S/PV.750 Security Council

Mr. Comut-Gentille, the permanent representative of France, was unable to be here at the time arranged for the opening of the meeting; he has asked me to take his place temporarily in view of the Council's wish to avoid any delay in the debate. 2. The provisional agenda for the Council's 750th meeting contains one more item than that of this aftemoon's meeting, namely, the letter from the Egyptian representative to the President of the Security Council [Sj3712]. We should begin by adopting the agenda.

As the President has pointed out, the provisional agenda for this evening's meeting contains an additional item, namely, a letter from the representative of Egypt. This letter in fact deals with the substance of a letter which I myself read out to the Council in the course of my intervention earIier today [749th meeting, para. 5]. The letter from the representative of Egypt puts this ~epresentationin a particular light, in a light in which It occurs to the Govemment of Egypt. 4. From everything that I have said in the course of this debate wtich has been continuing throughout the clay, it must be obvious to my colleagues that I by no 1 h:~fore us if in fact we do discuss it.

Speaking as the representative of FRANCE, 1 do not think that a discussion of the letter from t,le representative of Egypt couId add anything whatever to tbe debate which tcok place this afternoon. At that time Mr. Cornut-Gentille stated the French position on the question. 1 therefore associate myself wholeheartedly with the statement just made by Sir Pierson Dixon.

Accordin~ to the Council's practice, as th.; President knows betLer than l, to place a question où the agenda of a meeting does Hot mean that all the members of the Coullcil are in agreement with regard to the complaint submitted to them. Furthermore, we cannot know whether or not there are grounds for the complaint unless the item is placed on the agenda and the count~j which has submitted it has an opportunity to staT ,,; its case. 1 therefore propose that the item should b.;; placed on the agenda of the meeting.

Tc enable the members who are opposed to the discussion of item 3 of the provisional agenda to make their position clear, 1am going to put the agenda to the vote. g, We shall vote first on the inclusion iù the agenda of item 2 concerning the letter dated 29 Octuber 1956 from the representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Sec:urity Counci1.

I now invite the Council to vote on the indusion of item 3 concerning the letter dated 30 October 1956 from the representative of Egypt to the President of the Security Council.

1 invite de1egations to speak on the draft resolution subrnitted by the representative of the Soviet Union at the end of the previous meeting. fi 12. Speaking as the representative of FRANCE, 1 l announce that 1 have been in touch with my Government and that my instructions have not been altered. 1shall put th~ draft resolution to the vote. 13. Sir Pierson DlxON (UniteJ Kingdom): 1should like brief!.y to support the representative of Fr. 'ce. My attitude is the same. It is quite evident from the wording of the USSR draft resolution [S/3713/Rev.l] tha.t it is inconsistent with the poliey of the British and French Governments which has been described in considerable detail by myself and my French colleague at earlier stages in this debate. inchangée. Gouvernement français, France très J'avoue pris connaissance qui cru comprendre été repris Etats-Unis; je pensais que projet . cesser le feu immédiatement", serait ainsi, Mais intéressées être volontairement vague pour l'invitatiorl 14. MI'. WALKER (Australia): 1must confess that 1 was a little bit surprised when 1 saw the actual text of document S/3713/Rev.l, whieh was on the table when we met at this session. My understanding was that before the adjournment of the preceding meeting the representative of the Soviet Union had taken up certain parts of the origind United States draft resolution and 1 was expecting that operative paragraph 1 of that text would read "CaUs upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire", and that the remainder of the draft would remain as it is. If it had been drafted in those terms, 1 would have been prepared to vote for that draft resolution. But in view of the new wording that has been introduced now, whieh seems to me to be deliberately vague: "CaUs upon aIl the parties con· cerned", 1cannot vote for the draft resolution unless it is clearly indieated that it is directed towards the 1 Governments of Egypt and Israel. 15. listes du distribué ces cesser parties Israël s'adresse 15. MI'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [translatedfrom Russian]: Paragraph 1 of the U5SR draft resolution now before the Council reads as follows: "CaUs upon all the parties concerned immediately to cease fire". As of today, the parties concerned in this instance are, of course, Israel and Egypt and it is to them that this provision of the draft resolution applies. The alteration made, whieh is to omit the ·names of the countries, is simply a matter of drafting;

