S/PV.735 Security Council

Before wc consider our agenda, 1 should tike to pay a tribute to the outgoing President of the Council, Mr. Nufiez Portuondo, the representative of Cuba, whose courtesy, authority and wisdom are known to aH of us and who so ably opened the discussions last week which we are to continue today. 2. 1 should now tike to welcome my colleagues who are sitting here for the first time. Tt is an honour and a pleasure to me to be presiding over this meeting. 1 hope that, working together, we shaH achieve constructive results after a calm and objective discussion.

1 should like to thank the President for his kind words. 1 am sure that the office of the President is in more expert hands than when 1 heM it myself. Slalement by the representative of the United States of America

Before the Cotmcil begins its consideration of the first item on the agenda, 1 would tike to take this opportunity to say a word of welcome from the United States, which is the host country of the United Nations. 1 6. On behalf of the Government and the people of the United States, I extend my warm greetings ta the representatives of their countries who sit at this Council table, and to the Foreign Ministers who have come ta New York to join in our deliberations. I am glad that you are here, and I believe that your presence is a good augury for the success of our meetings. Adoption of the agenda Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 (S/3654) : 7. The PRESIDENT (translated fram French) : The President has received a letter dated 3 October 1956 from the representative of Israel [S/ 3663] requesting that he may appear before the Security Council ta speak on the situation resulting from the non-application of the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 [S/2322] that Israel vessels should be permitted free passage through the Suez Canal. 8. The President has also received a letter dated 4 October 1956 trom the representatives of seven Arab States [S/3664] requesting permission ta participate in the whole discussion which we are beginning today.

As the President has just announced, the Council has before it two requests, one by Israel and the other by Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, for permission ta take part in the debates on either one or both of the items on our agenda. 10. I do not think the Council should take an immediate decision on either of these requests. I therefore formally propose that any decisions on the requests made in the two letters sent to the President should be postponed until later.

For how long does the Yugoslav representative propose that this question should be postponed? 12. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Does the representative of Yugoslavia wish ta reply to this question? 13. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) (translated from 'French) : 1 have nothing to add. I have proposed that the matter should be postponed until later. 14. The PRESIDENT (translated fram French): I think I may answer the representative of Cuba by saying that the Security Council may take any decision it thinks fit at any time. Subject ta this reservation, 18. The problem with which we are confronted concerns the rights of user countries in the Suez Canal. What is the extent and nature of those rights? How have they been guaranteed in the past? What is the effect on them of the Egyptian Government's action? How will they be guaranteed in the future? 19. Of course, the Canal i5 geographically part of Egypt. It is under Egyptian sovereignty. But that does not mean the absence of international rights. That does not confer upon Egypt the right to destroy the international rights which exist. 20. In order to consider what those international rights are, we have to have sorne regard to the history of this matter. 21. Plans to connect the Mediterranean with the Red Sea by a navigable waterway go back to very ancient times, thousancls of years ago. In more modern times, schemes for that purpose were under discussion from the seventeenth century onwards. Those schemes, 1 think 1 am right in saying, were of non-Egyptian origin. When, in the period between 1855 and 1866, the Khedive of Egypt finally granted concessions for the construction and operation of such a waterway, they were given to a Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps. They were granted specifically on the basis that de Lesseps should found a company to operate the Canal which would be called the "Universal Suez Canal Company". 1 draw attention to the significance of the word "universal" in this title and in the original concessions granted by the Khedive. 22. This company, the Universal Suez Canal Company, was duly founded, and founded on an obviously international basis as regards its substantive ownership, the. provision of capital, its senior personnel and its operation and management. It operated under statutes and concessions granted or approved by the Egyptian 3 23. Th '~e were objects whose attainment could never have bee. assured in the same way by the operation of the Canal on a purely national basis. But they could be and were secured by the operation of the Canal by a company owned and managed in the way in which the Universal Suez Canal Company was owned and managed. 24. l draw attention to this fact because l think it is worth noticing that the idea of internationalization in the strict sense-a concept weil known to us todaywas a comparatively novel proposition in the nineteenth century. The idea of an undertaking run by an international organization or entity made up of member Governments was foreign to nineteenth-eentury thought. But the same object could be and was achieved by other means, such as operation by a company possessed of an international character, like the Universal Suez Canal Company. This was in effect the nineteenthcentury way of doing what today we should do by means of an inter-governmental international régime. 25. That this \Vas the conception behind the Suez Canal Company and its operation of the Canal is made quite clear by certain passages in the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 t, \Vith which l shall deal shortly. But from the start the Suez Canal, although it runs through Egyptian territory, was not regarded as a purely Egyptian affair. On the contrary, its management and operation were largely, if not entirely, on an international basis. 