S/PV.738 Security Council

The Yugoslav Government has viewed with grave concern the evolution of the Suez Canal question. Our attitude on the variûus aspects of the situation has been made known on several occasions. Neverthe1ess, 1 should like to summarize briefly our views on some of the main questions that have arisen in this connexion. ment. 4. Thus, in nl:l.tionalizing this company, the Egyptian Government was acting strictly within the sphere of the domestic jurisdiction. 5. The intemational instrument whir!t, while recognizing the Canal as an integral part of Egypt, defines the latter's obligations towards the international community, is the ConventLn of 1888.1 This Convention established the international obligation of Egypt to ensure free nav~gation for ships of an flags, while leaving it to Egypt as the~ territorial State to see that this right was impJemented. The Conenti!;n thus in no way modified the legal status Oi' the Cûmpany, as is c1ear from its article 14. which provides that Egypt's obligations under the Convention are not limited to the duration of the concessions, thereby dra",ring a c1ear distinction between the concessions governing the status of the Company and Egypt's international obligations with regard to freedom of navigation. 6. The fact that the Suez situation has come before the United Nations is encouraging in itself, regardless .of the actual form in which it has been brought before the Council. It may be taken, 1 thir.k, as the sign of a certain evolution in the approach to the question and, in a sense, in the question itself. It should he expected also to create 'COnditions in which such an approach eould acq. ire a more definite form andbe translated into genuine progress towards a settlement along the !:ines of the United Nations Charter. From that point of view, we have here a proof of what has been rightly called the "inevitability" of the United Nations. But do not let us make any mistake. It is at the same time a severe test for the Organization. Nevertheless, that the question should have assumed the proportions of a crisis calling for Security Couneil action is, of course, a matter of profound regret, all the more 50, it would seem, as it stands in stark contrast with the otherwise improving climate of world affairs. 7. 1 do not intend to go into' the origins of the Suez crisis, since the facts are well known. My Government, for its part, has a1way ~ favoured and supported efforts towards a settlement alllDg the tines of the Vnited Nations Qlarter and in ke~?ing both with the sovereign rights and interests of Egypt and the legitimate interests of the international commu..:f.y in the free use of this internationally important waterway. 8. 1 should like in this connédon to quote from a statement made on 12 August 1956 by the President of Yugoslavia, at the time of the first London Conference. President Tito said : <lIt is obvious that the principle of freedom of navigation in general, and the freedom of navigation 1 Convention r.especting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888. 1 9. One cannot, in this connexion, overlook the disturbing display of force and the measures of eeon01Llc pressure that have been brought to bear upon Egypt by France and the United Kingdcm. Snch measuresirrespective of any reservations one may have with regard to the actual manner in which the nationa1ization ·",as carried out--are clearly in conBiet with the oè..Jgations stipu~ated in ilie United Nations Ch<irter and they have certainly had p.nd still have a most unfortunate effcct on the situation. Such a course is, 1 might add, all the more to be ref,.rretted as the Egyptian Government has aIl along shown readiness to seek an agreement through free and equal negotiations. 10. It is my confident hope that the Couneil will soon find it possible, now that the different '''Îews on the events that have oceurred within the last few months have been placed on record, to pursue its efforts in a constructive and objective atmosphere free from recrimination, that it will find it possible to turn from the past to the future, to look beyond the Suez crisis to the Suez problem. 1 have no intention, of course, of denying the reality of the crisis. What 1 have in mind is that it is essential to try to disentangle the problem from the crisis if we are to solve the problem and settle the crisis. The fact that the problem has presented itse)f in an alarming guise is the reflection of a number of clrcumstanees, which are we1.l known to ail of us. Il. The problem would presumably have arisen sooner or later. The world has not stood still since the days of the Khedive Said and Ferdinand de Lesseps, or sinee the days when the representatives of nine Powers assembled at Constantinople to work out the convention of that name. And, as v·,,: ail know, the march of history has been partîcularly swift in the course of the decade that has elapsed sinœ the Second World War. In this changing international context, answers that were found more than seventy years ago ' to the Suez problem were bound to become obsolete,and the problem itself was bound ta re-emerge in a new shape. 