1 hope it is not an unworthy thought if 1 b<':y that a draft resolution on the Middle Eastern situation originating from the representative of the Soviet Union is bound to be viewed by my Government with a certain amount of circumspection. 1 have been rather struck by the fact that Mr. Sobolev modified the wording of the origi;al United States draft resolution in this way. He now seems to say that "aIl the parties" means Israel and Egypt. If so, why did he change it? 1 should be very much interested to know. There must have been a point, and to my mind the point is th:lt he wished to move the Council into a position where it would in fact he achieving what fortunately it was not able to achieve earlier today, a resolution which in fact would have run completely counter to the policy which has been announced by the Governm· dts of France and the United Kingdom. 18. At this stage 1 shall not say any more on this point, although 1 might have more to say later, but 1 suggest to my colleagues that the motives and the reasons underlying these few simple words do bear rather close examination.

1 have no desire to prolong the discussion on this point. 1 should merely like to ask a question: if the representatives of the United Kingdom and France express a preference for the earlier wording-"Calls upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire"-and state that they will vote for it, 1 am prepared to amend my text accordingly. 1 prefer the text in its present form, for 1 feel that it meets the position better than the earlier wording. But 1 repeat, if the representatives of the United Kingdom and France are prepared to vote for the previous version, 1 am prepared to defer to them and to amend my text accordingly.

Before our adjournment 1 thought it was agreed that this resolution should contain that paragraph which in the original text read: "Calls upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire". If that wording is kept, 1 will vote for the draft resolution. But if the ciraft resolution in its present form is put to the vote, my delegation will abstain.

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak now, 1 shall ask the representative of the SGviet Union to tell us which text he prefers. 22. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated jrom Russian): In view of the fact that four members of the Security Council have expressed doubts concerning this wording, it is appar-

,:,ince no one wishes to speak, 1 shall put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation [S/3713/Reil.l] , as just amended by the USSR representative. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Australia, China, Cuba, Iran, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia. Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Brit '!.in and Northern Ireland. 1 . Abstaining: Belgium, United States of America. The result of the vote was 7 votes in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions. 24. Mi'. LODGE (United States of America): 1 should like to explain my vote. At the preceding meet- ing 1 said chat our draft resolution Vias 2. unit and shoulè. Je considered as a whc~e. The draft !~esolution on which we have just voted usd certain parts of the UT'ited States resolution, but it leit out the words "aIl the parties concerned" and it also left out aIl the en- forcement provisions. For that reason the United States delegation abstained on this last vote because the draft resolution as a whole lacked the integrity which we thought it should have. j 1 . en

1 should like to make just one cbservation. The President will recall that before we adjourned there was some discussion as ta whether or not an adjourriment was worth-while. 1 expressed the view that time was running out and that the hours were passing too swiftly. It was implied that it would be possible for the Council to take a decision on the question. Sorne members of the Council expressed the view that favourable results might be achieved if the Council were to adjourn. The adjournment produced no such results, but the dilatory tactics . resorted to in the Security Council had again won the clay. The Council postponed its decision for another tV/o hours. That i8 a point to which 1 wish to draw attention.

In explanation of my 'Vote 1 simply wanted to say two things. First, there was no question of filibustering; Mr. Sobolev seems to have that term on the brain. 1would observe that even the Security Counci! has a stomach, and 1 have in fact been in touch with !llY Government despite the difference of hour, and 1 have actually been l'l.cting on its instructions. 27. But, more important, the reason 1 was unable to vote for this draft resolution was, broadly, the reason 1 gave earlier in this debate with regard to the

My delegation voted for this draft resolution because aIl it does is to reproduce certain paragraphs of the United States draft resolution, for which we had already voted. Sorne of these paragraphs were introduced by the USSR, one by the delegation of China, and one by the delegation of Iran. 29. We voted for the draft in the hcp~ that peace may be restored in that part of Egypt.

