S/PV.734 Security Council

1 have today received from the Secretary-General a communication [S/3658] informing me, as President of the Security Couneil, of the regrettable events which have taken place in Pa.lestine in the past few days. No request is made in this communication for a meeting of the Security Council, but 1 have had it eirculated for the information of members of the Couneil. 2. At ail events, 1 wish as President to express my sorrow at the loss of life sustained by bath contesting parties in Palestine in the past few days, and my concern at the course events are taking there. Expression of welcome to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, representative of France &

1 1 believe that 1 speak for the whole Security Couneil in extending a most cordial we1come ta Mr. Cornut- Gentille, the new representative of France to the Security Council. ~n'et you and say to ail the members of the Security Council that they may be sure they will always Ilnet Ille a courtt'OUS and loyal colleague. Adoption of the agenda h. The PRESIDENT (tmllslaft'd [rom Spallislt): ln a communication dal(d 23 September 1956 [S/ 3f154 1. the repregentatives of Fra!';('{~ and the United Kingdoll1 asked for a meeting of the Sentrity Councii tn lw heM on \Vedncsda), 26 '3ept"mber, ta consider Ihe fnl10wing item: "Situation crea',ed by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Govertilllent in bringing ta an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, whkh was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888". ï. n~, a communication datrd 24 S<,ptemher 1956 rS;3656]. the Permanent Repres('ntative of Egypt ta the Pnitcd Nations requested thal the Security Council should be urgently convened to consider the following: "Actions against Egypt by SOtl1e Powers. particularIy France and the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations". R In conformity \Vith this request by Egypt, tht" provisional agenda for this meeting was amended, and is now before the Council for its consideration. 9. T hope that in the discussion which may develop on the adoption of the agenda. representatives will confine their remarks to the procedural aspects of the problt'm. and not enter into questions of substance, which l'an be discussed \Vhen the agenda has been adopted.

1 shaH, of course. cornply \Vith the President's \Vishes and, without going into points of substance, 1 shaH confine myself today ta a few remarks arising out of the proYisional agenda b60re us. This is, 1 fet'I sure, the best way lO CünduLt (,ur procccdings at titis m~~ting since. as 1 think aB mt'l1bers are aware, t!:L Foreign Ministers of several of t~e States represented in this Council. induding the British Secretary of State, MI'. Lloyd. hope ta take part in a s\.,l.,<;tantive debate later next week. Il. 1 now turn ta the revised provisional agenda before us, and 1 propose first ta deal with item 2, wnicn the representative al France and 1 asked to be considered bv the Council in a letter which we addressed ta the President of the Security Council on 23 September 1956 [S/3654]. 12. It has for sorne time been in our minds that the situation created by the Egyptian Government might make it necessary for us ta have l'l'course ta the ; sentatives of those eighteen Governments which have p rccently dceided ta form an assoeiation ta protect ? their interests. It was the general view at that confp.rence that the time was ripe ta come ta the Security ~ COI .1crl. Consequently, the United Kingdom Government and the French Government t00k the decision ta bring the situation here. 15. We have donc this because wc consider that the time has come ta bring the atteûtion of the Security Council to the situation which 1 have briefly described. We hope that the Council will give full and careful consideration ta this situation. It is one which affects the vital interests of many nations-indeeu directly or indirectly the whole world. 16. From the beginning of this crisis, precipitated as it was by the hasty and ill-considered action of the Egyptian Governmcnt, we have be~n acting consistently in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. We are now coming in good faith to the Security Council of the United Nations in an effort ta improve thereby the prospects of a peaceful outcome, and we are confident that this Coundl will be animated by the desire to preserve the mIe of law and redress a situation which threatens the very life and strength of sa many nations. We think it right that the United Nations should be given this opportunity to assert the rule of law and he1p towards a peaceful solution. As a not uninfluentia1 Member of the United Nations, and as one of the architects of the Charter, the United Kingdom will make its contribution LO that end. 17. The full nature of our purposes in coming to the Security Council will be unfoldeù later, when we enter upon the substantive debate. 