S/PV.742 Security Council

The Chair wishes to apologize to the Security Council for the rather late opening of this meeting, which is due only tQ the fact that the texts we are to discuss had to he translated and circulated. 1 1 J 1 2. The United States representative has requested permission to address the Council before we discuss the substance of the item on the agenda. 1 accordingly cali upon him to make his statement.

At a prior meeting of the Security Council, 1 suggested that the representative of Israel and representatives of the Arab States who had asked to be heard should be invited to present their views at a meeting of the Council on the following day. It was the prevailing view in the Council that it would not be convenient to do this. However, no one seemed disposed to deny in principle the right of these Governments to be hearù; the problem was mereIy that of finding an appropriate occasion. , 1it. 4. We cannot, 1 think, ignore the fact that this Council has already he1d that the Constantinople Con- Sl'''fllfi~'t' (If F!l.\'tf, f(lo" a /,Ial'I' at tlrl' Sl'curif:.v CO'IIIcil tab/t". 7, ~l r. Ll.OYD (Uniled Kingdom): [n my opening statl'lI1l'nt llll 5 lktoher llJ5ô lï35tlr Illl'l'Ii/l[/]. 1 explaillt'(l the n'asons {If the United Killgdom Government for bringing, togethcr \Vith the French Gnvernment, the Suez Canal issue to the Securitv Council. 1 expresscd the hdicf that what we ~vcre askillg the United Nations to do \Vas ta uphold justice and respect for international obligations antl to l"nlress a situation which endangerell the economie and the politieal life of many natiuns, and so heip towanis the peaceful solution of a dangerous situation. 8. In a speech which I made in my own country on 14 August 1956, 1 said that, in this matter, the Government of the United Kingdom \Vould act in the spirit of the Charter, and I believe that, in the steps which we have taken to dea1 \Vith this matter, we have so acted. 9. As I exp1ained on 5 October, the first prerequisite seemed to me ta establish a just and fair basis for negotiating, and I asked the Council ta lay down such a basis. The users of the cana1-over 90 per cent of them, or representing over 90 per cent of the traffichave indicated what they consider ta be the right basis in what are knQwn as the e!ght~n-Power proposats: and we believe that negotiation on that basis cou1d tead ta a successful ûutcome. 10. In their proposaIs, the eighteen Powers set out certain requirements which they think a settlement of the Suez problem should meet, and then suggest a means of implementation. \Vhen these proposaIs \Vere put to the Egyptian Government, that Government appeared to reject not only the means of implementation but l'ven the principles themselves as a basis for negotiation. 11. Those principles \Vere; that the system designe<l ta guarantee at an times and for an the Powers the free use of the Suez Marilime Canal shûuld have duc regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt; shou1d ensure 1 Convention respeding the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signe<! in Constantinople on 29 October 1888. 12. After stating the case and after some discussion, 1 suggestcd, and the Council agreed, that we should conduct discussions in private in order to consider the next steps tG be taken in a less formaI atmûsphere. 13. During the last week, intensive discussions and consultations have been taking place. Some of those have consisted of discussions around this table, and we have been indebted to our colleagues for their valuable comments and suggestions. Other discussions have taken the form of conversations betwc-.:n the President, in his capacity as Foreign Minister of France, the Egyptian Foreign Minister and myself, in the presence of and, inùeed, under the roof the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose able and tactfui assistance has been of the greatest help to us aIl. , j 14. These discussions have been exploratory. It would be wrong to think of them as negotiations in the proper sense of the term, but 1 believe that a beginning has been made in the process of finding a basis for negotiation. 15. It would be wrong to delude ourselves by supposing that great strides forward have been made. The hard problems lie ahead and they dt:mand urgent solutions. But, though these exploratory conversations have not established a basis for negotiation, they have not been entirely negative, and we now have agreement, so 1 believe, on the basic requirements which any settlement of the Suez Canal question should meet. Thus we have established, so to speak, the framework within whieh a basis for negotiation can perhaps be constructed. ll 1l [ 1 Jl, 16. Those requirements--and they are set out in the draft resolution [S/3671] which has just been drculated-are as follows: "(a) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert-this covers both politieal and technical aspects; (b) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (c) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (d) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (e) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; (f) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egndan Government should be settled by arbitration, with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due". 1 1 li. 1 believe that there is agreement between us-I think, between aIl of us-upon these requirements, and the Council will note that they bear a marked similarity to those formulated in the eighteen-Power proposaIs. 