S/PV.788 Security Council

Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity which you have given me to take my seat at the Council table. This is a privilege which my Government values highly, and which it does not seek for petty reasons or with the object of seeking solutions for difficulties of a domestic political character at the expense of the time and the prestige of the body which, under the United Nations Charter, bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. With your permission, I shall address myself in the first place to the second item of the agenda - item (b) - which refers to violations by President: M. Emilio NUNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba). Presents : Les representants des pays suivants : Australie, Chine, Colombie, Cuba, France, Irak, Philippines, Suede, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/788/Rev.l) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour: 2. Question de Palestine : a) Lettre, en date du 4 septembre 1957, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par le representant de la J ordanie ; b) Lettre, en date du 5 septembre 1957, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par le representant d'Israel. Adoption de l'ordre du jour Question de Palestine: a) Lettre, en date du 4 septembre 1957, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par le representant de la Jordanie (S/3878) ; b) Lettre, en date du 5 septembre 1957, adrcssee au President du Conseil de securite par le representant d'Israel (S/3883) (suite). 1. M. KIDRON (Israel) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President, de me donner l'occasion de prendre place a la table du Conseil. C'est un honneur auquel mon gouvernement attache beaucoup de prix, mais qu'il ne recherche pas pour de mesquines raisons ou pour tacher de resoudre des problemes interieurs d'ordre politique au risque de faire perdre son temps et son prestige a l'organe qui, aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies, a la responsabilite principale du main- tien de la paix et de la securite internationales. Per- mettez-moi de parler d'abord du deuxieme point de l'ordre du jour-le point b) - qui a trait aux violations 2. The Security Council has discussed matters arising out of the implementation of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan on many occa- sions these past few years - and, I would be the last to deny that these occasions have been too numerous and too frequent. It has been our hope, ever since the Agreement was signed in April 1949, that it would truly be, as it was designed to be, a transition to peace, and that the international community would cease to be agitated by rancour and strife in an area sacred to so many millions of the peoples of the world. We were sadly wrong. 3. However, the frequent deliberations of the Council have not, I regret to say, resulted in any fundamental change in the situation. There are periods, such as the present, when the borders are relatively quiescent; there are others when they are red with blood and fire. No one can tell when the exigencies of domestic politics in Jordan, or of inter-Arab rivalries, will cause one condition or the othe~. For, at the heart of the matter is the Arab policy, to which Jordan enthusiastically subscribes, of refusal to make peace or to live at peace with Israel. 4. I venture to suggest that the principal reason for the meagre results which have attended the Security Council's efforts to restore peace to the Middle East has been that it has been dealing with effects rather than with causes. Nearly every debate around this table has been conducted against the background of border violence, and the main preoccupation of the Council has been to put a stop to the outbreak and to apportion responsibility. Perhaps because of this, the Council has not found it possible to go beyond those articles of the Armistice Agreement which refer speci- fically to conditions on the border and to examine the Agreement as a whole and, in particular, the parts which determine fundamental issues of principle. The General Armistice Agreement is, after all, an integral whole, and it is reasonable to assume that a standing breach of any of its provisions, and particularly a breach of basic principle, is likely to have adverse effect upon the operation of the entire instrument. Border violence is, in the view of the Government of Israel, a function of the basic attitude of the parties to their obligations unde the Armistice Agreements; an effect, not a cause. 5. It is for this reason that my Government instructed me to request the Security Council to include a com- plaint against Jordanian violations of the Armistice Agreement in the agenda of today's meeting. Our purpose is to discuss the violations by Jordan of funda- 2. Ces dernieres annees, le Conseil de securite a, en maintes occasions, discute de problemes decoulant de la mise en reuvre de la Convention d'armistice general conclue entre Israel et la Jordanie. Je ne nie certes pas que ces occasions ont ete trop nombreuses et trop fre- quentes. Nous avons toujours espere, depuis que la Convention a ete signee en avril1949, qu'elle marquerait - comme elle etait censee faire - le debut d'une periode de transition vel'S la paix, et que la communaute internationale cesserait d'etre agitee par des rancreurs et par des luttes dans une region qui est sacree pour tant de millions d'etres humains sur cette terre. Nous nous sommes lamentablement trompes. 3. En effet, les frequentes deliberations du Conseil n'ont pas, je le regrette, fondamentalement change la situation. A de certaines periodes, actuellement par exemple, la situation aux frontieres est relativement calme; a d'autres, les frontieres s'ensanglantent et s'enflamment. Nul ne peut predire quand les exigences de la politique interieure jordanienne ou les rlvalites entres Etats arabes engendreront l'une ou l'autre de ces deux situations. Car au creur du probleme il y a ce prin- cipe de la polit.ique arabe, a laquelle la Jordanie sous- crit avec enthousiasme : refuser de faire la paix ou de vivre en paix avec Israel. 4. J e me permettrai de dire que les pietres resultats des efforts deployes par le Conseil pour ramener la paix au Moyen-Orient tiennent principalement a ce qu'il s'est occupe des effets plutot que des causes. Presque tous les debats qui se sont deroules autour de cette table ont eu pour toile de fond des actes de violence aux frontieres ; le principal souci du Conseil a ete d'y mettre un terme et d'etablir les responsabilites. C'est peut- etre pour cela que le Conseil n'a pas ete en mesure, allant plus loin que les dispositions des articles de la Convention d'armistice qui se rapportent expresse- ment a la situation a la frontiere, d'examiner toutes les dispositions de la Convention et particulierement celles qui traitent des questions de principe fondamentales. Somme toute, la Convention d'armistice est un tout, et il est raisonnable de penser qu'une violation cons- tante de l'une de ses dispositions et particulierement du principe meme de la Convention doit nuire a la mise en reuvre de toutes les dispositions. De l'avis du Gouver- nement d'Israel, les actes de violence a la frontiere sont lies a la fa«on dont les parties entendent les enga- gements qu'elles ont pris aux termes des accords d'armistice. Ils sont une consequence et non pas une cause. 