1t will a1so depend on our estimate of what the United Nations can do in this matter in which wc look for a just solution. This estimate will naturally be affected by the course of the debate in this Council on which we have now embarked. ', J t ~8. 1 now turn ta the item proposed by Egypt, which 1S listed as the third item on our revised provisional ~genda. This is a strange1y worded item. It speaks " ~', lU a vague and unsubstantiated way of actions by some Powers. Those Powers are not specified. This suggests i F' ta me rather aminous overtones. The item contains ft accusations against France and the United Kingdom. II 1 do not think 1 need say more now than ta point out 1 that this is c1early a propaganda move designed to 21. It;s for the Security Council tu decide, amI, whate\'cr the Council may decide un that point, 1 naturally assume that it will wish to take up l11'st and to deal with first the item which figures first on the provisional agenda, in aC\'ordance with its nul'mal procedure. :2. As l mentioned cariier, a number of Forcign Ministers, including Mr. Lloyd, hope to participate in the substantive debate next week. 1 understaml that the afternoon of Thursday. 40ctobl't' 1956, IHight pro.-e generally convenient to ail I11cmbers as the date for the next meeting, and 1 assume that it will be agrœable tu mel11b('r5 that the Council should be alljourned until that time, after wc have decided on our provisional agenda. 23. l assume that the other membl'rs of the Council will think it appropriate if the rl'prescntative of Egypt is invited to participate in ou!' proccl'dings when the substantive discussions begin, sinee Egypt's interests will be especially affected. 24. 1 have just seen a letter from the reprcsentative of Israel [5/365ï J requesting permission to participate in the proceedings. 1 should like to l'l'serve my right to speak on this point 1ater. 25. MI'. CORNUT-GENTILLE (France) (translatcd jrom Fn'nch): The French delegation, wishing to respond to the Presidellt's appeal and to keep the discussion strictiy within the limits imposed by the rules of pwcedure, is fully prepared to confip..è itself to a very brief statement. \Ve are ail aware that the purpose of our first meeting is to establish our agenda, without going into any aspect of the matters which are to be kept for later meetings. l shaH accordingly l'l'main entirely within these bounds. 26. This is the situation. An international convention was suddenly broken. The disturbance resulting from this denunciation affected not only the signatories of that convention, b..1t the l!ltire world. The users of an international service found their rights unguaranteed, their interests :nsecure. 27. Then n\iO countries. acting whoHy in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which recommend conciliation between the parties concerned, took the initiative of calling a conference to which they invited the signatories of the brokell convention and the countries principally concerned. The 29. NevertheJess, a second collective effort was made with a view to holding a new conference whirh might produce the Lc-ginnings of a constructive soluttO:l. This fresh attempt met with the same uncomproll,~~ing attitude. In these circumstances, matters, far from moving towards a solution in accordance with peace and justice. have become progressively 'Norse. 30. Therefore, with patience as to the means, with finnness as to our goal, we must now pass to the second phase of the procedi.1rc provided by the United Nations Charter: recourse to the Security Caunci!. 31. The two countries raising the question are France and the United Kingdom. The Gover!1ment which created the situatinn is the Egyptian Government. 32. France and the United Kingdom are therefore today applying in ail good faith to the Security Council, in the hope that the principles of internatil)llal morality and law may br> reaffirmed and defended. The French delegation flrmly hopes that the Coune:! will include in its agenda the item that has been suL mitted and win give it priority., 33. The French delegation joins the United Kingdom ùelegation in proposing that Egypt should be invited to take part in the discussion. 34. Lastly, in order to enable the Foreign Ministers to come to New York to lead their delegations in the debate on the substance of the matter, the French delegation asks the Council to agree to adjournment until the middle of next week.

