S/PV.755 Security Council

As you know, this meeting was convened at the request of the representative of the Soviet Union following the telegram to the President of the Security Gmncil from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/3736]. 2. Before proceeding to the adoption of the agenda, l calI upon the Secretary-General. 3. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: l thank "the President for thb opportunity to inform the Security Couneil about the situation as l envisage it at present. The COlindl will remember that under the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, l am authorized to pursue efforts in order to achieve a cease-fire. That is the point on which l feel that the Couneil would like to be informed. 4. In replies received to the request for a cease-fire, effective 4 November at 2400, New York time, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that as soon as the Governments of Israel and Egypt signify acceptance of, and the United Nations endorses a plan for, an international force with the functions prescribed, the two Governments would cease all military action. 5. By the adoption of the resolution [1000(ES-I)] of 5 November 1956, providing for the establishment of a United Nations Command, the United Nations General Assembly has taken the first deeisive step in the 6. The Government ')f Egypt has, through a message which I received today, accepted the resolution of the General Assembly of 5 November, and may thus be considered as having accepted the est3rylishment of an international force under the terms fixed by the United Nations. The Government of Egypt has further accepted yesterday the request of the Secretary-General for a cease-fire without any attached conditions. It is ta be assumed that this acceptance, although referring ta the time limits set in my request, is generally valid. 7. Today 1 received frc,n the Government of Israel, in clarification of its first reply ta my request ior a ceasefire, a statement ta the effect that in the lïght of Egypt's decla.ation of willingness ta l:t:ase fire, Israel wishes ta confirm its readiness ta agrcr to ~ cease-fire. 8. The conditions for a general cease-fire would thus, it seems, depend on the possibility of an agreement concerning the plan for an international force. The Council is aware of the fact that by tomorrow, on the instructions of the General Assernbly, 1 hope ta ~ able ta present such a plan, following up the first decision through which the United Nations Command was established. However, in view of the significance of this specifie problem and the situation we are now fadng in the eease-fire question and in view of the progress made, 1 felt that it was appropriate to seek with great urgeney a further clarification in arder ta facilitate progress. 9. 1 have in this situation also to mention that this afternoon . received a letter from the permanent representative of the United Kingdom whieh 1 have taken the liberty of having circulated ta the members of the Security Council. There is one point in that letter which is in my view of special significance for the progress report I have taken the liberty of presenting. It is the following one: the representative of the United Kingdom states that orders have been given that all bombing should eease forthwith throughout Egypt. 10. 1 beg the pardon of the Couneil if 1 have interfered in any way with a question wh:ch in a certain way may be extraneous to the proceedings of the Council, but 1 have done so because 1 feel that the progress marked in the course of the day is of significance in its considerations. 11. The PRESIDEN'l' (translated from Frewh): The representative of the Soviet Union has éisked ta speak. 1 would ask him \."hether he wishes ta speak before or after the adoption of the agenda. 12. MI'. SOBOLEV (Union of ,:;~.riet Socialist Republics) (tmnsl.ate.d from Russian) : 1 wish merely to point out that the question r.îised by the Government of the Soviet Union has not become less timely as a result of the Secretary-General's explanation. 13. There is no need for me to go into the history of this question which is clear ta ail. 1 should merely like to add ta the Secretary-General's explanation a quota- This sentence was mentioned by the Secretary-Gem:ral. Unfortunately the Secretary-General did not read the next sentence as follows ; "Any other fcrm of air action as opposed to bombing will be confined to the support of any necessary operation in the Canal area." As l understand it, this means that sorne necessary operations will be carried out in the Canal area. The nature of these operations was explained to u;; earlier, at previous meetings of the Security Couneil. These operations will recei'!e aerial support. They will be supported not by bombing but by othe. methods. l know of two such methods and experts could no doubt sup".;e.,;: others. For example, parachute troops cau be d.opped. This i" also a form of air support. If hombing is not carried out then, let us say, rocket missiles could be used. That would not be bombing. In short, the nature of this reservation with regard to military operations is such that the item which the Government of the Soviet Union has requested the Security Couneil to place on its agenda is now just as timely as it was before.

