S/PV.744 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
6
Speeches
4
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Syrian conflict and attacks
General statements and positions
War and military aggression
Security Council deliberations
Peace processes and negotiations
ELEVENTH YEAR
ONZIÈME ANNÉE
NEW YORK
Symbols of II'Iited NatiollJ documents ;{"ith figUTl'J. 1\1/,,,tiOlI of Hlch a fymbol dOCUTTlI"nf.
LeJ cafes dl's docrwwnts de l'Organisation dl' lettTes maju.\cull'J et de chiffres. La sitJnifie qu'il s'agit d'un document de l'Organisation.
A few Jays ago, on attending the Council for the first time, the new representative of France was welcomed by the then President, the representative of Cuba. Today, in taking over the duties of the presidency in his turn, the representative of France is happy to greet all the members of the Council, collectively and individually, and to assure them of his entire devotion to his task.
J. représentant au étaient sentant charge heureux les dévouement
Adoption of the agenda The Palestine question (a) Letter dated 15 October 1956 nom the representa- live of Jordan addressed to the President of the Seenrity Council (8/3678). (b) Letter dated 17 October 1956 {rom the representa- live of Israel addressed to the President ofthe Secu- rity Council, with oomplaini: concerning : Pei'8istent v!olatiollil by Jordan of the General Armistice Agreement ano of the cease-fire p!edge made to the Secretary-General on 26 April 1956 (S/3682). agai~st its territory, Oit would have to reserve a perma- nent seat in the Council. 3. The delay in Jordan's coming before the Security Council has brought up the general question: why is my delegation so late? Why did it not come to the Se- cunty Council at the time of the first Israel attack more ihan a month ago, or at the time of the st'cond, the third, or the fourth? In answer to that big question, these are the reasons. 4. First, the Security Council has been preoccupied with the problem of the Suez Canal, a major problem which concerns aH the Arab States. The Jordan delegation did not wish to interrupt the debate and the negotiations on that problem. It preferred not to add to the respon- sibilities of the Security Council, which was directing its attention towards finding a peaceful settlement of that question. This attitude on the part of Jordan was, if 1 may say so, in conformity with the views of certain membërs of this Council. . 5. Seconàly, there was same doubt in certain of the quarters concerned that the aggressive actions of Israel genuinely represented an aggressive policy on the part of its Government. The delegation of Jordan wanted to eradicate that doubt by proving to those quarters that the continuity of Israe1's organized military attacks, in their widening scope and ., the light of the objectives they were designed ta attain, represented a real govern- mental policy of aggression. 6. Thirdly, the many resolutions previously adopted by the Security Council censuring Israel for its continued flagrant violatiùns had in themselves failed to prevent renewed Israel aggression. Therefore, my delegation was not eager to seek a further condemnation of Israel of the old type, or even additional expressions of censure. It waited, while thinking over what it could accomplish ta ensure the security of Jordan and the safety of its people. 7. But the successive Israel attacks did not permit of more waiting, in spite of all Jordan's self-restraint. My de1egation, therefore, cornes today to the Security Council not only with a complaint against Israel for one mili- tary attack, but also with a request for the consideration by the Council of the aggressive policy of Israel, which has created a most serious situation in the Palestine area. 8. Before 1 go into the various aspects of the problem, let me outline briefly what has happened on Jordan's borders. 9. At midnight on 11 September 1956, while the inha- bitants of the little village of Khirbat ar Rahwah, a little distance from the annistice demarcation line, and the few police and national guard at its small police post were enjoying some sleep, an Israel force of 800 soldiers launched a sudden attack on the village. The attackers were equipped with automatic weapons, half-track artil- lery, armoured cars, gre7.1ade~ and incendiary bombsJ and they assaulted the village with aU the equipment they possessed. Part of this force succeeded in reaching beyond the village, two miles inside Jordan, and laid an ambush along the Hebron-Beersheba road in order to prevent reinforcements from reaching the little village. The smaIl police post and the few soldiers and national guardsmen who were assigned to the village resisted des- perately and fought to the last man. Five Jordanian policemen and ten Jordanian national guardsmen were killed. As Jordanian reinforcements were speeding to the village, they feIl into the ambush, and five soldien; were. killed and three others wounded. The Israel battalion was then able to blow up the police post and the village school in the vicinity. So it was that the Israel regular army scored a great victory over little Rahwah and its small police post. 1 1 10. On 13 September~ n~o days after the first attack, the Israelis attacked the police outpost of Gharandal, far Sûuth in 'Wadi Araba, in an unin_hahited ;.