The United StatL> welcomes the initiative which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken in bringing the Suez Canal maLter to the Security Council for its consideration. It is a further demonstration of the determination of these two Governments ta fulfil their Charter obligations and to seek a peaceful solution. This is precisely what Lhey and numerous other Governments concerned with this situation have been doing since the action of the Government of Egypt against the Universal Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. These Governments and the United States Government have sought, consistently with our obligations under Article 33 of the Charter, to resolve the difficulties which have arisen between them and the Government of Egypt through negotiations with Egypt. 36. The documents bdore the Cuuneil sumrnarize in some detail the events which transpired at the first and second London Conferences on the Suez Canal. 37. Eighteen nations which attended the first Conference agreed to proposais which they deemed just fU!tICSS in the interests of pracc br initiating thc f()\'mation of the Suez Canal Uscrs .\ssocÎntion, 39. TIll' Gll\'ertln\l'nls of the Unit<-d Killgdom and France :U1d the lT'litcll Stalcs, as weil as nther (~ov­ l'rtlmel\ts, have conSit1lclIth' songht a seltlcl11{'nt haserl 01\ juslke :md 01\ their rights as users oE (he SUel Cana\. 40. The GOYCrhlllcnts of the United KingdOln alHI Fntuce haYe no\\" ('ù\ue to thc Secttritv l'nuncil, atHI wc ho~c that thc otlwr t1sers of the Catlal will support them m thcir determination that a lasting settirmcnt ",hidl protccts the rights of ail concertlcd shall be achie\'l'd. lt is cssential that the rights of the users of the Lanal re"t on a b.1sis other than ~milatcral promises. 4i. ln the Securitv Cotlncil lIcbate '. hich is to CI1St\C, the United Slakg \~'i\l seck a pc:' d just srtt!eml'nt of the Suez Canal situation, a!H1 it hope: that tbs will he the attitude of a1l ll\cmbers of this ll'll!y. 1Il this spirit, the United States will vole in f:n our (,f the adoption of the provisioaal agenda as circulahd. \Vc shall vote in fayour of the inscription of the item proposed. by the United Kingdom and France, and wc shaH also vote in favour of the in~cription of the item propost'd by Eg)1)t, The United States wil1 be acting in accordance with its generally liberal policy with respt'ct to the indusioo of itcms ~n the agenda. <1cspite the 5erious resl'rvations which wc ma" have as to the lllt'rits of certain of those items. . 42. This is consistent with the United States action in voting in favour of the inscription of items on at kast four previous occasions wnen the proposed item was directed against the United States. In 1950, for e.'"<ample, we voted in favour of inscribing an item charging the United States with armed invasion d the territory of China and violation of the Charter. .-\gain, in 1950, we voted for the inscription of an item charging the invasion of China by the United States Air Force and bombing by that Air Force of the territory of China, In 1952, we did not object ta the inscription of an item charging the United States, of aIl things, with engaging in bacteriological wal"fare, and in 1953 we did not abject to the inscription of an item charging the United State-s \vith actions in yiolation of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and threatening the peace. 43. In each of these previous cases, the charges against Ùe 1.:nited Statts, preposterous and fal1acious though they \Vere, did not Jeter us from not objecting tu the inscription of the item. \Ve there!ore J.u Ilot feel that we should oppose the inscription of an item such as the one proposed by the Government of Egypt making charges against the 1.:nited Kingdom ancl Françe. This, of course, does not mean that we agree with the contention contained in the Egyptian item that the 1.:nited Kingdom and France have aded in 44. With regard ta the qurst:on of our next 111reting-. the Ftlltrd States Government concurs in the views alrrady expressed by the representatives of the Unitrrt Kingdom and Francc that, sincc several Foreign Min· isters will participate in tJ11r debate, this Council should extend tu them the clJ11rtesy of waiting until they l'an convenicntly arrive. 45. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlks) (tr01lslafed [rom Russian): The Security (o\lncil is llOW l'mbarking on a discttRsion of the situation which has arisen in cot1l1exirJi1 with the Suez C":lal. The importance of this faet can hardly be over rstimat{'r1. Fllr ~eas(Jns whkh arc well known, the anxiolts attention of aH the pr()p1rs of the wnrld has recmtly bf'rll tUrtlcrl to this region of the globe. It is with cf]ually K('Cti attcntion that world public op:nion will follow the discussion of the Suez question in the Sccurity Cottncil. 46. T~le provisional agenda which bas been submittrrt r,,/ tllc Council's approval consis!s of two items. The Unifcd Kingdom. RP,I FrallCe cali upon the Council tf) dlsC11ss thc "siluatitln crf'atrd by the unilateral acion of thr E!:;yptian (-;ovrrnmrnt in bringing to an end tht system of international operation of the Suez Canal, whirh was confi rmrrl and completed by the Suez Canal Convf'ntion of 1888". '17. On the other hamt, the Egyptian Governnlf'nt asks the Securi'LY Council to consider the question of "actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the Ul1tted Kingdom, which comtitute :l danger to international peace and security and are serions violations of the Charter of the United Nations". In support of this complaint, the representative of Egypt refers to his letter of 17 Septemnrr 1956 to the President of the Security Council rs/ 36501, in which he sets forth certain faels concerning the llOstile measures taken against Egypt. 48. Without g'oing into the merits of the Egyptian cornplaint-in accordance with the Pres;dent's reC0111- mrl1flation-the deJegation of the Soviet Union neverthe1ess feels compelled to draw the attention of members of the Security Council to sorne facts of common knowledge, by way of completing the picture of events which has been sketched here by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. 49. According' to the aforementioned letter of the representative of Egypt, immediately after the Egyptian Government had nationalized the Suez Canal Company, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France resorted to gross and unjustified pressure on Egypt, applied measures of economic repression against that country and began taking military measures accompanied by threats of settlïng the Suez Canal question by force. 50. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France announced that they were making their armed forces ready for ".,., mobilizing their reserves, preparing for landinr 's and so forth. In the immediate vicinity of Egypt, an increasing concentration of ':;2. The PRESIDENT (trallslatl'd [rom Spanish): 'Would the representative of the Soviet Union kindlv confine himseli. so far as possible, ta discussing th'c procedural matter of the adoption of the agemh, as ..ther representatives ha\'(' riant', .53. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialht Republics) (trallslatcd fr(lm Rllssiall): The Presid,-nt may be sure that 1 am eomplying to the letter \Vith his recoll1mendation, that 1 ~h,\!l be wry brieL and that l shaH confine m)'sd f ta mentionini only those faets ",hich llIust be addul'cd to warrant the inc1usion of this item in the agenda. 