19. It is also satisfactory that the Government of Egypt is prepared to accept that the manner of fixing the to11s and charges of the Canal should he decided by agreement between Egypt and the users. 20. So 1 think that these points of principle with regard to requirements do constitute, as l have said, a framework. But it is no good having principles or requirements, howevcr valid. however valuable, unless means for carrying them out are specified. 21. The means of implcmcntation suggestcd by the eighteen Powers represent at present the only system which has been precisely formulated and laid before us. \Vlll.:n the committee of five, led by the Prime Minister of Australia. put those proposaIs ta the Egyptian Government, thev made it clear that there was room for adjustment and that those moclalities were not presented as an ultimatum. and that they had been put forward as a basis for discussion. 22. 1 have explained that we are prepared to examine with expedition an}" other specifie proposaIs for a system designed to implement the requirements now agreed. We have had from the Egyptian sicle indications that t!ley perhaps have something of this sort in mind, but we have not yet anything sufficiently specific with regard ta means of implementation to serve as a basis for negotiation. It is my feeling that it is now for the Government of Egypt, if it still rejeets the system that we put forward, to show more clearly for its part how the basic requirements, which we all now recognize as legitimate, can be met by means as effective as the proposaIs of the eighteen Powers. 23. 1 think that another positive achievement of our discussions has been to establish general acceptance of the principle that the users of the Suez Canal are entitled ta associate together in order ta maintain and proteet the rights accorcled to the users in the 1888 Convention. The Suez Canal Users' Association is designed to protect the rights of a11 nations served by the ships of its members. In my statement of 5 October, 1 expressed the hope that, when the Egyptian Government reflected on this matter and saw what the association involved, co-operation would not be withheld, .and 1 hope that that is now a genera11y accepted proposition. 24. It was in the light of these developments that the President and I. he fn his capacity as Foreign Minister of France, decided to record in the draft resolution beiore us the progress that has been made in the past iew days under the auspices of this Council and to ask for the Council's formaI endorsement. 26. 1 do not think 1 need elaborate on these paragraphs of the draft resolution. 1 should, however, like to say something about the cOilcluding paragraph, to which we attach considerable importance. 1 think we have been indebted in this matter to the views expressed by the Foreign Minister of Belgium [737th meeting]. 1 hope we are aIl agreed that what have been called conservatory measures-or, to use the language of the Charter, provisional measures-are essential in order to ensure that subsequent negotiations towards a settlement, which may indeed take sorne time to achieve, will not in the meantime be prejudiced by any events or incidents which may occur. 1 think we must therefore see that there is a provisional regulation of the practical problems which arise in the operation of the Canal. 1 think that, whilst avoiding undue formality, we have to institute a modus vivendi pending the conclusions of an agreement for the definitive settlement of the régime of the Suez Canal on the basifJ of these six requirements. And this is the purpose of the final paragraph of our draft resolution. 27. 1 believe that by adopting this draft resolution the Council will he making a contribution towards further progress in the direction of a peaceful and just solution of the Suez problem in conformity with justice and the rule of law. As 1 said in my statement of 5 October, our purpose in bringing this situation before the Council \-vas precise1y ta open the way to the finding of a peaceful and just outcome of the present dangerous situation. That was and remains the purpose of the draft resolution submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 5 October [S/3666]. 28. In view of the later developments to which 1 have been referring, it is not the intention of the United Kingdom and French Governments to ask the Council at this time to consider this eartier draft resolution. In saying this, 1 want to make it quite clear that we do not imply that we have any doubts now regarding that draft or that we are abandoning it as no longer representing a correct formulation of our views. That draft resolution, in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, is still a correct expression of the situation, and the action which it proposes still represents one way-and indeed, we think, the best \Vay-by which a fair and just solution can be reached. We do not withdraw that draft resolution. However. we do not ask for a vote upon it at the present time. . 29. We think that it has been found possible to make sorne progress along another raad which will, 1 hope, lead to the same goal. We are prepared to explore that 5 33. li we wished to analyse the private conversations which have taken place in the past few days, we might divide them imo two parts: iirst, those dealing with the principles on the hasis of which a seulement of the Suez problem can be envisaged, and secondly, those dealing with the practical mcasures designed to put those principles into effect. 