S/PV.763 Security Council

May I say to the representative of India, on m.y own behalf, that, while the Philippines is a new member of the Security Council, the repre- sentativeof the Philippines has taken it upon himself to·· r,ead the documen.ts in connexion with the question at issue. The representative of India need therefore President: M. Carlos P. ROMULO (Philippines). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Chine, Colombie, Cuba, France, Irak, Phi- lippines, Suede, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Ordre du jour provlsoire (S/Agenda/763.l 'I. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan: lettre, andate du 2janvier 1957, acfressee 'au ·PresidentduConseil de securite par leMinistredes affaires ~trang~resdu Pakistan. Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'or.dre du jour est adopte. Question,'lnde-Pakistan:'lettre.. en date du 2 janvier ,1957, GdresSee au'Presldent -du Consell de secur'lte par le Ministredes affaires etrangeres dLiPakistan (S/3767) [suite] " Sur l'invitation du President, M. V.. K. Krishna !YIenon, representant de l'lnde, et M. FirozKhan Noon, representant du Pakistan, prennent place a la table· du Conseil. 1. M. Krish~a,MEN6N (Inde) '\[traduit de l'anglais]: Avant de eontinuer ,l',expos~ des observ~tionsque je faisaisce matin, je vQudrais preciser que lalongueur de ~et 'expose il'est pas due a'un desii'particulierde ma delegation de prolongerledebat. Enfait, le Conseil , fi'a. pas ete saisi de cette question depuis plusieurs annees et, comme je le disais ce matin~ nous av.ons parmi nous un grand nombre de nouveaux membres;oil faut donc que les positionsfondamentales.soient bien comprises pour que l'alfairesoitpres,entee de JIlani~re convenable. En consequence, si le Consei! de securite souhaite etre iIiforme de tous les aspects de la ques... tion qu'il convient de prendre en consideration, ma delegation est obligee de consacrer un certainteDlps· a. leur expose. Cependant, je ne voudrais pas guele Conseil de securite ait l'impression que la longueur de ces observations a d'autres raisons et qu'il soit ainsi influence. 2. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais direau represen~ntdel'I'nde que, ence qUi me con~ cerne, si les .Philippines 'font partie d~puis peu du Conseil de I$~curite, le representant des Philippines ' a pris connaissance des documents rell;J.tifsala.q,ues.. tiondont· est s~si leConseil. Le representant de 4. I was dealing this morning with the resolution of the Security Council adopted on 21 April 1948 [S/726]; and I pointed outthatwe objectedto several paragraphs of it. But we were quite willingto confer and, as a re- sult of that, the United Nations Commission started functioning. 5. It is not really relevant to my purposeto go into the activities of the Commission. But it met at Geneva on 16 June 1948, and a study ofthe documents will reveal that at that time the Commission was concerned, and very much concerned, with one matter-and that was the matter of stopping the fighting. If the relevant paragraphs of the Commission's report were read, it would be quite clearthat the concern ofthe.Commission was somehow or other to bring about a cease-fire. 6. I read the follOWing from the Commission's report: "At the 14th meeting, it was agreed that the ques- tion of an immediate cease-fire should be explored and that the Government of india shouldbe asked for its observations regarding the ways. and means by which such a cease-fire might be brought about." [S/1100, para. 45.] 7. The Commission goes on to state: "•••that its immediate objective was to bring a cessation of hostilities rather than to deaJ. with specific provisions contained in resolutions of the Security Council." [Ibid., para. 47.] 8. Thus, the Security Council resolutions adopted earlier in the year had been disregarded by Pakistan in the sense that it had introduced other forces and heavy fighting had been taki11g place in the northern areas. What Is~d this morning referred very largely to the offensive in Western Kashmir. While that offen- sive was going OIl, however,.anddespite the injunctions of and the undertakings given to the Security Council that any material change in the situation should be reported, a considerable offensive was taking place in the Northern areas; I shall refer to the details of this latter offensive when I deal with the Northern areas. 9. As a result of this h~avy fighting, the Commission was naturally concerned aboutthe immediate objective of achieving a cease-fire. The Commission met in Geneva, and finally got to Karachi on 7 July. It was at t~t time that there .occurred the new development which has been described as a "bombshell" in a book written by Mr. Korbel, who wasthen the Chairman of Gen~ve" puis SIest rendue a Karachi· le 7 juillet. CIest a cette epoque que se produisit un evenement nouveau qui a fait l'effet d'une "bombe", comme l'a dit M. Korbel, qui 6tait a.lors presidentde laCommission, 10. The Security Council resolution had asked for information with regard to any material change in the situation. The above-mentioned information given by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan was regarded as a material change in the situation andwas communicated to the Security Council. I read againfrom the Com- mission Is report: I - "At the 19th meeting, on 20 July, a confidential cable was drafted and dispatched informing the Security Council of the presence of Pakistanitroops in Kashmir. The Commission adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a military adviser." [Ibid., para. 53.] 11. It was the presence of these troops-which had been denied all along, but was admittedby the Foreign Minister of Pakistan when the Commission arrived in Karachi-that created a new state of affairs. At a later stage, the Pakistan Government gave the reasons for this invasion. The report continues: "Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan stated that three main reasons had motivated the entry of Pakistan troops into Kashmir: protection of the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by Indianforces; prevention of a fait accompli inKashmir by the Gov- ernment of India; 'and prevention of the influx of refugees into Pakistan." [Ibid. para. 51.] 12. I submit that none of these reasons have anything to do with the people of Kashmir. We have heard a great deal about their future and their destiny,.but if the protection of the territory of Pakistan from Indian forces does not sound like a preventive war I do not , know what it is-that is the situation where a Member state gets the right to go into a neighbouring territory for fear that it might be attacked from that state. So protection of 'its territory, llte first reason, is not a reason that is sanctioned by the principles ofthe Char- ter. •f probl~me que soulevait le differend entre I'Inde et le Pakistan. Au cours de cette er:.trevue - et voici le passage qui nous interesse - le Ministre des affaires etrangeres a fait conpaftre aux membres de la Commission que l'armee du Pakistan avait a cette epoque trois brigades de troupes regulieres dans le Cachemire et que des troupes avaient eM envoye~s dans cet Etatpendant lapremiere quinzaine de maL Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khana declare que cette mesure avait ete prise a la suite de l'offen- sive de printemps commenceeparl'armeede I'Inde." [Ibid., par. 40.] 10. Dans sa resolution, le Conseil de securite avait demande qu'on le tienne au courant si la situation se modifiait de fac;:on considerable. La Commission a estime que lees renseignements donnes par sir Mo- hammed Zafrullah Khan et repris ci-dessus t~moi­ gnaient d'un changement important et les a communi- ques au Conseil de securite. Je vais citer de nouveau le rapport de la Commission: "Lors de la 19~me seance, le 20 juillet, la Com- mission a redige et envoye un.cablogramme con- fidentiel pour faire connaftre au Conseil de securite la presence de troupes du Pakistan au Cachemire. La Commission a adopte une resolution demaridant au Secretaire general de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies de nommer un conseiller militaire." [Ibid., par. 53.] 1i. C'est la presence de ces troupespakistanaises- niee jusque-Ia, mais que le Ministre des affaires etrangeres du Pakistan dut bien admettre lorsque la Commission est arrivee a Karachi - quLconstituait un fait nouveau. Plus tard, le Gouvernementpakistanais a donne les raisons de cette invasion. En effet;le rapport poursuit: "Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan a indique que trois raisons principales avaient motiv~ l 'entree des troupes du Pakistan au Cachemire: proteger le ter- ritoire du Pakistan contre une agression possible des forces de I'Inde; empecher que la prise du Cachemire par le Gouvernementde l'Inde' nesoit un fait accompli; empecher le reflux des refugies dans le Pakistan." [Ibid., par. 51.] . 12. Je pretends que ces raisOIisn'ont riena vi;liI' avec le peuple du CachemiI'e. On a beaucoup parle de son avenir et de son sort, mais si ce n'est p~s une guerre preventive que 1'0n mene pour pr6tegerle territoire pakistanais contre l'agressiondes'forces de l'Inde, je me demande ce que c'est; en effet, d,ans ce cas, on reconnait a un Etat Membre le.droitdepen6- trer sur un territoire voisin par crainte d'etre atta,que lui-meme. Aussi, la premi~re raison involluee ',... proteger le territoire pakistanais - n'est pas san.c- tionnee par les principes de la Charte. 14. The third reason was to prevent the influx of refugees into Pakistan, and I would say that of all the reasons giveQ this is the one that least holds water. After the partition there were seven or eight million people leaVing in each direction. Refugees came from Pakistan into India and from India into Pakistan-one of those horrid scenes in our common history which I hope we shall be able to forget some day. But the idea of troops moving in to prevent the influx of refugees into Pakistan is difficult to understand. The only ref- ugees who went into Pakistan presumably were those who preferred Pakistan as a home. Are we to under- stand that the Pakistan Government was going to pre- vent thes~ refugees by the use of an army? 15. So there are three reasons given, none ofwhich in my subntission have any substance. 16. This other matterto whichI referred justnow was a matter of serious concerntothe Government of India and the Commissionnotesthat. The Commission says- th~se are the Commission's findings-that Pakistanhad not informed the Security Council of the presence of its troops in Kashmir because at the time they had been sent into the state the question had been entrusted to the Commission, whose daily departure was expected. This is Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan's explanation. The matter put before the Commission immediately after its arrival in Karachi, in the view of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan-that is, the presence of foreign troops in Kashmir-did not raise the question ofinter- national obligations since Pakistan had never accepted any in regard to non-interference in Kashmir. 17. This view was repeated inMr. Khan Noon's state- ment before the Security Council, that is to say that Pakistan had no international obligations in regard to non-interference in Kashmir. I submit this is a viola- tion of the provisions of thE! Charter. Therefore the explanation that is given, that is,thatthe Commission "is coming here so we will not let it know", when the Security Council had asked six months before that these things should hot be done, does not hold water. A.nd what is more, this would have been more plausible if in the course of these six months there had been no denial. Then, to buttress this argument, the Foreign Minister went on, says the Commission, to dwell at length on ecoJl,omic and strategic considerations. Now if gu~s, c'est bien celui qui r~siste le moins a un exa- men critique. Apres le partage, 7 ou 8 millions de gens quitterent leur pays, d'un cot~ comme de l'autre. Certains, venant du Pakistan, se r~fugierenten Inde, d'autres quitterent l'Inde pour le Pakistan. C'est l'un de ces tristes ~venementsde notre histoire commune qu'un jour nous pourrons oublier, je l'espere. Mais on conc;oit difficilement que des troupes soient en- voyees pour empecher le reflux des refugies dans le Pakistan. Les seuls r~fugies qui sontalles au Pakistan sont probablement ceux qui pref~raient y vivre. Devons-nous en conclure que le Gouvernement pakis- tanais allait s'opposer a. leur desir en recourant a la force armee? 15. On donne ainsi trois raisons, dont aucune, a mon avis, n'est fondee. 16. L'autre question que je viens de signaler a pr~­ occupe serieusement le Gouvernement de l'lnde, et la Commission l'a not~. Elle a dit - ce sont ses cons- tatations - que le Pakistan n'avait pasinform~leCon­ seil de s~curite de la pr~sence de ses troupes au Cachemire parce que, au moment OU les troupes avaient ~t~ envoyees dans l'Etat, le probleme avait ~te confi~ a. la Commission, dont on pensait qU'elle partirait d'un jour a. l'autre. Telle est l'explication de sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan. Selon le Ministre des affaires ~trangeres du Pakistan, le problemedont la Commission avait ~t~ saisie des son arriv~e a Karachi - c'est-a-dire la presence de troupes ~tran­ geres au Cachemire - ne soulevait pas la question des obligations internationales puisque le Pakistan n'en avait jamais assum~ aucune en ce qui concerne la non-intervention au Cachemire. 17. C'est ce qu'a r~p~te M. Khan Noon.dansla deela- ration qu'l1 a faite devant le Consen de securite: le Pakistan n'avait aucune obligation internationale con- cernant la non-intervention au Cachemire. A mon avis, il s'agit lA d'une violation des disllositions de la Charte. AusSi, l'explication donnee, c'est-a.-dire "la Commission va venir, ne disons rien", alors que le Conseil de securite avait demande, six mois aupa- ravant, de ne rien faire de pareil, ne resiste pas a. l'examen. Bien plus, l'argument aUl"ait ete plus plau- sible s'l1 n'y avait pas eu de d6menti au cours de ces six mois. Pour etayer son argument, le Ministre des affaires etrangeres s'est ensuite~onguement etendu, declare laCommission, surdes considerations 18. The Commission goes on to say: "The Minister for Foreign Affairs•..argued that India, if it had control over Jammu· and Kashmir, would be in a position to divert allfive rivers of the Punjab, i.e. the Chenab, Jhelum, Beas, Sutl!,!j and Ravi, the last three being already under Indian con- trol, and thus could reduce to a desert one-third of the irrigated areas ofWestPunjab." [Ibid., para. 67.] 19. I think the most amazing paragraph is paragraph 68 of this report which says that the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out "••.that, if the Radcliffe Award had followed the terms of reference under which the Boundary Com- mission had operated and had included all Muslim majority areas inWestPunjab, the Pakistanboundary would have been much further to th<l east." [Ibid., para. 68.] 20. Now what isthe implication ofthatparagraph?The Commission pointed out that Lord Radcliffe had given an award andthat award, inthis particular respect, was not satisfactory: to Pakistan and in many respects it was not satisfactory to us. And here the Foreign Min- ister is saying that if the Radcliffe Award had been given the other way then of course the question of Kashmir would haye been further east andthe question of direct access would not have arisen. Therefore, by implication, this invasion is a method of modifying the Radcliffe Award by force. 21. At the time it became pUblic knowledge-we knew all the time that it was going on-that Pakistan had invaded Kashmir, this created a great deal of feeling in India, and the Prime Minister made some reference to it in some speeches he delivered, against which Pakistan protested. And the response of the Com- mission is significant in this matterto show how it felt about it. At the 30th meeting on 6August the Commis- sion considered a telegram receivedfrom the Govern- ment of Pakistan protesting a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, on 25 July in Madras and asking what measures ware contemplated by the Commission. The Commission felt that in view of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir, any representation to the Government of India regarding this speech of the Prime Ministerwould be ill-advised and therefore the rec1sipt of the telegramwas acknow- ledged without COmJ7J.9nt. The Commission exchanged views concerning alternatives-this is another signi- icant part-to a plebiscite, keeping in mind that the study of the alternatives could not be seriously under- taken without the consent of the Governments of India and Pakistan. 18. La Commission poursuit: "D'apres lui [le Ministre desaffairesetrangeres], 1'Inde, si elle detenait le pouvoir sur le Jammu et Cachemire, serait en mesure de detourner a. sa volonte les eaux des cinq rivieres du Pendjab, c'est-a.-dire le Tchinab, le Djhelam, le Bias, le Satledj et le Ravi, ces trois dernieres etant deja entre ses mains, et pourrait ainsi ramener a. l'etat desertique un tiers des zones irriguees du Pendjab occidental." [Ibid., par. 67.] .19. Toutefois, le passage le plus surprenant de ce rapport est, a mon avis, le paragraphe 68, dans lequel 11 est dit que le Ministre des affaires etrangeres a fait remarquer: "(.•.) que, si la sentence d'arbitrage Radcliffe s'etait conformee au mandat qui avait ete imparti a la Commission des frontieres, et avait compris dans le Pendjab occidental toutes les zones DU se trouve une majorite musulmane, le trace de lafron- tiere du Pakistan se serait etendu davantage vers l'est." [Ibid., par. 68.] 20. Quel est donc le sens deceparagraphe?La Com- mission a fait observer que lord Radcliffe avaitrendu une sentence, et que cette sentence, sur ce point particulier, ne donnait pas satisfaction au Pakistan- et, sur de nombreux points, ne nous donnait pas satisfaction non plus. Ici, le Ministre des affaires etrangeres declare que si la sentence Radcliffe avait ete differente, la fronUere. du Cache~ireaurait naturellement passe plus a. Pest et la question de 1'acces direct ne se serait pas posee. Cette invasion est donc, implicitement, un moyen de modifier par la force la sentence Radcliffe. 21. Lor~qu'il devint de notoriete publique - pour notre part, nous avons toujours su ce qui se passait - que le Pakistan avait envahi le Cachemire'.la reac- tion fut tres vive en Inde, et le Premier Ministre y fit quelques allusions dans certains des discours qu'il prononl$a a. ce moment et contre lesquels le Pakistan protesta. Quant a la reaction de la Commis- sion, eUe fut z:evelatrice. Pendant sa 30eme seance, le 6 aout, la Commission etudia un teIegramme du Gouvernement pakistanais protestant contre le dis- cours prononce a. Madras le 25 juillet par le Premier Ministre de l'Inde, M. Nehru, et demandant queUes mesures la Commission envisageait de prendre. La Commission estima qu'etant donne la presence de . troupes du Pakistan dans le Cachemire, il serait inopportun de presenter au Gouvernement de l'Inde aucune protestation contre le discours prononce par le Premier Ministre; elle decida donc d'accuser re- ception du teIegramme, sans commentaires.. La Com- mission proceda II un echange de wes ence qui con- cerne les differentes solutions possibles autres qu'un plebiscite - cela encore est significatif -- compte tenu du fait que l'etude de ces solutions ne pourrait ~tre entreprise serieusement sans le consentement de!! Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan. 23. The principles which the Government of India regarded as necessary for agreeing to a cease-fire, as set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and later, were the following: when the Commission, under its Chairman, Mr. Graeffe, interviewed the Prime Minister, the following points were submitted on behalf ofthe Indian Government: (1) the regulal' Pakistan forces shouldbe withdrawn from the State' of Jammu and Kashmir; (2) Indian forces should remain along fixed lines and oc.:;upy certain advanced strategic positions; and (3) the evacuated territories situated outside of the fixed line should be provisionally administered by existing local authorities, or, if :necessary, by local authoritiesto be designated by the Commission, and ~hould be super- vised by. observers of the Commission, but remain under the sovereignty of the State ofJammu and Kash- mir until the final settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan. 24. Therefore, these principles, which were put for- ward ultimately and which to a very great extent found favour in the Commission, were basedupon the idea of the sovereignty of the State, that is to say that it is indivisible, that its parts cannot be taken by invaSion, that the Indian forces have the right and the duty of protecting this area and that the invaders mustevacu- ate. That is the crux of the case: the invaders must evacuate the territory and, if it is necessary, there should be local authorities there-not governments but merely local authorities-for the maintenance of law and order under the supervision of the Commission. That was the position, as maybe seenfrom the resolu- tions that were adopted later. 25. As a result ofthese discussions, the Commission, having put to both the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India the various points of view, and in view of Pakistan's objections as set out in the report, at its meeting on 13 August finally formulated the resolution which forms the basis ofthe Kashmir ques- tion so far as the Security Council is concerned. This is the well-known resolution of 13 August 1948 which brought about a cease-fire. As I stated a short while ago, the concern of the Commissionat thattime was to a large extent the establishment ofa cease-fire so that the fighting might be stopped. I shall not read out the resolution, as it is a very long one, but there are certain points of ittowhichlmustdraw attention. This resolution was referred to in the statement by the Foreign Minister at the 761st meeting, and I believe 23. Voici, tels quIlls sont exposes aux paragraphes 46, 47 et suivants, les principes que le Gouverne- ment de l'lnde considerait comme les bases neces- saires d'un accord relatif au cessez-le-feu: lorsque la Commission, presidee par M. Graeffe, entendit le Premier Ministre, celui-ci soumit au nom du Gou- vernement indien le.s points suivants: 1) les forces arm~es regulieres du Pakistan devaient etre retirees de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire; 2) les forces armees indiennes devaient rester le long de lignes fixees et occuper certaines positions strategiques avanc~es; 3) les territoires ~vacu~s situ~s en dehors de la ligne fixee devaient etre administres a titre provisoire par les autorites locales alors en exis- tence, ou, si cela etait necessaire, par des autorites locales qui seraient designees par la Commission et agiraient sous la surveillance d'observateurs de la Commission, tout en restant sous la souverainete de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire jusqu'au reglement definitif du differend entre I'lnde et le Pakistan. 24. Par consequent, ces principes, qui en fin de compte iurent proposes et qui furent dans une large mesure accueillis favorablement par la Commission, etaient fondes sur l'idee de la souverainete de l'Etat, c'est-a.-dire sur le fait qu'il est indivisible, que ses differentes parties ne peuvent etre conquises par l'invasion, que les forces indiennes ont le droit et le devoir de proteger cette region et que les envahis- seurs doivent l'evacuer. C'est la le point essentiel du probleme: les envahisseurs doivent evacuer le territoire et, si c'estnecessaire, des autorites locales - non pas les gouvernements, mais simplement les autorites locales - doivent maintenir la loi etl'ordre sous la surveillance de la Commission. Telle etait la position adoptee, comme l'indiquent lef'l resolutions qui furent votees par la suite. 25. A la suite de ces discussions. la Commission soumit au Gouvernement du Pakistan et au Gouverne- ment de l'lnde les differents points de vue et, devant les objections du Pakistan, qui ont ete consignees dans le rapport, ene formula en fin de compte, lors de sa seance du 13 aoilt, la resolution qui exposel'essentiel du probleme du Cachemire, tout au moins en ce qui concerne le Conseil de securite. C'est lUaresolution bien connue du .13 aoilt 1948, qui permit de conclure un cessez-le-feu. Comme je l'ai declare il y a quel- ques instant~. le souci de la Commission, a. cette epoque, etait dans un~ grande mesure tl'arriver a. un cessez-le-feu afin de mettre fin aux hostilites. Je ne vous lirai pas la resolution, car elle est tres longu- -, mais il y a certains points dans cette resolution s ". lesquels je voudrais appeler votre attention. Le 26. The representative of Pakistan stated: "The main provisions of this international agree- ment for a plebiscite are: "(1) Cease fire and demarcation of a cease-fire line."-We have no quarrel wf.th that. "(2) Truce agreement providing, inter alia, for: (~ withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals ••• (tU withdrawal of Pakistan troops and the bulk of the IndianArmy ... (!D plebiscite tobe conducted ..." [761st meeting, para. 32.] 27. This might appear to be of very little importance if one did not know the history ofthis matter, because this resolution is really conceived inthree consecutive parts. The part referring to the plebiscite is not part II but part Ill, which has very considerable relevance . to the whole approach to this problem. Part I is con- cerned only with a cease-fire, It places responsibility on the High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces "to refrain from taking any measures ...". I shall not read out the whole resolution. It establishes the cease-fire as l:1etweenthe two High Commands. Part I, paragraph E, is relevant in this connexio~: "E. The Government ofIndiaand the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respectivepeoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion offurthern:egotiations." 28. Neither before 13 August nor after 13 August until the present time, as the Council will come to see when we deal with present conditions, has there been any appearance that this has been doneby the Govern- ment of Pakistan as reflected in the public opinion of Pakistan. This is not to say thatthe peoples of Pakistan are against the peoples of India, but there has been a campaign of hatred and a campaign.of a holy war against India. ' 29. Now that the cease-fire has been established, so far as the Government of India is concernedthat is an agreement into which it has entered and which should be supervised by an international body of observers. 30. Part II relates to the truce agreement. The plan of this programme is that, first, ther,e shouldbe a cease- fire,. then there should be a truce agreement and then comes the third part. Part 11is divided into three sec- tions: .A, Band C. Paragraph 1 of section A states: "As the presence oftroops of Pakistanin the terri- tory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change inthe situation since it was repre- sented by the Government of Pakistan before the 26. Le representant du Pakistan a declare: "Voici les principales dispositions de cet accord international: "1) Suspension d'armes et trac~ de la ligne ded~­ marcation. (Nous n'avons rien a dire sur ce point.) "2) Accord de treve prevoyant notamment: a) le retrait des membres de tribus et des ressortis- sants pakistanais (...) ~ le retrait "synchronise" des troupes du Pakistan et du gros de l'armee indienne (...) c) l'organisationd'unpU~biscite (...)." [761eme seance, par. 32.] 27. Cela semblerait peut-etr,e avoir bien peu.d'im- portanc:e si l'on ne connaissait l'historique de cette question, car cette resolution est en realiM con~ue en trois parties consecutives. La ,partie qui a tI"cl.it au plebiscite n'est pas la deuxi~me partie, mais la troisieme partie, qui est etroitement en rapport avec la fa~on d'envisager ce probleme dans son ensemble. La: premiere partie ne traite que du cessez-le-feu. Elle charge le haut commandement des forces armees indiennes et celui des forces pakistanaises de la responsabilite de "s'abstenir de toutes mesures...". Je n'ai pas l'intention de vous lire la resolutioa d'un bout :l l'autre. Elle etablit le cessez-le-feu entre les deux hauts commandements. Le paragraphe E de la premiere partie a trait a cette question: liE. Le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le Gouverne- ment du Pakistan acceptent de faire appel a leurs peuples respectifs pour qu'ils aident a creel' et a maintenir une atmosphere favorable au developpe- ment de nouvelles negociations." 28. Comme le Conseil de securitepourrale constater lorsque nous parlerons des conditions actuelles, il n'a ete releve jusqu'a pres,ent aucune preuve que cela ait ete fait, ni anterieurement ni posterieurement au 13 aoiit, par le Gouvernement du Pakistan, si l'on en juge d'apres les reactions de l'opinion publique du Pakistan. Non pas que les peuples du Pakistan soient opposes aux peuples' de l'lnde; mais on a lance une campagne pour precher la haihe et la guerre sainte contre I'Inde. 29. Un cessez-le-feu est maintenant intervenu; pour ce qui est du Gouvernemcnt de l'Inde, il est partie a cet accord et estime que cet accord doit etre plac6 sous le controle d'une groupe d10bservateurs inter- national. 30. La deuxi~me partie a trait ;t l'accord de treve. D'apr~s le plan de ce programme, le cessez-le-feu doit venir en premier lieu; puis il doit y avoir un accord de treve, et ensuite vient la troisi~mepartie. La deuxi~me partie est divisee en trois sections: A, Bet C. Le paragraphe 1 de la section A stipule: "Attendu que la presence de troupes du Pakistan dans le territoire de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire modifie de fac;on considerable la situation telle qu'elle avait ete expos6e au Conseil de securit6 par "The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. " 32. Our submission is that there has been no with- drawal of these nationals to the extentthatis required in this matter. What are called "other armies" in Kashmir are under the control of the Pakistan com- mand. They are officered by Pakistan officers, and their administration is under Pakistan control. There- fore, to say that paz:agraph 2 of the truce agreement has been carried out is not accurate. 