54. The Egyptian Government also points out that plans :Ire being put fOf\\"ard ta \vithhold payment to Egypt for the passage of ships through the Suez Canal. From the moment the Canal vvas nationalized, the former Suez Canal Campan)', wi th the support uf certain French and British circ1es, has been attempting to disorganize navigation through the Canal, and on 15 September it recalled employees and pilots from the Canal service, thereby deliberate1y attemptingtn disrupt the normal operation of the Suez Canal in order to create the impression that the Egyptian Go\"- emment ",as unable ta guarantee navigation through the Canal. 55. The Egyptian Government draws the Se,urity Council's attention to the fact that the actions of the United Kingdom and France are at variance \Vith the principles of peace fundamental to the United Nations and to its Charter, which requires aH Members of the Organization ta refrain in their international relations From the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. 56. At a time when, as a result of the Western Powers' actions, the situation in the Near and Middle East is becoming increasingly acute, the United N;:tions cannat remain indifferent to a solution of the Suez problem. The Security Council is in dutY bound to discuss the situation, in order to promote, as it is required to do under the United Nations Charter, the peaceful settlement of this international dispute. 57. Accordingly, the Soviet de1egation supports the Egyptian Government's request ta the Security Council to place the item it has proposed on its agenda. 58. As regards the item proposed by the United Kingdom and France, it is evident from its very formulation that the British and French Gm'ernments are attempting ta attribute responsibility for the present situation ta Egypt. 59. The United Kingdom anr1 France arc attempting ta represent the action of the Egyptian Government in nationalizing a private Egyptian company as a threat to peace and a vioIrttion of the 1888 Convention. But this charge against Egypt is without foundation, 60. No one, surely, can doubt that the nati,.malization of a company by a Government is a matter exclusively within the dome'stic jurisdiction of the State concerned, and cannat be a subje,t for consideration by the United Nations. Neverthdess. the Soviet de1egation be1ieves that the Security Council should discuss the complaint suhmitted by France and the United Kingdom, since it is the Council's dutY ta hear bath sides in a dispute and to be objective in its consideration of any dispute broug-ht before it for discussion. 61. Accordingly. the Soviet delegation will vote in favour of the inclusion of both items figuring in the provisional agenda. ()2, As ta the arder in which the Council should con,- sicler these items, the Soviet delegation considers that it +ol1o\\'s c1early from the considerations l have just advanc"cI that the item proposee! by the Egyptian Gov- ern!':h'nt should be g-iven priority. l submit this pro- jJosal for the Council's consideration. 63. MI'. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated trom Span- ish) : The Prr :dent of the Security Council has \Vith the assistance df the Secretariat submitted to us todav. on the basis of the' letters transmitted by the partiés conc':'rned \Vith this problem. a provisional ag-enda which is strictly in accordance with the rules of proce- dure of the Security Council anc1 which has, therefore, my support. 64. There have been previous occasions in the Secu- rity Council when attempts have been made ta change the worcling of proposed items in arder ta minimize the seriousness of a debate. l do not think we should follow that policy on this occasion. l ful1y agree with the view expressed this afternoon by th~ United States representative that the parties should be al10wed com- plete freedom in the presentation of items, it being und'~rstood that the wording of those items expresses onl~' the views of the party concerned. 65. My delegation accordingly believes that it \Vas rig-ht ta include these items, and right to keep them in the arder in which they Wf re submitted, which is the arder prescribed by the mIes of procedure. 66. l therefore have pleasure in stating that Peru will vote for the agenda as proposed. 67, l should be failing, however. in a moral dutY if, after this short procedural digression, l did not express a profound conviction of mine; l shaH do SI, a:', briefly as possible. 68. Despite the gravity of the problem, which is evidenced by the very wording of the items, and the - l'vents with which we are aIl familiar and aIl deplore, there is a g:atifying element of hope in sa far as the United Nations is concerned. 6? ,!,wo g;eat. countries, faced with a dispute or sltuatlOn whlch 1S likely to disturb or endanger world L:eaee, have ,tâctly complied with Article 37 of the 9 69. ou la 72. In conclusion. 1 should like to express the hooe that. if the Securitv Council. in the exercise of its functions. and in the interpretation of. and in strict compliance with. the principles of the Charter. form- ulates a resolution. thc rcsolution wil1 bring us a peace- fuI solution of this grave prohlem. 73. Mr. BRILEJ (Yug-oslavia): Tt has been the opinion of my Government ever since the outset of what is known as the Suez crisis that the wisest and most natural course to take was to bring- the matter before the United Nations. Indeed. it may be a matter of sorne regret that that course of action was not taken sooner. 74. \Ve shall. therefore. vote in favour of the provi- sional agenda in its entirety. that is to say, in favour both of the item proposed by France and the United Kingdom and of that proposed by Egypt. l need hardly sav that this in no way prejudg-es our attitude on the substance of the question that has heen hrought before the Security Council. Nor does it necessarily imply agreement with the actual language in which the items have been presented. 75. As regards the order in which the items should be discussed. it would seem to me that the most logical procedure would be ta disctiss them simultaneously. No matter. however. how this question of priority is settletl. it will. 1 suhmit. be impossible to do othenvise than consider the various aspects of the problem in their interrelationship. 76. In concluding, 1 should like to say that it is our hope that the deliberations we are now embarking upon will take place in a constructive and co-operative atmos- phere, and that they will lead to a peaceful. equ!table and mutually acceptable solution of the grave problem that has been placed hefore us. 77. Mr. TSIANG (China): In the brief remarks which 1 am about to make, 1 will adhere scrupuously ï9. In regard to the arder of debate, l favour the order as it stands in the provisional agenda. l think our rules of procedure require that we follow that order. Furthermore, without judging the matter, amI just as ~ question of chronology, it was the Egyptian act of nationalization of the Suez Canal Company whieh started or, as been said, precipitated the crisis. It appears to me only natural that our debate here should start with the starting point of the actual events.