\re<l in the depression of the Dead Sea. Tneix force, estimated by our military headquarters at 1,000 soldiers, was heavily equipped and assisted by observation aircraft to watch for any reinforcements. The Mixed Armistice Com- mission described the attacking force as a "large Israel force." [8/3660J para. 14.] Here, again, the Israelis destroyed the police post and blew up the village school. Nine lordanian policemen and two villagers were wounded. And, again at Gharandal, the army of Israel had scored a triumph against a village school and a smaIl police post. 11. At 10 p.rn. on 25 September, twelve days after the second murderous attack, the Israel army launched a much bigger attack on the two villages of Wadi Fukin and Husan, to the west of Bethlehem, but concentrated its major assault against Husan. The Israel force this time was composed of 2,000 soldiers, with full war equipment, heavy artillery and observation aireraft. The Jordan national guard and the small army detach- ment faced the enemy with stubbom boldness. Conse- quently, the night battle turned into a murderous and bloody hand-to-hand fight. Scores of Israel soldiers feIl dead or wounded. Israel armoured vehicles roved around the area picking up the bodies of the bloodthirsty attackers and carrying them ta Ein Karim Hospital. At 12. Let me read to the Council the text of the resolu- tion on this aggressive attack adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 4- October 1956: "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, "Hauing discussed Jordanian complaint No. C. 305, "1. FÏ7lds that, on the night of 25-26 September 1956, large Israel regular anny forces launched a major, unprovoked and premeditated attack against Jordanian territory in the area of Husan, 10 kilometres south of Jerusalem. Infantry, armoured cars, haU- tracks, artillery, bazookas and automatic weapons were used in this aggression against Jordan. Observation aircraft also participated in the operation; "2. Finds further that the said Israel anny forces advanced, supported by artillery, towards a small de- tachment of national guardsmen in the vicinity of Husan village, killing twelve national guardsmen. Simultaneously, other units of the Israel army attacked a national guard detachment at the village of Wadi Fukin; " "4. Finds further that, in the course of this large- scale aggression, the villagers of Husan were subjected ta firing resulting in the wounding of two civilians. "5. Finds further that the Sharafat police post and its vicinity were shelled and later subjected ta a con- certed attack. The aggressors demolished the police post. As a result of the attack in the said area, twenty-five Jordanians, including a sevênty-year-old civilian, were killed and six others wounded. Two police Rover cars were looted; "6. Finds further that the Israel anny forces shelled the village of Al Khadr, killing a twelve-year-old girl and wounding a seven-year-old girl and two other civilians; "7. Finds further that this flagrant act of aggression against Jordan lasted for almost seven hours; "8. Deplores the wanton loss of life brought upon Jordan by Israel's brutal and premedit3.ted assault upon Jorclanian territory; "9. Condemns the Israel authorities for a most flagrant aggression by Israel regular army forces against Jordan in utter disregard of their solemn obli- gations under article III, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement; "10. T akes a most serious uiew of the Israel autho- rities' openly admitted aggressions against Jordan in utter disregard of their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement; "11. CaUs upon the Israel authorities ta desist from their aggressions against Jordan, which constitute a threat to peace and security." [S/3670~ annex Ill.] 14. Two weeks later, on 10 October 1956 at eleven o'clock at night {Jordan time), the heaviest premedi- tated and unprovoked attack was launched by Israel against Jordan. The action was carried out by an Israel army brigade group composed of two infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion. These forces were supported by one light and one medium field artillery battalion. Ten bombing planes provided the attackers with additional support. The targets of the Israelis seemed to be the border town of Qalqilyah and the villages of Hablab, Kh. Sufin, Jayyus, and En Nabi Ilyas. The attacking Israelis were met by the stubborn resistance of the Jordanian defenders, who prevented their advance, inflicted heavy casualties, and destroyed a number of their armoured vehicles in the action. Jordanian artillery blasted enemy fortifications behind the attacking forces in three Israel border settlements and shelled enemy concentrations and advancing fomlations, inflicting severe losses. At a certain stage of the fighting, Jordanian reinforcemcnts carried out strong counterattacks at various points, effectively stemmed the enemy's incursions, and were able to eliminate Israel ambushes that were laid on the road ta Qalqilyah. Other Jordanian forces encircled an enemy unit of company strength that had marched to the neighbourhood of En Nabi Ilyas in Jordan and destroyed it completely. A third ,attacking Jordanian force proceeded to reinforce the defenders of Kh. Sufin village, who were resisting the advance of the Israelis, and prevented the enemy from relieving the encJl'cled Israel company-an action that completed the destruc- tion of that company. A few miles south of Qalqilyah, an Israel force which had been attacking Habla village was hurled back with heavy losses. Throughout the engagement a large number of enemy armoured vehicles seemed primarily charged with the task of roving about ~ the ba.de6eid, te piek up the Israei deaci ami wounded. ~ 15. ~ Jordan authorities notified the Chief of Staff of the lnited Nations Truce Supervision Organization of the attack as soon as it had started. In his turn, the Chief of Staff called upon both parties to effect cease-fire at 3 a.m. on Il October. The Israelis requested an extension of thirty minutes, in order to collect their dead and wounded. But when they failed to do so, they asked for the cease-fire to become effective at 4.30 a.m., and the request was granted. In their retreat, the Israelis passed near the already evacuated police-post building at Qalqilyah and demoli~hed it with the explosives which they had been unable to use against the manned military objectives. Jordanian losses in regular army soldiers and national guardsmen were twenty-five killed and thirteen wounded, according to first reports. However, General Burns' report of 17 October 1956, gives the final figure of forty-eight Jordanians killed, including civilians [S/3685 and Corr. 1~ para. 18]. 