S/PV.770 Security Council

This morning I have to answer two speeches of the representative of India, but please do not be afraid that my statement will be inordinately long. I shall try to be as brief as possible. 2. I am at a loss to decide where to begin my remarks and where to end them. I have listened very carefully to the representative of India. I do not know what the members of the Security Council feel about it, but I have had three lectures too many on the words "acces- sion", "aggression" and "sovereignty". All these matters, as the Council is well aware, have already been considered and decided, and I fail to see why the representative of India has dwelt constantly on these three words. I can find no reason for it except this: that probably he believes, as Hitler in "Mein Kampf" that if one goes on repeating a thing a million times; perhaps people will begin to believe in it. Otherwise, the time of the Security Council has been completely wasted by discussing these three words because such discussion is quite irrelevant. Therefore, I do not wish to waste any more of the Council's time in dwelling on them. 3. Mr. Krishna Menon picked out these three words from the speeches, bu.t he has forgotten-although he Pr~sident: M. Gunnar JARRING (SuMe). Pr~sents: Les repr~8entants des pays suivants: Australie, Chine, Colombie, Cuba, France, Irak, Philippines, Su~dp., Union des R~publiques sociallstes sovi~tiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Am~rique. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/770) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan: lettre, en date du 2 jan- vier 1957, adress~e au Pr~sident du Conseil de s~curit~ par le Ministre des affaires ~trang~res du Pakistan. Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adopM. Question Inde-Pakistan: lettre, en date du 2 Janvier 1957, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par le Ministre des affaires etrangeres du Pakistan (S/3767, 5/3787) [suite] Sur l'invitation du Pr~sident, M. Arthur S. Lall, repr~sentant de l'lnde, et M. Firoz Khan Noon, re- pr~sentant du Pakistan, prennent place a. la table du Conseil. 1. M. NOON (Pakistan) [traduit de l'anglais]: J'ai a. r~pondre ce matin a. deux discours du repr~sentant de 1'lnde, mais rassurez-vous, mon intervention ne sera pas d'une longueur d~mesur~e. Je m'efforcerai d'etre aussi bref que possible. 2. Je ne sais pas trop par quoi commencer ni par quoi conclure. J'ai ecoute le representant de l'lnde avec beaucoup d'attention. Je ne sais pas ce que les membres du Conseil de securite pensent de ses declarations, mais, pour ma part, j'ai entendu trois sermons de trop sur les mots "accession", "agression" et "souverainete". Tous ces sujets, le Conseil ne l'ignore pas, ont deja ete examines et tranches, et je ne vois pas pourquoi le representant de 1'Inde insiste constamment sur ces trois mots. La seule explication possible, c'est qU'il pense probablement, comme l'auteur de Mein Kampf, que si l'on rep~te une chose un million de fois, les gens finiront peut-etre par y croire. De toute fac;on, la discussion de ces trois mots est tout a fait hors de propos, etle Conseil a comple- tement perdu son temps. Je ne retarderai donc pas le Conseil davantage en prolongeant cette discussion. 3. M. Krishna Menon a pris ces trois mots pour tMmes de ses discours, mais s'il a prononc~ le mot 4. I must reiterate at the very beginning that the question which is beforE' the Security COW1cil is how to implement the internadonal agreement that subsists between India and Pakistan for decidingthe question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. The Security Council and the parties to this dispute agree that demilitarization of the disputed area is an essential prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite. Ithas not sofar been possible to bring about demilitarization of the State in accord- ance with the terms of the international agreementfor a plebiscite. It is, therefore, most essential that the Security Council should devote its attention to the problem of demilitarization in order that the agreed objective of a free and impartial plebiscite may be reached quickly. This is also the purpose of the pre- sent draft resolution. 5. Before I proceed to make my submissionabout the draft resolution which is under consideration, I must say a few words with regard to some points that the representative of India made in the course of his address to the Security Council on 8 February 1957 [767th meeting]. My sole object in doing so is to keep the record straight. I will limit myself to the main points and will leave aside the rest. That does not mean that we accept either the validity of the other arguments used, or in any way subscribe to them. I am leaVing them aside because in our view those matters are completely irrelevant to the issue that is engaging the attention of the Security Council. I think that such matters as the so-called secularism of India or the propaganda which is carried onin the vernacular Press of India and Pakistan against each other, of who in India or in Pakistan has suffered imprisonment, or what Sheikh Abdullah does or does not want, or the claim of India that, because Kashmir has prospered under its control, Kashmiris should be denied the right of self-determination, are all irrelevant to the issue which is under consideration. 6. The statement of the representative of India seems to imply that India accepted the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, dated 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75], about a week after it was presented, and accepted the second proposal of the Commission, dated 11 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 3], on 23 December 1948. What happened actually was that the Commission framed a resolution on 13 August 1948 and presented it to the parties. The Government of India signified its acceptance of the resolution. The Government of Pakistan also signified its acceptance of the resolution, subject to certain conditions. The Commission could not at that stage accept those con- ditions of the Government of Pakistan, chief amongst which was that the resolution should specify the conditions that would govern the final resolution of the pl~biscite. Soit dit avec tout le respect que je dois a. M. Krishna Menon, il a constamment parl~ hors du sujet et a cherch~ a. cr~er la confusion pour noyer la question du pl~biscite. 4. Je dois repeter pour commencer que le present debat a pour objet de determiner comment mettre en ceuvre l'l,tccord international qui subsiste entre l'Inde et le Pakistan concernant l'accession de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire a l'Inde ou au Pakistan. "Le Conseil de securite et les parties au differend s'ac- cordent pour estimer que la demilitarisation de la zone en litige est une condition prealable essentielle a l'organisa;tion du plebiscite. Jusqu'ici, il a ete impossible de demilitariser l'Etat conformement aux termes de l'accord international qui prevoit l'orga- nisation d'un plebiscite. Il est donc absolument essentiel que le Conseil de securite se consacre au probIeme de la demilitarisation, afin d'atteindre rapidement l'objectif COnvent': un plebiscite libre et impartial. C'est egalement le but du present pr-ojet de resolution. 5. Avant de formuler mes observations surceprojet, je commenterai bri~vementcertains arguments que le repr~sentantde l'Inde a avanc~s dans son intervention du 8 f~vrier 1957 [767~me s~ance]. Mon seulobjet est de r~tablir les faits. Je me bornerai a. l'essentiel et laisserai le reste de cot~. Cela ne veut pas dire que les autres arguments de M. Menon nous paraissent fond~s ou que nous y souscrivions en aucunefa~on.Je les laisse de cote parce qu'a notre avis 11s n'ont absolument rien a. voir avec le probl~mequi occupe le Conseil de s~curit~. Le pr~tendu lafcisme de 1'Inde, la lutte de propagande menee dans lapresse vernaculaire indienne et pakistanaise, les mesures d'emprisonne- ment prises de part et d'autre, les vceux du cheik Abdullah, la tMse indienne selon laquelle ondevrait refuser aux Cachemiriens le droit de disposer d'eux- m@mes sous pr~texteque le Cachemire aprosp~r~sous le controle de l'Inde, tout cela est hors du sujet. 6. Le repr~sentantde 1'Inde voudrait laisser entendre que son pays a accept~ la r~solutionde la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde etle Pakistan en date du 13 aout 1948 [S/l1 00, par. 75] environ une semaine apr~s qu'elle eut ~te pr~sent~e, et ladeuxi~mepropo­ sition de la Commission, en date du 11 d~cembre 1948 [S/1196, annexe 3], le 23 d~cembre 1948. En fait, la Commission a adopt~ une r~solution le 13 aoUt 1948 et l'a pr~sent~e aux int~ress~s. Le Gouvernement indien a fait savoir qu'll acceptait cette r~solution.Le Gouvernement pakistanais a egalement donn~ son as- sentiment, sous r~serve de certaines conditions. A l'~poque, la Commission n'a pas pu accepter cescon- ditions, dont la principale ~taitque la r~solutiondevait pr~ciser les modalit~s du r~glement final du diff~rend par un plebiscite libre et impartial tenu sous les 7. After some time, th,e Commission again took up negotiations with the representatives of India and Pakistan and succeeded in securing their agreement to certain proposals for a plebiscite. These proposals were, as pointed out by the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan in his letter to the Commission dated 25 December 1948 [S/1"196, annex 5], in amplification of the resolution of 13 August. The proposals were put to the two Governments on 11 December 1948 and were accepted by the Governments of Indiaand Pakistanafter certain assurances a.nd clarifications had been given to them on 23 and 25 December respectively. These proposals, after acceptance, were embodied in a resolution by the Commission, which was adopted on 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. 8. The entire agreement for a cease-fire, a truce and &. plebiscite was thus accepted by the Government of India on 23 D,ecember 1948 and by the Government of Pakistan on 25 December 1948. The agreement con- stitutes one entity. Each part of it is linked up with the other. There was to be a cease-fire first, which was to be followed by a truce, which in turn was to be followed by the plebiscite. The entire agreement stands or falls together. 9. It is very significant to note here that whereas Pakistan took a little time, a month or two, in asking for clarifications and then accepting, along with India, the resolution in toto, Mr. Krishna Menon tried to create trouble because of this two or three months' delay. Then we accepted. On the other hand, his coun- try, for eight or nine years, having accepted those resolutions, has not carried them out and has evaded them, and that waste of time does not concern him at all. 10. The Indian representative has said that India accepted the two resolutions of the Commission on the basis of certain clarifications that were given to the Government of India by the Commission. I begto sub- mit that the Government of Pakistan also accepted these resolutions on the basis of certain assurances that were given to it by the Commission. The Indian representative has mentioned only the assurances that were given to the Government of India by the Com- missiQn. I am afraid I have not been able to trace the authority for all of these assurances. He has put them in a context whic~ makes them completely different from what they were intended to mean. 11. For instance, it has been claimed by the Govern- ment of India that the Commission had assured it that there Would be large-scale disbanding and disarming of the"Azad" Kashmir forces. We accept this as being correct, but the point is, when will such disbanding and disarming take place? I have clearly shown in my opening address [761st meeting] that according to the terms of the resolutions of the Commission as well as the various assurances that were given to us and the qualifications that were given to the Government of India, indeed according to the Government of India's 7. Apr~s quelque temps, la Commission reprit les n6gociations avec les repr6sentants de l'Inde et du Pakistan et r6ussit cl obtenir leur accord sur certaines propositions concernant le p16biscite. Comme le Minist~re des affaires 6trang~res du Pakistan l'a signaIe ~ 1'6poque dans une lettre du 25 d6cembre 1948 adressee cl la Commission [S/1196, annexe 5], ces propositions 1taient destin6es cl comp16ter la r6so- lution du 13 aoUt. Elles ont ~te soumises, le 11 d6- cembre 1948, aux Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan, qui les ont accept6es les 23 et 25 d6cembre, respectivement, apr~savoir regu certaines assurances et pi"~cisions. Une fois acceptees, ces propositions ont 6t~ incorpor6es dans une r6solution, que la Com- mission a adoptee le 5 janvier 1949 [S/1196, par. 15]. 8. Ainsi, l'ensemble de l'accord relatif~unesuspen­ sion a'armes, :\ une treve et cl un pJ.6biscite a 616 accept~ le 23 d6cembre 1948 par le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le 25 d6cembre 1948 par le Gouvernement du Pakistan. Cet accord constitue un tout indivisible. Toutes ses parties sont reliees entre elles. II devait y avoir d'abord une suspension d'armes, puis une treve, puis un plebiscite. L'accord tient ou s'ecroule d'un seul bloc. 9. Il importe de noter que le Pakistan a eu besoin de quelque temps - un mois ou deux - pour demander des eclaircissements avant d'accepter, commel'Inde, la r6solution dans son ensemble, et que M. Krishna Menon a essay6 de cr~er des difficult~s :\ cause de ce delai de deux ou trois mois. Mais nous avons finale- ment accept6. En revanche, II y a huitou neuf ans que l'Inde, ayant souscrit ~ ces resolutions, ne les met pas en reuvre et les elude; mais M. Krishna Menon ne se soucie gu~re de cette perte de temps. 10. Le repr6sentant de l'Inde a declare que son pays avait accepte les deux resolutions de la Commission sur la base de certains eclaircissements que laCom- mission avait fournis auGouvernementindien.Jetiens a rappeler que le Gouvernement pakistanais a egale- ment souseritaces resolutions sur la base de certaines assurances que lui avait fournies la Commission. Le repr6sentant de l'Inde a seulement mentionne les as- surances que son gouvernement a re~ues de la Com- mission. Malheureusement, je n'ai pas pu remonter :\ la source de toutes ces assurances. M. Menon les a plac6es dans un contexte qui fausse compl~tementles intentions de leurs auteurs. 11. Le Gouvernement indien a pr6tendu par exemple que la Commission lui avait donn6 l'assurance qu'll serait proc6de :\ la dissolution et au d6sarmement du gros des forces du Cachemire "azad". Soit, mais il s'agit de savoir quand cette dissolution et ce desarme- ment auront lieu. J'ai clairement montre dans ma premi~re intervention [761eme s6ance] que, conform6- ment aux resolutions de la Commission, aux diverses assurances qui nous ont ete fournies, aux explications donnees au Gouvernement indien, et, qui plus est, aux declarations de ce gouvernementlui-meme, ladissolu- "The disarming of 'Azad' forces is really a matter of chronology. First. there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and IT of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occup~tion of 'Azad' Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has bee!"" carried out." 1/ 13. Today, the Government of India says that such disbanding is a prerequisite to the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from the State, always putting meaning into sentences, which meaning is not there. 14. ! would like to mention only a few of the assur- ances given to us by the Commission: one, that no officer, either civil or military, of the Government of India or of the State Government will be allowed to cross the cease-fire line or allowed to exercise any authority in the "Azad" Kashmir area; two, that the "Azad" Kashmir forces will not be disbanded or dis- armed in the truce stage; three, that synchronization of the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army with the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army will be arranged by the Commission in consultation with the two High Commands; four, that the Commission will be free to hear the views of the- Government of Pakistan with regard to the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the Indian side c,f the cease-fire line; five, that the expression "the Plebiscite Administrator will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir" does not mean that he will be an employee of the Government of Jammu and KashmIr or subject to its control; six, that by the expression "the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers neces- sary" is meant that the Plebiscite Administratcr will be competent to exercise such powers as he considers necessary for organizing and conductingthe plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality, and he shall be deemed to have derived those powers from the authorities concerned. The organizing and conducting of the plebiscite shall be the responsibility exclusively of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Plebiscite Ad- ministrator could not derive his authority either from India or from Pakistan since there was no accession of the State to either one. Nor did the sovereignty of the State vest in either India or Pakistan. Therefore the imaginary fountainhead of the Plebiscite Admin- istrator's authority was mentioned as the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the dissolution of whose powers "Le d~sarmementdes forces "azad" est en fait une question d'ordre chronologique. Il doit d'abord y avoir une suspension d'armes, puis une treve, ainsi qu'll est enVisage dans les premi~re et deuxi~m€ parties de la r~solution de la Commission en date du 13 aout 1948. Apr~s cela, la condition pr~alable a. toutes mesures d'organisation d'un pl~biscite est d'instaurer une situation qui permette aux res- sortissants du Cachemire de retourner dans la r~gion actuellement occup~e par les forces du Cachemire "azad". En ce qui concerne les non-musulmans, ce mouvement n'aura pas lieutantqu'onn'aurapaspro-- c~d~ au d~sarmementdes forces en question sur une large echelle 1/." 13. AUjourd'hui, le Gouvernement indien soutientque la dissolution des forces "azad" est une condition pr~alable au retrait du gros de ses fo:,ces de l'Etat, continuant ainsi a. donner aux phrases un sens qu'elles n'ont pas. 14. J'aimerais simplement mentionner quelques- unes seulement des assurances que nous avons rec;ues de la Commission: premi~rement,aucun fonctionnaire au officier du Gouvernement de 1'Inde ou du Gouverne- ment de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire ne serait autoris~ a. traverser la ligr.e de suspension d'armes ni a. exercer une autoriM quelconque dans la zone du Cachemire "azad"; deuxi~mement, les forces du Cachemire "azaa lt ne seraient ni dissoutes ni d~­ sarm(!es au stade de la treve; troisi~mement, la synchronisation du retrait du gros de I'arm~e indienne et du retrait de l'arm(!e pakistanaise serait arret~e par la Commission, en consultation avec les deux hauts-commandements; quatri~mement, la Commis- sion serait libre d'entendre le point de vue du Gou- vernement pakistanais en ce qui concerne le retrait du gros des forces indiennes du c6t~ indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes; cinqui~mement,les mots "l'Administrateur du pMbiscite sera officiellement nomm6 a. ses fonctions par le Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire" ne signifiaientpas que l'Administrateur serait un fonctionnaire du Gouvernement du Jammu et Cachemire ou qu'll rel~veraitde son autorit~; sixi~me­ ment, les mots "l'Administrateur du pl~biscite recevra de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire les pouvoirs qu'il juge n~cessaires" signifiaient que l'Administrateur du pMbiscite serait habilite a. exercer les pouvoirs qu'il jugerait necessaires pour organiser et mener a bien le plebiscite, ainsi que pour entourer celui-ci de toutes les garanties voulues d,' libert~ et d'impartialit~,et qu'll serait cens~ avoir rec;u ces pouvoirs des autorit~s int~ress~es. L'Administrateur du pl~biscite aurait seul qualit~ pour organiser et mener a. bien le ple- biscitEl. Il ne pourrait tenir son autoriM ni de l'lnde, ni du Pakistan, car l'Etat n'a acced~ ni a. l'un ni a. l'autre de ces pays. La souverainet~de l'Etat n'ap- partiendrait ni a. l'Inde ni au Pakistan. Ainsi donc, la 11 Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, qua- trieme annee, Supplement special No 7, document S/1430/ Add.l, annexe 7, par. 3. 16. Thus it will be seen that it is not only the Govern- ment of India that was given assurances with regard to the provisions of the two resolutions of the Commis- sion. The Government of Pakistan was equally in- terested in the framing of these resolutions. Although we do not claim to have as much ingenuity of thought as my Indian colleague has, we also took some care to see that our viewpoint was heard by the Commission and the provision for it was made in the resolution. 17. While dealing with the text of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the distinguished and ingenious repre- sentative of India has tried to import into one of its clauses a meaning which it is utterly incapable of bearing. I refer to part IT, section B, paragraph 2 of the resolution. I will read it once agaiD: "Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Governn:ent will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease- fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the obser- vance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary." [8/1100, para. 75.] 18. The representative of India has argued that be- cause the phrase "local authorities" is used, itis meant to allude to the area which is under the control of the "Azad" Kashmir Government. I would begofthemem- bers of the Security Council to mark the phraseology of the clause which says the Indian Government will be allowed to maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. 19. Now, you will want to know why the words "truce lines" and not "truce line" are used. As a matter of fact there are two of these lines, one is in the northern area which runs from south to north-east, and the other runs on the borders of the Punjab-our Punjab- which runs from north-west to south-east. Therefore, when the word "lines" is used it is two truce lines and not one. Now, with regard to the word "authorities". Mr. Krishna Menon took a great deal of trouble in pointing out to you that the word "authorities" means the authority on. the occupied Kashmir side, and the authority on the "Azad" Kashmir side-and therefore !he. word "authorities" is used [767th meeting, para. ...24]. He tried to give us a talk on the English language and the implication of this word. Well, Ido not pretend to know the English language because it is a foreign language to me; but I tried to look it up in the Oxford dictionary. I found that since the year 1611 the words ~num~r6es, figurent dans les trois rapports de laCom- mission au Conseil de s6curit6: documents S/l100 du 9 novembre 1948, S/1196 du 10 janvier 1949, et S/1430 du 9 d6'~embre 1949. 16. Par cons6quent, le Gouvernement indien n'a pas 6t.; le seul a. recevoir des assurances en ce qUi con- cerne les dispositions des deux r6s01utions de la Commission. Le Gouvernement pakistanais s'est6ga- lement int6ress6 a. l'6laboration de ces textes. Nous ne sommes peut-etre pas aussi ing6nieux que mon collegue indien, mais nous avons fait en sorte, nous ausGi, que notre point de vue soitentendupar la Com- mission et qu'il en soit tenu compte dans la r6solution. 17. Lorsqu'il a parle du texte de la resolution du 13 aoilt 1948, le distingu6 et ing6nieux repr~sentant de 1'Inde a essay6 de donner a. une de ses dispositions un sens qu'elle ne peut absolument pas avoir. Il s'agit du paragraphe 2 de la section B de la deuxieme partie, qui est ai'lsi conc;u: "En attendant que les conditions du reglement final de la situation dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire aient 6t~ accept6es, le Gouvernement l'Inde main- tlendra, en dec;a des lignes existant au moment de la suspension d'armes, les forces de son :u:m6e que, d I accord avec la Commission, ilconsiderera n6ces- saires pour aider les autorit~s locales a. faire res- pecter l'ordre public. La Commission placera des observateurs la 01.1 elle le jugera necessaire." [S/1100, par. 75.] 18. Le repr~sentantde l'lnde a pr~tendu que, du fait de l'emploi de l'expression "autorit6s locales", cette disposition visait la zone qui est sous le contrOle du Gouvernement du Cachemire "azad". J'appelle l'at- tention des membres du Conseil sur le passage qui dit que le Gouvernementde Plnde maintiendra, endec;ades lignes existant au moment de la suspension d'armes, les forces de son arm~e que, d'accord avec la Com- mission, il considere:ra necessaires pour aider les autorites locales afaire respecter Pordre public. 