ln connexion with the vote just taken here in the Security Council, may 1 be permitted to make just a short observation. A draft resolution, the purpose of which was to stop the fighting in the Sinai Peninsula and to avoid a major conflagration, has been vetoed by two permanent members of the Security Council. This veto is a blow to the restoration of peace in the Middle East. 1t is a blow to the United Nations. But behind the majority of the members of the Council which voted in favol:,- of both draft resolutions lies the powerful voice of world public opinion, which has too vital a stake in peace to allow it to he so lightly tampered with. It is our fervent hope that this will be understood in time by France and the United Kingdom, and that they will yet desist from the dangerous course which they are contemplating.

: This has been a black day for the Security Counci1. Confronted with an act of aggression perpetrated against a Member State of the United Nations, the Security Council has shown itself to be incapable of action. A heavy burden of responsibility is thus placed on those members of the Council which prevented it from acting. 32. We have already had occasion to say that the aggress~on by Israel against Egypt couId not have been perpetrated without the support of circles which are interested not in the maintenance of peace in the Middle East but in the furtherance of their own aims. Although only a few hours have elapsEi, the nature of these aims has become evident. Here in the Security Council we have already learnt of the decision of the United Kingdom and French Governments to resort to intervention, to intervene in Egypt's domestic affairs. We have heard that two great Powers have assumed the heavy responsibility of presenting Egypt with an ultimatum in violation of the United Nations Charter and in d.isregard of their responsibilities as permanent members of the Council. They have done so in the full knowledl!e that a sovereil!n State cannat even consider such an~ultimatum. The ultimatum in fact calls upon Egypt to withdraw, within its own territory, to a point ten miles west of the Suez Canal, an international waterway. Why? ln order to make it possible for the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France to occupy tJ-.e Canal. This makes their plan quite obvious. There have JOng been indications 33. The situation is worsening. The ultimatum is about to expire and the latest information available 1s that large United Kingdom and French naval forces are steaming east'Vards through the Mediterrar. Il towards Egypt. We aIl know why they are doing 50. 34. 1 should like to place it on record that the Security Council's inability to take the action prescribed by the Charter, its inability to take any measures at aIl, let alone effective measures, to deal with an act of aggression, places a heavy responsibility upon those members of the Couneil which prevented it from doing so. 35. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): The entirely unwarranted imputations against my country by the Soviet Union representative certainly cannot pass without answer. In the interests of orderly procedure, however, 1do not propose to answer them nûw. 36. It seemed to me that Mr. Sobolev \Vas antieipating his speech on the next item of the agenda. 1 shall therefore reserve my remarks until the Couneil passes to the next item.

As representative of FRANCE, 1 should like to reply briefly to Mr. Sobolev's charges. Like Sir Pierson Dixon, despite the la'.e hour, 1 too have consulted my Government and 1 am acting under its instructions. 38. With regard to Mr. Sobolev's statement respecting m)' Government's alleged objectives, 1 shaH reply to those too a littie later. 39. 1 have no other speakers on my iist for the time being. 1 therefore consider that the Couneil has completed its discussion of item 2 of the agenda. We shalL therefore go on to item 3. Letter dated 30 October 1956 from the representa- tive of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council (8/3712)