33. Paragraph 3 states: "Pending a final solution, the territory evacuatedby the Pakistan troops will be administeredby the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commis- sion." 34. This is an integral part of the conditions, and the principle for which India asked and which is incor- porated by the Commission in its resolution. What is the position today? I shall deal later with the political conditions, but there are no local authorities. The ad- ministration in that area is directly under Pakistan administration through its own officials, and the auth- orities in Kashmir ara controlled from Karachi. So there is no such thing as local administration, much less supervision by the Commission. So that part also has not been carried out. 35. Now we come to some of the other more important matters. Section B, paragraph 1, begins with "When". It states: "When the Commission shallhave notified the Gov- ernment of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part n, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Councilas havingoccasionedthe presence of Indian forces in the State ofJammuandKashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being With- drawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdrawthe bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission." 36. That is to say, itis only whenthe Commission has notified that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals have withdrawn and, secondly, when the conditions onwhich we came here, namely, an invaSion, has disappeared, it is at that time that the Government of India must withdraw the bulk of its forces. That is the position 8 31. La Commission declarait au paragraphe 2: "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan fera tout en son pouvoir pour faire evacuer de 1'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire les membres de tribus et les ressortis- sants du Pakistan qui, en temps normal, ne resident pas dans cet Etat et qui y ont p~n~tre afin de com- battre." 32. Nous estimons que l'evacuation deces ressortis- sants n'a pas eu l'ampleur exig~e. Ce quel'on nomme les "autres forces" se trouvant au Cachemire sont plac~es sous commandement pakistanais. Leurs offi- ciers sont pakistanais et leurs services administra- ills dependent du Pakistan. n est done inexact de dire que le paragraphe 2 de l'nccord de treve a ~t~ ex~­ cute. 33. On lit au paragraphe 3: "En attendant une solution definitive, le territoire evacu~ par les troupes du Pakistan sera administr~ par les autorites locales sous la surveillance de la Commission. " 34. C'~tait la. une des conditions exig~es pour la treve. La Commission avait done ~nonc~ dans sa reso- lution Pun des principes que l'Inde voulaitvoirrecon- nus. Or, quelle est la situation actuelle? Laissant de cote la situation politique, j'affirme qu'il n'y a pas d'autoriMs locales; daus cette region, l'administration depend directement de l'administration pakistanaise, qui y detache ses propres fonctionnaires, et les auto- rites du Cachemire rec;oiventleurs ordres deKarachi. n n'y a done pas d'administration locale et encore moins de surveillance de la Commission. Ainsi, cette partie de la r~solutionn'a pas non plus ~t~ ex~cut~e. 35. Nous arrivons maintenant ades questions encore plus importantes. nest dit a la section B, para- graphe 1: "Lorsque la Commission aura informe leGouver- nement de l'Inde du retrait des membres de tribus et des ressortissants duPakistanvises a.la deuxi~me partie, A, 2, de la presente resolution, mettant ainsi fin a. la situation qui, selon les representants du Gouvernement de l'Inde au Conseil de securite, a entrain6 la presence de forces indiennes dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire et, de plus, lorsque la Commission aura fait savoir au Gouvernement de l'Inde que les forces du Pakistan evacuent l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, le Gouvernement de l'Inde acceptera de commencer a retirer par etapes le gros de ses forces de cet Etat, selon des modalites a etablir apr~s entente avec la Commission. It '36. Cela signifie que, lorsque la Commission aura informe le Gouvernement de l'Inde du retrait des membres de tribus et des ressorlissants du Pakistan et, d'autre part, lorsque ce qui motivalt la presence de troupes indiennes dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cache- mire - c'e.st-a-dire l'invasion de cet Etat par le 37. Therefore, this part 11, section B, is a recognition of the fact that the security of the State is t..1J.e concern of the Government of India. That is again amplified in the phrase that follows in section B, paragraph 3: "The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State ofJammuand Kash- mir will take all measures within its powerto make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded ...". 38. It was given the responsibility for law and order and the responsibility for security. What is more, it was a condition that the Indian forces shouldwithdraw only when all others had withdrawn, and the reason for bringing the case had disappeared. That is set out in section B. 39. In the discussions that have gone oninthe Security Council after this period-1952 and subsequently- these matters have been put to one side. The reaSOn is not hard to seek, because we W(dre confined to one problem, a problem that could he implemented only after this came into effect. 40. However, so far as the Government of India is concerned, in spite of this conditionin section B of the reSOlution, we have withdrawn a considerable part of our forces. There is an army in Kashmir, and, as far as Kashmir-which is not underforeign occupation-is concerned and as far as India is concerned, that is the Indian Army. It is the Kashmir Army. Itcould no more be called a foreign army than the British Army would be called a foreign army in Lancashire. Itis a part of the army and the local militia that the Kashmiris are entitled to have. In spite of the fact that these foreign nationals are there, in spite ofthefactthat the aggres- sion has not been liquidated, we have withdrawna con- siderable part of our troops. 41. The Foreign Minister made some arithmetical calculations and told us that India had 80,000 troops in this area and, what is more, that that constituted one- twelfth of the population. I think that if we applied these mathematics in one place it might be useful to apply them in some other place. There are today forty-five battalions in those outposts around "Azad" Kashmir, and there are only half a million people there. There- fore the Security Council can,work ouUhe mathematics on that. I am not referring to other areas at the moment; I am referring to that half million people in what is called the "Azad" area, where there were, at 40. Cependant, en ce qui nous concerne, malgre la condition indiquee dans la section B de la resolution, le Gouvernement de l'Inde a retire une partie con- siderable de ses forces armGes. n y a une armee clans le Cachemire, mais, en ce qui concerne le Cachemire - qui n'est pas soumis a une occupation etrangere - et aussi en ce qui concerne l'Inde, c'est une armee indienne. C'est l'armee du Cachemire. On ne peut pas l'appeler une armee etrangere, pas plus qu'on ne pourrait dire que l'armee britannique stationnee dans le Lancashire est une armee etran- gere. C'est une partie de l'armee et de la milice locale que le Cachemire a le droit d'entretenir. Bien que des ressortissants etrangers soient toujours pr~sents et que l'agression n'ait pas encore pris fin, nous avons retir~ une partie consid~rable de nos troupes. 41. Le Ministre des affaires etrangeres dll, Pakistan s'est livre a des calculs d'arithmetique et nous a dit que l'Inde entretenait 80.000 hommes de troupe dans cette r~gion, et, qui plus est, que ce chiffre repre- sentait le douz1ame de la population. Je cr01s que, s1 nous appliquons ces mathematiques dans un. domaine, nous pourr10ns peut-etre les appliquer utilementdans d'autres domaines. n.y a aujourd'hui 45 bataillons dans les postes avances du Cachemire "azadr., alors que la region ne compte qu'un dem1-million d'habi- tants. Le Conseil de securite peut donc se livrer sur ce point a des calculs mathematiques. Je ne parle 42. On this matter, I also wish to submitthat Kashmir is the northern extremity of India. TheIndianArmy is deployed in the various sectors ofthe couritry, and this is one area where it has to function, not only for the protection of Kashmir and all that is involvedtherein, but because it is the place where itnormally would be located. 43. If we are to take this into account, then, as I shall point out later, we shall have to take into account the divisions of the Pakistan Army that are located about five, ten and twenty miles from ourborder. That is, if it is right to have the Pakistan Army in Abbottabad or in Murree or inany ofthese areas, then it is necessary for the Indian Army to be held somewhere. Therefore, the idea that this is an occupation, which is what has been represented to the Security Council, is a total misnomer. 44. Then we come to part ill of the resolution of 13 August 1948, which is the crucial part. Partm states, and I would request you, Mr. President, to give your very careful attention to this: "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that thefuture status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shallbe determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable con- ditions whereby such free expression will be as- sured." 45. The commitment about a plebiscite is usually spoken of as though it were the law of the Medes and Persians, but what does it amount to?Itamounts to an expression of a wish on the part of the two Govern- ments. The expression of a wish is far less than what may be called an international obligation. However, I do not wish to argue that point. Buttake the other one, that it should be carried outupon the acceptance of the truce agreement. There has been no truce agreement signed, because Pakistan armies have notvacatedand, what is more, there are continued violations. 46. As I shall pointoutlater, thereare large numbers of changed conditions under which it is no longer pos- sible to consider the matter in these terms. So any suggestion that the Governmen~ofIndia-and this is the burden of the apprehension about us, and there is no further charge-has a commitmentthatit is nothonour- ing, I deny totally. So far as we are concerned, the 43. S'll faut faire entrer ces considerations en ligne de compte, il faut egalement, comme je le soulignerai par la suite, faire entrer en ligne de compte les divi- sions de l'armee pakistanaise qui se trouvent placees a environ 5, 10 et 20 milles denotre frontiere. C'est- a.-dire que, s'iI est juste que l'arm~e pakistanaise se trouve a Abbottabad ou a Murree ou dans l'une quel- conque de ces regions, l'armee indienne doit alors necessairement se trouver quelque part. Auquel cas, c'est un mensonge d'affirmer, comme cela a ete fait devant le Conseil de securite, que la presence de ces troupes constitue une occupation. 44. Nous en arrivons maintenant a la troisieme partie de la resolution du 13 aout 1948, qui est la partie essentielle. La troisieme partie dit - et je vous demanderai, Monsieur le President, d'yaccorder une tres grande attention: "Le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le Gouvernement du Pakistan affirment a nouveau leur desir que le statut futur de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire soit fixe conformement a la volonte de la population et, a cette fin, des l'acceptation de l'accord de treve par les deux gouvernements, ils conviennentd'enta- mer des negociations avec la Commission afin d'atablir des conditions justes et equitables quiper- mettent d'assurer la libre expression de cette vo- lonte." 45. D'une maniere generale, on parle de cet engage- ment relatif a un plebiscite comme s'il s'agissait des lois immuables des MMes et des Perses, mais a quoi correspond-il? n correspond simplement a. i'expression d'un vreu des deux gouvernements. Or, l'expression d'un vreu est loin de representer ce que l'on pourrait appeler une obligation internationale. Mais je n'ai pas l'intention de discuter sur ce point. Considerons plutot l'autre engagement, selon lequel le plebiscite doit avail" lieu apres l'acceptation c'\e l'accord de treve. Aucun accorddetreven'aete signe, car il n'y a pas eu de retrait des forces armees du Pakistan, ''It, qui plus est, les violations se poursui- vent. . 46. Comme je le ferai remarquer dans un moment, beaueoup de conditions ont change, et 11 n'est plus possible de considerer la question sous le mame jour. Si donc on insinue que le Gouvernemerit de l'Inde n'honore pas ses engagements, je le nie categorique- ment; or, c'est la. le reproche le plus lourd que lIon nous fait, et 11 n'y a pas d'autre accusation. En ce 48. Now the resolution of 13 August 1948 was not accepted by Pakistan. We acceptedthis resolution, and as I told the Security Council a while ago, we had previously set out the principles that should be em- bodied. Whilethe resolution was not one that totally met our point of view, with a viewto resolving the position the Government of India acceptedthis resolution which was adopted by the Commission on 13 August. But still there was no cease-fire. Thefighting was going on in the northern areas. It was becoming more intense. The Commission reported to the Security Council and made further efforts and returned to the Indianpenin- sula. 49. It is essential in reading the document of 13 August, which is a resolution of the Commission, to appreciate that this document shouldbe read alongwith tl).l;l assurances given in writing by the Commission to the Government of India, because they form one docu- ment. If you like, that is a contract; these are the warranties. This document cannot be regarded as iso- lated from the context of the assurances given. 50. Those assurances were set out in a letter that was sent by the Prime Minister of India to the Com- mission on 20 August 1948. May I say here that the facts of this letter were not private, as is sometimes hinted in some newspapers, between the Commission and the Prime Minister. They were published and, in the next stage of negotiations, Pakistanandlndiacame into agreement on the resolution of 5 January 1949. Pakistan, if it agreed to that, had cognizance of these conditions. 51. That letter [S/1100, para. 78] says the following: 71On 17 August, my colleague, the Minister without Portfolio, and I discussed. with you and your col- leagues of the Commission now in Delhi the resolu- tion which you had presented to us on the 14th instant."-that is, the resolution that had been pre- 51. Cette lettre [S/1100, par. 78] estredigeedansles termes suivants: "Le 17 aoiit, mon coll~gue le Ministre sansporte- feuille et moi-meme avons discute avec vous et vos collegues de la Commissionqui se trouventactuelle- ment ;l Delhi, la resolution que vous nous avezcom- muniquee le 14 courant (c'est-A-dire la resolution tlIn accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations adopted on 17 January 1948, the Pakistan Government shouldhave informed the Council immediately of any material change in the situation while the matter continued to be under the consideration of the Council. The invasion of the State by large forces of the regular Pakistan Army was a very material changetl-I am sure the Council will agree-; "in the situation, and yet no information of this was given, so far as we know, to the Security Council. "The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Government is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international lawand us- age, but has also created a very grave situation. It is only the earnest desire of my Government to avoid any extension of the field of conflictand to re- store peace, thathas ledus to refrainfrom taking any action to meet the new situation that was created by this further intrusion ofPakistan armies into.Jammu and Kashmir State. The presence ofthe Commission in India has naturally ledus to hope that any arrange- ment sponsored by it would deal effectively with the present situation and prevent any recurrence of aggression."-1 would like the Council to take note of that sentence, that is to say, the fact that the Commission was intervening in this matter and brought this resolution to us. They had reason at that time to think that the aggression would be terminated, but nothing of that kind happened. "3. Since our meeting of 18 August, we have given the Commission's resolution our most earnest thought. There are many parts of it which we should have preferred to be otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental facts ofthe situation, especially the flagrant aggression of the Pakistan Government on Indian UniOn territory. We recognize, however, that, if a successful effort is to be made to create 12 s~jour a Delhi, nous lui avons expos~ ce qui consti- tuait, selon nous, l'~l~ment fondamental de lasitua- tion qui a amen~ le conflit du Cachemire. 11 s'agit de l'agression injustifi~e - indirecte d'abord, puis directe - du territoire du Dominion de l'Inde au Cachemire par le Gouvernement du Pakistan. Ce dernier a ni~ les faits, bien qu'ils fussent av~r~s. Au cours des derniers mois, des contingents tr~s importants de l'arm~e reguli~re du Pakistan ont encore p~netr~ au Cachemire sur le territoire de l'Union indienne et se sont heurt~s a l'armee de l'Inde qui y avait eM envoyee pour d~fendre cet Etat (fait dont tient compte la resolution). Nous croyons savoir que le Gouvernement du Pakistan reconnait maintenant les faits, quoique ce gouver- nement n'ait jamais officiellement misle Gouverne- ment de l'Inde au courant de cette invasion. En fait, il n'a cess~ de la nier et il a evit~ de r~pondre aux demandes r~it~r~es que lui a adressees le Gouver- nement de l'Inde. t1Conform~ment a la r~solution adopt~e le 17 jan- vier 1948 par le Conseil de s~curit~ de l'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies, leGouvernementduPakistan aurait du, tant que l'affaire ~tait pendante devant le Conseil, informer celui-ci de tout changement ma- teriel que subirait la situation. L'invasion de l'Etat par des contingents importants de l'arm~e r~gu­ li~re du Pakistan a fait subir a la situation un chan- gement mat~riel consid~rable (je suis sur que le Conseil sera de cet avis); ~ependant, a notre con- naissance, le Conseil de s~curit~ n'Em a nullement ~te inform~. "La Commission admettra que, non seulement la conduite du Gouvernement du Pakistan estincompa- tible avec tous les codes de morale comme avec le droit et l'usage internationaux, mais encore qu'il en est result~ un ~tat de choses tr~s s~rieux. Si mon gouvernement s'est abstenu de prendre des mesures pour faire face au nouvel ~tat de choses cr~e par cette incursion recente des arm~esdu Pakistandans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, c'est uniquement parce qu'il d~sire ardemment ~viter que le conflit ne s' ~tende et r~tablir la paix. Bien entendu, la pre- sence de la Commission dans l'Indenous a fait esp~­ rer que tout arrangement patronn~par elle reme- dierait effectivement a la situationactuelle etempe- cherait toute agre~sion nouvelle. (Je voudrais que le Conseil note cettephrase, ;l savoir que la Commis- sion intervenait dans la question et nous proposalt cette resolution. A cette ~poque, elle pouvaitpenser a juste titre que l'agression serait termin~e, mais rien de la sorte n'est arriv~.) tl3. Depuis notre entrevue du 18 aout, nouS avons ~tudi~ tr~s attentivement la r~solutionde la Com- mission. Elle contient de nombreuses clauses que nous eussions pref~r~ differentes et plus adaptees aux faits essentiels de la situation, notamment l'agression fla,grante du Pakistan contre le terri- toire de l'Union indienne. Nous admettons cependant que, si l'on dolt faire des efforts fructueux pour There follow the safeguards which are very material: n(l) That paragraph A.3 of part IT ofthe resolution should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as" (the paragraph with regard to localauthoriti,es). "(~) To bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops"-that is to say, that neither the invasion by Pakistan nor the fact that they evacuated it underorders from the Commission would in any way affect the sovereignty of the .Jammu and Kashmir Government. That was the condition we made; "(Q) To afford any recognition of the so-called 'Azad' Kashmir Goverrnment; or "(~) To enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvan- tage of the State."-That is what has happened since: the portion being administered from another place. "(2) That from ourpoint ofview the effective insur- ance of the security of the State against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no less important than the observance of internal law andorder, andthat, there- fore, the withdrawal of Indian troops and the strength of Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be conditioned by this overrid~ng factor." -that is to say, we emphasizedthe pointthat we have the responsibility for security. "Thus at any time the strength of the Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be sufficient ..to ensure security against any form of external aggression as well as internal disorder. "(3) That as regards part m"-thatis ascertaining the will of the people-,"should it Pe decidedto seek a solution of the future of the state by means of a plebiscite, Pakistan should have no part in the organization and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter of internal administration in the State." 53. Therefore, it was not as though there were two peas in a pod and two people with some equal juris- diction over ~s. The plebiscite was merely a con- cession, merely a method, whereby some peaceful settlement could be br- "ght about. Therefore, we made the reservation thaL this should be done. Then the Prime Minister went on to say: "4. If I understood you correctly, A.3 of part II of the resolution does not envisage"-this is the Com- mission's position being taken-"the creation of any of the conditions to which we have 0bjected in para- graph 3 (1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear 13 Suit une enumeration de garanties tras importantes: "1) L'interpretation ou l'application pratique du paragraphe A, 3, de la deuxieme partie de la reso- lution (le paragraphe relatif aux autorites locales) "ID Ne devra pas mettre en doute la souverainete du Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire sur la partie du territoire de cet Etat evacuee par les troupes du Pakistan (en d'autres termes, ni l'in\"a- sion par le Pakistan ni le fait que le Pakistan aurait retire ses troupes conformement aux ordres de la Commission n'affecteraientenaucunefa'!i0n la souve- rainete du Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire; c'est la condition que nous avions posee); "~) Ne devra en aucune mani~reconstituerune re- connaissance du Gouvernement dit "AzadKashmir", "£} Ne devra, pendant la periode de treve, per- mettre aucun renforcement duditterritoireaudetri- ment de l'Etat. (C'est ce qui est survenu depuis, la partie du territoire etant administree par une autre autorite.) "2) Nous estimons que la. garantie effective de la securite de l'Etat contre les agressions exterieures dont le Cachemire a tant souifert au cours de ces 10 derniers mois revet une signification capitale et n'est pas moins importante que le respectde l'ordre public interieur et que, parconsequent, eneffectuant le retrait des troupes de l'Inde et enfixant l'effectif des forces de l'Inde maintenues au Cachemire, il faudra necessairement tenir compte de ce facteur primordial. (Autrement dit, l'Inde soulignait le fait qu'elle assumait la :tesponsabilite du maintien de la securite.) Ainsi, l'effectifdesforces indiennesmain- tenues au Cachemire devra en tout temps suffire II en garantir la securite contre toute forme d'agres- sion exterieure et de desordres interieurs. "3) En ce qui concerne la troisi~mepartie (c'est-a- dire les dispositions II prendre pour s'assurer de la volonte de la population), sil'ondecid'iitdechercher a resoudre le probleme de l'avenir de l'Etat par voie de pl~biscite,·le Pakistan ne devrait en aucune mani~re participer a l'organisationetaufonctionne- ment du plebiscite, non plus qu'a aucune autre acti- vit~ touchant III'administration inMrieurede l'Etat." 53. n ne s'agissait donc pas d'un partage egal des pouvoirs, et les deux parties n'avaient pas juridiction egale en la mati~re. Le plebiscite constituaitsimple- ment une concession, une methode, par laquelle on pouvait esperer parvenir a un reglement pacifique. C'est pourquoi nous avions pose comme conditionqu'il ait lieu. Le Premier Ministre continuaj.ten ces termes: "4. Si je vous at bien compris, le paragrapheA,3, de la deuXieme partie de la resolution ne prevoit pas (telle etait en effet lapositionprisepar la Com- mission) la realisation des conditions contre ·les- quelles nous elevons des objections au para- 54. I ask the Council to take notice of this; that is, the Commission says that they have no authority to recognize any sovereignty other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. In the face of that, how can the Security Council contemplate with equan- imity the position that part of the territory has been invaded, usurped, annexed and assimilated? 55. The next paragraph says the following: "As regards paragraph 3 (2), the paramount need for security is recognized by the Commission"-that is to say, the sovereign function ofdefence is placed upon India-"and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained inthe State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India." That is to say, there is no mention of the words "the Government of Pakistan" so far as that is concerned. 56. The next paragraph reads as follpws: "Finally, you agreed that part rn, as formulated, does not in any way recognize the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite." 57. Then the Prime Minister concludes: "In view of this clarification"-these are all clarifications given by the Commission, and I shall read out the confirmation in a.moment-"my Govern- ment, animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace and thus to uphold the principles and the prestige of the United Nations, have decided to accept the resolution." 58. To complete this chapter, may Inowbepermitted to read the acceptance of the Commissinn [S/1100, para. 79]: "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated 20 August 1948 regarding the terms of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which the Com- mission presented to you on 14 August 1948. "The Cominission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation, it being understood that as regards point (1) (~) the local people of the evacuated territory will have freedom of legitimate political activity. In this connexion, the term. "evacuated territory" refers to those territories in the State of JammuandKashmirwhich are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command. "The Commission wishes me to express to Your Excellency its sincere satisfaction that the Govern- ment of India has accepted the resolution and s~curit~ (en d'autres termes, les fonctions souve- ra-ines de la d~fense sont assum~espar l'Inde) et 11 incombe a la Commission et au Gouvernement de l'Inde de regler entre eux les questions suivantes: la date a laquelle commencera le retrait des forces indiennes de l'Etat, les ~tapes de ce retrait et l'ef- fectif des forces indiennes qui demeureront sur le territoire de l'Etat." Ainsi, le document ne fait nullement mention ici du "Gouvernement du Pakistan". 56. Voici le texte de l'alin~a qui suit: "Enfin, vous avez admis que la troisieme partie, telle qu'elle est: r~dig~e, ne reconnait nullement au Pakistan le droit de prendre part en aucune fa~on a. un plebiscite." 57. Et le Premier Ministre conclut: "Ces precisions donnees (toutes ces precisions ont et~ donnees par la Commission, etvous en aurez la confirmation dans un instant) mon gouvernement, anime par un sinc~re desir de soutenir la cause de la paix et d'exalter les principes et le prestige des ~ations Unies, a decide d'accepter la resolution." 58. Min.de completer ce chapitre, jevoudrais donner lecture de 1'acceptation .donnee par la Commission [S/1100, par. 79]: "J'ai l'honneur d'accuser reception devotrelettre en date du 20 aout 1948, concernantles termes de la r~solutionde la Commission des Nations Unies pour 1'Inde et le Pakistan que celle-ci vous a communi- qu~s le 14 aout 1948. "La Commission me charge defaire savoiraVotre Excellence que l'interpr~tation de la resolu.tion qui ressCirt du paragraphe 4 de votre lettre concorde avec sa propre interpr~tation, ~tant entenduqu'en ce qUi concerne le point 1,!!., les habitants des terri- toires evacues auront toute liberte d'exercer leur activite politique legitime. Ace propos, l'expression "territoire evacue" s'entend des territoires de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire qui se trouvent lll'heure actuelle sous le controle effectif du hautcommande- ment des armees du Pakistan. "La Commission me prie de faire savoir a. Votre Excellence qu'elle est sinceremEmt satisfaite que le Gouvernement de 1'Inde ait accepte la resolution et 60. I should also add that whatever is said here also refers to the Northern Territories-that is to say, the territories where, as I shall point out later, owing to the instrumentality of the local commanders, who are not local people at all, affiliations have been received and a considerable amount of fighting has taken place. 