26. Unless this is realized and seen in its historical setting, and unless it is realized that this was a fact to which the greatest importance was attached by all the interests making use of the Canal hecause it afforded to them a guarantee of the Canal's efficient and impartial operation, the real character and implications of the present Egyptian action and attitude cannot be seen in their proper perspective. 27. l now turn to the 1888 Convention. This contained a number of provisions, sorne of them providing for and guaranteeing rights of passage through the Canal on a basis of complete freedom and equality for the ships of aIl nations, without discrimination of flag; and others safeguarding the position. of Egypt. l draw attention to the fact that the Convention constantly emphasizes the notion· of freedom of passage. Phrases that occur frequently are "{ree use" (articles 1, 8, 11 and 12); "free passage" (articles 4 and 8); "free navigation" (article 4) ; "liberty and ... entire security of ... navigation" (article 8) ; "free and open" (article 1). 28. Such language indicates the existence of a system by which the enjoyment of these rights, and their effective application in practice, wouId be secured and guaranteed. In fact, this is exactly what we find, for the Convention was not an isolated instrument, nor 1 Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888. 29. Nor was this al!. Note must be taken of another international instrument which is relevant, and that is a declaration made by the Turkish Government as suzerain over Egypt-and therefore binding upon Egypt-attached to the report of the Commission .on International Tonnage and Suez Canal Dues whlch met at Constantinople in 1873. By this declaration, the Turkish Government undertook that "no modification of the conditions of passage through the Canal" in respect of the dues levied on navigation, pilotage, towage, anchorage etc., should be effected "except with the consent of the Sublime Porte", which would not take any decision "without previously coming to an understanding with the Powers interested therein". 30. This was a clear recognition and confirmation, in an international instrument, of the interest of the user countries not merely in passage as such but in the conditions of operation of the Canal. 31. The Suez Canal Convention of 1888, therefore, constituted the completion rather than the initiation of a system which, taken as a whole, guaranteed passage rights through the Canal. Tt did not so much originate those rights as confirm them, and place them on a definite international treaty basis. 32. This position is clearly reflected in the Convention itself. l expect that members of the Security Couneil have already studied that Convention, but l may remind them of the words of the preamble, which states explicitly that the Powers desired to establish "a definite system designed to guarantee at aU times, and for al! the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Ca::lal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated the 22nd February 1866 ... and sanctioning the concessions of His Highness the Khedive". The firman referred to confirmed the important concessionary agreement entered into between the Company and Ismael Pasha. Viccroy of Egypt. dated the same day, 22 February 1866. That agreement in turn, by its article 17, confirmed the two previous principal concessions g-ranten to the Compatw-coveringalso its statutesrespectively dated 30 November 1854 and 5 January 1856. 33. l do not think that anything could be c1earer than the words of that preamble. And, as a matter of accepted legal principle, if one instrument is entered into expressly in order to "complete the system" ~stablished by a previous instrument, it must be a necessary basis of the later instrument, and implicit 35. So we find that, under the system of the Convention and the concessions, and the Turkish declaration of 1873 to which l have referred, the interests of the user countries were safeguarded not only in respect of passage but in respect of operation also, without which passage could not take place. For the right of passage would in practice have been a dead letkr, and of no real value, unless the Canal itself was properly maintained, and unless its operation was of such a nature that passage could take place under secure and orderly conditions. This was the fundamental reason why .the 1888 Convention assumed, and based itself upon the assumption of, operation by the Company for the period of its concession. 36. Ta put the matter in a different way, the Convention, together with the Company's concessions, constituted a balanced scheme. The position of Egypt was secured by various provisions of the Convention and by the fact that the Canal was within Egyptian territory and under Egyptian sovereignty. The position of the users, on the other hand, was safeguarded partly by the Convention and partly by the fact that the Canal was operated by a company so constituted as to be capable of providing for user interests. Operation by this Company for the period of its concession formed part of the basis of the Convention, as declared in its preamble. There was a balance in the scheme safeguarding the rights of Egypt and safeguarding the rights of users. 37. The Egyptian Government, by its action of 26 July 1956, has destroyed the balance of this scheme; it has taken out of the scheme the operation of the Canal by the Universal Suez Canal Company. It has thus removed one of the guarantees afforded under the régime of the Convention to user interests. This is coptrary to the basis of the Convention. The Egyptian Government cannat require the user countries to recognize the consequences of its action or to accept a purely Egyptian authority for the operation of the Canal, or to pay the passage dues to that authority. 