We were very pleased to see the two items on the agenda concerning the Suez Canal placed before the Security Council-':-"in order, so my delegation believes, t1lat the Council may help the parties concerned ta finè a peaceful solution to this question. 81. It was in this spirit that we took part in the London C...,ferences. At the second of those conferences my de1egation thought it desirable to suggestindeed, to request-that the matter should be placed before the Security Council; for we had felt from the outset that that would be the wisest procedure. 82. My delegation believes that if the Security Council spares no effort, it will be able to do useful work. We should use the Council's authority to prepare the ground and smooth the way for negotiations; and we believe that by employing its powers of negotiation and conciliation the Council will be able to ensure a peaceful settlement of the question. 83. My de1egat,on will therefore vote in favour of the provisional agenda submitted to us, on the understanding, of course, that the inclusion of these two items in the agenda in their present form in no way prejudges the substance of the issue. 84. With regard to the Council's next meeting, l should like very respectfully to suggest that we adjourn until Friday, 5 October. The members of the Council would then have some litHe time in which to give this vital question serious thought and to consider what the Council can usefully do to brins about peaceful settlement of the dispute. Furthermore, it would enable the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the = '" --....;.....;..--------~~

In addressing myself Jo the question of the adoption of the provisional agenda l shall. of course. confine myself to the statet';ent of the views of the Auslralian delegation nn whether or not the Couneil should adopt the two items proposrd, by the United Kingdom and France in the first instaner, and by Egypt in the second instanc<'. 87. The Aust"alian de1egation considers that the formulation of this problem proposed by France and the United Kin~dom indicates a proper perspective of the situation in respect to the Suez Canal at the presrnt time. and that the formulation presented by Egypt does not. It \Vas the Egyptian action that ereated thr crisis \Vith which the Security Council is now askerl ta rleal. and this Egyptian action was. in the view of th<, Australian Government, an illegal action. We therefore consider it right that the Council should take up this matter from the outset in a manner which reflects immediately our respect in this Council for the mIl:' of law and for fair dealing bet\Veen nations. Nothinge1se. l believe. would represent a true recognition of the Security Council's responsibilities. 88. The matter to which the Security Council IS asked to direct its att<'ntion is not, of course. the rig-ht of a country to nationalize business enterprises oper- 1 J atin~ within the ltmits of its territory, but the act of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end an international arrangement which for many years has protected and furthered the economic interests of many Members of the United Nations and has promoted the economic advancement of their peoples. 89. The Suez Canal has become a vital element m much of the world's trade. The economlc structure of many countries has been developed on the assumption that freedom of mowment through the Canal would continue to be assured by the int~rnational system comprised by the concession granted by the Egyptian Government and the 1888 Convention.1 The Egyptian Government, In repudiation of a long-standing contract, has taken over the Suez Canal. 90. The PRESIDENT Uranslated tram Spa1lish): l would ask the representative of Australia to try to confine his remarks to the question under discussion, the adoption of the agenda, and not to go into the substance of the matter. 91. ML WALKER (Australia): It is not my wish or my intention to enter into the substance of this question to any extent at ail, but mere1y to express the views of my delegation on the formulation of the agenda which has been submitted to the Security Council. It was in support of the view of my delegation 1 Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople, 29 October 1888. 92. It is because the Egyptian Government has taken over the Suez Canal with the avowed purpose that its future operation should serve the special financial needs and interests of Egypt that this matter has come before us. The action of the Egyptian Government should be considered by the Security Coundl because it has created widespread concern anci apprehension; not only does it represent a disregard for Egypt's obligation!>, but it also me~'laces th~ econom!c interests of Members of the U11lted NattOns. Thts situation, aggravated by the refusaI of the Egyptian Government to entertain proposaIs for the maintenance of the international system, even with advantagcous modifications, is clearly one that must now he considered by the United Nations. 93. The Australian delegation therefore supports the adoption of the item proposed by the United Kingdom and France. 94. As regards the item proposed by Egypt, the Australian de1egation sees no need for its inclusion as an additional item. The Egyptian Government, we understand, will be given every opportunity to express its views in the course of the Council's consideration of the item proposed by the United Kingdom and France when the agenda of the Council has been settled. The proposaI to inscribe an additional item seems to me to be an attempt to divert the Council's attention from the essential item before it, the action of the Egyptian Government. 97. Sir Pierson nIXON (United Kingdom): l shall certainly comply with the President's reiterated request that we should confine ourselves in this debate to the question before us, which is a procedural one. l shall therefore not answer certain unwarranted allegations in regard to the actions and policy of my country which were made by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 98. Assumt'ng-and t't t's a chart'table assumptt'onthat the representative of the Soviet Union was addressing himself to the procedural question, and that :.~~~~~~~~nV: ~~f~O s~~itt~t b~F~~~: :~~ 13 99. l am bound to say that it is very curious to find the representative of the Soviet Union supporting the Egyptian point of view in this matter and casting doubt on the competence of the Security Council. For many years the Soviet Government was consistent in uphùlding a very diffcrcnt and, in fact, a contrar)' opinion. 100. l think it is germane to remind the Council of what the Soviet Government stated in a note to Turkey on 24 September 1946, for example. Speaking then of the Suez Canal, this note said: "In relation ta these world waterways, it is in fact necessary to establish international control with the participation of the most interested Powers." 101. Now, if the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to argue, as l have heard his predecessor argue before, that this was ten years aga and that CÎrcumstances have changed, l think l might draw his attention to the fact that this view has been reiterated more recently, and on more than one occasion. l recall that in 1954, which was onl)' two and a haH years ago, the representative of the Soviet Union at the time, the lak ML Vyshinsky, took the same line. l should like ta quote what he said on 29 March 1954 in the Security Council: "The principle of free navigation laid down by the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 must. of course, be respected r664th meeting, para. 56]." 102. l found an extract from a book entitled "The Suez Canal", published in Moscow by the State Publishing Rouse of Geographical Literature, also as recently as 1954, which contains among other remarks this statement: "No single State should try ta obtain a privileged position on the Canal." 103. In the face of these previous statements by the Soviet Government. when looking for reasons behind the espousal of the Egyptian item l think one is justified in wondering what has inspired this volteface. What is the reason behind the otherwise surprising defence of illegal Egyptian action and this astonishing solicitude for the provisions of the Charter regarding domestic jurisdiction? 105. The first major step in the chain of events which has brought us here was, of course, the anus deat of 104. l do not think that we have ta look very far for the answer. l think it is germane to the point at ,issue to examine briefly the Soviet rôle in the whole series of events preceding and fol1owing the Egyptian Government's action against the Cana!. Even before this act, the Soviet attitude in the Middle East was c1early revealed.