34. On the first part, that is to sayon the statement of the actual principles, we are satisfied with the results we have been able to obtaill, for the Egyptian Government has agreed to six principles which Mr. Lloyd has just stated and which correspond to what we consider to he law and international justice. 35. With regard to the application of these principles, on the other hand, we have Ilot reached such specific solutions. It would be wfang to say that our conversations on measures of application have been useless. We have exchanged many ideas; we have c1arified our respective points of view; but it is plain that we are still very far from seeing eye to eye on many points. 36. Accordingly, since we have been unable to agree upon the establishment of a coherent system which would give effect ta these principles and give the users -thisbeing our main conccrn-the sanie güâîâüLt:es âs were embodied in the eighteen-Fower proposaIs drawn up in London in August, the United Kingùom Government and the French Government still consider that those proposais are at present the only ones under which the principles we have agreed upon can be put into effect. It goes without saying, however, that if the Egyptian Government should put before us proposaIs which in our opinion give us-arr'l all the usersthe same guarantees as the solutions proposed by ~he eighteen Powers, there would be no question of our failing to study them. 37. In any event, we have not yet reachcd the stage where an agreement on proposaIs of this kind could he reached. Many more conversations will probably be necessary to enable us to explore the ground further, and it is essential that, pending the outcorne of such conversations, we should arrange to have sorne pro- 40. This is the spirit in which this new draft resolution has been presented. It in no way supersedes the original draft resolution, as Mr. Lloyd has rightly said. That drait remains in abeyance. What we are asking for the moment is that the Security Couneil should express it views on the draft resolution we have just submitted.

My Government's views on aIl the matters raised in the draft resolution submitted to the Council today by France and the United Kingdom [S/3671], and in the' statements to which we have just listened from the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom, are already weIl knOW'1 to the Couneil. My comments on the draft resolution and on the two statements will therefore be brief. 42. The first part of the draft resolution, in which six basic principles are outlined, coincides with what was presented by the Secretary-General ta the Couneil yesterdayand was generally accepted. This acceptance represents our position today, just as it did yesterday. 1 hope that the Security Couneil will adopt the first part of the joint draft resolution. 43. l should like, however, to present sorne c1arificati1ns, speeially as regards sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, and sorne other parts. 44. Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 is aimed at providing for what it caIls the insulation of the operation of the Canal from the politics of any country. It is my delegation's view that, ta begin with, this expression is rather unfortunate as weIl as misleading, and allows scope for various and contradictory interpretations. We believe that the real insulation of the Canal from politics wouldbest be guaranteed by a solemn and internationally binding commitment in the forro of a reaffirmation or a renewal of the 1888 Conyention-either of which, as we have already dec1ared, 15 acceptable to the Government of Egypt. 45. In this connexion, l am pleased to he able ta recall once more that, in my statement to the Security Couneil on 8 October [736th meeting] and on previous occasions, I expressed the wiliingness of the Government of Egypt to negotiate and to provide for: first, the establishment of a system of co-operation between the Egyptian authority operating the Suez Canal and 50. As to the second part of the draft resolution which begins with paragraph 2, 1 ~rust that the trend eXpressed in it will not end 'o.-y provin~ that the words spoken yesterday by PresideTil Eisenhower were not justified and by dashing to pieces the hopes of the 'people of the world for a just, eqUltable and wise solution of this question ~ r the Suez Canal. l trust that the Council will not adopt this part of the draft resolution. The world was indeed happy to share the gratificaûon of President Eisenhower yesterday when he ouened his televised conference by saying: 51. Ml'. ABDOH (Iran) (translated from French): During my de1egation's statement in the general debate on Monday, 80ctober [737th meeting], we stated that at the first stage of the Council's discussions it should encourage the establishment of close contact between the parties most directly concerned so that it might endeavour to find com1110n ground as a basis for agreement. vVe said that it was necessary to make an honest attempt to explore the possibilities of agreement, with a finTI will to succeed, and that the moral force of the United Nations should be placed at the service of calm and fruitful negotiation. 52, It is a great satisfaction to us to learn that this procedure has been followed in a propitious atmosphere, and that the conversations which have taken place in these conditions have led to agreement on the broad lines along which the negotiations for the final settlement of this important issue should be conducted. 