16. 1 have given a true description of the Israel aggression that took place against our borders and within our territory. This aggression can by no means be described as a border incident-it is war, actual war, except that it lacks the rules of war, the bravery of war, and the honour and moraIs of war. It could only be identified as an "Israeli war". In the darkness, at midnight, when human beings go to sleep, the evil spirit of the Israelis awakes and sneaks out for murder, -collective murder. Then they return boasting about their aggression anà publish the pictures of their criminaIs as if they were real conquerors. 17. Here is what the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced in its communiqué following one of the Israel attacks: "Several Jordan army posts including a company stronghold in the Husan area were attacked and taken tonight by an Israel army unit. The Husan police station was also taken and blown tlp. Two amlY armoured cars were set afire, and the enemy suffered approxim;':\tely fifty killed. After accom- plishing the task, our forces returned to their bases." 18. 1 wish to compare this official Israel statement of praise for its wide-scale aggression with the conduct of the Jordanian authorities when an individual act was committed on 23 September 1956 against a group of archaeologists by a Jordanian soldier gone berserk. The soldier, having seen a crowd of Israelis approaching the line facing his position in the Jerusalem area, went berserk and fired at them, killing four and wounding a number of others. The Jordan military authorities hastened to arrest the soldier, who seemed to have been temporarilv insane. The soldier was disarmed and 19. The afore mentioned Israel attacks were, however, premeditated and unprovoked, as attested to by the Mixed Armistice Commission. In order to find some sort of excuse for launching these attacks, the Israel Government advances what it calls the "theory of retaliation." Whether the reasons justifying its aggres- sion arise from insignificant daily incidents or whether they are of its own making and its own logic, Israel takes them as an adequate pretext for justifying its aggression. 20. Let us look into the list of the Israel cornplaints against Jordan and see what type of incidents they were, and how and by whom they were done. To be precise, 1 refer to the official report of Major-General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, dated 26 September 1956 [813660]. 21. During the period 29 July tô 25 September 1956 inclusive, Israel lodged fifty-nine cornplaints against Jordan. Permit me to read this list: "One alleging crossing of the demarcation line by a military unit. "Four allegÏng crossing of the demarcation Hne by military units and firing inside Israel. r - i lr .. One allegÏng crossing of the demarcation !ine by armed civilians. "Nine aIIeging crossing of the demarcation line by almed civilians and firing inside Israel. "Three allegÏng crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians. "Eleven alleging crossing of the demarcation line and theft or attempted theft. "One alleging cro~sing of the demarcation Hne and destruction. "Fifteen alleging firing across the demarcation line. "Eleven alleging overflights. "Three al1eging miscellaneous violations." [813660, para. 2.] ~, These are the incidents for which Israel declares its "IsraeIi war" on my country. None of them had been planned by the Jorc1anian authorities; none of them had been carried out by our regular army; none of them felI within the Government's responsibility; and each of them was an isolated incident. "One alleging crossing of the demarcation line by anned civilians. "One alleging crossing of the demarcation line by anned civilians and firing inside Jordan. "Two alleging crossing of the demarcation line by unanned civilians. "Twenty-nine firing across the demarcation line. "One hundred and forty-seven alleging overflights. "Sixteen alleging miscellaneous violations." [Ibid, para. 4.] 23. If the" theory of retaliation" were to be adopted or even acceptable, on this basis Jordan should he the party to adopt such a theory, not Israel. But these minor incidents are not and could never he a reason for either party mobilizing its reguïar anny and mechanized troops against the other part}. What separates us irom Israel is the invisible annistice demar- cation line, 650 kilometres long, that passes mostly through valleys or along the edges of mountains. Any man or group of men could cross that line from either side. Jordan, for its part, has taken the strictest measures ta prevent individual crossings. The reports of the Chiefs of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza- tion prove how strict the Jordan authorities have heen in prohibiting infiltration or crossings. The Israelis try ta create justification for their attacks, and choose devious ways fol' providing evidence. 