The representative of Yugoslavia asked to speak in order to make a statemer.t which does not relate to the agenda for this meeting. In the circumstances, l think l can accede to his request. If there is no objection, l shall cali upon the representative of Yugoslavia. 15. MI'. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia) : l should like to make the views of my delegation c1ear on the question of the adoption ôf the agenda. My delegation will vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda as set out in document S/Agenda/755/Rev.1. 16. '!'he PRESIDENT (translated from French) : 1 apologize for interrupting you, but l had understdod that your statement did not relate to the adoption of the agenda. 17. MI'. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): Then it was obviously a misunderstanding. 18. The PRESIDENT (translated jrom French) : In that case, if the Secretary-General wishes to speak, l shaH call upon mm. 19. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: l wish to speak for just one minute. 1 am sure there is no misunderstanding between the representative of the Soviet Union and myself. 1 felt free to quote only one sentence, as 1 had given instructions that the letter should be on the table and thus could be read by all the members. My choice of facts, from the very rich story of this day, was based on my desire to register the points where progress had taken place. 21. M v vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda does not prejudge my delegation's at!itude with re~ard to any substantive proposaI that l111ght be sublnttted under' this item, the wording of which reflects the situation prevailing now in the Middle East. 22. 1\!l. YAN LAN(-;ENHOVE (Belgium) (trallslatrd ft'om Fn'IlC"): "Vhat I have to say concerns pro- \'~duré onlv. I do not know whether any members of the Counell intend to ohject to the agenda. For my part. I feel that the question is too important not to be put'to a formai vote, even if there are no express objer,ions. ?:. The PRESIDENT (translated fr'.Jm French): Are there cmy further comments? If I understand him correctly, the representative of Belgium is not requesting a vote on the adoption of the agenda. 24. 'Mr. '"AN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (trallslatea irom French) : On the contrary, 1 ask that a vote be taken. 25. The PRESIDENT (trallslat.~dfrol/! Fretlch) : As no objection has been raised, I shaH take a vote on the adoption of the agenda. 26. Mr. VA;..I LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translafrd f"olll Frellch): I explaincd that I was merely asking for a formal'vote on the adoption of the agenda. 2i. The PRESIDENT (trallslated Jrom Frellch): The Council will now vote on the adoption of the agenda, as contained in document S/Agendaj755/Rev.1. A vote 'was takell by show of /rands. In favour: Iran, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, y ugoslavia. Against: Australia, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Al,stailling: Belgium, China, Cuba, Peru. T"e !,V"O'i.'isiollal agellda 'was rejected by 4 '{Jotes ia 3, 'll1Ïtfl 4 abstentiolls. 28. ~fr. LODGE (United States of America) : Yesterdav we learnt of the butchery which Moscow \Vas in the prOeess of carrying out against the peopie oi Hungary under cover of so-called negotiations. Now we have the pending Soviet proposaI. 1 submit, in aIl candour, that it sets a sombre record of cynicism and indifference to the ,-:ùues of interrational morality. The Soviet draft resolution embodies an unthlllk"h1e suggestion that militan" forces of the Soviet Union, together -.vith those of the" United States, should he sent into the fighting in Egypt unless the fighting stops within twelve hours. 29. This would convert Egypt into a stil1larger battlefield. The fact is that the United Nations, through the

At the first meeting of its emcrgency special session the General Assembly adopted a resolution [997(ES-I)] designed to end the hostilities undertaken by the United Kingdom, France and Israel agr.inst :!.7CD'pt. In the words of that resolution the General Assembly : "Urges as a matter of priority that aU parties ne..1 involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereofr halt the movement of military forces and arms into i:he area." Secondly, the General Assembly: Urges "the parties ta the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw aU forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements". 31. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France rejected the General Assembly's recommendation which provided means of ending hostilities and settling the situation in the Middle East. In their reply to the General Assembly resolution, these Powers not only stated their intention of continuing aggressive activities against the Republic of Egypt, but set forth an additional condition which aggravated the situation. 32. In this connexion, on 4 Noyember the General Assembly adopted another resolution [999(ES-I)] in which it reaffirmed its resolution of 2 November and once again called upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of that resolution, and authorized the Secretary-General immediateiy to arrange with t.~e parties concerned for the implementation of the ceasefire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area. In this resolution the General Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later th.m twelve hours from the time of adoption of the resolution. 