19..Vous remarquerez que dans cette disposition le mot "lignes" est au pluriel. En effet, il existe deux lignes, l'une dans la region septentrionale, allant du sud au nord-est, etl'autre, alafrontiere du Pendjab - notre Pendjab - allant du nord-ouest au sud-est. Par cons~quent, la resolution parle de deux lignes et non d'une seule. Je passe maintenant au mot "autorites". M. Krishna Menon s'est donne beaucoup de mal pour expliquer qu'il s'agit de deux "autorites": celle de la partie occupee du Cachemire, et celle du Cachemire "azad", d'ou l'emploi du pluriel [767eme seance, par. 124]. Il a essaye de nous donner une lec;on d'anglais a propos de ce mot. Je ne pretends evidem- ment pas connaitre l'anglais, qui est pour moi une langue etrangere; j'ai cependant consulte l'Oxford Dictionary. J'ai appris que, depuis 1611, le mot "autorite" s'emploie au singulier au sens abstrait, comme dans les expressions "autorite de la loi" ou 20. English is a very difficult language, even the English themselves probably do not understand it, and we in the East are particularly in a very difficult si- tuation. So you see, for uS to come and lecture you people here who know the English language much better than we do, I will not say it is presumptuous, but it is very daring. 21. The cease-fire lines were established on 27 July 1949. The Government of India can maintaIn within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire a certain number of its forces. Could it be claimed that the Government of India is authorized by this clause to cross the cease-fire line and post its forces in "Azad" Kashmir territory? No further proof is required for rebutting this novel piece of reasoning. If, however, any further proof of the true im.port of the clause is required, I would respectfully draw the attention of the Security Council as well as of my distinguished col- league from India, to the Commission's summary report, dated 21 August 1948, of a meeting held between the United Nations Commission and the Government of India headed by the illustrious Prime Minister oflndia in person to discuss the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 in New Delhi at 3 p.m. on 17 August 1948. This forms part of the firstinterim report of the Commission to the Security Council [S/1100, annex 12]. 22. I shall now read out to the Council extracts Lrom this very interesting document which show what the Commission thought about the proposal of the Govern- ment of India to post forces on the "Azad" Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. (The Commission's view was apparently accepted by the Government of India, as no further mention of this demand appears in either the letter dated 20 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 78], or the letter dated 23 December 1948 [S/1196, annex4], from the Government of India to the Commission, or in any one ofthe two aides m~moireswhich formed appendices to the letter of 23 December.) "Mr. Korbel [Czechoslovakia] replied that the Commission fully recognized the concern of the Government of India for security, but that in all frankness he had to tell the Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan was equally fearful of in- vasion by the Indian forces, The Commission, he said, could not assure either country on this question of security. The present document, he said, was a first step in that direction. If the Commission could succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, it would have the obligation, while on the sub- continent, of watching over Pakistan. Once the Kash- "autorit~" de notre cot~ de cette ligne. Ainsi, le sens que M. Krishna Menon a essay~ de donner au mot "autorit~s" n'est pas celui que lui donne la langue anglaise. 20. L'anglais est une langue trt:!s difficile, que les Anglais eux-memes ne connaissent peut-etre pas parfaitement; II c.Jt ~gard, les Orientaux, plus parti- culi~rement, se trouvent dans une situa.tion tr~6 d~li­ cate. 11 est par cons6quent, sinon pr~somptueux, du moins tr~s risqu~ de notre part de venir vous donner, avous qui connaissez l'anglais bien mieux que nous, des le<;ons en cette mati~re. 21. Les lignes de suspension d'armes ont I1t~ ~tablies le 27 juillet 1949. Le Gouvernement indien peut maintenir certaines forces en de<;1I. des lignes existant au moment de la suspension d'armes. Peut-on dire que cette clause autorise le Gouvernement indien a. franchir la ligne et 11. disposer ses forces dans le territoire du Cachemire "azad"? 11 est inutile de chercher 11. r~futer cet argument singulier, mals je pourrais au besoin attirer respectueusement l'atten- tion du Consail et celle de mon coll~gue de 1'Inde sur le compte rendu analytique en date du 21 aout 1948, ~tabli par la Commission, d'une r~union organis~e entre des membres de la Commission et des repr~.. sentants du Gouvernement indien, dont J.'illustre Pre- mier Ministre de 1'Inde en personne, afin de discuter h r~solution de la Commission en date du 13 aofit 1948; la r~union s'est tenue II New-Delhi le 17 aoilt 194811 15 hem·es. La Commission a fait figurer ce compte rendu dans son premier rapport provi30ire au Conseil de s~curit~ [S/1100, annexe 12]. 22. Je vais donner ledurp de quelques passages de ce document tr~s intllressant, qui montrent ce que la Commission pensait de la proposition du Gouvernement indien tendant 11. disposer des troupes au-dea de la ligne de suspension d'armes, sur le territoire du Cachemire "azad". (11 faut croire que le Gouvernement indien s'est rang~ au point de vue de la Commission, puisqu'il n'a r~it~r~ sa demande ni dans ses lettres du 20 aout 1948 [S/1100, par. 78] et du 23 d~cembre 1948 [S/1196, annexe 4], adress~es ilIa Commission, ni dans les deux aide-m~moire annex~s ala lettre du 23 d~cembre.) "M. Korbel [TcMcosIovaquie] r~pond que la Com- mission comprend parfaitement le souci de s~curi~ du Gouvernement de l'Inde mals, en toute franchise, il doit dire au Premier Ministre de l'lnde que le Gouvernement du Pakistan redoute, lui aussi, une invasion de la part des forces de I'lnde. La Com- mission, dit-il, ne peut donner de garantie ni 11. l'un ni a l'autre pays en mati~re de securit~; ma.is le document sur lequel porte la pr~sente discussion constitue un premier pas dans ce sens. Si la Com- mission r~ussit 11. obtenir le retrait des troupes du Pakistan, alle aura, aussi longtemps qu'elle s~- "The Prime Minister reiterated his fears of pos- sible infiltration with or without the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan and mentioned that the strategic points previously enumerated to the Com- mission which the Government of India considered that its forces must hold in oraer to ensure the security of Kashmir. Mentioning Domel in particular, he rE;marked that, if Government of Indiaforces held that point, a natural boundary between the two would be established along the line of the river, and that Pakistan would, in no sense, be threatened thr<Jugh the occupation of that point by the forces of the Government of India inasmuch as Pakistan was from twenty-two to twenty-six miles distant. "Mr. Korbel commented that such a readjustment of the front line went beyond the cease-fire and said frankly that the Commission, after giving careful consideration to the Indian point af view in that respect, had not been able to accept the view." [S/1100, annex 12, pp. 103 and 104.J 23. And here is a perfectly clear and specific state- ment by the Commission with regard to the state of fear that will prevail in the area which will be eva- cuated by the Pakistan Army: "Part Ill, section G [of the document entitled"Truce terms transmitted to the Governments of I.'·iia and Pakistan by the Commission"Y], recognizes that the Commission cannot prejudge the sovereignty and integrity of the State as a whole. It should not be construed as envisaging the introduction into the area to be evacuated by Pakistan troops of civil or military officials of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or of the Government of India fOl' the purpose of administration or control. "Y 24. The representative of India has asserted that the withdrawal of troops as contemplatod in this resolu- tion was unconditional. The facts, however, as I showed in my opening speech [761st meeting], are quite other- wise. The Commission assured us that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army would be synchronized with the wihhdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army. Besides, the phraseology of the 13 August 1948 resolution itself clearly shoVJ8d that a certain action has to be taken by the Government of Pakistan on its side, while the corresponding action has to be taken by the Govern- ment of India on its side. It is not that the Pakistan Army would withdraw and then nothing would happen on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. When the Pak- istan Army is beginning to withdraw from the State, the Government of India is equally bound to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State. ~I !Illi!.., annex 21. y !Illi!.., Jnnex 23, para. 4, (g). "Le Premier Ministre r~pMe qu'il craint l'infil- tration d'~l~ments hostiles, au su ou a. l'insu du Gouvernement du Pakistan, et il rappelle ~ la Com- mission les points strat~giquesque le Gouvernement de l'lnde, dans des communications ant~rieures, a d~clar~ devoir etre occup~s par ses troupes, afin de garantir la s~curit~ du Cachemire. Enparticulier, il cite le nom de Domel, en faisant observer que, si les troupes de I'lnde occupent ce point, la rivi~re constituera une s~paration naturellE: entre les deux arm~es et que l'occupation de ce point par les troupes de 1'Inde ne saurait rnena~~r le Pakistan dont la fronti~re se trouve ~t quelque 40 kiloill~tres de la. "M. Korbel fait observer qu'une telle rectification du front irait bien au-deIa. de la suspension d'armes et d~clare franchement que la Commission, apr~s avoir soigneusement ~tudi~ le point de vue du Gou- vernement de l'Inde a. ce sujet, n'a pas pu s'y rallier." [S/1100, annexe 12, p. 103 et 104.] 23, Et voici une d~claration clatre et'pr~cise de la Commissio:; au sujet des craintes que l'on aura dans la region lorsque l'arm~epaklstanaise l'aura ~vacu~e: "Dans la section G de la troisi~mepartie [du docu- ment intitule "Conditions de treve communiquees par la Commission au Gouvernement de l'lnde et au Gouvernement du Pakistan"Y], la Commission re- connait qu'elle ne peut pr~juger la souverainete et I'int~griM territoriale de l'Etat dans son en- semble. 11 ne faudrait pas interpr~ter cette clause comme signifiant que 1'0n envisage d'envoyer, dans la region que les troupes du Pakistan doivent evacuer, du personnel civil ou militaire du Gouvernement de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire ou du Gouvernement de 1'Inde aux fins d'administration oUdecontr61e~". 24. Le repr~sentant de l'lnde a affirm~ que le re- trait des troupes pr~vu par cette r~solution devait etre incond.itionnel. Comme je l'ai montr~ dans mon discours d'ouverture [761~me s~ance], il n'en est pas ainsL La Commission nous a assur~ que le retrait de l'armee pakistanaise serait synchronise avec le retrait du gros de l'arm~e indienne. En outre, les termes de la r~solution du 13 aoiit 1948 montrent clairement que le Gouvernement pakistanais doit pren- dre certaines mesures tandis que, de son caM, le Gouvernement indien prendra des mesures corres- pondantes. 11 ne s'agit pas de retirer l'armee pakis- tanaise alors qu'on ne fait rien du cote indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes. Lorsque l'arm~e pakis- tanaise commencera a. ~vacuer 1'Etat, le Gouvernement de l'Inde sera tenu hit aussi de retirer le gros de ses fon~es. 5:./ Ibid., annexe 21. Y Ibid., annexe 23, par. 4, alinea g. "When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relation- ship between Pakistan and the said State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State." 26. With the existence of this definite provision in our Constitution, when Mr. Krishna Menon made the remark in my presence that Pakistan had incorporated the Kashmir State already, I was quite a little sur- prised. What does this show? Does it showthat we have incorporated certain areas of the State into Pakistan, or that the relationship of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan can be determined only after the question of the accession has been solved? 27. In this connexion I would like to mention the case of Chitral Once again. The Indian representative has stated that Chitral is part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We deny it. I do not propose to go into the history of Chitral in order to prove that it was a State which acceded to us lawfully, because the question of Chitral is not before the Security Council. But if Mr. Krishna Menon claims that Chitral is part of Kashmir, would he be willing to count the votes of the people of Chitral in a plebiscite for the determination of the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kash- mir to India or Pakistan? If that were the case I am sure he would speak for another four hours here as to why those votes should nut be counted On the Pakistan side. 28. Allied to this is another matter which I may deal with before passing on to other points. I am amazed that the representative of India should accuse us of not allowing elections to be held in "Azad" Kashmir. Although we have had elections in all the provinces of Pakistan on an adult franchise basis, why have no elections been held in "Azad" Kashmir? The reason is not far to seek. We have scrupulously refrained from interfering with the administration of"Azad" Kashmir; it is the responsibility of the local authorities. If they want to hold elections they are at liberty to do so, but that is a question they have to decide. In adopting this attitude I claim that we have upheld the directive of the Security Council contained in the resolution of 17 January 1948 "to refrain from...doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggra- vate the situation".1I It is unfortunate that the very fact of compliance with the directions of the Security Council is being pleaded against us before that very body. "Lorsque la population de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire aura d~cid~ d'acc~der au Pakistan, les relations entre le Pakistan et ledit Etat seront d~termin~es conform~mentaux vreux de la population de cet Etat." 26. Etant donne cette disposition formelll; de notre Constitution, j'ai ete tres surpris d'entendre M. Krishna Menon affirmer en ma presence que le Pakis- tan avait deja annexe le Cachemire. Les faits permet- tent-ils de conclure que nous avons annexe certaines zones de l'Etat, ou bien que les relations entre l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire et le Pakistan ne seront determinees que lorsque la question de 1'accession aura ete reglee? 27. A cet ~gard, je voudrais rappeler une fois de plus le cas du Chitral. Le repr~sentantde l'Inde a d~clar~ que le Chitral faisait partie de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire. Nous ne sommes pas de cet avis. Je ne me propose pas de faire l'historique de la question du Chitral pour prouver que cet Etat a acc~d~ Mgiti- mement au Pakistan, parce que cette question n'est pas inscrite ~ l'ordre du jour du Conseil de s~curit~. Si toutefois M. Menon pr~tend que le Chitral fait partie du Cachemire, est-il pret ~ comprendre les voix de la population du Chitral dans le pl~biscite qui doit d~cider de l'accession de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire ~ l'Inde ou au Pakistan? Si tel ~tait le cas, je suis persuad~ qu'il parlerait encore pendant quatre heures pour essayer de d~montrer pourquoi 11 ne fait pas compter ces voix en faveur du Pakistan. 28. A ce propos, il est une autre question dont je voudrais traiter avant d'aller plus loin. Je suis stup~­ fait d'entendre le repr~sentantde l'Inde nous accuser de ne pas autoriser d'~lections dans le Cachemire "azad". Des ~lections ont eu lieu dans toutes les provinces du Pakistan sur la base du suffrage univer- sel des adultes; on peut done se demander pourquoi il n'en a pas ~t~ de meme au Cachemire "azad". La raison en est simple: nous nous sommes scrupuleuse- ment abstenus d'intervenir dans l'administration du Cachemire "azad", qUi est assur~e par les autorit~s locales. Si ces autorit~s veulent organiser des elec- tions, elles sont libres de le faire, mais c'est a elles de d~cider. En adoptant cette attitude, j'afiirme que nous avon::: respect~ la r~solution du 17 janvier 1948, clans Iaquelle le Conseil de s~curit~ faisait appel aux Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan pour que chacun d'eux "s'abstienne...d'accomplir, deprovoquer ou de permettre aucun acte susceptible d'aggraver la situationn 1/. 11 est regrettable que l'on invoque contre nous, au Conseil de securite, le fait meme que nous ayons suivi ses directives. 29. Bien entendu, M. Menon tire vanite du fait que, s'il n'y a pas eu d'elections au Cachemire "azad", 11 y en a eu dans le Cachemire occupe. Toutefois, il interessera les membres du Conseil de savoir que dans 1/ Documents officiels de I'Assemblee generale, troisieme session, Supplement No 2, chap. 5, sect. C. 30. Mr. Krishna Menon has pointed out that according to the electoral laws of his country people are for- bidden to appeal to religion when asking for votes. It is clear that it might interfere with the freedom of an election if ecclesiastical condemnation and religious fiats were issued threatening with damnationapartic- ular candidate or those who might support him. Mr. Krishna Menon on this occasion tried to take credit for the fact that in his country there is a law by which religious interference is not permitted and the elec- tions are free. But I think it is ungenerous of him not to admit that this law was framed by the British in the year 1920 and not by the present Congress Government and that the law was framed not only for the Indian side of the people in India but that the same law exists in Pakistan also, where similar rules exist regarding the freedom of elections; and we both inherited that law from the British. Therefore, for him to claim credit for something which was done by the British and then come before an international body and try to be so generous was rather surprising to me. 31. It would be perfectly legitimate in the case of a plebiscite to draw attention ~o religious, cultural, linguistic, economic, geographic, strategic and other ties, affinities and considerations that might sway the choice. So long as nothing has been done to incite law- lessness or to exercise coercion, the exercise of all considerations that might affect the choice would be legitimate. 32. I think that Mr. Krishna Menon-and I bowbefore him for his knowledge of the English language-forgot to differentiate between the word "election" and the word "plebiscite". Whereas in an election it is the duty of a Government to see that it is free and no religious arguments ar~ brought in, in the matter of a plebiscite, wherever it is held, it is held because of religious differences or of ethnic differences or of geographic, linguistic or other differences. Therefore in a ple- biscite it is quite legitimate for people to appeal to the electorate fo:::' these reasons before they decide whether to accede to one side or the other. In the matter' of an election, it is quite different. I am very sorry that Mr. Krishna Menon is not here today to listen to my views personally and that he is not well. 1 hope he will Soon recover. We must realize that we a~'e now dealing with the question of a plebiscite and not an ordinary election, and we must notbe confused by the arguments that he advances on this point. In fact, the Prime Min- ister of India himself emphasized this principle in the telegram of 22 September 1947 to the Government of Pakistan when he characterized the acceptance by that Government of the accession of Junagadh as being "in utter violation of the principles oh which partition was agreed and effected". These were the words of the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru: that Pakistan's action in 30. M. Menon a signale que la loi electorale de son pays interdit d'invoquer des arguments religieuxdans une campagne electorale. 11 est evident que la liberte des elections pourrait etre entravee si l'on menagait de damnation OU d'autres censures ecclesiastiques un candidat ou ses partisans. A cette occasion, M. Menon s'est enorg1.leilli du fait qu'il existe dans Son pays une loi interdisant toute ingerence religieuse et assurant la liberte des ~lections. Je pense cependant qu'il a manque de generosite en oubliant de dire que la loi en question a ete promulguee par l'administration britannique en 1920 et non par l'actuel gouvernement indien, qu'elle n'a pas ete faite pour les seuls Indiens et qu'elle existe egalement au Pakistan, ou des dispositions analogues regissent la liberte des elec- tions; nos deux pays tiennent cette loi de l'autorite britannique. C'est pourquoi j'ai ete surpris de voir M. Menon s'attribuer le merite d'une mesure prise par les Britanniques et essayer ensuite de se montrer genereux devant UI1 organe international. 31. Dans le cas d'un plebiscite, il serait tout afait legitime d'attirer l'attention sur des liens, affinites et considerations religieux, culturels, linguistiques, eco- nomiques, geographiques, strategiques et autres, qui peuvent influencer le choix. Tant que l' on ne cherchera pas a provoquer des desordres ou a exercer une pression sur les electeurs, il sera Higitime de faire appel a toutes les considerations qui peuvent influencer le choix. 32. Je rends hommage aM. Krishna Menon pour sa connaissance de l'anglais, mais je crois qu'il aoublie d'etablir une distinction entre les mots "election" et "plebiscite". Alors que dans une election le gou- vernement a le devoir d'assurer la liberte et d' exclure tout argument religieux, les plebiscites sont toujours organises en raison de differences religieuses, eth- niques, geographiques, linguistiques ou autres. C'est pourquoi, dans un plebiscite, il est parfaitement legitime de faire valoir ces considerations aupres des electeurs avant qu'ils ne se prononcent sur l'ac- cession. Il ~n va tout autrement lorsqu'il s'agit d'elections. Je regrette vivement que M. Krishna Menon soit souffrant et ne puisse m'entendre aujourd'hui. J' espere qu'il sera bient6t retabli. Nous de~ons comprendre qu'il s'agit actuellement d'un plebiscite et non d'une simple election, et nous ne devons pas nous laisser induire en erreur par les arguments de M. Menon. En fait, le PremierMinistre de l'lnde lui-meme a souligne ce principe dans un UHegramme qu'il a adresse le 22 septembre 1947 au Gouvernement pakistanais; il y declarait qu'en ac- ceptant l'accession du Junagadh mon gouvernement "violait tous les principes sur la base desquels le partage avait ete decide et effectue". C'est donc le Premier Ministre, M. Nehru, qui a ditqu'enacceptant 33. The word "Junagadh" has reminded me of the fact that in both of my speeches I emphasized the case of Junagadh, which is still on the file of the Security Council and which India has forcibly annexed; and the State of Hyderabad, which was also annexed by in- vasion. Not a single word has Mr. KrishnaMenon said in his speech in defence of the action of his country in invading and annexing these two States. 34. The representative of India persists in referring to the question of the so-called accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. I will simply state that this mattE.r has been disposed of. No party to the dispute can now claim that Kashmir has acceded to it so long as the international agreement subsists, and there is nothing that the party can do to break that agreement unilaterally. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan must be decided by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. 35. There are other matters in the speech of the representative of India which are important. But! will pass over them to save the time of the Security Coun- cil, especially as these points have been made in this forum ad nauseum, and replies to each one o(them are already on the record of the Security Council. 36. There is only one point out of these which I would submit to the Security Council. In trying to impress on the Council the importance of the Commission's reso- lution ef 13 August 19~8, the representative of India said quite a .lot about the comings and goings and the palavers and conferences that preceded the framing of tht:l resolution and its acceptance by the parties. He said that the resolution was a very carefully drafted document. Immediately thereafter, he ran into some difficulties with regard to the meaning of the resolution of 5 January 1949, especially paragraph 4. which dealt with the question of the demilitarization ofthe State in the plebiscite stage. Speaking about the paragraph, the representative of India said: "As members of the Council know, the word 'dis- posal' has been used with regard to the Government of India forces in the sense of disposition, not in the sense of throwing away." [767th meeting, para. 147.] 