24. On 1 October 1956, when the Jordan-Israel Mixed Annistice '-.'ommlSSlon was conSldering the Israel complaint concerning the Ramat Rahel incident, in which a Jordanian who had temporarily gone insane fired on a gr0up of Israel archaeologists, the Israel delegation withdrew from the meeting because the Chainnan, on the basis of investigation and evidence, had not supported Israel's views on that incident. The first paragraph of the resolution which was adopted on that incident by the Mixed Annistice Commission reads as follows: "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, " H aving discussed Israel complaint ::-10. C. 280, . "1. Finds that, on 23 September 1956, automatic fire W3S directed from a Jordan position at a group of archaeologists in Ramat Rahel. Four Israelis were killed and sixteen wounded. As a result of the investigation, it transpired that the incident was 1 1 25. The facts being such, one should ask about the motives underlying the Israel military attacks. Israel caUs them "retaHation"-retaHation for what, and against whom? Retaliation was condemned by the Secarity Council, the Truce Supervision Organization and the Mixed Armistice Commission. Neither the General Àrmistice Àgreement· nor the cease-fire assurances justify any degree of retaliation. 26. What further crystalIizes the reponsibility of Israel is that it has lately refused to co-operate with the United Nations observers in the investigation of border incidents. In this connexion, 1 invite the attention of the members of the Serurity Council to the statement dated 3 October 1956 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, published in document S/3670, annex II, which says: "In this situation Israel sees no useful purpose in the continuation of routine examination of incidents in the Commission." 1 also invite the attention of this C'>uncil to what Major-General Burns, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, said in his report of 11 October: "Since 4 October, the Israel authorities have carried out their own investigations of incidents on the Israel side of the demarcation line. They investigated the Israel complaint of 4 October according to which a railway train had been fired at near Tul Karm on 3 October, as weIl as the above- mentioned Israel complaint of 5 October concerning the 4 October attack on the Sedom-Beersheba Raad. They also investigated an incident which occurred on 9 October near Even Yehuda... and in which two Israel civilians were killed, aUegedly by infiltrators from Jordan. This last incident was followed by the Israel retaliatory attack in the neighbouring Qualquilyah Area on the night of 10-11 October. I wish to add that these same views were endorsed by the Secretary-General in rus report to the Security Council on 17 October 1956 [S/3685]. The with- drawal of Israel from the Mixed Armistice Commission puts upon that Government the burden of a new failure 'Co comply with its obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations. 27. The Israel army launched its attacks, in the form of premeditated, unprovoked actions with no justifica- tion whatsoever, admittedly against Jordanian police and national guard posts which had been established by my Government to maintain order and security in the border villages along the demarcation Hne. Why is it, then, that the Israel army regards these same posts that are charged with the task of preserving arder and security as the first target for its assaults, and why should the village schools fOnIl the second ~<rget? The facts in the Israel aggression are no longer vague or hidden. The responsibility of Israel is admitted in communiqués that are similar to any war communiqué. The aggres- sive policy of Israel is also cIearly expressed therein. The official announcements and statements about these attacks are published. Mrs. Meir,' the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, made a declaration in Jerusalem on 6 October, in which she said: "Israel dk~ not keep books on the number of casualties !iuficred by the enemy. Authorities across the borders and their armed forces were responsible for the atta(;illl, and when Israel 2'.ttacks it attacks police and military posts.'~ 28. The Government of Israel is destroying the very foundations of the Jordan-Israel General Arm~tice Agreement 1 and violating the major clause of that Agreement, article III, paragraph 2. When the Secretary-General went on bis !uission f-: the Middle East last April under the terms of +he Security Council resolution of 4 April 1956 [S/3575J, he held discussions wi* the Govemments of the area, on the bsis of which he secured assurance~ regardingthe cease-fire which reaffirmed the parties' obligat..' :"iS in accordance with 29. But the responsibility of Israel goes even beyond these bounds and further llan these violations. Israel's responsibility .l'lcludes pressing matters to sucb a point that the Security Council may find it difficult, under particular circumstances, to act effectively when it is required to do so. 30. No one is unaware of L'le general situation in the world. It escapes no one's mind that there are certain concomitant problems, issues and conditions, both domestic and international, wmcb sometimes present themselves at a time when the Security Council, the principal organ of the United Nations, is ca!led upon ta tackle a major case threatening international peace. Jordan does not wish ta confuse any issues or complicate any situation, or affect domestic affairs in any country, although, in my Government's view, it is Jordan's legi~ timate right to submit its complaint to the Security Council for discussion. 1ts only wish is to see its case judged by the Security Couneil OIi its merits, insulated from political implications or complications. It was not my delegation's des!re to come to the Security Council at this particular moment. 