61. In regard to these Northern Territories, the Prime Minister said [S/1100, para. 80]: "The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars or Pakistan troops. The Commission's resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or defence in this large area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Govern- ment of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us." That is to say, in regard to these problem territories of Baltistan and Gilgit, and all those areas, there is a difference-a difference between the local authority issue in West Kashmir, where it was suggested there were some local movements, and this one. 62. The Government also s2id: "(The only exception that we should be prepared to accept"-it did not accept it, but it was prepared to do so-"would be Gilgit.) We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into CentralAsia." India has considerable trade through these areas into the Central Asian region and the lower provinces of Asia, of RUSSia, of China and of Tibet. 63. In -answer to this northern areas question, similarly, the Commission agreed. I shall read out the paragraph which relates to this agree- ment: 60. Je voudrais encore ajouter que tout ce qui est dit ici a ~galement trait aux territoires du Nord, comme je le preciserai, ou des ralliements ont eu lieu sous J.'influence de chefs qui se trouvent daus ces terri- toires et n'appartiennent absolument pas a la popula- tion locale, et ou de nombreux combats ont ete livres. 61. En ce qui concerne ces territoires du Nord, le Premier Ministre a declare [S/1100, par. 80]: "L'exercice de l'autorite du Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire sur cette region daus son en- semble n'a ete ni conteste ni trouble, si ce n'est par des bandes errantes de tribus hostiles ou encore en certains lieux comme Skardu qui ont ete occupes par des irreguliers ou par les troupes du Pakistan. Comme ':,'ous l'avez admisaucoursdenotreentrevue du 18, la resolution de laCommissionne resout ni le probl~me de l'administration ni celui de la defense de cette vaste region. Nous souhaitons que, lorsque les troupes du Pakistan et les irreguliers se seront retires de ce territoire, l'administrationdes regions evacuees soit de nouveau confiee au Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire, et que ie soin de les de- fendre nous incombe." . Cela veut dire que, si 1'on considere les territoires contestes du Baltistan, de Gilgit, et aussi des autres regions, il y a une difference - une difference entre la question de l'autorite locale dans le Cachemire occidental, ou certains mouvements locaux, disait-on, avaient eclates, et celle-ci. 62. Le Gouvernement a egalement declare: "(La seule exception que nous serions disposes a accepter - il ne 1'a pas l:!-CCeptee, mais il etait dis- pose a le faire - concernerait Gilgit.) Nous devons etre libres de maintenir des garnisonsendes points choisis de cette region, afin d'empecher les incur- sions des tribus qui ne reconnaissent aucuneauto- rite, et aussi de garder les principales voies com- merciales qui m~nent de ltEtat en Asiecentrale." L'Inde entretient des relations commerciales impor- tantes, a. travers ces regions, avec 1'Asie. centrale et les regions basses de l'Asie, delaRussie,de la Chine et du Tibet. 63.:,.. La Commission a egaleD:lent marque son accord ence qui concerne la question des regions du Nord. Je vais vous donner lecture du paragraphe relatif a cet accord: 65. So, by 25 December, we had a situation where the resolution of the Commission, as passed in its private sitting on 11 December, was accepted by both Governments, and that became the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. In this matter a different procedure was followed. That is to say, the resolution was first set up by the Commission and put to the two Governments; their agreementwas obtained, and it was lormalized. 66. This is a convenient moment to point out how we stand with regard to this, because these are the two resolutions to which we have given any agreement at all-that is the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949. My submission is that sofar as those resolutions are concerned they stand by their texts and by their intention. That is the first point. The second point is that they should be read together and their sequenc9 taken into account. The third point is that these resolutions are also to be read along With, and to be conditioned by, the assurances I have read out to the Council and the other assurances that are given by the Commission with regard to the resolution of 5 January. 67. These assurances are printed in aide-memoire which were submitted to the Commission and which are in the official records of the Security Council [S/1196, annex 4]. It was stated therein: "The Prime Minister emphasized firstly that, if the Government of India were to accept the Com- mission's plebiscite proposals, no action could be taken in regard to them until parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August had been fully implemented"-that is one of the things that is said in regard to the resolution of 5 January-; "secondly that, in the event of Pakistan not accept- ing these proposals or, haVing accepted them, of not implementing parts I and IT of the resolution of 13 August, the Indian Government's acceptance of them should not be regarded as in any way binding upon them"-I shall come backtothisina moment-; "and thirdly, that part ill of the Commission's resolution of 13 August provided 'that the future status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of. the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truc.e agree- 16 67. Ces assurances ont fait l'objet d'aide-memoire qui ont ete presentes a la Com.mission et figurent dans les proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite [S/1196, annexe 4]. I1 y est dit ce qui suit: "Le Premier Ministre insiste sur les trois points suivants: 1) Si le Gouvernement de l'Inde accepte les propositions de la Commission au sujet du ple- biscite, aucune mesure ne pourra etre prise a ce sujet tant que les premiere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee par la Commission le 13 aout n'auront pas ete entierement mises a execution (voila l'une des observations concernant la resolu- tion du 5 janvier); 2) si le Pakistan rejette ces propositions ou, les ayant acceptees, ne met pas en ceuvre les premiere et deuxieJl.le parties de la reso- lution du 13 aout, l'acceptation de ces memes pro- positions par le Gouvernement de l'Inde devra ~tre consideree comme n'engageant pas ce gouverne- ment (je reviendrai sur ce point dans quelques instants); 3) il est stipule dans la trolsleme partie de la resolution adQlptee par la Commission le 13 aout que "le statut futur de l'Etat de Jammu et "•..While the Government of India adheredto their position in regard to a plebiscite, they had pointed out that, in view of the difficulties of holding a pleb- iscite in present conditions in Kashmir, other methods of ascertaining the wish ofthe people should also be explored. The Commission had itself recog- nized the difficulties of carrying out a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Government of India feel that the ex- ploration of other methods should not be ruled out." 68. For the present purposes I am satisfied to put in these aide-m~moirefor the information ofthe Security Council. If, in further debate, there should be any challenge upon them, then I would have to argue what is in those aide-m~moire. But the main thing is this: "secondly that, in the event of Pakistan not accepting these proposals or, having accepted them, of not im- plementing parts I and IT ofthe resolutionof 13 August ..•"-and our submission is that parts I and IT of the resolution are not implemented, and that therefore the Government of India cannot be regarded as beingbound by those resolutions, because that is the consecutive character. It is a concerted resolution. Unless A is accomplished, B cannot be undertaken; unless B is accomplished, Ccannotbe undertaken. Apartfromwhat C means-something to which I have referred-, B has not been implemented, and so unless there is a truce, unless there is evacuation, howdoes the Security Council even contemplate the idea of anything in the nature of an assessment of the willofthe people in the occupied areas of Pakistan, with forty-five battalions of these forces, the entire army of Pakistan, right up on our frontiers? And when I deal with the military preparations in that area, the Security Council, I hope, will begin to sit up and take notice. That has nothing to do with the welfare of those people. The people in the Azad areas, the people in Gilgit, the people in Chitral and the people in Baltistan-they'do not go around in aeroplanes, and the Council will be bound to enquire what is the purpose of these airfields and airstrips in these areas. 69. I think it would be regarded as unfair to the Council if I did not refer to thefact that the resolution of 5 January 1949 deals, in the main, with the im- plementation of part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, which deals with the cease-fire andthe truce and leaves the plebiscite inoneparagraph. Whatthe resolu- tion of 5 January does isto elaborate the ways in which a plebiscite should be taken. Practically the whole of this resolution deals with ,the methodology of this plebiscite, but it is not as though it is laid down cat- egorically. There are so many "ifs" and "whens" in "(.•.) Bien que le Gouvernement de l'Inde nlaitpas chang~ d'attitude A l'~gard d'un pl~biscite, 11 a fait observer que, ~tant donn~ les difficult~s que pr~­ sente la conduite d'un pl~biscite en raison des con- ditions actuelles r~gnant dans le Cachemire, 11con- viendrait de rechercher d'autres m~thodes per- mettant Ala population de faire connaitre savolonM. La Commission elle-meme slest rendu compte des difficulMs que pr6sente l'organisation d'un ple- biscite dans le Cachemire. Le Gouvernement de l'inde estime qulon ne doit pas exclure la recherche d'autres m~thodes." 68. n me suffit, actuellement, de pr~senter, pour in- formation, ces aide-memoire au Consell.de s~curit~. Si, ult~rieurement, des contestations s'~levaient A leur sujet, j'aurais. A donner une interpretation du contenu de ces documents. Mais le point essentiel est celui-ci: "2) si le Pakistan rejette ces propositions ou, les ayant acceptees, ne met pas en ceuvre les premiere et deuxieme parties de la r~solution du 13 aout..•". Or, nous affirmons que les pi'emi~re et deuxieme parties de la r~solutionn'ont pas et~ mises en ceuvre et que, par cons~quent,le Gouvernement de 1'Inde ne peut pas etre consider~ comme li~ par ces r~solutions en raison des liens 6troits qui existent entre l'une et l'autre. Tout se tient. Si la partie A n'est .pas appliqu6e, on ne peut pas appliquer la partie B; si la partie B nlest pas appliqu~e, on ne peut pas appliquer C. Quel que. soit le sens de la partie C - j'y ai fait allusion - la partie B nla pas ~t6 mise en ceuvre. Et, aussi longtemps qu'll n'y aura pas de treve, aussi longtemps qu'il n'y aura pas d'~vacuation, comment le Conseil de s~curit6 peut-il seulement envisager l'id6e de consulter la population des regions occup6es du Pakistan, alors qu'il y a 45 bataillons - l'arm~e tout enti~redu Pakistan - sur nos fronti~res? Et lorsque je parIe des preparatifs militaires dans cette 'region, les membres du Conseil, je l'espere, s'inqui6teront et en tiendront compte. Cela n'a rien A voir avec le bien-etre de cette population. Les populations des regions "azad", du Gilgit, du Chitral et du BaItistan ne voyagent pas par avion, et le Conseil sera bien oblig6 d'examiner A quoi peuvent servir les aero- dromes et les terrains d'aviation etablis dans ces regions. 69. Je pense qu'll serait peu eqUitable, Al'egard du Conseil, de ne pas rappeler que la r6s01ution du 5 janvier 1949 traite avant tout de la mise en ceuvre de la ·troisi~me partie de la r6s01ution du 13 aolit 1948, resolution qui concerne la suspension d'armes et la treve et ne consacre qulun paragraphe au ple- biscite. La resolution du 5 janvier envisage les m~­ thodes selon lesqueIles un pl6biscite devrait etre or- ganis6. De fait, cette resolution tout enti~re precise les methodes A suivre pour le plebiscite, mals elle n'est pas conc;ue en termes categoriques. ElIe com- porte trop de conditions qui sont inseparables des en- 17 70. Now, what is this resolution of 5 January 1949? It reads as follows: "The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, "Having received from the Governments of In~ia and Pakistan, in communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, their accept- ance of the following principles which are supple- mentary to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1949: "1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite." As everybody will notice" it says "will be decided"-a simple futurity. It does not say "shall be decided". 71. Paragraph 2 of this resolution governs paragraph 1: "2. .A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in parts I and n of the Com- missi0n's 1"esolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have peen completed." That "when" still remains "when". And I shall submit later on that the "when" not only remains so, but it is no longer possible. 72. Paragraph 3 of the resolution deals with the f$ctions of the Plebiscite Administrator. I must say a word aboutthe PlebisciteAdministrator. Our position in this matter was thatwe didnot like it, but that there was really no objectionto a man working out the details if he wanted to, sothathe could put them into operation when the time came. We had no feeling about people coming inlo the country or seeingthingsfor themselves and so, when it was pressed upon us, we agreed to a PlebiscIte Administrator being appointed subjectto all this expert advi~e. 73•. Now we come to paragraph 4: '!4. @) After implementation"-andI askthe Council to take note of these words-, "ofparts I and n"-the previous paragraph said "when"-, "of the Com- mission's resolution of 13 August 1948, andwhen the Commission is satisfiedthatpeacefulconditionshave been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebisci~ Administrator will determine, in con- ,sultation with the Government of India"-notwiththe Government of Pakistan-,"the final disposal of the Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be 70. Quecontient cette r~solutiondu 5 janvier 1949? Elle commence de la fac;;on suivante: "La Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan, "Ayant ~t~ inform~e par les Gouvernements de 1'Inde et du Pakistan, dans des communications dat~es respectivement du 23 etdu 25 d~cembre 1948, qu'ils acceptaient certains principes qui completent la r~solution adopt~e le 13 aoiit 1948 par la Com- mission, principes qui sont les suivants: "1. La question du rattachement de I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire a l'Inde ou au Pakistan sera d~cid~e d'une faC;;on d~mocratique au moyen d'un pl~biscite libre et impartial." Tous les membres du Conseil auront remarqu~ que la r~solution dit "will be decided" (sera d~cid~e) et non "shall be decided"; il s'agit ici d'un simple futur ne comportant pas d'id~e d'obligation. 71. Le paragraphe 2 de cette r~solutioncommandele paragraphe: "2. n sera proc~d6a unp16biscitelorsquelaCom- mission aura constat6 que l'ordre de cesser le feu et l'accord de treve, pr6vus aux premiere et deuxieme parties de sa r6solution en date du 13 aoiit 1948, auront IUl! ex~cutl!s et que toutes dispositions auront 6te prises en vue du plebiscite." Le mot "lorsque" dit exactement ce qu'il veutdire, et j'i~diquerai par la suite qu'il n'est plus possible de l'employer. 72. Le paragraphe 3 de la r~solution concerne Ies fonctions de l'Administrateur du pl~biscite. Je d~sire dire quelques mots it ce sujet. Nous n'~tions pas en faveur de la d6signation d'un Administrateur du p16- biscite, mais nous ne nous opposions pas v~ritable­ ment a ce que quelqu'un mit au point Ies d~tails du p16biscite s'il le d~Sirait, afin de pouvoir les appli- quer le moment venue Nous n'avions aucune objection a ce que certaines personnes se rendissent sur place pour y constater ce qui sty passait; aussi, lorsqu'on nous en a presse, avons-nous accept~ qu'un Adminis- trateur du pl~biscitesoit design~, dans les conditions diiment fix~es. 73. Le par-~graphe4 de la r~solutionest ainsi conc;;u: "4. ID Lorsque les mesures pr~vues dans lespre- miere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee par la Commission le 13 aout 1948 auront ete exe- cutt~es (je prie le Conseil de prendre note de ces mots) et lorsque la Commission estimera que la paix et I'ordre public ont eM l'etablis dans I'Etat, ladite Commission et'I'Administrateur duplebiscite fixeront, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de I'Inde (et non avec celui du Pakistan), les modalites du retrait definitif des forces armees de I'Inde et 75. So paragraph 4, again, reiterates this fact, that nothing can happen until parts I and IT of the resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out. Part I has been signed, althoughthere have been serious breaches of the cease-fire-one of them of a serious character' which developed into a miniature battle. 76. Hence, the whole of the resolution of 5 January is concerned with the minutiae of the plebiscite, but even in that, it makes it quite clear at what time it will occur. This is a plan of action. It is a blueprint. But you cannot operate it, you cannot pull the trigger on it until parts I and 11 are in operation. Part I is in operation; therefore, there is no fighting-and, so far as we are concerned, it will remain in operation. But part IT is not in operation; and, what is more, the conditions that could have enabled part IT to be in operation have been breached before this, without the knowledge of the Securivj Council and without convey- ing the information, arid afterwards, and is being breached continually. In fact, a division of Kashmir, which is wrong both de jure and de facto, has taken place. This is a sheer violation of all the commit- ments made by the Government of Pakistan to_the United Nations. That is the limit of our commitments in this matter. 77. That finishes the first part of my submission to the Security Council·; that is, it takes us to what our commitments are. So far as I can remember, three or four resolutions were adopted by the Security Council before 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. I think that we should consider those two resolutions as one plan. The Security Council will appreciate, when ithas gone through the papers and pondered, that all the previous resolutions are absorbed by these; the resolutions of 13 August and 5 January really take into account all the previous resolutions. It is the submission of my Government that all the resolutions which may follow can only flow from these. Therefore, the binding con- ditions, whether they bind us or whether they are conditional bindings, or pJ!ovide for denunciation and escape, all have to be taken into acco.mt. The only things that bind us in regard to Kashmir, so far as the Security Council and the world are concerned, are these resolutions with all the conditions I have mentioned. And I would say that, while we are not a member of the Security Council, as a Member State which nas earnestly tried to discharge its solemn obligations to the international community, theCouncil will think many times before it is led even to think, let alone express. a view, that the Government of India has in some' way tried to get round international commitments. cut~e, bien quIll y ait eu de serieuses violations de la suspension d'armes - l'une d'elles, d'uncaractere particulierement grave, ayant abouti a. un combat. 76. Ainsi, la resolution du 5 janvier tout entiere traite de l'organisation d~tai11ee du plebiscite, mais elle pr~cise bien a quel moment ce plebiscite aura lieu. Cette r~solution constitue un plan d'action, un projet, qui ne peut etreex~cuteavantquelespremit)re et deuxieme parties de la r~solutiondu 13 aout aient ~te mises en oouvre. La premiere partie est a.ppli- quee - les combats ont en effet cess~ - et, en ce qui nous concerne, elle demeure en vigueur. Mais il n'en va pas de meme pour la deuxieme partie. Bien plus, les conditions qui auraient permis d'appliquer la deuxieme partie ont ~te violees a l'insu du Conseil de securit~, qui a ete tenudans l'ignorance, et, depuis, elles n'ont cesse de l'etre. De fait, un par..age du Cachemire, qui est irregulier de jure etdefacto, a eu lieu. n constitue une violation pure et simple de tous les engagements pris par le Gouvernementpakistanais envers l'Organisation des Nations Unies et marque la limite de nos propres engagements en la matiere. , 77. J'en ai termine avec la premiere partie de ma declaration au Conseil de securite. Je suis amene maintenant a parler de la nature de nos engagements. Autant que je puisse me le rappeler, le Conseil de s~curite avait adopte trois ou quatre resolutions avant celles du 13 aout 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949. Je 'pense que nous devrions examiner ces deux r~solutiom] comme formant un tout. Le Conseilde s~curiteconsta­ tera, en consultant ses documents, que toutes les reso- lutions prec~dentes sont contenuesdans celles du 13 aout. 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949. De l'avis de mon gouvernement, toutes les· resolutions qui pourront suivre de~oulerontnecessairement de ces deux reso- lutions. Il faut donc tenir compte de toutes les condi- tions de caractere obligatoire, qu'elles nous lient, qu'elles soient soumises a des r~serves, ou qu'elles se pretent a denonciation ou a echappatoire. Les seules choses qUi nous lient vis-a.-vis du Conseil de securite et du monde, en ce qui conCerne le Cacb,e- mire, sont ces resolutions et toutes les conditions que je viens de rappeler. J'ajouterai ceci: j'espere que le Conseil, considerant que l'Inde, si elle ne fait pas partie du Conseil de securite, est neanmoins un Etat Membre qui s'est sinc~rementefforce de s'acquitter de ses obligations solennelles envers la communaute internationale, n'ira jamais jusqu'a penser, et encore moins jusqu':! dire, que le Gouvernement indien a 82. The first ofthese is geographicalcontiguity, which is commonly accepted by all of us. The answer to that is that Kashmir has a frontier with Pakistan on the west and slightly to the north-west. It has a fron- tier with India and communications with India. It has a frontier with Russia in Sinkiang andChinaand Tibet. Therefore, Kashmir has a large number of frontiers. 83. Geographical contiguity is very often governedto a considerable extent by the historicalpast: and Kash- mir's economic relations and commercial relations have been very much more with Indiathan with Pakis- tan. This did not arise in the old days,because it was one country. Therefore, if iUs aquestion of a common frontier and of contiguity, it isnot as though the acces- sion of Kashmir to India is the accession of some far off island which is separated from the rest of our 79. J'ai Pimpression que Pon voudrait savoir ce qu'est PAssemblee constituante, puisque, il. tort pen- sons-nous, le Conseil de s~curite semble persister il. croire que c'est la une question d'importance cru- ciale. Je dois reconnaJ.tre que Pon a cree une atmos- phere de crise autour du 26 janvier, donton a fait une sorte de jour J, d'heure H. Mais, quelque idee que nous ayons sur Porigine de cet etat de choses, nous avons le devoir d'exposer les faits, etj'aidonc decide de modifier Pordre de mon intervention. C'est plus tard que j'aurais dii logiquement traiterdecetteques- tion, mais je le ferai maintenant pour faciliter la ta.che du Conseil et parce que, je dois le dire, ma sante nemepermetpasdeprendreparU. trois seances consecutives. Je me propose donc d'etudier d'abord les revendications du Pakistanal'egard duCachemire, que ces revendications s'appuient sur des titres, des arguments ou tout autre chose. Je parlerai ensuite du rattachement, et enfin de PAssemblee constituante, car si je ne parlais pas du rattachement on ne com- prendrait pas ce qu'est PAssembl~econstituante. Je pense pouvoir parler de tout cela cet apres-midi. Je crais qu'il est tout a fait necessaire que cet aspect politique, social - ou, si Pon prefere, logique - dela question soit bien compris. 80. De ce que nous avons entenduauConseilde secu- rite, de toutes les discussions, de tous les d~bats, de tous les ~crits, de meme que des evenements qui se deroulent au Pakistan et de ce qu'en dit la presse etrangere, se d~gage Pidee que, au-dessus des deci- sions du Conseil de securite, il y a certains ~lements et une certaine affinit~ natureUe quimilitentenfaveur du rattachement du Cachemire au Pakistan. 81. QueUes sont done ces considerations? Nous en acceptons certaines, mais nous affirmons qu'elles s'appliquent egalement, voire davantage, ~notrepays. Pour l~ moment, je fais abstraction de tous les titres que nous pourrions avoir acquis. Je parledes conside- rations extra-juridiques et de celles qui n'ont pas trait ~ la securite. 82. La premiere de ces consid~rations est la con- tiguil:~ geographique, qui est ge~.eralement admise par nous tous. n convient de repondre que le Cache- mire a avec le Pakistan une frontiere ~ Pouest et, sur une courte distance, au nord-ouest. n a aussi une frontiere avec l'Inde, pays auquel il est relie par des voies de communications. n a egalementunefrontiere avec la Russie - au Sin-kiang - ainsi qu'avec la Chine et le Tibet. Ainsi, le Cachemire a un grand nombre de frontieres. 83. La contiguite geographique est tres souvent - et dans une large mesure - determinee par l'histoire; les relations economiques et commercialesduCache- mire ont ete beaucoup plusetroitesavecl'Indequ'avec le Pakistan. La question ne se po!,!ait pas jadis, puis- qu'll n'y avait qu'un seul pays. En consequence, si Pon parle de frontiere commune et de contigufte geogra- phique, on ne saurait comparer le rattachement du Cachemire l1. l'lnde avec le rattachement d'une ne 85. Some of you may saythatthatisa very nice view, but it is not how the world is run. Then how do we look at it? Pakistan has a population-I am subject to correction-of between 70 and 80 million, because I believe that their census, like ours, was takenin 1951, and our populations increase by 1.5 per cent a year. Roughly speaking, Pakistan has a population of some- where about 75 million; but the proximity of Kashmir is to West Pakistan (Pakistan is in two parts and is separated by the Indian mainland extending for about 1,000 miles). Therefore, the proximity.of Kashmir, ethnically and otherwise, is to West Pakistan, and I have no accurate figures of the Muslim populatic,n of West Pakistan. However, at the very outside, itcannot be more than about 30 million, and there are nearly 50 million Muslims in India. If our Government were to accept the view that because people are Muslims, they should belong to another State, I ask the Security Council, in all conscience, to consider what would happen to the considerable Muslim minorities in my country'. They are distributed over the whole of our land. In some places they are sparse minorities, in some places they almost form the majority itt the area. Are we to say that they are second-class citizens? We refuse to accept that position in India. We have almost as many Muslims in India-and I qualify the word "almost"-as inthe whole ofPakistan. We do not regard it as either a foreign culture or a foreign religion. What is more, whether it be in Pa- kistan or in India, whether they be Hindus, Muslims, Christians, or whatever they are, their ancestries are pretty much the same. One religion does not mean one race, nor does it mean that there is a separation be- tween two religious groups. ~tat s~culier, ou tout habitant - qU'il soit hindou, musulman, chr~tien, bouddhiste ou qu'il professe une autre religion - est fils ou fille de l'Inde et jouit de droits ~gaux, notamment des droits de citoyennet~ garantis par notre Constitution. L'Inde consid~re l'islamisme comme l'une des religions du pays, au mame titre que le christianisme au toute autre reli- gion. C'est pourquoi nous refusons de souscrire a la th~se selon laquelie une question politique se trouve- rait en jeu du seul fait que la population d'une cer- taine r~gion appartient a une religion donn~e. Nous ne sommes pas une th~ocratie; nous sommes un Etat s~culier moderne, r~gi par des principes d~mocra­ tiques, ou le droit de citoyennet~ repose sur la r~si­ dence ou le domicile, et sur la fid~lit~ a la Constitu- tion. Nous rejetons donc cat~goriquement un telargu- ment, qu'il s'applique aux majorit~s musulmanes, aux minorit~s hindoues ou a n'importe quel autre groupe de population. 85. Certains membres du Conseil diront peut-etre qu'il s'agit la d'une tr~s belle vue de l'esprit, mais que ce n'est pas ainsi qu'on, gere les affaires mon- diales. Regardons donc les choses bien en face. Si je ne m'abuse, le Pakistan compte de 70 a 80 millions d'habitants; je crois, en effet, que le dernier recense- ment dans ce pays a eu lieu - comme chez nous - en 1951, et, d'autre part, nos populations augmentent de 1,5 pour 100 par an. On peut donc ~valuer la popula- tion actuelle du Pakistan aenviron75millions.Cepen- dant, c'est le Pakistan occidental qui est voisin du Cachemire (on sait que le Pakistan se compose de deux parties s~par~es d'environ 1.600 kilometres par la p~ninsule indienne). En d'autres termes, que ce soit d'un point de vue ethnique ou autre, le Cachemire est proche du Pakistan occidental. Je ne possMe pas de chiffres pr~cis sur la population musulmane du Pa- kistan occidental. Quoi qu'il en soit, elie ne d~passe certainement pas 30 millions, alors qu'il y a pres de 50 millions de musulmans dans 1'Inde. Si notre gou- vernement admettait que des gens, simplement parce qu'ils sont musulmans, doivent appartenir a un autre Etat, je demande alors au Conseil de s~curit~ de .r~fl~chir en toute bonne foi li ce qu'il adviendrait des nombreuses minorit~s musulmanes qui vivent dans mon pays. On les trouve r~parties sur l'ensemble du territoire. Dans certaines r~gions, elies consti- tuent des minorit~s ~parses; dans d'autres, elles forment pour ains! dire la majorit~. Devons-nous les con~id~rer comme des citoyens de deuxieme zone? Les autorit~s indiennes se refusentli adopter une te11e attitude. n y a dans l'Inde presque autant de musulmans - je dis bien "presque" - que dans le Pakistan tout entier. Nous ne consid~rons l'isla- misme ni comma une culture ~trangere,nicommeune religion ~trangere. Bien plus~ qu'lls habitent le Pakistan ou l'Inde, qu'lls soient hindous, musulmans, chr~tiens, ou qu'lls appartiennent ;lune autre religion, tous ces gens descendent pratiquement des mames 86. We have this considerable Muslim population inside India, but it is not regarded as a minority. There is no question ofthe Muslimshaving any special sheltered treatment; they would not have it. They are equal citizens in our country, taking their place in our Government, in our public services, in our in- dustry, in our agriculture, and in everything else, just like everybody else. The secular State is one of those ideas and one of those possessions which we regard with great jealousy, because in this world the rivalry of religion and the amount of violence that has been carried out in the name of religious loyalty has been to an extent that should shame humanity at any time. Therefore, we are not prepau~d at any time to accept any view, whatever resolutions anybody may pass, that there is any justice or anything that a modern community can entertain in this idea of what was spoken of in the address of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who attributed it to Lord Mountbatten, about what is called communal representation or communal affinity, or something of that kind. [761st meeting, para.13.] 