37. Here, again, we have had quite a lecture on the English language, on the meaning of the word "dis- posal". He says that the word "disposal" means locating the troops in various areas and not the dissolution or demobilization of the forces. That is what he is trying to do. 38. If my memory does not fail me, the members comprising the Commission which drafted the very carefully-worded document of 13 August 1948 also drafted the proposals of 11 December 1948, which were 33. Le mot "Junagadh" me rappelle que, dans mes deux interventions, j'ai insiste sur cette affaire, dont le Conseil est toujours saisi. L'Inde a annexe le Junagadh par la force; elle a egalement envahi et annex~ l'Etat d'HaE!erabad. Mais M. Krishna Menon n'a rien dit pour justifier l'invasion etl'annexionde ces deux Etats par son pays. 34. Le representant de l'Inde s'obstine cl parlerdela pretendue accession de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire cl l'Inde. Je me bornerai a declarer que cette question a ete regl~e. Tant que l'accord international reste en vigueur, aucune partie au differend ne peut pretendl'e que le Cachemire a ete rattacM.cl son territoire, et il est impossible de denoncer l'accord unilateralement. La question de l'accession de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire cl l'Inde ou au Pakistandoitetre reglee par la methode d~mocratique d'un plebiscite libre et impartial. 35. Dans son discours, le representant de l'Inde a souleve dlautres questions importantes; mais je les laisserai de cote, pour ne pas retarder le Conseil, d'autant plus qu'elles ont ete longuement traitees et que les reponses sont deja consignees dans les docu- ments du Conseil. 36. Je ne m'arr8terai que sur une seuledeces ques- tions. En essayant de faire ressortir l'importance de la resolution de la Commission en date du 13 aoUt 1948, le representant de l'Inde a longuementparle des entrevues, pourparlers et conferences qui on:precede 11 ~laboration de ce texte et son approbation par les parties interessees. il a fait observer que la resolu- tion avait Me r~dig~e avec grand soin. Imm~diatement apres, il s'est heurt~ cl certaines difficult~s en ce qui concerne le sens de la r~solutiondu 5 janvier 1949, notamment au paragraphe 4, relatif cl la d~militari­ sation de l'Etat au stade du plebiscite, Voici ce qu'll a dit au sujet de ce paragraphe: "Les membres du Conseil savent que le mot anglais "disposal" a ete employe, pour ce qui est des forces du Gouvernement de l'Inde, au sens de fac;on dont on dispose une chose, et non au sens de fac;on dont on slen debarrasse." [767eme seance, par. 147]. 37. La aussi, nous avons eu droit a un cours sur la langue anglaise et sur le sens du mot "disposal" qui, selon lui, vise le stationnement des troupes dans di- verses zones, et non pas la dissolution ou la demobi- lisation des forces. Voila ce qulil slefforce de faire. 38. Si la m~moire ne me fait pas defaut, les mem- bres de la Commission qui ont redig~ avec grand soin la resolution du 13 aoiit 1948 ont egalement elabore les , propositions du 11 decembre 1948, qui ont ensuite "(!?) As regards the territory referred to inA. 2 of part IT of the resolution of 13 August"-whichmeans the "Azad" Kashmir territory-"final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determinedby the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities." [S/1196, para. 15.] 40. If Mr. Krishna Menon says that the word "dis- posal" here means location of troops and not their demobilization, then the argument that he has been putting before the Security Council that the "Azad" Kashmir forces must be demobilized is contradicted by the interpretation which is put here, because if the word "disposal" means location, then this clause con- templates the continued location of"Azad" troops also, which I am sure is very far from his mind when he talks in that manner. But when arguments are made in haste and people are carried away by their rhetoric, then the consequences of those arguments are perhaps not realized momentarily. 41. The representative of India has said a great deal about the provisions of the resolution of the Commis- sion dated 5 January 1949. But the most misleading statement made by him is to the effect that this reso- lution gives way to part ill of the previous resolution of 13 August 1948, in which India and Pakistan re- affirm "their wish" that the future of the State shall be determined by the will of the people of the State. MUch is made of this by Mr. Krishna Menon, and he seeks to characterize India's undertaking regarding a plebiscite as a mere wish-not a resolve, not a com- mitment, but a wish. Nothing is said by the repre·, sentative of India about the further and unequivocwl undertaking of paragraph 1 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, which reads as follows: 11 39. Le paragraphe 4 est ainsi con<;u: "4. g,) Lorsque les mesures pr~vues dans lespre- mi~re et deuxi~meparties de la resolution adopt~e par la Commission le 13 aout 1948 auront et~ executee's, et lorsque la Commission estimera que la paix et l'ordre public ont ete retablisdans l'Etat, ladite Commission et l'Administrateur dupl~biscite fixeront, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de 1'Inde, les modalites du retrait definitif des forces armees de l'Inde et de l'Etat de Jammu et Cache- mire, apr~s avoir dilment tenu compte des conditions necessaires a la securite de l'Etat et a la liberte du plebiscite; "9) Le retrait definitif des forces armees can- tonnees sur le territoire dontirest question au para- graphe A. 2 de la deuxi~me partie de la r~solution du 13 aout - c'est-a-dire le territoireduCachemire "azad" - sera d~termin~ parlaCommissionetl'ad- ministrateur du pl~biscite agissant de concert avec les autorites locales." [S/1196, par. 15.] 40. Si M. Krishna Menon soutient que le mot anglais "disposal" signifie disposition des troupes, et non demobilisation, cette interpretation contredit son argument selon lequelles forces du Cachemire "azad" doivent etre d~mobilis~es, car si le mot "disposal" signifie disposition, la clause que je viens de citeI' pr~voit aussi le maintien des troupes "azad", ce qu'il n'a certainement pas voulu dire. Mais lorsqu'un orateur avance ses arguments a la hate et qu'll est emporte par le feu de la rethorique, il ne saisit peut- etre pas imm~diatement les consequences de son raisonnement. 41. Le representant de 1'Inde a longuement parl~ de la r~solution de la Commission en date du 5 jan- vier 1949. Mais sa plus grande erreur a ete de dire que cette r~solution est subordonnee a la troisi~me partie de la resolution du 13 aout 1948, ou l'Inde et le PakistanaffiI'mentanouveau "leur d~sir" que le sta- tut futur de l'Etat soit fixe conformement a la volonte de la population. M. Menon insiste sur ce point et cherche a presenter l'engagementdel'Indetouchant le plebiscite comme un simple desir et non pas comme une decision, une obligation. n omet de men- tionner l'engagement pris ulterieurement, sans equi- voque, au paragraphe 1 de la resolution du 5 janvier 1949, qui est ainsi con<;u: 42. I do not contest Mr. KrishnaMenon's rightto talk about the conditions of a plebiscite in the State, but perhaps it is not entirely relevant to the question that is engaging our attention at this stage, which is the problem of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the plebiscite. Whether a certain type of propaganda will or will not be allowed, how and when the refugees will go back to the State, what measures will be taken to ensure to them the right of legitimate political activity, what will happen if local authorities on the two sides of the cease-fire line do not do those things which they are called upon to do under the terms of the resolutions-these are all matters for discussion with the Plebiscite Administrator when he assumes office. He alone has the authority to discuss these matters with those concerned and to take decisions on them. It is not because we have no views on these subjects that I steer clear of them at this stage. It is only because the Pakistan Government does not wish to prejudice these issues beforehand. 43. The representative of Indiahas pleaded forcefully against any "unsettlement". He said: "Any unsettlement can only be based on the appeal to non-secularity; it can only be based on this appeal to religious prejudice." [767th meeting, para. 232.] 44. I have searched a lot whether we have made such an appeal and to whom, and I admit that I have not been able to find it. What is it that Pakistan has been de- manding about Kashmir? It is not thatKashmiris should be disposed of like goods and chattels to suit the whims and fancies of either the Government of India or the Government of Pakistan. We have always maintained that Kashmiris and Kashmiris alone can decide their own future in a free and impartial plebiscite-and when we say Kashmiris we mean all Kashmiris without di,stinction of religion. 45. Tne representative of India has levelled certain charges of breaches of international agreements again.::,-t Pakistan. This is indeed a serious matter, and I would be fa.iling in my duty if I did not refer to them. 46. The first so-called breach on the part of Pakistan 'ii'aS. and I quote from Mr. Krishna Menon's speech, "'withholding information from the United Nations that it was a combatant and that it was a party to the in- ......~ion"' ['i6'th meeting. para. 193]. 47. I submit that this matter has been considered and disposed ,)f by the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 17 January 1948 which called L.rpon the GoYemments of India and Pakistan to 1:a.1{:e all measures ,;,ithin their power calculated to impl"'O'7e the situation, and to refrain from doing or c:a:using to be done or permitting any acts which might agg:rav-ate the situation. Both Governments accepted t."lis resolution of the Security Council. In utter viola- 42. Je ne conteste pas que M. Krishna Menon ait le droit de parler des conditions d'un plebiscite dans l'Etat, mais cette question est peut-etre etrang~re a. celle qui nous occupe en ce moment, a. savoir la demilitarisation de l'Etat avant le pgbiscite. Autori- sera-t-on ou non une certaine forme de propagande, comment et quand les refugies retourneront-ils dans l'Etat, queUes mesures prendra-t-on pour leur as- surer le droit de menerune activitt3 politique legitime, que se passera-t-il si les autorites locales, des deux cote de la ligne de suspension d'armes, n'observent pas les resolutions, voila les questions que devra exa- minerI'Administrateur du plebiscite 10rsqu'il firendra ses fonctions. Il est seul habilite a discuter ces ques- tions avec les interesses et a prendre les mesures necessaires. Si je laisse ces questions de cote pour le moment, ce n'est pas parce que nous n'avons pas d'opinion, mais uniquementparce que le Gouvernement pakistanais ne veut rien prejuger. 43. Le representant de l'lnde s'est eleve avec force contre toute tentative de "troubler l'ordre". Il a de- clare: "On ne pourra troubler l'ordre etabli qu'en se departissant de la neutralite en matiere de religion, qu'en faisant appel aux passions religieuses." [767~me seance, par. 232.] 44. Je me suls longtemps demande si nous avons j?.mais lance un tel appel, mais en vain. Que demande le Pakistan au sujet du Cachemire? Il ne demande pas que les Cachemiriens soient traites comme des mar- chandises et du betail, au gre du Gouvernement in- dien ou du Gouvernement pakistanais. Nous avons tou- jours soutenu que les Cachemiriens et eux seuls peu- vent decider de leur propre avenir au moyen d'un plebiscite libre et impartial - et quand nous disons Cachemiriens nous entendons tous les habitants de 1'Etat, sans distinction de religion. 45. Le representant de 1'Inde a accuse le Pakistan d'avoir vioIe des accords internationaux. C'est la en verite une accusation grave, et je faiUirais a mon devoir si je la passais sous silence. 46. La premi~re pretendue violation commise par le Pakistan, c'est - et je cite M. Menon - "que ce pays a cache a l'Qrganisation des Nations Unies son role de combattant et sa qualite de partie a l'invasion" [767eme seance, par, 193]. 47. Je soutiens que cette questionadejaeteexaminee et reglee par le Conseil de securite. Le 17 janvier 1948, le Conseil de s~curite a adopte une resolution qui faisait appel au Gouvernement indien et au Gou- vernement pakistanais pour que chacun d'eux prenne toutes les mesures en sonpouvoir a l'effet d'amlHiorer la situation, et s'abstienne d'accomplir, de provoquer ou de permettre aucun acte susceptible d'aggraver la situation. Les deux gouvernements ont accepte c-ette 48. Again, the representative of India has cited Sir Owen Dixon in support of his contention that Pakistan was an aggressor in Kashmir. I shall, with the per- mission of the Security Council, read out what Sir Owen Dixon said on the subject in his report: "Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on 1 January 1948 of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already referred that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting, made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration; secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the SUb-continent, I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law. "1 therefore proposed that the first step in demil- itarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named daYJ then other operations on each side of the cease- fire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them to settle. "The Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed strongly his dissent from the third of the three posi- tions 1 took up, L'1at is to say the third of the positions stated above. But he expressed his readiness to accept, in compliance with my request. the proposi- tion that as a first step in demilitarization the with- drawal of the regular forces of the Pakistan Army should begin on a specified day and that a significant number of days should elapse before the commence- 48. Le representant de l'lnde a une fois de plus cite sir Owen Dixon pour etayer ses allegations selon les- queUes le Pakistan serait I'agresseur au Cachemire. Je voudrais, si le Conseilm'yautorise,donnerlecture de ce que sir Owen Dixon a declare a ce sujet dans son rapport: "Au cours de la p~riode commengant a. la date oll le diff~rend du Cachemire fut pour la premi~re fois soumis au Conseil de s~curit~, le ler janvier 1948, non seulement l'lnde fit valoir ;l plusieurs reprises l'argument que j'ai d~j;l rappel~ - a. savoir que le Pakistan ~tait l'agresseur - mais eUe demanda en outre qu'il flit reconnu comme tel. Au d~but de nos conversations, le Premier Ministre de l'Inde pr~­ senta la meme demande, sur laquelle il revint fr~­ quemment au cours de laConf~rence.Mapositionfut la suivante: en premier lieu, le Conseil de s~curit~ n'avait pas fait de d~claration dans ce sens; deuxi~­ mement, je n'avais pas regu d'instructions pour ~tudier cette question du point de vue juridique, et je n'avais pas proc~d~ ;l une teUe ~tude; toutefois, j'indiquai que, sans chercher a. discerner les causes ou les raisons des ~v~nementsintervenus, lesquelles formaient sans doute une partie de l'histoire de la p~ninsule, j'~tais pret a. estimer que le passage de la fronti~re de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire par des ~Mments hostiles, le 20 octobre 1947, si je pouvais me fier a. ma m~moire, ~tait contraire au droit international, et que l'invasion du territoire de l'Etat par les unit~s de l'arm~e r~guli~re du Pakistan, effectu~e ;l ma connaissance en mai 1948, ~tait, elle aussi, contraire au droit international. "Je proposai donc, comme premi~remesure de d~­ militarisation, de retirer les forces r~guli~res du Pakistan, cette Qp~ration devant commencer a. un jour fix~. Apr~s une p~riode appropri~e, s'~tendant sur un nombre de jours d~termin~, a. compter de cette date, d'autres mesures devraient etre appli- qu~es de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes, et, dans la mesure du possible, simulta- nement. Il appartenait aux deux parties de fixer la dur~e de lap~riodequ'elles estimeraient appropri~e. "Le Premier Ministre du Pakistan s'opposa vive- ment ;l la troisi~me des trois considerations que j'avais formul~es, c'est-a.-dire a. la t:roisi~me des trois considerations ~noncees ci-dessus. Toutefois, sur ma demande, il se d~clara pret a. accepter la proposition tendant a. faire du retrait des forces re- guli~res du Pakistan la premi~re mesure de demi- litarisation, ce retrait devant commencer ;l un jour fixe et une certaine periode de temps devant s'ecou- 50. In the same way, there has beenadiscussion here about aggression and sovereignty, and so on, for seven- teen hours. I do not know what the feeling of the Secu- rity Council is. Personally I think you would be pre- pared to say that we are so sick of hearing this that I would say: "All right, let us take for granted that all these things have happened. What about the agreement for a plebiscite? Why not get on with the plebiscite?" Then the Indians will come tomorrow and say that the Security Council decided that there was complete accession, and there was aggression, and there was sovereignty. and therefore there can be no plebiscite. This sort of argument has gone on for so long, for the last eight years, that I am sure we are tired of it, if the Security Council is not. 51. I have quoted what Sir Owen Dixon said in his report. What does this really mean? According to my understanding of the English language, which I must admit is imperfect, it only means one thing. That is this: for the purpose of getting the agreement of the Government of India to a plan of demilitarization, Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to assume, only for the sake of argument. that when the tribesmen entered Kash'mir that was a breach of international law and that the entry of Pakistan troops was also a breach of international law. It mea..'1t nothing more than this. Infact. Sir Owen Dixon himself made it more than clear that the Security Council had not made any declaration on the question of aggression. nor had he been asked by the Security CmlncU to go into that question, nor had he himself made all} stud;; or investigation of that matter, and therefr;re he was not in a position to pronounce upon it. 52. It is quite clear that Sir Owen Dixon was prepared tiJ ffi2,ke a mere assumption inordertoput on one side th~ r.fl€stirJ', of aggression, so that progress could be r:.l2:de ti;TJaraS the agreed plebiscite. The represen- pl~biscite. Chaque fois qu'il pronon~aitle mot "pl~­ biscite", l'Inde, au lieu de s'attaquer s~rieusementau probl~me et de parler d'un pl~biscite, r~pondait tou- jours: "Le Pakistan est l'agresseur; je vous prie de d~clarer que le Pakistan est l'agresseur") ce qUi ~tait tout ~ fait en dehors de la question. Les Indiens ont sans doute r~p~t~ si souvent cette accusation d'agres- sion que sir Owen Dixon a du s'en lasser et d~clarer: "Finissons-en, pour l'amour de Dieu. Admettons qu'il y a eu agression, mais occupons-nous maintenant du pMbiscite." Ayant cit~ ces propos hors de leur con- texte, le repr6sentant du Gouvernement indien vient d~clarer au Conseil de s6curit6: "Un tel a d6clar~ dans son rapport qu'il y a eu agression." Je ne peux pas comprendre la logique de l'argumentselonlequel, quand des gens essaient de se debarrasser d'uneper- sonne qui parle sans arret en lui disant: "Bon, admet- tons pour les besoins de la discussion que ce que vous dites est vrai, et venons-en :ll'essentiel", cette per- sonne vient dire ensuite: "Vous avez maintenant admis qu'il y a eu agression". 50. De meme, on a par16 ici d'agression, de souve- rainet~ et d'autres questions pendant 17 heures. Je ne sais pas ce que le Conseil de s6curit~ en pense, mais pour ma part, je pense que vous seriez prets ~ dire que nous sommes si las d'entendre tout cela que vous pourriez dire: "Bon, admettons que tout cela ait eu lieu. Venons-en maintenant :ll'accord relatif au pM- biscHe. Pourquoi ne nous occupons-nous pas du pl~­ tiscite?" Mais, si nous faisons cela, les Indiens re- viendront nous dire demain que le Conseil de securite a d~cid~ que le rattachement6taitdMinitif, qu'ily a eu agression, qu'il y a souverainet~, et par cons~quent qu'il ne peut y avoir de pl~biscite. Cette sorte de dis- cussion dure depuis si longtemps - depuis huit ans - que nous en sommes pour notre part tr~s las, si le Conseil de s6curiM ne l'est pas. 51. J'ai cit6 ce que sir Owen Dixon d~clarait dans son rapport. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie en r~alit~? Si je m'en tiens ~ ma connaissance de la langue an- glaise - qui, je dois l'admettre, est imparfaite - cela ne peut vouloir dire qu'une chose; cela veut dire que pour obtenir du Gouvernement indien qu'il donne son accord ~ un plan de d~militarisation,sir Owen Dixon ~tait pret ~ admettre, pour les besoins de la discus- sion, que les honimes des tribus comme les forces pakistanaises avaient commis une violation du droit international en p~n~trant dans le Cachemire. Cela ne voulait rien dire de plus. De fait, sir Owen Dixon a express~ment soulign~ que le Conseil de s~curit~ ne s'~tait pas prononc~ sur la question de l'agression et ne lui avait pas demand~ de s'occuper de ce~te question, sur laquelle il n'avait lui-meme proc~d~ :1 aucune ~tude ou ~ aucune enquete, et sur laquelle il n'~tait done pas en mesure de se prononcer. 52. n est tout ~ fait ~vident que sir Owen Dixon ~tait pret ~ faire une simple supposition pour ~carter la question de l'agression, de fa~on que l'organisation du pl~bisdte convenu puisse progresser. Le repr~sen- 53. The next so-called violation is with regard to the non-withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the State. I repeat that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the State is to be synchronized with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces on the other side of the cease-fire line. The Government of Pakistan is only too anxious to withdraw all its forces from the State. May I ask if the Government of India is equally willing to honour its international agreement with regard to the withdrawal of its Army and forces? 54. Then comes an astounding statement which is utterly incomprehensible to me: "Not only has the Pakistan Army not withdrawn, but the changed conditions in view of the imbalance of forces created by rearmament is such that with- drawal has become practically impossible." [767th meeting, para. 194.] 55. I really to not understand what this means. Even if the Pakistan Army should have become stronger, when it withdraws it will leave the State with all its equipment. I wonder whether he was referring to the Pakistan Army in" "Azad" Kashmir or to the Pakistan Army in our own territory. If he meant the Pakistan Army in "Azad" Kashmir has become stronger, which is not the case, then why should be wor'ry, because we say that when we withdraw, this whole army will go back? Why weep· about it? Besides, what has the strength of the Pakistan Army within the borders of Pakistan to do with the question of the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir under the terms of an inter- national agreement between India and Pakistan on de- ciding the question of accession by means ofa plebis- cite? However, if Mr. Krishna Menon is referring to the fact that our Army has become stronger, let us say in West Pakistan, that has nothing to do with the demil- itarization in the Kashmir State. Perhaps only Mr. Krishna Menon himself knows to what he was really referring. 56. Pakistan has accepted military aid in order to strengthen its defences. It has been repeatedly asserted that this military aid, andfor that matter any equipment that we may have, will not be used for aggressive ~Ul·~oses. The Government of India is also strengtben- mg Its armed forces. The only difference is that where- as Pakistan is receiving military aid, India is taking economic aid and diverting its funds and resources to the procurement of military supplies. This is a very diff~rente. 53. J'en arrive maintenant a. la deuxi~me pr~tendue violation que le Pakistan aurait commise en ne retirant pas son arm~e de l'Etat de JamplU et Cachemire. Je r~p~te que ce retrait dolt atre synchronis~avec le re- trait du gros des forces indiennes de l'autre cot~ de la ligne du cessez-le-feu. Le Gouvernement pakistanais n'a qu'un d~sir, c'est de retirer toutes ses forces de l'Etat. Puis-je demander au Gouvernement indien s'il est ~galement pret a. tenir ses engagements interna- tionaux en ce qui concerne le retrait de son arm6e et de ses forces? 54. Nous trouvons ensuite une d~claration surpre- nante, et absolument incompr~hensiblea. mes yeux: "Non seulement 1'arm~e pakistanaise ne s'est pas retir~e, mais la nouvelle situation cr~~e par le d~s~quilibre des forces auquel a abouti le r~arme­ ment est teUe que tout retrait est devenu pratique- ment impossible." [767~me s~ance, par, 194.] 