5. Voila pourquoi mon gouvernement m'a charge de demander au Conseil de securite d'inscrire a l'ordre du jour de la seance d'aujourd'hui une plainte contre les violations par la Jordanie de la Convention d'armis- tice. Mon intention est d'exposer les violations par la "3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory func- tions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI." 7. The Special Committee established under para- graph 1 met a few times in 1949 and, after overcoming a series of procedural roadblocks put up by the Jordan representatives, succeeded in accomplishing one of the tasks enumerated in paragraph 2, namely, the resump- tion of the operation of the railroad from the coast to Jerusalem. Since then it has not met, because Jordan has refused to appoint any representatives to it, and this in spite of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 November 1950 [8/1907 and Corr. 1], which took note that the Special Committee had been formed and had convened, and expressed the hope that it would proceed expeditiously to carry out the functions con- templated in article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 3. 8. In consequence of this clear violation by Jordan of its obligations under article VIII, the other plans and arrangements enumerated in paragraph 2 have remained a dead letter. The main road from Jerusalem to the coast is still cut; the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University buildings on Mount Scopus, including the National Library of Israel, are becoming deserted «1. Les Gouvernements de rune et l'autre par- ties nommeront chacun deux represerrtants, qui constitueront un Comite special charge d'etablir des plans et des arrangements communs en vue d'etendre la portee de la presente Convention et d'en ameliorer la mise en ceuvre. «2. Le Comite special entrera en {onctions imme- diatement apres l'entree en vigueur de la presente Convention; il sera charge d'etablir des plans et arrangements concernant les questions que rune ou l'autre partie pourra lui soumettre; ces questions devront notamment comprendre les suivantes, sur lesquelles un accord de principe a deja ete realise: libre circulation sur les routes essentielles, y compris la route de BethIeem et la. route Latroun-Jerusalem; reprise de l'activite normale des institutions cultu- relIes et humanitaires du mont Scopus et liberte d'acces a ces institutions; liberte d'acces aux Lieux saints et aux institutions cUlturelles et libre utilisa- tion du cimetiere du mont des Oliviers ; remise en service de la station de pompage de Latroun; fourniture de courant electrique a la Vieille Ville; et reprise du service de la ligne ferroviaire desservant Jerusalem. «3. Le Comite special sera selll competent pour les questions qui pourront lui etre referees. Les plans et arrangements communs qu'il pourra etablir pour- ront prevoir l'exercice de fonctions de surveillance par la Commission mixte d'armistice prevue a l'article XI.» 7. Le Comite special prevu au paragraphe 1 de cet article s'est reuni quelques fois en 1949 et, apres avoir surmonte divers obstacles interessant la procedure, eleves par les representants de la Jordanie, est parvenu a accomplir l'une des taches enoncees au paragraphe 2 : remise en service de la ligne de chemin de fer reliant la cote et Jerusalem. Depuis lors, il ne s'est plus reuni, la J ordanie ayant refuse de designer des representants, et ce malgre la resolutipn du 17 .novembre 1950 [8/1907] oil le Conseil de securite constate que le Comite special a ete constitue et s'est reuni et exprime l'espoir que ce comite s'acquittera sans retard des fonctions envisagees dans les paragraphes 2 et 3 de l'article VIII. 8. A cause de cette violation flagrante par la J ordanie des obligations decoulant de l'article VIII, les autres plans et arrangements enonces au paragraphe 2 sont restes lettre morte. La grande route reliant Jerusalem a la cote est encore coupee; I'hopital Hadassah et les batiments de l'Universite hebraique du mont Scopus - y compris la Bibliotheque nationale d'Israel- : Documents officiels du Conseil de st!curife, onzieme annt!e, Supplement d'avril, mai et juin 1956, document 8/3596, annexe 6. 9. During the past eight years the Government of Israel has made frequent efforts to secure the imple- mentation of article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement but has constantly met with an obdurate refusal on the part of Jordan to carry out this clear and unmistaken obligation of the Agreement. The matter was discussed with the Secretary-General and the Chief o~ StaiI on a number of occasions during the past eighteen months, but all efforts to secure Jordan's compliance with the article have failed. The result is that rights which Israel regards as of cardinal religious, educational and practical importance have been gravely prejudiced. 10. My Government accordingly turns to the Security Council in the hope that its influence will obtain for Israel relief from the denial of rights to which Israel has been subjected by Jordan's defiance of the provisions of article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement. 11. Article I of the General Armistice Agreement is, in the view of the Government of Israel, the heart of the General Armistice Agreement, and a violation of any of its provisions jeopardizes, if it does not indeed nullify, the operation of the entire instrument. Article I reads as follows: "With a view to promoting the return of perma- nent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed: "1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both parties; "2. No agressive action by the armed forces - land, sea, or air - of either party shall be under- taken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations; "3. The right of each party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected; "4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine." 9. Au cours des huit annees ecouIees, le Gouvernement d'Israel a souvent essaye d'obtenir que soit applique l'article VIII de la Convention d'armistice general, mais toujours il s'est heurte au refus obstiIie de la Jordanie de tenir cet engagement clair et net de la Convention. La question a ete examinee par le Secre- taire general et le Chef d'etat-major it de nombrenses reprises au cours des 18 mois ecouIes, mais tous les efforts pour obtenir que la Jordanie observe les dispo- sitions de cet article ont echoue.. I1 s'ensuit qu'il est gravement porte atteinte it des droits qu' Israel considere comme essentiels sur le plan de la religion, de l'enseigne- ment et de la vie courante. 10. C'est pourquoi mon gouvernement s'adresse au COTJ.seil de securite, 6sperant que par son influence il supprimera ce deni de droits qui vient de cc que la Jordanie fait echec aux dispositions de l'article VIII de la Convention d'armistice general. 11. L'article premier de cette Convention d'armistice est, de l'avis du Gouvernement d'Israel, le creur meme de la Convention, et toute violation de l'une quelconque de ses dispositions compromet, si elle ne l'empeche, l'application de toutes les autres. En voici le texte : « En vue de favoriser le retablissement de la paix permanente en Palestine, et reconnaissant !'impor- tance que revetent it cet egard des assurances reci- proques concernant les operations militaires futures des parties, les deux parties souscrivent par les presentes aux principes ci-apres qu'elles respec- teront pleinement pendant la duree de l'armistice : «1. Les deux parties respecteront scrupuleusement dorenavant !'interdiction faite par le Conseil de secn- rite de recouriL it la force militaire dans le reglement de la question palestinienne ; «2. Les forces armees terrestres, aeriennes et navales de l'une et de l'autre partie n'entreprendront ni ne prepareront aucune action agressive contre la popu- lation ou les forces armees de l'autre partie, ni ne les en menaceront ; il est entendu que le mot «prepa- reron!» employe dans le present texte ne s'applique pas au travail de preparation normal d'un etat- major, tel qu'il se pratique ordinairement dans les organisations militaires ; « 3. Le droit de chacune des parties it etre assnree de sa securite et it ne pas craindre d'attaques de la part des forces armees de l'autre partie sera pleine- ment respecte ; «4. L'existence d'un armistice entre les forces armees des deux parties est reconnue comme une indispensable etape vers la fin du conflit arme et dn retablissement de la paix en Palestine .») J 13. One does not have to go far back for proof of this contention. On 25 June 1957, the Foreign Minister of Jordan, Mr. Samir er-Rifa'i, made a statement to the Arab News Agency which included the following passage: "Jordan, the sincere and patient country, will not accept any solution of the Palestine issue which does not fulfil the mission for which she has always striven - to restore this usurped section of the great Arab homeland." 