31. But the gtavity of the situation ansmg from Israel's military attacks on Jordanian territory makes it imperative for my delegation, under the provi&ions of the Charter, to request the Security Council to convene. It was Israel's recourse to systematic military aggression that has brought my delegation here at tlùs time. Israel bas heen the ultimate cause. The responsibility, all the way through, is to he borne by Israel, and by Israel alone. Article 1 of the Charter declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to he a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends. Are the sinister Israel military plans against Jordau, in the present uneasy general situation, in harmony with the actions of nations for the attainment of their common ends? Should not Israel~ in the present international situation, refrain from acts whicb might complicate the issues? mément convocation systématiquement amené la seulement, événements. l'un d'être vers qu'Israël générale des l'actuelle pas pliquer 32. One bas to meditate for a long while to undentand the causes of the aggressive policy of Israel. Why bas it adopted such a policy? All this organized campaign of so-called retaliation by the Israel autho- 32. de adopté tendues a celui-ci plus ~ties stems from Israel's expansionist policy which in Its earlier stages it was able to obscure, but which no one can ignore any longer. Arab spokesmen, whether 33. But is argument necessary at this stage when rcady proof lies at hand? Israel Government yearbooks from 1951 onwards, quoting Mr. David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister, assert that the State "has been established in only a part of the Land of Israel", that independence has been reached "in a part of our small country", and that "the State of Israel has been restored in the western part of the Land of Israel only". In the Zionist daily Morni7zf; Journal on 31 January 1954, the same Mr. David Ben-Gurion wrote: "It will be the immigrants who will strengthen and extend the Jewish State; no one else." 34. Is it any surprise that, since the signing of the General Armistice Agreement in 1949, we observe Israel's policy-makers constantly seeking pretext after pretext for use in the implf'mentation of thf'ir programme to seize the "other parts of the Land of Israel"? The Israelis ha\'e been seizing parts of Palestine piecemeal. They believe that, since their defiance of the United Nations resolutions pertaining to Palestine has been overlooked, the poliey of the fait accompli has for them been a successful one. Encouragen hy the inaction of the Security Council with regard to their violations, they have constar:tly striven to keep the demarcation Hne and the border areas not stable or quiet, but in a state of flux. The policy of keeping the demarcation Hne unstable aims primarily at providing weak points through which to trespass across the border and expand into Arab t.erritory. 35. This expansionist policy is advocated not only by responsible leaders of Israel, but also by political party leaders. The following is a stateml"nt by the leader of Herut, Israel's strongest opposition party, as published in the Baltimore Sun on 12 October 1956: "Mr. Menachem Begin said tonight he is now oonvinced that the time has come when the Jews must fight again in order to subdue and occupy Jordan and to throw the Egyptians out of the Gaza strip and back across the desert. There is great urgency to act right away, he added, because Egyptian military strength is growing faster than Israel's. "FurthermoT(;, one of Hernt's basic tenets is that Israel has a historie right to the territory on both banks of the river Jordan, as far east as the wilderness that separates the Kingdoxn of Jordan from Iraq. . "Limitcd retaliatory raids by the Israeli army neither deter the people who control the Arab forces nor sufficiently reduce their capacity to continue to molest Israelis living near th~ borders. 36. 1 have mentioned that the Israel authorities were implementing a plan of organized collective military operations against Arab villages--operations that have recently encompassed the destruction of sorne police posts, but have nonetheless included the demolition of school buildings and other humanitarian institutions -in what they term retaliation for the infiltration of individual Arabs. 1 have also stated that these actions stem from the expansionist policy which the Israel Government closely follows, the time-table, for which it is anxious not to have upset. 37. The timing of the latest Israel attacks has been primarily dictated by the present conditions in our region. The fact that Egypt and its sister Arab States are deeply preoccupied with the Suez Canal problem gives Israel an opportunity to burden the Arab political calendar with a new problem in order to weaken the combined efforts of the Arab Governments to solve the Suez Canal problem peacefully and amicably with the western Powers. On the other hand, Israel may think that the capacity of the Arab States to meet its military and poEtical pressure is less resistible under present circumstances. It does not escape notice how much the Israelis try to profit out of present internaI affairs goveming the politics of certain big Powers mostly concerned in the Palestine problem. 38. 1 do not say that these are ail the reasons which motivate Israel in its aggressive policy. 