S/PV.751 Security Council

1 simply wish ta say that the United States thinks highly of the Secretary-General, of his mind and of his character. We regard him as being both able and fair. \Ve ghare the opinions that he has just expressed and his concept of his duties. If there were a vote of confidence in him hère this afternoon, we would unhesitatingly vote our confidence in him.

Spœking as representative of FRANCE, 1 wish ta associate myself with what the representative of the United States has just said, and 1 believe 1 can say the same thing in my capacity as President. 8. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): May 1 hegin by saying that the Soviet delegation has confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations and lends mm its support. 9. The situation in the Middle East has deteriorated sharply since yesterday's meeting of the Security Council. According to the latest information, joint British and French forces have begun to invade Egypt. Thus, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have passed from the thicat of arrned intervention in the Middle East ta the execution of their previously announced plan to occupy Egyptian territory. 10. The Soviet delegation expresses its deepest sympathy to the Government and people of Egypt, who are being subjected ta such a trial. We have no doubt that the Egyptian people, who have undergone many trials and tribulations, will, at this critical moment, too, he able to defend their freedom and independence against aU external attacks. 11. The action of the United Kingdom and France, who have unleashed aggression against Egypt, represeots a gross violation of the obligations they have assumed under the United Nations Charter. The Charter requires Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. France and the United Kingdom, in their action against Egypt, have not only threatened to use force, but are now bombing Egyptian settlements 12. The Govertlll1ents of the United Kingdom and France have assumed a heavy responsibility for the crrave deterioration in the international situation by ~ndertaking armed intervention against Egypt at a time when Egypt was repelling agression by Israel. Attention has already been. drawn to the fact that Israel's aggression, iike the aggression of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt, is being carried out in accordance with a single, previously prepared plan and that Israel's aggression was planned in arder to create conditions favourable for the seizure of the Suez Canal b" the. armed forces of the United T'-ingdom and France. The Governments of the Unite.d Kingdom and France are endeavouring to justify their action by asserting that they are protecting the Suez Canal and freedom of navigation on the Canal. It is quite clear, however, that this far-fetched and strained explanation is merely intended as a screen for the aggressive operations of the United Ki:lgdom and France against the Egyptian State. Tn fact, on the one hand, Israel is heingincited to commit aggressior). against Egypt and on tht> other. the Unite.d Kingdom and France are dealing a blow at the victim of the aggression-Egypt. contre l'Egypk 13. If the United Kingdom and France really desired a peaceful ami just "ettlement of the Suez question, there are other-peaceful-means and procedures at their disposaI. As is known, the Security Council recently examined the problem cf the Suez Canal and worked out a plan for the settlement of the Suez question by peaceful means. Under this plan, it would have bren possible to reach a settlement of the Suez problem, which would have been in conformity both with the national interests of the sovereign Egyptian State and with the interests of the Canal ttsers. However, this procedure is not to the liking of the United King-dom and France. The only settlement to their liking is settlement by force and it was precisely with. that ènd in view that Israel's aggression against the Egyptian State has been seized upon as a pretext. In the Security Council, the representatives of the United Kingdom ~nd France have attempted to justify their aggressive activities by allegingthat they are trying to haIt military operations and to restore peace and tranquillity in this area. However, the c-ourse of action the United Kingdom and France are following indicatcs that the opposite is true. un ils pacifiques. sait, de permis à rain telle France. ment qu'ils l'Etat de fier vernements taires région. France 14. tion chait Royaume-Uni Conseil international adressé avec fournir les Royaume-Uni 14. While the Security Council was considering the question of Israel's aggression against Egypt and was trying to find the means for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, the United Kingdom and France, bypassing the Security Cauneil and violating the standards of international law and the prineiples cf the United Nations. presented Egypt with a crude ultimatum, incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign State. with a view to creating a pretext for the seizure of the Suez Cana! by British and French troops. In this ultimatum, the United Kingdom and France required 3 15. The Secllrity COllncil cannot remain indifferent in such a complex situation and must take immediate steps ta haIt the aggression against the Egyptian State and to re-establish peace and tranquillity in that part of the world. 16. In its anxiety at the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East, the Soviet delegation considers it essential for the Security Council to censure the aggressive action of the United Kingdom and France, which has taken the fonn of the bombing of Egyptian settlements and the disembarkation of British and French armed forces in Egyptian territory, and to invite the Governments of the United Kingdom and France ta withdraw their armed forces immediately from Egyptian territory. The Soviet delegation is prepared ta submit a draft resolution to this effect, if necessary. The Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, cannot fail ta meet its direct and immediate obligations. The peoples of the whole world are awaiting the Security Council's decision.