14. A few days later, on 4 July 1957, Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army, Major-General Habbes el Majali, held a press conference in which he said, inter alia: " If relations among the Arabs will be established and their armed forces will be able to devote their energies to the job of preparedness, it will be an easy matter to retrieve J affa, Haifa and the other towns. It is up to us to prepare for this day, and for this purpose we are obliged to co-operate and create the necessary stability. There is no room in our stolen homeland for Jews or for world Zionism." 15. The King of Jordan has also not been laggard in his fulminations against Israel. On 5 JUlY he declared in a British television interview that there was no possibility that the Arab States would ever accept the existence of Israel. A short while before, he had called upon his people to "work together to strengthen their economic security, to bolster the great army, and to prepare for the great day of Arabism when they would all gather to retrieve the lost Arab homeland and to attain their long-sought unity". 15. Le roi de Jordanie n'a pas tarde lui non plus a tonitruer contre Israel. Le 5 juillet, il a declare, au cours d'une interview it la television britannique, qu'il etait hors de question que les Etats arabes acceptent jamais 1'existence d'Israel. Peu avant, il avait invite son peuple cc it travailler a1'unisson pour affermir sa securite economique, soutenir la grande armee et preparer le grand jour oil tous les Arabes se joindront en vue de recuperer la patrie arabe perdue et realiser l'unite tant attendue. » 16. I have given here a few examples of some of the most recent of the threatening statements made by the principal officials of the Jordanian Government against Israel, but we have been hearing this sort of thing for the past eight years. Well-disposed people tell us that we should pay no attention to these threats because, firstly, they say, the Arab countries, neither singly nor in combination, would have the strength to harm Israel, and, secondly, that the statements are really meant for internal consumption. We are unable to accept these comforting words. On all sides we see Arab nations arming feverishly while making no secret of their intention to use these newly acquired arms against Israel. And we do not believe that the inflamma- tory statements are made for internal consumption. We think that the Arab leaders mean what they say, but even if they do not the inevitable outcome of 16. J e viens de donner quelques exemples des declara- tions agressives les plus recentes des principales person- nalites du Gouvernement jordanien it l'adresse d'Israel, mais iI y a huit ans que nous entendons chanter cette antienne. Des personnes bien disposees a notre egard nous conseillent de ne pas nous preoccuper de ces menaces, parce que les pays arabes, disent-ils, ne ~.eraient, d'abord, pas assez forts ni individuellement, ni ensemble, pour porter un coup a Israel et, ensuite, parce que ces declarations sont en realite destinees ala consommation interieure. Nous ne saurions accepter cette interpretation rassurante. Nous voyons de toutes parts les nations arabes s'armer fievreusement, sans cacher leur intention d'utiliser contre Israel les armes nouvellement acquises. Nous ne pensons pas que ces declarations incendiaires soient destinees it la consom- mation interieure. Nous croyons que les chefs arabes 13. Il ne faut pas remonter bien loin pour en trouver la preuve. Le 25 juin 1957, le Ministre des affaires etrangeres de Jordanie, M. Samir er-Rifa'i, a fait a l'Agence de presse arabe une declaration dont j'extrais le passage suivant : « La Jordanie, dont on connait lasincerite et la patience, n'acceptera aucune solution de la question palestinienne qui ne lui permette pas de remplir la mission qu'elle s'est toujours assignee : recuperer cette portion usurpee de la grande patrie arabe. )) 14. Peu de jours apres, le 4 juillet 1957, le Chef d'etat- major de 1'armee jordKnienne, le, general Habbes el- Majali, a tenu une conference de presse au cours de laquelle il a notamment declare: « Si les relations entre pays arabes sont solides et si Ieurs forces armees sont en mesure de consacrer toute leur energie a se preparer, ce sera chose aisee que de reprendre Jaffa, Hai'fa et les autres villes. C'est a nous de preparer ce grand jour et, pour ce ce faire, nous devons cooperer et creel' la stabilite necessaire. Dans notre patrie voIee, il n'y a place ni pour les Juifs ni pour le sionisme mondial. » 17. We hold it essential that compliance with the Armistice Agreement means not only compliance with those of its provisions which call for the inviolability of the borders but also, and primarily, compliance with the fundamental principles of non-aggression, non- intimidation, and the promotion of peace which are included in article I of the Agreement. Without article I the General Armistice Agreement has no meaning. Israel would not have signed such an instru- ment on 3 April 1949 had article I not been included in it. 18. Another major provision of the Armistice Agree- ment of which Jordan has been in standing violation for the past four years is article XII, which lays down the procedure for review or modification of its provi- sions. The relevant paragraphs of article XII of the General Armistice Agreement read as follows: "2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article. "3. The parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and Ill, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary- General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and Ill. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties. " 4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine." 19. On 23 November 1953, the permanent represen- tative of Israel addressed a letter to the Secretary- General [8/3140] drawing his attention to the deep concern of the Government of Israel at the impairment of peace and security on the Israel-Jordan frontier 17. Il est essentiel, it nos yeux, que soient respectees non seulement les dispositions de la Convention d'armis- tice general qui concernent l'inviolabilite des frontieres, mais aussi et surtout les dispositions fondamentales sur le principe de la non-agression, de la non-intimi- dation et de la recherche de la paix, dont il est question it l'article premier de la Convention. Sans son artiCle premier, la Convention d'armistice general n'a pas de sens. Si cet article n'avait pas ete insere dans la Conven- tion, Israel ne l'aurait pas signee le 3 avril 1949. 