasize that the awakening of the peoples of Asia and Africa and their movement for political and economic liberation will follow their normal course, regardless of the temporary difficulties encountered on the road to achieving these legitimate aspirations. In the same spirit it seems to us that France cannot remain indefinitely unmoved by the struggle of the Algerian people for the right of selfdetermination. This l110vement towards liberation which has succeeded in numerous Asian and African countries is one of the salient facts of our contemporary 35. Therefore l express the hope that the Council's discussions on this matter will bring a b~tter understanding of the existing situation in Aigeria; that they will have positive results in opening the way for a greater effort of conciliation, and that the Algerian ;=~:~è~::::::::'"ta:n:~:::c,::::~,,:,,~::,,:S:i:::::,:::::Uq::~~~:: 1 1 . hÏ.:i~ory. T 38. Nevertheless, the African and Asian Statc~, tagether with other Members of the United Nations, agreed to postpone consideration of the Algerian question. 10 accepting this course of action we were motivated by a conciliatory spirit and encouraged by the constructive stcps which France had just taken in regard to Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, in a spirit of co-operation, we did not desire to make the Genelal ~ssemblY'sd tas~ more di'ffi l cult awta thimde whhe~ hth~ sehssIon was rawmg to a c ose. e a cens 3'!l t e hope that France would take similar measur '3 in Algeria in a situation which is not different from those that had prevailed in the other two countries. Unfortunately, the policy foIlowed by France fills us with bitterness and apprehension. 1 39. When the present French Government took affice, we thought <, t the situation would improve. And :~e,~~'_'~i:rY:eff~r~Of:e ~~roch,:~em- 7 41. Instead, military operations have been expanded, and repressive measures against the Aigerh.il people have been intensified. For sorne time now, the news from Algeria as reported in the Press, has been more and more alarming. Every day the situation deteriorates. Thus, the hopes for a settlement which we held when we agreed to the postponement of the Algerian question in the General Assembly' have proved vain. 42. On i2 April 1956, the representatives of Afg-hanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Inàia, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Thailand and Yemen, upon instructions from their respective Governments, drew the attention of the Security Couneil [S13589 and Add.l] to the grave situation in Aigeria. under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter. They underlined that in refusing to negotiate with the representatives of the Aigerian people with a view to meeting their legitimate aspirations, and in having instead greater and greater recourse to force and to a policy of repression, the French Government l'an the risk of causing international friction and endangering peace and security. 43. However, we did not ask for a meeting of the Security Couneil at that time because we preferred to wait and examine the question among ourselves and, in the meantime, to give the French Government ample opportunity to settle the question in a way which would be acceptable to the interested partL~s. 44. ParaUel to our meetings in New York, many Governments endeavoured to express their concern at the situation in Algeria through diplomatic channe1s, urging the French Government to aet to bring about a just and.equitable settlement of the question. 45. In the same 1'pirit, the Ambassador of Burm:l, who was the Ch::>.irman of the Asian-African group last· month, discussed the question with the Secretary- General and asked him to take whatever steps he deemed necessary in whatever way he thought best. Our spokesman also consulted Ambassador Brilej, the President of the Security Couneil for the month of May, with a view to requesting him to use his good offices, not only in reg-ard to a situation likely to threaten international peace dnd security, but also and more particularly becat',se of humanitarian considerations, so that violence could be brought to an end in Algeria and an end be put to the bloodshed 8 t 48. The number and the importance of t.lle coul'1tries which have submitted the question to the Council deserve our undivided attention and iend a certain weight to the request, not only because of the geographical !" uation of these countries, but also because of the size of their population. These countries have the right to be heard because of the cultural and reli· gious ties which unite them with the Algerian people, and we believe that the least the Council can do is to inscribe the question ir its agenda so as to give them an opportunity to express their views. It would be a great error not to consider their request by having resort to procedural manœuvres. 49. If their desire for justice were not satisfied, it could but aggravate the situation, and confirm the often prevalent impression that the United Nations cannot protect the interests of small countries when they find themselves at grips with large ones. Moreover, such an action would have the effect of dividing the peoples into two camps, whereas the Afro-Asian countries wish only to cement better co-operation with the West on a basis of equity and justice and in the interests of consolidating world peace. 