Before l begin my statement, l should like to say that the views expressed here by the Secretary-General have the full support of my Government. On bchalf of my Government, l should like to reiterate our appreeiatioll for the efforts he has always tire1essly deployed in the cause of peace.

l beg the Yugoslav representative's pardon, but l think that the Egyptian representative has just asked for the floor.

l asked for the floor in arder ta make a brief statement ta the Conncil before the debate begins. l think that Egypt's considerable interest in this debate should justify stlcb a request. l do not intend to make a long state1l1ent.

Are the representatives of Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and Iran, who are on 1l1Y list, prepared ta allow the Egyptian representative to speak now? 21. If there are no objections, l caU upon the representative of Egypt.

At the very moment l am speaking before the Council, French and British aircraft have begun ta bomb 4 25. nements hier, manière la que ont, Conseil une cesser 26. mément La une Bien et à nialisme ne seurs. vant 27. de membres grave paix 28. La bilité internationales. d'assumer sion. 29. Hier 30. Thus for the second time within a little more than twcnty-four hours thc Security Council is faced \Vith a c!t'ar-cut case of aggression. The two aets of aggression have actually been so perfectly and so obviousl)' s)'nchronized. their moti\'es fit in so completely, that it is impossible tn vicw them as two separate cases of aggression. What is taking place is a joint aggrcssion by Israel, France and Great 13ritain against Eg)'pt. 31. The moti\'es for the Anglo-French attack on Fgypt are cIear. ,,'hat they sel'!, is ta impose b)' force a solntion of the Suez qucstion at a time when snch earnest eŒorts arc being made to achieve a pcaccful and tIlutually acceptahle st'lllctllt,tlt of the ~ttez proulem in acconlance with the prillt'ipks of the United Nations, 32, The :\nglo-French aggression has placed uefore the United Nations the most serious crisis it has yet hat! to face, The const'llut'nces of this attack on the peace and securitv of the world are incalculable. This morning the l'res'ident of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, in connexion with what he calletl "a regrettable and tragic" course of action, stated: "If this :Jgg'ression is not arrcstcd br the C011- certed action of ail the ~lembers of the United Nations. unforseeable LOnsequences may arise for the peace both in this part of the worId and in cther p:Jrts of the wor!d also." 33, Should Security Council action be once again stultified by the \'l'ta of the aggressors or by other means. the responsibilit\· of the United Nations will not haYe ceased. It will'have passetl to all1\1embers of the United ~ations. tn the United Nations as a whole, 34. Mr. ENTEZA~r (Iran) (translatcd trom French): l was deepl)' moved by the Secretary- General's statement. l should like to tell 1\1r. Hammarskjold that he has always enjoyed the fuH confidence of my deleg"<..ion, a confidence which the comageou5 stand he has just taken has only served to increase. By this l mean that he will have the unreserved support of the delegation of Iran and, l think l would not be going tao far in saying, the support of ail peace-loving' nations. 35. 'Vith regard ta the a1arming reports which have just reached us and whkh create a new and deplorable situation, 1 prefer ta hear what the representati\'es of France and the United Kingdom have to sa\' before giving the views of my delegation. .