18. Une autre disposition importante de la Convention d'armistice, que la Jordanie a sans cesse violee au cours des quatre dernieres annees est celle de l'article XII qui fixe la procedure de revision ou d'amendement des dispositions de la Convention. Voici les paragraphes pertinents de cet article: «2. La presente Convention, negociee et conclue en execution de la resolution adoptee par le ConseiI de securite le 16 novembre 1948 et demandant la conclusion d'un armistice afin d'eliminer la menace contre la paix en Palestine et de faciliter le passage de la treve actuelle it une paix permanente en Pales- tine, restera en vigueur jusqu'it ce qu'intervienne un reglement pacifique entre les deux parties, sauf dans le cas prevu au paragraphe 3 du present article. «3. Les parties it la presente Convention pourront, d'un commun accord, proceder it la revision de la presente Convention ou de l'une quelconque de ses dispositions, ou en suspendre l'application, it l'excep- tion des articles I et Ill, il n'importe quel moment. En l'absence d'un commun accord et si la presente Convention a ete en vigueur pendant une duree d'un an it dater de sa signature, l'une quelconque des deux parties pourra demander au Secretaire general des Nations Unies de convoquer une conference de representants des deux parties en vue d'examiner it nouveau, ou de reviser, l'une quelconque des clauses de la presente Convention autre que les articles I et Ill, ou d'en suspendre l'application. Les deux parties seront tenues de prendre part it cette conference. « 4. Si la conference prevue au paragraphe 3 du present article n'aboutit pas it une solution d'un point litigieux acceptee par les deux parties, l'une ou l'autre partie pourra porter la question devant le Conseil de securite des Nations Unies pour en obtenir l'aide voulue, en faisant valoir que la presente Convention a ete conclue en execution d'une decision prise par le Conseil de securite pour etablir la paix en Palestine. » 19. Le 23 novembre 1953, le representant permanent d'Israel, dans une lettre adressee au Secretaire general [8/3140], a appele l'attention sur la profonde inquietude que causait au Gouvernement d'Israell'affaiblissement de la paix et de la securite sur la frontiere israelo- 20. The Secretary-General thereupon approached the Government of Jordan and made it clear that article XII, paragraph 3, imposed an obligation on him to convoke the conference and upon the parties to attend it. 20. Le Secretaire general a, des lors, pris contact avec le Gouvernement de la J ordanie et rappeIe que le para- graphe 3 de l'article XII faisait une obligation au Secretaire genera! de convoquer la conference et aux parties a la Convention d'y assister. 21. The Secretary-General later reported on the failure of his efforts to secure Jordan's compliance with this article [8/3180 and add. 1 and 2.J Here again Israel was faced with an obdurate refusal on the part of Jordan to comply with a central provision of the Armistice Agreement. 21. Le Secretaire general a, par la suite, fait savoir que ses efforts en vue d'amener la Jordanie a respecter l'article XII avaient echoue [8/3180 et Add.1 et 2J. Israel se heurtait donc de nouveau au refus obstine de la J ordanie de se conformer a une disposition cle de la Convention d'armistice. 22. In bringing this matter once again before the Security Council the Government of Israel is actuated by two considerations: firstly, it wishes to df\fend the legal integrity of the Agreement as a whole, and, secondly, it wishes to preserve the only constructive mec:(ns offered by the Agreement for review and modi- fication of its provisions. The refusal of Jordan to accede to the Secretary-General's invitation when it was made betokens an attitude to the Armistice Agree- ment which cannot but have grave consequences for its continued integrity. 22. Si le GouvernemeIit d'Israel souleve une fois de plus ce probleme devant le Conseil de securite, c'est pour deux raisons : premierement, il d~sire conserver sa valeur juridique a l'ensemble'd.e la Convention et, deuxiemement, il desire sauvegarder ce seul moyen pratique que prevoit la Convention pour I'amendement ou la modification de ses dispositions. Le fait que la Jordanie n'a pas, it l'epoque, repondu favorablement it !'invitation du Secretaire general reveIe it I'egard de la Convention d'armistice une attitude qui ne peut que compromettre gravement la valeur juridique de l'en- semble des dispositions de cette Convention. 23. When representatives of the Government of Israel signed the Armistice Agreement at Rhodes, in April 1949, they signed an agreement which contained a preamble, twelve articles and two annexes. Some of the provisions of the Agreement, such as the references to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, the exchange of prisoners and other matters of a transitory nature, have been rendered inoperative by the fact of imple- mentation; others have been nullified for years by Jordan's persistent and purposeful evasion. What is left now of the Armistice Agreement is a mere shell of the document which representatives of Israel and Jordan signed eight years ago. 23. Lorsque les representants diu Gouvernement d' Israel. ont signe la Convention d'armistice a Rhodes, en avril 1949, ils ont signe un instrument contenant un preambule, douze articles et deux annexes. Certaines dispositions de cette Convention, notamment celles qui concernent le retrait des forces irakiennes, l'echange de prisonniers et d'autres questions de caractere transi- toire, sont maintenant sans effet puisqu'elles ont ete appliquees. D'autres sont toujours demeurees lettre morte parce que la J ordanie en a constamment elude l'application de propos delibere. De l'accord d'armis- tice signe il y a huit ans par les representants d'Israel et de la Jordanie, il ne reste plus, aujourd'hui, qu'un document vide de sa substance. 24. The Government of Israel cannot passively ac- quiesce in a selective interpretation and implementation of the Armistice Agreement by Jordan, and therefore appeals to the Security Council to use its influence to restore to full effect all the articles of the Agreement, including articles VIII, I and XII, which lay down fundamental principles of action for the parties. 24. Le Gouvernement d'Israel ne saurait rester indifferent devant !'interpretation et l'application tendancieuses de la Convention d'armistice par la Jor- danie; c'est pourquoi il demande au Conseil de secu- rite d'user de son credit pour rendre plein effet it tous les articles de la Convention, et notamment aux arti- cles VIII, I et XII qui posent les principes fonda- mentaux qui doivent regir les actes des deux parties. 25. I now turn b ."e second part of my statement, concerning the JOi. ';'1 complaint about the afforesta- tion work on the Israel side of the civilian line esta- blished in the former Government House area in Jeru- salem. There mayor may not be some significance in 25. J'en viens maintenant it la deuxieme partie de ma declaration, qui porte sur la plainte relative aux travaux de boisement executes du cote israelien sur la ligne civile etablie dans l'ancienne zone du Palais du Gouvernement, it Jerusalem. On peut se demander, 27. The Jordan authorities are, I fear, prone to that sort of thing. A fairly typical example was a double complaint submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission on 17 July 1957 about huge Israel troop concentrations on the Jerusalem road and opposite Qalqilia. After investigation it was found that the Jerusalem troop concentration consisted of a group of followers of the late Rabbi of Belz who had come to visit him in J eru- salem and had been met on the outskirts of the city by the venerable Rabbi himself. A slight traffic jam ensued, and the Jordanian scouts therefore transmitted the dread news of an impending Israel attack post- haste to Amman. The troop concentration opposite Qalqilia was similarly, after investigation, found to have been a well-attended concert held at a labour college at the Israel village of Kefar Sava, which faces the Jordan town of Qalqilia. 