S/PV.777 Security Council

The Australian delegation is glad that the Security Council is meeting today, at the request of the United States representative, to consider the stage reached in negotiations regarding the use of the now reopened Suez Canal. We believe that it is right that members of the Security Council should at this time express their views on this matter of such world-wide concern, affecting, as it does, not only the people of Egypt and the Middle East, but also countries aIl over the world, including my own country, Australia. 2. As we understand what has been happening over recent months regarding the arrangements for the 3. On behalf of the Australian Government, 1 desire to welcome the initiative which was taken by the United States in undertaking these negotiations in Caîro and to express our warm appreciation of the patient efforts which the United States Government has made in the general interest. We also applaud the action of the United States Government in reporting to the Security Council on these negotiations, so that members of the Council might have an opportunity of reviewing the present situation. 4. The Security Council has a continuing responsibility in this matter following its unanimous adoption on 13 October 1956 of a resolution [8/3615] endorsing the six principles that had been agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, the United Kingdom and France as the requirements of any settlement of the Suez question. As the Council left the matter at that time, it was our hope that the Egyptian Government would bring forward for international consideration detailed proposaIs for a system that would satisfy these six requirements. "We have now received not set of proposaIs but a unilateral declaration by the Egyptian Government on the arrangements which it intends to apply to the operation of the Canal. In this Declaration the Egyptian Government accepts certain international obligations, and it has requested the Secretary-General to register the Declaration as an international instrument, presumably under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, which makes provision for the registration of international agreements. We note from the Secretary-general's letter of 24 April 1957 [8/3819] that the Declaration has been registered under Article 102 of the Charter. We also noted the statement of the representative of Egypt this morning that the Egyptian Government considers this Declaration, with the obligations contained in it, as constituting an international instrument. We would have been interested to hear a firmer undertaking that the Declaration is regarded by the Egyptian Government as constituting a binding engagement of a permanent nature. 5. In the view of the Australian delegation, both the procedure adopted by the Egyptian Government and the actual contents of the Egyptian Declaration still fall short of providing the sort of international - ! 6. 1 have said that the Australian delegation finds the Egyptian Declaration unsatisfactory both as regards procedure and as regards content. From the procedural point of view, the mere registration of the Declaration with the Secretariat does not, in our view, alter its unilateral nature; nor does it give to the Declaration any more force than any other official declaration of the Egyptian Government. True, the obligati~ns accepted therein may be invoked by others against the Egyptian Government so long as Egypt continues to recognize those obligations, but they may ?also be revoked at any time by the Egyptian Government. Even if the contents of the Declaration were adequate, taken by itself it would still fail to provide the same degree of assurance to users of the Canal as would a regular international agreement. The present Declaration is simply the most recent unilateral action in a series of unilateral actions by Egypt. The question is whether it will be the last. How are we to know, for example, whether the Egyptian statute setting up its Suez Canal authority will not ! ~e unilaterally amended by Egypt, perhaps making ~C~cOmparabI:f::~m:I.:~iththe~r:vlS1::~. 7. It has not yet been possible for the Australian Government to give the Egyptian Declaration a detailed examination, but, on a first reading, it would seem that in aIl essential respects it is a statement of a position which has not progressed much beyond that adopted by Egypt at the time of the illegal nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. The Declaration either ignores or glosses over the modifications which might have been expected in Egypt's attitude following its acceptance of the Security Council's six requirements and the correspondence which took place between the Secretary- General and Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt [8/3728]. Although the Declaration contains a number of undertakings that might weIl be covered in an agreement, it still leaves much to be desired. 8. The Australian delegation does not regard the Egyptian D~clarationas providing an adequate embodiment of the six requirements which the Security Council unanimously agreed on 13 October 1956 should be met in any settlement of the Suez question. 1 might add that the Australian Government regards these six principles, which Egypt accepted at the time and which were later elaborated in the correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Foreign Minister as an essential minimum. In our view, these six principles were the requirements governing arrangements under which the Security Couneil considered this great international public utility of world-wide importance should be operated in the interests of world' commerce. It remains our view that the users of the Suez Canal are still entitled to rely upon ultimate Egyptian implementation of these six requirements - whieh are not fully met in the present Egyptian Declaration - and W" also contend that, under the Charter, these six principles, having been unanimously endorsed by the Security Council, must carry very great force in the approach adopted by an Members of the United Nations. 