S/PV.743 Security Council

1 wish first of aIl to express my grati.fication at the large measure of progress that has been made during this week of Security Council activity. The Suez CanaI problem is one of vast importance and great complexity, and it easily arouses great emotion. It is a tribute to this Council, and above aIl to the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom and to our Secretary-General, that the problem has a points avec ~een considered here calmly and constructively and that Important agreements have emerged. 2. We cannot expect a solution aIl at once; a solution c?mes only by stages. And by agreeing upon the prin- ~lples, the requirements of a definitive settlement,. an Important stage has been passed. We can enter mto this next stage with confidence. The principles here agreed upon are realistic and concrete. They will permit the future proposaIs and conduct of the parties con- 7. 1 think that that is an accurate and indeed a conservative statement. Those proposais emerged last August out 01 a week of intensive study. 1 should like to read 1:0 you the names of the eighteen countries: AustraIia, Denmark, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 8. This 'Louncil can, 1 think, confidently assume that proposais having this broad sponsorshtp, which incIndes countries whose nationals represent over 90 per cent of the shipping through the Canal, countries whose pattern of traffic shows the greatest dependence on the Canal, and countïÏes widely separated by geography and culture, must he reasonable. 9. Of course, the draft resolution does not suggest that the proposais of the eighteen are the only proposaIs which could comply with the principles upon which we have agreed. No one has contended that. 10. In my opening statement 1 said that there existed, of course, a great wtriety of means whereby the basic principles stated by .'he eighteen could be carried out, and 1 went on to say: uI believe that this Cound1 ought not to dose its mind ~o . . . alternative ::iuggestions" [738th meeting, para. C:3]. 1 think this viewpoint is cIearly reflected by the language of the draft resolution, which, while pointing out the a...:-optability of the proposaI of the eighteen, goes on ta invite the Egyptian Government ta submit al~ernative proposaIs which would equally accomplish the desired result. 11. The draft resolution as it now stands, when read as a whole, makes it quite cIear that alternative proposaIs submitted by Egypt, which would aIso meet these requirements, would be equally acceptable. We are, 1 am sure, aIl glad to have heard the declaration made earlier today [742nà meeting] by the Foreign 12. The last paragraph of the draft resolution dea1s 1 with provisional measures. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has suggested [742nd meeting] that, because thi5 matter is hefore the Council, no provisiona1 or interim measures are required. That 1 think 1s hard1y logica1. Our Charter itself contemplates that provisional measures may be called for by the Council in relation to matters that are before it. In other words, the Charte~ makes it quite clear that, simply because a case is l'ending before the Council, this does not exc1ude the need for interim arrangements. 13. The Soviet Foreign Minister has suggested that the interim arrangements contemplated would involve the exercise by the Suez Canal Users Association of administrative powers in Egypt. That is not the case. W~lat is contemplated is practical co-operation at the .vorking level bctween the users aJ1d competent Egyptian authorities. 14. It has also been suggested that the draft resolution would substitute the Suez Canal Users Association for the Egyptian authorities in the collection of dues. That again is not the case. What is said is that the association is in fad, as organized, qualified to act in respect of dues payable by ~;hir' belonging to its members. Whether these ships decide to pay to the a~sociation as their agent is for them and for their Governments to decide. Neither this Council, nor the association itself, attempts any compulsory régime. Since, however, the association already has a membership representing approximately 90 per cent of the shipping, it can be a useful instrument for practical co-operation at the operating level while a definitive solution is being worked out. J ï 1, lt 15. There is nothing in the draft resolution which should be in the slightest âegree offensive to Egypt or which is derogatory of Egypt or Egyptian sovereignty. As we read it, it represents an honest attempt to advance our pursuit of peace and justice through the next stage. We attach particular importance to the invitation to the Governments of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom to continue Loeir interchanges. Wh&t has so far developed out of these interchanges, held in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, has already yielded important positive results. We believe that it is a procedure tn he pursued. 16. For the reasons given, the United States intends to vote for the draft resolution as submitted by France and the United Kingdom.