53. My de1egation wishes to express its gratitude ta the Secretary-General who, mindful of the responsibilities conferred on him by the United Nations Charter, has made so valuable a contribution to the conversations which have been he1d, and which have proved frttitful and constructive. We also wish to commend the parties concerned on the sincere efforts they have made to arrive at the fundamental principles which should govern further negotiations for the final settlement of the question. Despite certain differences of view which have come to light today, we rejoice in the progress thus achieved, especially when we compare the favourable atmosphere now prevailing with the grave situation in which the Council first began its discussion of this question. 54. We are glad, therefore, to note that the parties represented at the conversations are in agreement on these six principles, and that it now remains for them to study the best means of putting them into effect. l do not think it should be very difficult to arrive at agre~ment on how to apply these established principles, prO':lded we see to it thatthe, negotiations between the p,ar!les most c10sely concernecI can take place in a slml1ar atmosphere. 55, First of all, therefore, the Council should take not~ of the progress achieved and the formulae on wlu.ch agreement has been reached, pending the opportnll1o/ which further negotiations will afford to work ont ln greater detail the means bv which the established princip,les are to be applied. lt ls reasonable to expeet that thlS atmosphere will be preserved, and that nothing "Corlsidas that the proposaIs of the eighteen Powers correspond to the requirements set out above and are suitably designed to bring about a settlement of the Suez Canal question by peaceful means, in coniormity with justice". 58. ~Iy deleg"dtion will be, of course, the last to oppose this paragraph, since Iran is one of the eighteen countries. \Ve wondered, however, whether it would not be advisable, in the interest of establishing equality between the parties to the negotiations, to refer to the same idea that has just been e.'Cpres!;d by the Secretary of State for Foreign At!airs of the United Kingdom. 59. We consider that this formula, as it is worded, could give the impression that the proposaIs of the eighteen States are the only ones which correspond to these requirements, whereas that does not conform to the actual intentions of the co-sponsors of the draft resolutions. We wonder whether it would not be possible to remedy this state of at!airs and whether this idea and this intention should not be expressed more explicitly. 60. My delegation is therefore prompted, at the present stage of the debate, to propose that the following phrase be added after the words "in conformity with justice" in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution: "while recognizing that other proposais, corresponding to the same requirements, might be submitted by the Egyptian Government"" 61. 'Vith the same desire to maintain the atmosphere of cordiality, which is essential if the future negotiations are to lead to positive results, my delegation ventures to suggest that paragraph 3, as it now stands, should be replaced hy the fol1owing paragraph: "Notes that the Egyptian Government has declared its readiness, in the exploratory conversations, to accept the principle of organized collaboration hetween the Egyptian Authority and the users". 62. We cannat be unaware that, incomplete though they may be, proposaIs exist even now concerning the application of the principles advanced, particularly if we consider the statement made yesterday by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General told us that there had even been sorne progress on this point. And 63. 1 now come to paragraph 4, at the end of which we tind the words: "guarantees to the users not less effective than those sought by the proposais 01 the eighteen Powers", 64. My delegation considers that this wording might give rise to difficulties, especially in the future; 1 am thinking in particular of the question whether any guarantees that Egypt might offer-and 1 am certain that it will offer them-can he mathematically equivalent to the guarantees already provided under the proposaIs of t1:e eighteen Powers. 1 wonder whether it would not be preferable simply to insert the ward "adequate" before the word "guarantees" in the paragraph. The expression "adequate guarantees" is unambig-l1ous and might satisfy the eighteen countries-including my own -which participated in the drafting of the proposaIs; 1 think that that is a more appropriate formula, a formula which may satisfy everybody, a formula which will not lead to controversy either today or in the future. 65. With regard to the last paragraph, 1 wonder whether we should not repeat the wording used by the sponsors in paragraph 5 of their tirst draft resolution [S/3666], name1y: "Recommends that the Government of Egypt should, pending the outcome of such negotiations, co-operate with the Suez Canal Users' Association." 66. My delegation feels that to enter into the details set out in the last paragraph-and we recognize that it is sometimes useful to do so-might tead us inta difficulties. We consider that it is possible to reach a compromise solution which will take into account the view§ of the United Kingdom Government and the opinion of the French Government without adoptir-g expressions which might give rise to controversy. 67. 1 have ventured, at this stage of the discussion, to offer these few, very simple suggestions. 