55. Je n'arrive vraiment pas :l comprendre ce que cela signifie. A supposer mame que 1'arm~e pakista- naise ait ~t6 renforc6e, lorsqu'elle se retirera, eUe 6vacuera l'Etat avec tout son ~quipement. Je me de- mande si le repr~sentant de l'Inde faisait allusion :l l'arm~e pakistanaise stationn6e dans le Cachemire "azad" ou a. l'arm6e pakistanaise stationn~e sur notre terrltoire. S'il voulait dire que l'arm6e pakistanaise du Cachemire "azad" a 6t6 renforc6e - ce qui est inexact - queUe raison aurait-il de s'inqui6ter, puis- que nous affirmons que tout/es ces forces se retireront lorsque nous ~vacuerons 1'Etat? Pourquoi le repr6- sentant de 1'lnde se lamente-t-il a. ce sujet? En outre, quel rapport y a-t-il entre les effectifs de 1'arm6e pakistanaise :ll'int~rieurde nos fronti~resetla ques- tion de la d6militarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cac.hemire conform6ment aux dispositions d'un accord international entre l'lnde et le Pakistan pr6voyantque la question du rattachement sera tranch6e par unp16- biscite? En tout cas, si M. Krishna Menon veut dire que notre arm6e a 6t6 renforc6e, par exemple dans le Pakistan occidental, cela n,a rien :l voir avec la d6mi- 1i.tarisation du Cachemire. Peut-atre M. Menon est-il le seul :l savoir ce :l quoiilfaisait en r6alit6 allusion. 56. Le Pakistan a acceptt1 une aide militaire afin de renforcer sa dMense. Nous avons affirm6 :l maintes reprises que cette aide militaire, ainsi, du reste, que tout le rnat6riel militaire dont nous pouvons disposer, ne seront pas utilis6s :l des fins agressives. Le Gou- vernement indien, lui aussi, renforce son arm6e. La seule dlff6rence est la suivante: tandis que le Pakistan rer;oit une aide militaire, l'Inde accepte une aide t1co- nomique et d6tourne les fonds et les ressources ainsi 57. India itself has recently placed an order for the purchase of sixty-five Canberras in the United King- dom. The Canberra, as members of the Councilknow, is a long-range bomber which is used only for offensive purp03es. Why is India purchasing these bombers and who" are they going to be used against? It is only Pak- istan and nobody else. India has also placed an order in the Pnited Kingdom for 300 of the best and the largest tanks. Against which country are these 300 tanks going to be used? It is not against China and Soviet Russia, I know that. They will not look towards those countries. Water does not flow up the hill; it always flows down the hill. He dare not look towards Peking or Moscow because they are too bigfor him. He looks only towards the smaller countries, like the poor Hyderabad State, Junagadh and Kashmir. If we had been equally weak, he probably would have started a war against us by now. All the armaments that India is receiving and pre- paring are against Pakistan. 58. Mr. Krishna Menon complained that the British Government was not very kind to his country. But where has India placed these orders? Who has supplied it with all the equipment? It is the United Kingdom. It takes these things from the United Kingdom and then abuses it. From whom is India buying aircraft car- riers? It is buying them from the United Kingdom, and then it comes here and abuses the UnitedKingdom for nothing. 59. I want to point out that at the time of partition, all the gun factories, the tank factories, the armoured car factories, the airplane repair shop factories, were all inside the territory which is today India. Most of the large underground installations of army stocks and munition dumps were in the territory which is now India. Members will recall that the British left the country within two months. They were the quickest quitters that anybody has ever seen in the whole history of mankind. They left all those armaments in the hands of the Indians. Having withdrawn, they said: "Now, gentlemen, you divide it amongst yourselves." Do you think that India was going to give us a single thing out of those armaments, part of which was our share? It has swallowed all those armaments and they are still in India. It is proceeding to purchase more from Canada, from the United Kingdom and from all over the world. The Americans give the money, bags full of dollars, and say: "Oh, you poor boys, you take this money to help yourselves." By obtaining that money, India makes a reduction in its budget, and with the money saved, purchases things from the United King- dom and Canada. 60. The position today with regard to armed fo rces is the follOwing: Air Force-ours is one-third the size of India's; Navy-ours is one-third the size of India's; Army-ours is one third the size ofIndia's. The money 57. L'Inde elle-meme a r~cemment commandl! au Royaume-Uni 65 Canberra. Comme les membres du Conseil le savent, le Canberra est un bombardier ~ grand rayon d'action qui n'est utilis~ qu'a. des fins offensives. Pourquoi l'Inde ach~te-t-elleces bombar- diers et contre qui seront-Hs utilis~s? Uniquement contre le Pakistan. L'Inde a l!galement command6 au Royaume-Uni 300 chars, choisis parmi les meilleurs et les plus grands. Contre que1 pays ces 300 chars seront-ils employl!s? Pas contre la Chine etlaRussie sovi~tique, que je sache. L'Inde ne regardera pas du cot6 de ces pays; leseauxnecoulentpas vers l'amont, e11es coulent toujours vers l'aval. L'Inde n'ose pas tourner ses regards vers Pl!kin ou vers Moscou: ca sont la. de trop gros morceaUx. Elle regarde seulement du cotl! des petits pays, du cot~ de ces malheureux Etats que sont I'Hai'derabad, le Junagadh ou le Cache- mire. Si nous avions ~t~ ~galementfaibles, I'Inde auralt probablement d~ja. dl!clenchl! une guerre contre nous. Tous les armements que l'Inde re~oit ettous ses pr!!- paratifs militaires sont dirig~s contre le Pakistan. 58. M. Krishna Menon s'est plaint que le Gouverne- ment britannique n'ait pas usl! de tr~s bons procl!d!!s envers son pays. Mais o-Q.l'Inde a-t-elle plac~ces com- mandes? Qui lui a fourni tout ce .mat~riel?Le Royaume- Uni. L'Inde accepte ce que lui donne le Royaume-Uni et, ensuite, elle cherche a. le discr~diter.A qui l'Inde achete-t-elle des porte-avions? Au Royaume-Uni, et une fois qU'elle les a obtenus, elle s'efforce ici, sans motif aucun, de discrl!diter le Royaume-Uni. 59. Je dl!sire souligner que, au moment du partage, toutes les fabriques d'armes, de chars etde v6hicules blindl!s, et tous les ateliers de r~parationd'avions,se trouvaient dans le territoire qui constitue aujourd'hui l'Inde. La plupartdes vastes installations souterraines destin~es aux stocks militaires et laplupart des d~p6ts de munitions se trouvaient sur leterritoire quiconsti- tue maintenant l'Inde. Comme les membresduConseil s'en souviennent, les Britanniques ont l!vacu~ le pays en deux mois. C'est l' ~vacuation la plus pr6cipi~eque l'on ait jamais vue dans toute l'histoiredel'humanit!!. Les Britanniques ont laiss~ tous ces armements entre les mains des Indiens. Leur retrait op6r~, Hs ont dit: "Maintenant, MeSSieurs, partagez-vous ces arme- ments." Croyez-vous que l'Inde allait donner au Pa- kistan la moindre parcelle de ces armements, dont une part nous revenait? Elle s'est appropril! tout ce mate- riel, qui est toujours entre ses mains. Elle s'apprete a. en acheter encore au Canada, auRoyaume-Uni, dans tous les pays du monde. Les Am~ricainsfournissent l'argent, de pleins sacs de dollars, etdisent: "Pauvres petits, prenez cet argent pour vous aider a. vous tirer d'affaire:" Munie de cet argent, l'Inde op~redes r~duc­ tions dans son budget et, avec les sommes ~conomi­ s~es, ach~te au Royaume-Uni et au Canada. 60. Voie! queUe est aujourd'hui la situation de nos forces arm6es: nos forces a6riennes, nos forces na- vales, nos forces terrestres repr~sententle t1-:s de celles de l'Inde. L'Inde dl!pensepour sesforcesdl!fen- 61. At the time of the partition, the British had their forces in Tibet; they had theirbattalions, theirpolitical officers, their public works officers to look after the roads, and their post and telegraph officers-that all belonged to the British. That country was looked after by the British. It was almost a part of British India, like any of the other States. But when the Chinese Government paid a little attention to Tibet, my friends there said: "Oh, yes; these people look like you; this is your country, by all means come and take it." Behind that request was the might of China, and not the Prime Minister of a small country like 'Pakistan. 62. The Security Council must realize these matters. It is responsible for the security and peace of the world. It is the highest authority today in the Inter- national organization and these things mustbe brought to its notice. 63. I am told that in order to attack a country one must have at leastthree times the strength of the other country. If today we have one armoured division and we want to attack India, which has three armoured divisions, in order to win we would need nine armoured divisions. How can we increase our strength from one armoured division to nine armoured divisions over- night in order to fight against India? 64. When India comes before the Security Council and pretends that there is a danger of and it fears an attack from Pakistan, I am reminded of a little story of the wolf and the lamb that were drinking water from the same stream. The lamb was downstream from the wolf, and the wolf turned round and said: "Why are you polluting my water?" The lamb replied: "Sir, I am drinking down here below you and you are above me; I cannot be polluting your water." The wolf then said: "You dare to contradictme and call me a liar", where- upon he grabbed the lamb and ran off with him. That is the type of argument which India is nowputting forward with regard to the defensive strength of Pakistan, a small country which has practically nothing at all in comparison .with what India has, when it claims that we are going to attack it. I think that the world has better sense than to agree to such a flimsy argument. 65. I assert that the Indian armed might is not there for show. Even as I am speaking before this august body, the Indian war machine is being mobilized and concentrated along the frontiers of Pakistan. We had a ~tait britannique. Les Britanniques s'occupaient du Tibet, qui faisait alors presque partie de l'Inde britan- nique, comme n'importe lequel des autres Etats. Mais lorsque le Gou,vernement chinois ~anifesta quelque interet pour le Tibet, nos amis indiens s'empress~r.ent de dire: "Mais certainement, ces gens vous res-' semblent; ce pays est votre, vous n'avez qu'a. vous en saisir." Qui esUl'origine de cette invitation? La puis- sance de la Chine, et non le Premier Ministre d'un petit pays comme le Pakistan. 62. Ce sont la. des choses que le Conseil de s~curit~ doit comprendre. Le Conseil est responsable de la s~­ curit~ et de la palx du monde. Le Conseil est au- jourd'hui l'autorite la plus haute de cette organisation internationale, et son attention dolt etre appelee sur tous ces faits. 63. Pour pouvoir attaquer un pays, il faut disposer, me dit-on, de forces au moins trois fois plus puis- santes que celles de l'adversaire. Si nous disposons aujourd'hui d'une division blindee et que nous voulions attaquer l'Inde, qui poss~de trois divisions blindeeG, neuf divisions nous seraient necessaires pour que nous ayons des chances de vaincre. Commentpouv0ns-nous du jour au lendemain porter nos forces de une it neuf divisions blindees afin de combattre l'Inde? 64. Lorsque l'Inde se pr~sente devant le Conseil de s~curi~ et pr~tend qu'il existe un danger d'agression de la part du Pakistan et qU'ellecraintd'etre attaqu~e par cet Etat, cela me rappelle la petite histoire du loup et de l'agneau qui buvaient l'eau du meme rUis- seau. Vagneau se trouvait en aval par rapport au loup, et le loup, se tournant vers lui, lui dit: "Pourquoi troubles-tu mon breuvage?" L'agneau r~pondit: "Sire, je me d~salt~re en cet endroit qui se trouve en aval par rapport a. vous; je ne puis donc pas troubler votre breuvage." Et le loup de dire: "Tuoses me contredire et pret~ndre que je mens. ri La.-dessus, H se saisit de l'agneau et l'emporta. Tel est legenred'argumentque l'Inde fait valoir actuellement au sujet des forces d~­ fensives du Pakistan - petit pays pratiqu!l!ment d~­ pourvu de tout par rapport a. ce que l'Inde poss~de - 10rsqu'elIe pr~tend que nous alIons l'attaquer. Je pense que le monde a trop de ban sens pour accepter un ar- gument aussi d~nu~ de fondement. 65. J'affirme que les forces arm~esindiennes ne sont pas seulement destin~es a. la parade. En ce moment meme 011 je parle devant le Conseil, on mobilise la machine de guerre indienne; on la concentre le long, 66. Significant troop movements have taken place on the Indian side of West Pakistan since the recent dis- cussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council began. The information that I am going to give the Council is based on a telegram which I received from my Government, and the telegram is based on army intelligence reports and other reports which our Gov- ernment possesses about the troop movements ofIndia on our borders. We released this information by way of a press release here, and it was based on this official telegram and not on newspaper information which was conveyed to us. This is official Government information, 67. The principal moves were as follows: "(1) 166th Brigade (5th Division) has been moved from Dalhousie (Punjab, India) to Pathankot on the Indo-Pakistan border; "(2) 77th Infantry Brigade (5th Division) from Dharamsala to Amritsar"-which is within thirteen miles of our border-"relieving 123rd Brigade (27th Division) which is now being deployed in the Khem- karan-Rajoke area between Ferozpur and Wagah"- That is also on our border. "The net result of these movements is that India now has two complete divisions, plus one independent brigade, on the East Punjab-West Pakistan border, and, in addition, one division, the 4th Division, at Ambala, and two independent armoured brigades at Patia.la. !!Thus the over-all position is that India now has tllree divisiOIlB, plus three detached brigades, onthe Jammu and Kashmir border." 1J.8. Now these are the figures in Kashmir State: "Three divisions, plus three detachedbrigades, on fu-; Jammu and Kashmirborder; three divisions, plus arm~e." La mobilisation de l'arm~e s'est effectuae hors du Cachemire, sur les fronti~res du Pakistan occidental. Je communiquerai au Conseil les rensei- gnements officiels dont nous disposons a. ce sujet. Si je dis que l'Inde a un couteau dans la main droite, M. Menon r~pond: "Mais non, regardez: ma main droite est vide, elle ne tient aucun couteau" - mais il a une grande ~p~e suspendue au cota gauche. 11 ajoute alors: "Mais vous n'avez jamais parl~ du cot6 ga~che." Il essaie de donner le change au Conseil de sacurit6 en disant que l'Inde n'a rien fait auCachemire. Il se peut que l'Inde n'ait rien fait au Cachemire - ce n'est pas ce que nous pr~tendons. Nous affirmons que l'Inde a mobilisE! des troupes sur les fronti~res du Pakistan occidental. 66. Des mouvements de troupes importants ont eu lieu du c6M indien de la fronti~re du Pakistan occi- dental depuis la r~cente discussion dont la question du Cachemire a commenc~ a. faire l'objet au Conseil de sacurit6. Les renseignements que je vais donner au Conseil se fondent sur un t6Mgramme que j'ai regu de mon gouvernement; ce t6Mgramme se fonde lui-meme sur des rapports de notre service de renseignements militaires et sur d'autres rapports dont notre gouver- nement dispose au sujet des mouvements de troupes indiennes le long de nos fronti~res. Nous avons !ci meme, sous forme d'un communiqu6 de presse, di- vulgu6 ces renseignements, qui se fondaient sur ce t6Mgramme officiel et non sur des nouvelles parues dans les journaux. 11 s'agit de renseignements offi- ciels de source gouvernementale. 67. Les principaux mouvements de troupes ataient les suivants: "1) La 166~me brigade (5ll!me division) a l!Mtrans- f6r6e de Dalhousie (dans la partie indienne du Pendjab) a. Pathankot, a. la fronti~re indo-pakista- naise; "2) La 77~me brigade d'infanterie (5~me division) a l!tl! transf6rl!e de Dharamsala a. Amritsar - cette ville est situae a. 13 milles de la fronti~re pakista- naise - oil elle a releva la 123~me brigade (27eme division), qui se daploie actuellement dans laragion de Khemkaran-Rajoke, entre Ferozpur et Wagah- c'est-a.-dire agalement le long de la fronti~re du Pakistan. "11 rl!sulte de ces mouvements de troupes que l'Inde a maintenant deux divisions compl~tes et une brigade autonome a. la fronti~requi sapare le Pendjab oriental du Pakistan occidental; elle a, en outre une division, la 4~me, a. Ambala et deux brigades auto- nomes blind6es a. Patiala. "En consaquence, 1'Inde dispose maintenantau total de trois divisions et de trois brigades autonomes a. la fronti~re de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire." 68. Voici maintenant les chiffres concernant les forces indiennes stationnaes dans l'Etat: fronti~re de l'Etat; trois divisions, une brigade au-L "Trois divisions et trois brigades autonomes a. la "Whatever may be the reasonS for these move- ments, the action of India will have dangerous con- sequences. So many troop movem:ents along the border, digging trenches, taking up strategic posi': tions, may provoke border incidents which may become serious. I have issued instructions to our Army and our people not to be provoked under any circumstances. Clashes on the border will suitIndia, and may even be engineered by it h an attempt to prevent the United Nations from considering the matter coolly and calmly. We have, therefore, to be all the more careful that we do not get excited and that we do not fall into a trap laid for us." 70. I should, at this stage, like to point out very earnestly to the Security Council that the question is very serious. You do not,know, gentlemen, the danger that you are facing, and it is really the duty of the Security Council to take. some definite steps to resolve this dangerous situation. Otherwise, the whole of this area will get into a position which we will all regret hereafter. So, something has to be done, andhas to be done quickly, and you, gentlemen, have got to stop this progressive deteriorationbetween these two countries. I should not say any more. I think you know what the position is, and if you do not take any action, well, it is your responsibility. 71. Mr. Menon again said, "Now there are forty-five battalions of the 'Azad' Kashmir forces..., officered, trained and equipped by the Pakistan Army" [769th meeting; para. 58]. The conclusion which it is sought to draw from this is that demilitarization of the "Azad" Kashmir area is not possible. I am sorry, but I have not been able to understand that argument. I would, first and foremost, like to state categorically that the "Azad" Kashmir forces do not number forty-five battalions. I have said before, and I repeat, that not one soldier has been added to the strength of the "Azad" Kashmir forces since the time the cease-fire became effective. 72. So, when this area is demilitarized, what will 72. Qu'arrivera-t-lllorsque cette r~gion serad~mi- happen? The Pakistan Army will withdraw from the litaris~e? L'arm~e pakistanaise se retirera de l'Etat State, taking out all its equipment and personnel. The avec tout son mat~riel et toutes ses troupes. Ainsi, la link between the Pakistan Army and the "Azad" Kash- liaison entre l'arm~e pakistanaise et les forces du mir forces will thus be broken. What will be left in Cachemire "azad" se trouvera rompue. Il ne restera "Azad" KaShmir will be the people of the area itself. plus dans le Cachemire "azad" que lapopulation civile. There will be no officer of the PakistanArmy in com- Il n'y aura plus un seul officier pakistanais a. la tete mand of any"Azad" Kashmir forces when the Pakistan des fQrces du Cachemire "azad" lorsque l'arm~e pa- Army withdraws from Kashmir. The reason that there kistanaise aura quitt~I'Etat. Si un certain nombre d'of- are Some Pakistan officers in top positions in the ficiers pakistanais occupent des postes de commande- L'ad" Kashmir forces is thai, in agreemeoi with the 19 ment d""s les forces du eachemire "azad", e'est paree , : 69. En raison de ces ~v~nements,le Premier Ministre du Pakistan aprononc~le 16 f~vrierundiscours radio- diffus~, dont je vais citer un passage: "QueUes que soient les raisons de ces mouvements de troupes, l'action entreprise par l'Inde aura de dangereuses cons~quences.De si nombreux mouve- ments de troupes le long delafronti~re,le creusage de tranch~es, l'occupation de positions strat~giques, tout cela peut provoquer des incidents de fronti~re qui risquent de devenir s~rieux. J' ai donn~ des instructions i l' arm~e et au peuple pakistanais afin qu'en cas de provocation lls ne r~pondentsous aucun pr~texte. Des incidents de fronti~re serviraient les desseins de l'Inde, etil sepeutmeme que les Indiens en provoquent eux-memes dans l'intention d'em- pecher l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'examiner la question avec calme et impartialit~. Nous devons donc faire extremement attention :l ne pas perdre notre sang-froid et a. ne pas tomber dans le pi~ge que l'on nous tend." 70. Je d~sire, a. ce stade du d~bat, dire de fac;on pres- sante aux membres «;iu Conseil que la question est tr~s grave. Vous ne voyez pas, Messieurs, le danger qUi vous menace; le Conseil a sans aucun doute le devoir de prendre des mesures ~nergiques pour mettre fin a. ce dangereux ~tat de choses, faute de quoi, la situa- tion dans l'ensemble de cette r~gion ~voluera d'une mani~re que nous d~plorerons tous par la suite. Il faut done agir et agir rapidement; c'est a. vous, Messieurs, qu'll incombe de mettreun terme a.l'aggravation - qui va en s'accentuant - de la situation entre les deux pays. Je n'en dirai pas plus, car je pense que le Con- seil connaft la situation - et j'estime qu' ~llui incombe de prendre ses responsabilit~s. 71. M. Menon a dit ~galement: "On compte maintenant 45 bataillons de soldats du Cachemire "azad" (...), command~s, form~s et ~quip~s par l'arm~e du Pa- kistan" [769~me s~ance, par. 58]. On voudrait en d~­ duire que la d~militarisationdu Cachemire "azad" est impossible. Je dois avouer que je ne comprends pas cet argument. Je tiens avant tout a. affirmer cat~gori­ quement que les forces du Cachemire "azad" ne comptent pas 45 bat~Uons. J'ai d~ja. di~ et je r~p~te que. les effectifs des forces du Cachemire "azad" ne se sont pas rccrues d'un seul soldat depuis Fentr~e en vigueur de la suspension d'armes. 74. The representative of India has more than once quoted from the third interim report of the Commission words to the effect that, while the situation in the State has changed, the resolutions rem ain unchanged. That report was submitted by the United Nations Commis- sion for India and Pakistan on 9 Dtecember 1949. All that the Commission said, I submit, was-and I quote from paragraph 283: "The period of investigation has been completed. Within the framework of its terms of reference, following in its endeavours the provisions contained in its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the Commission feels that the possibilities of mediation open to it have been exhausted. Over a pro- longed period, in a changing and dynamic situation and restricted by long-standing related clarifications which p~oved to be a real impediment to reaching agreement, the framework of the resolution of 13 August has become inadequate in the light of the factual conditions in the State. The Commission has been unable, therefore, to mediate much beyond what is today a rather outmoded pattern. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been demilitarized, as was envisaged in part IT of the resolution of 13 Au~st, and until this is achieved the conditions necessary to the holding of a plebiscite cannot begin to be established. As has been seenfrom those parts of the report entitled 'The"Azad" Kashmir forces' and 'Withdrawal of forces' the Commission believes that the problem of demilitarization must be treated as a whole, and that the distinctions relative to demilitarization which exist in the division of the problem into truce and plebiscite periods as visual- ized in the original plan of demilitarization has proven one of the most difficult obstacles in achieving agreement on the problem. It is evident that the pre- sence of large numbers of troops in the State is not conducive to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. The demilitarization of the State is essential to per- mit the holding of afree and unfettered plebiscite."y d'apr~s ces rapports, si les al16gations faites it ce sujet par le repr6sentant de l'Inde sont exactes. J'af- firme, pour ma part, que ces all~gations sontd6nu6es de tout fondement. 