12. It is generally agreed that the crux of the Suez problem, as it now presents itseJf, is to bring E~t's sovereign rights with regard to the Suez Canal mto barmony with the legitimate interests of the world community in navigation through what is undoubtedlyand increasingly-a waterway of exceptional international importance. This is, of course, but one aspect of the broader problem of adjusting, within a rapidty evolving international fmmework, the particu1ar interests of nations--especially of the newly independent na- I 13. Egypt's sovereign rights with regard to the Suez Canal have never, to my knowledge, been questioned in principle; they have moreover been affirmed and reaffirmed in the different international instruments re- _ lating to the waterway. They have been emphasized in various forms in the documents and proposals that have appeared during the last few months. Bebind this unanimity of principle (which in itse1f should not he underrated), differences have, of course, appeared with regard to the scope to he given to these rights. One thing shou1d be clear, however: it would he idle to expect a nation that has, after many centuries, finally acbieved genuine independence, to consent to more farreaching restrictions upon its sovereignty than' those acceptd by a nineteenth-century vassal State. It is especially obvious that any limitations which increasing international co-operation might caU for with regard to the sovereignty of aState, can he based ooly on the free agreement of that State. 14. It is no less evident, on the other hand, that the i'_cernational community, in this growingly interdependent world of ours, is entitled to adequate assurances regarding the freedom and security of navigation through the Canal. 15. It would appear that it is precisely in the quest for the necessary adjustrnent hetween these twobasic aspects of the matter that the main differences of interpretation concerning the nature and extent of both begin to arise. 16. Perhaps the problem will seem somewhat less formidable if we view it on the two different practical levels upoh which it has always been dealt with in the pasto 17. On one level we have the question of freedom of navigation through the Canal in the literal, or, if you prefer, the political sense of the word; we have the question of ensuring that the Canal "shall always be free and open . . . to every vessel . . . without distinction of flag". The obligation to ensure such freedom, as provided for under the 1888 Convention, has been solemoly reaffirmed by Egypt. Nor has anything occurred to justify the contention that the events of the last months have wrought a change in tbis regard. On the contrary, navigation in the Canal has been progressing in a perfectly smooth and satisfactory manner, despite some artificially created difficulties. 18. It is felt, h\)wever-and we, for our part, would certainly be prepCi red to go along with this view-that the principle of freedom of navigation through the Canal requires sorne more up-to-date instrument than the Constantinople Convention. It is, of course, essential to bear in mind that responsibility for the implementation of such m instrument and for ensuring freedom of navigation in tbis iiC~S~ must of necessity l'est -as was the case under the Constantinople Convention-with the territorial Power, which assumes a ,very definite internàtional obligation in this respect. 19. Where a new instrument should, in our opinion, seek to improve upon its predecessor at this leve1 of the problem, is in the procedure for settling possible differences arising from its' application; recourse ta the 20. Now to tum to the other leve1 l mentilmed. Here wc are faced with the various practical or technical requirements connected with navigation through the Canal. These requirements relate to the maintenance and development of the Canal, to the question of dues, to the various sel'Vices and facilities that are need~d, etc. Here, it would seem, th~ interests of the international community in general, and of the users of the Canal in particular, could by mutual agreement be given a more direct and tangible form without, however, encroaching upon what Egypt rightly regards as the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction. The Indian proposal made at the first London Conference contains in this respect valuable suggestions providing for the establishment of an international organ will. advisot"j, arbitration and liaison functions. 21. l would, if l may, merely by way of example and without any intention of offering solutions at this stage, refer to sorne of the questions l have in mind here. "[ake the question of Canal dues, for example. This question is such as ta affect, in a variety of ways, the interests both of Egypt and of the user nations. It is therefore only,appropriate thaï this question of dues should he dea1t with by mutllal agreement through appropriate machinery, with due consideration for the need of maintaining and deve10ping the Canal, of guaranteeing to Egypt the revenue to which it is c1early entitled, white making transit as little onerous as possible for the users. Similarly, as regards the maintenance and de,.