50. Thcrefore we believe that the Council should indude the Algerian question in its agenda anci examine it under Article 35 of the Charter, which provides: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Asserrbly." r! 51. Article 34 provides: "The Security Couneil may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead ta international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." 52. No one can deny that far-reaching military operations undertaken by an army of sorne 400,000 men 53. This situation has already led to international friction, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter, in the sense that thirteen Member States ;ave expressed their serious concern about the unhappy situation now prevailing in Aigeria. Could we force these States to remain silent when they ask the Council to examine this situation, which appears to them to constitute a dangerous. thrcat to peace and security? My delegation believes that it is essential that the United Nations examine this question, when a large number oi its Members express their desire to discuss its problems within the framework of the Ch.. rter. 54. Furthermore, the intemational community made known its attitude regarding the Aigerian question when the General Assembly-the highest international forum-approveù the inclusion of the matter :n its agenda. The situation has not improved since then; on the contrary, it has grown worse. 1 am fully aware that the Security Council is an independent organ of our Organization and that it can decide for itself on the questions submitted ta it. In any event it must not be forgotten that the Security Couneil in performing its task should, according ta Article 24 of the Charter, act on behalf of all the Members which have cùnferred on it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international {Jeace and security. It is to be hoped that the Security Couneil will not take a decision which would be contrary to the will of the majority of the Members of the United Nations. 55. With your permission, 1 should like to dwell further on this point to demonstrate why the situation in Aigeria is one on which the Security Couneil should act under the provisions of Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. 56. First of all, the armed conflict which began in Aigeria on 1 November 1954 bas developed rapidly and has today attained the proportions of a colonial war. Mr. Robert Lacoste, the minister residing in Aigeria, declared during the last debate on this question before the French Parliament that French forces were continuing to grow and that at the end of June France would have 364,000 infantrymen in Aigeria. To this figure must be added the militia, the police, the gendarmerie and the armed French inhabitants of Aigeria. In addition, the military equipment is impressive, both in quality and quantity. Because of the size of the forces engaged and the modern armaments employed, the Aigerian struggle is an armed conAict of incontestable gravity. 57. Jf we take into account the extent of the military operations and the resulting loss of life. we can but conclude that we are faced with a full-scale war, with all its consequences at bath the national and the international level. Even if there were any douhts abont the status of Aigeria, this war would still be a fullscale civil war. Nothing in international law prevents a civil war from assuming, in certain cases, the char- T

I am readv to bow ta the President's wishes; but you will understand that in trying to show how the Algerian situation is likely to threaten peace and security, 1 am oblig-ed to cite certain facts on the strength of Press reports. As we have no official source of news, I am forced to rely on quotations from the newspapers to estabIish the fact that at the present time the situation in Algeria constitutes a danger to peace and security. However, 1 shall take your remarks into consideration to trie extent that this is necessary. 11 f 62. 1 quote: "It is now no longer a question of pacification or of blind repression; the unfortunate Moslem inhabitants of Constantinois and Kabylia are being subjected to virtual extermination... Every day, alleged suspects or hostages are executed ..." \ , !. 63. If these statements are correct, I prefer to believe that such acts were committed without the knowledge of the French Government, for 1 cannot think for a moment that the French Government, with its traditions of liberty, would give its sanction to acts which constitute a violation of the Genocide Convention. l article 8 of which incidentally recognizes the compe- ~, ience of United Nations jurisdiction. ~,, r.· 64. Moreover, the \var l'n Algerl'a l'S already CatlS\'ng t ) grave repercussions in neighbouring countries. Indeed r the experiences of the last three years in North Africa i have emphasized the interdependence of the prob1ems ! of the three North African countries, Morocco, Tun1- us. 'd ~ sia and Algeria. Thp. situation is a result of the 1 entity of race, of religion, of culture and of tradition, as weil as of the geographical situation of the three j countries. i 65. His Majesty the Sultan of Moroc:co has proclaim- ~ 66. Ml'. Habib Bourguiba, President of the Council in Tunisia, has also proclaimed his support in similar terms before the Tunisian Parliament. 