74. Le repr~sentant de l'Inde a plus d'une fois cit6 des passages du troisi~me rapport provisoire de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pa- kistan pour prouver que, si la situation de l'Etat a chang6, les r6solutions demeurE'nt les m€lmes. La Commission a pr~sent6 ca rapport le 9 d~cembre 1949. Les seules d~clarations que la Commission a faites ~ ce sujet sont les suivantes - je cite le para- graphe 281: "A pr6sent, la p~riode d'enqu€lte a pris fin. D~­ ployant tous ses efforts dans les limites de son man- dat, et s'inspirant it cet ~garddes dispositions de ses r6solutions des 13 aout 1948 et 5 janvier 1949, la Commission a la conviction d'avoir ~puis~les possi- bilit6s de m~diation dont elle disposait. Apr~s une p6riode prolong6e, dans une situation mouvante et novatrice au milieu de laquelle la Comnussion se trouvait limit6e par des pr6cisions 6tablies de longue date, pr6cisions qui se sont av6r6es €ltre un r6el obstacle it la r~alisationd'un accord, le :dre de la r6solution du 13 aout a perdu de son actualit~ au regard de la situation de fait qui existe dans l'Etat. La Commission a donc ~t6 incapable de con- duire ses m~diations au-deIa de ce qui, a l'heure actuelle, constitue une formule plutot d6su~te. L'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire n'a pas 6t6 d6mili- taris6, comme l'envisageait la deuxi~me partie de la r~solution du 13 aout; or, tantqu'onn'en sera pas arriv~ la, 11 ne sera pas possible de passeI' it la r~alisationdes conditions n6cessaires ~l'organisa­ tion d'un pl6biscite. Comme il ressortdes parties du rapport intif:ul~es "Les forces du Cachemire "azad" et "Retrait des forces arm~es", la Commission estime que le probl~me de la d~militarisationdoit etre consid~r6 comme un tout et que les distinctions, touchant la d~militarisation,qui r~sultentdeladivi- sion du probl~me en une p~riode de tr€lve et une p6- riode de pl6biscite, comme l'envisageaitleplanpri- mitif de d~militarisation, se sont av~r6es €ltre un des plus redoutables obstacles it la r~alisation d'un accord. Il va de soi que lapr~sencede troupes nom- breuses dans l'Etat n'est pas favorable ala r~alisa­ tion d'une atmospMre pacifique. Lad~militarisation de I'Etat est essentielle si I'on veutpouvoir organiser un pl~biscite libre de toute entraveY." ~/ Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, ua- trieme annee, Supplement special No 7, document S 1430, par. 283. "The Commission doubts whether a five-membel' body is the most flexible and desirable instrument to continue in the task. In the Commission's view, a single person can now more effectively conduct the negotiations which, to be successful, mustbe carried out in active and constant consultation with the two parties. The designation of a single person with broad authority and undivided responsibility offers a more practical means of finding the balance and com- promise necessary to advance the settlement of the dispute. "§./ 76. The context in which this phraseology was used by the Commission is clear. In the light of the changed circumstances, the Commission suggested two things: first, that demilitarization should henceforth be brought about not in the two stages, as enVisaged in the resolution, but in one stage; second, that the Com- mission should be dissolved and that its place should be taken by a single individual. Those were the only two changed circumstances; the resolution stOOd; the cir- cumstances were changed in those two directions. There was nothing more that the Commission meant by the phraseology which the representative of India has quoted more than once. 77. Let us see whether ornotthese recom'mendations by the Commission were accepted by Pakistan. I beg to submit that they were. Despite the fact that demil- itarization in a single, continuous process worked against the interests of Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan, in a sincere effort to go forward on any reasonable basis, accepted this proposition. What did the Government of India do? It secured the concession that was offered, and thereafter dug its toes in and refused to agree to any reasonable plan of demilitar- Lation in a single, continuous process. 78. I need not repeat the story. The number of occa- sions on which the Government of India refused to accept clear-cut and specific proposals for the demil- itarization of the State have already been enumerated by me in my opening statement; and, despite his efforts, the representative of India has not been able to say that even one of these proposals was found acceptable to the Government of India. Surely, there should be some limit to intransigence. d~claration comment le Gouvernement indien, ama1n- tes reprises, a refus~ d'accepter des propositions concrEltes et pr~cises en vue de la d~militarisationde l'Etat. Malgr~ ses efforts, le repr~sentantde l'Inde n'a pas pu dire qu'une seule de ces propositions a ~t~ jug~e acceptable par le Gouvernement indien. Il devrait vraiment y avoir une limite a l'intransigeance. 79. In his address to the Council on 15 February, Mr. Krishna Menon read out certain portions of what purported to be the views of. a certain Australian Correspondent who was recently in Kashmir. It appears from Mr. Krishna Menon's version that this Australian newspaper correspondent was giving his impressions - QJ !!lli!., paras. 284 and 285. - 79. Lorsqu'il s'est adress~ au Conseil, le 15 f~vrier dernier, M. Krishna Menon a donn~ lecture de quelques passages d'un article qui auraitexprim~l'opiniond'un certain correspondant australien qui s' ~tait r~cemment rendu au Cachemire. n ressort de la version donn~e par M. Krishna Menon que ce correspondantde presse 76. Les circonstances qui ont amen~ la Commission a faire ces d~clarationsapparaissent nettement. Tenant compte des changements intervenus, la Commission a fait deux suggestions: elle a indiquEHoutd'abord que la d~militarisationdevrait s'effectuer non pas en deux ~tapes comme on l'avait envisag~ dans la r~solution, mais en une seule fois; elle a indiqu~ ensuite que l'on devrait dissoudre la Commission et coniier sa tache a une seule personne. Telles ~taientles deux seuls chan- gements intervenus, mais la r~solutiondemeurait la meme. C'est la tout ce que laCommission voulait dire dans son rapport, que le repr~sentant de l'Inde a si souvent cit~. 77. Voyons si ces recommandations de laCommission ont ~M accept~es par le Pakistan. J'affirme qu'elles l'ont ~t~. La d~militarisationen une seule ~tape con- tinue ~tait contraire aux int~rets du Pakistan, mais le Gouvernement pakistanais, sinc~rementd~sireuxd'al- ler de l'avant a partir de toute base raisonnable, n'en a pas moins accept~ cette proposition. Qu'a fait le Gouvernement indien? Il a profit~ de la concession qui lui ~tait offerte, puis 11 a adopt~ une attitude intran- sigeante, refusant d'accepter tout plan raisonnable de d~militarisationen une seule ~tape continue. 78. Il est inutile que je retrace tout l'historique de l'affaire. J'ai d~ja indiqu~ au cours de ma premiElre §/ Ibid., par. 284 et 285. 81. I would mention here what happened as recently as the first week of the current month to two foreign correspondents Visiting Srinagar. One was the correspondent of the "Daily Mail", Mr. Richard Greenough. This is what he said in a dispatch from Srinagar dated 4 February: "Two recent demonstrations of mob violence against myself and another British correspondent here were carefully 'fixed' by a high quarter of the Kashmir Government, I have good grounds for believing. Demonstrations were intended to impress on me the pro-Indian feeling of the people here and also the degree of hatred and bitterness felt against the British, the United Nations and the West generally for favouring the Pakistan request for a plebiscite. They were also intended to try to scare me off talking to those who oppose integration with India. They undoubtedly exist, stifled though they are." 82. Another correspondent who visited the area was Mr. Stephen Harper of the "Daily Express". This is what he said about his experiences in Srinagar in a dispatch published in the "Daily Express" on 5 February 1957: "In this capital city of the 'Valley of Fear', I learned today how a plot was laid to set the mob against me. The 'Valley of Fear' is in Kashmir- where India's PremierNehrukeepsapuppetGovern- ment in power with the support of 80,000 Indian troops. "The puppet Premier is Bakhshi Ghulam Mo- hammed. He had declared 'the irrevocable accession' of Kashmir to India without Kashmir's 4 million people having a say in the matter. "1 had scarcely arrived in the Srinagar capital last week when a mob swarmed round my car. They shouted 'Murder him-we don't want British re- porters here!' Car doors and canopy were ripped off. Hands grabbed and tore at my clothes. Little baskets pan~trer daI18 l'Etat. Quant aux correspondants ~tran­ gers, on les en a exclus dans la mesure du possible. Seuls quelques privil~gi~s ont ~t~ admis a.prendre part a. des visites officielles organis~es a. travel's l'Etat. Non seulement les journaux de l'Etat qui r~clamaient un pl~biscite ont ~t~ interdits, mais les journaux de Deiili et d'autres villes importantes qui demandaient que la population du Cachemire fUt trait~e de fa<;on ~quitable ont ~t~ supprim~s ou ont fait l'objet de me- sures vexatoires. 81. Je voudrais signaler ici ce qui est arriv~ r~­ cemment - au cours de la premi~re semaine de" ce mois - a deux correspondants ~trangers qui se trou- vaient a. Srinagar. L'un d'eux ~tait M. Richard Greenough, correspondant du "Daily Mail". Voici ce qu'il d~clare dans une d~peche expMi~e de Srinagar le 4 f~vrier: "R~cemment, certains milieux gouvernementaux du Cachemire ont orgaI1is~avec soin ..... j'ai de bonnes raisons de le croire - deux manifestations violentes dirig~es contre moi et contre un autre correspon- dant britannique. Ces maIlifestations avaient pour objet de me convaincre des sentiments pro-indiens de la population ainsi que de la haine ~t de l'amer- tume ressenties contre les Britanniques, l' Organisa- tion des Nations Unies etl'Occidenteng~n~ralparce qu'ils sont favorables a. la requete pakistanaiseten- dant a. l'organisation d'un pMbiscite. Elles avaient ~galement pour but de me faire peur et de m'empe- cher de parler a ceux qui s'opposent au rattache- ment a. l'Inde. Ces op: sants existent sans aucun doute, malgr~ toutes les mesures de r~pression." 82. Le deuxi~me correspondant qui se trouvait dans la r~gion ~tait M. Stephen Harper, du "Daily Express". Voici ce qU'il dit de son s~jour a. Srinagar dans une d~peche publi~e par son journal le 5 f~vrier 1957: "Dans ceUe capitale de la "Vall~e de lapeur", j'a! appris aujourd'hui comment on avait complot~ pour dresser la foule contre moi. La Vall~e de la peuT est situee au Cachemire, oft, grace a. M. Nehru, premier ministre de l'Inde, un gouvernement fan- toche se maintient au pouvoir avec l'appui de 80.000 soldats indiens. "Le chef de ce gouvernement fantoche est Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed. Il a proclam~ "le rattachement irr~vocable" du Cachemire a. l'Inde, sans que les 4 millions d'habitants du Cachemire aient eu voix au chapitre. "La semaine derni~re, j'~tais a. peine arriv~ dans la capitale, Srinagar, que la foule a entour~ ma voiture. Elle criait: "A mort! Nous ne voulons pas de journalistes britanniques ici:" Les portes et la capole de rea volture ont.", arracMes. Des mains ~ "The idea was to try to convince me that the people of Srinagar favour integration with India, as Bakhshi has decreed. "Secondly, assembling of the mob was an attempt to try tc frighten me out of trying to contact opponents of the Bakhshi r~gime. In both ways theplot failed. "I now have evidence that Sheikh Abdullah-hustled out of premiership and jailed in 1953-is still the darling of Kashmir, and a party called the Kashmir Political Conference carries on secret meetings in mosques. "Besides my sources for this news, I have heard of two other attempts to contact me. Last night I was warned that I am a target for the mob because my paper is critical of Premier Nehru. News of the 'Daily Express' campaign urging a fair deal for Kashmir has spread to this remote valley." 83. I am mentioning these recent incidents because Mr. Krishna Menon has chosen to inform the Security Council of what an Australian correspondent was re- ported to have told Indian newspapermen in Srinagar on 7 February. Thefact,however,isthatIndia's policy has consistently been to screen off the area from foreig:l correspondents. Whenever, under pressure of world opinion, India has allowed foreign correspon- dents to go to Srinagar, we have had reports on con- ditions which would interest this Council. 84. A correspondent of the London "Economist" made the following report in a dispatch which appeared on 20 August 1955: "As j:hings are, the average Kashmiri has no desire to be assaulted by the paid bullies of the present Kashmir Government's so-called 'Peace Brigade' or to be arrested on some specious charge and to be locked up without trial. His resentment smoulders, but it seldom bursts into flame. Kashmir is quite a well-run Indian colony ... Bakhshi Ghulam Mo- hammed, the present Prime Minister of Kashmir, looks like a moustached Mussolini and often talks like one." 85. The London "Times" of14 October 1955 published the following report from its correspondent in India: "The Government of India is still practising cen- sorship by refusing to allow British correspondents to visit Kashmir. Representatives of the 'Daily "Il s'agissait d'essayer de me convaincre que la population de Srinagar estfavorable au rattachement :ll'Inde, d6cret~ par Bakhshi. "En second lieu, on voulait, en ameutant la foule, me faire peur et m'empecher d'entrer en rapports avec les adversaires du r~gimede Bakhshi. Le ccm- plot a toh:lement 6choue, car nil'un nil'autre de ces objectifs n'ont 6t~ atteints. "J'ai maintenant la preuve que le cheik Abdullah, chass6 de son poste de Premier Ministre et empri- sonne en 1953, est toujours l'enfant cMri duCache- mire, et qu'un parti appe16 Conference politique du Cachemi-re tient des reunions secr~tes dans des mosqu6es. "Outre ces renseignements que j'ai r6ussi :lobte- nir, j'ai appris que deux autres tentatives avaient ete faites pour entrer en rapports avec mol. Hier soir, j'ai ~te averti que la foule m'en veut parce que mon journal critique le Premier Ministre, M. Nehru. La nouvelle de la campagne menee par le "Daily Express" en faveur d'une solution equitable pour le Cachemire est parvenue jusque dans cette val16e eloign~e." 83. Si je rappelle ces incidents recents, c'est parce que M. Krislma Menon a juge bon d'informer le Con- seil de securite de ce qu'un correspondant australien aurait declare :l des journalistes indiens le 7 fevrier :l Srinagar. En realite, l'Inde a toujours eu pour poli- tique d'tkarter de la region les correspondants de presse etrangers. Chaque fois que, sous la pression de l'opinion mondiale, l'Inde a autorise des corres- pondants de presse etrangers ~ se rendre :l Srinagar, nous avons obtenu sur la situation des renseignements qui int6resseraient certainement le Consei!. 84. Un correspondant de l' "Economist", de Londres, a 6crit ce qui suit dans une d6p~che parue le" 20 aout 1955: "Dans l'etat actuel des choses, le citoyen moyen ne d~sire nullement etre attaqu~ par les brutes :l gages qui font partie de la pretendue "brigade de la paix" de l'actuel gouvernement du Cache'mire, ni ~tre arrete sous quelque pr~texte fallacieux et em- prisonne sans jugement. Ses ressentiments couvent, mais Hs ~clatent rarement. Le Cachemire est une colonie indienne parfaitement administree (...). Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, l'actuel Premier Mi- nistre du Cachemire, a l'air d'un Mussolini mousta- chu, et il parle souvent comme lui." 85. Le "Times" de Londres a, le 14 oc;tobre 1955, publie la d~peche suivante de son correspondant dans l'Inde: "Le Gouvernement indien continue d'appliquerune censure en interdisant aux correspondants de presse britanniques de se rendre auCachemire. Les repr~- "This morning when I withdrew my application after a vain eighteen-day wait for an entry permit to Kashmir, a New Delhi Government spokesman insisted that my application had not been refused. It was merely 'delayed'. "This statement was made despite the fact tha.t since my application was first submitted the India Ministry of Defence, which controls the issue of permits, had given one to a Japanese correspondent within two days of his application." 87. In its issue of 21 October 1955, the London "Daily Telegraph" published another dispatch from the same correspondent, Mr. George Evans, writing from Muzaffarabad, "Azad" Kashmir-that is, from the free side of Kashmir. In this dispatch, Mr. Evans said: "Recent reports of disaffection in 'Azad' Kashmir emanating from India are not in accordance with the actual conditions which I have observed in the course of a two-day visit here. liThe most striking contrast is that, while Mr. Nehru's Government excludes observers from Indian-occupied Kashmir whom it suspects might voice criticism of conditions there, no such dis- criminatory censorship is applied this side of the cease-fire line ... "Permission to enter'Azad' Kashmir is necessary, but it seldom takes more than a few hours to get it. The day after applying, I drove unconducted across the frontier." 88. A correspondent of the London "Times" who secured permission to go to Srinagar sent a long dis- patch to his newspaper, dealing with the activities of the "Peace Brigade" in Anantnag. This correspondent of the London "Times" said: "One man had torn nostrils and another claimed that his teeth had been knocked Qut by members of the 'Peace Brigade'. Two shopkeepers complained that they had been robbed during unofficial searches and others said their shops had been looted. A woman in a highly hysterical state said that she was afraid to go home because of constant harassment. She was the widow of a Muslim killed during the tribal invasion while escorting Hindu refugees, and she alleged that compensation awarded to her had not been paid be- cause she was a supporter of Sheikh Abdullah. "Ce matin, lorsque j'ai retir~ ma demande apr~s avoir attendu vainement pendant 18 jours l'autorisa- tion d'entrer au Cachemire, unporte-paroleduGou- vernement de New-Delhi a soulign~ que mademande n'avait pas ~t~ rejet~e, et que l'octroidel'autorisa- tion avait ~t~ simplement "retard~". "Voll~ ce qui m'a ~t~ dit, alors que, depuis que j'ai pr~sent~ ma demande, le Minist~re indien de la d~fense, de qui d~pend la d~livrance des laissez- passer, en a accord~ un a. un correspondant de presse japonais dans les deux jours qui ont suivi la pr~sentationde sa demande." 87. Dans son num~ro du 21 octobre 1955, le "Daily Telegraph", de Londres, a publi~ une autre d~peche que le meme correspondant, M. George Evans, avait expMi~e de Muzaffarabad, localit~ situ~e dans le Cachemire "azad", c'est-~-dire dans la partie du Cachemire qui est libre. Dans cette d~peche,M. Evans disait: "Les r~cents rapports indiens concernant un m~­ contentement dans le Cachemire "a:zad" ne sont pas conformes a la situation r~elle tellequej'aipu l'ob- server pendant un s~jour de 48 heures que j'ai fait ici. "Le contraste le plus frappant est le suivant: alors que le Gouvernement de M. Nehru interdit l'acc~s de la partie du Cachemire occup~e par l'Inde aux observateurs ~trangers qU'll soupgonne de vouloir critiquer l'~tat de choses existant dans cette r~gion, aucune censure d'un tel caract~re discriminatoire n'est appliqu~e de ce cot~-ci de la ligne du cessez- le-feu ... "Il faut une autorisation pour se rendre au Cache- mire "azad", mais II est rare qU'll faille plus de quelques heures pour l'obtenir. Le lendemaindujour oft j'ai pr~sent~ ma demande, j'ai pu traverser la fronti~re en voiture, sans escorte." 88. Un correspondant du "Times", de Londres, qui avait obtenu l'autorisation de se rendre a Srinagar a adress~ a. son journal une longue d~peched~peignant l'activit~ de la "brigade de la paix" a. Anantnag. Ce co.rrespondant disait:' "Un homme a eu les narines d~chir~es etun autre a affirm~ que des membres de la "brigade de la paix" lui avaient bris~ les dents. Deux commergants se sont plaints d'avoir ~t~ vol~s au cours de perqui- sitions non officielles, d'autres ont d~clar~ que leurs magasins avaient ~t~ pllMs. Une femme en pleine crise nerveuse a dit qu'elle avait peur de rentrer chez elle a cause des vexations constantes qui lui ~taient impos~es. Il s'agissait d'une veuve: son mari, un musulman, avait ~t~ tu~ durant l'inva- sion des tribus alors qu'llaccompagnaitdes r~fugMs hindous; elle affirmait que l'indemnit~qui lui avait ~tait en faveur du cheik Abdullah. t ~t~ allou~e ne lui avait pas §t~ pay~e parce qu'elle "One of the town's leadingtraders appeared before this correspondent with bruised and bandaged face. To top all this, the correspondent himself was ap- proached by a member of the 'Peace Brigade', who demanded information such as his name, address, nationality and purpose of his visit. "The Indian Government often behaves as if its moral duty is to defend dependent peoples, and it is therefore surprising that so little attention is given to the political welfare of 4 million Kashmiris for whom it is ultimately responsible. "Generous Indian economic aid and indeed the intelligent development programme of the Kashmir Government tend to conceal the methodsofthatGov- ernment that are totalitarian in concept and occasion- ally border on outright terrorism in practice." 89. May I also recall to the Security Council the beating administeredto Mr. Ashoka Mehta, a prominent member of the Indian Parliament who, on a visit to the Kashmir State, had the audacity of suggesting a fair deal to the people of Kashmir. This incident was fully reported practically in every important Indian news- paper. I 89. Je me permettrai ~galement de rappeler au Conseil de s~curit~ les s~vices inflig~s :l l'un des membres les plus en vue du Parlement indien, M. Ashoka Mehta, qui, lors d'un s~jour dans l'Etat, avait eu l'audace de proposer que l'on traite de fagon 90. Then the Council has before it the testimony of such a distinguished Indian social worker as Miss Mridula Sarabhai with regard to the conditions preva- lent in Indhm-held Kashmir. She was an inmate of the Gandhi Ashram for years and later became Assistant Secretary-General of the Indian National Congress. After she had written the letters which have been cir- culated to the members of the Security Council, the Indian Prime Minister had her thrown outfrom the New Delhi Constitution House, a Government hostel, where she had stayed for a number of years. It was recently reported in the Indian Press that the Indian Prime Minister had her ejected from a meeting of the Congress, at which she was present and which Mr. Nehru was addressing. I have requested that her letters be released as a United Nations document as well as the letter of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the veracity of which has been admitted by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, the present Prime Minister of Kashmir.JJ This is what has happened to a lady of very high rank. She is a daughter or sister of one of the biggest textile manufacturers of India, and she has spent her whole life in SOCial service for the benefit ofthe people. She has been in the forefront of the Congress Party-that is Mr. Nehru's party. The moment she utters a word in favour of the people of Kashmir, Mr. Nehru throws her out of the hostel in New Delhi, which is a Government Y;;;document S/PV.761/Add.I. L consacr~ toute son existence aux esuvres sociales et au bien-etre de la population. Elle a ~t~ l'un des membres les plus en vue dupartiduCongras - c'est- a-dire du parti de M. Nehru. Des l'instant ou elle eleve la voix en faveur de la population du Cachemire, "Le correspondant qui rapporte ces faits a vu l'un des principaux commergants de la ville, qui s'est pr~senM ~ lui le visage tum~fi~ et band~. Et pour comble, ce correspondant lui-mame a ~t~ interpelM par un membre de la "brigade de la paix", qui lui a notamment demand~ son nom, son adresse, sa na- tionalit~ et le motif de son s~jour. "Le Gouvernement indien se comporte souvent comme si le devoir de dMendre les peuples non au- tonomes lui incombait sp~cialement; il est donc surprenant 1U'il prete si peud'attention au bien-atre politique de ces 4 millions d'habitants du Cachemire, dont il a, en fin de compte, la charge. "La g~n~rosit~ de l'aide ~conomique indienne, et, il faut le reconnaftre, la valeur du programme de d~veloppementmis au point par le Gouvernement du Cachemire, tendent a. faire oublier les m~thodes de ce gouvernement, qui sont d'inspiration totalitaire et qui parfois, en fait, touchent au terrorisme pur et simple." ~quitable les habitants du Cachemire. L'incident a ~t~ rapport~ en d~taiI dans presque tous les journaux im- portants de I'Inde. 90. Le Conseil dispose aussi du t~moignagede l'un des travailleurs sociaux les plus eminents de l'Inde, Mile Mridula Sarabhai, en ce qui concerne la situation dtr. Cachemire occup~ par l'lnde. Longtemps pension- naire de I' "ashram" de Gandhi, Mile Sarabhai ~tait devenue secr~taire g~n~raladjoint du Congres national indien. Une fois qu'elle eut ~crit les lettres qui ont ~t~ communiqu~es aux membres du Conseil de s~cu­ ritl~, le Premier Ministre de l'lnde l'a fait mettre :l la porte d'une r~sidence de l'Etat, la Constitution House de New-Delhi, ou elle habitait depuis de longues ann~es. On a signal~ r~cemment dans la presse in- dienne que le Premier Ministre de l'Inde l'avait fait expulser d'une r~union du Congr~s :l laquelle elle assistait et pendant laquelle M. Nehru pronongait un discours. J'ai demand~ que ses lettres soient pu- bli~es en tant que document de l'Organisation, ainsi que la lettre du chelk Mohammed Abdullah, dont la v~racit~ a ~M admise par Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, l'actuel Premier Ministre du Cachemire1/. Voil:l ce qui est arriv~ :l une dame de la haute socMt~. Fille ou sesur d'un des plus grands filateurs de l'Inde, elle a 91. Mr. Krishna Menon had been trying to create an impression, here and outside, that it is entirely im- material what world opinion thinks of Pandit Nehru's attitude in Kashmir, of his intransigence and defiance of this international body created by the Charter, to which India has subscribed. 