9. The Declaration does not really satisfy the third of the Security Council's six requirements - insulation from the politics of any country - except to the extent that the Declaration reaffirms the Convention of 1888. The Australian Government is convinced that something better than this is ultimately required if account is taken of past breaches of the Convention of 1888 by Egypt and its denial to Israel of passage through the Canal in defiance of the Security Council 1 For an English translation of the Convention, see Sir Edward Hertslet, ed. A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions... between Great Britain and Foreign Powers... London, Butterworths, 1893, vol. XVIII, p. 369. 10. So far as the fixing of tolls is concerned, it is obvious that the Egyptian Declaration does not satisfy the fourth of the Security Council's requirements, which states that "the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users". The procedure suggested for the settlement of disputes is also unsatisfactory since the position of countries not parties to the Convention of 1888 would appear to be that they are to have no recourse at aIl except, apparently, when the dispute concerns discrimination and complaints arising out of the Canal Code. 11. We also find the meaning of certain parts of the Declaration far from clear. This points up again how unsatisfactory it is to have a great international utility governed by arrangements fixed by means of unilateral declarations. How are countries that are forced to use the Canal under these arrangements to know what the Declaration means? Are they to accept the position that Egypt having made the Declaration will be the sole authority entitled to interpret it authenticallY? To this it may be replied that the Declaration contains provisions for references in certain cases to an international tribunal or to the International Court. IncidentaIly, it has not so far been clarified as to whether the Egyptian Government, by its present Declaration, is formally accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, or whether it intends to deposit in the near future another instrument accepting the Court's jurisdiction in relation to matters arising out of this Declaration. But if these bodies did in fact have matters referred to them involving interpretation of the Declaration, and if they came up with an interpretation thatwas unsatisfactory to Egypt, what possible guarantee is there that Egypt would not then unilaterally amend the Declaration, which it made unilaterally in the first place, so as to bring it into line with its own interpretation as opposed to any interpretation put . upon it by an international authority? 12. For example, we should like to known what paragraph 9 (a) of the Egyptian Declaration, which refers to settlement of disputes or disagreements "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ", is to mean in practice? Does it mean that such matters will be referred to the Security Council? We aIl know what a protection can be afforded in such circumstances hy the veto in the hands of a permanent member of the Security Council willing to use it to serve political ends. Or does this mean that such matters will be referred to the General Assembly? 1 cannot say that such a prospect can satisfy my delegation in cases where the point at issue may be the interpretation 14. My delegation is also concerned over the arrange·· ments regarding the future development of the Canal as set out in the Egyptian Declaration. As we see it, there is no guarantee that the 25 pel' cent of aIl gross receipts to be set aside for developmental purposes will in aIl circumstances be fully utilized for development. What provision is there in the Declaration for recourse by users of the Canal if Egypt does not use aIl of these so-caIled development funds for developmental purposes? 1 can find none. \/ 15. 1 do not propose to prolong at this stage my examination of the deficiencies of the Egyptian Declaration. 1 have said enough, 1 believe, to make two things clear. In the first place, the resumption of use of the Canal by shippers under the pressure of economic need should not be regarded as acceptance or endorsement of the Declaration as it stands. If the users of the Canal are obliged to take account of these arrangements in order to pass through the Canal, this should only be on a de facto basis, pending the negotiation of a proper international agreement providing a more faithful expressioI). of the six principles approved by the Security Council, an agreement more appropriate" to the requirements of international waterwaysXln the second place, the Security Council " should be ready to take any necessary steps to facilitate the early pursuit of negotiations to that end; and the Australian delegation would be willing to discuss with other like-minded delegations the best means to bring this about. 1 would hope that this latter course of further negotiations would commend itself not only to my colleagues in the Council but also to the Government of Egypt. 16. 1 have recently been looking over the statistics Qf world trade in recent years and the volume of cargoes - both dry cargoes and oil - that have moved through the Canal; and 1 have been greatly struck by the dramatic expansion of traffic in recent years and the enormous potentiality for future expansion, if favourable conditions can be secured. If we look, for instance, at south-north traffic through the Canal, we find that by 1947 the best pre-war years had been overtaken and, in the following eight years to 1955, the tonnage of traffic had quadrupled itself. 1 have seen estimates - apparently careful and conservative ones - which suggest that this 1955 tonnage could quadruple itself again by 1972. 