67. Thus it is evident that the war in Aigeria with its profound and direct repercussions on Morocco and Tunisia has become a conflict which spreads beyond the Iimits of the Algerial1 frontier and may become a threat to peace in these two neighbouring countries. 68. Not only that, but the Algerian tragedy is passing beyond North Africa and threatens to set the whole African continent on fire. Indeed Algeria, spreading as it does over such a large area, is on the way to becoming the sprillgboard for violence and, by a series of chain reactions, l'uns the risk of contaminating the whole continent of Africa. 69. To this must be added the co-operation between the Afro-Asian peoples and the Algerian people. This solidarity is taking an ever more active form. There is talk now of the possibility that the Arab States might consider a cultural and economic boycott of France. The workers' unions refuse to load or supplY provisions to French ships in the Suez Canal. The Syrian Government has suspended the de!ivery of wheat to France. Violent attacks against France arc being made more and more frequently in the Press, in the streets, at public meetings and in the par1iaments of the Afro-Asian countries. 70. Is it possible for the Couneil to ignore aIl these implications of the war in Aigeria without failing in the duty which the United Nations Charter has conferred on it \Vith regard to the maintenance of international peace and security? 71. If, in spite of aIl that 1 have just said, there are still certain members of the Council who are not absolutely certain that a threat to international peace and security exists here and now, they nevertheless cannot deny the possibility of such a threat. The Council, therefore, must include this question in its agenda so as to determine, as stipulated in Article 34 of the Charter, if, in its opinion, the continuance of this situation threatens the maintenance of international peace and security. It is quite evident that the Couneil cannot decide upon this until the question has been included in the agenda. 72. The representative of France has jüst objected to the inclusion of the Aigerian problem, declaring that Aigeria is an integral part of France and that the United Nations is therefore not competent to intervene in this question. 73. In this connexion may 1 point out that Algeria was an independent country before 1830, maintained diplomatie relations, concluded treaties with many States and welcomed the representatives of foreign Powers, including the representative of France with which Algeria had concluded a treaty of friendship? It also concluded a treaty of friendship and peace with the United States on 5 September 1772. It is pertinent 75. The Algerian people has never been invited to state its views on the unilateral decision of France: While it is true that France exercised its authority in Algeria in the same way as it did for a time in Morocco, sovereignty neverthe1ess belongs to the Algerian people, and that not only by virtue of the UnivcrsaI Declaration of Human Rights, but also by virtue of the French Constitution which also contains the principle of human rights. The conquest of Algeria in the nineteenth century could not abolish the Algerian people's right of sovereignty because the whole world recognizes that the right of a people to selfdetermination is an inalienable right. In these circumstances, therefore, we are called upon to examine a question which is purely a colonial one, since Algeria forms part of the French colonial empire. 76. 1f tilè argumem of national competence could be validly invoked, the legitimacy of the very existence of many countries in this Council, and also of many United Nations Member States, might easily be contested. ' • I 1 J 1 ~ 1 1 77. The great people of the United States established its existence as a great sovereign State by revolting against England of which it had formed an integral part. Cuba and Peru, which are members of this Council, together with other Latin American countries have put an end to foreign hegemony although their people possessed the same culture as Spain. Besides, if one accepts the French point of view, colonialism would have found an easy way of perpetuating itself, since ail any colonial State would have to do would be to confer on the inhabitants of one of its territories so-called equal status with the citizens of "the mother country" and thus prolong its domination of that people. J 78. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the Algerian people are far removed from France by their language, their customs, their origin,· their race and their religion. As everyone knows, alleged equalities between French and Algerians have been cited, but they do not exist in facto 79. In the light of these considerations we are convinced that this juridical argument, or rather this fiction, to which the French delegation has had recourf'~, is complete1y unfounded and we cannot agree that. 'icie 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter applies in tnis instance. 