38. Our view of the legal position may' therefore be summed up as follows. According to the scheme of the 6 t 41. In the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 19 October 1954, Colonel Nasser solemnly reaffirmed the 1888 Convention. On 17 November 1954, Colonel Nasser stated that there remained fourteen years until the end of the Universal Suez Canal Company's concession. He said that gClOd relations existed between the Company and the Egyptian Government. He said that the Egyptian Government had full confidence in the attitude of the Company. It had no grievance against the Company's administration. 'Vell, either he was quite insincere when he said that, or else his attacks upon the Company since are without foundation. 42. On 10 June 1956, the present Government of Egypt again formally recognized the validity of the concession. It approved an agreement under which the Company was to invest in Egypt large sums of money-ilO million sterling by the end of 1956; a furtr.er E3 million sterling by the end of 1957; a further E2 million sterling by the end of 1958 and instalments to be increased thercafter each year until the end of 1963. The whole agreement recognized that the concession ran until 1968. J 1 43. That agreement was signed on 10 June 1956: yet, six weeks later, on 26 July 1956, the concession was summarily cancelled. It is preciseiy because of that course of conduct that we say that the guarantees for the user rights under the 1888 Convention must he more than just verbal promises or written promises. 44. We have no quarrel with the right to nationalize as such. That is not in issue in this matter. Most countries, for better or for worse, have nationalized undertakings in their territories. But this was not an ordinary ul1dertaking. Although technically registered in Egypt, it was in substance as in name an international company enjoying concessions built into an international treaty. The principle of the general right to 46. It \Vas not merely the disregard for a treaty, Dot merely the repudiation of an agreement made six weeks earlier. that worried us. The reasons given by the President of Egypt \Vere most disturbing to any future confidence or reliance upon the undertakings of his Government. In an angry speech, he stated that the action \Vas taken because the United States Government had refused aid to Egypt to build the Aswan dam. He made it dear that this action against the Company \Vas a form of retaliation. He 0:scribed it as a triumph and said that his intention was to secure triumph after triumph. and he indicated that the revenues of the Canal would be used to build the Aswan dam. 47. In other words, he was indicating that action in regard to the Canal was being taken for politieal reasons, and that in future its finances would be conducted for the benefit of one country, Egypt. That was not aH. The deCision was taken \vithout notice, with- Oilt any discussion with any Governments, Arab or any other, or with the Canal Company itself. Tt was staged in the manner of a coup d'état, with armed personnel occupying the Company's premises; in the decree of nationalization the Employees of the Company were told that they would be liable to irnprisonment if they did not continue at their work. 48. 1 have recounted an this for one purpose, because 1 think it is extremely relevant v. hen we consider what internatiû:1a1 guarantees should be sought for the conduct of a Government in the future and for its respect for its iegal obligations. 1 say quite frankly that the United Kir.~dom Government does not feel, after what has happened, that we can take any chances in the future. The guarantees for the users must be dear and specific. The methods fur ascertaining breaches of those guarantees must be defined, and the consequences, if those guarantees are broken, must be dearly specified. 49. 1 must say that the Egyptian Government has only ·itself ta blame for this lack of confidenc:.::; if it were alone concerned in This ma~~;;;r and if this had been a domestic issue, then of course that lack of confidence would have been its punishment. But this is a matter in which many other peoples besides Egypt are concemeet.. 8 car,~o irom a particular c(juntry. or g-oin,~ to a particular c(jlll1tn', then therl' \,'i1l hl' no confidence in the future of this Canal as an international waterway. 52, Of course. to some extent alternative means of transportation l'an be devisec!. Other pipelines can be constrnctecl; very large tankers l'an he built ta go by alternati"e routes: patterns of trade can be changed -~:i th('~(' ;'r,' possihle, :11111 may. inclC'('e1. he necessarL Hllt the,' are extrelllelv costh·. anel ma,' cause gréat harclshill to many peoille, Ta' give a srÏlall example: shopkeepers in Port Said, in Aden and in Ceylan are already suffering grievollsly because the big passenger liners ta the Far East are no longer going throllgh the Can,!1. 53, The oil-proclllcing countries in the ~fiddle East must regard with grave cIisquiet the possibility dlat the direct route for their uil supplies for \Vestern Europe through the Canal may he interrupted. If this oil has to go around the Cape, less of it can be moved. and therC' is a yirtual certainty that \\'estern Europe wil\ look increasingly te the western hemisphere and that production in the ~[iddle East will fall. 5-J., Thesc ctre weighty economic considerations. but there is more at stake than econo:nic considerations. It is rt'sped for the rule of la\\', it is respect for international ohligations that is in jeopardy. That strikes at the foundations of the ne", system of international sncipty that \\'1:> are seeking so'painstakingly to construct. rt is il11pnrt;mt for us not ta forget that E~ypt has already put itself in the ",rong over the Canal by flagrantly disregarding a Security Council resolution of 1951 [S/2322] with regard to the passage of Israel ships. 55. \Vhat might happen if this example \Vere to be followed e1sewhere? To take one case, 1 suppose that the Government of Switzerland would be entitled to nationalize the Bank of International Settlements, which is an entity having a legal personality under 57. l have tried to indicate the legal position; 1 have tried to indicate sorne of the implications of the action of the Egyptian Government. 