1 do not say that cveryone should subscribe to the same line of reasoning. Sorne may think that, by initiating such aggressive actiono, Israel may be in a better position to l'aise funds abroad and to secure aid by claiming that it is labouring in the face of great strife. Others may think that, by so doing, Israel is trying to divert the attention of the world ta its own requirements and its own problems. In any case, it is not for me to expIain Israel's policy of aggression. 1 am sure that an Israel politician couId do the job far better than 1. However, whether one agrees or disagrees, the striking and unchallengeable fact remains that Israel is conduct- ing an agressive programme and disturbing peace and security. 39. What measures, therefore, will the Security Couneil take against Israel after it has persistently failed to comply with its obligations under the General Armistice Agreenent and under the United Nations Charter? What action will the Conncil take against Israel for the attack on Khirbat al' Rahwah? On Gharanda1? On Husan? On Qalqilyah? What should the Council do concerning ail these aggressive attacks or any one of 41. If the Council does not take action to stop Israel's aggression immediately, then my country will have to seek other methods to ensure the safety of its borders. Sucb a development, if it takes place, will extend beyond our present local arrangements. 42. Israel has persistently followed a course of continued violation. Has not Israel defied the United Nations resolutions that brought Israel itself into existence? Is not Israel challenging the successive resolutions of the United N.dons which reaffirm the rights of the Arabs of Palestine? Was not Israel strongly condemned and censured severa.! times by the Council for its repeated aggressive attacks? Has not Israel failed to comply with its obligations under the Articles of the United Nations Charter? Has not Israel violated the basic conditions of th~ General Armistice Agreement? Has not Israel failed to keep its assurance of 3 May 1956 regarding the cease-fire? Has not Israel adopted an official policy of military aggression, carried out by its regular army? Dues not Israel disregard the delicate international situation and act in contradiction to international political decency? 43. In the past, severai resolutions censuring Israel for its continued flagrant violations have been adopted by the Couneil. The most recent of these resolutions was that adopted by the Council at its 715th meeting, on 19 January 1956, in regard to the attack against Syria in the area of Lake Tiberias [S/3538]. Para- graphs 3, 4 and 5 of the operative part of that resolution read as follows: " The Security Council 50 "3. Condemns the attack of 11 Decemher 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter; "4. Expresses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations; . .. 5. CaUs upan the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures ur.der the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peaœ." 45. It is for the sake of maintaining peace and. arder in the Palestine area, and consequently in the whole of the Middle East and perhaps further afield, that the Security Council should apply these sanctions against Israel in arder to put an end to its aggression in Palestine. It is also for the purpose of safeguarding the prestige and authority of the Security Council, which have been challenged by Israel several times, that these effective measures shouid be taken against Israel. It is for the sake of every Jordanian soldier. who died in defending the cause of peace in the îace of the Israel aggressors, for the sake of every school that bas been shelled in our territory, evelY house that has been destroyed, every child who bas been orphaned and every woman who has been widowed, that the Council must take action. . 46. 1 look forward to seeing such a resolution adopted by the Council, and 1 reserve my right to speak again at a later st.age of the present debate.
The agenda was adopted.
a) b)
1 am gratelul to the President and to the Councii for the opportunity which has been given ta me to take my seat at this table. The statement which my delegation wishes ta make at this time is very short.
48. Since 26 April 1956, when the Secretary-General received a binding commitment from the Jordan Government to respect the cease-fire, that Government has been responsible for a series of armed attacks against Israel's territory and population, resulting in the death of thirty-seven people and the wounding of scores of others. Notwithstanding several condemnations of Jordll'.n by the Mixed Armistice Commission and repeated efforts by the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to stop the attacks, they have continued without interruption.
49. The Charter docs not require Israel to suffer armed attacks upon its territory and population. Israel regrets the loss of life suffered both by its own citizens and by those of a neighbouring country. But the responsibility for bath lies on the shoulders of the Jordan Government, which mu been responsible in every case for initiating this grievous sequence of bloodsbed. 1 cao give an assurance that, if Jordan
It is a matter of very grave concern to my Governrr.~nt that the Security Council should once again have to be dealing with the situation along the border between Israel and Jordan. Earlier this year, on 4 April, the Couneil unanimously passed a resolution in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations was asked to arrange with the parties to each of the four Armistice Agreements "for the adoption of any measures which after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines". On 4 June, a further resolution [S/3605] was passed unanimously, in which the Secretary-General's mandate was renewed and confirmed with an even greater expression of Ul·gency.