1 should like at the outset ta associate myself with the expressions of regard for the Secretary-General which have been voiced by various members of the Council. 'Ve have the highest regard for the integrity and impartiality of Mr. Hammarskjold. 37, As members of the Council will be aware, since our meeting yesterday evening it has been announced that the Egyptian Government regrettably has rejected the communication from Her Majesty's GO'lernment and from the French Government dated 30 October, 39. This intervention, as 1 hope to show in the course of my remarks, has as its overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Middle East. It is one facet of a highly complex and dangerous situation and it cannat therefore be considered, as the Egyptian representative in his letter [S/3712] invites us to do, as a separate ami isolated development. 1 do not, of course, for one moment accept the implications and insinuations in that letter. But in so far as this matter relates to an aspect, and a troubling aspect, of the general situation, naturally 1 am rearly to discuss it. 40. The situation in the Middle East with which we are confronted is perhaps more serious than is generally realized by those who are not intimately concerned with what is going on in that part of the wortd, and 1 think it would be as weil if 1 were to deal with sorne of .the allegations and some of the misconceptions Wll1Ch seem lu have developetl regarding the Anglo- French intervention. 41. The Soviet representative told us yesterday, and he has repeated it again today, that this intervention was part of a long-prepared plot hatched by the British, French and Israel Governments, designed to stir up trouble in the Middle East in order to restore old colonial empires, or words to that effect. 1 think nobody will take this very seriously. 1 think we can aIl understand why the representative of the Soviet Union would wish to invent such stories in view of his owu country's troubles in Eastern Europe. 1 need only make this simple point. It is common knowledge that over the past few months our relations with Israel have been very difficult and even strained. And why? Because of the strenuous efforts made by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the tensions around its borders. Indeed, my colleagues will recollect that it was only a few days ago that the representative of Israel ha'd some sharp words to say about the sympathy 1 had expressed for Jordan. 42. We have also heard the argument that since the Government of Israel has agreed to keep its troops ten miles away from the Suez Canal, no threat to the Canal now exists and the Anglo-French intervention is no longer justified. But 1 must point out that the Israel Government accepted the terms of the communication of the United Kingdom and French Governments on the assumption that the Egyptian response would be positive. But, as we know, the Egyptian response was unfortunately negative. 43. A different line of criticism was expressed yesterday by the representative of Yugoslavia. His tine was that the Anglo-Frenclt intervention, while pur- 46. l need not, l think, weary the Council by repeating what l said yesterday about the very real dangers to the international waterway of the Suez Canal if the present hostilities between Israel and Egypt were prolonged. l will simply say that any prolonged fighting along the banks of the Canal would seriously endanger the lives and shipping of many nations of the world. As is well known, Great Eritain and France are the main users of this Canal, an1 our yital interests ,vould be endangered if free passage were interrupted. l need not go far back into the past, but l should like to recall that the circumstances ln which the Canal \Vas seized were circumstances in which violence and resort to illegal methods \Vere employed. 47. We have a right to defend these vital interests, <md we believe, moreover, that in so doing we are also defending the interests of all nations, and the)' are many, whose economies depend on this great inter- . national right of way. But although we have acted to protect our vital interests and those of other nations in this international waterwa.y, our other purpose, as l have made abundantly c1ear, has been, and remains, to prevent an armed clash between Israel and Egypt leading to a general conflagration. 49. Let me state also with emphasis that we do not and could not condone any Israel action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. It is our view that Israel should withdraw its forces from their present positions as soon as this can be satisfactorily arranged. As 1 stated yesterday, we have no hesitation in regard Israel's incursion across the Egyptian border as a violation of the Armistice Agreement. 50. In the misleading version of events contained in the letter from the delegation of Egypt now before us and in the statement made this afternoon by the representative of Egypt, my Government and the French Government are accused of committing an act of aggression. This is a very serious charge ta make in the Security Council, bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. We strongly deny such charges and do not think it will he profitable for the Council to discuss them. What does constitute and what does not constitute an act of aggression is, as we aIl know, a matter for debate. But the matter which the Council should consider today and on which we ask for the CounciI's understanding support is a temporary intervention by the two Governments that are in a position to restore peace and order effectiveJy and speedily in an area of the world where a major conflagration threatens us. Our intervention is not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt, still less at the territorial integrity of Egypt. 51. 1 sincerely trust that with these explanations, the misunderstandings that may have arisen or that may have been deliberately created will be dispelled, and that the Council, looking at this very grave situation in aIl its aspects, will give sympathetîc support' to what we are trying to do in the interests of preserving peace and order.