The general views of my delegation on the present item on the agenda were stated by me at the meeting of the Council on Monday aftemoon, 80ctober [737th meeting]. 1 find it unnecessary to repeat or to revise any part of my earlier statement. In the brief submission which 1 am making 1 intend to confine myse1f exclusive1y to the new draft ~aypt, France and the United Kiugdom and the Secretary-General for their success in securing agreement. Although the Foreign Minister of Egypt has some reservation in regard to the language of the third requireme..·lt, 1 note that the language used in the draft resolution is that proposed by the Secretary-General; and 1 note further that, in spite of this slight reservatian, the Foreign Minister of Egypt has recommended that the Council should adopt that part of the draft resolution. My de1egation will certainly vote for its adoption. 19. The second part of the joint drait resolution has been rejected, if 1 understand correct1y, by the representative of Egypt. 1 regret this outright rejection. 1 had hoped that he might suggest specifie amendments. 20. My de1egation finds the second part of the draft •èsolution important, useful and, on the whole, acceptable. 21. The amendments suggested by the representative of Iran [742nd meeting] are, in the jud,gement of my delegation, an improvement on the original. There is only one minor point to which 1 should like to call the attention of the representative of Iran. In paragraph 4, he suggests the addition of the ward "adequate" before the ward "guarantees", and then the de1etion of all the words following the word "guarar.tees". It seems to me that the phrase "ta the users" should he retained. 22. Aside fmm this minor point, my delegation supports aU the amendments suggested by the representative of Iran. 1 do not think 1 need explain our support of these amendments, because Ml". Abdoh stated the reasons better than 1 could hope ta do. 1 appeal, therefore, ta the co-sponsors of the draft resolution ta accer: the amendments suggested by the representative of Iran. 23. 1 find nothing in the draft resolution, either in the first part or in the second part, which is inconsistent with respect for the sovereignty of Egypt.

1 should like ta outline briefly my delegation's position with regard ta the draft resolution which was submitted ta us this aftemoon by France and the United Kingdom [S/3671]. 25. We should have eamestly wished ta have presented to us a draft whïch was acceptable ta all members of the Security Councii. "vVe do not believe, however, that the dmft submitted to us corresponds ta this wisb and this need. The tirsi. part contains the general principles on which we have aU agreed. The second 'part, on the other hand, contains points which do not stem from what we thought had been accepted; tms part is based on the proposaIs of the eighteen States which, as 1 said in the course of my first statement [738th meeti/~g] in the general discussion, have already shown themselves to offer no basis for agreement. J 30. The continuation of the negotiations with a vlew to putting these principles inte effect is, as l have a1ready said, desirable, possible and necessary. Our <iraft resolution therefore provides for the continuation of these negotiations with, if it is deemed necessary, the valuable assistance of our Secretary-General. 31. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): l ask the Council's indulgence for intervening again, but l must confess that l am a little surprised at some of the things which have bêen said in our debate, and particularly, if l may say so, dllring the intervention of the representative ef the Soviet Union. 32. We, the members of the Security Council, and many other countries affected, are faced with a grave intemational situation. The United Kingdom and France believe that there has been a breach of an inter- national obligation, and exactly what we trunk about that is set out in the preamble of our original draft resolution [S/3666]. But we are not insisting that the terms of that preamble should be inc1uded in our second draft resolution [S/367l]. J ! 33. We maintain that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom have acted with great restraint in this situation. In my speech of 5 October [735th meet-ingl, l quoted what the Secretary of State of the 1 United States had said about that matter; l will not weary the Council by repeating it. But we, the Gov- ernments of France and the United Kingdom, took the - initiative in informing the Security Council about the situation. Vve took the initiative in cûming heïe to the Seclliity Council to discuss it. We took the initiative , in suggesting private meetings. We took the in;tiative in s1.lggesting private conversations in the presence of the Secretary-Genera1. There has ,been an idea put 34. Our draft resolution, 1 maintain, is temperate and c:onciliatory. We are not demanding decisions from the Security Council on any of the matters affected. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union referred to paragraph 2 of our draft resolution and suggested that it was coercion of Egypt. AlI we have stated there, in very modente ierms, is that we believe that proposaIs which are weIl known to the members are suitably designed tO bring about a settlement by peaceful means in conformity w:ith justice. 