1 say again it could quadruple itself; but it obviously will not, unless there is an appropriate expansion of the Canal's capacity; and that will need 17. If the possibilities for expanding the traffic of the Canal are to be realized, there will be a great need for international capital investment. Will international capital be available for investment in the Canal in the absence of a satisfactory international agreement about the future operation of the Canal? The answer is obvious. If the present uncertainty and insecurity are prolonged, the international capital needed for the Canal's development is more likely to be diverted into other projects designed to make world commerce less vulnerable to the policies of those who control the Canal - projects such as pipelines, large tankers, and even alternative sources of power to replace oil. 18. These are just the facts of life. It would seem to me a matter of elementary prudence for Egypt's rulers to take account of them, and to seek the path of international co-operation ratller than a chauvinistic and onerous self-sufficiency. • 19. Ml'. AL-SHABANDAH (Iraq): Ever since July 1956, when the crisis of Suez suddenly erupted, Iraq has been watching the development of this situation with the closest attention. Our concern in this matter must be abundantly clear to aIl. As an Arab and major oil-producing country of the Middle East, we are vitally interested in the preservation of peace and stability in the area, and are at the same time anxious to see that Egypt's legitimate rights are upheld and its sovereignty respec.ted. 20. We made our views known when the crisis began last summer, ane! we abide by them now. It is our firm belief that in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company Egypt acted entirely within its legal rights. We have no second thoughts on this subject. We recognize, aS indeed Egypt has recognized from the very beginning, that, although the Canal runs through Egyptian territory, its operation is of vital international concern. As we saw it, the main differences centred on the questions relating to the methods of operation. In view of this, it was our firm belief and hope that the question would be settled by negotiations, given sufficient goodwill and patience. These qualities were displayed in ample measure last October when the Foreign Ministers of several members of the Council met here. The private talks held between the Foreign IVIinisters of Egypt, the United Kingdom and France succeeded in producing agreement on the six principles which were approved by the Council on 13 October 1956. octobre gères réunis lieu britannique principes tobre 21. At that time most of us looked with optimism to the future. It was our fervent hope that the qualities 21. sageaient 22. That such progress has been made despite aIl these handicaps is a cause of deep satisfaction for my country. We believe that the Egyptian Government has demonstrated an admirable spirit of compromise and has shown a genuine willingness and desire to arrive at a just solution and has, indeed, gone a long way to meet the other side. 23. A good deal of credit is also due to the United States, whose representatives have conducted useful talks with the Egyptian Government recently and whose untiring efforts have contributed in great measure to stabilizing the situation in the Middle East and eliminating as much as possible the effects of the events of last autumn. 24. During this period the Secretary-General, with bis customary devotion and ability, assisted the progress of negotiations, while the United Nations clearance team was working hard and weIl to allow the resumption of traffic through the Canal. 25. We now welcome the Declaration of the Government of Egypt as evidence of Egypt's sincere desire to settle the problem and to ensure smooth transit through the Canal. We are particularly pleased to see that the Egyptian Government considered its Declaration as a solemn undertaking and a binding international instrument. That should afford agreat deal of security for the users of the Canal and allay any fears of those who believe that Egypt intends to use the Canal for its political ends. 26. It is our belief that the Declaration has substantially met the six principles approved by the Security Council. The Declaration may not be a perfect one, it may not satisfy aIl of us, but it must be recognized as a.significant step forward. Egypt has undertaken to adhere strictly to the Convention of 1888; to ensure the freedom of passage in accordance with that Convention; to consult and co-operate continuously with the users of the Canal; not to raise the tolls without agreement or arbitration; to implement the improvement programmes of the former Suez Canal Company; to aUow 25 per cent of the gross received for development; to subject any alterations in the Canal Code to arbitration; and finally, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on 28. But such an approach is wrong and can only intensify the existing disputes. The only constructive approach, it seems to us, would be to show satisfaction with the progress so far achieved and to express the hope that the remaining points at issue would be resolved later in a spirit of understanding and compromise in the light of the six principles. We should give the new arrangements a chance to function. It would be wrong. and unfair to condemn them outright and pretend that no progress has been made. Such an attitude can be taken only by those who do not wish to see the problem settled and who are trying to get some political advantage out of the present difficulties. 29. It is our hope that transit through the Canal will be as smooth and as uninterrupted as it has hitherto been under the new Canal authority, and we feel sure that with time the world will come to accept and trust the new administration of the Suez Canal. It is our hope and expectation that Egypt will live up to the confidence that we and other friendly nations have placed in it and will not disappoint those who have always had its best interests at heart. 