80. RefusaI to allow the people of Algeria the right of se1f-determination constitutes a violation of the Charter, particularly of Article 1, paragraph 2. The right of peop!es to self-determination, which is cited in that paragraph, constitutes one of the fundamental principles of human rights, established by many resolu- 82. Indeed, the United Nations has dcc1arerl itsclf ta be competent when such questions have been raisc(l as that of the treatment of persons of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa or of the policy of apartheid in the Union of South Africa. The competence of the United Nations has been recognizccl, although there is no doubt that the Union of South Africa exercises sovereignty over its territory. The Security Council itself has included similar questions in its agenda, among tnem the question of Indonesia and the request from Chile concerning events which took place in Czechoslovakia in 1948. 83. In addition, tne ward "essential1y" which appears in the text of .L~rticle 2 t paragraph 7, al1ov/5 a ,alider interpretation of this Article, since the prohibition contained in the paragraph cannat he applied to ail matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, but only to those which are essentially-and 1 stress the word "essentially"-within its jurirliction. 84. It is an established fact thar any question which has a bearing on violation of human rights, when these violations are of particular importance and are capabie of affecting the cordial relations which should exist between the Members of the United Nations, is not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of aState. As attested by numerous precedents, especially those which 1 have just cited, the United Nations has always pronounced itself competent as far as questions of this nature are concemed. 85. The French Government itself, moreover, does not seem to he convinced tOOt the question of Algeria is within its domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, when the French Govemment signed with the USSR, on 19 May 1956, a communiqué which contained a passage on the settlement of the Aigerian problem, it accepted, tacitly at least, the idea that the Algerian problem could not be considered as an essentialiy French affair; otherwise the French Government would not have allowed it to be mentioned in an internationai document sigOt::J bath by the representatives of France and by the representatives of the Soviet Union. &l. Suniiariy, l \\t:ould refer tü the ca-;nmuniqué signcd on Il May 1956 by the heads of the French and the Yugoslav Governments, which \Vas couched 10 similar terms. 87. Lastly, in an address he delivered in the French National Assembly on 2 June, Mr. Guy Mollet declared: "It is not possible, because of 8 million Moslems, for Aigeria to be a French province Iike the rest. Assimilation, which was a generous idea, is now an out-of-date conception." 97. There can be no reasonahle doubt that the affairs of Aigeria are, in the words of the Charter, a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. The notion of domestic jurisdiction is dear; it is a concept of law. It cannot he evaded merely by invoking facts. It cannot he maintained that AIgcnan affairs are outside French domestic jurisdiction, simply because they in some way concern a population part of which does not belong to the same race-as Mr. Abdoh has said-speak the same language, or practise the same religion as the remainder of the French population. 98. Domestic juris(:;,-~:'1tl AS ordinarily defined by the exercise of intern~ j sovereignty: if Aigeria ;5 iegally part oi France, if the French executîve power, the French legislative power and the French judicial power, in short, French sovereignty, are alone legally exerciscrl in Aigeria, then the exercise of that executive power, that legislative power and that judicial power is exdusivelya matter oi French domestic jurisdiction-essentiaIly 50, indeed, for obviously nothing is non-essential which touches the exercise of sovcreignty. 99. French sovereignty alone has been exercised over Algeria for more than 120 yeaTs and it has been implicitly or explicitly recognized by aIl members of the international community. In September last our Ministtr for Foreign Affairs said: "AIl the international treaties which we have signed, induding the Charter, are applicable to Algeria as French territory, and no one has ever thought of disputing it"-no one, 1 will add, is in a worse position to dispute it than those very persans who, as co-signatories of these treaties, thereby accepted the French status of Algeria. 1 will mention only one example: the States-aIl the Stateswhich have requested permission from the Government of the Republic to open consulates in Algiers or in any other Aigerian town, have recognized French sovereignty over Algeria. 100. France is doing no more in Algeria than exercising one of the most normal attributes of domestic sovereignty. It is endeavouring to maintain public arder which has been disturbed by rebe!lious citizens; it is trying to prevent, or, if that bas proved impossible, to pu.rlish the killings, the brnta.lities, fires and robberies which certain French-Algerians are committing against other French-Algerians, whether Christians or Mohammedans. Is there any need to repeat that it would he the most dangerous of precedents ta recognize the right of the United Nations ta intervene between the Government of a State and those of its citizens who are disturbing the peace? It would he a fatal precedent for in time it might he turned against any one of us. 101. It wo. : also he a violation of the Charter, which sought to prohibit most strictly intervention by the 102. Moreover, Article 2, paragraph 7, is not the only Article in which the principle of non-intervention is embodied. 