52. The Council was entitled to expect that a decided improvement along the borders would ensue from this unanimous and repeated expression of its concern and from the efforts of the Secretary-General, which have been as tactful as they were energetic and persistent. Instead of that, in his letter of 26 September [S/3658], the Secretary-General ealled our att~ntion to the continued deterioration along the armistice demarcation line between Israel and Jordan} and his latest report, that of 17 October [S/3685 and Corr. 1], speaks of a further deterioration. Indeed, it seems to me that the tension along the border between Israel and Jordan is DOW greater than at any time since the Annistice Agreement between the two countries was signed. It is due to the great restraint shown by the Govemment of Jordan that the situation has not got almost out of band. Our ally, Jordan, has our sympathy and our commendation. At this stage of the proceedings, 1 do not wish to say more than that. 1 reserve, of course, my right to speak more fully at a later stage.
The Council has just heard the statement of the representative of Jordan describing the brutal manner in which the Israel army launched a large-scale military attack against Jordanian territory during the night of Il October, after having made a similar attack during the night of 25-26 September. In the course of these military operations many persons, including civilians and children, were killed, many were wounded, and there was considerable material damage.
54. My delegation deeply regrets this loss of life and wishes to take this opportunity to express its sympathy to the families of the victims, the Jordanian Government
55. At the present stage of the debate, my delegation does not intend to analyse in detail the complaint submitted to the Security Council and the measures which the Council should take before hearing the Israel representative and studying in detail the report concerning the attack of 11 October [8/3685 and Cord] submitted to the Council today by General Burns, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
1 l i1
56. Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the situation, the anxiety awakened by these large-scale attacks, the danger tbat these serious incidents may degenerate into a general conflagration, and the importance which my Government attaches to the peace and stability of the Middle East, 1 feel bound to malte the foUowing observations on the basis of General Burns' report of Il October 1956 concerning the incidents of 25 and 26 September [8/3670, annex Ill].
57. In the first place, according to General Burns' report, on the night of 25-26 September 1956, large Israel regular army forces launched a major, unprovoked and premeditated attack against Jordanian territory in the area of Husan. The Israel authorities have openly admitted that they launched that offensive in utter disregard Dl their obligations under the Generai Armistice Agreement. The least that can he said is that the attack constitutes an act of flagrant aggression against Jordan. It is aU the more reprehensible as the Security Council, in its resolution of 19 January 1956 [8/3538], had already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and had caUed upon the Government of Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions.
L
58. In the second place, the report shows that the Government of Israel is 110t co-operating with the Mixed Armistice Commission, makes its own investigations, which are not checked by the United Nations, publhhes the results of those investigations, draws its own conclusions from them, and undertakes actions by its military forces on that basis.
59. Moreover, in its statement of 3 October [8/3670, annex II] the Ministry of Foreign Afrain of Israel stated that Israel saw no useful purpose in the continuation of routine examination of incidents in the Commission. This is a most regrettable decision. The Government of Israel is thus refusing to co-operate with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization despite the Security Council's recommendations calltng upon it to Co-operate with the Chief of Staff, and to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the Interpretation and application of the provisions of
de l'interprétation
60. In view of these considerations, my delegation considers that the Security Council is faced with a grave situation requiring the most serious examination, a situation which has been created by the Israel Government's defiance of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the Security Council resolutions and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, the Council, in view of its responsibilities, and having regard to the last warning it addressed to the Israel Government in its resolution of 19 January 1956!- should consider what measures are required to maintain order and security in this area.
61. These are the general considerations which my delegation has feh it necessary to submit for the attention of members of the Council at the present stage of the debate. It reserves the right to state its attitude in more precise tenns after it has made a thorough study of aIl the relevant documents and heard aIl the parties concerned.
62. As regards the next meeting of the Council, my delegation considers that since we also have belore us the letter addressed to the Pre~ident by the Israel representative, we should meet again as saon as possible to hear the Israel representative's statement. The Council might then adjourn for a few days to give its members time to ponder the new measures required in view or the fact that the steady deterioration of the situation is threatening the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.