30: Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [translated from Russian]: After a prolonged interruption the Security Council has again turned its attention to the Suez Canal. In the intervening period many important events have occurred which have considerably altered the international situation in the Middle East. 31. In 13 October 1956 the Security Council, after an exhaustive discussion, unanimously adopted a resolution concerning the principles which should serve as a basis for further negotiations aimed at settling disagreements arising in connexion with the administration of the Suez Canal. It might have been expected at that time that in view of the Security Council's unanimously adopted resolution the United Kingdom and France as weIl as other Powers using the Canal would meet half way the reasonable proposaIs put forward by Egypt and would take aU possible steps to settle disagreements by peaceful means. Such a method was and is the only correct and possible way to settle any international problem, as provided in the United Nations Charter. 32. Unfortunately, subsequent events did not justify those expectations. The United Kingdom and France, at the very time when they were negotiating with Egypt and voting in favour of the Security Council's resolution, were making intensive preparations for an armed invasion of Egypt, seeking by force of arms 33. The failure of the armed attack on Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel proved as nothing else could have done the utter futility of the imperialist Powers' efforts to impose upon the Egyptian Government by force disadvantageous conditions with respect to the operation of the Suez Canal. 34. At the same time it is gratifying to note that as a result of the defeat of the interventionists Egypt's situation has actuaIly been strengthened, and its international position and authority have been consolidated. Today no one would question Egypt's sovereign rights with respect to the Suez Canal. 35. After the nationalization of the Canal the Egyptian authorities not only confirmed that Egypt would respect the provisions of the Convention of 1888 but in practice fully guaranteed the normal operation of the Canal despite aIl the obstacles put in their way at the time by the western Powers in their attempt to disrupt navigation. We need only recall that the former Suez Canl:!-l Company withdrew aIl its pilots who had been taking ships through the Canal. Nevertheless, Egypt in a very short time trained its own pilots and hired new pilots in order to ensure normal navigation in the Canal. AlI those efforts by the Egyptian authorities, however, were frustrated as the result of the attack upon Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel and its well-known and tragic consequences, which put the Canal out of operation for a long period of time and made it impossible to use it. 36. As soon as the intervention had been halted the Egyptian Government made notable efforts to restore navigation in the Canal. We should be grateful to the Egyptian authorities, who are trying to maintain the Canal as an international waterway. 37. Recently, after a long interval, normal operations in the Suez Canal were resumed. As the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs said in his letter of 44 April 1957 to the Secretary-General transmitting the Declaration, "the Suez Canal is now open for normal traffic and will thus once again serve as a link between the nations of the world in the cause of peace and prosperity ". 38. According to numerous reports, the Canal is operating without interruptions. The technical con- 39. que son problème vernement du attestent observer son égyptien au nant la à également la l'unanimité 39. The Security Council should note with satisfaction that Egypt has done everything in its power to bring about a positive solution of the Suez Canal problem. The official statements of the Egyptian Government, its memorandum of 18 March 1957 and its Declaration of 24 April 1957, prove that the Egyptian Government is undertaking scrupulously to abide by the Convention of 1888. In its memorandum of 18 March the Egyptian Government set forth basic principles relating to the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation. Those principles were further developed and refiected in the Declaration of 24 April, in which it was stated that the Declaration was drawn up by the Government of Egypt in accordance with the Convention of 1888. That declaration also refiected the six principles laid down in the resolution on the subject unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 13 October 1956. 40. The Egyptian Government proposes a fair system for conecting tons on vessels passing through the Canal, which takes into account the sovereign rights of Egypt yet does not in any way infringe the interests of the Canal's users. The Egyptian Government guarantees to establish a monetary fund for the reconstruction and development of the Canal, into which 25 per cent of an gross receipts shall be paid. This fund will enable the Egyptian Government to fulfil the responsibilities which it has assumed for the technical maintenance and improvement of the Canal. 40. équitable la nière tien de pour Ce remplir l'entretien 41. The Soviet delegation also regards as entirely fair and right the Egyptian request that tons levied should be deposited in. an Egyptian bank for the account of the Suez Canal Authority, which would dispose of aIl such monies, including the reconstruction . fund, in accordance with the operational requirements of the Canal. 41. juste ce une canal sommes, les 42. A particularly noteworthy feature of the Egyptian Government's contribution to the settlement of the Suez Canal problem is its proposaI for the establishment of an arbitration procedurf' to deal with such disputes as may arise. 42. contribution aU de procédure éventuels. 