28. I have listened to the dissertation of the Jordan representative with attention. He has gone to great lengths to prove that the silvicultural activity which has for the past few weeks been pursued on the Israel side of the civilian line in the " area between the lines " in Jerusalem is of a hostile and, to quote the words of his Foreign Minister, "aggressive" nature. In view of the length and detail of the Jordan representative's statement, I wish to reserve my right to reply to it more fully at a future meeting of the Council. On this present occasion I wish briefly to give the Israel view of the matter. 27. Les autorites jordaniennes aiment apparemment agir de la sorte. On peut en trouver un exemple typique dans la double plainte soumise a la Commission mixte d'armistice le 17 juillet 1957 au sujet de concentrations massives de troupes israeliennes sur la route de Jeru- salem, en face de Qalqilia. Apres enquete, il s'est avere que les troupes concentrees a Jerusalem etaient un groupe de partisans du rabbin de Belz, maintenant decede, qui etaient venus lui rendre visite a Jerusalem, et que le venerable rabbin lui-meme etait alle accueillir dans la banlieue de la ville. Cela avait provoque une legere perturbation de la circulation, et les eclaireurs jordaniens transmirent a Amman la nouvelle d'une attaque israelienne imminente. De meme, apres enquHe, on a etabli que les troupes concentrees devant Qalqilia n'etaient rien d'autre que la grande foule assistant a un concert donne au Labour College dans le village israelien de Kefar Sava, situe en face de la ville jorda- nienne de Qalqilia. 28. J'ai ecoute avec attention les developpements du representant de la J ordanie. II s'est evertue a faire la preuve que les travaux forestiers effectues par Israel, au cours des dernieres semaines, du cote israelien de la ligne civile de la « zone situee entre les lignes » a Jeru- salem presentent le caractere d'actes hostiles ou, pour citer les paroles du Ministre jordanien des afIaires etrangeres, d'« actes d'agression». Etant donne la longueur et le caractere detaille de l'expose du repre- sentant de la Jordanie, je voudrais me reserver le droit de lui repondre plus a fond a une seance ulterieure du ConseiI. Aujourd'hui, je voudrais me borner a exposer brievement le point de vue israelien sur la question. 30. We in Israel have a particular feeling about trees. Among the things of which we are most proud in the history of modern Jewish settlement in the Holy Land is the conversion of large stretches of barren hills and rock-strewn mountains into verdant forests. Trees are for us symbols of life and of growth. It is the custom in Israel to signify anything of importance in the life of a man by the planting of a tree in his honour or in his memory. When a child is born, a tree is planted for his future growth. When he reaches the age of manhood, more trees are planted, and so on through- out every important event in his life. When he dies a grove is planted in his memory. It was thus with a particular feeling of amazement and lack of compre- hension that we heard that Jordan wished to put a stop to the planting of trees in the former Government House area. 31. But one is, of course, compelled to assume that it is not the trees to which the Jordan Government objects, but to the fact that they are being planted in the " area between the lines ". This assumption makes necessary an examination of the origins, the history and the present circumstances of this area in order to find out whether the work at present being under- taken there is indeed legitimate, as we have no doubt it is. 32. The" area between the lines" had its origin in the neutral zone established by the Red Cross in 1947- 48 and was one of a few such areas in the Jerusalem district in which civilians of both sides were able to take refuge during the course of the fighting. When the Red Cross withdrew from active operations in Israel and Jordan, the area was handed over in almost precisely its present boundaries to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which established its headquarters in the former Government House and a small area immediately surrounding it. 33. On 27 August 1948 the central Truce Supervision Board declared this area a non-combatant zone. The existence of this zone was further referred to in the cease-fire agreement signed on 30 November 1948. 34. A new situation, however, arose following the signature of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agree- ment on 3 April 1949. There is no specific reference in this agreement to the area around the former Govern- ment House. A vacuum was thus created in a densely populated part of the country where civilian activity had never ceased even during the time of the fighting. Both Israel and Jordan recognized the need to remedy this anomalous situation and therefore made several attempts to arrive at an agreement which would allow civilians to continue with their normal activities. To 30. En Israel, nous aimons beaucoup les arbres. Parmi les realisations dont nous sommes le plus fiers dans 1'histoire de l'etablissement des J uifs en Terre Sainte anotre epoque, figure la transformation en forets verdoyantes de vastes etendues de collines denudees et de montagnes rocheuses. Pour nous, les arbres symbolisent la vie et la croissance. C'est la coutume en Israel de marquer tout evenement important dans la vie d'un homme en plantant un arbre en son honneur ou en sa memoire. Quand un enfant nait, on plante un arbre qui grandira avec luL Lorsqu'il atteint l'age adulte, on plante d'autres arbres pour marquer tous les evenements importants de sa vie. Lorsqu'il meurt, on plante un bosquet d'arbres pour honorer sa memoire. Aussi c'est avec un vif etonnement, et sans comprendre, que nous avons appris que la Jordanie desirait mettre fin a la plantation d'arbres dans l'ancienne zone du Palais du gouvernement. 31. On est donc force de supposer que ce ne !'Iont pas les arbres memes qui indisposent le Gouvernement jordanien, mais le fait qu'ils sont plantes dans la (I zone situee entre les lignes ll.. Ayant fait cette supposition, on est conduit necessairement a examiner les origines, l'histoire et la situation actuelle de cette zone, et ce afin de determiner si les travaux actuellement effectues sont vraiment legitimes, comme nous en sommes persuades. 32. ;La «zone situee entre les lignes» a son origine dans la zone neutre etablie en 1947-1949 par la Croix- Rouge; elle est 1'une des quelques zones de meme nature dans le district de Jerusalem Oll des civils des deux parties ont pu se refugier au cours des combats. Lorsque la Croix-Rouge a cesse ses activites en Israel et en Jordanie, la region a ete confiee, presque dans ses limites actuelles, a l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve qui a installe son siege dans 1'ancien Palais du gouvernement et dans une petite zone alentour. 