5 35. This reply from thf' Governments of th" United Kingdom and France is nothing more th,m another ultimatum, this time directed not only against Egypt, the vidim of anned aggression, but in l'ffect against the United Nations as a \Vltole. 36. By making the cessation of hostilities dl'pl'nd on the acceptance of the ce;-lse-lire condi,iolls by Israel, whîch WolS the instrument of British-French intervention in Egypt and which is now 0pCt1ly making territorial daims on Egypt, the victim of aggression, the United Kingdom &nd France are trying, first, to prolong aggressive operations against the Egyptian people and, second, to foist upon the United Nations a solution of the Suez and Paiestine questions through the threat and use of force. 37. The unprovoked aggression of the United Kingdom, France and Israel has assumed a new, even more threatening character and there is danger that it may lead to another world war. The United Kingdom and France, using large forces, have begun an invasion of Egyptian territory. 38. The Secretary-General has informed us here of certain facts which he thinks show that progress is being made towards a cease-fire. However the situation t_:", ~ _L ..J = : ,._ _1 ,.1 ,... .. llèl:t UU\. '-lldl1f;t:\.! lU <1il)' nGY .;,UI\"..... VU1J LVUUoJ" Uo3' J'""u, know, the invasion of Egypt by parachute troops has begun. Moreover the letter from the United Kingdom Governtl1ent2 addressed to the Secretary-General which l re2.d out here contains no promises but states quite openly that " orders have been given that aH bombing sho1tld cease Any other form of air action ... will be confined to the support of any necessary operation in the Canal area". 42. The Soviet Government proposes that action should he taken in accordance with Article 42 of the United Nations Charter. In the draft resc!ution which has been submitted to the Council [S/3736] and which it has just rdused to consider, the Security Council: ItC011sid('rs if ('ssl'nflal, in accordance with Article 42 of thr United Nations Charter, that al! States Mem- ÎKrs of the United Nations, ebflecially the United Statf~s of America and the Union (lf Soviet Socialist Rep.1blics, as permanent members of the Security Cot'ncil having powerfal air and naval forces at their dislJo:ml, should give military and other assistanœ to the R.epttblic of Egypt, which has been the victim of aggression, by sending naval and air forces, military units, volunteers, military instructors and other forms of assistance, if the United Kingdom, France and Israel fail to carry out this resolution within the stated time limits." The draft resolution also states that the Security Council: "Considering the necessity of taking immeciiate steps to put an end to the aggression . . . "Proposes to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel that they should immediately, and not later than twelve hours after the adoption of this resolution, cease ail military action against Egypt and withdraw within three days the troops that have invaded Egypt." 43. The Security Council has refused to examine this draft :esolution and even ta discuss the question of tue violation of a United Nations decision by the United Kingdom and France. The Security Council rejected thi5 question without discussion. 44. Mr. Lodge frequently uses the word "cynicism". 1 can only say to Mr. Lodge that it is indeed cynkism to push the Security Council down the path of inaction white aggressive operations by the United Kingdom and France agaînst Egypt are in full swing. Docs he not consider that by restricting the Security Council and rendering it inactive in this way the aggressors are being encouraged to persevere in their actions? 45. l would like to condude my statement with the folIo. ;ing remarks. Those members of the Security 7 47. At the same time, however, the Cuban delegation desires to state its view that the Security Council is not competent to consider this question since the question is now pending before the General Assembly. The Soviet Union draft purports to amend a resolution [998(ES-/)] adopted yesterday in conne.xion with a United Nations international Force by substituting the Soviet Union for such trustworthy nations as Norway. Colombia, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Canada. In my view, that would certainly be prejudicial to the interests of the United Nations and to those of the Egyptian people, for if the Soviet Union uses its forces to impose peace in Eg-ypt as it has done in Hungary, it is safe to say that more than 50,(X)() men, women and children will be killed. Knowing that that would happen, the Cuban delegation could not cast an affirmative vote. 48. 1 understand that considerable progress has been ma.de. That is what the Secretary-General has told us. The parties concerned have offered to cease fire, the international Force is being constituted, and if the Soviet Union draft resolution were adopted we would have to begin a1l over again. For if the Soviet Union should be allowed to establish itself on Egyptian territory with its own troops, we would subsequently need a huge international force to get them out again. Never have they left a place in wruch they have set foot. Cuba could therefore not take the responsibility for such a development. 49. Moreover, 1 hope that the Secretary-G~neral is making every e~ort to determine what progress can he achîeved on the question of Hungary. The latest information is distressing. The slaughter of defence1ess Hungarians is continuing. As the General Assembly has also agreed on that question, 1 am sure that the Secretary-General will make every effort to bring about, as speedily as possible, the withdrawal of Soviet troops which are oc.cupying Hungary and crucifying the innocent Hunganan people. 