1 think that is an extremely moderate statement about proposaIs vrhich we still believe are the best way to effect a settlement. 35. However, in order to t"'" -" the matter c1ear he- yond any doubt, 1 myselfi<-> 1"" ••ti.red tl) accept the amendment put forwaI d hy the representa1:ive of Iran [742nd meeting, para. 60] which wculd add to that paragraph th~ words "while recognizing that other proposaIs, corresponding to the same requirements, might be submitted by the Egyptian Government". 1 think, if 1 may say so, that that is a helpful amendment, and l would willingly accept it in order to make the matter absolutely clear. There is no coercion at all about that paragraph. 36. But we believe that at the moment the interna- tional community is suffering from a wrcng, from a course Of action which-and 1 do not want to come inta undue controversy-was embarked upon without notice, without negotiation, as a unilateral act. And we believe, as 1 say-I do not want to be too con- troversial, because that is quite contrary to the spirit in which we have introduced this draft resolution-that Egypt is in breach, and we can real1y accept the con- tinuation of that situation during discussions cnly if there is a genuine attempt to establish, ad interim, a system of co-operation between the users and the competent Egyptian authorities. 37. We have not sought to define in precise terms what that system of co-operation should be. 1 think it would have been unwise to try to define it. 1 think there may have been genet:ated during these discussions an atmosphere which would make it possible, ad interim, for such a system of co-operation to come into being. But that, 1 think, is reaIly the very least which we can ask. 38. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union talked during his speech about the Suez Canal Users Asso- ciation, and he suggested that it was seeking to act in violation of the Convention of 1888. May 1 just remind . the Security Council of the purposes which it was agreed that that association should have: "First, to facilitate any steps which may lead to a final or provisional solution of the Suez Canal prob- lem and to assist the members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Suez Canal in consonance with 39. sociation, violation liter soire 40. seil gences - - nous pourrions progresser de membres d'G.ctopter compte et règlement je que faire projet 41. Ayant affaire reprendre 1 dD not see anything very provocative about that. "Thirdly, to extend hs facilities to vessels of non- member nations which desire to use them." That, l think, is the least that could be done. "Fourthly, to reœive, hold and disburse the reve- nues accruing from dues and other sums which any u~er of the Canal may pay to [the Suez Canal Users Association], without prejudice to existing rights, pending a final settlement." 1\ 1 l, There is no cotrcion or compulsion about that. "Fiftl-Jy, to consider and report to memhers re- gardirg any significant cievelopment affecting the use or non-use of the Canal." That, l should have thought, was cIearly within the compf:tence of any one user or any body of users. "Sixthly, to assist in dealing with any practical problems arising from the failure of the Suez Canal adequately to serve its customary and intended pur- pose and to study forthwith means that may render it feasible to reduce dependence on the CanaL" i That, l shouId have thought again, was an elementary matter weIl within the competence of any individual user or any boriy of users. And fimlly: l "Seventhly, to facilitate the execution of any pr,:,- A visional solution of the Suez probIem that may be Il adopted by the United Nations." 39. So l should have thov.ght that the purposes of the association, so far from being provocative or in breach of international law, are directIy designed te assist the evolution of cither provisional or final settlements. ] 40. Really, what we are ash.-ing the Security Council • to vote upon is first of aIl the requirements-there seems , to he general agreement about them-and secondly our 1 ideas as to how we may move towards sorne agreed lTeans of implementing those requirements. l do most e.rncstly ask the members to accept our draft reso- Iution in its entirety, subject to the amendmen~ which l have said l wiII accept, and to accept it as a genuine contribution towards a peaceful settlement. l reaIly believe, and l say this with aU the emphasis which l \ can command, that the best contribution the Security l Council can make to a reduction in the tenseness of this situation is to vote our drait resolution as we have . put it forward. " i 41. Mr. WALKER (AustraIia): Having already made cIear AustraLia's p<-ition on this matter [737th meeting], l had not 'i.l--.)tl .nt it would he necessary for me to enter into the debate at this particular stage, but time, there mus.t ~e in madny .count~ies t~roughout .thel world people busl1y consi enng this senous practica prohlem-whether in their future economic plans, whether on behalf of business enterprises or of gov- ernments, they should build on the assumption of con- tinued use of the Suez Canal in the way that they have used it in the pasto There must be many people counting the cost of alternative plans involving to a varying degree lesser dependence upon the Canal in the future. With that sort of concern in the back of their minds, they will scrutinize very carefully the content of what~ver is achieved by the Security Council on this occaSIOn. 