33. Le 27 aout 1948, la Commission centrale de surveil- lance de la treve a declare cette zone no man's land; la Convention de suspension d'armes signee le 30 novembre 1948 rappelle 1'existence de cette zone. 34. La signature de la Convention d'armistice general israelo-jordanienne, le 3 avril1949, est venue modifier la situation. Cette convention ne contient aucune mention expresse de la zone qui entoure l'ancien Palais du gou- vernement. Il s'est donc cree un vide dans une partie du pays fortement peupIee Oll les activites n'ont jamais cesse, meme pendant les combats. Israel et la Jordanie ont reconnu la necessite de redresser cette situation anormale et ont essaye aplusieurs reprises d'arriver aun accord en vue de permettre aux civils de poursuivre leurs activites normales. A cette fin, les parties ont 36. The question of the status of the area came up again on 12 June 1949 when the Mixed Armistice Commission adopted a resolution holding that "the advance into and the presence in the Government House area of armed forces of both parties is a breach of the Rhodes Agreement." Following the adoption of this resolution, the United Nations Chairman of the Commission declared: "Initially, or during the period of the truce, it was possible for the Truce Supervision Organization to control the civilian situation within the a.rea. Upon the signing of the Armistice Agreement between the two Parties, the Truce Supervision control was withdrawn. We still have civilians in the area... I, therefore, propose making contacts with both Govern- ments... to see ifa solution, satisfactory to both sides, can be worked out at the earliest possible date..." 37. This statement by the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission should, I think, dispose of the argument that the area is under the supervision of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. If further proof were required, Lieutenant- Colonel MM. Izhaq of Jordan provided it himself in an interview with the Jerusalem newspaper Falastin on 24 August of this year. He said: " It has been established beyond any doubt that the Jews have dared to do what they did only when they were certain that UNTSO Headquarters would not intervene. For instance, last autumn the Jews started planting trees in the Government House area in the direction of Sur Bahir village. When the Jordanians protested, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO replied that this was an action of a civilian nature and therefore not within the purview of UNTSO. This position of UNTSO encouraged the Israelis to cany out other agricultural and military works of a larger scope at this time. The Jordan Government gave the Chief of Staff sufficient time to take the necessary measures to evict the Jews from this area. When it was convinced that the Chief of Staff was unable to exercise his authority, it was compelled to lodge a complaint with the Security Council." 38. Following the initiative of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in 1949, both parties met 36. La question du statut de la region s'est posee de nouveau le 12 juin 1949, jour OU la Commission mixte d'armistice a adopte une resolution dans laquelle elle declare que «l'avance et la presence, dans la zone du Palais du gouvernement, de forces armees des deux parties constituent une violation de la Convention de Rhodes». Apres l'adoption de cette resolution, le President de la Commission a declare : « A l'origine, et pendant la periode de la treve, l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve pouvait controler, sur le plan civil, la situation dans la zone. Une fois signee la Convention d'armistice entre les deux parties, ce controle a cesse. Des civils se trouvant encore dans cette zone... C'est pourquoi je me propose d'entrer en contact avec les deux gouvernements... afin d'examiner si une solution acceptable pour les deux parties peut etre elaboree a une date aussi proche que possible... » 37. Cette declaration du President de la Commission mixte d'armistice doit suffire, je pense, pour infirmer l'argument selon lequel la zone se trouverait sous la surveillance de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve. S'il fallait une autre preuve, le lieutenant-colonel M. M. Izhaq de l'armee jordanienne 1'30 lui-meme fournie dans une interview accordee le 24 aout dernier au journal Falastin de Jerusalem. Il a declare a cette occasion: « Il a ete etabli de falion irrefutable que les Juifs n'ont ose agir de la sorte que lorsqu'ils ont ete assures que l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve n'interviendrait pas. Ainsi, al'automne dernier, les Juifs ont commence aplanter des arbres dans la zone du Palais du gouvernement du cote du village de Sur Bahir. Les Jordaniens ayant proteste, le Chef d'Etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve a repondu qu'il s'agissait d'une activite de caractere civil, et qui ne relevait donc pas de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Cette prise de position a encourage les Israeliens a entreprendre d'autres travaux agricoles et militaires, de plus grande envergure. Le Gouver- nement jordanien a laisse au Chef d'etat-major suffisamment de temps pour prendre les mesures necessaires en vue de faire evacuer la zone par les Juifs. Une fois convaincu que le Chef d'etat-major n'etait pas en mesure d'exercer son autorite, il s'est vu dans l'obligation de porter plainte devant le Conseil de securite.» 38. Sur !'initiative du President de la Commission mixte d'armistice, les deux parties se sont reunies 39. At a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 26 June 1949 - that is, three days later - an agree- ment between the parties was formulated which was designed to regulate the conduct of civilian activities on both sides of the civilian line. However on 28 June 1949 the Jordan representative to the Mixed Armistice Commission informed the Chairman that his Government did not wish to ratify the arrangement regarding the area of the Government House and that it demanded modificaUons in the line proposed by Captain Nuwar. Israel refused to reopen the negotiations. As a result the Nuwar line became the de facto demarcation line dividing the respective areas of activity of Israel and Jordan civilians despite the fact that the proposed limitations on civilian activities never became effective. Both parties have ever since conducted their activities in the area between the lines on the basis of the exis- tence of the civilian line. 40. This is the only status quo ever recognized by both parties. Thus, on the Jordanian side of the area an important section of the highway leading to Bethlehem was built across the Jordanian sector by labourers brought in from outside. The villagers of Jebel El Mukabbir situated in the area enjoyed unrestricted access to Jordan and no restrictions were imposed on the number of Jordanian civilians entering the village and settling there; nor have complaints ever been submitted by Israel against planting or other agricultural or civilian activities such as the erection of permanent buildings, including a school, that the villagers have undertaken from time to time right up to the civilian line. 41. On the Israel side, the Hebrew University Expe- rimental Farm continued to function, its students performing various agricultural tasks in the area, including exactly the same type of forestry work that they are pursuing now. 42. Again in June of this year fresh proof was given of the valid existence of this civilian line when Colonel Byron V. Leary, the Acting Chief of Staff, ordered a team of United Nations observers to examine the border markers placed on the ground by Israel surveyors. The Chief of Staff reported that no mistakes had been made by Israel in demarcating the civilian line. Obviously the United Nations surveyors could have arrived at their verdict only by comparing tb-:o grounc demar- cations with the lines drawn on the map of 23 June 1949. 