Even though 1 reserve the right to speak on the item under discussion when the proper time comes, 1 feel bound, in view of the splendid wards we have heard from the Secretary-General, to express the opinion and also the sentiments of the delegation of Peru. 53. 1 believe 1 am performing a proper dutY in saying that the delegation of Peru bas had no occasion to voice anything but approval-indeed, nothing but et1thusiastic endorsement-for the conduct of the Secretary-General not only as the chief executive officer of an efficient administration but also as the secretary of an assembly deeply irnbued with the spirit and purposes of the Charter. Sb. The PRESIDENT (tra1ls/atcd from French): 1 alll speaking as the representative of FRANCE. 5ï. lt was with regret that the French de1egation telt l1ulige<l lasl night to oppose the adoptioll of the draft resolutilHlS lhen bdorc the Council. \Ve opposed them hecausL' \H' cOllsiùe1'ed that, in the present case, the L'ouncil L'llllid not cOlllille itself simply to examining one sillgle aspect of the l'roblem and because, in our opinion, ail the faclors ought to oe taken iuto consiùeratiull. lt is this thought which guided, and which contillucs to guide, the action taken by the French GovernllleIlt in dose co-operation with the Government of the Unitl'ù .Kingdom. 58, y esterdav we were told that we should first deal with the incidents in the ~inai and should then, if it was considered proper, rcturn to the ùiscussion of thp. Suez question and of the other items on our agenda. fn view of the gravity of the situation, we feel that was not a realistic course. 59. The French GO\'ernment considers that the tension in the :MidJle East had progressive1y grown to such serious proportions that it was no longer possible not to ~xamine the situation as a whole and from aIl its aspects, with a view to taking action accordingly. \Ve were confronted \Vith an attack by the forces of Israel in the Suez zone heading towards the Canal. We had every reason to be1ieve that the military developments arising out of this action might reach the point where free passage through the Canal would be impeded. The latest news received from Egypt, which repûrts the position of the Israel troops, shows how weIl our fears \Vere justified. 60. Experience has also shown us that, whatever the moral force of the Council's decisions, they unfortunately had but little practical effect in this area of the globe since, as my United Kingdom colleague recalled yesterday, there \Vas no means of enforcing them. 61. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom therefore considered that there existed a serious threat to the Suez Canal and that, unless swift, effective and decisive action was taken immediately, we ran the risk that traffic through the Canal wOüld be seriously impeded for an indefinite period. Now free passage through the Suez Canal is a matter of vital importance to most countries of the world. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom took the view that it was their duty to take all necessary steps, even if these steps should, at first, be misunderstood by certain of their friends, in order to safeguard and maintain free passage through the Canal against any 6..J.. In these circumstances, the French Government is convinced that its objects are identical with those which the majority of the members of the Couneil hope to achieve. It asks them to understand the reasons for its action and to help it in proceeding with the action which, in concert with the United Kingdom Government, it has taken in what it believes to be the interest of the international community. 65. Ml'. ENTEZAM (Iran) (translated tram French): 'Nere the situation confronting us less dangerous, we could speak for hours in defence of the Egyptian cause and express our sympathy towards a country which has just been subjected to an unprovoked and absolutely unjustifiable armed attack. But instead of making long speeches, Wf~ must endeavour to find practical means of saving that country. Accordingly, my remarks will be brief. 66. As 1 listened to the French and United Kingdom representatives, the only excuse that 1 could find in their statements was their reference to the existence of threats in the Middle East and the Suez Canal zone. From what side did these threats come? One of two things must he true: if it is Egypt that has created the situation deseribed as threatening, why did you not bring the matter befon:: the Security Couneil and ask the Council to find a solution? But it is Egypt that could make this excuse and, if it had sent its own troops it could defend and justify its action by saying: 1 have done my duty ; 1 have brought the case to the Security Council but, as the Couneil was unable ta come to my assistaoce, it was my duty to defend myself. 67. Accordingly, the excuse pleaded by those who have sent troops seems to me absolutely groundless. 68. The other excuse that might have been pleaded is the existence of a threat in the Suez Canal zone. How did this threat arise? Through the aggression of another State? What have the representatives of France and the United Kingdom done to haIt this aggression? They opposed the drait resolution which was submitted in the Security Council yesterday. And now, instead of punishing the aggressor, they have turned on the victim. Is this kind of excuse tenable before world public opinion? 70. As 1 said at the beginning of my statement, the Council, instead of plunging into prolonged debate, should find the practical means of putting an end to these armed activities which can in no way be justified.

At the dose of yesterday's night meeting, as the Council stood apparently powerless in the face of a rapidly worsening situation, l suggested the possibility of an emergency session of the General Assembly. The tragic developments that have since taken place have given an added emphasis and a new sense of urgency to the necessity of finding other forms of Unhed Nations action to dea! with the deepening crisis. My delegation therefore formally proposes that an emergency special session of the General Assembly be called in accordance with rule 8 (b) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. The text of the draft resolution which 1 am submitting to the Council is as follows: ''Tite Security COlmâl, "Considering that a grave situation has been created by action undertaken against Egypt, "Taking i1Jto a.ccOtmt that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 749th and 7501h meetiüg5 of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, "Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950, in arder to make appropriate recommendations." 1 hope the text of this draft will be circulated as soon as possible.