87. The whole connexion of Kashmir is, as I said a while ago, with the mainland. Its capital was founded in the third century B.C. I am not an antiquarian, I have not studied it, but the history of Kashmir is a continuous one. It has been ruled by Hindu kings, by Muslim kings, by Sikh kings, by Afghans, and by all kinds of people, but it has always been part of the mainland of India. 88. Therefore, those are extra-constitutional, extra- legal, e~ra-United Nations considerations, by which I mean they are considerations which are outside the principles of the Charter, on the one hand, and which do not come into any of the resolutions or any of the decisions which we have made. However, it was necessary for me to put them forward because it was on them that the other argument was based: that the accession was wrong, that we got it by force or by fraud. 89. What, then, is the interest? Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan said that there are strategic interests. Well, I would argue first of all that the strategic interests of a country should not always be placed in the picture when we are talking about the fortunes of the people of that country. But let us leave that alone. What if there are strategic interests? The strategic interests of a country like India, withitsbig land mass in the Indian OCean, is at least as vital in the world as the strategic interests of its neighbour, andwe are not aware of any strategic interests in our mind which are inimical to the strategic interests of Pakistan. Therefor~, this strategic interest, whichwas advanced by the former Foreign Minister, in our opinion, is one that should not 'appeal to the Security Council. 90. What is the actual position with regard to this evaluation? I outlined briefly this morning the relation of Kashmir to India, that is, that when the British left. India these Stat!!s' were to accede to one country or to the otheer, to one Dominion or to the other. That was the position. That way was prescribed in the [761~me s~ance, par. 13]. 87. Comme je l'ai d~ja dit, le Cachemire est enti~­ rement li6 a la p6ninsule indienne. Sa capitale a 6t6 fond6e au IDeme si~cle avant J6sus-Christ. Je ne suis pas historien, mais ce qui me frappe, c'est la contin.uit6 de l'histoire du Cachemire. Le Cachemire a 6t6 gouvern6 par des rois hindous, musulmans, sikhs, par des Afghans et par bien d'autres encore, mais il a toujours fait partie de lap6ninsule indienne. 88. Les consid~rations qui pr6cMent n'ont rien II voir avec les principes constitutionnels ou juridiques ni avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies - c'est-ll- dire qu'elles sont sans rapport avec les principes 6nonc~s dans la Charte et qu'elles n'apparaissent pas dans les r6s01utions ou d6cisions de l'Organisa- "ion.' Mais j'ai dii les rappeler, car c'est sur de teUes consid~rations que lIon s'est fond~ pour pr6- tendre que le rattachement ~tait irr~gulier et que nous l'avons obtenu par la violence ou par la fraude. 89. Passons maintenant aux consid6rations d'int6ret. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan aparl~ d'interets stra- t~giques. Je r~pliquerai tout d'abord que l'on ne de- vrait pas toujours mettre en avant les interets strat6- giques d'un pays quand on se pr60ccupe du sort des populations qui I'habitent. Mais passons - admettons qu'il y ait des int~rets strategiques. Les interets strategiques d'un pays comme l'Inde, dont le territoire s'avance fo:1'1: loin dans l'oc6an Indien, sont au moiI:ls aussi importants dans le monde que ceux de son voisin, et je ne vois pas en quoi les int6rets strat6- giques de l'Inde heurtent ceux du Pakistan. 11 ne me semble donc pas que le Conseil de s6curit6 doive s'arreter II l'argument invoqu6 par l'ancien ministre des affaires 6trangeres. 90. QueUe ~tait, en fait, la situation? J'ai parl6 bri~vementce matin des rapports entre le Cachemire et l'lnde, et rappe16 que, apr~s le d6part .des Britan- niques, les Etats comme le Cachemire devaient etre rattacMs II l'un des deux pays, II l'un ou a l'autre des dominions. Voila queUe ~tait la proc6dure de 91. On 26 October 1947 the Maharaja of Kashmir who was the Head of the State-I am now dealing with the constitutional necessities-submitted to the Gov- nor-General of India an. instrument of accession-in the Constitution of that day the Governor-General of India was the Head of the Government, but not today; he W2.S the represE::ntative of the British Crown because at that time we were an independent British dominion. The text of this instrument is set out in annex IV of my statement [S/PV.762/Add.1, annex IV, document 5]. I will not read it because it is a legal document in conformity with what is said in the Con- stitution. I will read it if it is challenged, but other- wise I will not do so. Ii is set out in the Constitution, in the Act of 1935, as amended. That instrument was sent over on 26 October and on the 27th, Lord Mount- batten, Governor-General of India, acceptedthe acces- sion. Lord Mountbatten said: "I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession." The accession is complete. We should look at these caveats more frequently than we have done. It has been suggested time and again that there is something like provisional accession, that you can go in and come out. 92. This is a very serious matter for us, a serious matter not only for India but for every country seated around this table. We are a federation; we are not a confederation, and the units thataccedetofederation stay in once they have acceded. There is no provision in our Constitution, there is no contem'plation in our Constitution for the secession, and that is notpeculiar to us. Our institutions are largely derivedfromAnglo- Saxon parliamentary institutions which affected the constitutions of the countries of Western Europe and North America. In these countries there is no pro- vision for secession at all. That is to say, under the Government of India Act, as in force on 15 August 1947-the relevant extracts of which are in annex IV [S/PV.762/Add.1, annex IV, document 3]-it has been set out how a state should accede. Oncethat accession has taken place there is no provision inthis to go out. The only provision there is, is in regard to variation. A ruler may, by a supplementary instrumentexecuted by him, and accepted by the Governor-General, vary the instrument of accession of his State by extending the functions which, by virtue of that instrument, are exercisable by any dominion authority in relation to the State. But, of course, the Government ofIndia also has to agree. If the two sides agree, it is possible to vary the conditions of the relationship between the constituent unit in the federation and the central Government. That is all that is permitted by the law. Therefore, when anyone suggests to us that there should fie a divorcement of this territory from our federation, we are being asked to act agalnstour con- stitutional procedures. Now I freely admit that when the municipal constitutional procedures, as your ~ l'intt§rieur de la fed6ration. 91. Le 26 octobre 1947, le maharajah de Cachemire, chef de l'Etat - je parle malntenant de la procedure constitutionnelle - a prt§sentt§ un instrument d'acces- sion au Gouverneur gt§n6ral de I'Inde - qui, selon la Constitution d'alors, 6tait le chefdel'EtateUe repr6- sentant de la Couronne britannique puisque 1'Inde 6talt a l'6poque un dominion britannique ind6pendant. Le texte de cet instrument est reproduit dans 1'annexeIV ~ ma d6claration [S/PV.782/Add.l, annexe IV, docu- ment 5]. Je n'en donnerai !las lecture puisqu'il s'agit d'un document juridique conforme aux dispositions constitutionnelles, mais je le feral s'il y a contesta- tion. Toutes les modaliMs sont fixt§es par la Consti- tution, par la loi de 1935 telle qu'elle a 6t6 modifi6e. L'instrument en question a 6t6 transmis le 26 octobre, et lord Mountbatten, gouverneur g6n6ral de l'Inde, a accept6 l'accession le 27 en ces termes: "J'accepte par les presentes cet instrument d'accession." Le rattachement est achev6. 11 serait bon detenircompte de ces faits plus souvent que nous ne l'avons fait. On a maintes fois d6clar6 que le rattachement peut etre provisoire, qu'll est possible de se rattacher ~ I'Union, puis de s'en d6tacher. 92. C'est la un point tres important qui n'inMresse pas seulement 1'Inde, mais aussi tous les pays re!lre- senMs ici. L'Inde est une fed6ration, et non une con- fed6ration; tous les Etats qui entrent dans une f6d6- ration doivent ensuite y rester. Notre Constitution ne mentionne pas la s6cession, elle ne l'envisage pas, et ceci n'est pas particulier a notre pays. Nos institu- tions d6coulent en grande partie des institutions par- lementaires anglo-saxonnes, qui ont influenc6 les constitutions des pays de l'Europe occidentale et de l'Am6rique du Nord. Or, dans ces pays non plus, la secession n'est pas pr6vue. Autrement dit, la loi sur le gouvernement de I'Inde envigueurau 15aoiit 1947- dont vous trouverez les passages pertinents dans l'annexe IV [S/PV.762/Add.1, annexe IV, document 3] - fixait la proc6dure a suivre pour le rattachementd'un Etat a l'Union. Le rattachement une fois effectu6, aucune disposition ne permet de ledefaire. LaConsti- tution envisage seulement une procedure de modifica- tion. Un chef d'Etat peut, par un instrument supp16- mentaire qu'll execute et que le Gouverneur g6ni!ral accepte, modifier l'instrument d'accession de son Etat en elargissant les pouvoirs qui, en vertu de cet instrument, peuvent etre exerces par toute autorit6 du dominion ~ 1'6gard de l'Etat. n faut 6videmment que le Gouvernement indien donne lui aussi son assentiment. S'll y a accord entre les deux parties, il est possible de modifier les conditions qui regissent les rapports entre 1'une des unit6s constituant la f6d6ration et le pouvoir central. Mais c'est tout ce que la loi autorise. Donc, lorsqu'on propose de d6ta- cher .le Cachemire de la fed6ration, on nous demande d'enfreindre notre procedure constitutionnelle. ~e 93. I want here to refer only to two instances. One is the well-known instance of the United States and it is possible to quote case after case to show where the constituent states of the United States have a greater degree of sovereignty than the units of our federation- one can say this without going into domestic affairs- because they have residuary powers in those States. But it has gone to the Supreme CO'lrt of the United States time after time. 94. I think the leading case in this matter is a case called Texas v. White, where the Supreme Court ruled once and for all that there was no such right vested in' a state. The issue was not whether they wanted to secede, but that was the point that had to be decided. For our purposes it is much betterto go into the general principle of secession. If you want me to, I can quote it. But any textbook on this subject will tell you that in a federation there is no right of secession. Our Constitution in this sense is different from the constitutions of some other countries. In Texas v. White, the Supreme Court settled the con- stitutional question. The book Studies in Federalism, edited by Bowie and Friedrich states that "the Supreme Court settled the constitutional question of the right of secession, as it had in fact been settled by the Civil War."!! I did not want to refer to that because the Civil Warwas not exactly judicialprocess. But, at any rate, it certainly showedthedetermination of a people to retain the unity of their country and .,'hich side really asserted itself. 95. But in this case the Supreme Court said: "When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation."U That is a provision of a constituent unitin the federa- tion. In other words, a federation does not recognize divorce. Once it is in, it is a sacrament; it cannot be separated; it is an indissoluble relation. 96. The Supreme Court continued: "All the obligations of perpetual union and all the guarantees of republican government in the Union, 11 Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Studies in Federalism, Boston, Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1954, p. 789. s~cession. 93. Je ne citerai que deux exemples. L'un, qui est bien connu, est celui des Etats-Unis d'Am~rique, et, sans p~n~trer dans le domaine des affaires int~­ rieures d'un Etat, on pourrait citer de nombreux cas qui montrent que les Etats formant les Etats-Unis d' Am~rique jouissent d'une plus grande sOl.werainete que les Etats qui constituent notre f~d~ration, parce qu'ils ont conserv~ certains pouvoirs. La question a ~te cependant portee l\ maintes reprises devant la Cour supreme des Etats-Unis. 94. Le cas le plus typique est, je crois, l'affaire "Texas c. White", dans laquelle la Cour supreme a tranch~ souverainement en declarant qu'un Etat n'a pas le droit de secession. TIne s'agissaitpas de savoir si ItEtat voulait se separer de l'Union, mais c'est cette question que la Cour supreme a et~ amenee d trancher. Etant donne le but que nous nousproposons, il parait bien preferable de traiter du principe gem~­ ral de la s~cession. Si le Conseille desire, je peux citer des textes, mais n'importe quel manuel nous dira que, dans une fed~ration, le droit de secession n'existe pas. A cet egard, notre Constitution differe de celles d'autres pays. A l'occasion de l'affaire Texas c. White, la Cour supreme a tranche la question constitutionnelle. Dans l'ouvrage Studies in Federal- ism, edite par Bowie et Friedrich, il est dit que "la Cour supreme a tranche la question constitutionnelle du droit de s~cession, comme l'avait resolue, en fait, la guerre civile"ll. (Je ne voulais pas me referer l\ ce pdc~dent parce que la guerre de S~cession n'a pas ete, d proprement parler, une procedure judi- ciaire. Quoi qu'il en soit, elle a temoigne de la deter- mination d'un peuple r~solu l\ maintenir l'unite de Son pays et a montre qu'il a su imposer cette unite.) 95. Dans l'affaire Texas c. White, la Cour supreme a declare: "Par consequent, lorsque le Texas est devenu l'un des Etats unis, ils'estliepardes liens indisso- lublesU." TI s'agit a d'un element constitutif de la fed~ration. En d'autres termes, une fed~ration n'admet pas le divorce. Une fois que la federation est instituee, elle devient sacr~e et ne peut etre rompue. Elle cr~e des liens indissolubles. 96. La Cour supreme ajoutait: "L'Etat assume de ce seul fait toutes les obliga- tions d~coulant d'une union perp~tuelle et acquiert "!7'itobert R. Bowie et Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Studies in Federalism, Boston-Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, edit., 1954, p. 789. 97. The Supreme Court continues: nThe act which consummated her adri:lission into Union was something more than a compact.nV 98. A State, in my submission, can no more banish itself from a federation than an individual can banish himself from a State. He has no right of divorce- ment from the community to which he belongs. There may be rules of exile in a country, but there is no way in which a man can disqualify himself except by com- mitting a crime. The act which consummated the admission of Texas into the Unionwas something more than a compact; it was not a contract and therefore could not be dissolved. 99. The Supreme Court continued: n•..it w.as the incorporation of a new memb9r into the political body. And it was complete and final... There was no place for reconsideration or revoca- tion, except through revolution or consent of the States.nV 100. It is possible for the Parliament of India, in the exercise of its sovereignty and according to its constitutional procedures which would require the consultation and the assent of the constituent State to separate it, but that is the kind of sovereignty that Professor Dicey spoke of when he said that a Parliament can do everything but make a man a woman. But that sovereign right isnot what is at issue here. The issue is: what was the formal relationship which was contingent, which was conditionalandwhich could be altered? Even if it were so, t~en a dispute about territory, to which the previous representati,.ve in this Chair, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, referredto·" and refuted, would have been very simple; butthere is no such thing. 101. I would refrain from quoting the general prin- ciples on this subject, but I want to refer to another instance, particularly in order that the represent- atives of the United Kingdom and ~ustra1ia can come nearer to this problem. Australia has six States. It is not a confederation. But power is much more dispersed, shall we say, thanl in Canada-and Western Australia, at one time, had ideas of separation. A plebiscite was taken. Some 130,000 people-in round numbers-voted for separation, and 30,000 people voted for remaining in. The plebiscite, then, was in favour of separation. That was before the Statute of Westminster, and therefore any alteration of the law would require the consent of the British Parliament. It went to Parliament, and the Parliament appointed a joint committee of the two Houses which sits in judicial session on these matters. The casewas argued by counsel on both sides, and the parliamentary view about this was recorded in the joint committee's l/Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Studies in Federalism, Boston, Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 11154, p. 789. sanctionn~ son admission dans l'Union ~tai~plusqu'un pacteV." 98. A mon avis, un Etat ne peut se d~tacherd'une f~d~ration, pas plus qu'un individu ne peut se d~tacher d'un Etat. L'individu n'a pas le droit de se s~parer de la communaut~ ~ laquelle il appartient. Certes, il peut exister des lois sur l'exil, mais un individu ne peut pas s'exclure lui-meme de la communaut~dont il Elst membre, sauf s'il commet un crime. L'acte qui a sanctionn~ l'admission du Texas dans 1'Union ~tait plus qu'un pacte. Ce n'~tait pas un contrat et, par cons~quent, il ne pouvait se dissoudre. 99. :La Cour supreme disait enfin: "Un nouveau membre se trouvait incorpor~ dans 1'organisme politique, d'une fa~on d~finitive et irr~vocable... n n'~tait pas possible de revenir sur cette incorporation ou de 1'annuler, si ce n'est par la r~volutionou avec le consentement des EtatsV." 100. Le Parlement indien peut, dans 1'exercice de sa souverainet~et selonlaprocedure constitutionnelle qui exigerait l'assentimentde l'Etatint~ress~,d~cider que cet Etat cessera de faire partie de l'Union, mais il s'agit ~ du genredesouverainet~dontle professeur Dicey a dit qu'elIe permettait a un parlement de tout faire, 'sauf de transformer un homme en femme. Quoi qu'll en soit, il ne s'agit pas ici de ce droit de souve- rainet~. La question est de savoir quel est le lien formel, contingent et conditionnel, qui pourrait etre modifi~. Dans ce cas, le diff~rend territorial que mon pr~d~cesseur, M. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a mentionn~ et dont il a contest~ la r~alit~ serait fort simple. Mais il n'en est pas ainsi. 101. Je n'~voquerai pas, ace propos, des principes g~n~raux, mais je voudrais citer seulement un autre exemple qui permettra peut-etre au repr~sentantdu Royaume-Uni et au repr~sentant de l'Australie de mieux voir le probl~me. L'Australie comprend six Etats. Ce n'est pas UI;le conf~d~ration. Mais l'autoritEi. gouvernementale est plus dispers~e qu'au Canada, par exemple, et i1 fut un temps od 1'Australie occi- dentale nourrissait des id~es s~paratistes. Uil pl~­ biscite eut lieu: 130.000 personnes environsepronon- c~rent pour la s~paration et 30.000 vot~rent contre. Ainsi, le r~sultat du pl~biscite ~tait favorable a. la s~paration. Cela se passait avant l' entr~eenvigueur du Statut de Westminster, et par cons~quent, toute modification de la loi n~cessitait le consentement du Parlement britannique. La question fut done renvoy~e au Parlement britannique, qui instituaune comm~ssion mixte, compos~e de membres des deux chambres et investie de pouvoirs judiciaires. L'affaire fut plaid~e !/Robert R. Bowie et Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Studies in Federalism, Boston-Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, edit., 1954, p.789. 102. The right of secession, then, does not exist in our federation. This may be abstract law, but it is of very great importance to us. And I want to ask the members of the Council to address their minds to what would happen to what is now called India if this principle were not strictly enforced. 103. I have mentioned that there were 562 states be- fore the British went away. A handfulofthem are part of Pakistan; the remainder are part of the Indian Union. If every local Maharaja had a differentidea the next morning and started seceding, our unity would disappear in no time. What is applicable to Kashmir would be applicable to every state that has acceded if once we said that the accession is not permanent but provisional. 104. Therefore, the Government of India, out of con- sideration~ of security, out of considerations of inter- national law and the law of India, and tl)e law that has been given to it by the BritishParliament, cannot ever accept the idea that accession is anythingbutan indis- soluble bond. When Kashmir acceded, that matterwas finished. Therefore, there is no suchthingas going out. In the United States, as I said, they decided in other ways. Accordingly, any suggestionto us thatthe acces- sion is provisional or temporary is very wrong. 105. We might then be asked: What is the meaning of the letter written by the Earl of Mountbatten, when he was Governor-General of India, tothe Maharaja, about consulting the wishes of the people? I do not want to evade this question. 106. As I pointed out, there is a document of acces- sion. There is an offer andthere is an acceptance. That concludes the arrangement. I will notcallita contract -but that concludes the arrangement. The letter ofthe Governor-General is a separate document and has nothing to do with this. What does thatdocument do? It makes no guaranties. It expresses the wish ofthe Gov- ernment of India-not as part of the law, but as part of a political policy. We are entitled to ask that the Security Council should make a distinction between what is a policy of a Government at any time and the constitutional law or the principles of international law that govern these matters. 107. Therefore, when the Governor-General of Iridia wrote to the Maharaja and said "Inaccordance with the general policy that we follow, we will consult", he did not say anything about a plebiscite; he said that the wishes of the people would be consulted. I shall deal 108. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has quoted a telegram in which my Prime Minister says to the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, that this is a pledgeto all the world-a pledge to y~lU and everybody else [761st meeting, para. 24]. I am going to deal with those telegrams of the Prime Min- ister, because they must be read out in the context in which they happened. And we have always communi- cated this view to the Government of Pakistan. 109. In the telegram of 31 October 1947, from New Delhi to Karachi, the Government says: "Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's Governmentand the most numerously representative popular organiza- tion in the State, which is predominantly Muslim. Even then, it was accepted on conditionthat, as soon as the invader has been driven from KaShmir soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would be able to decide the question of accession." 110. That is why the Constituent Assembly becomes important-because, while we have no international commitment in this matter, we have a moral commit- ment to the peoples overthere-thatcommitmentinthe context of subsequent events. Therefore, when we consider this question of consulting the wishes of the people, the plebiscite and so on, we should bear in mind that there are twoaspects oftt. One is the aspect of whether there is a commitment by the· Government 'of India to other parties than the Security Council of the United Nations, and the other is the aspect of whether there is a commitment that has come inthe context of the United Nations. And that is where the consultation of the people has arisen. 111. First of all, the reason for statingthis wish was the previous history of Kashmir. Kashmir was ruledat that time by a Maharajawho wasfar from having given it a popular Government. The leaders of the national movement were in prison. Tne national movement in India was in close association with the national move- ment of Kashmir, and the leaders ofthe Indian national movement had shared the prison life of these people. So this great national movement, which was kept under suppression by the Maharaja, really represented Kashmir in a political and social sense. And a Govern- ment like the Indian Government, which had grownout of a national movement after a peaceful revolution, would not havefeIt happy in merely accepting the ac- cession-not for legal reasons, but political reasons- of the Maharaja. It therefore consulted what was at that tim.e the only widespread movement inthe place- the Natienal Conference. 112. While we are on this subject, it is well to say that the national movement in Kashmir started as a "Nous avons accepte l'accession du Cachemire a l'Inde 2. la demande du gouvernement du maharajah et de l'organisation populaire qui estnumeriquement la plus representative de l'Etat, dont la population est en majorite musulmane. Aussi bien, nous avons accepte a condition que la population du Cachemire se prononce sur la question de l'accession des que I'envahisseur aura ete chasse du territoire et que l'ordre public aura ete retabli." 110. C'est pourquoi la question de l'Assemblee constituante acquiert de l'importance - parce que, si nous n'avons pas d'engagement international en la matiere, nous avons un engageIIientmoralenvers cette population, un engagement qui s'inscrit dans le {:on- texte des evenements qui se sont deroules par la suite. C'est pourquoi, quand on parIe de s'enquerir des vooux du peuple, de plebiscite, etc., il ne faut pas Qublier que la question a deuxaspects. Premierement, y a-t-il un engagement du Gouvernement de l'lnde envers d'autres parties que le Conseil de securite de l'Organisation des Nations Unies? Deuxiemement, y a-t-il un engagement qui rentre dans le cadre des Nations Unies? C'est la qu'intervient la question de la consultation populaire. 111. Tout d'abord, si le voou en question a eM ex- prime, c'est a cause de l'histoire anterieure du Cachemire. Le Cachemire etait gOllverne l\. cette epoque par un maharajah, qui etait loin d'avoir donne a. son Etat un gouvernement populaire. Les chefs du mouvement national etaient en ·prison. Le mouvement national de l'lnde entretenait des relations etroites avec celui du Cachemire, et les chefs des deux mo\.!- vements se sont retrouves en prison. Ainsi, ce grand mouvement national, opprime par ~e maharajah, re- presentait bien le Cachemire au point de vue politique et social. Un gouvernement tel que le Gouvernement de l'Inde, mis en place par un mouvemellt national a la suite d'une revolution pacifique, ne se serait pas contente d'accepter simplement l'accession decidee par le maharajah - et cela pour des raisons politi- ques, et non pas j\lridiques. C'est pourquoi il a con.,. suIte le seul mouvement numeriquement important a. l'epoque: la Conference nationale. 112. Toujours dans le meme ordre d'idees, ilestbon de rappeler que le .mouvement national au Cachemire 113. Therefore, when we accepted this accession, we did the next best thing we could. And after that, if conditions had not been what they were, that is to say, if the country had not been invaded, if there had not been all that followed inthe wake of the invaSion, if the country had not been dividedby the cease-fire line into the occupied part and the free part-the part occupied by Pakistan and the part that is free in India-then it would have been possible to do something else. 114. It is in thatcontextthat the telegramto which the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has referred was sentto the former Prime Minister of Pakistan. And I would request the Security Council to read the text of that telegram, because' it was more a message from the heart than from any political deliberations. It was a time when India and Pakistan were emerging fromthe background of the great mass slaughter on the north- western frontiers, and it was hoped on both sides to prevent any further spread of this bloodshed. 