39. A une reunion de la Commission mixte d'armistice qui s'est tenue le 26 juin 1949, c'est-a-dire trois jours plus tard., un accord entre les parties a ete soumis visant a reglementer les activites civiles de part et d'autre de la ligne civile. Cependant, le 28 juin 1949, le representant jordanien a cette commission a informe le President que son gouvernement ne desirait pas ratifier l'arrangement relatif it la zone du Palais du gouvernement et exigeait que des modifications soient apportees a la ligne proposee par le capitaine Nuwar. Israel a refuse de rouvrir les negociations. En conse- quence, la ligne Nuwar est devenue la ligne de demar- cation de facto entre les secteurs d'activite respectifs des civils israeliens et jordaniens, en depit du fait que les restrictions proposees touchant les activites civiles n'ont jamais ete appliquees. Les deux parties ont toujours, depuis lors, exerce leurs activites dans la zone situee entre les lignes en se fondant sur l'existence de la ligne civile. 40. C'est la le seul statu quo que les deux parties aient jamais reconnu. Ainsi, dans le secteur jordanien de la region, un tron<;on important de la grand-route condui- sant a BethIeem a ete construit a travers ce secteur par des travailleurs venant de l'exterieur de la zone. Les habitants du village de Djebel el-Moukkaber, situe a l'interieur de la zone, peuvent librement passer en Jordanie, et le nombre des civils jordaniens qui se rendent dans le village et s'y etablissent n'est pas limite. Israel n'a depose aucune plainte au sujet de la plantation d'arbres ou d'a,utres tra,vaux de cara,ctere agricole ou civil, tels que la construction de batiments permanents - nota,mment une ecole - que les habi- tants du village entreprennent de temps a autre dans leur secteur jusqu'a proximite de la ligne civile. 41. Du cote israelien, la ferme experimentale de I'Universite hebra,ique n'a pas cesse d'etre exploitee et les etudiants ont effectue divers travaux agricoles dans la zone, notamment des trava,ux identiques aux travaux forestiers dont ils s'occupent a,ctuellement. 42. En juin dernier, le colonel Byron V. Leary, chef d'etat-major par interim, a donne une preuve de plus que la ligne civile existait bel et bien puisqu'il a donne l'ordre a une equipe d'observateurs des Nations Unies d'examiner les bornes frontieres installees sur le terrain par des geometres israeliens. Le Chef d'etat-major a signaIe qu'Isra,el n'avait commis aucune erreur dans la, demarcation de la ligne civile. De toute evidence, les geometres designes par les Nations Unies n'ont pu arriver a cette conclusion qu'en comparant la demar- cation sur le terrain avec les lignes pm"tees sur la carte du 23 juin 1949. " If the Commission which goes to investigate the matter reached the conclusion that this has been made for civilian purposes in the area, I would have no say in the matter." 44. On 20 July 1957, the Israel representative to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission informed the Chairman and the Jordan representative as a matter of courtesy, that on the following day a party of labourers employed by the Agricultural Experi- mental Farm, with agricultural machinery, would start levelling the ground on the Israel side of the civilian line preparatory to the planting of trees. This was part of a large project to surround Jerusalem with a green belt. No opposition was expressed at that time by the Jordan representative or by any other Jordan authority. 45. However, after the work had begun the Jordanians suddenly announced that they would oppose the conti- nuation of the work until a new agreement was made to modify the existing civilian line. Israel immediately agreed to negotiate the demarcation of this line with Jordan. The Jordanians, however, made such discussion conditional on the immediate suspension of the work by Israel. To this demand Israel was not prepared to submit. We were, as we always have been, willing to meet the Jordanians to discuss outstanding points of difference, but we are not prepared to forgo the exer- cise of legitimate rights as a condition to the holding of such discussions. 46. Faced with the refusal of Jordan to participate with Israel in a joint demarcation of the civilian line, Israel surveyors then proceeded to do it alone in the presence of United Nations observers. In the meantime, however, the Jordan authorities took other measures. Elements of the Jordanian army crossed the demar- cation line and moved into certain parts of the area between the lines where they proceeded to establish strong-points. 47. Consequently, on the same day, 21 July, Israel submitted to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Commission a complaint against the stationing of units of the J 01'- dal1ian army in the area. A relevant passage from the complaint reads as follows: "Work began as scheduled and continued without interference for approximately one hour when J 01'- 44. Le 20 juillet 1957, le representant d'Israel it la Commission mixte d'armistice israelo-jordanienne a informe le President et le representant de la Jordanie, par courtoisie, que le jour suivant une equipe de travail- leurs employes par la ferme experimentale commen- cerait, en utilisant un outillage agricole, it aplanir le terrain du cote israelien de la ligne civile en vue d'y planter des arbres. Ces travaux s'inseraient dans un vaste programme visant it entourer Jerusalem d'une ceinture de verdure. Aucune objection n'a ete soulevee it l'epoque par le representant de la Jordanie ou par une autorite jordanienne quelconque. 45. Or, une fois les travaux commences, les Jordaniens ont soudain annonce qu'ils s'opposeraient it la poursuite des travaux jusqu'it ce qu'un nouvel accord filt conclu qui modifierait la ligne civile existante. Israel a imme- diatement accepte de discuter le trace de cette ligne avec la Jordanie. Toutefois, les Jordaniens ont fait dependre la discussion de la suspension immediate des travaux entrepris par Israel. Israel n'etait pas dispose it accepter cette condition. Il etait pret, comme il l'a toujours ete, it discuter avec la Jordanie les questions restees en suspens, mais non it renoncer it exercer ses droits iegitimes pour que les discussions puissent avoir lieu. 46. Devant le refus de la J ordanie de participer avec Israel au trace de la ligne civile, les geometres israeliens entreprirent de le faire seuls, en presence d'observateurs des Nations Unies. Cependant, dans le meme temps, les autorites jordaniennes prirent d'autres mesures. Des elements de l'armee jordanienne franchirent la ligne de demarcation' et penetrerent dans certaines parties de la zone situee entre les lignes, oil ils commencerent it installer des positions. 47. En consequence, le meme jour, c'est-it-dire le 21 juillet, Israel a adresse it la Commission mixte d'ar- mistice israelo-jordanienne une plainte relative it la presence d'unites de l'armee jordanienne dans la zone. Voici un passage pertinent de cette plainte : «...les travaux ont commence it la date prevue et se sont poursuivis sans incident pendant it peu "These soldiers occupied well-fortified Jordanian military positions the presence of which in the area is illegal. One of these positions is situated at a distance of less than fifty metres from the fence surrounding the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Headquarters near the east gate." In this connexion, I am able to state categorically that no elements of the Israel defence forces have entered the area during this whole period. 