50. Si:- Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): As 1 understanct it, the essence of the Soviet Union proposai is. that a1l Member States-and especial1y the United States and the Soviet Union-should combine against the United Kingdom and France, with the approval and blessing of the United Nations. 1 think that it is no exaggeration to say that this i_ ",fi impossible proposaI in terms of the United Nations, and it clearly bas no 51. On the other hand, we are anxious and ready to band over our responsibilities to the United Nations. The United Kingdom and French G:lvernments will c~~e aIl military action as soon as the United Nations enrJISes a plan for an international force, with the objectiv'~s which are too well known to all to need repetition nere. 52. 1 think that the Security Couneil was entirdy right in rejecting the idea of even discussing tbis Soviet Union pr\Jposal. 53. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (tramlated fram French) : My vote was detern:tined by the unorthodox nature of the Soviet Union Government's sudden action. The emergency special session of the General Assembly discussed and adopted recommendations on the Egyptian question. It did 50 in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the Security Couneil which the Soviet Union delegation voted for. If the Security Cauneil were to deal with the matter, as it has been requestecl to do, it would paralyse the General Assembly, for the Charter clearly seeks to prevent the confusion and possible conflict which would arise if these two bodies were to take up the same question at the same time. 54. 1 fail to see the purpose of the Soviet Union proposaI. Nor do 1 see how this action could serve the cause of peace. It seems to me that it would be more likelv to compromise the efforts which the General Assembly is at p-resent making. 55. Mr. TSIANG (China) : My delegation has seldom voted against the inscription of a new item on the agenda. Indeed, my delegation has seldom abstained in the vote on the adoption of an agenda. We have been consistently liberal in this matter. Wherever there is doubt, we give the benefit of the doubt to the propu'sal and vote in favour of its adoption. In the present case, 1 find it impossible to stretch my liberaHty to the extent of voting in favour of the adoption of the agenda. 56. It is my understanding that the peace-making process initiated in the speeial session of the General Assembly bas made considerable progress. Whether or Si. Mr. BELAUNDE (Pem) (transfa/cd fram Spmlislr) : One of the bases of our Organization-in fact, of any organization-is the avoidance of ovcrlapping competence or double jurisdiction. Just as the General Assembly cannot consider a question of which the Security Council is seized. so the Security Council obviously callnot logically consider a question which is pending before the General Assembly, particularly one referred to it by virttte of a procedural resolution adopted by the Council itsetf. 58. The General Assembly is considering the whole question of the Middle East. It is doing so not merely for the purpose of adopting a general resolution and, having done so, of leaving the matter there. It has adopted a resolution which initiates a series of resolutions and which, in addition to issuing an injunction to the parties concerned, confers a mandate. The Secretal")'- General is the persan upon whom the mandate for achieving a peaceful seulement has, with complete confidence. been conferred. The Secretary-General is reporting to us daily on his negotiations. He has just presented a report for the information of the Council. He is required to report to the General Assembly within the time limit prescrihed in the resolution [998(ES-I)] which Canada had submitted. He has told us today that his negotiations are producing results, although perhaps not as speedily as he might wish. The fact is that we are wittlt:ssing today a process designed to restore peace br promoting agreement among the parties and a rapproc/lemetlt which is essential to the restoration of peace. Nothing, not even the Charter, much less the specifie provisions of General Assembly resolution 377 (\-) entitled "l.'niting for peace" and those of us who participated in the extensive debate which resulted in the adoption of that resolution are familiar with its provisions-nothing, 1 say, would authorize the Council at this stage to declare itt 'f competent in the matter and so t'J provoke an unwarranted and in lOvery respect undesirnble suspension of the action initiated by the General Assembly which, at this moment, represents the judgement of all mankind and has received its full support. 59. Hence, from the strictly legal point of view, we were right not to include the USSR draft in our agenda. 60. However, 1 have yet another legal reason for not .ha,;ng supported its inclusion. Peace, as every member of the Council knows, is divided into stages. We are at the stage of carrying out provisional measures the immediate purpose of which is to prevent the situation from deteriorating. \Ve can certainly not take any further steps before exhausting these provisional meas- 61. Accordingly, 1 fm'mally abstained because, like the representative of Cuba, 1 have not had time to transmit the Soviet Union draft resolution to my Government. In the cil'cumstances, the correct course of action \Vas to abstain, particularly when that abstention, by its nature and effect, prevented the USSR proposaI from being included in the Council's agenda.