43. The Declaration clearly outlines the procedure 43. à qui plication égyptien et ration Unies. les obligatoire pourra surgir l'interprétation féliciter telle fo~ settling disputes and disagreements which may anse among the parties to the Convention of 1888 c?ncerning its implementation. It confirms the EgyptI~n Government's willingness to settle, in conformity ~Ith the United Nations Charter, aIl disputes and dIsagreements arising in respect of the Convention o~ the Declaration itself. The Government of Egypt will also take the necessary steps in order to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which may be asked to consider disagree- ~ents arising among the parties to the Convention fi respect of the interpretation of its provisions. The Egyptian Government should be congratulated for having taken that stand. 44. From the statements made by certain members of the Security Council, particularly that of the French 44. notamment .15. In that connexion the members of the Security Conncil might turn thair attèntion to the paragraph in the letter addressed by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 24 April to the Secretary-General in which it is stated that the Declaration will be deposited and registered with the United Nations Secretariat. The letter goes on to say that the Declaration, with the obligations therein, constitutes an international instrument and the Government of Egypt requests the Secretary-General to receive and register it accordingly. In the light of that statement there can be no doubt that Egypt itself regards the Declaration as a binding international instrument. As we know, the Secretary-General acceded to Egypt's request. That question is therefore settled. 46. At today's meeting we have again heard the familial' voices of the irreconciliables. Apparently there are those who still cling to the hope that they can somehow limit Egypt's sovereignty over the Canal even if they cannot remove it entirely from Egyptian control. The Security Cauncil should calI a haIt to the attempts of certain circles in the Western countries to impose upon Egypt a solution of the Suez Canal problem which would infringe its sovereign rights in respect of the Canal and would open the way to intervention in Egypt's internaI affairs. In curbing such attempts the Security Council would be helping to clear the air and to lessen tension in the :Middle East. 41. The Secllrity Council should help to remove any obstacles w'hich may stand in the way of a just settlement of the" Suez Canal problem. The Egyptian Government's Declaration of 24 April 1957 points the way, in our opinion, to snch a settlement. Naturally we cannot overlook the difficulties which may yet arise on the way, for the recently improved prospects for the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the Near and :Middle East are obviously not to the liking of certain circles in the imperialist countries who stand to gain from continued tension )n that area. It is in the light of that policy of the Western Powers that we must view the recent events, particularly in Jordan, which have arollsed such serious misgivings among peace-loving peoples. 48. The Press in the Arab countriJs frankly states that the events in Jordan are inspired by imperialist circles in the Western countries who are trying to disrupt the unity of the Arab countries and draw them one by one into the aggressive bloc. The Governments of those countries which do not wish to submit to dictation are being blackmailed, intrigued against and penalized. That this ;;; true is demonstrated by the events of the last few days. 49. Today, for example, it has been announced that the United States Sixth Fleet has received orders to proceed towards the shores of the Arab countries, and it is stated that this is being done as a show force. 51. à danger tique doctrine eux-mêmes 9 M. affaires si des la sième sence on 51. 1 should like to take this opportunity to draw the Security Council's attention once again to the serious danger to peace inherent in the policy proclaimed by the United States in the so-called Eisenhower doctrine. United States leaders themselves do not try ta conceal that facto It is known, for example, that when Secretary Dulles was asked at a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 9 January 1957 whether a world war might result from the exercise by the President of the powers he would hold if the above doctrine were confirmed, he answered that it might indeed mean a third world war. In the light of that policy pursued by the United States it may weIl be asked... 52. regrette l'Union que canal qui

1 am sorry to interrupt the representative of the Soviet Union, but 1 wonld point out to him that we are discussing the problem of the Suez Canal and would ask him to keep to the subject before us. 53. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [translated tram Russian]: 1 willingly heed the President's warning. As 1 see it, what 1 am saying has a direct relationship to the question being discussed by the Council. 1 would ask a little more forbearance. 1 need two or three minutes at the most to finish mY statement. But 1 cannot pass over in silence such events, as, for example, the movements of the United States Sixth Fleet in the approaches to the Suez Canal. We know that six months ago similar movements of the fleets of certain other Powers were made, with the result that the Suez Canal and the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea were closed to the ships of a great many Powers, including the Soviet Union. It is therefore only naturai that we should wonder whether the current movements are not the prelude, the buildup, to a similar event. 53. listes tiers je examinons. dans On silence de de analogues fermer à dont 54. That is why 1 bring up the matter, believing as 1do that the Security Council itself is the most appropriate forum for the examination and discussion of the problems which arouse and disturb the members of the Council. In our opinion the present course of United States poUcy has already led to a serious deterioriation of the situation in the Near and Middle East and has given rise to uneasiness and alarm among the peoples of that area. In such circumstances the Security Council has no right to stand calmly aside and ta nothing. Its immediate dutY is to take steps to maintain peace and security and to remove the causes of international tension. The peoples of the world have the right to expect the Council to take such actions as will deliver them from the constant le 56. We are convinced that with the publication the Egyptian Government's Declaration the Suez Canal problem is in fact settled. 