You have before you (he letter addressed by my Government to the President of the Security Council [S/3712], expressing the Egyptian view concerning the ultimatum presented to Egypt by France and the United Kingdom. In my statement this morning 1 expressed the hope, echoing the wards of the United States representative, that no State which was a Member of the United Nations would take advantage of the critical situation in the Middle East for selfish political ends. 1 see that that hope has been dashed. 41. It appears from Sir Anthony Eden':; statement that an ultimatum has been presented to Egypt, the victim of aggression by Israel, asking that Egyptian forces be withdrawn to a distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal. The Egyptian Government if asked to reply ta this communication within twelve :lOurs. The authors of the ultimatum seem ta have lost sight of the fact that the Suez Canal area and the Suez Canal itself are an integral part of Egypt, and lthat this is in conformitv with bath the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 and the Agreement between Egypt and the United Kmgdom of 19 October 1954. 42. Furthermore, it is no less strange to find that the French and British Governments are trying of their own accord, unilaterally, to settle a question which has already been brought before the Security Council. That, ta our way of thinking, is an entirely unjustifiabl~ infringement of the United Nations Charter. Force may not be used except in accordance with the principies and provisions of the Charter. 43. The United Kingdom and France have twice made use of the veto ta avoid being bound by the decisior.s of the Council, which might be an iuconvenience to them in the aggressive designs they have clearly adopted since Israellaunched its armed attack against Egypt. 1 need not repeat what the representative of the Soviet Union has just said on this subject. 44. Egypt has been the victim of aggression; its territory has been invaded; and as 1 had the honour to inform you this moming, it has been obliged to take the necessary measures and to use force to repel the aggressors invading its territory. But it did not resort to force until the Israel troops had actually entered Egyptian territory in large numbers, equipped with tanks and aircraft. 45. It is therefore very hard to conceive of a country which has been the victim of armed aggression, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, being presented with an ultimaturil by two other Member States of the United Nations, when the question of the armed attack on that country is under examination by the Security Couucil. 46. 1 should now like to clear up certain points raised here in the course of this aftemoon's debate. First, 1 should like to dispel the anxieties of the United Kingdom representative concerning the passage of ships through the Suez Canal. Fifty-one ships have passed through the Canal today. The Israel forces which have entcred Egypt are a long way from the Canal, and aIl the rumours in that connexion are quite with- .out foundation. The Israel forces at this moment are not far beyond the fronder. Most British subjects and French citizens have left Egypt, and as far as 1 know, none of them has been molested. 48. If France and the United Kingdom go through with the ultimatum they have presented to Egypt, their action will have unforeseeable consequences for which France and thé United Kingdom will have to bear the responsibility. In our view it wouId be a death-wound to our cherished Organization. 49. 1 call upon the Security Couneil, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, to face its responsibilities. Meanwhile, until such time as the Security Couneil has taken the necessary measures, Egypt has no choice but to defend itself and to protect its rights against aggression of this kind.

The Soviet Union delegation has already pointed out the serious consequences which may result from Israel's aggression in Egypt. The events of the last few hours show that an attempt is indeed being made to exploit the tense situation created by Israel's invasion of Egypt with a view ta the seizure of the Suez Canal by United Kingdom and French armed forces. 51. The United Kingdom and France have served Egypt and Israel-Egypt particularly-with an ultimatum amounting ta this: that if within twelve hours Israel and Egypt do not comply with the demand of the United Kingdom and French Governments for the withdrawal of their troops to certain positions, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary ta secure compliance. 52. This ultimatum is nothing but a threat of armed intervention by United Kingdom and French forces in the Suez Canal area. It cannat be overlooked that this declaration was made at a moment when it was already known that the Security Council was about to discuss the question of lsrael's aggression in Egypt. Accordingly, it was made with the purpose of anticipating Security Council action by means of unilateral action on the part of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France. 53. It is quite plain that under the United Nations Charter, which was subscribed ta by the United Kingdom and France, the Security Couneil bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. As we know, the Couneil has authorized neither the United Kingdom or France to take any f'Ûrt of unilateral action, let alone military action, circumventing the United Nations. We are thus confronted with a clear attempt to by-pass the Security Couneil and to take advantage of the situation created by Israel's aggression in Egypt in order to seize the Suez Canal by armed force. 55. On the one hand, certain groups which are interested in the further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East have been doing everything possible to encourage Israd in its militaristic mood and, in fact, have inspired its ag-gression against Egypt. 56. At the same time, it is common knowledge that the United King-dom and France have been hard at work concentrating their forces in Cyprus and at other points near the Suez Canal. 57. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken the unprecedented decision of issuing an ultimatum, ÏI. vrder to create a pretext for the iIIegal seizure of the Suez Canal by United Kingdo~ and French forces. 1t is obvious that this action by the United Kingdom and France is completely incompatible \Vith the United Nations Charter, that it is designed to undermine the authority of the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council, and that it endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. 58. The movement of United Kingdùm and French forces into the Suez Canal area can he regarded only as a totally unjustified act of armed aggression, which may lead to even graver consequences and do irreparable damage to international peace. 59. The Security Council is in duty bound to examine Egypt's complaint as a matler of the greatest urgency. The Soviet delegation believes that the Security Council must give the most serious attention to the action of the United Kingdom and France, and that it must cali upon the Governments of those countries not to interfeïe, either by an ultimatum of any kind whatsoever or by armed intervention, in the events now taking place in the Middle East. 60. The Soviet delegation feels compelled again to reminà the United Kingdom and French representatives, and aIl members of the Council, of the grave consequences which may result from armed aggression in the Suez C~mal area. 61. We express the hope that there will be enough men of sound judgement in the United Kingdom and France to understand that any persistence in the present dangerous course may lead to extremely grave consequences for aU mankind. 62. We hope that the Security Council will take resolute action to prevent the further development of armed conflict in the Middle East. The Soviet deiegation, for its part, will be prepared to support any proposaIs designed to achieve that object.