58. However, although we regard Colonel Nasser's forcible seizure of the assets of the Canal Company in Egypt as illegal and as an act of violence, our concern from the beginning has been to try to establish basic principles and also practical methods which would ensure that the international aspects of the system for the operation of the Suez Canal should be preserved in the future. \Ve are prepared to concentrate on adequate guarantees for the users to replace those destroyed by the action of Mr. Nasser on 26 July. 59. It was in that spirit that. on 2 August 1956. the United Kingdom Government, after consultation with the Governments of France and the United States, invited the Powers principally concernec1. includil1g of course Egypt. to discuss the matter at a conference in London. \\'e invited twentv-four countries to come. It did not seem to us either' practicable or desirable to invite every nation to that conference, whether or not it had a concern in the Suez Canal. In order ta keep the conference ta manageable proportions, we set up certain objective criteria. which l think ;1"e familiar to everyone here. \Ve invited the twenty-four countries principally concerned. 60. l think it was a great pitY that the Egyptian Government· refused to attend. It did indeed send a special representative, who was in London throughout the Conference, but who made no attempt to get in touch with the Conference. l believe that if an Egyptian representative had come to the Conference with the same desire as ourse1ves to reach a solution ensuring the interests of both sides, the whole matter could have been settled at that stage to the great advantage of everybody concerned, and perhaps especially to the advantage of the Egyptian people themse1ves. 61. It must be kept clearly in mind too that, from the very beginning, the United Kingdom Government and the other Governments co-operating with it have recognized that any just solution, and any solution likelv to last, must scrupulously respect the sovereignty of Egypt. The statement put out by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States at the time of the invitation to the first London Conference declared that the three Powers "do not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation". 62. The proposaIs put forward by Mr. Dulles on bèhalf of the United States de1egation at the Conference on 20 August 1956 showed a similar regard both for Egypt's rights and Egypt's interests. The modifications submitted the next day by the representatives of Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey were expressly designed to underline this concern for Egyptian 67. To achieve these results on a permanent and reliable basis, the eighteen Powers recommended that a convention should be negotiated with Egypt providing for a Suez Canal Board responsible for operating, maintaining and developing the Canal. The Board would include Egypt and other States chosen with due regard to the use of the Canal, pattern of trade and geographical distribution. The Board "would make periodic reports to the United Nations" ; there would be an arbitral commission to settle disputes; there would be effective sanctions for violation of the convention, sanctions \Vhich would treat any use or threat of force to interfere with the operating of the Canal as a threat to peace and a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. 68. Members of the Security Council will notice that the proposais specifically provide for appropriate reference to the United Nations. 69. Those were the pmposals of the eighteen Powers. They were not presented as an ultimatum. They were put forward as a basis for discussion. The aide mémoire from the five-man committee spoke of the "negotiation of a convention along the lines suggested". Once again it made clear the desire to avoid any violation of Egyptian sovereignty. The aide mémoire continued: "lu case it should be thought that \Vhat we are proposing conflicts with the sovereign rights of Egypt with regard to the Canal, which flows through 70. The Chairman of the Committee, in his letter of 7 September 1956 ta President Nasser, again referred to this point. "Nowhere in our proposaIs", he wrote, "is there an)' denial of Egypt's territorial sovereignty". He explainecl that the whole essence of the eighteen- Power proposaIs was that "Egypt's position as the landlord oi the Canal being completely accepted, it shoulcl proceed by international agreement to instal a tenant so constitutecl that the future of the Canal woulcl be satisfactory both to its owner~"-that is to say, to Egypt-"ancl to the many countries that use it." 71. As ;\Ir. ~Ienzies said, it cannot seriously be maintainecl that, when a landlord grants a lease, this derogates from his ownership; the fact is that any lease or any similar arrangement is an expression of his ownership. 72. \"hat is more, slightly different from the orclinary landlord and tenant arrangement, it was proposed that Egypt. apart from its position as lancllorcl, should also be fully ~nd adequately represented on all the organs which furnished the international guarantees and which administerecl and developed this international waterway. 73. These proposaIs seemed to us to be fair and just to both sicles. They were put forward then, and they still stand 110W, 'as an outline of the sort of solution which we be1ieve should be arrived at. The committee of five proposed negotiations on this basis, and said that there would be room for adjustments. l repeat that assurance now. 74. There is another aspect of any fair and durable solution to \vhich l should like to cal·l your attention, and that is: which system for the Canal is likely to bring the greatest material benefits to the people of Egypt? The major economic problem of Egypt is that, while its population is rising rapiàly, it is difficult for its national income to keep pace \Vith this population growth, let alone provide for a higher standard of living. 