92. At this stage r should like to refer to a speech that Mr. Nehru made on 3 February 1957 in connexion with the election campaign. Having seen that his Government was being condemned by the Press of the whole world for not allowing the plebiscite in Kashmir, and being convinced of his position, that he had fallen in the eyes of the whole civilized world in this matter, he made a remarkable speech at this public meeting. He said: "Gentlemen, I am told"-I suppose he referred to the world Press and world political opinion-"that I have fallen in stature. But what does it matter what the whole world thinks? My stature depends on you, my people." That is the value that Mr. Nehru attaches to world opinion, to the Security Council, to the United Nations and to the world Press. He says, "Let them say what they like. So long as my people, you people, are with me, I do not care for world opinion". When you are dealing with a man like that, I do not know what method you can employ in order to incline him to honour his pledges given to the United Nations and to the Security Council, when the man does not care for public opinion, the public opinion of the whole world. I think that Mr. Krishna Menon wasted your time when he came here and argued his case for seventeen hours when his Prime Minister has no intention of carrying out his international obligations. 93. I am sure that members of the Security Council have seen some of the comments that have appeared in the Press the world over which have severely taken Pandit Nehru to task for his Kashmir policy. Among these are such distinguished papers as the "Man- chester Guardian" and the "New Statesman and Nation" of London, both of which are great admirers of Pandit Nehru. Mr. Kingsley Martin, who is the world-re- nowned editor of the "New Statesman and Nation" of England, is a fast friend of Pandit Nehru and has been such for the last twenty or thirty years. Mr. Kingsley Martin has brought out a leading article against Mr. Nehru, his friend, condemning him for not allowing a plebiscite in Kashmir and for dishonouring his inter- national agreement. What further proof do you need of world opinion in this direction? In the face of Mr. Nehru's wholly unreasonable attitude in Kashmir, the world Press has been forced tt> revise its estimate of Mr. Nehru. Such distinguished papers or magazines as "The New York Times", the "Christian Science Moni- tor", the "Washington Post", the "New York Herald Tribune", "Life" and "Time" in the United States, the "Times", the "Observer", the "Daily Telegraph", the "Daily Mail", the "EconOmist", to mention only a few 91. M. Krishna Menon s'est efforc~ de faire croire, ici et hors de l'Organisation, qu'il n'y apas lieu d'at- tacher la moindre importance a. ce que l'opinion mon- diale pense de l'attitude prise par le pandit Nehru au Cachemire, de son intransigeance et du faitqu'ild~fie cet organe international cr~~ par la Charte, :llaquelle l'Inde a adh~r~. 92. A ce stade, je voudrais rappeler un discours que M. Nehru a prononc~ le 3Mvrierdernier, :ll'occasion de la campagne ~lectorale.Ayant constat~que lapresse du monde entler blamait son gouvernement de s'oppo- ser a. ce qu'un pl~biscite ait lieu au Cachemire, et sa- chant bien qu'aux yeux du monde civilis~ cette affaire avait fait baisser son prestige, il a prononc~ au cours d'une r~union publique ces paroles m~morables: "Messieurs, on me dit - je suppose qu'il faisait allusion a. la presse et :ll'opinion mondiales - que mon prestige a souffert. Mais qu'importe ce que pense le monde entier. C'est de vous, mon peuple, que d~pend mon prestige." Voila. donc l'importance que M. Nehru attache a.l'opi- nion mondiale, au ConseU de s~curit~, :l1'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies, :l la presse mondiale! Il affirme: "Qu'ils disent ce que bon leur semble: Tant que vous, mon peuple, etes avec moi, l'opinion mon- diale m'importe peu." Quand on a affaire a. un homme comme lui, a. un homme qui se moque de l'opinion, de l'opinion du monde entier, je ne sais pas queUe m~thode on peut employer pour l'amener ahonorer les engagements qu'll a pris devant l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Conseil de s~curit~. Je crois que M. Krishna Menon vous a fait perdre votre temps en venant ici soutenir sa cause pendant 17 heures alors que son Premier Ministre n'a nullement l'intention de s'acquitter de ses obligations internationales. 93. Je suis sur que les membres duConseilde s~cu­ rit6 ont lu quelques-uns des commentairesparus dans la presse mondiale, qui a s~v~rement blam~ le pandit Nehru de la politique qu'il poursuit au Cachemire. Parmi ces critiques figurent des journaux ou des re- vues aussi r~put6s que le "Manchester Guardian" et le "New Statesman and Nation", de Londres, qui sont tous deux de grands admirateurs du pandit Nehru. M. Kingsley Martin, qui est le r~dacteur en chef uni- versellement connu de la revue anglaise "New States- man and Nation", est un grand ami du pandit Nehtu, et cela depuis 20 ou 30 ans. M. Kingsley Martin a publi~, contre son ami M. Nehru, un ~ditorialoil illui reproche de ne pas permettre qu'un pl~biscite ait lieu au Cachemire et de ne pas respecter l'accord interna- tional auquel il a souscrit. Mais, Messieurs, avez-vous besoin d'autres preuves puur savoir quelle est l'opinion du monde en la mati~re?Devantl'attitude parfaitement d~raisonnable qu'a adopt~e M. Nehru au Cachemire, la presse mondiale a dti reviser l'id~equ'elle se faisait de M. Nehru. Des journaux ou revues aussi r~put~s que le "New York Times", le "Christian Science Monitor", le "Washington Post", le "New York Herald Tribune", "Life" et"Time",auxEtats-Unisd'Am~rique,etque- 94. I have with me a very interesting cartoon. I think that if Mr. Krishna Menon were here he would regret having referred to one newspaper correspondent on whom he tried to pin his faith. I have here the latest edition of "Punch", the periodicaL Here on this page- I will pass it on-we see a cartoon where Mr. Nehru has one body; he has two heads. On one side of his head, in one hand, he is holding a dove of peace and a little twig. On the other side of his body near his face there is a big sword and underneath is written on the sword side "Kashmir"; on the dove side "Suez Canal". 95. I would venture to say that on no single issue has world opinion expressed itself so clearly and so vigorously as in the case of Kashmir, and the Council would agree with me that almost the entire volume of this opinion is critical of Pandit Nehru's policy in Kashmir. ;Mr. Menon advises the Security Council to disregard this expression of public opinion the world over. We have compiled some of these comments and editorials, and although these are only a fraction of what the world Press has said, I would request that the compilation be circulated as a United Nations document. 96. I, of course, agree with the representative of India that the resolutions of the United Nations Com- mission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 are "the only international engage- ment that exists". Since these are international agree- ments, and binding international agreements, there is no relevance to Mr. Menon I s laboured discussion of the present effect of unaccepted offers by the Government of India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. These offers, and for that matter the 20 August 1953 agreement between the Prime Ministers ofIndiaandPakistan that a fair and impartial plebiscite was the most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes ofthe people, as far as the Security Council is now concerned, are simply demonstrative of India's long-standing announced intention to hold a plebiscite in the State. What is now before the Security Council is the implementation of the international agreement between the Council, India and Pakistan to hold that plebiscite. 97. No change has taken place as may absolve the Government of India of its international commitment to a plebiscite. Any change that may have taken place " is due to unilateral action taken by the Government of :l India in clear violation of the provisions of the Inter- :1 national agreement. Even these changes are such as can H be easily undone without causing any harm to either 1 ,Id,. 27 94. Jlai sous la main un dessin humoristiquetr~sin­ t~ressant. Je crais que si M. Krishna Menon ~tait ici il regretterait d'avoir mentionn~un certain correspon- dant de presse, en qUi il a mis tous ses espoirs. J'ai ici le dernier num~ro de "Punch". Sur la page que voici - je vais vous la faire passer - se trouve un dessin 0\1 M. Nehru est repr~sent~ avec un seul corps et deux tetes. Du c6t~ de l'une de ces tetes, il tient a. la main une colombe et un petit rameau. De l'autre c6t~ de son corps, pr~s de l'autre Visage, il brandit un grand sabre; du c6t~ du sabre se trouve inscrit le mot "Cachemire", et du c6t~ de la colombe, les mots "canal de Suez". 95. J'irais jusqu'cl dire qu'il n'yapasdequestion sur laquelle l'opinion mondiale se soitprononc~eavec tant de nettet~ et de fermet~ que sur celle du Cachemire, et le Conseil sera d'accord avec moipour reconnaJ.1:re que dans sa presque totalit~ cette opinion condamne la politique suivie par le pandit Nehru au Cachemire. M. Menon recommande au Conseil de ne pas tenir compte de cette manifestation de l'opinion mondiale. Nous avons r~uni quelques-uns de ces commentaires et de ces ~ditoriaux et, bien qu'ils ne repr~sentent qu'une fraction de ce qu'a dit la presse mondiale, je voudrais demander qU'ils soient publi~s sous forme -d'un document de l'Organisation. 96. n va sans dire que je reconnais, comme le repr~­ sentant de l'Inde, que les r~solutionsde laCommission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan en date du 13 aout 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949 sont "le seul en- gagement international existant". Etant donn~ qu'il s'agit d'accords internationaux et d'accords interna- tionaux ayant force obligatoire, on volt mal pourquoi M. Menon a longuement d~battu la port~e actuelle d'offres du Gouvernement indien, relatives cl l'orga- nisation d'un pMbiscite au Cachemire, qui n'auraient pas ~t~ accept~es. Ces offres, et cl cet ~gard l'accord du 20 aoiit 1953 entre les Premiers Ministres de l'Inde et du Pakistan reconnaissant que le moyen le plus pratique de d~terminer les vceux de la population ~tait d'organiser un pl~biscite ~quitable et impartial, t~­ moignent simplement, en ce qUi concerne maintenant le Conseil de s~curit~,de 1'intention de l'Inde, annonc~e il y a longtemps, d'organiser unpl~biscitedans l'Etat. La question dont le Conseil est maintenant saisi est celle de l'ex~cution de l'accord international conclu entre le Conseil de s~curit~, l'Inde et le Pakistan, au sujet de l'organisation de ce plebiscite. 97. n ne s'est produit aucun changement qui puisse d~lier le Gouvernement indien de l'engagement inter- national qu'll a pris de procMer cl unpMbisclte. Tous les changements qui ont pu intervenir r~sultent de mesures unllatt:lrales prises par le Gouvernement indien en violation flagrante des dispositions de 1'accord internationaL D'ailleurs, ces changements sont tels que l'on pourrait aist:lment revenir cl l'~tat 99. I do not understand Mr. KrishnaMenon'sdissatis- faction with the supporters of this draft resolution and the manner in which he has expressed that dissatis- faction. It is interesting to note what Mr. Krishna Menon has said. He has accused Sir PiersonDixon-or is it the Government of the United Kingdom?-of a "lapse from fortitude and wisdom" [769th meeting, para. 53]. Mr. Krishna Menon has taunted the repre- sentative of the United States with having proposed something that is against international law, unethical and inequitable, although he does notimpugn Mr. Lodge personally, whom he regards as a man "of great simplicity of mind"-I do not know whether Mr. Lodge will consider that as a compliment - "frankness, and candour of expression" [ibid., para.99]. Mr. Krishna Menon charges the representative of Cuba with not haVing understood history, political philosophy or the record of the Security Council in respect of Kashmir. The representative of Iraq was chided for having com- mitted the offence of referring to the brotherhood of Islam. Mr. Krisha Menon contrasted it with human brotherhood. If he had read the Koran, from which he is often fond of quoting, he would have known that the concept of the brotherhood of man and of tolerance for a~l peoples, irrespective of race, creed, colour or caste, is fundamental in Islam. It is one thing to put these things down in a Constitution and quite another thing fully to comprehend them. A little later in his speech Mr. Krishna Menon plainly accused the repre- sentative of Iraq of having departed from the truth. 100. Here, I should like to make a few comments. When Mr. Krishna Menon was commenting on the speech of the representative of Iraq, his last sentence ~nonc~e dans I' accord international - obligation que le Gouvernement et le peuple indiens, si 1'on en croit M. Menon, n'ont "pas l'intention de renier et (...) ne renieron(t) jamais" [767~me s~ance, par. 85]. Quelle est la nature de cette obligation? M. Menon souligne que le pl~biscite est subordonn~ a. la d~militarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire. C'est on ne peut plus vrai. Je tiens cependant a. faire observer que l'argument suivant de M. Menon, a. savoir que, la d~­ militarisation n'ayant pas eu lieu, l'obligation depro- cMer a. un pMbiscite disparail, est absolument insou- tenable. De fait, l'Inde s'efforce de tirer parti de son manquement a. ses obligations. Aux termes de l'accord international, le r~glement de la question du Cache- mire doit se faire par ~tapes, et les premi~res me- sures qu'il convient maintenant de prendre doivent avoir pour objet d' assurer la d~militarisation de l'Etat. C'est a. ces mesures que j'avais consacr~ mes premi~res observations le 16 janvier [761~me s~ance]. Nous avons essay~ toutes les m~thodesrecommand~es par la Charte, par le Conseil de s~curit~,par la Com- mission et par les repr~sentantsdes Nations Unies, et le Cachemire n'est toujours pas d~militaris~. Le Conseil est maintenant saisi d'un projet de r~solution [S/3787] qui enVisage pr~cis~ment les mesures a. prendre. 99. Je ne comprends pas le m~contentement dont t~moigne M. Menon a. 1'~gard des partisans de ce projet de r~solution, non plus que la fagon dont ill'a exprim~. Il est int~ressantde noter ce que M. Menon a dit. n a accus~ sir Pierson Dixon - ou serait-ce le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni? - de "s'~carter du courage et de la sagesse" [769~me s~ance, par. 53]. Il a reproch~ au repr~sentantdes Etats-Unis d'Am~­ rique d'avoir pr~sent~ une proposition contraire au droit international, a. la morale et a l'~quit~, tout en ~vitant de s'en prendre personnellement a. M. Lodge, qu'il consid~re comme un homme "qui s'exprimeavec une grande simplicit~" - je ne sals si M. Lodge prendra ceci comme un compliment - "une grande franchise et une grande sinc~rit~" [ibid., par. 99]. M. Krishna Menon a accus~ ensuite le repr~sentant de Cuba de n'avoir pas compris l'histoire, la philo- sophie politique nl les documents du Conseil de s~cu­ riM, en ce qUi concerne le Cachemire. Il a reprocM au repr~sentant de l'Irak d'avoir os~ mentionner la 'fraternit~ de l'Islam. M. Krishna Menon lui a oppos~ la fraternit~ humaine. S'il avait lu le Coran, qu'll aime a. citer, il se serait rendu compte que la notion de fraternit~ humaine et de tol~rance pour tous les peuples, sans distinction de race, de croyance, de couleur ou de caste occupe une place fondamentale dans le monde islamique. Inscrire ces principes dans une constitution est une chose, les saisir enti~rement en est une autre. Dans la suite de son discours, M. Menon a carr~mentaccus~lerepr~sentantdel'Irak de s'etre ~cart~ de la v~rit~. 100. Je voudrais faire quelques observations a. ce sujet. Commentant I"~ tervention du repr~sentantde 1'Irak, M. Krishna ; mon a termin~ par la phrase 28 101. If an advocate before a High Court Judge, a Supreme Court JUdge, or even an ordinary Magistrate, accuses the Judge or the Magistrate ofdeparting from the truth, that is an insult which, when offered to a judicial authority, would bring the confiscation of a lawyer's licence to practise. If a sentence like that accusation-and a false accusation-were uttered by a Member of Parliament, the Speaker would call upon that Member to withdraw that word. Otherwise, that Mem- ber of Parliament would be expelled from the House. I feel that it is commensurate with the dignity and honour of the Security Council that the parties who come before it to argue their cases must control their language and speak in a respectful manner which is in consonance with the high office which the Council holds; and I hope that it is for the Council now to take steps to defend its own honour and prestige so as not to set an example by which, in future, parties who come before it can insult it to its face in the manner in which the representative of Iraq has been insulted. 102. When dealing with other representatives on the Security Council, Mr. Krishna Menon has employed a technique which is well known to us in India &.~d Pak- istan, but which may not be well known to the Council. He began to criticize Sir Pierson Dixon very strongly, and when he saw a smile-as I did-on the face of Sir Pierson Dixon, he must have realized that the days when we could accuse the British in India, and they were frightened of us, had gone and we are now a free country, and that Sir Pierson was probably thinking: " "Well, my friend, you are afree country; you must now U look after yourself." Mr. Krishna Menon must have felt 11 immediately that he had made a mistake in attacking n Sir Pierson, and so he softened. He tried to cajole him: "When I was High Commissioner for India in London, the British gave us a lot of supplies and arms, and so on, and we have been friends; we are in the Commonwealth, and we are a sister country, and we are brothers." Then he proceeded almost as if he was kissing him on both cheeks. This sort of conduct of a party using strong language against a representative on the Security Council and then changing to another sort of language, thinking that the representative might get angry, a language to cajole him, is an advocacy which I have very seldom come across. 103. I could have "said a good deal about the remarks Mr. Krishna Menon has made about each representa- tive-about the representative of Cuba, the representa- :1 tive of the United States; and so on-simply because if I1 a representative on the Council does not agree with him il he resorts to these personal attacks. However, I il believe that representatives can defend themselves. ij ~1 explained exhaustively by the sponsors. My Govern- I menl takes nole of the follOWing clarlflcalloos of the 29 104. Instead of examining personalities, let us ex- amine what the representatives on the Council have said about the draft resolution. This document has been I1 th~se devant lui surveillent leur langage et s'ex- priment avec tout le respect du aux hautes fonctions du Conseil. J'esp~re que le Conseil ne manquera pas de prendre d~s maintenant des dispositions pour de- fendre son honneur et son prestige de fa~on a. ne pas laisser s'etablir un precedent qui pourrait ulterieure- ment inciter une partie se presentant devant lui a. l'insulter comme le representant de l'Irak l'a ete. 102. Avec d'autres representants, M. KrislmaMenon a use d'une tactique qui, si elle est bien connue dans l'Inde et au Pakistan, est peut-etre moins famili~re aux membres du Conseil. Il a commence par critiquer tr~s violemment sir Pierson Dixon, mais lorsqu'il a vu, comme je l'ai vu moi-meme, un sourire sur le visage de sir Pierson Dixon, il a du se rendre compte que le temps etait passe o~ nous pouvions, dans l'Inde, accuser les Britanniques, qui nous craignaient - que nous ~tions maintenant un pays libre et que sir Pierson se disait probablement: "Tr~s bien, mon ami, votre pays est un pays libre; vous devez desormais vous debrouiller tout seuls. n M. Krislma Menon dolt avoir aussi senti l'erreur qu'il avait commise en attaquant sir Pierson, et il s'est adouci. Il a essaye de le ca- joler: "Lorsque j'etais Haut-Commissaire de l'Inde a. Londres, les Britanniques nous ontfourni de grandes quantites de materiel et d'armes, etc.; nous etions amis. Nous faisons partie du Commc!llwealth, nous sommes une nation sceur, et nous appartenons tous les deux a. la meme famille." On avait l'impression que M. Menon allait l'embrasser sur les deux joues. J'ai rarement ete le temoin d'un telprocMe: quelqu'un use de propos extremement vifs contre un membre du Conseil de securite, puiS, craignant que celui-ci ne se mette en col~re, change brusquement de ton et essaie de le cajoler. 103. Je pourrais m'etendre plus longuement sur les remarques que M. Krislma Menon a adressees a. cha- cun des repr~sentants, au repr~sentant de Cuba, a. celui des Etats-Unis, etc.; d~s qu'un membre du Conseil ne partage pas ses vues, M. Menon l'attaque personnellement. Je suis convaincu cependant que les representants peuvent se defendre. 104. Au lieu de discuter de questions de personne, examinons ce que les membres du Conseil ont dit du projet de resolution. Ses auteurs en ont expos~ tous les aspects. Mon gouvernement prend note des pr~ci­ sions suivantes, apportees par les auteurs du projet "As regards other conditions for progress towards the settlement, perhaps I should indicate what we have in mind in including this in the draft. " •.. This, then, is one conditionfor progress which indeed should be examined-the need for a decrease in tension-and there are doubtless other matters. I think, for instance, of clarification of the position of the Plebiscite Administrator, which the President may think would repay examination with the two Governments. But all this examination is governeq by the phrase 'haVing regard to the previous resolu- tions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan'. That point is fundamental. " ..• The draft resolution, therefore, provides for a procedure which, we trust, will enable progress to be made, but not through the medium of p"blic debate, during the next few weeks. Yet, the need to make progress is pressing, and for that reason the draft resolution proposes a definite time-limit within which the President should report to the Security Council; for the Councilcannotfailto take up its task again at the earliest possible moment." [768thmeet- ing, paras. 16 to 19.] 106. The representative of the United States'said: "The draft resolution which has been introduced by the Governments of Australia, Cuba, the Umted Kingdom and the United States [S/3787] builds upon these points of agreement. It thus lays considerable stress on the importance of achieving demilitariza- tion. Four of the preambular paragraphs refer to this problem. "The task which we are suggesting thatthe Security Council assign to its President also emphasizes the ~fforts to achieve demilitarization. Inthis connexion, a proposal has already been put forward as a sug- gestion by which the present deadlock might be broken. This was the proposal of the representative of Pakistan at the 761st meeting, reiterated at the 766th meeting, to the following effect: " 'The functions of protecting the State and ensuring internal security should be entrusted by the Council to a United Nations force which shouldbe introduced into the area m: once.' [761st meeting, para. 112.] "We have thought it desirable to note this proposal by the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force in connexion with demilitarization ... "As I indicated earlier, the United States believes that we must build upon the gains which have been made before. The President, in undertaking this mission, is accordingly to do so having regard to the "(00.) Cette d~tente nj§cessaire est donc unecondi- tion favorable au r~glement qui devrait sans aucun doute etre examin~e, et il en existe certainement d'autres. Je songe, par exemple, a. la n~cessit~ de pr~ciser la situation de l'Administrateur du pM- biscite, question que vous pensez peut-etre, Monsieur le Pr~sident, devoir examiner avec les deux gou- vernements. Mais tout cet examen est subordonn~ a. cette phrase: "compte tenu des r~solutions ant~­ rieures du Conseil de s~curit~ et de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan". C'est la. un point essentiel. "(00.) Le projet de r~solution pr~voitdonc une pro- cedure qui, nous l'esperons, permettra de faire des progr~s, mais sans recourlr a. un d~bat public au cours des quelques semaines "a. venir. Cependant, des progr~s doivent etre faits de toute urgence, et c'est pour cette raison que le projet de resolution sugg~re un delai precis a l'expiration duquel, Mon- sieur le President, vous devriez presenter un rap- port au Conseil de securite; en effet, le Conseil ne peut faire autrement que de se saisir a. nouveau de cette question le plus t6t possible." [768~meseance, par. 16 a 19.] 