47. The essential question 1S whether we are moving towards a situation in which people can continue to have confidence as regards the future of the Canal in their own individual planning of their affairs. From that point of view l am sure that many of us feel as l do-that while these principles do represent a great achievement, they only carry u;; a certain way, and we come now ta the very crucial stage of working out arrangements that are going to give us all the assurances " ,~~,we must have re~rdiug ili". future. 50. It has been shown that there is no irreconcilable difference of principle in this matter. 1 also helieve that there is a very great community of interest between the users and Egypt. And 1 trust very much that that community of interest will be increasingly revealed in the further discussions that are needed. But those dis- cussions should have sorne guide, and the Australian <i~legation feels that the terms of the draft resolution l_ ;fore us could be a very useful guide. V.,re therefore grec.t1y hope that the Council will adopt that draft resùlution. 51. Mr. ~ AAK (Belgium) (translated fram French) : 1 hardly think that 1 can contribute anything new at the present stage of the discussion, but 1 believe that, be- lOre the vote, each must make his position clear. That is why 1 wish to explain the reasons underlying my vote on the draft resolution whi~h France and the United Kingdom have now submitted to the Council [5/3671]. 52. 1 must admit to sorne regret that certain repre- sentatives have said that they could not vote for the second part of this draft resolution because it contained a reference to the position previously taken by those called "the eighteen", and that they could not vote for it or recommend its adoption because it referred specifically to provisional measures. 53. In this connexion, 1 regret the uncGmpromising attitude adopted by the delegation of one country, be- cause it precludes or renders nugatory any effort on our part to produce an improved text. 1 do not consi~~r it would he right to delete from this draft resolution everything relating to the previous position of the eighteen Powers, nor do 1 feel that it would he wise to deIete any reference to provisional clauses. 54. 1 think that it would not be right to delete from the draft resolution everything relating to the position of the eighteen Powers, because we must recognize that, despite the progress achieved-wllich, 1 believe, is real, and, like ail my colleagues, 1 find this gratify- ing-it must he acknowledged that no precise, complete, definitive, unambiguous system has heen proposed which can, at the present time, be considered by the eighteen Powers as a substitute for the system which they had worked out in an effort to solve the Suez problem. 55. Accordingly, the text proposed in the joint draft resolution, amended again by the representative of Iran-an amendment accepted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom--,is really 57. But it seems to me unjust, at this stage of the debate, to make the vote contingent on the stipulation, as an essential condition, that :my reference to previous action by the eighteen Powers should be removed. It seems to me that the two ensuing paragraphs of the draft resolution are simply a statement of facts. 1 would, of course, like the representative of Iran, have preferred a positive rather than a negative statement. 1 think we could note in positive terms that the Egyptian rep- resentative has declared himself ready to explore the principle of organized collaboration between an Egyp- tian authority and the users. 1 believe, in fact, from what I have heard about the conversations which took place in the office of the Secretary-General, that not only \Vas the principle accepted by the Egyptian repre- sentative, but that a first effort at elaboration was made. 58. But \vould anyone here dare ta suggest that the proposaIs were su!ficïently precise or compiete to pem;it us seriously to dlscuss them or to d~lare them. ~a?s­ factory? Of course not. 1 am not makmg an~ cnUelsm in this respect. This is probably the way thmgs must go; perhaps we must he content with taking on~ step at a time and not expect to be able to do everythmg at once. But 1 think that when the joint draft resolution notes that there is agreement on the principle and th~t the Egyptian representative has given his assent ta 11, but that the proposaIs have not yet been for~ulated sufficiently precisely ta permit any real appraIsal of the system proposed, this is a true reflection of th~ facts. It is a reflection of facts which cannot cause distress to anyone. We must not refuse to look the facts squarely in the face. 59. What does the draft resolution do aiter noting this acceptance of the principle and this lack. o~ suffi- cient precision? \\That does it propose? Does 1t m any way condemn the Egyptian Government? Dees it turn away from it? Not in the least. Tt invites it to complete its work, ta submit, as saon as possible, full proposaIs . which will enable us to form an opinion on its system. 15 there anything excessive in that? It is, it seems to me, the correct line ta take. Since the system proposed today is incomplete, we are inviting the Egyptian Gov- ernment ta provide fuller information sa that we may obtain a clear picture of it and may discuss it with a .f~~~"looge of th~~cts . "__._ 61. There remains the final question to wh.ich, as the rremhers know, 1 attach very great importance. 