75. Cnder the system set up by President Nasser, Egypt would derive certain revenues from the Canal. He has stated more than once that large sums will go into the coffers of the Egyptian treasury. But in fact, if proper compensation i· ;.., he paid to the Universal 76. The main problem in the future will be the provision of enough money for the enlargement and development of the Canal itself. Only a system with adequate guarantees will create enough confidence to attract further international capital on a larg~ scale; and only the attraction of this capital can hope to bring to the Egyptian people in future years that increasing income which we should like to see them enjoy. Let us make no mistake ahout this. International assistance was need on a large scale-in those days on a very large scale-to build the Canal in the first place, and it is necessary for its adequate expansion now. The revenue from this expansion is Egypt's chief hope of improving ibs standard of living. That money will not come without a restoration of the confidence so disturbed by Colonel Nasser's action. 77. As we ail know, the Egyptian Government refused to treat the eighteen-Power proposaIs as a basis for discussion, just as it had refused to attend the London Conference. 78. Thus, our efforts to negotiate with the Egyptian- Government have so far been frustrated. 1 do not think that the blame for that lies \Vith us. The eighteen- Power proposals were summarily rejected by President Kasser. ~Ir. :\Ienzies. in his fillal letter, was careful to leave the door open for further suggestions. His letter asked President Nasser to supplement his statement with such views as he might care to express. 79. As we know, President Nasser put forward no proposai in reply to the committee of five, although they had spent a week in discussions with him. Yet, within twenty-four hours of their departure, 011 10 September 1956, the Egyptian Government issued a vague counter-statement. \Vhen the eighteen user Powers met in London for the second time, on 19 September, they readily agreed with the proposai that this Egyptian statement should be studied and considered. But, as is kno\Vn, they, ail eighteen of them, found that proposaI "too imprecise to afford a useful basis for discussion". SO. Everyone, 1 think, is familiar with ",hat happened at the second London Conference. The main idea under LJnsideration then was that the users of the Suez Canal should form themselves into an association. \Vhat was the object of that? The main users of the Canal, which had been associated in formulating and putting to President Nasser the eighteen-Power proposaIs, felt that they should give their association corporate form, 50 as to protect their rights, and indeed the rights of ail nations which are served by the ships of the A5sociation's members. This Association is in no way provocative or bellicose. The Egyptian Government, so 1 understand, has ail along recognized the validity of the 1888 Convention from which the rights of the users derive. l t was made clear at the Conference in London that the co-operation of the Government of 82. In all this we have set great store by the part which the United Nations might play in the new régime for the Suez Canal. It has always been our intention that there should be an appropriate link between the United Nations and any international system set up for the Canal. From the beginning of the controversy created by the action of 26 July 1956, it has been in the mind of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that it might be necessary at some stage to bring the matter before the Security Council. The second Conference in London made dear the general belief of the eighteen Powers that, having done what we couId by peaceful means to secure our just rights in accordance with the United Nations Charter, wc should lay the matter before the Security Council at an early date. And this is what we have now come, in aIl good faith, to do. 83. l repeat that the situation which we are asking the Council to consider is indeed a grave one. It is one that threatens the very life and strength of countless nations. It is not just a quarre1 between Egypt and a group of countries who own the ships that ply through the Suez Canal. It is a matter of vital importance to peoples in every part of the globe, the peopl66 of Asia and Afriea no less than the peoples of Europe. No nation can or should stand aside, indifferent, when the greatest international waterway in the world is subjected to the unrestricted control of one Government, when that is done in contravention of a treaty of long standing. 84. These are the principal considerations in the light of which the draft resolution of France and the United Kingdom [S/3666] now beiore the Council has been presented. l do not propose to go through this draft paragraph by paragraph. Everything in it, l think, is already covered by what l have said. l would, however, draw the attention of the Council to the fact that it falls into three principal parts. 85. The draft resolution begins with five paragraphs setting out in summary form the grounds on \Vhich we think that tht> Egyptian action in regard to the Canal is unacceptable and that measures to correct it are called for. 86. 1t then goes on to recapitulate briefly the steps that have been taken with a view to formulating proposaIs that would be acceptable to the countries principally using the Canal as a basis of negotiation \Vith Egypt, and the steps taken to try to procure Egyptian agreement to a negotiation on that basis. There is also a paragraph noting the inauguration of the Suez Canal 88. 1 do not have to remind members in this chamher that it is part of the duty of the Security Couneil to keep the peace, and that it is also its role to preserve the rule of law, which is the only underlying guarantee for har1110nious relations between nations. 89. This Council must act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Un.ited Nations. In this connexion l cannot do better than quote a passae-.'" from one of the speeches delivered by Mr. Dulles~ at the second London Conference on Suez, a passage which seems to me to embody a principle of the very first importance in the sphere of international relations. 