May l, through the President, ask a question of the representative of Yugoslavia: Is it his intention to put the draft resolution immediately to the vote? 73. ~Ir. BRILEJ (Yl1gos1avia): 1 submitted the draft r~solution. It is up to the Council to decide when it wishes to vote on it.

1 should like to see the text.

It will be circulated as soon as it is :"ady.

1 think it would be better to adjourn for haH an hour .so that we can have the text before us to study.

If there is no objection 1 shall suspend the meeting for haH an hour in accordance with the Iranian represemative's proposaI.

The representative of Yugoslavia has just submitted a draft resolution calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly under General Assembly resolution 377A (V) entitled "Uniting for peace". 82. 1 submit that the procedure proposed is quite out of order and not in accordance with the clear terms of the "Uniting for peace" resolution itself. 1 shall explain why. 83. It is quite clear that the "Uniting for peace" resoiution may he invoked only when certain conditions are fulfilled. The relevant passage of the resolution provides for the calling of an emergency special session of the General Assembly: "... if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to he a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression ...". Thus, a pre-condition-of invoking the procedure is that a lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Councij should have prevented the Council from taking a decision. 84. This clearly presupposes that a draft resolution on the substance of the item before the Council has peen submitted, circulated and voted upon, and until that has been done, it cannot he determined t},ett the Security Council has failed to take a decision owing to the lack of unanimity of the permanent members. But no such text has been circulated or voted upon on the item now before the Council, namely, the letter dated 30 October frc,m the representative of Egypt. 85. Furthermore, the two draft resolutions which we voted upon yesterday under another item are not within the compass of the "Uniting for peace" resolution and, therefore, in my submission they cannot he invoked to support the Yugoslav proposaI. 86. A further consideration in my mind is that it is quite true that two draft resolutions. advanced successively by the United States delegation and then by the Soviet Union delegation, failed yesterday to carry because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Council, but the reason for that is simple and must be well known to all the memhers of the Council. It was because my Government ana the French Government were and are convinced that action on the Hnes proposed by the United States dele- 87. Finally, 1 would add that in the present circumstances the calling of an emergency special session of the General Assembly on this subject would clearly have serious implications. 88. 1\1r. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): 1 am sorry, but it is impossible for me t0 accept the arguments submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom. It seems to me that sorne of his arguments are not at all relevant ta the cirait resolution, such as, for instance, the reasons for which the two permanent members of the Security Council used the veto yesterday. They ttsed the veto twice on two draft resolutions calling fOT a cease-fire. 89. It seems to me that the representative of the United Kingdom will agree with me that there exists not only a threat to the peace but also a breach of the peace. 1 hope that he Wi'l, agree with me that the landing of armed forces on the territory of an independent country and the bombarding of its cities are certainly a breach of the peace. The Secttrity Council failed to agree on that hecause of the veto. 90. The third argument the representative of the United Kingdom introduced is that on the item now under discussion no draft resolution bas heen vetoed, and that, therefore, the "Uniting for peace" resoltttion cannot he applied. Both aspects of the problem in respect of which we propose that an emergency special session should he convened arc covered by the United States draft resolution [S/3710), which was submitted yesterday. The question of the intervention in Egypt of forces other than Israel forces is covered by paragraph 2 (a) of that draft resolution. That was recognized by the representative of Australia yesterday when he said: "1 just wish to explain t.'te Australian vote on item 3 of the provisional agenda." This was the vote on the agenda which we are 110W discussing. "The AustraHan delegation abstained on the inclusion of this item because we consider that the substance of the matter has a1ready been before the Council in the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom and that while the views set forth in the letter contajned in document 5/3712 may no douot be advanc.ed in the Council, it is not necessary to inscribe this as a separate JI1f.:ter on the agenda." [750th meeting, para.lO.] 91. 1 also have here the views expressed by the representative of the United IGngdom. He said: "This leti:er in fact deois with the substance of a letter which 1 myself read out to the Council in the course of my intervention earJier tOOay." [Ibid., parti. 