1 said just now that it was not right to wish to remove from the draft resolution every reterei:~e to the position of the eighteen Powers. 1 say, and 1 say it emphatica.11y, far it is my profound conviction, that it would he unwise for the Security Council to disperse without expressing its views on what 1 shaH caB, not con- servatory, but provisional, measures. + 62. As the representative of the United States has clearly shown, when we speak of provisional measures we ar~ conforming to and not v-iolating the Charter. And those who drafted the Charter fully realized-it 1S, indeed, a matter of common sense---that in certain cir- cumstances, when it is difficult to reach a final solu- tion, and in the present instance events have clearly shawn that a final solution is hard t" Gnd-the wise thing to do is not to leave things in the air but to agree upan a certain number of provisional measures which, in the minds of those who adopt them, should have the purpose and the effect of preventing the occurrence af incidents and the deteriaration of the situation. 63. AlI this. is very well put in Article 40 of the Charter, of which 1 shaH read only one sentence: "... Such provisional measures shall be without preju- dice to the rights, daims, or position of the parties cancerncd." 64. Who can reasonably oppose the application of such a provision? How is it possible, in such a de1icate and serious situation, where unintended incidents may break out at any moment and embroil the parties in measures far exc~eding their real wishes, not to feel the absolute necessity of applying this same Article 40 and adopting by cornmon accord such provisional meas- ures, "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or posi- tion of the parties concerned"? 65. The joint draft resolution effers us a formula for the provisional measures to be adopted. 1 am well aware that the chapter of the Charter which relates to the type of questicn we are now considering does not spe- cifically mention these provisional measures; but it is clear, to me at any rate, that there is no legal problem about applying this principle from Chapter VII to the matters referred to in Chapter VI. 66. Is the way in which the French and British have formulated thes\:: provisional measures a source of dis- satisfaction? Does it involve any encroachment upon Egypt's interests? Does it prejudge a final solution? Tt does not. What limits does it observe? Ir invites che Egyptian Government to co-operate with the Suez Lee'na! Users Association in a system which will not he 11 68. As it stands, the draft resolution proposed by France and the United Kingdom appears ta those familiar with the case ta be a wise and moderate meas- ure. As explained by Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Pineau and Mr. Dulles, it genuinely appears ta be a sincere effort, a rea1 step towards understanding; but if it was bereft bath of a just allusion ta the position of the eighteen Powers and of references ta the wise and necessary measures which must be adopted with regard to a provisional system, then unquestionably this text would be incomplete, and we should by that token have failed ta do all our duty. 69. For that reason, l sb:;.ll vote for the draft reso- lution as submitted and amended. 70. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated trom Spanish) : My turn ta speak has come so late that l am compel!ed ta compress what l have ta say. l should like to hegin by expressing the great satisfaction of my delegation, which issued a cordial invitation ta the Foreign Ministers ta take part in meetings at the United Nations, that such meetings have taken place. 71. l should next like ta say that the result of these conversations has also been' highly satisfactory. The six principles set out in paragraph 1 of the draft reso- lution submitted by France and the United Kingdom [S/3671J, principles which we shall approve unani- mously, contain, l bdkve, a felicitous restatement and clarification of the essential principles of the 1888 Con- vention. For two of these principles, the first and the third, state clear!y and specifical1y that transit through the Canal shaH be open and without discrimination either political or technical-a renewed declaration of the so-called neutrality of the Canal, which has re- mained open ta aIl ships without distinction of flag and even if they are ships of belligerents. 72. But these conversations did not merely result in a clarification of or, we might say, in laying the nec- 73. Then, in addition to tbis darification-which, in my view, and 1 think in the view of public opinion in general, is of overriding importance, satisfying, as it does, the technical and political requirements postulated by the principle of universality laid down in the 1888 Convention-the principles agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers contain something wbich we might say marks an advance upon the 1888 Convention. For the 1888 Convention left aside the matter of the operation of the Canal; it confirmed the situation established by the + firman wbich granted the Suez Canal concession, and it was then left to the Company to determine rights, toUs and charges. 