90. This is what M1". Dulles said on that occasion: "Now 1 would like to point out that the United Nations Charter itself does not just say there must be peace. \Vhat does it say? The very first Article of the United Nations Charter says that the purpose of the United Nations is to bring about settlements by peaceful means, and in conformity with the prineiples of justice and international law, and if that part of it is forgotten, the first part of it will inevitably be ignored. We have got to realize, 1 think, who have to deal with problems of this character, that we are not really in the long run furthering the cause of peace, even peace for ourselves who seem remote from i:he particular problem, if we do not realize that we have just as much a responsibility to try to seek a solution in conformity with the principles of justice and international law as we have a dutY to try to prevent the use of force. If we only put our emphasis upon one side of that problem and forget the other, then our effor"; are going to be doomed, and the effort represented by this Charter of the United Nations is equally going to be doomed." Mr. Dulles went on to say, deahng with the problem of Suez: "Now we are faced here with a problem in which great nations are faced with a great peril. Nobody 1 think can fairly dispute that facto It is a peril that they could readily remedy if they resorted to the 91. That was a fine statement, worthy of much thought. It goes to the roots of the problel11 \Vith which the Security Council is confronted in this controversy, and 1 believe that our deliberations provide a great opportunity for the United Nations to uphold justice and redress a situation which endangers the economic and perhaps the political life of so many nations. vVe for our part are confident that the Security COUllClI will not fail in its duty and that, by upholding justice and the sanctity of international obligations, it will help towards a peaceful outcome of this dangerous situation. 92. By adopting our draft resolution, the Security Council will not only be upholding the mIe of law in the ,vorld but will, we believe, be opening the way towards furthers efforts to promote a peaceful solution of this grave situation. 93. The first prereguisite is to establish a just and fair basis for negotiations. yVe therefore ask the Council to lav down such a basis. \Ve have indicated the basis in the eighteen-Power proposaI. 'vVe believe that negotiations upon that basis resulting in agreement would lead to the restoration of the international svstem of operation for the Suez Canal, which is, as 1 sai~l earlier, built into and part of the Convention of 1888. 94. 1 h~ve heen thinking, during the last day or two, of the best way for us to organize our deliberations \Vith regard to this matter, and perhaps it may he convenient if 1 indicate my thoughts at this stage to my colleagues. 95. It seems to me that, after there has been a chance for those who wish to state their views in public session, it might be a good thing for this Council to move into private session. 1 would hope that we might reach that point some time on Tuesday, 9 Octoher, perhaps. That would give up the opportunity to cCl.sider the next steps in a less formaI atmosphere. Some ;f Ill> have come a long \Vay. \Ve have other tasks wa;~.. ,ls for us which are also pressing, and we have no time to waste. Nor 96. Having said that, may l summarize very briefly the position which the GCivemment of the United Kingdom takes up in this matter. l think l can put it in two short propositions. 97. The first proposition is that we are determined to uphold our rights-rights, properly secured and guaranteed, to free transit through this international waterwav. In this we act not merelv for oUfselves but for ail those who depend upon this éanal. 98. The second proposition is that we seek a peaceful solution by negotiation and have stated a basis for negotiation which we believe to be just both to the users and to Egypt. 99. For these two propositions-which are more widelv defined in the draft resolution we have submitted-we seek, in the cause of peace, the endorsement of this Cauncil. 100. The PRESIDENT (translated front French): l shaH now speak as the representative of FRANCE. 101. The Government of the French Republic, together with the Government of the United Kingdom, has referred to the Security Council "the situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888". 102. This situation, in the opinion of the two Governments, is serious, and Hable, if it continues, to threaten international peace and security. 103. On 12 September 1956, the permanent representatives of the United Kingdom and France brought this situation to the attention of the President of the Security Council. On 23 September, in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter, they referred it to the Security Council. 104. Perhaps it would not be out of place to recaH the facts on which our appeal is based. 105. Egypt passed a law nationalizing the Universal Suez Canal Company. In application of that law, the Egyptian Government forcibly seized the Canal itse1f, the installations connected with it, and aIl property of the Company situated in Egypt, and handed over their management to an office responsible to it alone. 106. The Egyptian Government maintains that the Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company and that it comes under Egyptian domestic law. That is why it invokes the right which it, like any other State, possesses to nationalize the undertakings situated in its territory. 107. The French Government considers that the premises of this argument are false: it is not correct that the Universal Suez Canal Company is subject sole1y to Egyptian Iaw: this "universal" company is an essential part of the system, recognized by the Convention of· Constantinople of 29 October 1888, as indispensable 119. In 1885, another international commission met to draw up, under the terms of the London declaration, a conventional act which would establish a definitive system destined to guarantee the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal at aIl times and for all Powers. It is significant that this commission, which drafted the Convention of Constantinople of 29 October 1888, was convened at the initiative of the Governments of the principal European Powers. . 