l would ask the representative of the United Kingdom to confine himself to sppaking as briefly as possible about the question under discussion. There will be plenty of time to express all points of view when . we take up the substance of the matter.

1 had hoped that these facts-and 1 do not think it can be denied that they are facts-might have been thought to be germane to the subject, but 1 have in fact completed my exposition. All 1 would say is that 1 would expect the Council to approach with open eyes the motives behind tht. ,-equest for priority for the item proposed by Egypt which has been made by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 myself certainly shaH not support this request, and 1 am confident that it will be the general view of the Council that it should not be admitted.

The French delegation wishes to comment very briefly on sorne of the statements " we have heard. avec 109. It is plain to all that the Egyptian complaint is merely a manoeuvre. It is based, as the wording the Egyptian Government has chosen for it shows, on a completely incorrect statement of the facts. It is not true that the United Kingdom, France or gome other Powers are threatening international peace and security. It is not true that they have violated the ~ Charter. What is true is that no one can believe such an accusation to be well founded. Moreover, if France and the United Kingdom were reaHy threatening Egypt, it would be a matter for astonishment that the Egyp- • tian Government should have waited until those two countries had submitted a complaint on 23 September 1956 before itself applyingto the Security Council the following day, 24 September. Furthermore, the Egyptian Press itself, whose relations with the author- L ities need no comment, was lately writing that there was no risk of war. Hence we cannot take the complaint made against us very seriously. 110. The French delegation will abstain when the inclusion of the Egyptian complaint in the agenda is put to the vote. If the item is nevertheless included, the French delegation will oppose giving it priority. f 111. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): Members of the Council will understand, 1 believe, that 1 can hardly ) pass over in silence certain remarks which Sir Pierson Dixon addressed to me, as the representative of the Soviet Union, in connexion with my statement. 1 must l' say that 1 am somewhat surprised that Sir Pierson Dixoi1 should have attempted to turn our discussion in the Council, concerning the inclusion in the agen- 1 da of the two items submitted respectively by the United Kingdom and France and by Egypt, into a ):< 113. To the best of our knowledge, the Egyptian Government too has stated that it guaralltees freedom of passage through the Canal to ail ships. And, 1 might say, the clearest possible evidence that this guarantee is being honoured is the fact, of which we ail are aware, that British ships are passing back and forth through this Canal in complete freedom, just as they did before the Egyptian Government nationalized the Suez Canal Company. And it j, not t..: ~gyplian Government which is dis":::-1)inv order in the Canal by withdrawing the pilof.::i who, as we aIl know, are abso· lutely indispensable to the normal operation of the Canal. 114. As to the matter of the Soviet Union's sales of arms, Sir Pierson Dixon knows, 1 think, that the United Kingdom has sold and is still selling arms to various countries in the Near East. If Sir Pierson Dixon wants us to exchange information about who has been supplying weapons to whom in the Near East, when, and for what purposes, 1 can assure him that we on our side shall raise no difficulties. 115. Statements have also been made here to the effect that' the complaint that has been put forward by the Egyptian Government for consideration by the Security Council is a propaganda step, a manœuvre, and so forth. That, of course, is easy to say in the absence of an Egyptian representative at the Security Council table. 1 should like the representative of the Egyptian Government himself to answer these charges. Unfortunately, he is not at this table. 1 believe he will yet have the opportunity to explain his position on this matter in detail, and that he will be able ta give factual evidence to show whether this is really a propaganda manœuvre or whether the Egyptian complaint corresponds to the facts. 116. In my brief statement today 1 did not attempt any estimate of the actions of the French and British Governments. 1 merely mentioned a few well-known facts-by no means ail of them-regarding certain activities which, in the opinion not only of the Soviet Government but of many other Governments, too, are creating or could create a threat to international peace and security in that region. That was why 1 supported the proposaI that the Security Council should discuss this question, with a view to bringing about a peacefuI settlement of the conflict.