57. Ml'. TSIANG (China): The documents basic to this discussion, to which the President called our attention at the beginning of this marning's meeting, became available only two days ago. My delegation and, of course, my Government have not had the time to study them as carefully as they should be studied. 'Vhat l. have to say now, therefore, is only preliminary and not final. 58. When the Security Council adopted the resolution of 13 October 1956, l fully expected that an international agreement would be derived from the six requirements embodied in that resolution. \Vhat we have now is not an international agreement but an Egyptian declarati.on. This sort of development has been a surprise, even somewhat of a disappointment, to me. 59. Naturally, in the circumstances, certain questions arise - questions, in fact, of two different categories. The first relates to a unilateral declaration per se. One may asle how binding is it? how long can its terms be relied on? and what exactly does registration with the United Nations do to such an instrument'? The other category of questions concerns the contents of this Declaration. One may ask, for example: to what extent does the Egyptian Declaration of 24 April 1957 meet the six requirements of the resolution of 13 October 1956? 60. These and other questions have been raised. They are important, but l shall not try to answer 62. In the second place, it is the view of my delegation that the exact meaning of sorne of the provisions of the Egyptian Declaration can only be learned from actual experience of their administration. In this case, dispute on the meaning of words would prove academic most of the time. It is deeds, not words, that count. The proof of the pudding lies in the eating. 63. Finally, my delegation is glad to find in the Egyptian Declaration a provision for compulsory arbitration in connexion with certain operational disputes. We think that this provision, if implemented in good faith, might prove very helpful. 1 wish to express the hope that this provision of arbitration will be given a fair trial by aIl parties concerned. 64. Ml'. JARRING (Sweden): After having studied the text of the Declaration on the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt to the Secretary- General, 1 confine myself for the present to the following remarks. In the opinion of my delegation, the statement which was made by the representative of the United States of America ear"lier today represents a realistic review of the situation with regard to the international use and .operation of the Suez Canal under conditions acceptable to the users of the Canal. 65. As to the position of the Government of Egypt, my delegation understands that the Declaration of 24 April 1957 constitutes an instrument that is internationally binding on the Government of Egypt. The purpose of paragraph 10 of the Declaration seems to he to establish this in a legal form. 66. My delegation attaches great importance to the reaffirmation in the Declaration of the principle of non-discrimination in respect of the use of the Suez Canal. We also would like to stress the significance o~ th~ provision that cornplaints of discrimination or vlOlatlOn of the Canal Code may be referred to arbitration and that the Government of Egypt intends to elaborate further upon that matter. Moreover, we note with satisfaction that a similar procedure, as weIl as reference to the International Court of Justice is provided for in case of disagreement or dispute as

1 have asked speak in order to comment on certain statements just made by the Soviet Union representative. 69. 1 had hoped that the Soviet Union representative would confine his remarks to the Suez question. Unfortunately, however, he made certain allegations about two matters to wbich my Government attaches particular importance: the situation in Jordan and the Baghdad Pact. 70. The troubles in Jordan have indeed been caused by outside intervention. That intervention came from one source: international communism and its agents in Jordan. My country is an ally of Jordan, and must make an observation in tbis connexion. His Majesty King Hussein has clearly placed the responsibility where it belongs. He is on the scene and dealing personally with the matter. There is no reason why we should believe the Soviet Union representative, who is 5,000 miles away from Jordan, rather than King Hussein, who is in Amman. 71. The Soviet Union representative used the adjective "aggressive" in referring to the Baghdad Pact. He called it an aggressive pact. 1 can assure bim that if aIl the pacts in this world were as inoffensive as the Baghdad Pact, it would be possible to have real and peaceful co-existence in the world.

1 shall take only a moment to comment on the latest in the apparently endless series of attacks upon the United States, wbich seem to be the principal staple feature of Soviet policy in the United Nations. 73. Nothing in the Eisenhower doctrine need bother anyone who does not contemplate violent deeds. The Soviet Union representative's remarks about the Eisenhower doctrine refiect on him and not on the United States. If he did not harbour dreams of domination and ·of the subversion of suffering peoples, similar to the monstrous Soviet subversion of Hungary, of tragic memory, he would not be bothered by these United States undertakings. They are entirely aimed at preventing aggression. They become effective only upon the request of a country which feels that its independence is threatened. And they become effective 75. l'anglais] même a se mer,

The answer is so simple that 1 even wonder that the Soviet Union representative should have bothered to ask the question. The Sixth Fleet is in international waters; it is on the high seas, where it has every right to be.