3.] We were discussing "-L-':: urst point at that time. 92. It seems to me, therefore, that the provisions of th~ General Assembly resolution entitled "Uniting 94. In my submission, this resolution ean only be invoked following action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Action under Chapter VII is dependent upon a determination by the Couneil of the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The draft resolutions which were before the Council yesterday contained no such finding. This, 1 think, is all 1 need sayat the moment in response to the counter-arguments advanced by the Yugoslav representJtive. 95. The PRESIDENT (tratlslated fram- French): 1 should like ta speak as the representative of FRANCE. 96. 1 cannat agree with Mr. Brilej's interpretation of the juridical background of his draft resolution. 1 note that this draft resolution does not specify the question which would be brought before the General Assembly. There have been no manifestations today of a lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council. If the Yugoslav representative is referring to the \'oting which took place yesterday, 1 must point out to him that the item to which those votes related, that is to 5ay, the United States complaint, is not on the agenda of this meeting. 97. Moreover, the resolution entitled "Uniting for peace" provides that the Council may bring before the General Assembly cases of threats ta the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Now-and 1 am still speaking of the United States complaintneither the text of the" complaint nor the draft resolutions proposed yesterday by the United States and the Soviet Unio.l de1~gations respectively came within the terms of the General Assembly resolution, in other words within the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. A specifie decision would have been necessary for that purpose. IS 9~. For both these reasons, the Yugoslav draft resolution seems to me to be inconsistent with the texts on which it is based. 99. 1 would add, with regard ta substance, that if· such a draft resolution were aclopted this evening, the consequences might be m05t serions. 100. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): The United States has always be~n a strong supporter of the "Uniting for peace" resolution. 1 personaUy remember that in 1950, when 1 was a representative, Mr. Dulles, who is now Secretary of State, represented the United States in the First Committee. He played a very active part in the drafting of that resolution and, as a matter of fact, is somewhat of an expert on its spirit and on Its letter. 101. We believe in exhaustïng every remedy that is open to us in the interests of peace. Much as we dislike to disagree with our friends, we do think that the Yugoslav draft resolution is c1early relevant and c1early applicable in the present circumstances, and we shall therefore vote in favour of it. 103. l do not find the reasoning of the representative of Yugoslavia at aIl convincing. The Security Council yesterday considered item 2 on the agenda and two draft resolutions-one of which 1 voted for-which were not adopted by the CoundI. At the conclusion of that discussion the President of the Council said: "1 shall conclude that the Council has completed its consideration of item 2 of the agenda, and we shall now proceed to the consideration of item 3." [750th nteeting, para. 39.] 104. It is true that in my view the matter raised in the letter from the representative of Egypt was a matter that had been referred to in the communication given to us by the representative of the United Kingdom when he tabled the statement made by the United Kingdom Prime Minister in the Bouse of Commons, and 1 took the view that this was not a separate item appropriate to be inscribed in our agenda. 1 was overruled by the decision of the CounciI. The representative of Yugoslavia and others, thought that it should be a separate item, and it was owing to their votes that it was included in the agenda. From that point of view, therefore, it does not seem to me to be logical ta affirm that the votes that took place in connexion with item 2 of the agenda would govern our procedure in dealing with item 3. l'hat is aIl 1 wish to sayat the moment. 105. Of course, if the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Yugoslavia were to be considered further, then I would reserve my right to comment on it. 106. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): 1 have one brief remark to make. The President, in his capacity as the representative of France, had stated, inter alia, that the subject with which we were dealing yesterday was not a question under Chapter VII of the Charter. 1 should like to recall first the statement made yesterday hy the representative of the United States in introducing his draft resolution. He said: "The Government of the United States feels that it is imperative that the Council act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace has occurred, to order that the military action undertaken by Israel cease immediately . .." [748th meeting, para. 8.] 