1f we read Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, with particular reference to the competence of the Security Council, we find that under Article 34 -to which reference is rightly made in Article 35. which has been mentioned by the authors of the letter submitted to the Council today-the Council's competence is Hmited to "any dispute, or any situation which might !cad to international friction or give rise to a dispute", a dispute or situation the continuance of which "is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and seclll'ity". 103. Is the situation in Algeria likely t.o endanger international peace and security, that is t J say, peace and security between States ("il'1:ternatio.::tI" means between States) Members of the internatiOl;'l1 community and of the United Nations? Not l'ven the authors of the Ictter submitted to the Council (SI3609] have been bold enough to make that daim. They state in the second paragraph of the letter that "the situation had deteriorated to th., f'xtent that the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the threat to peace and security"-I cali attention to the fact that, in their letter to the Coundt, the thirteen Asian-African States referred to peace ~nd security without inserting the qualifying adjective "international" which appears in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter-and th~ infringement of the basic right of self-determination, and to the flagrant violation of the other fundamental human rights". 1 1 104. The point is, however, that neither the violation of fundamental human rights nor the denial of the right of self-determination is a matter within the competence of the Security Council. Threats to peace and security are not within the purview of this high forum unless they relate to international peace and security. In truth, the maintenance of order in any province of any one of the seventy-six--or, as they will saon he, seventy-seven-Member States could not in itself affect international peace and security. To conceive of a âisturbance of international peace, either the forces ot the State concerned would have. to go beyond its frontiers improperly in their operations, or third States would have to intervene in the rebellion. In that case, howcver, is it not clear that if we applied the latter hypothesis to the present issue, it would be for France alone, as the victim of such interference, to plead before this Council a violation of the Charter committed against her interests, and to make that violation the cause of a dispute-which in that case would he ti-uly international? 106. There would in fact be no need to recall these essential principles if, in this matter as in many others, right had not been sacrificed to passion. As soun as tlll' word colonialism is pronounced, anything appears to be permitted, so long as it is presented as a weapon against colonialislU. Yct, here as elsewhere, the term is singularly abused. There is no place for colonialism among those who seek to defend freedom, those whose dec1ared aim is the holding of free elections. It is not colonialisrn to aim at an increase in the number of schools, to promote social and economic reform, to raise underprivileged people to a level where they will be able, in full consciousness, to he masters of their own destiny. 107. It was nût a colonialist programme which Mr. Guy Mollet outlined on 28 February 1956 when he said: "The Franco-Moslem community will be created in free discussion. The Government intends to proceed as soon as possible, once order is restored, ta hold fair elections. It will study with freely designated representatives of the whole Algerian people the future structure of the indissoluble Franco- Moslem community." 1s that coioniaiism? "Our aim", Mr. Christian PiTJeau, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs said in a recent speech. "is to create a new \lgeria in which we can fully develop the Franco-Moslem co-operation we desire." 108. The enemies of freedom ana of progress are those who are today burning schoois, destroying crops and deliberately preventing by terrorism a return to the normal functioning of dernocratic institutions. ]09. Freince cannot renounce the aim it has set itself. On 17 June 1956, Mr. René Coty, the President of the French Republic, said at Verdun that France made immense sacrifices in the course of two world wars ta maintain its integrity and, he added: "Tomorrow, on the shores of the Mediterranean, France wiii not abandon people who are deeply loyal to us to a minority of butchers of women and children which would lead them only to the most terribIt> relapse intù barbarism, fanaticism, anarchy and poverty." Moreaver, is there no danger that such barbarism, fanaticism, anarchy and poverty might inevitably bring the unfortunat~ Algerian people under other domination-whether of the left or of the right-which would stifle its democratic aspirations for years to come? lIt. 1 thererore ask the Security Couodl to refuse to indude in its agl'nda the complaint of the thirteen Arah .ürd Asian countries. The Council will not allow itself to I~ drawn ir.to violating the Charter, or into prejudicing, by unju"t and untimely action, the restoration in a rruclly-tried French land of the JJl'ace and security which it is ifs dutY to maintair among nations.