The Security Councü bas taken up Jordan's complaint concerning aggressive action by Israel in recent months, in particular on 25 September and 10 October. The Council has heard the statement by the representative of Jordan, astate· ment setting forth indisputable facts testifying to the serious deterioration of the situation in tÎle area of the the statement by the representative of Jordan, a statebers of the Council aIso have before them detailed reports by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, dated 5 September [S/3659, annex] and 11 October [S/3670] and 17 October [S/3685 and Corr.1]. Unfortunately, the Council has not been able to hear the representative of Israel today, as he is not ready to present his complaint.
64. Without prejudging my final position, and whiJe r.eserving the right to malte a further statement, 1 feel it necessary to make a few preliminary observations at the present stage.
65. In the documents sllbmitL';1 '~'. the Council, facts are adduced showing that on the night of 10-11 October
66. borent
66. The reports of the Chief of Staff, which 1 have already mentioned, fully confinn these facts and underline the seriousness of the situation which has arisen on the demarcation line between Israel and Jordan. In his last report the Chief of Staff points out that the nllmber of victims claimed by the events of 10-11 October is the highest since the incident in the Gaza region in April 1956 [8/3685, para. 211 which the Sccurity Council took up at the time.
67.
67. 1 take this opportunity to express my deep sympathy with the families, the Government and the people of Jordan for the losses they have suffered.
du Conseil venaient antérieures. continuelle prendre
68. In his letters to the Security Council of 26 September and 17 October, the Secretary-General pointed out the extreme seriousness of the situation. In his letter of 26 September he suggested that, if the Governments concerned did not bring the situation rapidly under control, the Security Council would have to take the matter up, in order to reaffirm its policy, as established in previous resolutions. "Were the Council," he continues, "to find the continued deterioration [of the situation] to constitute a threat to peace," it would have to "decide what further measures may be indicated". [8/3658.]
69. Since then the situation has not improved; on the contrary, it has deteriorated. On 10-11 October, Israel launched a completely unprovoked attack against Jordan. Particularly disquieting, in these circumstances, its the Israel Government's statement that these invasions of Jordanian territory and acts of aggression by the Israel forces have been part of an organized plan in pursuance of a so-calIed policy or retaliation. Such a poliey is contrary to the resolutions of the Security Couneil, which has repeatedly condemned the policy of retaliation, and is incompatible with the obligations assumed by States Members of the United Nations under the Charter.
69. aggravée. conditions rités territoire exécution sailles. décisions à incompatible l'Organisation signant
70. The facts that have been presented provide incontrovertible evidence that Israel has deliberately violated a the Armistice Agreement with Jordan, the relevant Seisraélo-jordanienne, curity Council resolutions and the undertakings given de during the discussions with the Secretary-General of the les United Nations held pursuant to the Security Council sation resolution of 4 April 1956 rS/S575]. The grave résolution situation which has arisen along the Israel-Jordan de- Etant marcation Hne, a situation which May easily become a de threat to peace in the Near East, calIs for energetic dégénérer intervention by the Security Couneil. le
71. The Soviet delegation considers that the Security 71. Council should give Jordan's complaint its immediate étudier
72. The lranian representative bas brought up the question of the Security Council's next meeting. As 1 have already stated, the Soviet delegation considers that the Security Council should consider the complaint before it without delay, and accordingly it helieves that the Security Couneil should hold its next mccting as saon as possible, in oroer to hear the parties, express its views and take the necessary steps to correct the situation that bas arisen. 1 therefore support the lranian representative's proposaI that the Security Council should meet as early as possible next week-on Monday or Tuesday-to proceed with its examination of the question.
As there are no other speakers on my list, 1 should Iike, as President, to express what is, 1 helieve, the deep feeling of the members of the Couneil.
74. The large numher of incidents that have occurred on the border between Israel and Jordan and the heavy loss of life that has resulted bear witness to the serious tension "' uich prevails in that part of the world.
75. Once again the Security Couneil has decided to hear the complaints brought before it by the two countries; it is ready to hear the parties concerned conscientiously and objectively. However, the Security Council would he highly gratified if, in calling upon it, the countries concerned would not only present their grievances and their demands, but show the calm and the good will without which this debate could be neither meanh.gful nor effective. In the area of the world with which we are dealing, the least faIse step may have incalculable consequences. In consideration of the respeet due to the United Nations and of the interest of the countries concerned, the Security Council must call upon both parties, irrespective of their feelings, to furnish solid proof of their self-control and good will. The Council hopes that its appeal will he heeded.
76. The Chair bas noted the suggestions made during the debate by certain speakers. 1 propose to caII a further meeting of the Council early next week, after consulting the other members.
The meeting rose at 12.35 p.rn.
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