115. If the telegramisto be quoted, the next paragraph should also be read. The Foreign Minister ofPakistan quoted a paragraph-and it is accurate asfar as it goes. But I submit that the Security Council, in looking at the document, has to look at the previous and the succeed- ing paragraphs, if necessary. Now, this is what the succeeding paragraphs say: "I have no doubt that you realize that the raiders from the Frontier Province or along the Murree road came from Pakistan territory and that it is the easiest thing in the world to stop them at the two bridges which connect Pakistan territory to Kash- mir." In other words, it was an appeal to him to stop the bloodshed at these bridges. They were not so prevented, and the equipment of arms, including artillery and automatic weapons, bears witness to the help being given them. The telegram goes on: "We are credibly informed that regular officers of the Pakistan Army are adVising these raiders. Even. now, it should be easy for your Government to stop the passage ofthem andtheir supplies to the Kashmir territory." 116. Now, the statement made by Mr. Khan Noon should be read in the context of the telegram of 31 October 1947 from the Prime Minister of India and of the reply by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. 117. At the 761st meeting of the Security Council, I said that Mr. Khan Noon had referred-not only a'" securit~ de lire ce teMgramme, car il s'agit plus d'un message venant du cceur que d'un document r6sultant de d6liMrations politiques. 11 a et6 envoy6 a une 6poque ou l'Inde et le Pakistan sortaient seule- ment des massacres qui avaient ensanglant6 les fronti~res du Nord-Ouest, et ou les deux parties esp6raient empecher de nouvelles effusions de sang. 115. Si le Mlegramme est cite, leparagraphesuivant ne peut etre passe sous silence. Le Ministre des affaires etrang~resdu Pakistan a cit6 un paragraphe, et la citation est juste en sOi; mais j'estime que le Conseil de securit6 doit, si c'est n6cessaire, 6gale- ment tenir compte de~ paragraphes pr6cedents et suivants de ce document. Les paragraphes suivants sont ainsi conc;us: "Vous savez sans aucundoute que les envahisseurs venant de la province fronti~re ou le longde la route de Murree viennent du territoire pakistanais, et rien n'6tait plus facile que de les arreter aux deux ponts qui relient le territoire du Pakistan au Cachemire." Autrement dit, c'etait un appel au Premier Ministre du Pakistan pour mettre fin aux effusions de sang ll. cet .endroit. Les raids continu~rent, et les armes, notamment l'artillerie et. les armes automatiques, dont etaient equipes ceux qui les effectuaient, te- moignent de l'aide qu'ils recevaient. On Ut encore dans le telegramme: "Nous savons de source sure que des officiers de l'arm6e reguli~re pakistanaise conseillent CElS envahisseurs. Mame maintenant, il devrait atre fa- cile pour votre gouvernement de les empecher de passer avec leur equipement sur le territoire du Cachemire." 116. La declaration de M. Khan Noon doit etre lue en tenant compte du telegramme du 31 octobre 1947 envoye par le Premier Ministre de l'Inde, ainsi que de la reponse du Premier Ministre du Pakistan. 117. A la 76Ume seance du Conseil de securite, j'ai dit que M. Khan Noon avait fait allusion - non seule- "As far as we can find out, Sir Firoz Khan Noon's references to statements by me all relate to certain messages sent by me to Liaquat Ali Khan within the first ten days or so of the invasion of Kashmir in 1947."-1 would ask the Security Council to place itself within the contextofthat background.- "During those days, we had no knowledge of the part that the Pakistan Army was playing in this invasion-thatis, obviously helping the raiders. It was later, in November, that we came to know of the presence of the Pakistan Army itself in Kashmir, because our troops came into contact with them there. You will notice"-and here the Prime Minister is referringto me-"that, at the time that I had suggested to Pak- istan to make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir, Pakistan did not accept this, and in fact continued its aggression for a year subsequently, that is, throughout 1948. "We went to the Security Council to avoid all-out war with Pakistan. Later, the fact of Pakistan's aggression came out clearly. The military situation in Kashmir State began to be unfavourable to them. "The resolution of the United Nations Commission of 13 August was agreed to by India, subject to clar- ifications. Pakistan did not agree to this resolution and continued the aggression. Owing to a further deterioration of the military situation, they agreed to the United Nations resolution of 5 January, which supplemented the 13 August resolution." - 118. Now, this goes back to a very earlyperiod of the tumult. It was our hope that Pakistan would join us in settling the matter. At this point, I should like to say something that I shall have to repeat later. If an offer is made and it is not aceepted at the time it is made, it cannot be held for generations over the heads of those who made it. It is quite true that at that time we told Pakistan: "Let us go to the United Nationstogether and ask for a plebiscite." They did not agree. When they did not agree, that offer lapsed. They cannotcome here nine years later .and say: "You mentioned the word 'plebiscite'." That is the position. We have made many offers to Pakistan at various times. Som~ of th~se offers may be reconsidered, if necessary, when the time comes. But, if an offer made to an opposing party is not accepted within a reasonable time, it cannot be maintained that it is still an open offer. The offer terminates when it is not accepted. In very many cases, we have said that explicitly; where we have not done so, it must be taken as the normal state of affairs. cord~e - afin de consulter mon Premier Ministre. A cette 6poque, je ne disposais pas du texte complet du t~l~gramme en question. J'ai maintenant re~u de mon Premier Ministre les renseignements n~ces­ saires. Voici ce qu'il dit: "Pour autant que nous puissions le v~rifier, les r6f~rences de sir Firoz Khan Noon a des declara- tions que j'ai faites se rapportent toutes a certains messages adress~s par moi a. Liaquat Ali Khan au cours des 10 premiers jours de l'invasion du Cachemire, en 1947. (Je voudrais demander au Conseil de s~curit~ de se replacer dans le cadre de ces ~v6nements.) "Durant ces jours, nous ne sa- vions rien du role jou~ par l'armee du Pakistan dans cette invasion - c'est-a.-dire de l'aide que recevaient manifestement les envahisseurs. crest plus tard, en novembre, que nOus avons eu connais- sance de la pr6sence au Cachemire de l'arm~e - pakistanaise, avec laquelle nos troupes etaient en- trees en contact. Vous remarquerez (ici, le Premier Ministre s'adresse a moi) - que, a. l'~poque ou j'avais sugg~re au Pakistan de se joindre a nous pour adresser a I'Organisation des Nations Unies une demande concernant l'organisation d'un pl~­ biscite au Cachemire, le Pakistan n'a pas accepte ma suggestion et, en fait, a poursuivi son agression pendant un an, c'est-a.-dire pendant toute l'ann~e 1948. "Nous avons saisi le Conseil de s~curite afin d'~viter une guerre ouverte avec le Pakistan. Par la suite, l'agression de ce pays es.t apparue comme un fait. La situation militaire, au Cachemire, a com- menc~ a etre defavorable au Pakistan. "La r~solution adopt~e le 13 aoiit par la Commis- sion des Nations Unies a ~te acceptee par l'Inde, sous reserve d'eclaircissements. Le Pakistan ne l'a pas acceptee et a poursuivi.son agression; puis, la situation militaire s'etant encore aggrav~e, ila accepte la r~solution des Nations Unies en date du 5 janvier, qui compl~tait celle du 13 aoiit." 118. Cela remonte tout au debut de l'affaire. Nous esp~rions que le Pakistan accepterait de regler la question avec nous.· Ici, je voudrais dire une chose sur laquelle je devrai ..dvenir-plus tard. Si une offre n'est pas acceptee au moment oll elle est faite, elle ne saurait lier pendant des g~n~rationsceux qui 1'0nt formulee. n est tout a fait exact quIa c;ette epoque nous avons dit au Pakistan: "Allons ensemble devant l'Organisation des Nations Unies et demandons un pl~biscite." Le Pakistan n'a pas accepte. De ce fait, l'offre a cess~ d'etre valable. Le Pakistan ne peut· venir ici, neuf ans plus tard, et dire: "Vous avez parl~ de "pl~biscite". Telle est la situation. Nous avons, a plusieurs reprises, fait de nombreuses offres au Pakistan. Quelques-unes pourront etre re- consid~r~es le moment venu, si cela est n~cessaire. Mais si une offre faite a la partie adverse n'est pas acceptee dans un d~lai raisonnable, on ne peut soute- nir que cette offre continue d'etre valable. Elle prend fin au moment oll elle est rejet~e. Nous l'avons dit de 120. It has been said that we obtained this accession, on the one hand, by force and, on the other hand, by fraud. In anything that I shall now say on the question of force, I do not wishto be understood as referring to the word "fraud". So far as force is concerned, I would say this: force did play a part in this accession. Force affected the timing so that the Maharaja had no alternative but to ask for protection. Apart from any questions of accession, apart from any questions of the law relating to this matter, I would ask the Security Council this question in all conscience: if a State is being invaded, is it not the most natural thing in the world for that State to ask a neighbour to come to its protection? Is such a request. to be regarded as the illlposition of force from outside? We used noforce in connexion with the accession. 121. I believe that the Security Council is familiar with communications in this respect from General Lockhart, the British Commander-in-Chief of our Army, and from Air Marshal Elmhirst, the head of the Air Forc~ at that time-in any case, I shall circulate these communications. These officers were commis- sioned by His Majesty the King ofEngland, and were on temporary service with us. They had nothing to expect from us by way of reward, butthey categorically stated that any suggestion that there was any conspiracy in connexion with this accession was entirely wrong. 122. Thus, I repeat, we used no force. The only force we used was that necessary to repelthe invader-and I believe that thatis a force whichwe are entitled to use, and indeed are enjoined to use, under the Charter of the United Nations. 123. With regard to the other suggestion that some sharp practice was involved, I setoutthis morning the conditions of the standstill agreement. Had the State concluded the standstill agreement with us, we should immediately have become responsible for its foreign affairs, defence, and communications-but, as I said this morning, this matter was interrupted by the in- vasion. The Security Councilwill recallthe chronology of the invasion which I read out this morning. 124. Therefore, it can be seen that it was not we who used force-or that other word which I do not want to use. The accession was legal. As I have already Said, at one time, beforethe Maharajahad made up his mind, we asked the Governor-Generalto tellhim to accede to 120. On a dit que nous avions obtenu cette accession par la force d'une part et par la tromperie d'autre part. Que l'on ne considere pas ce que je vais dire maintenant a propos de la force comme s'appliquant a la "tromperie". Pour ce qui est de la force, je dirai ceci: la force a joue un role dans cette acces- sion; elle a influence le cours des evenements de telle sorte qu'il ne restait au maharajah qu'une seule possibilite: celle de demanderune protection. Indepen- damment de toute question relative a l'accession, in- dependamment de toute question juridique relative a cette afiaire, je voudrais poser auConseilde securite, en toute conscience, la question suivante: si un Etat est envahi, n'est-il pas tout naturel qu'il demande a son voisin aide et assistance?' Ira-t-on considerer cette aide comme un acte de force venant du dehors? Nous n'avons pas use de la force dans cette affaire d'accession. 121. Je pense que le Conseil de securite est au cou- rant des rapports communiques sur cette question par le general Lockhart, commandant en chef bri- tannique de notre armee, et par le marechal de l'air Elmhirst, a cette epoque chef des fqrces aeriennes. De toute fa~on, je ferai distribuer ces communica- tions. Ces officie'rs etaient charges d'une mission par S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre et ils etaient en service temporaire aupres de nous. Ils n'avaient aucun inte- ret .a declarer categoriquement, comme ils l'ont fait cependant, que toute idee d'une conspiration quel- conque dans cette affaire d'accession etait absolu- ment denuee de fondement. 122. Ainsi, je le repete, nous n'avons pas recouru a la for,ce. Le seul usage que nous en ayons fait a eM pour repousser l'envahisseur, et je crois que selon la Charte des Nations Unies nous avions le droit, et meme le devoir, de le faire. 123., Pour ce qui est de l'autre insinuation, selon la- queUe des procedes trompeurs auraient ete employes, j'ai expose ce matin les conditions de l'accord de statu quo. Si l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire avait conclu avec nous l'accord de statu quo, nous aurions immediatement eu la responsabiliM de ses affaires etrangeres, de sa defense, et de ses communications, mais, comme je l'ai dit ce matin, tout cela a eM interrompu par l'invasion. Le Conseil de securite se rappellel'a la chronologie des evenements que j'ai indiquee ce matin. 124. Il est donc facile de voir que ce n'est pas nous qui avons recouru a la force - ou a; cet autre moyen que je ne veux pas nommer. L'accession s'est faite dans la legalite. Comme je l'ai dejaditune fois, avant que le maharajah n'ait pris sa decision, nous avons 125. Questions may be asked regar,ding the right of the sovereign-that is, the Prince-to m,akethe acces- sion for the State. In this respect, we have the very reputable and, in this particular case, very helpful authority of Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Jinnah was President of the Muslim League and a founder of Pakistan. He said the following on 17 June 1947, before he became Gov- ernor-General of Pakistan: "Constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent, sovereign States on the termination of Paramountcy, and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to jointhe Hindustan ConstituentAssembly"- that was what they called us-,"or the Pakistan Constituent Asse:nbly"-that was their name-,"or decide to remain independent. . ..I am clearly ofthe opinion that the Cabinet Mission's memorandum of 12 May 1946 does not in any way limit them [in this choice]." 126. Just two weeks before the partition took place, Mr. Jinnah reiterated this attitude before the Muslim League. He said: "They are free to join either ofthe two dominions, or to remain independent. The Muslim League recog- nizes the right of each State to its destiny." 127. There are other statements by Mr. Jinnah in which he says that the person to whom the accession should be offered is the Ruler. If that were not the case, there would be no legality. The Ruler is the repository of power. Whether, morally speaking, he is democratic or not is another matter. In an Indian State, however,all power flows from the Ruler-in some cases, this istrue only in theoryj in many cases, before independence, this was also true in form. There was, therefore, no one else who could have offered the accession. 128. I come now to the question of the Constituent Assembly. In acceding to India, every State-not only Kashmir-had the right, if it so Wished, to call its own Constituent Assembly. They could have discussed various other matters, such as the allocation ofvarious sources of revenue and all kinds of things like that. But the majority of States, in fact all of them after some time-some of them had toyed with the idea-decided that it was a waste of time and energy in procedure, so they elected members to the India,n Constituent Assembly. When the subject was under discussion and they did not see the reason, the princes of India- patriotic. men and women as they were-all realized the importan'Ce of allOWIng a united India to emerge, and it was the princes who came forward, without making any difficulties in regard to this matter, and decided to go into the Indian Constituent Assembly. 125. On peut demander si le souverain - c'est-a- dire le prince - a le droit de decider de l'accession au nom de 1'Etat. A cet egard, nous pouvons nous referer a 1'opinion respectee, et, dans le cas qui nous interesse, tr8s utile, de M. Jinnah. M. Jinnah etait le president de la Ligue musulmane et l'undes fonda- teurs du Pakistan. Voici ce qu'll a declare le 17 juin 1947, avant de devenir Gouverneur general de cepays: "Les Etats indiens deviendront, constitutionnelle- ment et juridiquement, des Etats independants et souverains d8s que la suzerainete aura pris fin, et lls seront libres de decider eux-memes de leur sort. Ils auront toute latitude de faire partie de l'Assem- bIee constituante de l'Hindoustan (c'est nous qu'lls designaient ainsi) ou de l'Assemblee constituante du Pakistan (tel etait leur nom) ou de deciderde rester independants (...) Je suis nettement d'avis que le m~morandum de la mission du Cabinet en date du 12 mai 1946 ne limite en rien leur choix." 126. Deux semaines exactement avant que le partage n'ait lieu, M. Jinnah prit de nouveau position dans ce sens devant la Ligue musulmane. Il declara: "Ils sont libres de se joindre a 1'un ou a l'autre des dominions ou de rester independants. La Ligue musulmane reconnait a chaque Etat le droit de de- cider de son sort." 127. M. Jinnah a encore fait d'autres declarations, selon lesquelles la personne a qui l'accession peut etre offerte est le souverain. Autrement, l'accession ne serait pas legale. Le souverainesUe depositaire du pouvoir. Qu'il soit, moralementparlant, democratique ou non, cela estune autre question. Dans un Etat indien, cependant, tout pouvoir vient du souverain. Dans cer- tains cas, cela n'est vrai qu'en theoriej avant l'inde- pendance, cela etait ~galement vrai en fait dans de nombreux cas. Il n'y avait donc personne d'autre pouvant offrir 1'accession. . 128. J'en arrive maintenant a la question de l'Assem- bIee constituante. Enaccedanta l'Inde, tous les Etats - et pas seulement le Cachemire - avaient le droit, si tel etait leur desir, de convoquer leur Assemblee constituante. Ils pouvaient discuter de diverses autres questions, telles que la repartition des ressources financi8res et toutes sortes de sujets analogues. Ce- pendant, la plupart d'entre eux, et meme finalement la totalite, ont decide par la suite - quelques-uns avaient caresse cette idee pendant quelque temps - que cette procedure representait une perte de temps et d'energie et Hs ont elu des representants a l'As- sembIee constituante de l'Inde. Lorsque la question est venue en discussion, les princes indiens, dans leur patriotisme, se sont tous rendu compte qu'll importait de permettre la realisation d'une Inde unie et ce sont eux qui, d'eux-memes, sans creer de dif- 130. What I am here concerned in pointing out is that this idea of a constituent assembly was not something either strange in the relationships between India and the Indian states, or something that we conjured up just because the matter was before the Securii.'~ ~oun­ cil. It was there long before there was an inva:mJll of Kashmir; it was part of the demand of the people to the Maharaja. But the Maharaja had his own plans- like some countries have·for their colonialterritories and will not give them any power-and he would have none of it. 131. So the national movement in Kashmir wanted this constituent assembly. Then came the war, the invasion and all these troubles and the matter was kept in suspense. Kashmir acceded in three main subjects only. There were various other matters, because under the British rule there were varying relations between British India and the Indian States, and, in the case of Kashmir, there were a large number of problems, of customs and so on, to be resolved. So the people decided to have their own Constituent Assembly. 132. What does this Constituent Assembly amountto? So far as the Security Council is concerned it has to look at the documents. These are constitutional docu- ments and I would ask the Council to look at the docu- ment which is the source from which the Constituent Assembly in its present form derives its existence; then its scope will be seen; because it has been pre- sented as if this Constituent Assembly were a device rather in disregard of all other processes. It is con- tained in the proclamation of the Yuvraj of Kashmir, the son of the old Maharaja, who is elected by the people every five years-this is a democratic process. He is the head of the State, and he issued? proclama- tion on 30 April 1951, and this is the proclamation: "Whereas it is the general desire of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that a Constituent Assembly shouldbe brought into beingfor the purpose of framing a constitution for the State" (that is its terms of reference), "Whereas it is commonly felt that the convening of the Assembly can no longer be delayedwithoutdetri- ment to the future well-being of the State" (again a purpose with which we do not disagree), "And whereas the terms of the proclamation ofthe Maharaja" (his father) "dated 5March 1948 in regard to the convening of a national assembly ascontained in clauses 4 to 6 of the operativeput thereof do not 130. Je tiens surtout a faire ressortir ic! que cette idee d'une assembIee constituante n'etait pas chose insolite dans les rapports entre l'lnde et les Etats indiens, ni quelque chose que nous avions simplement invente parce que le Conseil de securite etait saisi de la question. L'idee existait longtemps avant 1'in- vasion du Cachemire; elIe faisait partie de ce que la population du Cachemire demandait au maharajah. Cependant, celui-ci avait ses plans, comme certains pays a l'egard de leursterritoires coloniaux, auxquels ils ne veulent accorder aucun pouvoir - et il refusait de donner suite aces demandes. 131. Ainsi donc, auCachemire, le mouvement national reclamait la creation de cetteassemblee constituante. Ensuite est venue la guerre, 1'invasion et les de- sordres que 1'on connait, si bien que toute l'affaire est restee en suspenso L'accession du Cachemire ne portait que sur trois questions principales. 11 y avait diverses autres questions car, sous la domination britannique, les relations entre l'Inde britannique et les Etats indiens variaient selon les cas; dans celui du Cachemire intervenait un grand nombre de pro- bl~mes, de coutumes, etc. Ces gens ont donc decide d'avoir leur propre assembIee constituante. 132. Qu'est-ce, ensomme, que cette Assemblee cons- tituante? 11 y a des documents que le Conseil de se- curite doit etudier. Ce sont des documents constitu- tionnels, et je demanderais au Conseil d'examiner celui dont l'Assemblee constituante dans sa forme actuelIe tire son existence; ainsi, i1 pourra se rendre compte de sa portee, car on l'a presente comme si cette Assemblee constituante etait une creationtenant assez peu compte de toutes les autres methodes. Ce texte est contenu dans la proclamation du Yuvraj de Cachemire, le fils du vieux maharajah, qui est elu par la population tous les cinq ans par une methode de- mocratique. Le Yuvraj est le chef de 1'Etat, et, le 30 avril 1951, il a publie la proclamation suivante: "Attendu que le vreu general du peuple de 1'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire est qu'une assemblee cons- tituante soit creee a l'effet de rediger la Constitu- tion de 1'Etat (voila pour le mandat de cette assem- blee), "Attendu que l'on estime communement que la convocation de l'AssembIee ne peut etre retardee sans qu'll soit porte prejudice au bien-etre futur de 1'Etat (encore un but que nous ne desapprouvons pas), "Et attendu que les termes de la proclamation du maharajah (le p~re du Yuvraj) en date du 5 mars 1948, relative It la convocation d'une assemblee na- tionale, et notamment les dispositions 4 ;l 6 du dis- "2. For the purpose of the said elections the State shall be divided into a. number ofterritorialconstit- uencies each containing a population of 40,000 or as near thereto as possible, and each electing one member; a delimitation Committee shall be set up by the Government to make recommendations as to the number of constituencies and the limits of each constituency; "3. Elections to the Constituent Assembly shallbe on the basis of adult franchise, that is to say, every person who is a State subject of any class, as defined in the notification No...., isnotlessthantwenty-one years of age on the first day of March, has been a, resident in the constituency for such period as may be prescribed by the rules, shall be entitled to register in the electoral rolls of that constituency, provided that any person who is of unsound mind or has been so declared by a competent court, shall be disqualified for registration; "4. The vote at the election shall be by direct and secret ballot; "5. The Constituent Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof" -this is in order to provide for the places from which people could not be elected, in the occu- pied area: there again, they tried to work it out as smoothly as possible without talking about annexation or anything of that sort; they simply leftthose places vacant; "6. The Constituent Assembly shall frame its own agenda and make rules for the governing of its pro- cedure and the conduct of its business; "The Government shall make Such rules and issue such instructions and orders as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of this proclamation." 133. Then it goes on to say that all things done before the issuing of this proclamation with a view to facil- itating the provision of electoral rules for the purpose of election to the Constituent Assembly shall, insofar as they are in conformity with the provisions of this proclamation (tllerefore anything that is not in con- formity with this proclamation,or the decision of any conference, is not binding at all), will be deemed to have been done or taken under this proclamation as if it was in force at the time such things were done or such steps were taken. 134. This is the proclamation which states the terms of reference so to speak of this ConstituentAssembly• It is quite clear from this proclamationthat the function of this Constituent Assembly is to make a constitution "2. Aux fins desdites elections, l'Etat sera divise en un certain nombre de circonscriptions dont cha- cune comprendra 40.000 habitants ou une population aussi proche que possible de ce chiffre et elira un representant a 1'Assemblee; un Comite dedelimita- tion sera cree par le gouvernement et charge de faire des recommandations quant au nombre des circonscriptions et aux limites de chacune d' elles; "3. Les elections a. l'Assemblee constituante auront lieu par le suffrage des adultes, c'est-lt-dire que, quelle que soit sa classe sociale, toute personne qui est ressortissante de 1'Etat selon la definition donnee dans l'avis No..., qui aatteintl'agede 21 ans au moins a la date du 1er mars et qui a reside dans la circonscription pendant telle periode qui peut etre prescrite par les reglements, a le droit de se faire inscrire sur les listes electorales de sa cir- conscription, etant entendu que les personnes quine sont pas saines d'esprit ou qui ont eM declarees alienees par un tribunal competent ne peuvent exer- cer ce droit; "4. Les elections ont lie'.l au suffrage direct et au scrutin secret; "5. L'AssembIee constituante est habilitee a agir nonobstant toute vacance parmi ses membres (cela afin de tenir compte des elections qui n'ontpu avoir lieu dans la zone occupee: la 'encore, Cl;. a cherche a eviter les difficultes, sans parler d'annexionoude rien de pareil; on s'est borne a laisser les sieges vacants); "6. L'Assemblee constituante determinera elle- meme son ordre du jour ainsi qu'un reglementinte- rieur qui regira sa procedure et la conduite de ses travaux; "Le gouvernement edictera les reglements, ins- tructions et ordonnances necessaires pour donner effet aux dispositions de la presente proclamation." 133. nest dit ensuite dans la proclamation que tout ce qui aura ete fait avant sa promulgation en vue de faciliter l'elaborationd'un reglement electoralauxfins d'elections It l'Assemblee constituante sera, dans la mesure ou les dispositions prises seront conformesa celles de la proclamation (par consequent, tout ce qui n'est pas conforme a la proclamation, ou les deci- sions de telle ou telle conference, n'ont aucun carac- tere obligatoire), considere comlne ayant ete fait ou edicte en vertu de certeproclamation, comme si'celle- ei avait ete en vigueu.r au lnoment oll les choses ou mesures en question ont ete faites ou prises. 134. Telle est la proclamlltion qui definit en·quelque sorte le mandat de certe Assemblee constituante. n en resulte clairement que l'Asselnblee apourfonction de rediger une constitution pour le Cachemire. Elle 135. Now we turn to the document which is the Con- stitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly and look at what it says. The burden of the argument here is that this Constituent Assembly is going to create a new relationship, and my answer is, in terms of interna- tional law: the actions of a Constituent Assembly are not creative, they are merely declaratory; they donot make anything new. What does it say? "We, the people ofthe State ofJammu and Kashmir, having solemnly resolved, in pursuance of the ac- cession of this State to India"-if anything is wrong, it is the accession that is wrong not the Constituent Assembly; the relationship withIndiawas notbrought about by the Constituent Assembly, it was brought about by the accession-, "which took place on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1947, to further define the eXisting relationship ofthe Statewiththe Union of India a~ an integral part thereof, and to secure to ourselves: justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith andwor- ship; equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among us all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation; "In our Constituent Assembly this seventeenthday of November, 1956, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution." 