1 wish ta speak as the representative of CUBA. 118. At this stage c' ..he debate 1 must express our views on the matter L. Jer discussion, and 1 shaH do '

As 1 understand it, there are three proposaIs as to the procedure which the Council should adopt for the discussion of the two items on the agenda. Unless I am mistaken, the first proposaI, which was made by Sir Pierson Dixon, was that the items should be considered in the order in which they appeared on the provisional agenda. Secondly, there was my proposaI that we should first consider the item submitted by the Government of Egypt. FinaHy, if 1 am not mistaken, a third proposaI was made by the Yugoslav representt ative, to the effect that both items should be discussed simultaneously. 125. Since the Yugoslav representative has proposed ~ the simultaneous discussion of both items, and in order to make the Council's task easier, I shaH not press my 17

1 do not consider that there is any profosaI by the United Kingdom representative, because it is the normal procedure ta deal with the first item first and the second second. In my judgement, the United Kingdom representative has not made any proposaI to this effect. 1 also consider that the representative of Yugoslavia has not made any formaI proposaI as yet, but merely a suggestion. The only proposaI before us is that made by the representative of the Soviet Union, and that is why it was put to the vote. If the representative of Yugoslavia wishes to make a proposaI, 1 shaH receive it with the greatest pleasure.

1 wish tu make the position of my de1egation clear. The President was right. In my statement 1 did not make a formaI proposaI that both items should be discussed simultaneously simply because 1 was waiting for the stage of our debate when the.order of the items would be discussed. 128. 1 now move formally the proposaI that we discuss both items simultaneously, for the reasons given in my statement.

1 consider that the representative of the Soviet Union has withdrawn his proposaI and that the only proposaI now before us is that of the representative of Yugoslavia, to the effect that both items should be discussed simultaneously. 1 shaH put this proposaI by the Yugoslav representative before the Council for discussion. 130. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): For reasons which 1 explained earlier in this discussion, I shaH not be able to support-~n fact, I shaH have ta vote against-the proposaI that both items be discussed simultaneously. As 1 said in my earlier statement, I assume that the Security Council will wish to take up and deal with first the item which figures first on the agenda, in accordance with its n01mal procedure. That is my position. 131. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Sir Pierson Dixon said, a short time ago, that the Council must approach the question before it objectively. Surely it is clear that the first condition of objectivity is to enable the other party to this dispute to explain its position. That is so obvious, 1 believe, that it requires no proof. 132. The only pos::lble decision in the present case is ,to debate the two items simultaneously, which will enable both sides to explain their ~ositions. Any other decision or, to be more precise, the decision proposed by Sir Pierson Dixon, would be one-siderl a.nd would indica)::,: that the Council was putting obstacles in the way of an objective examination of this problem. I do not think that the Security Council will take that position. In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia. Against: Australia, Belgium, Cuba, France, "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northprn Ireland, United States of America. A bstaining: China, Iran, Peru. The proposaI was rejected by 6 votes io 2, with 3 abstentions.

1 should like, as the representative of CUBA, to explain my vote. 1 voted against the Yugoslav representative's proposaI because 1 consider that, when the first item is discussed, the representative of Egypt will, also, have an opportunity to take part in the debate. He will be able to express his views on this matter in full. 135. Mr. ABDOH (Iran) (translated from French) : My delegation abstained when the Yugoslav proposaI was put to the vote for the following reason. We at first took the view that, as items 2 and 3 of the agenda were c1ose1y related, they should be examined simultai1eously. But, after careful consideration, we came to the conclusion that it would be preferable to discuss the two items separate1y. We hope, as 1 said a moment ago, that, during the discussion of item 2, no effort will be spared to find a peaceful solution of the problem a('ceptable to all the parties concerned. We are afraid. therefore, that item 3, by its very nature, may give rise to a discussion likely to disturb the harmony of the debate and the spirit of understanding which should pervade it. That is why we now think that it would be better first to discuss item 2 separate1y. 136. Of course, if the Counci1 fails to find an equitable solution of the question, it will then have to discuss item 3, because that item has just been officially included in the agenda, and there should be nothing to prevent discussion of it, if necessary.