107. It seems to me that, whatever might be the wording of the ciraft resolutions and questions with which we are dealing, the fact is that yesterday's draft resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of armed forces, expressed grave concern at the violation of the Armistice Agreement and requested a cease-fire. It would seem to me, according to my understanding of the Charter, that aIl of this is covered by Chapter VII, Articles 40 and 4l. 108. The PRESIDENT (translated front French) : l would like to reply brieRy ta Mr. Brilej in my capacity as representative of FRANCE. In the first place, what matters is the texts that have been submitted to us and not the discussions or the comments that have been made on them. Neither the letter from the representative of the United States nor the cirait resolution which he submitted make any reference to a breach 110. .Ml". 'l'SlANG (China): The considerations put before us by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Aust,alia seem to me to be weil founded, but l eonsicler those considerations to be of a technical nature. If pressed too far, they would be tantamount to an. invitation ta put before the Council such a draft resolution, to put it ta a vote and then to bring about the failure that would fulfil the technical requirements advanced by Sir Pierson and Ml'. Walker. On political gl"ounds, therefore, l hope that the delegations of the United Kingd01l1 and Australia will not press that technieal argument too far. l put that point forward because l want to explain the attitude of my delegation taward this draft resolution. 111. My delegation will vote for the draft resolution. If a special session of the General Assembly is convoked, my de1egation will join with ail others in seekillg a constructive solution of the problem in harmony with justice and law. That would be our primary interest. 1 believe that it would be wrong for the Security COl.lncil or for the General Assembly, in special session, ta make its primary concern the condemnation of someone or to indulge in propaganda or controversy. We are faced with a serious situation. Despite the fact that wc have once debated the Suez Canal question, 1 am not sure that we have donc enough to p'"omote a constructive solution of that problem in accordance with law and justice. That is the spirit in v..-hich we hope the special session of the General Assernbly will be held. 112. Ml'. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated from S panish): At this juncture the Peruvian delegation is deeply concerned about the prob1em of maintaining the peace and the methods of maintaining peace. 113. Yesterday, when l associated myself with the fine initiative taken by President Eisenhower, l expressed a hope which, in spite of events, l still cherish. 1 prefer that hard facts should deprive me of my last hope; but l shall not abandon hope myself until this happens. 114. l hope that those intangible feelings of justice and peace will prevail and lead us to a solution. And that is why l heard, with great pleasure and complete approval, the statement made by the Chinese representative. 17 o~h.er countries, a universality in which peace is indi- VIslble-has the mission of maintaining the peace. We cannot accept the existence of other organizations unless they co-opt'rate with, or within the framework of, the United Nations. 117. Accordillgly, when a breach of the peace has occurred, the United Nations must pursue the ideal of peace to the very end, with equanimity, with caImness and in a constructive spirit. We have been unable t~ pUt'sue this idea.l in the Security Council owing to d.tfIerences on whlch 1 shaH not comment. Consequ.ently! .we should attend the General Assembly in thiS spmt; we should go to the Assembly in a constructive frame of mind, and 1 hope that the very announcement that the Assembly is ta meet will have sufficient moral impact ta calm the minds and ta bring us the peace which we ail desire. 118. In this spirit the deiegation of Peru will vote for the draft resolution. ~19. Mr. ~LANCO (Cuba) (trans/ated tram Spanssh): 1 thmk that nobody Cüuld deny that a breach of the. pea~e has. occurred. Throughout yesterday the ç0i!nctl tned, 'YIth aH ~~e means at its disposaI, ta hmit the extensIOn of mlhtary operations and ta take the necessary steps to bring about a cease-fire and the restoration of peace. But our efforts were frustrated by the use of the veto. 1 assume that in these ~ircum5tances the United ~ations cannat simply stand Idly by, but must pursue Its peaceful efforts. That is the primary responsibility of the United Nations. 120. In the opinion of my delegation, the proper course would be to convene the General Assembly for an emergency special session, a decision which can be taken by this Council on the vote of any seven of its members. 121. 1 consider that the United Nations should exhaust ail possible courses of action likely ta restore peace and open the way for the settlement by peaceful means of the problems which have produced the extr~meIy grave situation in the Middle East. 122. For these reasons the delegation of Cuba will vote for the Yugoslav draft resolution.