106. Le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique a dit: "Le projet de resolution presente par l'Australie, Cuba, le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis [S/3787] est fonde sur les points d'accord entre les deux parties. C'est pourquoi il insiste particuli~rement sur l'importance de la demilitarisation, qui fait l'objet du quatri~me considerant. "La mission que nous proposons au Conseil de confier a son president vise egalement a la demili- tarisation. A ce propos, la proposition suivante, qu'a faite le representant du Pakistan a la 761~me seance et qu'il a renouvelee a la 766~me seance, pourrait permettre de sortir de l'impasse actuelle: "La protection de l'Etat et sa securite interieure devraient etre confiees par le Conseil aune force des Nations Unies, qui devrait etre envoyee im- mediatement dans la region." [761~me seance, par. 112.] "Nous avons juge utile de noter la proposition du representant du Pakistan tendant a recourir, en vue de la demilitarisation, a une force temporaire des Nations Unies (00.). "Comme je l'ai indique precedemment, les Etats- Unis estiment qu'il faut faire reuvre constructive en partant des resultats deja obtenus. Dans l'ac- complissement de sa mission, le President du Con- 107. Le representant de Cuba a dit: 107. The representative of Cuba said the following: "The Cuban delegation therefore believes that this draft resolution would lead to the holding of a ple- biscite ... " ... Therefore, for us ... , the problem of the plebiscite is something that has been definitely settled and agreed upon by the parties. All that has to be done is to bring about conditions in which the plebiscite can be held. "From the Indian representative's statementhere, and also from the statements I have quoted, it seems clear that India has at no time tried to retract its promise to hold the plebiscite, since it laid down conditions under which parts I and IT must be com- plied with before partill can be carried out; and there would be no reason to speak of the fulfilment of conditions for a plebiscite if no plebiscite were to be held. This, in our opinion, is crystal clear. Wc there- fore believe that the draft resolution we have sub- mitted is an attempt, by entrusting the President of the Council with this task, to bring about the condi- tions which will allow the holding of a plebiscite." [Ibid., paras. 95 to 99.] 108. Le representant de l'Australie a dit: 108. The representative of Australia stated the following: "The Council has ,all along attached great import- ance to the adoption of appropriate measures of demilitarization in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as ;- 'lecessary step towards the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. Itis well known that negotiations on detailed practical measures to bring about such demilitarization have not in the past been successful. This is the most immediate problem to which, in our view, the Security Council should bend its present efforts. "The draft resolution refers to the proposal ofthe representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force to facilitate agreement on effective arrangements for demilitarization. The idea is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. With- out draWing any parallel between the situationthat led to the General Assembly's decision to establish that Force and the problem 6f securing appropriate measures of demilitarization of Kashmir as a pre- liminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for any- body to deny t.hat the use of such a force, in so far as tt might contribute towards demilitarization, would, in the words of the draft resolution 'deserve con- I "Le projet de resolution que nous discutons actuel- lement tend, selon nous, a faire en sorte que le plebiscite puisse avoir lieu (...) " (...) Aussi,pournous i(...),leproblemedu plebis- cite est definitivement resolu et regIe par accord entre les parties. La seule chose qU'il reste a faire est de creer des conditions telles qU'il soit pos- sible de l'organiser. "De l' intervention du representant de l'Inde au Con- seil, de meme que des declarations que j'ai citees, il r~sulte, selon toute ~vidence, qu'a. aucun moment l'Inde n'a voulu revenir sur sa promesse au sujet du plebiscite, pUisqu'elle a insiste sur certaines con- ditions, a savoir que les premiere et deuxieme parties de l'accord aient ete executees avant que l'on entreprenne la troisieme partie; on compren- drait d'ailleurs mal que M. Menon parle des condi- tions du plebiscite si son pays ne voulait pas de ce plebiscite. Cela nous paraft coul~r de source. C'est pourquoi le projet de resolution que nous avons presente s'efforce, par le mandatqu'ilconfieanotre President, de parvenir a etablir des conditions qui permettraient un plebiscite." [Ibid., par. 95 a 99.J "Le Conseil a toujours attache une grande im- portance a l'adoption de mesures appropriees de demilitarisation dans I'Etat de Jammu etCachemire en tant que premier pas vers l'organisation d'un plebiscite libre et impartial. On sait que le£- negocia- tions entreprises dans le passe pour la recherche de mesures pratiques de demilitarisation n'ont pas abouti. C'est le probleme le plus immediat que, a notre avis, le Conseil de securite devrait essayer de resoudre pour le moment. "Le projet de resolution fait allusion a la propo- sition du representant du Pakistan tendant a faire usage d'une force temporaire des Nations Unies pour faciliter un accord sur les mesures propres a amener cette demilitarisation. L'idee n'estpeut-etre pas nouvelle, mais son interet et son importance se sont accrus a la suite de l'experience recente faite par les Nations Unies dans la constitution et l' emploi de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies en Egypte. Sans vouloir, bien entendu, etablirunparal- lele entre la situation qui a amene l'Assemblee generale a decider la creation de cette force et le probl~me que pose la recherche des mesures pro- pres a assurer la demilitarisation du Cachemire prealablement a 1'0rganisation d'un plebisicte libre et impartial, il semble difficile que l'on puisse nier que l'emploi d'une telle force, dans la mesure ou 109. Apart from these clarifications and explanations as to its objective offered by the sponsors, my Gov- ernment also notes the following from the speeches of the representatives of the Philippines, China and Iraq with regard to their understanding of the contents of the resolution and its objectives. 110. The representative of the Philippines said: "Although the representative of India has dealt with the question of aggression anew, I do not think that the Council is called upon to make any finding as to whether there has been aggressiQn and by whom it was committed. It should be recalled that the charge and counter-charge of aggression ceased to be relevant the moment both sides agreed to the resolu- tions of the United Nations Commissionfor India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5January 1949."[Ibid., para. 104.] 111. The representative of the Philippines then went on to say: "The will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, according to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan ofl3 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which have been accepted by both India and Pakistan, is to be ascertained by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The other ::;>rovisions of the resolutions mentioned are clearly subordinated to that end. The provisions relating to the cease-fire and the truce arrangements are aimed simply at the creation of conditions to enable the free and orderly attainment of the prime objective. Whatever changes may have occurred in the situation since the resolutions of the Security Coun~il were passed, it is submitted that the prin- ciple underlying those resolutions cannot be changed because it is Wlchangeable." [!Q!Q., para. 110.] 112. The repre::'entative of the Philippines, further on in his statem.ent, went on to say the following: "The draft r·::solution before us meets all the requirements of the situation and, without departing from the sOWld ann practical (' curse heretofore followed by this organ of the United Nations, opens the way realistically to a settlement which, if the parties are minded to co-exist in peace, should be final and conclusive. "The proposal does ro;'l deviate from the course we have followed. It rec '6nizes the absolute necessity of demilitarizing the disputed region as a condition precedent to any genUine plebiscite. None of us here will dispute the proposition that no plebiscite is possible in a setting of warlike appearances. The first and most important condition to a free election is that the people should be able to go to the polls 109. Outre les precisions et explications donneespar les auteurs en ce qui concerne 1'objet du projet da resolution, mon gouvernement prend note egalement des passages suivants des declarations du representant des Philipl-ines, de celui de la Chine et de celui de l'lrak, qui indiquent comment ils cOlll;oivent l'objet et le contanu de la resolution. . 110. Le representant des Philippines a dit: "Bien que le re}!l'esentant de l'lnde soit revenu sur la question de 1''''0- ..lssion, je ne crois pas que le Conseil soit appeIe ni a se prononcer sur le point de savoir si une agression a ete commise, ni a designer le coupable. N'oublions pas que les ac- cusations et les contre-accusations que nous aVQns entendues a ce sujet ont perdu toute importance des 1'instant ou les parties ont accepte les resolutions adoptees par la Commission des .Nations Uniespour l'lnde et le Pakistan le 13 aoiit 1948 et le 5 janvier 1949." [Ibid., par. 104.] 111. Le representant des Philippines aditegalement: "D'apres les resolutions de la Commission des Na- tions Unies pour 1'lnde et le Pakistan en date du 13 aoiit 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949, resolutions que 1'lnde et le Pakistan ont tous deux acceptees, on cherchera a determiner les vreux de la population. de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire par le moyen democratique d'un plebiscite libre et impartialtenu sous l'egide de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Les autres dis- positions des resolutions precitees sont clairement suboraonnees a cet objectif. Les dispositions rela- tives au cessez-le-feu et ala treve visent simple- ment a creer des conditions qui permettent de par- venir a ce but essentiel dans laliberte et l'harmonie. Quels que soient les changements survenus dans la situation depuis que le Conseil a adopte ces resolu- tions, j'estime que le principe sur lequel elles se fondent ne peut pas etre change parce qu'il est immuable." [Ibid.• par. 110.] ; 112. Le representant des Philippines, dans la suite de son intervention, a ajout~: "Le projet de r'esolution dont nous sommes saisis repond atoutes les exigences de la situation et, sans s'ecarter du chemin pratique et raisonnable que le Conseil de securite a toujours suivi jusqu'ici, il ouvre la voie, de maniere realiste, a un reglement qui devrait etre durable et definitif si les parties interessees sont animees du desir de vivre en paix cote a cote. " . "La proposition ne nous ecarte pas de la voie que nous avons suivie; elle reconnait qu'll est absolu- ment necessaire de demilitariser la region en litige et que cette demilitarisation est la condition prea- lable d'un veritable plebiscite. Aucun membre du Conseil ne. contestera que, la. ou il existe des condi- tions rappelant l'etat de guerre, un plebiscite est impossible. La premiere et la plus importante des "We can assume that one of the principal concerns of our President when he goes to the sub-continent is that the ground is properly laid for the untram- melled exercise 01 popular suffrage when the plan of a plebiscite, which is the Security Council's decision, is actually carried out. "Finally, the reference in the draft resolution to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan that a United Nations Force be assigned to Jammu and Kashmir as a temporary means toward the achievement of demilitarization is in line with my Government's views that the idea merits full con- sideration." [Ibid., paras. 118 to 121.] 113. I must apologize for these quotations, but I am going to draw a conclusion from them as regards the draft resolution. That is my only reason for quoting them. 114. The representative of China said: "Therefore, what this Jraft resolution tries to do is to further the implementation of the resolutions which the Council or the Commission has already adopted. The co-sponsors have told us and the language of the draft resolution states that all those resolutions stand. " ... So we have to devise a scheme to take care of these two requirements: first, the peace and security of the State during the plebiscite; and, second, that the force that maintains peace and security should not coerce or intimidate or give the appearance of intimidating the voters. These are the two require- ments that we must always keep in mind in solving this problem of demilitarization. "I do not know of a better way of meeting those two reqUirements simultaneously. With the temporary use of a United Nations force in Kashmir, we can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in that State during the pIebiscite. In the second place, the stationing of a temporary United Nations force in Kashmir cannot be suspected by anybody of intim- idating or coercing the voters to vote in favour of either of the two parties. Therefore, I find that this idea of a temporary United Nations force really deserves consideration." [Ibid., paras. 124 to 130.] 115. The representative of Iraq said the following- and this is the last quotation: "The whole issue centres around one major ques- tion, namely, that of the establishment of conditions "Nous pouvons etre certains que lorsque notre President se rendra dans la peninsule indienne I'une de ses principales preoccupations serad&s'assurer qu'on aura etabli dans cette region des conditions telles que le suffrage populaire pourra s'exprimer librement au moment du plebiscite decide par le Conseil de securite. "Enfin, en mentionnant une proposition du repre- sentant du Pakistan concernant l'envoidansl'Etatde Jammti et Cachemire d'une force des Nations Unies comme moyen temporaire pour-aider a realiser la demilitarisation, le projet de resolution exprime une idee conforme aux vues de mon gouvernement, qui pense qu'elle merite d'etre pleinementprise encon- sideration." [Ibid., par. 118 a 121.] 113. Je m'excuse de ces ci12.tions, mais je vais en tirer une conclusion qui interesse le projetde resolu- tion. C'est la seule raisonpourlaquellejeme permets de citer ces d~clarations. 114. Le representant de la Chine a dit: "Ainsi, ce projet de resolution cherche ::l assurer encore davantage la mise en ceuvre de resolutions deja. adoptees par le ConseU ou la Commission. Les auteurs du projet nous ont declare, et lestermes du projet le montrent, que toutes ces resolutions restent valables. "'" Nous devons donc elaborer un programmequi permettrait de concilier les deux exigences sui- vantes: maintien de la paix et de la securite dans l'Etat pendant le plebiscite; certitude que lesforces qui maintiennent la paix et la securite n'exercent aucune pre!3sion sur les votants, ne les intimident pas, et ne donnent pas l'impression de les inti- mider. Nous ne devons jamais perdre de vue ces deux exigences lorsque nous nous attaquons au probleme de la demilitarisation. "Je ne vois pas de meilleur moyen de concilier simultanement ces deux necessites. En utilisant tem- porairement une force des Nations Unies l\.U Cache- mire, nous pouvons aider a maintenir la paix et la securite dans cet Etat pendant le plebiscite. En outre, le stationnement d'une force temporaire des Nations Unies au Cachemire ne peut eveiller nulle suspicion d'intimidation ou de coercition exercee sur les electeurs pour les obliger a voter enfaveurde l'une ou l'autre des deux parties. C'est pourquoi j'estime que l'idee d'une force temporaire des Nations Unies merite certainement d'etre examinee." [Ibid., par. 124 a 130.] 115. Le representant de l'Irak a dit a son tour - et c'est le dernier membre du Conseil que je me per- mets de citer: "Tout revient i resoudre un probleme essentiel: arriver a creer des conditions qUi permettent de 116. The representative of Iraq then said: "':T'he passage of time hasneitherchangedtheprin- ciples upon which the future of Kashmir was to be decided nor has made the method of a plebiscite less applicable now than it was eight years ago." [Ibid., para. 21.] 117. The representative of Iraq concluded his state- ment as follows: "We believe that the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787] contains all the elements necessary at the moment for taking certain positive steps in the solution of the Kashlilir dispute." [Ibid.? para.27.] 118. The Government of Pakistan is grateful to the members of the Security Council for the clarifications of the draft resolution whichthey have been kind enough to give publicly. In view of these clarifications t I take great pleasure in informing the Security Council that my Government would accept the draft resolution that is now before the Security Council and has authorized me to assurethe Security Council that the distinguished President of the Council will receive all possible co- operation from the Government of Pakistan in his difficult and responsible task. 119. My Government has complete confidence in the ability and impartiality of the President of the Security Councilt Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring, Ambassador of Sweden. Let us hope that his mission, which is to bring about demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, preparatory to the holding of a plel;Jiscite under the auspices of the United Nations to determine the question of the acceSsion pf the State to India or Pakistan, shall succeed. 120. My Government is happy that the Security Council has noted the proposal that a United Nations force be sent to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in orqer to facilitate its demilitarization in accordance with the terms of the international agreement. I would humbly submit, once again, that in our view this is a good way of making progress towards the agreed objective t namely, the plebiscite. Over the course of the last eight years the Government of India has rejected, one after another, eleven proposals to bring about the demilitarization of the State. The various procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter have been tried without success. If the situation is not to erupt into a catastrophe, something positive must be done to demil- itarize the State thus making it possible for the ple- biscite to be held without further delay. 121. Mr. Menon has said, and I quote him: ~tait tres clair, s'est parfois trouv~ obscurci par l'introduction dans la discussion d'un certain nombre d'elements qui lui ~taientetrangers et n'avaient par- fois aucun rappv~t avec lui." [76geme seance, par. 17.] 116. Le representant de l'lrak a dit ensuite: "Le temps ecoule n'a ni change les principes dont devra s'inspirer toute decision sur l'avenir du Cachemire, ni rendu la m~thode du pl~biscitemoins applicable a pr~sent qu'elle ne l'~taitil y a huit ans." [Ibid., par. 21.] 117. Le repr~sentant de I'Irak a declare pour con- clure: "Nous sommes convaincus que le projet de r~so­ lution presente par l'Australie, Cuba, les Etats-Unis d'Am~rique et le Royaume-Uni [S/3787J contienttous les ~lements qui sont actuellement n~cessairespour prendre certaines mesures positives en vue de par- venir au reglement du differend relatif au Cache- mire." [Ibid., par. 27.] 118. Le Gouvernement pakistanais remercie les membres du Conseil de securite des precisions qu'lls ont bien voulu officiellement donner au sujet duprojet de resolution. Maintenant que ces precisions ont ete apportees, je puis faire savoir au Conseil de securite que mon gouvernement acceptera le projet de resolu- tion dont le Conseil est saisi, et qu'il m'a autorise a donner au Conseill'assurance qU'il fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour aider le President dans l'ac- complissement de sa mission delicate et lourde de responsabilites. 119. Mon gouvernement a entiere confiance dans la competence et l'impartialite du President du Conseil de securite, M. Gunnar V. Jarring, ambassadeur de Suede. Souhaitons que sa mission, qui est d'amener la demilitarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire afin qu'un plebiscite ait lieu sous les auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour trancher la question du rattachementdel'Etatal'lndeouau Pakis- tan, soit couronnee de succes. 120. Mon gouvernement est heureux de constater que le Conseil de securite a pris note de la propositicn tendant a envoyer une force des Nations Unies daus l'Etat de Jammu et Cacbemire afin de faciliter sa d~militarisation conformement aux dispositions de l'accord internationaL Je voudrais dire une fois de plus que, a notre aVis, c'est la un bon moyen de pro- gresser vers l'objectif convenu, c'est-a-dire vers le plebiscite. Au cours des huit dernieres annees, le Gou- vernement indien a rejett~ rune apres l'autre 11 pro- positions qui avaient pour objet d'assurer la demili- tarisation de l'Etat. Les diverses procedures enoncees au Chapitre VI de la Charte ont ete essayees sans succes. Si l'on veut eviter que la situation ne degenere en catastrophe, il faut prendre des mesures positives pour demilitariser l'Etat, de maniere que le plebiscite puisse avoir lieu sans plus de retard. 121. M. Menon a dit - et je me permets de le citer: 122. Mr. Krishna Menon is a clever lawyer. He has left sufficient scope in these words to argue when he returns, after having agreed to everything, to say, "The meaning of my words were 'our territory', which was Indian territory but not Kashmir territory-whichwas not our territory." Therefore we should not be dis- mayed by the use ofthese words by Mr. Menon because he has left a loop-hole for himself. 123. The distinguished representative of India has also raised objectionswith regard to the United Nations force on the score that it may not succeed in demil- itarizing the area. We have never suggested that the force will go round the army barracks in Kashmir and force the troops to surrender their arms. The disarm- ing and disbanding of forces is under the terms of the international agreement the responsibility of the representative or the Plebiscite Administrator, as the case may be. The object of the entry-and I specially draw the attention of the honourable member of the Soviet Union-of a United Nations force is simply to create confidence in the minds of the two sides which should enable them to proceed without fear to the dis- charge· of their obligations under the international agreement. As soon as the United Nations force enters Kashmir, both sides must, strictly according to the terms of the international agreement, start with- draWing their forces, which operationwould be followed by disbandment of the "Azad" Kashmir forces and further reduction in the forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. 124. Now, this thing must be clearly understood, that this United Nations force is going into Kashmir with the consent of both parties, in the sense that both parties have agreed to demilitarize, and both parties have agreed to withdraw their forces. It is in pursuance of that agreement which has been made by India and Pakistan before you here, for demilitarization, tha.t this force is going. Therefore, for anyone to think or imagine that this force is going against the wishes of the people of Kashmir, or of India, or of Pakistan, would be wrong. 125. If India said today: "We will not admitthe force", then it would be going against its agreement made before the Council that they will demilitarize. This force is now being sent there from the Pakistan side to occupy the frontiers, to prevent war between the two, and to remove fear from the mind of each that the other will invade ifthey withdraw. Therefore, when this United Nations force has gone to the cease-fire line, then India, haVing already agreed to withdl'aw its forces according to the resolution-internationaltreaty, I call it-must withdraw. Therefore if anybody argues, andI want to address this point to Mr. Sobolev, that these troops are going there-forced on India-he is wrong. We are agreeing to it, and India has already agreed to demilitarization, therefore its consent is presumed. 1I 122. M. Menon est un juriste habile. n s'est exprime de maniere assez vague pourpouvoir dire, lorsqu'U re- viendra sur cette question apres avoir donne son ac- cord sur tous les points: "En disant "notre territoire", je voulais parler du territoire de l'Inde et non de"celui du Cachemire, qui n'est pas territoire indien." Il ne faut done pas se laisser deconcerter par cette decla- ration de M. Menon, car il s'est exprime de maniere a se menagel' une issue. 