The situation in the Middle East is at present before the General Assembly. The item which we have just refused to place on the agenda of the Security Couneil was proposed by the permanent. member of the Conncil which vetoed the Couneil's re.solution on Hungary and which is using the powerful armed forces at its disposaI to suppress in most brutal fashion the attempts of the Hungarian people to affirm their national independence. 63. The Soviet step in proposing this i1<:111 for our agenda today is an act of odious and heartless effrontery. This is ablatant attempt to inject Soviet power into the Middle East in its most naked form. How is it possible that the country that is now completing the subjugation of Budapest can appear here and pose, on the one hand, as the champion of the Charter and, on the other, as the champion of oppressed peoples? It is fantastic that the Soviet Union, which has used its military might since the war to deny freedom of politieal choice to scores of millions of people, should presume today to play the palt of accuser against countries that in the same period have brought freedom and independence ta hundreds of millions.

Speaking as the representative of IRAN, 1 should like very bridly to explain my delegation's vote. The majority of the Security Council members have always heîd -and my delegation entirely shares that view-that the inclusion of an item in the agenda in no way prejudges the substance of the question. My delegation voted in favour of the adoption of the agenda, because it believes that, if the meaning and scope of an item whose inclusion is requested by a delegation are to be properly understood, the item must first be placed on the agenda.

1 should like to make a few remarks on the statements that have been made at today's meeting. Certain legal objections were raised against the proposa! submitted by the Soviet Union, but unfortum.tcly it was impossible to examine these legal objections in the Security Council because the question was not even inc1uded in the agenda. The objections on the substance of the matter are unfounderl. "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 wouId be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action"-I wouId draw Sir Pierson Dixon's attention to the word "action"-"by air, sea or land forces as mav be necessarv to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations." 68. In what respect is our proposaI inconsistent with the Charter? Let us e....amine it. In the words of the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council [S/3736] by the Soviet Union, but not e....amined by the Council, the Security Council: "Considers it essetltial, in accordance with Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, that aIl States :i\Iembers of the United Nations,"-"all States", as the Cuban representative will observe, not the Soviet Union alone-"especially the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as permanent mernbers of the Security Council having powerful air and naval forces at their disposaI, should give military and other assistance to the Republic of Egypt, which has been the victim of aggression ..." 69. AlI arguments to the effect that the Soviet Union proposaI contains concealed motives are therefore unfounded and untenable. vVe are proposing participation in the aid to he given to the victim of aggression, not mere1y by forces of the Soviet Union but by the forces of all ~Iember States prepared to take part. 70. Such is the situation. Accordingly the proposaI made by the Soviet Union is fully in accordance with the Charter. 1 would point out to the representative of Peru that the proposaI does not violate the Charter in any way; nor is there any conflict of jurisdiction between the General Assembly and the Security CounciI. The fact that the General Assembly is taking action on any question does not relieve the Security Council of the .obligation to aet if the circumstances demand it. 71. Thi~ is further emphasized by the faet that the General Assembly is not required ta act under Chapter VII of the Charter entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 74. 1 should like to repe::t that the rejection by the Security Couneil of the Soviet Union's proposaI without discussion places a heavy responsibility on those members of the Security Council who prevented this discussion. 75. Arguments based on lack of instructions are also untenable, since there is no question of an immediate vote on the draft resolution; not even a discussion of the draft was allowed. Accordingly references to lack of instructions and statements to the effect that a vote on this draft resolution was out of the question are likewise unfounded. 1 repeat that the responsibility for the rejection of this question lies on those members of the Security Council whu refused to indude it in the agenda. 76. MI'. ORDONNEAU (France) (translated tram French) : Like most of the members of the Couneil who have spoken, the French delegation is shocked and amazed by the Soviet proposaI. 77. As the United States representative said a moment ago, the plan, if adopted, would have unthinkable consequences. Its adoption would seriously endanger the peace of the world. 78. There is at present no danger of general \Var. Hostilities between Israel and Egypt appear to be dying down. The objectives of the Anglo-French operation, which will provide a barrier between the combatants on the Suez Canal, are well lmown. It is limited in space and time. It prepares the way for the possible intervention of the international force, the principle of which was approved by the Assembly yesterday. 79. If the Soviet Union were to intervene, the present situation would immediately degenerate into a conflict which could not be limited. 80. Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-

The Yugoslav representative's statement will be inc1uded in the record of the meeting at which the draft resolution was put to the vote. Printedin U.S.A. Priee: $U.S. 0 15 ; 1/0 stg.; (or equivalent in other currencks)