=lopment of the Canal, a system might, 1 think, he devised' whereunder the users (and l U!,!e the tcrm in its general sense) could both have an adequate say and assiune the nece;;sary obligations, in keeping with the sovereign rights of Egypt as the terdtorial Power. Possibly, too, certain temporary arrangements could he worked out with respect to some of these questions, pending a more lasting and comprehensive solution. 22. 1t is in the light of these general considerations governing our attitude on the Suez Canal question that we have examined the different proposaIs now before th~ Couneil. 23. The draft resolution 'submitted by France and the United Kingdom [S/3666] is not, in our view, such as 'to provide a basis for agreement. This draft seems to ignore the fact that the proposais it contains have alreaay proved unacceptable to the party most directly concerned-Egypt. Moreoller, the draft reE'olution tends to prejudge-in a one-sided manner-settlements which œhbe' reached ,pnly through negotiation;con-. e~ possible measurè of obj~~ __ . _. .lld efficacy. Its terms of reÎerence shoulù inc1ude a study of the ideas set forth by Mr. Fawzi in the conc1uding pOl"tion of the statement he made yesterday morning f736th meeting]. 27. 'We are convinced that a solution can he found, because we do not see anything fundame1.ltally irreconcilable between the different interests involv~; they should, on the contrary, he expected to merge into the common interest-politica1 as weIl as eC'onomic-of all concemed, which is that the ftow of traffic through the Canal shoqld be free and efficient. We are fully aware that such a solution will require patient and persevering efforts, l.'. conciliatory spirit and a substantial dose of realism on the part of aIl. Our discussions here should mark an important stage in the quest for a solution. They should make it possible to find enough common grouna and to establish a basis upon which an agreed settlement may he reached. . 28. Mr. DULLES (United States of America): As our general debate draws to a close, it is important to recall some fundamentals. 29. First, we are here dealing with a situation which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. That is conceded by all concemed. 30. Secondty, the nations of the world, and explicitly the seventy-six Members of the United Nations, have conferred upon us, constituting this Council, the primary ?esponsibility to maintain international peace and security. 31. Thirdly, we are obligated in dIscharging this duty to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and that means to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or sett1ement of this dangerous situation. 32. Our duty is clear: it is to seek by peaceful means a settlement in accordance with the prineiples of justice and international law. We thus have a two-pbased responsibility; one aspect relates to pea.ce; the other th~ United Kingdom and the Unitèd States met together and decided that a solution s}'Juld first of an he sought by a meeting together of the twenty··four nations principally concemed, including Egypt. That was the first peace move. 37. From 16 to 24 August 1956, a conference was held in London. Egypt declined to attend. But th~re were repres~nted aIl seven of the unquestionably surviving signt'ltories of the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888; seven other countries which are the principal users 01 the Cand, and another eight countries whose economies dtpend most largely upon the Canal. 38. This conference produced an agreement among dghtef:n vf the twenty-two States represented upon a formula for settlement which they believed should he acceptable both to Egyptand to the nations which were users of the Canal or dep~ndent thereon. That was the second peace move. 39. During that conference, a comrr.tÏttee of five nations was established, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Australia, to commdllicate the views of the eighteen to Egypt and to ascertain whefuer or not those views would he acceptable as a basi.s for negotiation. A meeting at Geneva was suggested, but the Government of Egypt indicated that it was not convenient for it to meet with the c6mmittee except :!t Cairo. Accordingly, the cori'unittee, consisting of one Prime MitÙster, three Foreign MiQisters and one Deputy Foreign Minister, travelled to Cairo in their quest for peace. That was the third peace move. 40. The committee was in Cairo .from 3 to 9 September 1956, presenting and explaining the proposal of the eighteen nations. That was the fourth peace maye. . 41. At ,Cairo, the Government of Egypt rejected the 1 .}roposals of the eighteen Powers, even as a basis for llegotiation, and it made no counter-proposal. 