1 take the floor merely to note and take cognizancc of the declaration of the President of the Security Council that, in the discussion of item 2 on our agenda, Egypt will be given every opportunity to exp1ain its position on the Suez problem. 138. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spmtish) : My feeling is that if, as the United Kingdom and France have proposeif, and, as 1 hope, the Council agrees, Egypt is invited to take part in our proceedings, that country will undoubtedly have the right to expiain its views, in accordance with the rules of procedurr of the Security Council. 139. Mr. TSIANG (China): The two items which we have agreed to put on our agenda are of course interre1ated. A case might be made for their simultaneous discussion. Upon c10ser examination, 1 find th!lt the two items are in fad distinct. Item 2 is in fact centred on one point, namely, the nationalization by 1·10. T thought that the natural course of action for the Council would be. \\'hell the item proposed by France and the Fnited Kingdom came up, that the representatiYes of those two countries would present their reasons for hringing that question to the Counl'il and that Egypt would be given a full opportunity ta answer on that occasion. 141. Later. ",hen we take up item 3, the Egyptian representatiw will naturally present his case as regards French ami British actions subsequent to the nationatization. and Tam sure the French anci British representatiws will have a full opportunity to answer and that all membt't's of the Counril-the rest of us-will have a full opportunity to discuss these items as they come up. 142. That is the reason why 1 abstained on this votp. This is how 1 visualize the future conduct of this whole debate. 143. The PRESTDENT rtranslated from Spanish): In accon1ance \Vith the Council's decision, the two items will be discussed separatelv. Ttem 2 of our agenda will be discussed tirst and item 3 second. 144. \\Te now have to consider the proposai made bv the United King-dom representative. and supported by the represrntatiw of France, that the representative of "Egypt should be im'ited to take part in the next meeting. if it is agreed to adjourn, \Vhen we begin our discussion of this issue. 145. The Council must also take a decision regarding the rennest suhmitted bv the representative of Israel rS/36571 that he should be permitted to take part in the discussion as an interested party.

I should now like to know whether there is anv obiection to the invitation of the representative of Israel. 148. Mr. WALKER (Australia): T do not wish to raise any objection ta the sugg-est;on that Israel should participate in our niscussioll. but 1 eto wish to point out tllat the letter From the Permanent Representative of Israel was distrihuted ta the members of the Council this afternoon. <Inn th(lt, pngagen as we have been, it has not been possible to give the matter very much rotlsideration. Thr reClue:;t does raise some considerations on which T, fOi one. would like to have the opportunity of consultation with my Government. 149. l shou1c1 like to suggest that it would be advantageous to defer our consideration of this request until the next meeting of the Council on this subject, and 1 should like to propose that the consideration of the hm" "que,! he deferred uulil tha! lime. r,'~uest. • J. On the other hand, 1 have no objection to the proposai for deferring the discussion of this matter which has just been made by the representative of Australia; 1 agree with him that we should do weIl to consult our Governments on this question. 1 shaH not oppose this procedural motion. 154. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): If there are no objections, 1 shall consider the Australian proposai that further discussion of this matter should be deferred until the next meeting adopted.

There remain before us only two proposais: first, the United Kingdom proposaI, supported by France and the United States, that the Security Council should agree to meet again on 4 October at 3 p.m., and the second, the Iranian proposaI, that it should agree to adjourn until 5 October at 3 p.m. 156. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Although the dates proposed are not far apart, 1 should nevertheless prek.· the adoption of the Iranian representative's proposaI. That would enable aIl the Ministers concemed to take part in the Security Council's meetingswhich, 1 think, would be usefui for the Council's work. • t ,! ' 157. On behalf of the Soviet delegation, therefore, ~ l should like to support the proposaI put forward by r the representative of Iran. . 158. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated from Spanish) : 1 do not think it actually makes much dif- . ference whether we meet on Thursday or on Friday; ~ 'J but if it is felt that the extra day will be to the convenience of the guests whom we hope to see here, my r' delegation would be inclined to favour the later date, ~ .',' that proposed by Iran.

The ,; question of arranging a time for a future meeting is ~ normally one which we have no difficulty in deciding

The French delegation is fully prepared to leave it to the present or future President to decide on the date for our meeting. But 1 hope that delegations will be in a position to communicate their final opinion within the next twenty-four hours.

In that case the Chair will ask each representative through the Secretariat on 28 September to state which date he prefers, and will then cali a meeting on the date chosen by the maJority. Priee: $U.S. 0.25; (or equivalent in .,