136. So if there was a date, that was 17 November 1956. Secondly, this Constitution creates nothing. ltis in pursuance of the accession. If the relationship of Kashmir is not acceptable-as it is not-to Pakistan, then the thing to quarrelwith, so far as the Constitution is concerned, is the instrument of accession and the Government of India. The Constituent Assembly could do nothing; it was done in pursuance of the accession. In other words, this isthe act of a sub-sovereign body. This Constitution is for the internal government of a constituent State where an enormous amount of social reform is taking place, where land reform has resulted in the abolition of the old form of landlordism an.d where no one can hold more than twenty-three acres of land, where education has spread. The people there want to arrange all their economic affairs. 137. Furthermore, I want todrawtheCouncil'satten- tion to part I of the Constitution, which states, in section 1, paragraph (2): "(2) This section' and sections 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 158 shall come into force at once"-that is to say when. this Constitution is put in draft-, "and the remaining provisions of this Constitution shallcome into force on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1957•••" 135. Nous en arrivons maintenant au document que constitue la Constitution adoptee par l'AssembIee constituante, et nous allons considerer ce que dit ce document. A cet egard, le principal argument est que l'Assemblee constituante va creer une nouvelle rela- tion, et ma reponse, du point de vue du droit interna- tional, est la suivante: les actes d'une Assemblee constituante ne creent pas; ils ont un caractere pure- ment declaratif, et ne produisent rien de nouveau. Que dit le document dont il s'agit? I1 dit ceci: "Nous, peuple de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, ayant solennellement decide, a la suite de 1'acces- sion de notre Etat a l'Inde (si l'on veut trouver a redire a quelque chose, ce doit etre a l'accession et non a 1'Assemblee constituante, la relation avec 1'Inde n'etant pas le fait del'AssembIee constituante, mais celui de l'accession), qui a eu lieu le 26 oc- tobre 1947, de preciser la nature des relations entre l'Etat et l'Union indienne, dont il fait partie inte- grante, et d'assurer pour nous-memes la justice sociale, economique etpolitique; la liberte depensee, d'expression, de croyance, de foi et de culte; des droits egaux et des possibilites egales; etdefavorl- ser parmi nous la fraternite en assurant la dignite de l'individu et l'unite de la nation; "R6unis en Assemb16e constituante ce 17 novembre 1956, adoptons et promulguons par les presentes cette Constitution que nous nous donnons." 136. Donc, s'il est une date qu'il faille retenir, c'est, bien celle du 17 novembre 1956. En second lieu, cette constitution ne cree rien. Elle a ete rMigee en vertu de l'accession. Si le Pakistan estime - etc'est juste- ment le cas - que l'accession du Cachemire n'est pas acceptable, alors, ce qu'il faut attaquer, dans la mesure all il s'agit de la Constitution, c'est l'acte d'accession etle Gouvernement de l'Inde. L'AssembIee constituante ne pouvait rien faire; elle a agi en vertu de 1'accession. En d'autres termes, il s'agit de l'acte d'un organisme vassal. La Constitution en question a trait au gouvernement interieur d'un Etat constituant de l'Inde, dans lequel un grand nombre de reformes soeiales sont en cours, ou la reforme agraire s'est accomplie par 1'abolition de l'ancien regime des grandes proprietes et oll personne ne peut posseder plus de 9,2 hectares de terre, ou l'enseignements'est repandu. Les habitants veulent mettre de l'ordredans toute leur economie. 137. En outre, je voudrais appeler l'attention du Conseil sur la premiere partie de la Constitution, qui stipule a l'article premier, paragraphe 2: "2. Le present article ainsi que les articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 et 158 entreront en vigueur immediate- ment (c'est-ll-dire au moment de la redaction de la Constitution), et les 'autres dispositions de cette Constitution prendront effet le 26 janvier 1957 (.•.)." "4. The territory of the State shall comprise all the territories which on the fifteenth day of August, 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty ofthe Ruler of the State. "5. The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State under the provisions of the Constitution of India." All those provisions which relate to federation matters, to matters of the relationship betweenthe State and the federation, are matters of past history. 139. In this connexion, the PresidentialOrderof1954 is important. That is part of our Constitution.It is not as though the 26th were a zero hour. As a matter of fact, the Security Council is in a somewhat difficult position. Actually nothing will happen on 26 January except, in all probability, before midnight of the 25th the Constituent Assembly will dissolve itself. 140. Can the Security Council tell the members ofthe Constituent Assembly that they should not dissolve the Assembly? The Security Council has been askedtoput itself in a position where its actions would have no meaning in this connexion.Ifthere were any issue, that issue should be in regard to accession. Is Kashmir a part of India? There I thinkthe Security Council is tied up by the findings of the Commission; itis tied up with constitutional law and practice; it is tied up with the law of federations and, what is more, itis tied up with the principles of the Charter ofthe United Nations. The Security Council, of course, in its profound wisdom may do what it likes. I now speakfrom memory, which is not always very good, but the Foreign Minister of Pakistan either said or suggested that there should be some restraining action in the character of an injunc- tion. Members know that an injunction is an equitable process, a process arising from .equity. And what invader can ask for equity? Therefore, that question does not arise. 141. I want to submit, therefore, thatthe whole of this crisis atmosphere which has been created about 26 January is just unreal. The 26 of January with us, as with Mr. Walker in Australia, marks the foundation of Our Constitution. It is India's national day. Therefore, the State thought it fit to finish its municipal constitu- tion on that day. Its conduct is municipal-itis dealing . with its legislature, how many members ofParliament there should be, what to do with the land laws, what taxes th~y should raise and are competent to raise in Connexlon with the Federation ofIndia, what the powers of the Speaker of the House or the Advocate-General might be-these are the matters contained in this Constitution. A great many of them are already in Toutes les dispositions qui traitent de questions fe- derales, de questions ayant trait aux relations entre l'Etat et la federation, appartiennent au passe. 139. A cet egard, l'ordre presidentiel de 1954 a son importance. n fait partie de notre Constitution. Ce n'est pas comme si la date du 26 representait l'heure H. En fait, le Conseil de securite se trouve dans une position assez delicate. En realite, il n'arrivera rien le 26 janvier, si ce n'est, selon toute probabilite, que l'AssembIee constituante prononcera sa dissolu.. tion le 25 avant minuit. 140. Le Conseil de securitl~peut-ildire aux membres de l'AssembIee constituante de ne pas prononcer leur diSsolution? On a demande au Conseil de securite de se mettre lui-meme dans une situationou les mesures qu'iI prendrait n'auraient aucun sens a cet egard. Si une question se pose, c'est celle qui concerne l'ac- cession. Le Cachemire est-il une partie de 1'Inde? Sur ce point, je pense que le Conseil de securite est lie par les conclusions de la Commission; il est lie par le droit et la pratique constitutionnels; iI est lie par la loi qui regit les federations; et, surtout, il est lie par les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. NatureIIement, le Conseil de securite, dans saprofonde sagesse, peut agir comme il I'entendra. J e cite main- tenant de memoire - ma memoire n'est pas toujours bonne - mais le Ministre des affaires etrang~res du Pakistan a dit ou a suggere qu'il devrait y avoir une sorte d'action de contrainte, uneactionayantlecarac" tere d'une injonction. Les membres du ConseiI ~avent que la procedure d'injonction est une procedure judi.. ciaire propre au syst~me d'equite. Or, unenvahisseur peut-il se rechmer del'equib~?t.aquestionnesepose donc pas. 141. J'eml· Li par consequent l'opinion que toute cette atmospn1i!re de crise qui a ete creee au sujet de la date du 26 janvier est absolument artificielle. Pour nous, comme pour M. Walker en Australie, le 26 janvier marque la creation de notre Constitution. C'est la journee nationale de l'Inde. Par consequent, l'Etat a jugea propos d'achever sa constitution na- tionale ce jour-la.. Ses actes ontune portee interieure - Us concernent son corps legislatif, la question de savoir combien le Parlement aura de membres, com- ment seront appliquees les lois agraires, quels impets seront leves et quels impets il pourra lever en liail:ion avec la Federation de l'Inde, quels pourront etre les pouvoirs du "Speaker of the House" oudel'ftAdvocate.. 142. I have taken this out ofthe general scheme of the argument in order to meet the wishes of the yarious members of the Security Council who had intimated privately that they would like to hear about it. That is the position as regards the Constituent Assembly. I hope that the Security Councilis not going to find itself in a positionwhere itwill subscribe to a decision which is so devoid of reality, whichwillexpose it to ridicule, which is so unconnected with the events ofthe day and which is contrary to the constitutional procedures of a sovereign State, of a Member State whose Constitution is presumed to be known to the United Nations in international law• What is more, there are large num- bers of people who subscribe to the same kind of legal system to which we subscribe. 143. I should like, therefore, to erase from the minds of members this idea of a crisis or a zero hour or of something happening on 26 January. It is a day which is observed in every part of Indiaingeneral jubilation as the day when the Constitution of India was inaugu- rated. It traces its origin to midnight, 26 January 1930 when, on the banks ofthe Ravi, the present Prime Min- ister, the President of the Indian National Congress, stated that all men are entitled to their freedom. Therefore, should any country oppressus, where there is a rule of that kind we shall try peacefully to term- inate it. That was the declaration of independence in 1930, and this is the anniversary of that day. ,144. There is nothing in this, therefore, which should attract the attention ofthe Security Councilwith regarq to the ConstituentAssembly process. I have takenpains to inquire about whatactually is gOingto happen on that day. I understand that all that will happen will be a formal meeting of the Assembly in order formally to wind up its affairs because it no longer will have any function. Parliament may then sit the next day. This w~s not arranged in view ofthe meeting of the Security Council. It is part of its normal proceedings. It bas finishw its functions long ago. There is no particular reason why it should do this oJ.l the,26th, except that it maY thus spare the expense of having two separate 142. J'ai interrompu la ligne generale de mon argu- mentation pour repondre au desir de plusieurs mem- bres du Conseil de securite qui m'avaient fait savoir persoooellement qu'ils aimeraient avoir des preci- sions sur l'Assemblee constituante. J'esp~re que le Conseil ne va pas se mettre do souscrire a une de- cision qui le couvrirait de ridicule, car elle ne tient aucun compte de la r~alite, n'a aucun rapport avec les evenements actuels et va a l'encontre de la proce- dure constitutionnelle d'un Etat souverain, d'un Etat Membre, dont la Constitution estpresumee coooue des autres nations en droitinternational. D'ailleurs, beau- coup de pays ont un syst~me juridique semblable au notre. 143. Je voudrais donc effacer de vos esprits toute notion de crise ou d'heure H, toute idee qu'il va se passer quelque chose la 26 janvier. Ce jour-la est pour l'Inde enti~re une occasion de rejouissances en souvenir de la naissance de la Constitution indieooe. Le 26 janvier 1930, a minuit, sur les bords du Ravi, l'actuel Premier Ministre, president du Congres na- tional indien, a declare que tous les hommes ont droit do la liberte, et que par consequent, si nous etions opprimes, nous essaierions par des moyens pacifiques de mettre fin a cette domination. Voila queUe a ete la declaration d'independance de 1930, que nous com- memorons le 26 janvier. 144. n n'y a done rien dans la procedure de.l'As- semblee constituante qui doive attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite. Je me suis renseigne sur ce qui se passera en fait ce jour-hl. J'aiapprisqu'il y aurait seulement une seance soleooeUe de l'Assemblee, qui prononcera officieUe~ent la cloture de ses travaux, puisqu'elle n'a plus de raison d'etre. Le Parlement pourra alors tenir sa premi~re seance le joursuivant. Toutes ces dispositions n'ont pas·ete prises en raison de la reunion du ConseU de securite. C'est la proce- dure normale. L'Assemblee constituante a termine sa tache depuis longtemps. n n'y a pas de raison speciale! pour que sa session preooe fin le 26 janvier, si ce 145. I have so far argued that the claims in regard to this are based, on the one hand, upon something which is extra-legal and extra-constitutional and outsidethe decisions of the Security Council, andI have sub~tted the views of the Government of India in refutation of that position. There are no considerations which are so generous in this matter, no considerations which, on their own merits, indicate that this musthave been the course. To the extent that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has quoted authority, I have proved, if my documents are correct-and they are openfor scrutiny to anyone-that the conditions to which he referred not only did not exist but that they referred to other matters. The legal and constitutional aspect of the problem relates to the accession. 146. I should like once again to repeat that this is a matter-and I quoted this position this morning-on which the Government of Indiahas atno time made any recession. What is more, the Commission has at no time raised this point; that is to say, it is accepted on all sides. The members were concernedwiththe issues of international peace and security, and that is the function of the Security Council. 147. I ask you, Mr. President, to look at Chapter VI of the Charter, or even Chapter VII, ifyou wish, and I ask where is the provision to challenge the merits of accession. The Security Council is called upon here to deal with pouring oil over troubled waters. So far as we are concerned, we have not only helpedto fetch the oil,but we do not trouble the waters at all. We ask the Council to restrain others from making the water muddy. 148. If those two issues are out of theway, then what remains? What remains is aggression. That is what remains in any claim that can be made with regard to what is called a plebiscite. 149. As regards the commitments which we have made, I am prepared to face them quite squarely, because the Government ofIndiahas a responsibilityto explain its position before a world body such as the United Nations. We did not ask the Security Council at the end of five years to spend several days on this matter. Our sister State of Pakistan desired to do so and we were quite preparedto come here either in June of last year, when there were rumours about it, or at the present time. You, Mr. President, notified us about this meeting, and we are here. 150. Now, what was this commitment? The comniit- ment was that in various resolutions it has been said that it is the Wish, that it is the desire, to refer this matter to the people Cllf the country, and so on. I do not know whether youwant me to quote this again, as I have quoted it so many times, but it is all there. No one, least of all any responsible person from India, would say mat the question of plebiscites wasnotconsidered 145. Jusqu'a pr~sent, j'ai soutenu que les arguments qu'on nous oppose se fondent sur des consid~rations non juridiques et inconstitutionnelles, qui ne figurent pas dans les d~cisions du Conseil de s~curit~, et je les ai r~futees en exposant les vues du Gouvernement indien. Aucune consid~ration - et les consid~rations ne sont pas ce qui manque ici - ne prouve par elle- meme qu'il auralt dli. en etre ainsi. Le Ministre des affaires ~trangeres du Pakistan s'est appuye sur des citations; j'ai demontr~ - si mes documents sont exacts, et chacun peut les consulter - que les condi- tions dont il a parl~ non seulement n'existaient pas, mais encore portaient sur d'autres sujets. L'aspect juridique et constitutionnelduprobleme concerne l'ac- cession. 146. Je voudrais rep~ter a nouveau mes paroles de ce matin et redire que sur ce point le Gouvernement indien n'a jamais fait de concessions. Je dir-ai plus: la Commission n'a jamais conteste ce point; c'est donc que les deux parties l'acceptent. Les membres de la Commission se pr~occupaientdes questions de paix et de s~curite internationales, qui sontde la com- p~tence du Conseil de s~curite. 147. Monsieur le Pr~sident, je vous demande d'exa- miner le Chapitre VI de la Charte, ou meme le Cha- pitre VII si vous le desirez: ou sont les dispositions qui autoriseraient a contester la validit~ d'une acces- sion? Le Conseil de securite se reunit ici pour filer de I'huile sur des flots troubl~s. En ce qui nous con- cerne, non seulement nous avons aid~aallerchercher l'huile, mais encore nous ne faisons rien qui puisse troubler les flots. Nous demandons au Conseil d'em- pecher les autres de troubler l'eau. 148. Puisque ces deux points sont ~claircis, que reste-t-il de la question? L'agression. Voila tout ce qui se d~gage des arguments que I'on peut avancer au sujet du pretendu plebiscite. 149. Quant aux engagements que nous avons con- tract~s, je n'ai pas l'intention d'esquiver la question, car le Gouvernement indien a le devoir d'expliquer sa position devant une organisation internationale telle que 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Cen'estpas nous qui avons demande auConseilde s~euritede eonsaerer, apres einq ans,plusieurs jours a cette question. C'est notre voisin, le Pakistan, qui le souhaitait; nous ~tions tout disposes a venir iei, aussi bien en juin de l'an dernier, quand il en a ete question, que maintenant. Vous nous avez convoqu~s en vue de cette s~anee, Monsieur le President; nous voici. 150. Quel est done cet engagement? n a ~te dit dans plusieurs resolutions que l'on desirait, que ran sou- haitait, soumettre eette question It la population du pays, etc. J'ignore si vous desirez que je donne eon- naissanee de ee texte une nouvelle fois, commeje I'ai d~ja fait si souvent, mais je l'ai entre lesmains. Personne - et surtoutaueun Indien eonseient de ses responsabilites - ne pretend que la question des 151. One aspect is the commitmentwe may have made to the peoples of Kashmir, that is to say, what came out of us, by our own volition in the context of the national life of India. That is represented bythe comp munication made by Lord Mountbatten to the Maharaja on 27 October 1947, which states that: "Inconsistence with their policy..., it is my Government's wish that ..•the question•.• should be settled by a reference to the people." He did not say anything about a ple- biscite. "Reference" might be any kind of reference: it might be a referendum; it might be a plebiscite; it might be a general election; it might be a Gallup Poll; it might be anything. Thatwas the position at that time, but let us assume that it was a plebiscite. Even he attached conditions to it: when the soil was cleared of the invad~r and peace and orderwas restored. I cannot state the authority of my distinguished colleaguefrom Pakistan on the question of peace and order, because in one part of his statementhe says there is peace and order but in another he says there is not. I think he is right, because there is peace and order inthe territory we administer. 152. That was one commitment. Now I should likeyou to examine what it was. This is very much like an equitable doctrine, and therefore I think that one may make an analogy. Suppose thatyou, Mr. President, with all the wealth you possess, make a testamentary dis- position to your children, Willing them your property and saying that you give so much money for this and so much for that, and that at the end of it you say to your eldest son: "It is my wish that out of this money you should build a library", or something of thatcharacter. That has no force in law; it is the expression of a wish. .All that binds the young maniswhatyou have said. The expression of a wish is not binding in any equitable relations. It may be respected. We try to respect it. 153. Therefore, the first commitment, if it was a commitment, is to the people of Kashmir. No other party comes into it. Secondly, it is in consonance with the policy of the Government of India. Policies of Governments are matterswhich the Governments alone can decide. Thirdly, it would be effectivewhen the soil was cleared of the invader; and, fourthly, whenpeaceful conditions had been restored. 154. That is why my friend and predecessor, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, when he came here, said that the garrisons of India must garrisonthenorthern area, that the troops must be kept to prevent tribesmen coming across the frontiers. The whole of the territory 156. The members of the Security Council are all of sQvereign independent states given to the democratic way of life. Can the Security Council ask us that the people of Kashmir should bewithoutfranchise, without the guaranty of fundamental rights, without being able to introduce the economic legislationthat is necessary for their planning, their education and things of that character? How is that to be done? Is it to be done by command from the Government of India? That is not how our country is governed. These provisions are made by the Constituent Assembly for that reason. Therefore, while it was not possible for us to do it in one way, we did it in another way. 157. So in Kashmir there is a legislature, a Constit- uent Assembly that functions. In that parliament there is an opposition, small as it is. In 1952 there were fifteen newspapers and journals in Kashmir, in a very small area where the majority of people are not literate; today there are forty-eight. What is more, as I shall point out later, in the last two or three years more than 500 primary schools have come into this area. So it can be seenthatthe Government of Kashmir is advancing all State matters in this way. Therefore, to the extent that the wishes of the people could be consulted, we did so. 158. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan'also made a reference, not very complimentary to uS,to the election of this Constituent Assembly. I am prepared to face this issue also. The proclamation askedfor a universal franchise, secret ballots, and so on. The Constituent Assembly elections are announced; the electoral rolls are prepared; the electoral constituencies are de- limited. All the arrangements were made. The candi- dates came forward. Afact that has ~otbeen mentioned is that the opposition candidates who afterwards with- drew did not come from the people who are either Moslems or those whowantedto go to Pakistan or were suspected of wanting to go to Pakistan; they came from the orthodox Rajput Hindu sections of the community who were against India for its being a secular State. We did not stop them, but they realized that in this large country, where there is a big nationalist move- ment, they did not have a chance. Having filed their nominations, and all arrangements having been made before the election dates, they withdrew their can- didacy. 159. According to our election laws, in common with the electron laws of the United !<ingdom, Australia, and, I believe, other countries, each candidate has to . deposit a certain amount of money, and if he does not poll one-tenth of the votes he forfeits the deposit. What 156. Les membres du Conseil de securite repre- sentent tous des Etats independants et souverains, adonnes a la vie democratique. Le Conseilde securite peut-il nous demander que les populations du Cache- mire n'aient pas le droit de vote, n'aient aucun droit fondamental, ne soient pas en mesure defaire adopter la legislation necessaire a leur planification econo- mique, a la constitution de leur systeme scolaire, et ainsi de suite? Comment legiferer sur tout cela?Sur l'ordre du Gouvernement indien? Ce n'est pas ainsi que notre pays se gouverne. C'est justement pour- quoi l'AssembIee constituante ypourvoit.Commenous ne pouvions pas le faire d'une maniere, nous l'avons fait d'une autre. 157. Il existe donc au Cachemire un corps legislatif, une AssembIee constituante. Dans ce Parlement, ily a une opposition, si faible qu'elle soit. En 1952, il Y avait 15 journaux et revues au Cachemire, dans una region tres peu etendue, ou la majorite de la popula- tion est illettree; aujourd'hui, il y ena48. En outre'- j'y reviendrai par la suite -, plus de 500 ecoles primaires se sont ouvertes dans cette regionau cours des deux ou trois dernieres annees. On peut voir que le Gouvernement du Cachemire fait progresser ainsi tout ce qui releve de PEtal. Dans la mesure ou il etait possible de s'informer des vreux de la popula- tion, nous l'avons fait. 158. 'Le Ministre des affaires etrangeres duPakistan a egalement parIe - en des termes qui n'etaient pas tres elogieux pour nous - de la maniere dont on avait elu cette Assemblee constituante. C'est une question que je suis tout dispose a aborder. La proclamation demandait le suffrage universel, le scrutin secret, etc. On annonce les elections l'lI'Assemblee consti- tuante, on dresse les listes electorales, on delimite les circonscriptions, on prend toutes les dispositions necessaires. Les candidats se presentent. Un fait que l'on n'a pas mentionne'est que les candidats de 1'0p- position qui se sont retires ensuite ne provenaient pas des milieux musulmans ou des milieuxfavorables - ou que 1'0n soups;onnait d'etre favorables - a un rattachement au Pakistan. Ces candidats venaient des milieux radjpoutes, hindouistes stricts, qui etaient adversaires de I'Inde parce que c'est un Etat lafque. Nous n'etions pas opposes a leurcandidature, maisils ont compris que, dans cet immense pays, ou il y a un puissant mouvement national, ils n'avaient aucune chance de succes. Apres avoir fait enregistrer leuT candidature, et alors que toutes les dispositions etaient prises, ils se sont desistes avantladate des elections. 159. En vertu de nos lois electorales, semblables en cela a celles du Royaume-Uni, de l'Australie, et, je pense, d'autres pays, tout candidat esttenudedeposer une caution et, s'il obtient moins d'un dixieme des suffrages, il perd le montant de cette caution. Bien 160. With great respect to the Security Council, I would submit that when a country has the largest democratic electorate in the world, when it has a Constitution guaranteeing the fundamental rights, when every man andwomanin it may vote and, what is more, when 200 million people will go to the polls in two months in that country, I think that to speak of such a country as stifling elections is a charge that.cannot pass muster. I shall not say anything more than that. 161. You cannot compel people to be opposed. Ifthere are unopposed returns, itdoes not meanthat the system is not functioning. The Constituent Assembly does not sit in secret. The worldPressisthere. Kashmir is the centre of the world's visitors. Last summer we had 62,000 people in Kashmir as visitors, and 9,000 of them were foreigners, and the majority Americans. And they did not stick to the towns. They went around all over. Therefore, any suggestion that this Constit- uent Assembly was an arranged pocket affair is very much of a mistake. What is more, in that Constituent Assembly, as regards the very men, whose names were referred to by the ForeignMinister ofPakistan as now having fallen from favour, and who therefore were in prison, when I go into the facts, the Foreign Minister will probably be pleased to withdraw some of these names. But at any rate thatis another matter. However, what I say is this: thatthe candidateswho were elected are people who have been participants in the national movement for a very long time. 162. For the convenience of the Council I have SUb- mitted the statement made by Sheikh Abdullah to the Jammu and Kashmfr ConstituentAssembly [S!PV.762! Add. 1, annex VI]. It is anextremely interesting docu- ment and we do not make any apologies for submitting it. Sheikh Abdullah is in detention. He is in detention under the law of Kashmir. I will come to that in a moment, before I finish the whole submission. 160. Avec tout le respect que j'eprouve pour le Con- seil de securite, je pretends que, lorsqu'un pays a le corps electoral le plus nombreux du monde, que sa Constitution garantit les droits fondamentaux, que chaque homme et chaque femme de ce pays a le droit de vote et, ce qui est plus important, que 200 millions d'electeurs se rendront aux urnes dans deux mois, ceux qui affirment que, dans ce pays, on etouffe les elections lancent, a. mon avis, une accusation insou- tenable - c'est le moins que j'en puisse dire. 161. Vous ne pouvez pas obliger les gens a avoir des concurrents. S'll y a des candidats elus sans concurrent, cela ne signifie pas que le systeme ne fonctionne pas. L'Assemblee constituante ne siegepas a. huis clos; la presse mondiale est la.. Le Cachemire est un centre de tourisme pour le monde entier. L'ete dernier, nous avons eu 62.000touristes auCachemire, dont 9.000 etrangers, en majorite des Americains. Ces visiteurs ne restent pas dans les villes; ils parcourent le pays. C'est une grave erreur, par con- sequent, de pretendre que l'election de l'Assemblee constituante a ete truquee, qu'elle etaitd'avance "dans le sac". En outre, II propos de cette assembIee, le Ministre des affaires etrangeres duPakistanaindique les noms d'un certain nombre de personnalites qui seraient tomMes en disgrace et qui se trouveraient, par consequent, en prison. Quand j'examinerai les faits, le Ministre des affaires etrangeres sera pro- bablement heureux de rayer de la liste certains des noms qu'il a mentionnes. Mais il stagit, de toute fac;on, dtune autre question. Je declare que les candi- dats elus sont des gens qui, dep~is tres longtemps, font partie du mouvement national. 