Since no other member of the Council wishes to speak at this time, 1 should now like to make a statement as representative of the UNITED KINGDOM. 76. qu'aucun la une ROYAUME-UNI. 77. 1 think that 1 should begin by saying a few words about the extraordinary first statement that we heard this afternoon from the Soviet Union representative. 1 shall not taire up the Council's time in adjusting in detail the distorted picture of past and present events which Mr. Sobolev has put to the Council. The representatives of Iraq and th~ United States have effectively disposed of the charges levelled against their countries. That really was the only new feature in Mr. Sobolev's phantasmagoria. The charges which he made against my Government and the Government of France have been repeatedly made before and repeatedly refuted. 77. de l'extraordinaire en de du des M. Unis contre aspect Les le fois 78. But why has Mr. Sobolev chosen to disturb in this way what has, 1 think, on the whole, been a calm and objective consideration of the Suez Canal problem? Why has he sought to deflect our discussion to quite irrelevant topics? 1 think 1 can pershaps see the reason r for this. The representative of the Soviet Union has taken the line today that it is for the Government of Egypt to decide unilaterally on what terms the Canal may be used. But that has not always been the position of his Government. And one can see why. . It would, 1imagine, hardly suit the Soviet Government , if the territorial Power in question were left with unfettered discretion to lay down conditions on which traille could pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, if this could be done by a unilateral declaration to be registered at the United Nations but capable of alteration or cancellation at the sole discretion of one Government. That, 1 think, would be something which the Soviet Government would pre- 78. ainsi dans blème faire aucun la tient l'Egypte des pas pour du toriale gré Dardanelles, qui Unies, gré sumer cela \~mably regard as detrimental to its interests. 79. We can therefore aIl understand why, in October 1956, the Soviet - Mr. D. T. Shepilov, Mi:nis1ter, - should have spoken of 79. 1956, en l'occurrence, 80. 1 suggest to my colleagues that we now let the smoke drift away and that we come back to the business at hand. 1 therefore now turn to the item before us. 81. First, let me say that 1 have listened with great interest to the statement made this morning by the representative ôf the United States. 1 think we must aIl pay tribute to the spirit in which the United States Government undertook its ,conversations with the Government of Egypt. 82. The position of my Government on this question is a simple one. We stand firmly by the resolu~ion adopted by the Council on 13 October 1956, which laid down that any settlement of the Suez question should meet six specific requirements. The Security Council, in adopting the resolution in question, has engaged itself in this matter, and its authority remains engaged. This seems to be a view generally held. It is therefore natural that we should approach any new proposaIs for settlement of the problem with this question: to what extent do they meet the requirements laid down by the Security Council? 83. It is also material to consider to what extent any new proposaIs meet the understandings embodied in the correspondence between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt 'and the Secretary-General [8/3728]. 84. It will be recalled that the first of the requirements l!lid down by the Security Council was that "there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert", and that this was to cover " both political and technical aspects ". The Egyptian Declaration which we have before us repeats that it is the unaltered policy and firm purpose of the Government of Egypt to respect the terms and the spirit of the Convention of 1888 and the rights and obligations arising therefrom. But it is not clearly defined how the Egyptian Government intends to apply" this policy in practice. This seems to me a point on which there should be further clarification. 85. The second of the requirements is that "the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected". 1 need make no comment on this requirement. 86. The third is that "the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country". My Government attaches particular importance to this third requirement. It may be said that the arbitration procedures set out in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Egyptian Declaration are a step toward the implementation of this requirement. It would, however, appear to me that, since Egypt proposes to operate by way of a unilateral declaration, it retains the power 88. The fourth requirement of the Security Council is that " the manner· of fixing tolls and charges should be .dedded by agreement between Egypt and the users ". The Egyptian proposaI on toIls, in paragraph 3 of the Declaration, appears to come reasonably close to meeting this fourth requirement. It has, however, not been specified with whom the Suez Authority should negotiate about any increase beyond one per cent in the level of toUs. This essential point requires clarification. 89. The fifth of the Security Council's requirements is that " a fair proportion of the dues should be alloted to development ". The proportion of 25 per cent of aIl gross receipts suggested in paragraph 5 (c) of the Egyptian Declaration appears to be adequate. 1 would, however, point out that the Capital and Development Fund which it is proposed to establish will apparently be under the sole control of the Canal Authority, ln our view, it would be more in keeping with the third requirement of theSecurity Council if this fund were placed in sorne independent bank and if there were sorne binding understanding about its use.' 90. The sixth requirement of the Security Council was that "in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due". 