120. Moreover, this Convention only completed "the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, :iated 22 February 1866, and sanctioning the concessions of His Highness the Khedive". l have just quoted from the preamble to the 1888 Convention, which clearly links this instrument with the Universal Suez Canal Company. And finally, the system established by the firman of 1866, and completed by the 1888 Convention, wasthe very one which resulted from the concession granted to the Canal Company. The operation of the Canal by the Suez Canal Company was really, as Mr. Eden said on 12 September 1956, a part of a comprehensive system, designed by the 1888 Convention to ensure the fl'ee use of the Canal by all the Powers concerned. 121. If it \Vere necessary to continue here to analyse texts and to interpret facts, the following would cIearly emerge. The major European Powers, which comprised nearly all the users of the Canal in the last half of the nineteenth century, did in fact establish ·the Universal Suez Canal Company; in 1873, they established the standards for tolls; they called the Paris Conference of 1885 in order to supplement the existing system by a formaI international guarantee. It was those Powers, in fact, which conceded the international public sel'vice, in the name of the users. Turkey merely granted right of way through part of its territory. Egypt, its successor, cannot today exercise the rights of a grantor over an international public service. [, 122. What i5 left of the Egyptian argument? In the first place, the Universal Suez Canal Company is not 126. On 26 July 1956, Colonel Nasser's first concern was, according to his own statements, to retaliate against the withdrawal of the offer made by the United States Government several montl1s earlier to finance the construction of the Aswan high dam. The timing dearly proves that for the head of the Egyptian Government the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company constituted a mea~ure of reprisaI. That purpose is therefore completely different from the purposes laid down in the 1888 Convention and has no connexion with free transit through the Canal. 127. Moreover, we find in the speech of 26 July appeals to violence, incitement to hatred and glorification of anti-foreign feelings. Nothing in ail this can possibly be regarded as a justification of the decision to nationali~<: the Suez Canal Company. "We shan regain :l11 our rights", Colonel Nasser dec1ared, "for ail these funds (the Company's) are ours and this Canal is the property of Egypt". It would be difficult to give a clearer definition of the objective, whkh was not so much to assert Egyptian sovereignty as to take over the Company's assets. 128. The head of the Egyptian Government has, of course, stated on several occasions that his decision was also designed to raise the standard of living of his countrymen and to develop the domest;<: economy. If this had been Colonel Nasser's only purpose, he could easily have secured international agreement. France has never disputed Egypt's right to receive, in return for the int.ernational concession of its territory, compensation which would enaLle it tü invest the' capital necessa'ry for the development of the Egyptian eccnomy. 129. The methods adopted by t11l: l.cad of the Egyptiall Goverrunent, and the threats which he inserted in the nationalization decree, have given a very different impression of his intentions. Not on1y did the Egyptiall Government give no notice to the Universai Suez Canal 130. Acts, statements and methods of this kind were boun<\ to disturb the French and British Governments profoundly ; hence the military measures taken by them, 131. If we had been acting with aggressive intent, we wouId not have shown the patience we have shown ever since 26 July; we would not have made repeated attempts to negGl:iate, nor would we have appealed to the Security Council. 132. Those who assert that our precautionary moves were uncalled for wouId do weIl to consider them in relation to developments. Over the past few weeks, Colonel Nasser's tone has altered, ~nd his recent speeches are not comparable with the spp~ch of 26 July. Moreover, numerous ships have L<:n moving through the Suez Canal without remitting tolls to the Egyptian authority. Lastly, despite the terms of article 5 of the nationalization decree, Canal pilots and employees have been able to leave Egypt without being subjected to sanctions or ill treatment. 133. Unfortunately we cannot avoid seeing a connexion between these concessions made by the head of the Egyptian Government and the apprehensions he may have had about French and British counter-moves. But we had to remove the Suez Canal problem from the atmosphere of passion and violence into which Colonel Nasser's words and acts had plunged it. 134. In the course of recent international conferences, the French Government has had occasion to outline the main features of a possible solution of the Canal question. 135, Egyptian sovereignty over the territory of Egypt in general, and over the Canal zone in particular, has never been questioned. It was recognized by the firmans of 1856 and 1866 and confirmed by the 1888 Convention ; but we maintain that respect for treaty obligations is itse1f (l11e of the essential attributes of sovereignty. 136. The French Government has never chailenged the right of the Egyptian pe0l- .~ to receive a fair sharc of the profits accruing from the use of the Canal bv ships of foreign nations. • 137. On the other hand, the French Government continues to believe that passage through the C;:tnal ought to be managed by an international body. It draws a clear distinction in this respect between management and control. Canal users are entitled to the assurance that traffic arrangements, the fixing of toHs, the assignment of pilots, and maintenance and modernization work will always he carried out with the legitimate interests of the users primarily in mind. 138. If traffic conditions could be rendered uncertain as a result of sudden measures taken out of purely national considerations, the whole flow of trade between Europe and Asia would be endangered. 140. In this connexion, a disturbing .precedent cornes to mind. Has not the Egyptian Government in fact refused to carry out a unanimous recommendation of the Security Council concerning the use of the Canal by vcsse1s belonging to Israel? 