1 hope that they will he acceptable to the United Kingdom and French delegations, and that we may soon he able to reach agreement on the principles which should underlie the draft resolution to he adopted by the Couneil. 68. Mr. SHEPILOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated jrom RllSsian): The Security Cauneil is assessing the results of the tirst phase of its discussion of the Suez question. These results are highly instructive. We hegan our work in a somewhat disturbing situation-in conditions when the path to a sound solution of the Suez problem was not being cleared of the various difficulties and obstacles, but was, on the contrary, being artificially blocked by them. Those difficulties and obstacles have not yet been removed but a trend towards an improvement in the situation has nevertheless become visible. 71. The past few days have shown that the convening of the Security Council has made possible the establishment of contact on the Suez question between the representatives of the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other. This is undoubtedly a positive achievement which must be accounted a success for the United Nations. As you know, from the time of the promulgation of the Act nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, name1y, for a period of more than two months, there has been no effective contact between the British and French side and Egypt. 72. We are gratified to find that, as a result of the exchange of views between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, France and Egypt, \Vith the active and fruitful participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1\1r. Hammarskjold, it has become possible to agree on a number of general principles to serve as the basis for working out specifie methods and devising appropriate machinery for the peaceful settlement of the Suez question. 73. A new draft resolution has been submitted to us tod:!)' by France and the United Kingdom. We should not underestimate the importance of the agreement reached on the general prindples. 1 have no doubt that the first part of the draft resolution submitted for our consideration, in which these general principles are set forth, will receive the unanimous suppurt of the Security Council. 74. It would, of course, be an over-simplification ta say that the difficulties in the \Vay of agreement have now been overcome. There will, obviously. be a good many difficulties yet; but the first part of the draft resolution is a good beginning, and it is a point of honour for the United Nations to consolidate this /irst suc~ess and ensure the further fruitful development of negotiations. 75. The Soviet Union considers that important prerequisites for an agreed settlement of the Suez problcm have been defined in the course of the preliminary negotiations. It is no longer pos~ihle to assert. as was done not long ago, that Egypt is unwillin~ to make any concessions in the interests of a constructive solution of the problem. It must in al! justire })f' acknowledged that Egypt is showing gomlwill with <1 vipw to ending the tension which has ari~en and s<'t!ling the Suez question. 76. The proceedings in the Security Cmtncil have clearly estahlished that Egypt ag-re"s : first. In . ',,, l'st',]llishment of a SYS' ë.,. of cnl1ahor:ltinn "l"f w('en the Egyptian authoritif'. "perating the Suez Cnr"l 'l"rI tlw 77. A number of other important points have also been established as the resuit of a reasonable compromise between the two parties, and have now been embodied in the agreed text of "six principles". 78. But it is not simply a matter of formulating general principles. In practice, Egypt is in faet guaranteeing ireedom of passage through the Suez Canai in accordance with the 1888 Convention. 79. Ali this gives us cause for optimism, for hoping for a successiul outcome of the negotiations on the Suez question, for the triumph of the principles of the United Nations. BO. 1 should like once again to stress that the first part of the draft resolution hefore us, which sets forth the six principles, represents the fruit fui result of the application of the method of negotiation. It is a statement of a reasonable compromise desirned to facilitate the attainment of agreement on the Suez question, and ta unite the Security Council on a common platfonn. The Soviet Union supports this part of the draft resolution. 81. Most unfortunately, however, and, 1 should like ta say, completely to the surprise of many members of the Security Council, there is a second part to this draft resolution which in no way stems from the conversations which have taken place or from the work done by the Security Council in recent days. 82. In their statements today, Mr. Uoyt:! and Mr. Pineau said that the first part of the draft resolution was a declaration of general principles and that the second part represented the practical application of those principles. We are quite unable to accept such an interpretation of the second part of the draft. 83. The principal idea of this part is that the basis of subsequent conversations must be the so-called eighteeen-Power proposaIs. It is perfectly c1ear that the first part of the draft resolution, fonnulating the six agreed principles which are intended to be the point of departure for subsequent negotiations, is incompatible with the second part. Far from being the outcome of the preliminary negotiations and far from reflecting any degree of agreement, this second part of the draft resolution reproduces entirely unchanged a set of words on \...hich ïadical disagreement has been evinced between the parties. The only difference is that now it is proposed that the so-called eighteen- Power proposais, which had served as a basis for the Menzies mission. should be imposed on Egypt in the name of the Security Council. 