123. L'eminent representant de l'Inde a egalement formule des objections contre l'envoi d'une force des Nations Unies en faisant valoir qU'il se peut que cette force ne parvienne pas a demUitariser la region. Nous n'avons jamais dit que cette force iraitinspectertoates les casernes du Cachemire pour obligeI' les troupes a deposer les armes. Aux termes de l'accord intersa- tional, c'est au representant des Nations Unies ou a l'Administrateur du plebiscite, selon le cas, qu'il in- combe d'assurer la dissolution et ledesarmementdes forces. L'intervention d'une force des Nations Unies- et je me permets d'attirer particulierement sur ce point l'attention du representant de l'Unionsovietique- a uniquement pour objet de creel' un climat de con- fiance qui permette aux deux parties de s'acquitter sans crainte des obligations que leur fait l'accord in- ternational. Des que la force des Nations Unies pene- trera au Cachemire, les deux parties devront, ainsi que le prevoit expressement l'accord international, commencer a retirel' leurs forces, operation qui sera suivie par la dissolution des forces du Cachemire "azad" et par une nouvelle reduction des forces se trouvant du cote indien de la ligne de demarcation. 124. Il doit etre bien entendu que cette force des Na- tions Unies se rend at< Cachemire avec l'assentiment des deux parties, puisque les deux parties ont accepte la demilitarisation ainsi que le retrait de leurs forces. C'est en execution de cet accord de demilitarisation que l'Inde et le Pakistan ont conclu ici meme que cette force penetrera au Cachemire. Par consequent, qui- conque penserait qu'elIey est envoyee contre la volonte de la population du Cachemire, ou contre la vOlonte de l'Inde ou du Pakistan, .serait dans l'erre"r. 125. Si I'Inde disait aujourd'hui "nous ~'".nc;,pterons pas la presence de cette force", elIe.. 'rmnaftrait l'engagement pris devant le Conseil de demilitariseI'. Cette force se rendra sur place pour occuper les frontieres, pour empecher une guerre entre les deux parties, et pour que chacune des parties n'ait pas a. craindre que l'autre n'occupe le territoire qu' elle aura evacue. En consequence, lorsque la force des Nations Unies sera arrivee a la ligne de demarcation, l'Inde, qui a deja accepte de retirel' sesforcesconformement a la resolution - que j'appelIe traite international - devra quitter le territoire. n serait donc faux de pre- tendre - je fais cette remarque a l'intention de M. Sobolev - que ces troupes se rendent dans l'Inde pour imposer une solution. Nous acceptons l'envoi de 127. Therefore the question of forcing the troops into that area does not arise. If anybody has been arguing- especially the Russian delegate-I hope he will bear in mind my interpretation of the request for troops: that it is the willingness ofthe parties to receive the troops that will take the troops there. If India is fighting and will not in any case allow the United Nations troops to go there, then we may not be willing to allow our troops to move out in order to make room for the United Nations troops unless India has also agreed. Therefore we must help the President in solvingthis problem. We must give him a chance. We must give him this auth- ority. When he has been to New Delhi, then he will return to report to you and there will be sufficient time for every member of the Security Council to reconsider this matter in connexion with the troops. At the moment we are only authorizing the President to go and to negotiate with India to find out wheL'1er India is Willing to receive the troops or not, and if so, on what conditions; and if it is not, how are they going to implement the international treaty? 128. Nothing is going to happen with regard to these troops until the President returns and reports to you on the opinion ofIndiawith respect to this subject. Then the Council will have plenty of time to assess the sit- uation and consider this point. I am saying this because yesterday a certain :rumour was spread by a certain quarter-which did not come from the Soviet Union, I know. That is why I felt it necessary to explain the question in this way since I did not have an opportunity of seeing the representative of the Soviet Union to explain this to him before. The troops are not being 129. The Council also has before it the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union with respect to the draft resolution [S/3789]. The decision on these amendments as well as the draft resolution is, ofcourse, one for the Security Council. We have given carefulconsideration to these amendments and suggest, with due respect,that, if adopted, the Soviet Union amendments would remove from the resolution an authoritative and valuable pro- nouncement on the present status of the dispute and the lines along which a solution must be sought. The sig- nificant area of agreement between India and Pakistan which the Security Council is seekingto buildwould be overlooked if the Soviet Union amendments were accepted. The usefulness of the purpose of a United Nations force which, though unexplored, has certain distinct possibilities, would be ignored. 130. Further, these amendments would severely restrict the authority of the President of the Security Council in seeking to develop proposals forthedemil- itarization of the State. The draft resoll'tion speaks of examining proposals which in the President's opinion are likely to contribute to the achievement of demil- itarization. The amendments restrict the President to examining the present situation and the progress that can be made. The Soviet Union amendments wouldun- fortunately remove the deadline date for the Pres- ident's report on demilitarization-a provision which my Government considers vital in view of the present mounting tension over this dispute. 131. Mr. Krishna Menon, in the course of his last intervention, has tried to differentiate betweenthe case of Algeria and Kashmir [769th meeting, para. 112], but I cannot follow his arguments. Did he mean to convey to the Security Council that because Algeria was con- quered by the French some 130years ago it has earned the right of liberation and self-determination, whereas Kashmir was conquered by Indian troops only nine years ago and therefore the struggle for liberation by these people cannot be rated on a par with the struggle for liberation of the Algerian people? Or is it that because the people of Kashmir, having placedtheir faith in the Security Council, have, undergreatprovocation, refrained from reacting violently against the Indian forces of occupation, Mr. Menon does not consider them to be human beings worthy of the name?Is Mr. Menon waiting for Kashmir to erupt like Algeriabefore he will concede that the move for liberation by t!le people of that area is on the march? 132. The fact is that Kashmir did erupt some nine years ago butfailed to engulf India because the Security Council solemnly promised to its people a fair and just solution through peaceful means. If that promise is not kept and if that solution is not allowed to go through, 129. Le Conseil est egalement saisi des amende- ments au projet de resolution qui ont ete proposes par le representant de l'Union sovietique [S/3789]. Il appartient evidemment au Conseil de se prononcer sur ces amendements comme sur le projetlui-meme. J'ai examine attentlvement ces amendements et je me permets de faire remarquer qu'en les adoptant on sup- primerait de la resolution les affirmations autorisees et precieuses qu'elle contient au sujet de l'etat actuel du differend et des principes dont on doit s'inspirer pOur parveniraune solution. Adopter ces amendements serait meconnaitre le terrain d'entente que le Conseil de securite cherche aetablir entre 1'Inde et le Pakistan; ce serait meconnaftre l'utilite d'une force des Nations Unies, qui offre des possibilites certaines, bien qu'encore inexplorees. 130. En outre. l'adoption de ces amendements aurait pour effet de restreindre considerablement les pou- voirs qui ont ete accordes au President du Conseil de securite pour lui permettre de mettre au point des propositions en vue de la demilitarisation de l'Etat. Aux termes du projet de resolution, il s'agit d'exa- miner les propositions qui, del'avisduPresident, sont de nature II contribuer a la demilitarisation de l'Etat. Si les amendements etaient adoptes, le President aurait seulement pour tache d'examiner la situation actuelle et les progr~s qu'il est possible de faire. De plus, si l'on adoptait ces amendements, il ne serait plus question de la date limite avant laquelle le Presi- dent doit presenter son rapport sur la demilitarisatibn, disposition qui, de l'avis duGouvernementpakistanais, est d'importance capitale en raison de la tension croissante que provoque actuellement le differend. 131. Je rappellerai, pour terminer, qu'au cours de sa derni~re intervention, M. Krishna Menon a essaye d'etablir une distinction entre la situationde l'Algerie et celle du Cachemire [769~meseance,par.112].Pour ma part, je ne puis suivre son argumentation. A-t-il voulu indiquer au Conseil queparcequel'Algeriea ete conquise par les Fran~ais il y a environ 130 ans elle a acquis le droit de se liberer et de decider de son avenir, tandis iIue, du fait q..le le Cachemire a ete conquis par les troupes indiennes ily a neuf ans seule- ment, la lutte menee par le peuple de cet Etat pour sa liberation ne peut pas etre comparee II celle que m~ne le peuple algerien? Ou serait-ce que, du fait que la population du Cachemire, qui aplacesaconfiancedans le Conseil de securite, s'est abstenue, en depit de graves provocations, de toute manifestation violente contre les forces d'occupation indiennes, M. Menonne la' considere pas comme composee d'etres humains dignes de ce nom? M. Menon attend-il que le Cache- mire se soul~ve comme l'Algerie pour reconnaftre qu'il existe un mouvement de liberationpopulairedans cette region? 132. En realite, le Cachemires'estsouleveilya neuf ans environ, mais l'Inde n'a pas euaen subir les con- sequences parce que le Conseil de securite a promis solennellement ala population du Cachemire que l'on parviendrait, par des moyens pacifiques, IIune solution 133. I am most grateful to the President and the members of the Council for having listened to me patiently, because I fully realize that my speech has been quite a long one this morning, which is unusual, and which the Council does not expect from me.

The Security Council has heard statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan, and by members of the Council, on the question of Kashmir. The Soviet Union's general position on this question was outlined at the Security Council's meeting on 24 January [765th meeting, paras. 81 to 88]. 135. The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actualfact already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir them- selves, who consider their territory an integralpart of the Republic of India. HaVing attained their rights as an autonomous State within the united family of Indian peoples, the people of Kashmir have assumed an active part in the peaceful constructive work in which the whole country is engaged, and have.scored considerable successes in the field of economic, social, cultural and political development. 136. Some states, however, do not want to acknowledge the great changes which have come about in Kashmir in the last few years. They continue to foment an artificial hue and cry on the subject of the so-called "Kashmir question" in order to force the reconsidera- tion of the deCision taken by the people of Kashmir themselves. This hue and cry will in no way help to bring about the re-establishment of normal cor..ditions in the area, and it is diametrically opposedto the vital interests both of the people of Kashmir and of the peoples of India and pakistan. The object of those who started this hue and cry is not to find a solution to the differences still outstanding between India and Pak- istan, but rather to aggravate them. In fact, they are urging the Security Council along the same path, by calling on it to ignore the changes thathave taken place in Kashmir and to try to force the solution of the Kashmir question into the Procrustean bed of the old resolutions. 137. The Security Council would be committing a serious mistake if itwere to recommend any measures whatsoever without taking into account the extent to which they corresponded to the true situation and the vital"interests of the people of Kashmir. 138. The Security Council cannot ignore the facts which have been placed before it notably in the state- ment made by the representative of India. The facts show that in the many years that have passed since the Security Council adopted its resolutions on the holding of a plebiscite, the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably. We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now meets with the objections of one of the parties; that it has in fact been rejected by that party. At the present time, the holding of a 133. Je remercie le President et les membres du Conseil de securite de la patience avec laquelle ils m'ont ecoute. Je reconnais que j'ai prononce cematin un discours qui aura sans doute quelque peu surpris le Conseil, car je n'ai pas l'habitude d'etre aussi long. 134. M. SOBOLEV (Uniondes Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]: Le Conseilde securite a entendu les declarations que les representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan, ai~si que les membres du Con- seil, ont faites au sujet de la question du Cachemire. L'attitude generale de l'Union sovietique dans cette question a deja ete expusee le 24 janvie:- [765eme seance, par. 81 a 88]. 135. L'Union sovietique estime que la question du Cachemire a deja ete regMe, au fond, par le peuple cachemirien lUi-meme, qui considere son territoire comme etanf partie integrante de la Republique in- dienne. Entre avec le statut d'Etat autonome dans la grande famille des peuples de l'Inde, le peuple du Cachemire s'est associe activement au travail de construction pacifique qui anime tout le pays, et il a. remporte des succes considerables en matiere eco- nomique, sociale, culturelle et politique. 136. Cependant, certains Etats ne veulent pas temr compte des grands changements qui se sont produits, ces dernieres annees, au Cachemire. lis continuent a entretenir une agitation artificielle autour de ce qu'ils appellent "la question du Cachemire", afin de provo- quer une revision de la decision qui a ete prise par le peuple cachemirien lUi-meme. Cette ·campagne tapageuse ne peut en aucune fa~oncontribuer a norma- liser la situation dans cette region et elle est abso- lument contraire aux interets vitaux tant du peuple du Cachemire que des peuples de 1'Inde et du Pakistan. Les- instigateurs de cette campagne cherchent nonpas a regler les differends qui subsistent entre "1'Inde et le Pakistan, mais ales aggraver. En fait, Hs vou- draient entrainer dans cette meme voie le Conseil de securite, en lui demandant de ne tenir aucun compte des changements survenus au Cachemire et de recou- rir, pour regler cette question du Cachemire, au lit de Procuste des anciennes resolutions. 137. Le Conseil de securite commettrait une grave erreur s'il s'avisait de recommander des mesures sans se soucier de savoir si ceS mesures repondent a la situation reelle et aux interets vitaux du peuple cachemirien. 138. Le Conseil de securite ne peut fermer les yeux sur les faits qui ont ete cites, notamment par le repre- sentant de l'Inde. I1 est certain que de nombreuses annees se sont ecou1.ees depuis l'adoption des resolu- tions dans lesquelles le Conseil envisageait un ple- biscite, et que la situation dans la region du Cache- mire a beaucoup change. On ne doit pas perdre de vue que l'idee d'un plebiscite au Cachemire se _.eurte actuellement aux objections, et meme a l'opposition formelle, de l'une des parties. Organiser actuelle- 139. Nor, in our opinion would there be any point in making a reference in the resolution to the Pakistan representative's proposal concerning the use of United Nations forces in the Kashmir region. The United Nations Charter provides clearly and unambiguously that United Nations armed forces can be used only to repel aggression and to restore international peace. The Charter of the United Nations makes no provision for the use of armed forces for any other purpose. It goes without saying that the Charter does not provide for the use of United Nations forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any country. Thus, the introduction of a United Nations force into Kashmir would be completely at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and would be an outright insult to the national sentiments of the people of Kashmir. 140. That being so, the Soviet Union delegation will vote against the inclusion in the draft resolution of any provisions which do not correspond to the true situation in the Kashmir area, whichfail to take into account the vital interests of the people of Kashmir or which are at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 141. The Soviet delegation would however be prepared to support proposals calling for the suspension for a certain time of the Council's consideration ofthe Kash- mir question. During that time the members of the Council could study the documents which have accumu- lated, and the parties directly concerned could make a further effort to settle their differences by means of direct negotiation. 142. In the Soviet delegation's opinion, the parties are 142. A notre avis, les parties sontloind'avoirepuise far from having exhausted all the possibilities for a toutes les possibilites d'un reglement pacifique de la peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question by means question du Cachemire par la methode de negociations of bilateral negotiations, without outside intervention bilaterales et sans aucune intervention etrangere. of any sort. Such a procedure would be fully in keeping Cette voie est entierement conforme aux principes de with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as la Charte des Nations Unies et elle repond aux inte- also with the interests of the people of Kashmir and of rets du peuple du Cachemire comme a ceux des the people of India and Pakistan. peuples de l'Inde et du Pakistan. 143. The sponsors of the draft resolution have told 143. Les au.:eurs du projet de resolution des quatre us that the purpose of the resolution is to try a new- puissances nous ont dit ici que la resolution avait and I would stress the word "new"-approachtofinding pour but d'essayer une methode nouvelle - je dis a peaceful settlement of the differences between India bien nouvelle - propre a regler pacifiquement les and Pakistan. This new approach consists in requesting differends qui subsistent entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Mr. Jarring, the President of the Security Council, to Cette methode nouvelle consiste acharger M. Jarring, go to the area and examine with the Governments of president du Conseil de securite, de se rendre sur India and Pakistan the situation in Kashmir and possible place et d'examiner avec les Gouvernements de l'Inde ! indeed the purpose of the draft resolution, there can be mire, ainsi que les methodes qui permettraient de i no objection to it. In that case, however, there is no regler leur differend. Si tel est le but du projet de I need to lie Mr. Jarring's hands hy proposal' which, 39 r~solulion, nous n'y voyons pas d'ohjeclion. Maladans i means of settling the eXisting differences. If this is et du Pakistan la situation qui s'est creee au Cache- 140. Pour ces motifs, la delegation de l'Union so- vietique s'opposera a l'insertion, dans la resolution, de dispositions qui ne repondent pas a la situation reelle dans la region du Cachemire, qui ne tiennent pas compte des interets vitaux du peuple du Cache"- mire ou qui sont contraires auxprincipes de la Charte des Nations Unies. 141. En revanche, la delegation sovietique est prete a appuyer des propositions qui permettraient au Con- seil de suspendre pour quelque temps l'examen de la question du Cachemire. Les membres du Conseil pourraient utiliser ce laps de temps pour etudier la documentation qui s'est accumulee; de leur cote, les parties interessees pourraient en profiter pourtenter encore une fois de regler leurs divergences par des negociations directes. 144. The representative of Colombia, Mr. Urrutia, has made a very interesting proposal here. If! under- stood him rightly, he proposes that the preamble to the draft resolution, with the exception of the first para- graph, should be deleted [768thmeeting, para. 86]. The delegation of the Soviet Union supports this idea; how- ever, it would be desirable to modify not only the preamble but also operative paragraph 1, by deleting from it any proposals to which objections have been raised. 145. The delegation of the Soviet Union therefore presents the following amendments [S/3789] to the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787]: "1. Replace the preamble by the follOWing text: " 'Having heard the statements of the represeata- tives of the Governments of India and Pakistan.' "2. Amend paragraph 1 of the operative part to read as follows: . " 'Requests ilie President of the Security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with -the Governments of India and Pakistan the situation in respect of Jammu and Kashmir, and to consider the progress that can be made towards the settlement of the problem, bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan;" "3. In paragraph 3 of the operativepartdelete the words: 'but not later than 15 April 1957'. The last amendment is to delete the reference to a specific date for the presentation of the report. Mr. Jarring should be at libertyto presenthis report when- ever he deems it appropriate. 146. These amendments are intended to remove from the draft resolution such provisions as have been objected to by one of the parties directly concerned, while retaining the nucleus of the proposal, as we understand it, namely, the request to the President of the Security Council to examine the situation in Kash- mir with the Governments of India andPakistan and to report to the Security Council. 147. The delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that these amendments will be accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution and supported by the other mem- bers of the Security CounCil. The delegation of the Soviet Union is of course :ready to discuss with the sllonsors of the joint draft resolution the best way of including in it the idea underlying the Soviet amend- ments. 40 The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m. 144. Le repr~sentant de la Colombie, M. Urrutia, a fait une proposition int~ressante. Si nous l'avons bien compris, il propose de supprimer tout le pre- ambule du projet de r~solution,a l' exception du pre- mier alin~a [768~me s~ance, par. 86]. La d~l~gation de l'Union sovi~tique appuie cette id~e, mais il lui parait souhaitable de modifier non seulement le pr~­ ambule, mais aussi le paragraphe premier du dis- positif, afin d'y supprimer ce qui a donn~ lieu a des objections. 145. En cons~quence, la del~gation de l'Union so- vi~tique propose d'apporter les amendements suivants [8/3789] au projet de resolution pr~sente par l'Aus- tralie, Cuba, les Etats-Unis d'Am~rique et le Royau- me-Uni [8/3787]: "1. Remplacer le pr~ambulepar le texte suivant: "Ayant entendu les expos~s des repr~sentantsdu Gouvernement indien et du Gouvernement pakista- nais". "2. Donner au paragraphe 1 du dispositif la rMac- tion suivante: "Demande au President du Conseil de securite, representant de la Su~de, d'examiner avec le Gou- vernement indien et le Gouvernement pakistanais la situation en ce qui concerne le Jammu et Cache- mire et d'etudier les progres qu'il est possible de faire vers un r~glement du probleme, en tenant compte des exposes des representants du Gouver- nement indien et du Gouvernement pakistanais". "3. Supprimer, au paragraphe 3 du dispositif, le membre de phrase suivant: "et au plus tard le 15 avrilI957". Le dernier amendement vise a ne fixer aucun delai pour la presentation du rapport. M. Jarring pourra lui-meme d~terminer ce delai en fonction des cir- constances. 146. Nos amendements ont pour but d'~carter du projet de resolution les dispositions qui soulevent une objection de la part de l'une ou de l'autre des parties directement interessees tout en conservant ce qui nous parait etre la proposition essentielle, a. savoir celle qui charge le President du Conseil de securite d'examiner avec le Gouvernement indien et le Gouvernement pakistanais la situation qui s'est creee au Cachemire, et de faire rapport au Conseil de s~cuFite. 147. La delegation de l'Union sovietique espere que ces amendements auront l'approbation des auteurs du projet de resolution- et celle des autres membres du Conseil de securite. La delegation de l'Union sovie- tique est prete, bien entendu, a examiner, en consul- tation avec les auteurs du projet de resolution com- mun, quelle serait la. meilleure fa<;on d'incorporer dans le projet de resolution l'idee qui est a la base des amendements qu' elle propose. La seance est levee a 13 h. 5. 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