1 should like tn reply ta the Chinese representative in my capacity'.", representative of FRANCE.

Frankly 1 have heard nothing to contravert my contention that the Yugoslav draft resolution is not in order. The only argument that bas been advanced is that my objections have been founded on technica1 ~ounds. This, 1 suppose, means that 1 may be right ID my interpretation of this important document on which we are asked to take certain action but that that is a consideration which we need not take iuto aecount. This is not a good position for the Couneil to adopt towards its constitution, in view of the regard we must have to the precedents we may create in dealing with our affairs. 126. Therefore, Mr. President, 1 feel that 1 must ask you to take a vote on my contention that the Yugoslav draft resolution is not in order. It is merely to save you embarrassment that 1 am not suggesting that you should make a ruling on the matter. Therefore 1 ask for a vote on my contention that the Yugoslav draft resolution is not in order.

The Cauneil has before it a United Kingdom motion to the effeet that the draft resolution submitted by the Yugoslav representative should he ruled out of order. 1 shall put the motion to the vote. A voie was taken by show of hands. In favo"r: Australia, Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland. Against: Cuba, Iran, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Yugoslavia. Abstaining : China. The motion was rejected by 6 flotes ta 4, witn 1 abstention.

The voting, 1 think, will have demonstrated that there must. be considerable doubt as to the legality of the draft resolution which has been advanced by the representative of Yugoslavia. avoir des de

It seems to me, as the President mentioned earlier, that the list of speakers il! exhausted. Therefore 1 propose that we proceed to the vote on the draft resolution which is before the Council. 129. glais] liste au saisi.

1 have deferred commenting on the substance of the Yugoslav draft. 1 said before that 1 would reserve my right to speak on it if it was to be \"oted on today. One reason for deferring my remarks for so long is the impossibility of obtaining instructions from my Government in 50 short a tirue concerning this draft which was submitted this afternoon. 1 wanted, however, to he sure that 1 should have an opportunity to speak before the vote. 1 raised my hand because 1 feared that the President 130. Je n'ai pas du droit L'une est gouvernement, résolution pendant, avant 132. And if we ask ourseh'es why it is that today the United Nations machinery does not vrovide for effecth"e action in accordance with the original conceptions of the Olarter, 1 think there is no doubt of the reason. The development of this machinery, conceived in such statesmanlike terms at the original conference in San Francisco, has been hampered and often fmstrated bv the use of the veto bv the Soviet Union delegatio-n and by that delegation's opposition to varions measures which the Council might weil have taken ta deal with the grave proolems before it from time to time. 133. \\Te are meeting here today because of the tragic situation in the Middle East-a situation the gravity of which has been increasing but which, as 1 say, has e:'{isted for a very considerable time. Heaven knows that the Securitv Council has done its best to maintain peace in the l\I1ddle East. It has investigated, it has endeavoured to conciliate, it has recommended, it has issued calls to the parties. It has been defied by Israel and defied by the Arab neighbours of Israel agaip at'd again. The Security Council sent the Secretary- General to the area. and he had achieved, we believed. a considerable degree of success in holding the position of observance of the provisions-or, at any rate, the most vital provisions--of the armistice agreements. 134. 1 should like to say, with regard to the statement which our respected Secretary-General made earlier ~oda:r, that the Australian Government, like the other Governments represented in the Council, has the fullest confidence in the Secretary-General and the greatest .respect for the devoted and extremely able efforts that he has deployed in carrying out the tasks assigned to him by the Council in connexion with the conflict in the Middle East. But there has still been deterioration in this tragic situation. There has been continued disregard of the decisions of the Security Council by bath sides. 137. 1 should also like to say that the record of the United Kingdom and France in the work of the United Nations, and their contributions in the past to our attempts to solve these problems, have been such as to merit dispassionate and even sympathetic consideration for the statements that they have made in this Couneil, and 1 would hope that the Council is able to accept the assurances which the representatives of these great States have given us. 138. 1 ask myself whether an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as is now proposed, will contribute to the solution of tbis conflict-a conflict which we were considering yesterday, between Israel and Egyot. Since the Couneil ha~ felt it appropriate to admit this proposaI for an emergency speeial session, and has rejected the view that the question dealt with yesterday and the question deaIt with today are entirel)' different, it seems to me that, if there is an emergency session, it must be concerned not onty with the action now taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France but with the continuing conflict between Israel and its neighbours. For the whole present situation is just one phase of that unresolved conflict which has plagued the world and the Security Couneil for 50 long. 1 ask myself, then, whether a special session will contribute to a solution of these problems. 1 very much doubt it.

' The Yugoslav representative has asked that bis draft resolution should be put to the vote. 1 shaH comply with his request in a moment. Before doing so, however, 1 should like to make a brief remark. If the Yugoslav representative's draft resolution should be adopted, it is c1ear that the item on the General Assembly's agenda would be the United States complaint, and not the Egyptian complaint, on wbich no vote has '1een taken. 140. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): May 1 also make a brief observation. It seems to me that the General Assembly, if convened, is the master of its own procedure and business.

It is therefore clear that the intention is to refer to the General Assembly the Eg)'ptian complaint, in respect of which the conditions required by the resolution entitled "Uniting for peace" are not fulfilled.

Speaking as the representative of FRANCE, 1 should like to make the same remark as Sir Pierson Dixon has just done. 1 fully reserve my Government's position concerning the admissibility of the resolution that the Council has just adopted.