162. J'ai communique auConseil, pourinformation, le texte de la declaration faite par le cheik Abdullah a. ItAssemblee constituante de l'EtatdeJammu et Cache- mire [S!PV.762!Add.1, annexe V.I]. C'est uildocument extremement interessant et je ne regrette pas de l'avoir communique. Le cheik Abdullah est en prison. 11 est en prison en vertu de la 10i du Cachemire. J'aborderai ce point dans uninstant, avantde terminer ma declaration. 164. The Constituent Assembly did not do its workin one day. In this Constituent Assembly members spoke about each of these various aspects, onwhattheir Stat~ s,hould have, more or less, for its defence, its indus;. tries and everything else. Therefore, to suggest that this Constituent Assembly was some kind of a time- table affair is a misnomer. Thus, so far as we are concerned, on the commitments to the people ofKash- mir and the plebiscite, on that leg of this argument, we have discharged our obligations.Where we have not been able to discharge our obligations so far as the form goes, if that is considered necessary, we have been imped..id by acts which are beyond our control, namely, invasion, unsettlement, occupation and the division of Kashmir by force of arms. 165. Sheikh Abdullah said: "As a realist I am conscious that nothing is all black or all white, and there are many facets to each of the propositions before us. I shall first speak on the mer;.ts and demerits of the State's accession to India. In the final analysis, as I understand it, it is the kinship of ideals which determines the strength of ties between two States. The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause ofthe State's peoples' freedom. The autocratic rule of the Princes has been done away with and representative governments have been entrusted with the admin- istration. Steps towards democratization have been taken and these have raised the people's standardof liVing, brought about much-needed social recon- struction, and, above all, builtup their very indepen- dence of spirit. Naturally, ifwe accede to India there is no danger of a revival offeudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four,years, the Govern- ment of India has never tried to inte'rfere in our internal autonomy."-We.were not permittedtodo so by our Constitution-"This experience has strength- ened our confidence inthemas a democratic State."- This is Sheikh Abdullal1 speaking. clart~ un certain nombre defaitstouchantl'invasionet la pr~tendue lib~rationdu Cachemire par les envahis- seurs. C'est pourquoi je pense que, quels que soient les arguments que l'on nous pr~sente aujourd'hui, nous ferons aussi bien de lire l'expose de l'affaire que l'Assembl~e constituante a entendu parce qu'il donne l'occasion de discuter le pour et le contre. 164. L'Assemblee constituante n'a pas accompli sa tache en un jour. A l'Assemblee, les membres ont exprime leur opinion sur chacundes differents aspects de la politique nationale, sur ce que leur Etat devrait faire pour la defense nationale, l'industrie et tous les autres domaines. Il est donc faux de pretendre que l'on a cree cette Assemblee constituante, juste d ce moment~ld,pour des raisonsd'opportunite. Ainsidonc, nous estimons qu'en ce qui concerne nos engagements d l'egard du peuple du Cachemire et au sujet du ple- biscite, et quant d ce point de l'argument, nous avons rempli nos obligations. Ld ou nous n'avons pas pu respecter nos engagements de fac;on formelle, si l'on y tient absolument, c'est que nous en avons ete emp.ecMs par des evenements independants de notre volonM: l'invasion, les troubles, l'occupationetlepar- tage du Cachemire par la force des armes. 165. Le cheik Abdullah a dit: "Je me flatte d'etre realiste et suis parfaitement conscient que rien n'est ou tout noir ou tout blanc, et que chacune des propositions dont nous Sommes saisis a de nombreux aspects. Je parlerai tout d'abord des avantages et des inconvenients de l'ac- cession de l'Etat II l'Inde. En derni~re analyse, il me semble que l'element qui determine la force des liens entre deux Etats est 1'analogie des ideaux. Le Congres national indien a soutenu sans defaillance la cause de la Uberte du peuple cachemirien. Il a supprime le gouvernement autocratiquedesprinces, et 1'administration du pays a ete confiee d des gou- vernements representant le peuple. Des meSUres ont ete prises en vue de democratiser les institutions; et elles ont eu pour resultat une elevation du niveau de vie de la population, la reconstruction sociale indispensable du pays, et, surtout, de permettre au peuple d'acquerir une reelle independance d'esprit. Bien entendu, si nous accedons d l'Inde, tout danger de- retour 111'e-i:at feodal et d l'autocratie est ecarte. En outre, au cours de ces quatre dernieres annees, le Gouvernement de 1'Inde n'a jamais essaye de s'immiscer dans nos affaires interieures et de menacer notre autonomie. (Notre Constitution ne nous autorisait pas d le faire.) L'experience a ainsi confirme notre conviction que l'lnde etait bien un Etat democratique. (Ce sont les paroles du cheik Abdullah que je cite en ce moment.) , "The national movement in our State naturally / gravitates towards these principles of secular demo- cracy. The people here will never acceptaprinciple which seeks to favour the interests of one religion or social group against another. This affinity in political principles, as well as in past association, and our common path of suffering in the cause of freedom, must be weighed properly while deciding the future of the State. "We are also intimately concerned with the eco- nomic well-being of the people ofthis State. As I said before while referring to constitution-building, po- litical ideals are often meaningless unless linkedwith economic plans... As you know, and as I have detailed before, we have been abletoputthrough our 'land to the tiller' legislation"-and he goes on to talk about legislation that has taken place. 166. Then he continues as follows: "In the secondplace, our economic welfare is bound up with our arts and crafts. The traditional markets for these precious goods, for which we are justly known all over the world, have been centredin Indi:?." -That is, their economic life is tied up with ours.- "The volume of our trade, in spite ofthe dislocation of the last few years, shows this. Industry is also highly important to us. Potentially we are rich in minerals, and in the raw materials of industry; we need help to develop our resources. India, being more highly industrialized than Pakistan, can give us equipment, technical services and materials. She can help us too in marketing.•• It is around the efficient supply of such basic necessities that the standard of living of the man-in-the-street depends." 167. Then he goes on to talk about the disadvantages: "To begin with, although the land frontiers ofIndia and Kashmir are contiguous and an all-weather road 166. n poursuit ensuite en ces termes: "En second lieu, notre prosperite economique est liee au .developpement de nos arts et de nos indus- tries artisanales. Les marches traditionnels sur lesquels nous ecoulons ces biens precieux, qui nous ont acquis dans le monde entierune enviable renOm- mee, se trouvent dans l'Inde (ce qui veut dire que leur vie economiql.le est liee a. la notre), comme en temoigne le volume de notre commerce, malgre le demembrement de notre territoire, ces dernieres annees. L'industrie est aussi pour nous d'une extreme importance. Notre sol est riche en res- sources minerales et en matierespremieres neces- saires a. l'industrie, mais nous avons besoin d'etre aides pour les exploiter. L'Inde, qui est un pays beaucoup plus industrialise que le Pakistan, peut nous fournir du materiel, des services techniques et des materiaux. Elle peut aussi nous aider a. ecouler nos produits (..•). Le niveau de vie de l'homme de la rue est fonction de la livraison re- guliere de ces produits essentiels." 167. Le cheik Abdullah parle ensuite des inconve- nients: "Tout d'abord, bien que les frontieres terrestres de l'Inde et du Cachemire soient contigues, il ItStill another factor has to be taken into consid- eration.. Certain tendencies have been asserting them.selves in India which may in the future convert it into a religious State wherein the interests of Muslims will be jeopardized.It_He has put in every argument.-ItThis would happen if a communal or- ganization had a dominant hand in the government, and the Congress ideals of the equality of all com- munities were made to give way to religious intol- erance. The continued accession of Kashmir to India should, however, help in defeating this tendency. From my experience of the last four years, it is my considered judgement that the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India has been the major factor in stabilizing relations betweenthe Hindus and Muslims . of India. Gandhiji was not wrong when he uttered ' words before his death which paraphrase: Itl lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help. It ItAs I have said before, we mustconsider the ques- tion of accession with an open mind, and not let our personal prejudices stand in the way of a balanced judgement. I will now invite you to evaluate the al- ternative of accession to Pakistan. It 168. Now he has dealt with India. He goes on: ItThe most powerful argument which can be ad- vanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim Stat~ and, a big majority of our people being Mus- lims, the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only a camou- flage. It is, a screen todupe the common man, so that ~tudi~ la question, et, grace aux am~liorations des proced~s modemes de construction, si 1'Etat d~sire rester attache a l'lnde, il estpossible etmeme facile de creer un r~seau de communications stable et utilisable par tous les temps. De meme, il est im- possible d'utiliser les rivi~res et les fleuves de l'Etat comme moyens de transport pour le flottage du bois d'reuvre en direction de l'Inde, sauf dans le Jammu, Oll la Chenab transporte toujours des troncs d'arbre vel'S la plaine. (Leur commerce de bois se fait avec le Pakistan.) En r~ponse a cet argument, il convient de souligner que si nous acc~dons a l'Inde, nous aurons la possibilit~d'utiliser nos res- sources forestieres a des fins industrielles. Par exemple, au lieu d'exporter le bois de nos forets, nous pourrons exporter des produitsfinis vel'S l'Inde, Oll il existe pour eux un vaste march~, et nous pourrons ainsi donner du travail a nos menuisiers et a nos ouvriers. En fait, ~tant donn~ que nous pos- sedons de nombreux camions t§quip~s pour le trans- port du bois d'reuvre, l'acheminement des grumes par flottage est un syst~me primitif, qUi se solde par une perte de 20 a35pour 100 au cours du trans- port. "11 convient egalement de tenir compte d'un autre facteur. On voit s'affirmer en Inde certaines tell- dances qui pourraient conduire dans le futur a. faire de ce pays un Etat religieux Oll les int~rets des musulmans se trouveraient menac~s. (11 n'a pas oublil! un seul argument.) Cela se produirait si une communau!e prenait une influence pr~ponderante au sein du gouvernementetsi l'id~ald'egalit~detoutes les communaut~s - qui est ceIui du congr~s - devait ceder la place a l'ip..tol~rance religieuse. L'accession permanente du Cachemire a. l'Inde devrait toutefois contribuer a faire ~chec a. cette tendance. D'apr~s l'exp~rience de ces quatre der- nieres ann~es, je suis fond~ a croire q1Je la pr~­ sence du Cachemire au sein de l'Union indienne a ~t~ le facteur qui a le plus contribu~ a stabiliser les relations entre hindous et musulmans de l'Inde. Gandhiji n'avait pas tort lorsqu'en mourant 11 mur- murait des mots qui paraphrasaient le psaume: "Je leve mes yeux vel'S les montagnes: d'Oll me viendra le secours?" "Comme je l'ai d~ji'i dit, nous devons examiner la question de l'accession en toute objectivite, et sans laisser nos pr~jug~s personnels troublernotre juge- ment. Nous allons maintenant, sivous levoulezbien, examiner 1'autre solution. c'est-a.-dire l'accession au Pakistan. It . 168. Le chelk AbdulJ2.h ~n a fini. avec l'Inde. n pour- suit: ItL'argument le plus fort que 1'on puisse faire valoir en faveur de c:)tte solution est le fait que le Pakistan est un Etat musulman et que, la grande majorit~ de notre population etant musulmane, l'Etat doit acceder au Pakistan. Cette pr~tention a. "In addition to this, the appeal to religion consti- tutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question. Sentiment has its own place in life, but often it leads to irrational action. Some argue, as a supposedly natural corollary to this, that on our acceding to Pakistan our annihilation or survival depends. Facts have disproved this. Right-thinking men would point out that Pakistan is not an organic unity of all the Muslims inthis SUb-continent. It has, on the contrary, caused the dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistans at least a thousand miles apart from each other. The total population of Western Pakistan, which is contiguous to our State, is hardly 25 million"-I was wrong; it is less t\1an I said,-"while the total number of Muslims resident in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslims, if they are worriedby such considerations, should'choose the 40 millions liVing in India. "Looking at the matter too from a more modern political angle, religious affinities alone do not and should not normally determine the politicalalliances of States. We do not find a Christianbloc, a Buddhist bloc, or even a Muslim bloc, aboutwhichthere is so much talk nowadays in Pakistan. These days eco- nomic interests and a community of political ideals more appropriately influence the policies of States. "We have another important factor to consider, if the state decides to make this the predominant con- sideration. What will be the fate of the dne million non-Muslims now in our State?I'I-Outofthe4million population of Kashmir in 1941, more than one million were non-Muslims, and a great many of these were Buddhists of Tibetan race.-"As things stand at present, there is no place for them inPakistan. Any solution which will result in the displacement or the total subjugation of such a large number of people will not be just or fair•••" 169. I will leave this now and come back to the other course he has pointed out. I do not want to weary the Council. The third course which is su~gestedis:"Why dc, they not remain independent?"-And I am reading this in order to show that it is not as though these people were jockeyed into some position. They hadall this before them. sup~rieur, j'ai fait erreur), alors que le nombre total des musulmans r~sidant dans l'Inde est de 40 millions. Comme un musulman en vaut un autre, les musulmans cachemiriens, s'ils tiennent compte de telles consid~rations, devraient choisir les 40 millions qui vivent dans 1'lnde. "De plus, si l'on envisage la question d'un point de vue politique plus moderne, on peut dire que les affinit~s religieuses ne dE!terminentpas, et, normale- ment, ne doivent pas d~terminer, a. elies seules les alliances politiques des Etats. n n'existe pas de bloc chr~tien, ni de bloc bouddhiste, ni meme de bloc musulman - encore qu'il en soit tant question aujourd'hui au Pakistan. De nos jours, les int~rets ~conomiqueset une communaut~ d'id~aux politiques sont les facteurs qui, It plus juste raison, influencent la politique des Etats. "11 y aurait ~galement une autre question im- portante a. consid~rer dans le cas oill'Etat d~ciderait de faire de la question religieuse la consid~ration majeure. Quel sera le sort du million de non- musulmans que compte actuellement notre Etat? (Au Cachemire, sur une population s'~levant en 1941 a. 4 millions, plus d'un million ~taient des non-musul-' mans, et un grand nombre de ceux· ,j ~taient des bouddhistes de race tiMtaine.) Dans les circons- tances pr~sentes, il n'y a pas de place pour eux au Pakistan. Toute solution qUi entraineraitle d~place­ ment ou l'asservissementtotal d'un aussi grand nombre de personnes ne serait ni juste ni ~qui­ table (oo.)" 169. Je laisse ace texte et passe It !'autre solution indiqaee par le cheik Abdullah. Jeneveuxpas fatiguer le Conseil. La troisi~me solution envisag~e est: "pourquoi ne pas demeure:r ind~pendants?" - jedonne lecture du document afinde nlontrer que l'onnl{,.saurait. pretendre que ces gens ont et~ amen~s a. faire un certain "choix" par quelque louche manmuvre: toutes les possibilit~s ~eur avaient et~ present~es. "Firstly, it is~t easy to protect our sovereignty and independence in a smallcountrywhichhasnot the sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering on many countries. "Secondly, we must have the good will of all our neighbours. Can we find powerful guarantors among thorn to pull together always in assuring usfreedom from aggression? I would like to remind you that from 15 August to 22 October 1947 our State was independent"-this was before accession-,"and the result was that our weakness was exploited by our neighbour, with whomwe had a valid standstillagree- ment. The State was invaded. What is the guaranty that, in future too, we may not be the victims of similar aggression?" 170. Sheikh Abdullah has developed this point, so I have read this out atlengthbecausethisidea of acces- sion is obtained. 171. Now, therefore, what is the nature of our com- mitments outside? I have dealt with the position with regard to the Kashmir people and ourselves. The out- side commitments are what arise from the mention- and I want to use this word "mention"-of the word "plebiscite", and from its use as a provisional mechan- ism, or the idea that it can be part of a plan which is a concerted plan implementing itself in consecutive stages. That is what is being argued. Firstof all, I do not know whether I need repeat the arguments. I said this this morning and this afternoon, but all of these commitments can be tied up inthese two resolutions of the Commission-that is, the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 172. The resolution of 5 January 1949 is an imple- menting resolution. It provides the mechanism, pro- vided the decision is made. But our commitments for a plebiscite in this matter are, first of all, conditioned by the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and nationals, by the large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the "Azad" Kashmir army, by the restoration ofthe unity of the country, by the return of refugees, by the restora- tion of law and Qrder and by conditions of security. 173. I have not the resolution of August 1948 before me; if I had, I would probably make this statement longer, but! do notwantto do so. So if the Council will recall to mind the various "whens" and "afters" and "ifs" that were inthat resolution, itw:ll1appreciate that there can be no shadow of doubt in any·rational mind that what was conceived was a plan conditional upon a contingency. There are two levels of conditions, and those conditions have not been performed. What is 45 "Premi~rement, il n'est pas facile de demeurer souverairi et independant dans un petit pays qui n'est pas assez fort pour se defendre sur des fronti~res longues et difficiles, enbordured'unsigrandnombre de pays. "Deuxi~mement, il faut que nous soyons assures de la bonne volont~de tous nos voisins. Pouvons-nous trouver parmi eux des garantspuissants, quiagiront de concert pour nousprotegercontrel'agression?Je tiens ~ vous rappeler que notre Etat a connu l'in- dependance du 15 aout au 22 octobre 1947 (c'est-~­ dire avant l'accession). A quoi cela a-t-il abouti? Notre voisin, avec qui nous avions signe un accord de statu quo, a profite de notre faiblesse. L'Etat a ete envahi. Quelle garantie avons-nous qu'al'avenir nous ne serons pas encore victimes d'une agression semblable?" 170. Le cheik Abdullah a expose laquestionendetail; j'ai lu tout le passage parce'qu'il traite du probl~me de l'accession. 171. Quelle est donc la nature de nos engagements envers l'exterieur? Je viens d'exposer notre situation quant ~ nos engagements envers la populaticl du Cachemire et envers nous-memes. Nous aurions des engagements envers l'exterieur 'parce que l'on a fait mention - je dis bien "inention" -- d'un "plebiscite" comme d'un dispositif de transitionoubienparce qu'on pense qu'il pourrait entrer dans le cadre d'un plan concerte applicable en plusieurs etapes. Voila ce que l'on pretend. Je ne sais si je dOi,S repeter tout d'abord les divers arguments avanc~s. Je les at deja. exposes ce matin et cet apr~s-midi; ils sont tous dans les deux r~solutions de la Commission - celle du13 aout 1948 et celle du 5 janvier 1949. 172. La resolution du 5 janvier 1949 concerne les modalites d'application. Elle indique le dispositifau- quel on recourra si la d~cisionestprise.Mais notre engagement ~ l'egard d'unplebiscite depend avant tout de l'evacuation des forces et des ressortissants pakistanais, de la dissolution et du desarmement total de l'armee 4u Cachemire "azad", de,I'unifica- tion du pays, du retour des r~fugies, du retablisse- ment de l'ordre public et du respect de las~curite du territoire. 173. Je n'ai pas la resolution d'aout 1948 devantles yeux;si je l'avais, je ferats SaIlS doute up.e plus longue declaration, ca que jeveux~viter._ M~iEl le Conseil se rappellera qu'il y avait bea\lCoup· de "quand", de "apresque" ~t de "si" dafiscatta 1'e80;" lution; il comprendra. que personne de sens~nepeut doutel' qu'il s'agissait d'un plan dont lamise ell a,ppli"" cation dependait·decertaines conditions. Ellesetaient de· dela,sortes, etelles n'ontpas ~t~ remplies.Qui 175. But allthe same, we are not only prepared to say, but anxious to say, thatwhatever there is is to be found in the resolutions of13August1948 and 5 January 1949, with the assurances in the context of the conditions then existing. And what is more-and this is the most important part-did not the fact that violations of the gua..-anties andassurances givento the Security Council by the 'other sidehadtakenplace before the agreement, a fact which was concealed from the Council, mean that therefore, in equity, that agreement was vitiated in its foundation because it was not reachedbona fide, if the Pakistan Government knew in August 1948 that that was the position of the "Azad" forces, as has btlen pointed out by the Commission. Even at the risk of tiring the Council's patience I have quoted from the reports of the Commission instead of giving them in indirect narration because I did not want to expose myself to a charge of inaccurate citation. 176. Therefore, those are our commitments. Whatis their position in the context of the Charter? These resolutions, first of all, are not Security Council resolutions; they are, to the extent thatthey have been endorsed by the Security Council. What do they say? They are by way of recommendations-recommenda- tions which can be implemented only if the two sides co-operate, if the two sides agree. Our sidewas willing to agree. It has been Willing to agree, and it has tried for years to agree. But we have always said that the Government of India will never agree to the inter- ference ofPakistaninthe sovereign affairs ofthe State, and that the plebiscite is not Pakistan's business but has to be taken by a Plebiscite Administratorwho has to decide its terms. And in any case none of these things can take place so long as the territory-more then 42,000 square miles out of 84,000-is under oc- cupation. 177. I. have not referred as yet to the story of the occupation of the Northern Areas. Iwouldliketo do so during the next mstalment ofthis statement, andI have to ask all those concerned to forgive references to individuals and nationalities which are pf a character which is not intended to hurtthemat all since they are the facts of history. l'1~L Thus we have no commitments in this way. Our commitmerd is contingent upon the performance of s'el~ve energiquement contre l'idee qu'il n'aurait pas rempli ses engagements. Crest li ceux qui por- tent cette accusation qu'il appartient d'apporter des preuves evidentes. 174. Nous n'avons pris aucun engagement. Qu'est-ce qu'un engagement, Monsieur le President? Vous con- naissez bien les questions internatiqnales. Un engage- ment resulte d'un traite entre nations; il y a des obligations internationales qui decoulent d'actes offi- ciels, de declarations, de protocoles, etc. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, la Commission a adopte une resolution, que les deux parties ont acceptee. Tech- niquement, il n'y a pas d'accord bilateral entre le Pakistan et 1'Inde. 175. Cependant, nous tenons li dire, que s'il y a une explication, crest dans les resolutions des 13aoiitl948 et 5 janvier 1949 qu'ilfautla chercher, les assurances donnees s'entendant compte tenu des conditions qui existaient alors. En outre - et crest l'element le plus important - le fait que des violations des garan- ties et assurances donnees au Conseil de securite par l'autre partie ont eu lieu avant l'accord - ce qui a ete cacM au Conseil - ne signifie-t-il pas, entoute equite, que l'accord etait vicie li la base parce qu'il n'a pas ete conclu de bonne foi, si, comme la Com- mission l'a fait remarquer, le Gouvernement pakis- tanais savait quelle etaitlapositiondesforces "azad"? Meme au risque d'abuser de la patience du Conseil, j'ai cite les Tapports de la Commission au lieu d'en mentionner indirectement des passages, car je ne veux pas que 1'on puisse m'accuser de faire des cita- tions inexactes. 176. Tels sont nos engagements. Comment se pr~­ sentent-ils dans le cadre de la Charte? Tout d'abord, ces r~solutions ne sont pas des resolutions du Consei~ de securit~ - elies le sont dans la mesure ou elles ont ~t~ approuvees par le Conseil. Que disent-elles? 11 s'agit de recommandations qui ne peuvent etre appliquees que si les deux p~.rties cooperent, que si elles sont d'accord. Pour notre part, nous etions disposes a. donner notre accord. Nous etions dispos~s li aboutir li un accord et nous nous sommes efforces pendant des ann~es d'y parvenir. Mais nous avons toujours dit que le Gouvernement indien n'accepterait . jamais. une ingerence du Pakistan dans les affaires qui rel~vent de la souverainete de 1'Etat. Nous avons toujours dit, egalement, que le plebiscite ne concer-' nait pas le Pakistan, mais un Administrateur du ple- . biscite d~siglle li cet effet, qui en fixerait les moda- lites. En tout etat de cause, on ne pourra rieh faire aussi longtemps que le territoire - plus de 42.000 milles carr~s sur un total de 84.000 - est occupe. 177. Je n'ai encore rien dit de l'occupation des re- gions du Nord. Je voudrais en parler dans une autre partie de mon expos~, et je prie tous les interesses de m'excuser si je mentionne des personnes et des nationalites. Je ne le fais nullement dans l?intention de blesser, car 11 s'agit de faits historiques. 178. Ainsi, nous n'avons pas d'engagements a. cet egard. Notre engagement depend de l'execution de la' 46 179. The next point is whether we have, by our action, made non-performance of part n possible.. I thinkthat the Security Council, and every member of it, and our friends in Pakistan, would be entitled to point a finger of rebuke and scorn at us if it was our action that had prevented part n from being implemented, because it is not equitable to say: I will do ill if n comes about, and I go out and make n impossible. But the whole history which I have unfolded is not like that. The personal conversations of the Prime Minister, who is the head of the Government ofIndia, the aide-m~moire and correspondence with the Commission are all on record. It is not as though it was done at some low departmental level-although that would not bind the Government of India even then. It has been carefully gone into at every point. 180. And then we come to the interpretationof agree'- ments. For this purpose, if the President so desires, we could take a hypothetical position. First of all, I said that there was no agreement on' the level of a treaty. There is no international agre~mentofthe type that is a protocolor a final declaration of a conference. What there is~ is an agreement on a plan of settlement, which is a very different thing. Today it is us; to- morrow it may be someone else in the same position. If one cannot come before the Security Council and iiscuss with its representatives tentative plans, how I can one carry on negotiations? All the agreements, all the meeting of minds, allthe differences between minds constitute a plan that is contingent upon another con- tingency. 181. Now, for the purpose of argument, my Govern- ment will be prepared, not to admit that there is any- thing more than that, but to examine this problem as though it were a treaty. And I want to emphasize this because we have suffered in the past by making hypothetical propositions. Supposing we assume- which we cannot assume-that whatever we have said 'in the way of a treaty is a plebiscite; what are the obligations under international law with regard to treaties? I am not going to quote any law because this is not a juridical body, but there are principles of international behaviour. caract~re complementaire. n s'agit en realite d'une resolution qui fixe de fac;on detaillee la procedure du plebiscite. On ne saurait donc opposer 4 l'Inde aucun engagement en ce qui concerne l'execution d'un ple- biscite. 179. n s'agit ensuite de savoir si, par notreattitude, nous avons empecM que la deuxi~mepartiesoitappli­ quee. A mon avis, le Conseil de securite et chacun de ses membres, ainsi que nos amis du Pakistan~ pourraient nous mOI1trer du doigt et IlOUS temoigner du mepris si nous avions mis obstacle 4 cette appli- cation, car il est deloyal de dire: fappliquerai la troisi~mepartie si la deuxi~me est mise en reuvre, et de s'arranger ensuite pour que cette deuxi~mepartie soit inapplicable. Mais, comme je l'ai demontre, ce n'est pas ainsi que les choses se sont passees. Les entretiens personnels du Premier Ministre, chef du Gouvernement indien, les aide-memoire, les memo- randums et les notes echangees avec la Commission, tout cela figure au dossier. Ce n'est pas comme si tout s'etait passe a l'echelon peu eleve d'unminist~re quelconque - et meme dans ce cas, cela ne lierait pas le Gouvernement indien. L'affaire a ete minu- tieusement suivie, point par point. 