91. My Government considers that the procedures indicated in paragraph 8 of the Declaration are a reasonable approach toward meeting this requirement, with the following reservations: ln the first place, paragraph 8 of the Declaration provides that compensation "shall, unless agreed between the parties concerned, be referred to arbitration..." It is not clear what is meant by the phrase " the parties concerned ". The Security Council's sixth requirement expressly and advisedly recognized the position of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company as regardscompen- ~ation. This was important. The Egyptian Declaration IS decidedly less positive in this respect than the siXth requirement of the Security Council. 1 must, moreover, draw attention to the fact that, whereas the sixth requirement stated that suitable provisions should be made for the payment of sums found to he due, there is no indication in the Declaration 93. So far as 1 can see, the procedure adopted and the form in which the Declaration has been made means that any part of it can be unilaterally offered or withdrawn. As 1 understand it, even though it is rem-stered with the United Nations, the Declaration re~lains a unilateral declaration which can be revoked or altered. 1 liave already touched upon this point when speaking of the third requirement of the Security Council, but it in fact goes to the heart of the whole question. 94. 1 have been struck by the general feeling that the Egyptian Declaration cannot be regarded as a final settlement in accordance with the six requirements contained in the resolutiQn of 13 October 1956. Many members have pointed out how obscure its meaning was; and. many pointed out that, as a de facto arrangement, much depended on the manner in which it would be operated. 95. My Government, like others Governments, has been in possession of the Declaration for only a short time. It is still studying the document, and it may have further comments which it would wish me to make to this Council. My Government will, 1 am sure, wish to take into account the views expressed in the Council today. If may wish to consult with other user Governments not represented on the Council. This may take a few days. 96. 1 noted that several other representatives on the Council likewise felt that they would need more time to study these new developments. l, therefore, reserve my right to speak again more fully at a subsequent meeting of the Council. 97. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [translated from Russian]: 1 cannot pass over in silence a remark made by the President concerning the Soviet Union's stand with regard to the question of international agreement on the Suez Canal. He stated that the Soviet Union had adopted two contradictory positions: formerly it upheld the need for an international agreement guaranteeing freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal, whereas now we were expressing our satisfaction with Egypt's unilateral declaration. 98. 1 am afraid 1 must disillusion him because there is no contradiction here. We considered in the past and consider now that an international agreement guaranteeing freedom of passage through the Suez Canal already exists. It has existed since 1888. It still exists today. 1 refer to the Convention of 1888, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory. The 99. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt) [translated from French]: 1 should like to thank the delegations which in today's speeches have expressed their appreeiation of Egypt's efforts to arrive at a fair solution of the Canal problem. 1 do not propose to reply to the comments which have been made. 1 clearly explained my delegation's point of view this morning. The representative of France has treated us to an interpretation of the Declaration which, in our opinion, does not hold water; however, 1 do not see any point in joining issue with him, espeeially as other speakers have already replied to him. Re said, incidentally, that Egypt, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, had failed to carry out the resolution of 13 October 1956, under which States are bound to implement the resolutions of the Security Couneil. In my statement this mordng, 1pointed out that we had conformed to that resolution in our Declaration. On the contrary, 1 wonder whether the present Government of France has respected it. It seems to me that the French Government itself violated this resolution, as weIl as the United Nations Charter, when it resorted to force a few days after the resolution of 13 October 1956 was adopted. 100. 1 must also admit that 1was somewhat surprised by the statement of the representative of Australia. 1 can weIl believe that he is not entirely satisfied with our Declaration. 1 hardly expected it to be otherwise. However, 1 am surprised that he should see fit to accuse Egypt of sabotage. 1 am forced to remind him that even if there had been any sabotage of the Canal, as he claims - and there was none - it was the result of an unprovoked act of aggression, in violation of the United Nations Charter, an act which Australia endorsed. That act gave Egypt every right to take the necessary steps for its own defence and security, and Egypt alone had a right to decide what those steps would be. 1 think, therefore, that it is useless to continue this discussion. 101: In conclusion, 1 should like to clarify my delegatlOn's position once more. In order to implement the resolution of 13 October 1956 and the principles contained therein, Egypt is resolved to continue to apply the Convention of 1888, which it has again reaffirmed in its Declaration, as weIl as to carry out the terms of the Declaration itself, which it has just had registered and regards as an international ins- The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m. " --------------------------------------------, Printed in France Priee : SU.S. 0.25 ; 1/9 (or equivalent in