UnIes" there is any objection, 1 propose to adjourn the meeting until 3 o'c1ock thi" Ilfternoon. 113. Mr. Abdoh (Iran) (trmtslated trom French): We have ju"t heanl a vety important "tatement by the French rcprc:lentntive, to whom Tshould Iike to express my "Ineere thanks for the kinrl words he addre"sed both to l11e and to illY country. 114. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of his statement, which concern" equally the substance of the malter and the question of competence, T Leel that the 1ranian dekgatiOll !;hould have the nc(cssary time to cOllsider it and ta reply at the appropriate moment to certain points which he has mentioned. 1 1 115. T would therefore make the' suggestion-and it is no more than a suggestion-that the meeting he adjotlt'l1ed until tomorrow 50 that my delegatioil may have th\' iH'CeSS1iïY Hm\' to pOii\ki' the French repf'esentative's statcment and to reply to certain questions raised in it. 116. Mr. ALPHAND (France) (translated tram Fre1lclt): 1 am somewhat surprised at the suggestion ny the f'epresentative of Iran. My statement this rnorn- ;ng can have come as a surprise to no one arnund this table, and to him Icast of ail, for it represents my Governml'11t's position, which has bren public knowledge for manv months. 1 have spoken to him about it at length, 1 have spoken about it to each of my colleagues on the Council, as, 1 think, 1 have the right and indeed the dutY to do as a mcmber cf this Council. T cannot sec why it should be necessary to take a whole afternoon tù read things that arc comman knowletlge. 117. 1 should therefore be grateful if the Council wOllld agree ta meet this afternoon, if it is not possible to vote at once, as 1 personally would desire. 1 11 Î 117. de sible je l'importance matin, sécurité ! 18. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translafprl. : t'am Russian): In view of the importance of the statements made at today's meeting, J consider that the Iranian representativc's request that we should fix our next meeting for tomorrl'" is weil founded and that the Security Council will be taking a very sound course if it sets the next meeting for tomorrow. 119. The Soviet delegation supports the Iranian representative's proposaI. 120. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): l UI1- derstood that the President's proposaI to adjourn was to la 120. de

There must he sorne misunderstanding. As .the .President pointed out at the beginning of this meeting, the question now under discussion is whether or not we will adopt the provisional agenda; it is not whether we should or should not discuss the substance of the problem. The Iranian representative knows perfectly wen that he will vote for the adoption of the agenda. 1 isnow perfectly well that 1 shall vote against its adoption. We do not need to waste a further haH clay ta search our consciences on that point. 123. Moreover, the statements to which 1 have just referred date back to 28 Fehruary. Today is 26 June. These statements were made publidy, in the National Assembly, by the President of the French Cauneil. 1 have therefore contributed nothing new to Mr. Abdoh's documentation. 124. In the circumstances, if the President puts the adjournment of the meeting to the vote, 1 intend to vote in favour of adjournment until three o'clock this afternoon.