The representative of the Soviet Union has accused me of filibustering, and 1 shall be. very brief. 64. The position which my Government and the Government of France have taken is this. In violation 65. There are certain objectives which, 1 think, every member of the Council-or nearly every onehas in common. These are: to stop the fighting, which could, unless arrested, easily develop ioto a full-scale war; to secure the withdrawal of the Israel forces, and to restore the security of the area of the Canal. Where we differ is in regard to the means of attaining these objectives. 66. Nearly ten years of experience have taught the lesson that decisions of this Council, weighty as they are, in regard to Israel and its Arab neighbours are slow to take effect. But the situation facing us aIl is one of the most immediate urgency. Unless action is taken at once-and, by "at once", l mean in a very few hours-we believe that the Canal may be put out of operation and that the fighting may spread outside the Sinai Peniasula. 67. These are the reasons which have impelled my Government and the Government of France to take preventive action of what is cer-tainly a very drastic kind. As 1 have said repeatedly earlier in the course of today, this action is to be of a purely temporary nature. 'vVe have no wish to infringe the sovereignty of Egypt. When the emergency passes, our forces will be withdrawn. This is, 1 repeat, preventive action, not just selfishly in our own vital interests, but in the interests of ail those who use and are dependent on the Canal and are interested in the maintenance of order in the Middle East. 68. 1 would, if 1 may, recall to representatives the realities of the situation in the Middle East as 1 see them. 69. On the one hand, the Soviet Union Government, which has sought consistently in the last few months to add to the difficulties and dangers of this situation, poses as the protector of the rights of the States in the area and the spokesman of peace. We need only look at events in Hungary to see what such Soviet protection really means and what is the real Soviet attitude to the rights of sovereign nations and to peace. And may 1 add that, but for the unhelpful attitude of the Soviet Union when we were lately discussing the Suez Canal question in this Council, the whole situation in the Middle East would undoubtedly have been far different, and we would probably never have been faced by the grave situation which has arisen. 70. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and France, two nations which have suffered enough from ~r to =lize its full meauiog, = gOiog,~o~aro~n:,:

The subject matter of the item before us is serious indeed and 1 am sure that 1 do not need to speak at any length in order to portray to the Cou41d[ what the attitude of the United States is. 72. President Eisenhower has made his position clear beyond any peradventure. He today expressed his hope that the United Nations would be given a full opportunity to settle the issues in this controversy by peaceful means instead of by forceful ones. He has sent urgent personal messages to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and to the Prime Minister of France. 73. l, as his representative, have devoted, ail day long, ail the time and the energy and the faithfulness that 1 have to give effect to his views. Let the record show, therefore, that such is our position. That will be the extent of my statement tonight.