84. The truth is that the eighteen-Power proposais are based on the principle that Egypt should be deprived of its right to operate the Suez Canal, and accordingly set at naught the sovereignty of the Egyptian State. Furthermore, those proposais provide for a plan for the so-called internationalization of the Canal, that is to say, the establishment of some sort of international organ to operate the Canai. This means, in effect, that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...u 87. Nowa few words about the so-caUed Suez Canal Users' Association, which is referred to in the final paragraph of the draft resolution. 88. The Soviet Union bas never rejected the idea that the views and wishes of Canal users should be given organized expression or that specific relations between them and the Egyptian Canal authorities should he established. Since the Egyptian Governm~nt has dealings with Canal users, it is perhaps necessary that users' interests should be given sorne organized expression. But this matter caUs for special study and for international agreement arnong an the interested States. 89. But the "association" to which the draft resolution refers-whether established or in the process of establishment--does not meet these requirements; more particularly, it is far from being a representative expression of the interests of all Canal users. It consists of a restricted group of States which are not justified in speaking for all users of the Canal. 90. In the form in which it bas been conceived, the association represents a violation of the 1888 Convention. The Convention in fact proclaimed the principle of free navigation through the Suez Canal for aIl States. But in the present instance a small group of States is laying daim to particular functions which, in the form in which they have been announced, are in sorne measure those of the administration of the Canal. But this is a matter for special discussion and special agreement. 91. Nevertheless, the last paragraph of the draft .resolution proposes, not simply tbat the Seeurity Council should sanction the so-eaUed Suez Canal Users' Association: it does something more; it proposes that the countries which are members of this association should pay to it the dues for transit through the Canal, and that the Egyptian authorities should cooperate with the association. This goes a good deal further even than the eighteen-Power proposaIs. It 93. It is utterly incomprehensible that a proposaI should be made that the Security Couneil, which can have 110 views on these matters-for the association 50 far is hardly more than an idea-shou!d lay down a definite procedure for the payment of toUs. This paragraph in fact requires the Security Council to direct that the dues for the passage of ships through the Canal should he paid to the association, and not to the Egyptian administration. In other words, if Italy, for example, is now paying toUs to the Egyptian Government, the draft resolu~ion-and if the draft is adopted it will become an outright directive-wiU require Italy in the name of the Secm'ity Council, to pay toUs not to Egypt but to the association. Several other Governments will be in the same position. 94. But is this the Security Council's province? 15 such a proposa} really designed to settle outstanding problems which still require special consideration and the elaboration of a definite, reasonable system which would take due account of the interests of a sovereign Egypt and the interests of the CariaI users? 95. What IS the explanation for this attempt to imluce the Security Coundl to take such an unjustified decision? As 1 understand it, the explanation is that it is necessary to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the Suez Canal and to safeguard the interests of the users. But this explanation is not at aU convincing. 96. In the first place, no one can dispute the undeniable fact that the operation of the Suez Canal is continuing without interruption and that a record number of ships are passing through it. If this has been the case for two and half months, at a time when , relations between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other have been somewhat strained in the Suez Canal zone, why must we assume that now, when the stage of negotiation has been reached and the general situation has taken a tum for the better, extraordinary and special measures are caUed for? 97. In the second place, the Suez question has now become the concern Qf the United Nations. Is not this fact, together with the continuation of the negotiations initiated on the Suez question, a genuine safeguard obviating the need to apply any extraordinary measures to which O;le of the parties has justified objections? 98. In these circumstances, is it not clear that for the Security Council to endorse the proposed paragraph of the draft resolution and the measures recommended in it, even on a provisional basis, would not mere1y fail to lessen tension, to stabilize the situation and to settle the Suez problem, but might, on the contrary, make the situation more acute? 99. For the reasons 1 have stated 1 am unable, as representative of the Soviet Union, to support the