ln the spirit of compromise \..'-Iat always prevails in my delegation and hecause it is nel.~ssary for me to study the statement made by the French representative, 1 would suggest that this afternoon's meeting be held at 4 p.rn. instead of 3 p.m. Quite frankly, 1 feel 1 must study the French representative's statement. It does, indeed, contain sorne new factors. 1 cannot he expected to know wllat happened in the French Parliament. Quite possibly the state~nent in question was made in the French Parliament, but 1 have not received the records of that Par~:~mlent's proceedings. Nevertheless, that statement was made today in the Security Council. 1 think that my suggestion is worthy of the Council's attention. If other de1egations object to the Council's meeting tomorrow morning, 1 would suggest that this aftemoon's meeting be held at 4 p.m. 1 think that a membt:r of the Security Council, sr-eaking on hehalf or The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m. 11 1 'l. AIGINTlNA..uGENTINE Editorial SlIdollm.rlcana s.A., A111na 500, lu.no. AIr... AUSTIAUA-AUSTIAUE H. 1<.. Goddard, 2550 Georg. St., Syd'l'Yl 90 Qu••n SI., Malheurn•• Malheurn" University .r.... C~rllon N.3, VIctoria. AUSTIIA-AumlCHE Gerold & Co., Graben 31, Wl.'" 1. 1. WüU...torff. Markul Sl"IIcuIIlrOIl' 10, :salzbure· IElGIUM-IRGIQUE Ag.nce .1 Moasag..l.. ~ la 'r.1IIl s.A., 14-22 ru. du '.r11I, Brux.llo.. W. H. Smith .. Son, 71·75, Doulevard Adolpho-Max. Irux.U... IOliVIA-IOllVlI L1br.rla Sol_Ion... CallUa 972, la 'aL UAZlloUBll i,lvrona Agir, Illo ci. janciro, Seo i'=l:~# ond lolo H§rlzonl•• CAMlODIA-cAMIODGE 'ap.torl"lIbralrlo Nouvello, Albon !to.. tail. 14 Av.nu. Boulloch., 'na.'.nh. CANADA Ry.rlO" '''''' 299 Queen St. W.Il, Toronto. CEYlON-CEYLAN lak. Hauso IIookohop, Th. IwodlJtod N.wspap of Coylon, lId., •• O. Iox 244. Cola bo. . CHllE-eHllI Editorial d.1 'adllco, Ahumacla 57, Santiago. lil>,.rla lvonl. ('011110 205. Santiago. CHINA-eHINE Th. World look Co., lId., 99 Chunll' King Raad, ht Section, TaIpoh, Taiwan. Th. Ca.......rdal 're.. lId., 211 Honan Rd., Shanghai. COlOMIIA-eOLOMIIE libr.rlo A_rlca, Mod.llln. libr.rlo Iluchhola Gal.rlo, Iogot6. lIb,.rla Naclanal lido., lafranq"lIIa. FINLAND-FINLANDE A"al••mln.n Klriakouppa, H.llinki. FIANCE Edition. A. P"don., Pa,ll V. GEiMANV.AllEMAOK~ R. ElsonKhmldt, Kalsorslralso furt/Maill. Elw.rl & M.ur.r, Haupltra Schon.b.rg. Al••and.. Horn, SpI.II.lga ba«:en. W. E. Scarboch. !Coin (22c). GlEECE-GlRE Kauffmann 8aa~, Alh"n... GUATEMALA Soci.dad Ecan6fnl~ ~rl~..~~acha 207, 1,. .....NIo City. HAITI lIbralrl. "A 10 Cora 111-8, Port-au.Prlnce. HONDUU5 llbr..la 'anamerlcana, HONG KONG-HONG-KONG Tllo Swindon IIook Co., Kowloon. ICElAND-ISLANCE Bo"averalun Slg'lIlOr i'., Aultunt'lJ.ti lii, INDIA.INDE Od.nt lang_ni, Calcu"a. dra! and New D.lh'. Oaford look .. Slatlon.ry D.lhl and Ca'cu"o. P. Varadamary .. 'NDONESIA-lNDONESIE '.mbongunun, lId.• Dja"arta. IIAN "Guily", 482 A••"u. 11AQ.IIAK Mack.nzl.'. IooklhOl', ISIAB IlI..ml,oIn'. IIookllarel Rcael, T.!-Avlv ITAlY·ITALlE lIbr.,... Comml..lonarlo GIna Cappanl 26, JA'AN-.lA'ON Marua.n Call1pGny, Nlhcnbolhl, Tokyo. lEIANON-UIAN lIbralrlo Unlv....II•• UlUlA J. Ma_lu Ka_ra. LUXEMIOUIG UbraIIIe J. Schumlller, MEXlCQ.MEXIQUE editorial H.'_I S.A., 41, M'xlcÔ, D.F. NETHEllUNDS-PAYS-IAS N.V. Martlnu. Nlihoff, 9, '..GraV0nhaga. NEW ZEALAND-NOUVW.I-ZEIANDE Unlt.d Natlonl Association Iond. C.P.O. 1011, COSTA IICA-e051A..ICA Tr'IOI H.rmanol, Apartodo 1313. So" Jo... CUlA la CaIO "!go, O·R.llly œ, la Habona. CZICHOSlOVAKIA·yettECOSLOVAQUIE C..kodo"'''lky Splsovat.l, N6rodnl T,Ida. 9, 'raha 1. DINMAIIC-DANEMAlIC Einar Mua"lSJaord, lId., NorrO\lad. 6, Kabenhavn, K. DOMIN[CAN IIPUILI.'l',.. • IPUILIQUE DOMINICAINE lIbrorlo D«II.tnlcana, Ma_d.. 49, CIudad Trulillo. ECUADOIl-EQUATIUI lIb,.rlo Clent"ka, Guayaquil and Quito. EGYPT-EGYFTE libralrl, "la I.naluance d'Egypte", 9 Sh. Adly 'olha, Colra. EL SAlVADOIl-sALVADOI Manu.1 Naval '1 Cio., la. Av.nlda IUr 3i, San SoIYoclor. Old'." afld 1"'Iulrl•• lrom eaunt,l.. wlt... 10'.' all.nll /ta.,. not ,., ....n appoint.d lIIOy Il. sent ta: Sa'•• end Clrcu'a,lon Section, United Natlcn., N.w ;~orle, U.S.A.; or Sa,.. Section. Unit", Nafionl OHiee, 'a/ais de. Nation., Gen••o"Swltzer'and.