As repreeentative of FRANCE, 1shall reply briefiy to the statements of the representative of Egypt and at the same time to those of the representative of the Soviet Union. 75. A grave situation exists along the IsraeI-Egyptian armistice demarcation tine. The French Government considers that the measures it has deeided upon, in conjunction with the United Kingdom Government, are such as to avert the danger of hostilities and put an end to the fighting. The French and United Kingdom Governments have requested the Israel and Egyptian Governments to withdraw their troops on either side of the Suez Canal zone. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the cease-fire, the French and United Kingdom Governments have also asked that they should assume provisionally-I repeat "provisionally"-control of certain key positions along the Canal. The purpose of this request is to guarantee the effective separation of the combatants; and also to protect freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, sinee it is absolutely essential to maintain this freedom of passage. 76. These steps should bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of machinerv which will in fact make it impossible for the fighting to continue. In these eircumstances, it seems to me that it would serve no purpose to enter upon a discussion at present of the letter submitted by the representative of Egypt.

At this afternoon's meeting 1 had already explained the attitude of my delegation with regard to the situation creatcd by the ultimatum addressed to Egypt by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom. 79. The statements we have heard from the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, and their unwillingness to support a cease-fire, has only emphasized this gravity. The threats with which Egypt has been confront~d carry an incalculable impact on the peace of the world. 1 wish, therefore, to reiterate our hope that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom will hearken ta the pressing appeal of the President of the United States, that they will not be wholly unresponsive to the sentiments of the majority of the members of this Council, and that they will not pass over the threshold of an adventure which pretends to extinguish one conflict, but which in fact is creating a far more dangerous one and is more seriously endangering the peace of the world.

Two days ago, v;f1en we were discussing the Hungarian question, 1 c1early set forth the position of my delegation by saying that we were opposed to the presence of foreign troops on the territory of another State. 81. The same principle governs our attitude this evening. Furthermore, my delegation's position is clearly shown by the vote which we gave this afternoon in favour of the draft resolution presented by the United States. 82. 1 must confess that, listening ta the statements by the United Kingdom and French representatives, 1 have heard nothing which in our view might justify the actions of their Governments. 1 should still like to hope that these two Governments will realize the responsibilities which they are assuming in committing acts which are without precedent in the annals of the United Nations.

The United States representative has officially informed the Couneil of the substance of President Eisenhower's message to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France. 1 should be failing in my moral duty towards public opinion in my country and towards the Council itself if 1 did not at this time of crisis, with ail due deference, respect and good-will towards ail parties, express my support for the President's message. 1 feel that it reflects the views of public opinion in many parts of the world, and 1 therefore trust that it will be given due consideration by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, for which we have no feelings other than admiration, sympathy, and a desire to see them work together with us effectively on the Security Counci).

With the permission of the President, 1should Iike to submit one suggestion ta the Security Council. We are faced with a situation in which the Security Council, through the use of the veto, has been rendered powerless, a situation which literally is deteriorating by the minute. The danger ta world peace is growing at the same alarming pace. Too much is at stake. We s~reIY cannot let the situa- 13

Daes anyone wish to speak on this proposai?

It was not a formaI proposai; it was just put forward for the consideration of the members of the Couneil.

1 just wish to say, on behalf of my delegation, that the action envisaged by the United Kingdom and French Governments has been fully explained in the Couneil by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. These explanations have been challenged by the Soviet Union and reflected on by sorne other speakers. The Australian delegation does not accept any of the allegations that have been made &c:g'11 1in:;, ~he motives or objectives of this artion. 88. We express fie firm hope that the Ob~'::Ltivesthat have been set out by the representative of the United Kingdom in connexion with this matter will be achieved and that the action so far taken and envisaged will, as he hoped, make a definite contribution towards the re-establishment of peace in this area and, particularly, reinforce the calI which many members of the Security Couneil would have been willing to make ta Israel and Egypt to institute an immediate ceasefire. 89. The PRESIDENT (translatedfrom French): The Couneil has just heard the suggestion made by the representative of Yugoslavia, and 1 am sure that aIl members of the Council will wish to have time ta reflect on that suggestion. 1 therefore propose that we adjourn the meeting and resume our consideration of this subject tomorrow at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 11.5 p.m. Printed in U.S.A. Priee: $U.S. 0.15; (or equivalent in other currencies)