74. The agreed principles state categorically that the' manner of fixing to11s and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users. Thus if tomorrow we arrive, as we hope to do, at a settlement, and manage to eSbblish a new régime for the Suez Canal, it will be possible to daim that the application of tbis article creates for the Suez Canal, for Egypt and for the users, a sy~tem superior to that bitherto in operation. 75. This is something which .must afford great satis- faction to those of us who believe that the United Nations must always use peaceful means and, above all, those means wbich are arrived at by the impartial judgement of a conciliator, an arbitrator or a tribunal. Ïn case of disputes-to quote the last principle-"ul1re- solved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbi- tration, with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to he due." 76. 1 do not tbink it is over-optimistic ta say that we have taken a great step forward. The area of shadow or half-shadow beyond this area of light may, it is true, be wide, but for the time being 1 shall linger in tbis area of light, tbis constructive area wbich has earned aIl my praise, as in a11 sincerity 1 say to the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, the United Kingdom and France, and to the Secretary-General. 77. We now know that the first part of the draft reso- lution will be adopted unanimously. l should have pre- ferred this unanimity to have applied to the whole draft, but unfortunately this will not be the case. 1 respect, of course, each individual view, but in answer to this individual view 1 may state, with equal sincerity, my own view. 7S. ln the second part of the draft resolution it ",. J inevitable that mention should be made :-f the prOcess of negotiation. The Peruvian delegation has avoided uttering any reproach, any word which might strike a disagreeable note. But we may make an objective review of the facts; and the fact is that the eighteen Powers, as they are ca11ed, made certain proposals. We must take note of this fact, for we should be guilty of an injustice if we did not mention in our resolution l believe that, rather than refer to the principle of the Convention of 1888, it is better to be precise and to say: "the Canal shaH be insulated from the influence of al1 politics", and: "the Canal must be technica1ly efficient and politically neutral, politically impartial". The Canal must he used Iike a sacred thing, in the interest of mankind; this principle then corresponds entirely to the principle which we considered in the bases of agree- ment accepted by the Foreign Ministers. The relevant principle in the eighteen-Power proposaIs is worded in almost exactly the same way: "insulation of the opera- tion of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation". 84. In other words, the Foreign Ministers have in fact approved the actual text of the eighteen-Power 'prop=ls. Thus 1 tbiuk thatthe objectiou to a relereuce 14 81. When we affirm that the proposaIs of the eighteen States: "correspond to the requirements set out above and are suitably designed to bring about a settlement of the Suez Canal question by peaceful means in con- fornlity \Vith justice", we are saying something which is not an exaggeration, nor does it imply any special sympathy for either party. 82. For what, in reality, do these proposaIs say? They begin hy affirming the sovereign rights of Egypt. l think that the words "sovereign rights of Egypt", used in the eighteen-Power proposaIs [5/3665], are more emphatÎc than the simple expression "the sovereignty of Egypt". Why? Because the rights of sovereignty are linked with the attribute of sovereignty, so that l find respect for the sovereignty of Egypt in the eighteen- Power proposaIs formulated in the same way as, but even more emphatica1ly than, in the proposals which Egypt and the representative of the Soviet Union have accepted. 83. Another of the eighteen-Power proposaIs speaks of: "Efficient and dependable operation, maintenance and development of the Canal as a free, open and secure international waterway in accordance with the principles of the Convention of 1888." 85. With regard to paragraph 3, it is true that the Egyptian Government, "while dec1aring its readiness in the exploratory conversations to accept the principle of organized collaboration bêtween an Egyptian au- thority ann the users, has not yet formulated sufficiently precise proposaIs". Nevertheless, the Peruvian de1e- gation would have preferred merely to state that we hoped that the Egyptian representative would complete rus proposals. But I do not wish to labour this point, for in reality it is covered by the first Iranian amendment. 86. We find next, in the draft resolution, an invitation to the parties to continue negotiations with a view to establishing a system which will meet the requirements expressed in the principles, providing the users with guarantees no less effective than those embodied in the proposaIs of the eighteen Powers. The whole of this paragraph must he viewed in the light of the Iranian amendment, which is aIl amendment of great impor- tance, for it not only gives a meaning to the specific point to which it applies, but it also places any pro- posaIs which Egypt may make on an equal footing with those of the eighteen Powers. 