180. Nous en arrivons maintenant a l'interpretation des accords. Si le President le desire, nous pourrions nous placer d'un point de vue theorique. Toutd'abord, comme je l'ai deja dit, il n'existe pas d'accord ayant le caract~re d'un traite. Iln'existepasd'accordinter~ national comparable a un protocole ou a l'acte final d'une conference. Nous nous trouvons en presence d'un accord sur un projet de r~glement, ce qui est tout a fait· different. Demain, quelqu'un d'autre peut se trouver dans la situation od nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui. Comment peut-on menerdes negocia.tions s'H est impossible de se presenter devant le Conseil de securite pour examiner des p~ans provisoires? Tous les arrangements, toutes les ententes et toutes les divergences de vues constituent un plan qui est fonction de certaines contingences. 181. .Mitt de faciliter la discussion, mon gouverne- ment est dispose, non a reconnaitre qu'il yait euplus qu'un accor~, mals a etudier la question commesi un traite avait ete conclu. Je tiens a le soulignezo, car nous avons eu a souffrir pour avoir formule des propositions hypothetiques. A supposer que nous ad- mettions - ce que nous ne saurions faire - quec~ que IlOUS avons envisage par voie de traite ~st .un plebiscite, q.uelles sont, en droit international, les obligations .qui decoulant des traites? ·Je ne citerai aucune disposition juridique parce que le Conseil de securiten'est pas un·organe judiciaire; je me borne- rai a rappeler quelques principes qui regissent leS relations internationales. . "It is taken for granted thatthe contractingparties intend something reasonable"-something adequate to the purpose of the treaty-"and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international law•,,~/ 183. I say that what the Security Council is being asked to believe that we have committed ourselves to is not anything reasonable. That is to say, to plunge a country that has got law and order institutions into a whole mixture of foreig~ intervention that is already on its frontier, to make this gateway of invasion into another way of interference, another way of the viola- tion of sovereignty, is not reasonable. IUsnot reason- able. to assume that there could be freedom of the poll in a Pakistan-occupied area when there are-as I will tell the Council later-how many divisions of thePak- istan army within five and thirty miles of its border, when there are forty-five battalions of "Azad" forces ready to line up, with modern troops and equipment. We have some idea of this equipment; we do not live far away. There are airstrips built in these places- again I am going to give the particulars. So far as we are concerned it is not a military secret, although it may be a secret to others. But there it is. When there is an armed fortress and, what is more, when there is all this appealto hatred andinvasion, andlanguage such as that used by the Foreign Minister himself-which, at an appropriate stage, I propose to quote-it is not reasonable to expect that a countrYwillunsettle things that are settled. My LatinAmericanfriends willunder- stand that we must let things alone in this case. 184. It is not reasonable now. Then it must be ade- quate. Would this be adequate for this purpose?It was Sir Owen Dixon who said that no plebiscite wo~d ever be adequate because, supposing the" plebiscite by majority decided for India, he said, there would still be trouble; if they decidedfor Pakistan, therewould be even more trouble. And, what is more, how would the adequacy of this plebiscite be justified in the present conditions? 185. Oppenheim says: It must "not [be] inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international law"-and that isthe main shaet-anchor ofourposition. For the Security Council to take a step in this matter today which does not take ourprimaryposition-thatis . our territory has been invaded-into account would be inconsistent. It does not matterwhether there are flaws in our claim. Kashmir was never a part of Pakistan. Kashmir never acceded to Pa....ltistan. Kashmir was in no way historically connected with t.1te preeent Pak- istan, and therefore, its entry into that territory, irrespective of our claims, is an act of invasion. it/ L. Oppenheim, International Law - A Treatise, 8th ed., H. Lauterpacht (ed.), (London, NewYork, Toronto; Longmans, Green and Co., 1955) vol. I, p. 952. ~trang~re qui menace d~jll ses fronti~res, et tol~rer, sous forme d'une invasion, une autre ing~rence~tran­ g~re, une autre violation de souverainet~. U n'est pas raisonnable de penser que la libert~ de vote serait assur~e dans une r~gion occup~e par le Pakistan, alors qu'll 5 ou 30 milles de la fronti~re station- nent - comme je le dirai plus loin - tantdedivisions de l'arm~e pakistanaise et que 45bataillons des forces "azad", munies d'un ~quipement moderne, sontpretes a. se regrouper. Cet ~quipement, nous le connaissons dans une certaine mesure, car notre pays est voisin. De plus (c'est peutuetre pour d'autres un secret militaire, mais ce ne rest pas pour nous), on cons- truit dans cette r~gion des pistes d'envol et d'atter- rissage - 13. aussi, je suis pret a donner des d~tails. Voi13. ou nous en sommes. Quand on voit cette con- centration de forces, quand on entend ces appels a. la haine et a l'invasion et les propos tenus par le Ministre des affaires ~trangeres du Pakistan - que je me propose de citer en temps voulu - 11 n'est pas raisonnable de s'attendre qu'un pays remette en question ce qui est d~ja r~gl~. Mes amis d' Am~rique latine comprendront donc que, dans ce cas, nous devons laisser les choses telles qu'elles sont. 184. Cette solution n'est pas raisonnable. Serait- elle au moins ad~quate eu ~gard aux buts envisag~s? Sir Owen Dixon a dit que le pl~biscite ne serait jamais une solution satisfaisante, car, si la majorit~" se pronon~aitpour l'Inde, les troublescontinueraient, et, si elle se pronon~ait en faveur du Pakistan, les troubles seraient encore plus graves. En outre, com- ment un pl~biscite pourrait-11 "se justifier dans les circonstances actuelles? 185. Oppenheim dit que l'objet du trait~ ne dolt pas etre "incompatible avec les principes g~I1l~ralement reconnus du droit international", et c'est la le prin- cipal argument que nous avan~ons a l'appui de notre th~se. Le Conseil de s~curiM n'agirait pas avec logique si, aujourd'hui, il prenait a ce sujet une d~ci­ sion qui ne tiendrait pas compte de notre position originale - a savoir que notre territoire a ~t~ envahi. Peu importe que notre revendication presente cer- taines imperfections. Le Cachemire n'a jamais fait partie du Pakistan. Le Cachemire n'a jamais accM~ au Pakistan. A aucun moment de son histoire, il n'a ~/ L. Oppenheim, International Law - A Treatise, 8eme ea., revue par H. Lauterpacht, Londres-New-York~Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., edit., 1955, vol. I, p. 952. 187. International law is based upon the priIlciple of .equity, of fair play and of iIlternational morality, and no party can come before this body and ask for equity unless it is prepared to deal it. The rule of equity in civil law is: those who want equity must come with clean hands. 188. Oppenheim says further: "If, therefore, the meaning of a provision is am- biguous, the reasonable meaniIlg is to be preferredto the unreasonable; the more reasonable, to the less reasonable.lt~/i 189. Now, we have so many pundits ofEnglisharound here. In other words, what does the resolution of 13 August 1948 mean? The reasonable meaning is stageA, then stage B, then consideration of stage C. That is the reasonable meaning, and an unreasonable meaningcan- not be read into that document. The purpose of the treaty is to get a settlement in Kashmir-that is the cpnsistent meaniIlg, not the meaning that is inconsist- ent with the recognized principles ofinternational law• That is the first set ofconditions inthe interpreting of a treaty. Inthe secondplace, the whole of a treaty must be taken into consideration ifthe meaning of anyone of its stipulations is doubtful, not only the wording of the treaty, but also the purposes, the motives, and the conditions preVailing at the time. 190. There are two things here to be taken into account., Firstly, "the motives that led to its conclu- sion"•[;VI The representatives may recall that earlier this afternoon I referred to the anxiety of the Com- misS;i.on to get a cease-fire. Ididnotdo this merely to draw attention to the fact that ithad some relationship with this. The motive in getting this agreementwas to stop the fighting. Therefore, to talk now of something which would lead to greater,violence is not in con- formity with this. The second is, "the conditions pre- 188. Oppenheim dit plus loin: "Done, si une clause est ambigue, la signification raisonnable doit etre preferee a la signification deraisonnable, celle qui est plusraisonnable ll. celle qui l'est moinsY." 189. n ya tant de specialistes de l'anglais ici qu'ils pourront peut-etre nous expliquer ce que signifie la resolution du 13 aoiit 1948. Si on l'interprt;te raison,;. nablement, on s'aperc;oit qu'elle envisage une phase A, puis une phase B, et, enfin, l'examende la phase C. C'est llit la signification raisonnable; on ne saurait d'ailleurs preter a ce document une signification qui ne le soit pas. Le traite a pour objet d'amener un reglement de la question du Cachemire. C'est Ill. la signification logique de la r~solution, et non une si- gnification incompatible avec les prmcipes reconnus du droit international. Ce sont Ill. les premieres con- ditions .qui doivent etre satisfaites dans l'interpr~ta­ tion d'un traite. En deuxieme lieu, il faut examiner l'ensemble du traite si la signification de 1'une de ses clauses est douteuse; il ne faut pas se limiter aux termes employes, mais tenir compte egalement des buts et des motifs, et de la situation teUequ'elle se presentait au moment de la conclusion du traite. 190. Dans le cas present, il convient de tenircompte de deux facteurs, et tout d'abord, des "motifs qui ont amene la conclusion du trait6"W.Comme les . membres du Conseii s'en souviennent sans doute, j'ai parl~ au d~but de l'apr&s-midi du 'vif d~sir de la Commission d'obtenir un cessez-Ie-feu. Jene l'ai pas fait simplement pour souligner qu'il y avait un certain rapport entre les deux choses. Le but que l'on se proposait en concluant cet accord etait de mettre fin au combat. n ne serait donc pas compa- :J/ Ibid., p. 953. 191. Then Oppenheim stated: "The principle in dubio miUus must be ap~lied in interpreting treaties."- That, again, is important- "If, therefore, the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to bepreferredwhichis less onerous for the party assuming an obligation":-in this case, we are asked to be the partieswho are to assume the obligation, and, therefore, if there is an ambiguity, the meaning that is less onerous to us must be taken - "or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party"-whatcouldbe more on all-fourswiththepresentcase?-"or involves less general restrictions upon the parties. "",~/ It is also stated: "If two meanings of a provision are admissible according to the text of a treaty, such meaning is to prevail a;s the party proposing the stipulation knew at the time to be the meaning preferredby the party accepting it." ~ _ "192. That is the case here, becausewhenwe accepted the two resolutionS we acceptedthe stipulations and the meanings of the letters of assurance and the aide- memoire. These were known to the other side. There- fore, thatmeaning is to bepreferred. There are a large number of other' conditions, but these are sufficient fo!" my purposes. 193. It is also stated that: "It is a well-established rule in the practice of international tribunals that so-called preparatory work {travaux preparatoires)-i.e. the record of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of a treaty; the minutes of the plenary meetings and of committees of the Conference which adopted a convention, the successive drafts of a treaty, and so on-may be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting con- troversial provisions of a treaty."-That is what I done, I havegone.intothe minutes ofthe Commission, into the letters, and so on-"ThePermanentCourtof International Justice .•• has frequently affirmedthe usefulness of preparatory work."y 194. Therefore, even if there were, and there is not, a high-level treaty as between ourtwo countries, or an agreement of the nature of a treaty obligation, either registered with the United Nations orenteredintowith the Secretary-General, it would still beboundby these commitments. Therefore, we say that one of our com- mitments in this matter is accession. Therewe have a 4/ ibid•• p. 954. 5/ Ibid•• p. 957. 50 191. Nous lisons ensuitedansl'ouvraged'Oppenheim: "Le prlncipe in dubio mitius doit s'appliquer dans l'intel'pretation des traites. (Cela aussi est impor- tant.) Si, par consequent, le sens d'un terme est ambigu, il faut choisir l'interpretation la moins onereuse pour la partie qui assume une obligation (dans le cas present, on nous demande d'etre les parties qui doivent assumer l'obligation et, par consequent, s'l1 y a ambiguite, c'estl'interpretation la moins onereuse pour nous qu'il faut choisir) ou qui met le moins en question la suprematie terri- toriale et personnelle de 1'une des parties (pour- rait-il y avoir une analogie plus grande avec le cas present?) ou impose le moins de restrictions gene- rales aux parties2!." Oppenheim ajoute: "S'il est possible d'interpreter une disposition de deux manieres differentes en s'en tenant an texte d'un traite, l'interpretation qui prevaudra est celle que la partie qui a propose la stipulation savait ll. l'epoque etre l'interpretation preferee par la partie qui a accepte la~ite stipulation!!." lS2. Tel est bien le cas devant lequel nous nous trouvons, car, lorsque nous avons accepte les deux resolutions, nous avons accepte les stipulations en meme temps que l'interpretation des lettres od etaient enoncees les garanties et des aide-memoire. Cela etait connu de l'autre partie. C'est pourquoi il faut donner la preference a cette interpretation. n y a de nombreuses autres conditions, mals il suffit que je mentionne cenes-cL 193. Oppenheim dit encore: "Une regIe dument etablie de la pratique des tri- bunaux internationaux est que ce que l'on appelle les travaux preparatoires - c'est-a.-dire le compte rendu des negociations precedant la conclusion d'un traite, le proces-verbal des seances plenieres et des seances des commissions de la conference qui a adopte une convention, les projets de tralte suc- cessifs, etc. - peut etre utilise lorsqu'il s'agit d'interpreter les dispositions d'un traite qui don- nent lieu a controverses. (C'est ce que j'al fait, j'al examine le compte rendu des debats delaCom- mission, les lettres echangees, etc.) La Cour per- manente de Justice internationale (...) a affirme a. de nombreuses reprises l'utilite des travaux pre- paratoires&1." 194. Ainsi, mame s'il existait - ce qui n'est"as le cas - un tralte veritable entre nos deux paysj;ou un accord qui comporterait des obligations analogues ll. celles d'un traite et qui auralt ete enregistre a. l'Organisation des Nations Unies ou conclu avec le Secretaire general, il serait encore soumis ll. de telles conditions. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que 4/ Ibid•• p. 954. 5/ Ibid•• p. 957. 195. We have another commitment, to which I shall refer at length later. That is the cease-fire commit- ment, and we shall honour it. But we have no other commitments. 196. The Ministerfor'ForeignAffairs ofPakistan said that in regard to this Kashmir matter he had no other international obligations than those thatare to befound in the resolutions [761st meeting, para. 115]. I agree with that, but to a limited extent in the sense that we have to interpret this agreement in the terms of these two resolutionsto whichI have referred, but if it means that the international obligations of the Charter of the United Nations are not binding, then I join issue with him. I am prepared to confirm that I subscribe to the view that in the discussion of any procedure, of any particular decision, of any agreement reached, these resolutions are what are bInding in the circumstances I have submitted to you. But it would be wrong, so far as we are concerned, for a Member Stateto argue that there are no other international commitments. The Charter is a commitment for every State, andwhen the time comes to sum up these observations at the con- clusion of these meetings of the Security Council, we shall fall back upon our bounden duty to ask, all of you to address yourselves to the provisions oftheCharter. Therefore, no Member State, in our submission, may say there are no other international obligations. Heel sure that that is notthe meaning ofthe statement made by my colleague, but I wish to be clear on this point.

I am sorry, but that is a misinterp:i'etatiQn of my statement.

You have no rightto interrupt. 199. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I will read out the quotation.J thought that by not doing so before I could save ti~lf,J~jlt it will be seen that my slow procedure is the quickest in the long run. The representative of Pakistan said: "Pakistan is equally convinced that the inter- national agreement for a plebisciteis oneindivisible whole."-We agree-ftNo party to the dispute hasthe right to accept it in part. IfIndia, a party to the dis- puteft-which does not exist-ftmakesan attempt to freeze the situation as it exists, Pakistanwouldcon-. unit~ et notre souverainet~nationale nous sont cMres. Dans ces conditions, nous ne sommes donc pas dis",,: pos~s l admettre que lIon conteste la validit~de cette' accession. Tel est l'engagement que nous avons pris et nous nous y tenons. 195. Nous a:vons un autre engagement, dont je par- lerai plus tard en d~tail. Cet engagement a trait au cessez-le-feu, et nous le tiendrons. Mais nous n'avons pris aucun autre engagement. 196. Le Ministre des affaires ~trang&resduPakistan a dl§clar~que, en ce qui concerne la question du Cachemire, II n'avait pas d'autres obligations inter- nationales que celles qui sont 6nonc~es dans les r~so­ lutions .[761eme s6ance, .par. 115]. Je suis d'accord avec lui, mais dans une certaine mesure seulement, en ce sens que nous devons interpr~ter cet accord eu ~gard aux dispositions des deux rl§solutions que j'ai rappel~es, mais, si cela signifie que les obliga- tions internationales pr~vues par la Charte des Na- tions Unies n'ont pas un caractere obligatoire, alors je ne puis l'approuver. Je reconnais - et je suis pret l le confirmer - que lorsqu'il s'agit d'examiner une proc6dure, une d~cision ou unaccordquelconques, ces r~solutionssont ce qui nous lie dans les circonstances que j'ai rappell§es. Mais un Etat Membre ne saurait, a. notre avis, pr~tendre qu'll n'y a pasd'autres obli- gations internationales. La Charte constitue un en- gagement pour chaque Etat, et lorsque le moment sera venu de r~sumer ces observations, l la fin du d~bat que le Conseil de sl§curit~ consacre a. la ques- tion, nous serons tenus, une nouvelle fois, de prier chacun d'entre vous de se reporter aux dispositions de la Charte. C'est pourquoi aucun Etat Membre ne peut,. a. notre avis, pr~tendre qu'll n'y a pas d'autres obligations internationales. Je suis certain que tel n'est pas le sens de la d~claraUon faite parmon coll&gue, mais je desire que toute la. clarte soit faite sur ce point. 197. M. NOON (Pakistan) [traduit de l'angla,is]: Je regrette de devoir dire que c'est JAnne interpreta- tion erronee de ma declaration. . 198. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglaiS): Vous n'avez pas le droit d'il1terrompre l'orateur. 199. M. Krish!la MENON (Inde) [tradui! de l'anglais]: Je vais donner lecture de cettedeclaration. Jepensais qu'en ne le faisant pas je pourrais gagner du temps, mais on constatera que ma maniere de proctider avec lenteurest, en fin de compte, la methode la plus rapide. Voici.ce quIa dit le representant du Pakistan: "Le Pakistan est egalement convaincu que l'accord international relatif au plebiscite forme un tout indivisible. (Nous sommes d'accord.)Les parties au differend n'ont pas le droit de ne l'accepter qu'en partie. Si l'Inde, partie au diff~rend qui n'existepas en realite s'efforee de maintenir la situation dans 200. I should not have referred to this withoutquoting it, but I submit that, in my own rea<Jtng of this, it does not exclude our comDlitments under the Charter. It simply means that there are no other agreements of the type of thes'e resolutions orplans ofthat character outside these two resolutions. Iwas trying, in my state- ment, to elicit information on this pointinthe reply of my colleague. So far- as the Government of India is' concerned, for the moment we assume thatthis means that, as far as commitments ofthis kind are concerned, t~ese are the only two resolutions. That is also our position. 201. Could I now rest on this instalment at this time?

I should liketo know how much more time the representative of Indiadesires in order to finish his statement. 203. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I thinkthat another meeting would be sufficient. 204. THe PRESIDENT: I have the feeling that the members of the Council would be willing to stay for another hour. . 205. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I do not think I would be able to finish my statement in another hour. It will probably take two or two and a half hours, even if I condense everything. The whole ofthe argument in this case remains. I have a responsibility to the Gov- ernment of India at this stage, when this matter has come up after five years, with the statements made in the Council with regard to tribal movements and the references to armed concentrations and so on, tobring before this Council all the facts inthe situation. I have done my best to make itnon-controversial and to stick to the facts and to the record. I have no desire to prol<mg these proceedings;, Iwould have a considerable personal difficulty in carryingonfor another two hours.

If the representative of India requires two and a half hours more, we can adjourn now and resume again at 8.30 p.m., and continue until the statement is finished.

I see that the listes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]:Je vois que le representative of India is literallyworn out. The mem.- representant de l'Inde estlitteralementepuise. D'autre bars of the Council, too~ are obviously notgoing to find part, nous aurions nous-mames du m.al, je crois, li it easy toliS::en for another two and a half hours t06f.y. l'ecouter encore pendant deux heures et demie au- For the sake of purely phySical relieffor everyone and jourd'hui. Aussi,pour permettre a. tous les membres for the sake, too, of the results of our consideration of de se reposer, et pour assurer, en quelque sorte, 52 200. Je n'aurais pas dii mentionner cette d~claration sans la citer textuellement, mais il me semble que, telle que je la comprends, elie n'exclut pas les en- gagements que nous avons aux termes d.e la Charte. Ellesignifie simplement que, en dehors de ces deux resolutions, il n'y a pas d'autres accords qui leur soient comparables ni de plans qui aient le m@me caractere. Au cours de ma d~claration, j'ai essaye de trouver dans la r~ponse de mon coll~gue des ren- seignements sur ce point. Quant a. nous, nous inter- pr~tons cette declaration comme signifiant que, pour ce qui est d'engagements de cet ordre, il n'y a que les deux resolutions. Telle est ~galementnotre posi- tion. 201. Puis-je en rester la. pour le moment? 202. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je vou- drais Savoir decombien de temps le representant de 1'Inde desire encore disposer pour terminer sa de- claration. 203. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]: Je pense qu'une autre s~ll:t"1ce suffira. 204. Le PRESIDENT (traduitde l'anglais): J'ail'im- pression que les membres du Conseil seratent dis- . poses a. sieger encore pendant une heure. 205. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]: Je ne crois pas que je puisseterminerma declaratic;m en une heure. n me faudra probablement encore deux heures ou deux heures et demie, m~me si je r~sume au maximum. Toute l'argumentation reste li exposer. Au moment. OU, au bout de cinq ans, cette question est examinee, au moment ou l'on evoque devant le Conseil des mouvements de tribus et ou l'on parle de concentrations de forces armees, j'ai pour devoir, envers le Gouvernement de l'Inde, d'exposer au Con- seil tous les elements de la situation. Je me suis efforc~ de le faire d'une mamere objective et de mIen tenir strictement aux faits ainsi qu'aux docu- ments. Je ne desire pas que les debats du Conseil se prolongent, mais je dois dire qu'il me serait tres difficile de poursuivre ma declaration encore pendant deux heures. . 206. Le PRESIDENT (traduitde l'anglais): SUe re.. presentant de l'lnde a encore besoin de deux heures et demie, nOuspouvons lever maintenant la s~ance et la reprendre a. 20 h. 30. Nous siegerons.ensuite jusqu'li ce qu'il ait terinine sa declaration.

What is the pleasure of the COlmeil? If there is no discussion, does that mean that the Council agrees to the President's proposal to resume the meeting at 8.30 p.m. tonight? 209. Mr. Krishna MENON(lndia): Am I entitled to speak on this?

I think this is a decisionto be made by the Council. 211. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): We are hereunder Article 32 of the Charter, andifthe Council desires to hear the views of the Government of India, that must be physically possible. .

The President will listen to your views. 213. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): A night meeting would be necessary and warranted in cop.ditions of a different character,if this were a matter of grave urgency which has not waited five years. Now, sud- denly, we are called upon to conclude this business tonight. I can submit to you privately the reasons why this cannot be done-and this is in no political context whatsoever. I want to do justice to the presentation of the case of the Government of India, andit is not pos- sible for me to do that more than five or six hours a day. If you insist, Mr. President, uponcarrying on the meeting, then I am afraid that part of this case will have to go ex parte. This is a very unreasonable position and, withgreat respect, I suggestthat after the normal. sitting of the Council, where a very complex matter of this kind has to be submitted over the hours, a great strain is imposed because one has to summa- rize very much more than one would do if time were not important; for me to continue with the degree of intensive application that is required for this purpose would bevery difficult. Therefore, I hope thatthe Coun- cil will not hold a meeting tonight. Ifit does so, it will be the decision of the Council. 214. Mr. NuNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) (translated from SpaJl.ish): I think tllat we should agree to what the representative of India proposes. If his statementwill take two and a half hours more and, as he tells us, he is physically incapable of continuing, it willbe impos- sible for us to continue the meeting tonight. That is the view of the delegation of Cuba. 215. We all wish, of course, to~oncludethediscussion as rapidly as possible. Mr. Menoncanfinishhis state- ment tomorrow morning, and we can then continuethe debate. The difference will be only a matter of a few hours. •

If there is no further discus- sion, there is a proposal by the representative of the 208. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Quel est l'avis du Conseil? S'il n'y a pas de discussion, cela signifie-t-il que le Conseil approuve la proposition du Prasident tendant a. reprendre la saance ce soir a 20 h. 30? 209. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]: Puis-je prendre la parole sur cette question? 210. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je pense que c'est au Conseil qu'll appartient de se prononcer. 211. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]~ L'Inde se trouve ici en vertu de l'Article 32 de la Charte, et si le Consell d~sire connaitre les vues du Gouvernement de l'Inde, il faut encore que je sois physiquement en mesure de les pr~senter. 212. Le PRESIDENT (traduit del'angiais): Nousvous ~coutons. 213. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]: Une s~ance de nuit serait n~cessaireet se justifierait daus. d'autres conditions, s'll s'agissait par exemple d'une question extremement urgente qui ne serait pas rest~e en suspens pendant cinq ans. On nous demande soudain d'en terminer ce soir avec l'examen de cette affaires. Je puis vous faire connaftre en privl1 les raisons pour lesquelles cela n'estpaspossible - rai- sons qui ne sont absolument pas d'ordre politique. Je d~sire exposer comme elle doit l'etre la th~se du Gouvernement indien, et je ne puis le faire pendant de cinq ou de six heures par jour. Si vous insistez, Monsieur le Prl1sident, pour que la s~anc.e se pour- suive ce soir, je crains que le d~bat ne revete, en partie du moins, un carct~re unilaMral. Cela ne me parait pas du tout raisonnable. Je voudrais faire remarquer qu'apr~s une s~ance d'une dur~e normale, il me serait tr~s difficile de continuera parler; l'ex- pos~ d'une question aussi complexe prend des heures et exige un grand effort d'attention parce que je dois me r~sumer beaucoup plus que je n'aurais voulu le faire si le facteur temps n'~taitpas aussi important. C'est pourquoi j'esp~re que le Conseil ne tiendra pas de s~ance ce soir. S'll le fait, la responsabilite lui en incombera. 214. M: NUNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) [traduit de l'espagnol]: n me semble que le Conseil doit acceder a la requ~te du representant de l'Inde, S'il doit parler pendant deux heures et demie encore et qu'il pense ne pas etre physiquement en ~tat de le faire, nous ne pouvons continuer a si~ger ce scir. Tel est l'avis de la d~legationde Cuba.