42. Nevertheless, on 19 September 1956, the eighteen nations again met to explore further the possibilities of peaceful adjustment. They re-examined and reaffirmed their August proposals as a fair basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal problem, taking into account the interests of the user nations as weIl as those of Egypt. . 44. Then the Governments of France and the United Kindom acted to bring to the attention of this Council the situation with which we are now dealing. That was the sixth peace move. 45. In the light of this history no one, 1 think, can fairly question the peaceful desires of those who ar;,; aggrieved by the action of Egypt. Rarely, if ever, in history have comparable efforts been made to settle peacefully an issue of such dangerous proportions. This Council knows that it is not dealing with Govern.nents bent on the use of force. Even those most aggrieved have shown their desire to bring about a just solution by peaceful means. 46. 1 tum to the second aspect of our problem-that is, to und a solution which will conform to the principles of justice and international law. And here also the way is clear. 47. Oftentimes we are confronted by situations as ta which there is no relevant body of international law. But in the present situation there is a governing treaty, the Convention of 1888. It provides that for all time the vessels of all the nations shall have the right of free and equal passage through the Suez Canal. It caUs for a "definite system destined to guarantee" such right of use, and it incorporates by reference the concession of 1866 to the Universal Suez Canal Company as providing such a system. 48. Mucn has been said about the need to respect the sovereignty of Egypt in relation to the Canal. 49. Sovereignty exists where a nation can do whatever it wants. Gell.eraUy speaking, a nation can do what it wants within its own territory and, generally speaking, no nation has any rights within the territory of another sovereign nation. 50. The Suez Canal, to be sure, goes through what is now Egypt, and in this sense the Canal is Egyptian. But the Canal is not, and never has been, a purely internaI affair of Egypt with which Egypt \.Guld do what it wanted. The Canal has always been, from the very day of its opening, an international waterway dedicated to the free passage of the vessels of aU nations. Hs character ài> an international right-of-way was guaranteed for aU time by the 1888 Convention. Egypt cannot rightfully stop any vessel or cargo from going through the Canal. And for those who use that right-of-way, to c.ombine to secure the observance of their rights is no violation of Egyptian sovereignty, but a c1ear exercise of their rights accordOO by international law, namely, by the Convention of 1888. SI. Egypt has accepted this legal view, al'ld bas indeed expounded it before this CounciI. 52. 1 recall that, on 5 August ~947, the representative of Egypt spoke here before t:.is Council of the situation which existed when the United Kingdom had treaty rights in lands abutting on the Canal. The Egyptian representative pointOO out that that did .not make free- 1 stress the words of the Egyptian representative that, under the Convention of 1888, the nations organized to regulate the traffic of the Canal. . 53. On 14 October 1954, the representative of Egypt, again speaking before tms Security Couneil in the Bat Galim case, said: "The Canal Company, which controls the passage, is an international company controlled by authorities "'~o are neither Egyptian nor necessarily of any part':ular nationality. It is a universal company, it functions, and tmngs will continue to be managed tha~ way in future" [682nd meeting, paragraph 150]. 54. 50 much for the law of the case. Then there is the question of j. .tice, which we are also required to hear in mind and to apply. What is the just tm.ng to do? 55. The Council should, 1 believe,. in this matter give much weight to the conclusions of the eighteen nations which joined in an expression of their views last August. The eighteen included aIl but one of the clearly surviving signatories of the 1888 Convention; they represented over 90 per cent of the total traffic; and they represented countries whosc ecanomies are largely dependent upon the Canal. Among the eighteen were countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia and America. 56. They affirmed that, as stated in the preamble to the 1888 Convention, there should be established "a definite system destined to guarantee at aIl times, and haIl the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal". 57. They enuneiated four basic principles which, with due regard to the sovereign rights af Egypt, should find expression through such a system. 1 qucte their statement of these four basic prineiples: fir5t, efficient and dependable operation, maintenance and development of the Canal as a free. open and secure international waterway, in accordance with the prineiples of the Convention of 1888; secondly, insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation; thirdly, a return to Egypt for th~ use of the Suez Canal which will be fair and equitable and increasing with the enlargement of the Canal's capacity and its greater use; fourthly, Canal to11s as low as is consistent with the foregoing requirements and, except for Egypt's share, rio profit. 