141. One of the administrators of the Egyptian authority set up on 26 ]uly 1956 wrote in a recent publication tàat Egypt will be able to close the Canal to ships belonging to any Power at war with Egypt; to take less drastic measures, such as searching ships belonging to an enemy State and neutral ships which help the enemy or have commerce with it; and also to prevent the supplying and Ioading of these ships. He went on to say that the Egyptian Government will then organize movement through the Canal in any way it thinks fit. Such statements justify our apprehensions; that was why we decided that we must stand by the principle of international operation, since that of international control does not meet the requirements of the situation. It is in the day-to-day operation of the Canal that the discrimination, delays and difficulties may occur that the 1888 Convention was designed to prevent. 142. On the basis of the views 1 have just outlined, the French Government has for over two months been seeking sorne means of finding a peaceful solution to the problem created by Colonel Nasser's decision. 143. After presenting to the Egyptian Government on 30 July a note of protest against the arbitrary nature of the measures taken, the French Government, in agreement with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, called for a conference of twenty-two States which together account for 95 per cent of the trade passing through the Canal. The purpose was to explore the possibility of devising an international system which, without infringing upon Egyptian interests, would give effects to the principles set forth in the Convention of 1888. In six days, eighteen of those Governments had worked out the basis of a solution which would ensure respect for the rights of the users as weil as those of Egypt. 144. In order to stress still further their eagerness to come to terms with the Egyptian Government, the eif;!hteen Governments decided to ask Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, along with the representatives of four other Government5, to present their proposaIs to Colonel Nasser and to explain to him aIl the yarious aspects of those proposaIs. The conversations took place in Cairo from 3 to 9 September 1956. Unfortunately, they were of no avail. From those talks, the Chairman of the five-nation committee emerged with the feeling that Colonel Nasser was :not prepared in any circumstances to consider the guarantees wilich the 151. What is Iikely to happen during the months or years to come if shipping companies and undertakings which send their products through the Canal are not giv~n assurance of protection against sudden and arbltrary decisions? We shall witness a graduaI sterilization of the Canal, and in the long run the Egyptian people will bear the brunt of the drop in income from the operation of the Canal. 152. An atmosphere of international confidence is as ~ssential to the countries which have recently achieved mdependence and need outside assistance to raise their standard of living as it is to anyone else. At a time when schemes for foreign aid are the subject of suggestions from aIl quarters-at the very time when the establishment of an international system more in keeping with 154. One last point: reading Colonel Nasser's writings and hearing his speeches one cannot he1p feeling even more gravdy concerned. Is Ilot the nationalization oi the Suez Canal the first stage in a policy which may lead the worlll to disaster? In his bllUk. Egypt's Liberation: The Philosoph." of tlic Rc~'olrlfl'?1!. Colonel Nasser goes over the events of his time and concludes that there are a number of circles which will constitute Egypt's field of activitv, and in which it should endeavour to bring into play aH its reserves of energy. Surrounding Egypt, he envisages an ..Arab circle"; on the southern borders of his country, an African continent; over a vaster area, an "Islamic world", and he wonders whether this does not portend a great role for his hero. 155. Ail this makes one wonder whether it is the wellbeing ut the Egyptiau people or the boundless expansion of one man's ambition that is at issue. Twenty years ago we were unwilling to listen to the clenr warnings given us. Nearly 20 million men and women paid for our apathy with their lives. 156. \Ve wish to bring home our apprehensions to the Security Couneil. \Ve feel that it is incumbent on the United Nations to restore international confidence for the greater good of. ail peoples, especially those commonly referred to as "under-developed". It is also the duty of the United Nations to state plainly that the violation of international undertakings is no proof of a nation's indcpendence. 157. In the face of a problem whose issues are so clear and so unequivocal, half-measures will not do. No settlement wouId be acceptable on the mere prete.~t that it preserved the peace for the time being. The United Nations Charter recognizes that there is no gcnuine peace without the maintenance of justice and international law, thus recognizing that circumstances may arise where weakness is more perilous than firmness. We are eager for a peaceful settlement, but, wc cannot acceot anv solution which wouId condone the fait accQ;,~pli and admit the right of a Chief of State' to releaser.is country from international undcrtakings to which it had freely subscribed. 158. The question is a serious one. The future of the United Nations--and. for: that matter, future peacewill depend on the way in which you answer it. FINLAND-FINLANDE Akateemln.n Klrlakauppa. 2 H.lslnkl. FRANCE Edition. A. "done. Paris V. GERMANY.Ai.LEMAGNE R. Els.nschmldt, furt/Maln. Elwert & M.urer, Schon.b.rg. AI.xander Horn, bad.n. W. E. Soarbach, Kain (22c). AIlGENTINA·ARGENTINE • Editorial Sudamerlcana S.A., Alslna 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALlA·AUSTRALIE H. A. Goddard, 2550 Georlle St., SydneYI 90 Queen St., Melbourne. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N.3, Victoria. AUSTRIA·AUTRICHE Gerold & Co., Graben 31. Wlen, 1. B. wünerstorff, Markus SI"ikusstrasH 10. Sallburg. IIELGIUM-IELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Pre... 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