87. And l come finally to what has heen called the question of provisional measures. l am going to be very brief, because this matter has been dealt with in a masterly fashion by the Belgian representative. l am gratified that he accepts t11e interpretation which I gave at another time: it is c1ear that although, strictly speaking, before provisional me1.sures can he taken, the Council must first determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it is obvious that, by analogy, provisional measures may also 'he taken under Chapter VI. They are not specifical1y provided for in Chapter VI, but, in empowering the Security Council in Articles 34, 36 and 37 of this chapter ex officio to investigate any situation which is likely to endanger peace and, more particularly, in empowering it under Article 37 to ree- ommend "tenns of settlement", the Charter did not excluàe provisional measures from those term~' of settle- ment, precisely so that such measures could be put into effect. There is a legal axiom according to whkh principles which are not directly relevant mayhe applied to similar cases by analogy. lr 93. 1 am to sorne extent impressed by the argument that we are not as yet in a position to take legal cog- nizance of the existence of the Suez Canal Users Asso- ciation. 1 accordingly venture to say-without of course making it an amendment-that 1 should have preferred the general tenu "users", since the Egyptian Govern- ment could be considered as co-operating with the users either individually-the 10 per cent that have been mentioned, which are outside the association-or collec- tively, that is, the 90 per cent. 94. But these are small details which are not going to prevent me from, or give me serious qualms about, voting for the draft resolution. 1 shall give it my vote; and, a'rter this study, 1 shall do so in full awareness of the interpretation that, as Mr. Lloyd so weIl expressed it, it does not represent any insinuation, any moral coercion, any principle of compulsion or pressure, but the expression of a desire, the free formulation of proposaIs which Egypt is fully at liberty to counter with its own and, at the same time, the statement of measures which are a guarantee to Egypt of respect for its sovereignty and a guarantee to mankind of the free use of the Canal. 95. Mr. SHE T _LOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- puhlics) (transi. ,d from Russian) : 1 do not intend to 97. The second part of the draft resolution is entirely different. This is not a result of the conversations. It is something which had already been rejected by the Egyptian Government at an earlier stage in the deve1- opment of the Suez question. That is why this part of the draft resolution also failed to receive the support of and drew serious objections from, Egypt, the Soviet Ucion and Yugoslavia here today. The representatives of sorne other States have made reservations or pro- posed amendments with respect to this part of the draft. J,. 98. 1 wonder whether, in these circumstances, it is necessary to complicate our proceedings and demon- strate the lack of tmanimity in the Security Couneil. The world at large expects much of the Security Council, and we should be strengthening its hopes by adopting unanimously a draft resolution which would provide a sound basis for further negotiations. 99. In this connexion 1 should like to refer to the positive aspects of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Yugoslavia [S/3672]. 100. The first part of this draft reproduces in its entirety the text of that part of the joint draft resolution which sets forth the six principles agreed on. In addi- tion, the Yugoslav draft rec0mmends that negotiations should be continued, requests the Secretary-General to offer, if necessary, his assistance in subsequent stages of negotiations, and, finally, cai!s on all the parties con- cerned to refrain from taking any measures which might impair these negotiations. 101. Tt seems to me that we could adopt this draft resolution unanimously. Assuming, of course, that the representatives of France and the United Kingdom found it possible not to press the second part of their draft resolution, which is controversial, we could, by adopting the Yugoslav draft resolution, demonstrate our unanimity and our desire not to compli.:ate the forthcoming negotiations by taking positions which should be discussed later, and demonstrate our com- mon resolve to lend our sincere assistance in the settle- ment of the Suez problem.

We have before us two draft resolutions. 103. The first i:; that proposed by France and the United Kingdom [S/3671]. An amendment to it has been submitted by the representative of Iran [742nd meeting, para. 60] and accepted by the United Kingdom representative, and the representative of France is also prepared to accept il. With the agreement of the two sponsors, this amendment will accordingly be incorporated in the draft resolution. 104. If 1 have rightly interpreted the statements which have been made, the draft resolution should be put , r

1 regret that it has not been possible for the Council to agree on more than the principles, the requirements, of a settlement; but that already is much. 1 think, of course, that it is understood that the Council remains seized of this matter and that the Secretary-General may continue to encourage interchanges between the (