58. How can anyone seriously dispute these principles? Indeed, only one of them was disputed at the August conference, and only by the Soviet Union; it was the second principle ta which 1 referred, name1y, 60. If, as the United Nations Charter commands, we are to seek justice, we must agree that the operation of this international utility shaH be insulated from the politics of any nation. 61. 1 believe that this Couneil can accept unhesitatingly the prineiples enunciated by the eighteen nations as prineiples of justice. 62. The eighteen nations then went on to indicate a mechanism by which these prineiples might he applied. They suggested institutional arrangements for cooperation between Egypt and other interested nations, and the creation of a Suez Canal Board on which Egypt and others would he represented. This Board, they suggested, should he assoeiated with, and make periodic reports to, the United Nations. They suggested that arbitration should he agreed upon to settle disputes and that there should be effective sanctions against violation of the arrangement. "1 believe that such additional burüen as might result from the adoption of our amendment would not be much as compared with the sacrifices we have :lU suffered and are aIl ready to suffer again for the sake of maintaining peace and security in the world ... If we want to keep peace and security only, we would not differ much from Hitler. who was also trying to do that and who, as a mattèr of fact, partIy succeede<1. But where the difference lies, is that we want to maintain peace and security in conformity with the principles of internationallaw and justice."2 50 spoke the voice of Egypt, and with those sentiments we can, l think, all agree. 69. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this proceeding. Our Couneil finds, on the one hand, a demonstrated desire for peace on the part of all the parties. On the other hand, .the situation is governed by prineiples of justice and of law such as are rarely evident. If, under these favourable conditions, with all of these assets, our Couneil finds itself impotent to secure a settlement by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, then our failure would be a calamity of immense proportions. 70. This seems to be recognized by those who have spoken around this table, and our general debate has on the whole been temperate and constructive. 71. l say "on the whole", for there have been exceptions. One such was the portrayal by the Soviet Foreign Minister of so-called "United States monopolies" clad, as he picturesquely put it, in "snow-white robes", and which, with wheited appetites, are on the prowî throughout the world seeking new victims. 2 United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1/6. Il 75. The Government of Egypt, in a more constructive vein, has proposed that we establish a negotiating body which will have the guidance of an agreed set of principles to work on, and of agreed objectives to keep .in mind and to attain. This was indeed the procedure which we sought to follow at the London Conference which was held last August where, as 1 have indicated, a set of principles was formulated and certain objectives were outlined. 76. The heart of the problem, as 1 indicated, seems to me to be whether among these principles we can get acceptance of the principle that there should be a system to ensure that the Canal cannot be used by any country as an instrument of its distinctly national policy. 77. If Egypt accepts that simple and rudimentary principle of justice, then 1 be!ieve that the subsidiary problems can be resolved But if that principle be repudiated, then it is difficult to foresee a useful role for a negctiating body. Indeed, under those conditions, it is difficult to foresee any settlement in accordance with the principles of justice and of international law. And if this case cannot be so settled, then the whole system of peace with justice sought to be established by this Charter will have been undermined. 78. Surely we can do better than that. 1 feel confident that no nation here desires other than friendly relations with Egypt. Indeed, the settlement proposed by the user nations, representing over 90 per cent of the traffic, will significantly promote the welfare of Egypt. A peaceful and equitable solution of this problem would open up a vista of new hope for an area of the world where the peoples have for long-for too long-been grievously oppressed by alarms of war and by the economic burdens of preparing for war. Also, we can open up a new hope for ail humanity, which has begun, 1 iear, to lose confidence in the capacity of this Organization to secure peace and justice. 79. 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