48. The situation, therefore, Jis as follows: (1) The General Armistice Agreement contains no provisions determini!'lg the legal status of the area between the lines and does not define the re- spective rights and obligations of the parties in the area. However, the prohibition applicable to the crossing of the demarcation line by military forces also applies of necessity to the entry into this area, as it is completely surrounded by demarcation lines. (2) Article IV, paragraph 3, of the general Armistice Agreement provides that the rules and regulations of the armed forces of the parties prohibiting civilians from entering the area between the lines shall remain in force. As no such rules were applicable at that time to the area under discussion, it is not subject to any restrictions in this connexion under the Armis- tice Agreement. (3) All subsequent arrangements concerning rights and duties of the parties in the area have been the result of agreements between the parties. Such agreements have been either of a formal nature or on the basis of tacit consent without any limitation as to the duration of their validity. (4) The most important arrangement that has been made between the parties was the drawing, eight years ago, of a civilian line running through the area dividing it between Jordan and Israel. As a result, ever since, civilians of both parties could move into and perform civilian functions in their respective sectors without specific agreement be- tween the two countries, but could not enter the sector of the other party. (5) Attempts at spelling out these functions in formal agreements have been made in the past, but no valid agreement of this nature exist at present. (6) Hence no activity which is civilian in charac- ter, carried out by either party within its own sector of the area between the lines, can be considered to be in violation of either the General Armistice Agree- ment or of any other binding arrangement between the parties. (7) Evidence that this has been the view not only of Israel, but also of Jordan, is to be found in thefact 48. La situation se presente donc comme suit : 1) Il n'y a pas, dans la Convention d'armistice general, de dispositions qui fixent le statut juridique de la zone situee entre les lignes et definissent les droits et devoirs respectifs des parties dans cette zone. De toute evidence, cependant, l'interdiction de franchir la ligne de demarcation qui s'applique aux forces militaires vaut egalement pour l'entree dans cette zone, entierement a l'interieur des lignes de demarcation. 2) Le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general stipule que les decrets et regle- ments des forces armees des parties interdisant aux civils de penetrer dans la zone situee entre les lignes, resteront en vigueur. Etant donne que de tels regle- ments n'etaient pas applicables, a l'epoque, a la zone en question, cette derniere n'est a cet egard soumise aaucune restriction aux termes de la Conven- tion d'armistice. .3) Tous les arrangements subsequents relatifs aux droits et devoirs des parties a l'interieur de la zone decoulent d'accords conclus entre les parties. Ces accords sont de veritables instruments ou resultent d'une acceptation tacite, sans limitation quant a la duree d'application. 4) L'arrangement le plus important qu'ont pris les parties a ete le trace, il y a huit ans, d'une ligne civile qui traverse la zone et la partage entre la J ordanie et Israel. Depuis lors, les civils qui sont ressortissants de l'une ou de l'autre partie ont toujours pu se deplacer dans leur secteur respectif et y exercer leurs activites civiles, sans convention particuliere entre les deux pays, mais ils ne pouvaient penetrer dans le secteur relevant de l'autre partie. 5) On a essaye de preciser ces activites dans des accords ecrits, mais il n'en existe aucun de valable a l'heure actuelle. 6) En consequence, on ne saurait considerer qu'une activite quelconque de caractere civil, exercee par l'une ou l'autre des parties dans son propre secteur de la zone situee entre les lignes, constitue une viola- tion soit de la Convention d'armistice general, soit de tout autre accord liant les parties. 7) Que ce point de vue n'etait pas seulement celui d'Israel, mais aussi celui de la Jordanie, on en a (8) It is submitted, therefore, that there is no basis on which the Security Council can entertain the Jordanian complaint concerning the planting of trees in the Israel sector of the area between the lines, as such a purely civilian activity carried out there does not violate any international agreement binding on the parties. The allegation that this work was being carried out under the protection of Israel security forces which had entered the sector is simply not true. No Israeli military personnel has entered the area between the lines. (9) The only violations of such agreements are those which are being committed by Jordan: ifrstly, Jordan has erected military fortifications inside the area which have been manned on many occasions by Jordanian troops; secondly, Jordan has set up a sentry post, manned by a soldier or soldiers, near the eastern gate of Government House inside the area; thirdly, military traffic has continuously used the highway constructed through the area. These acts constitute flagrant violations by Jordan of article Ill, paragraph 2, and article IV, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement. 49. I would therefore urge the Council to dismiss the Jordanian complaint as being without foundation either in fact or in law. 50. The PRESIDENT [translated trom Spanish] : I have several speakers on my list, and before calling on them, I should like to draw the Council's attention to the fact that this afternoon, at 4 p.m., the Secretary- General, the President of the Council and, I think, the Council members are invited to attend an official ceremony here at Headquarters. I would therefore suggest that we suspend the meeting at 4 p.m. and resume it at 4.30.

I should like to refer to a point which was discussed this morning. It had been decided that after listening to the statements of the two parties, the council would consider the order of the debate. You mentioned that there were a number of speakers on your list. I am wondering whether the members who have asked to speak will speak on the question of the order of the debate or on the substance of the matter. 52. The PRESIDENT [translated trom Spanish] : As I do not know what the speakers on my list are going to say, I cannot answer your question.

I agree that no one here, not even the President, is able to say whether those who have asked for the floor will speak on the substance of the matter or on the point that was decided upon this 49. Je prie donc instamment le Conseil de securite de rejeter la plainte jordanienne qui n'est fondee ni en fait ni en droit. 50. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Plusieurs autres orateurs sont inscrits. Avant de leur donner la parole, je voudrais cependant informer le Conseil que cet apres-midi, a 16 heures, le Secretaire general, le President du Conseil de securite ainsi que les membres du Conseil, je pense, sont invites a assister a une ceremonie officielle au Siege de I'Organisation. Je suggere donc que le Conseil suspende la seance a 16 heures pour la reprendre une demi-heure plus tard. 51. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je voudrais me rMerer a une question qui a ete examinee ce matin. Il avait ete decide que le Conseil, apres avoir entendu les exposes des deux parties, examinerait l'ordre d'examen des points de l'ordre du jour. Le President vient de nous annoncer que plusieurs orateurs sont inscrits. Je me demande si les membres du Conseil qui ont demande a prendre la parole examineront l'ordre d'examen ou le fond de la question. 52. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : J'ignore ce dont traiteront les orateurs inscrits sur ma liste. 53. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je comprends, bien entendu, que personne ici, pas meme le President, ne puisse dire si les orateurs inscrits parleront du fond du probleme ou se conformeront a la 54. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Il reste au Conseil a se prononcer sur deux questions : tout d'abord, le Conseil accepte-t-il qu'a 16 heures nous interrompions la seance pour une demi-heure exactement? Il en est ainsi decide. 54. The PRESIDENT [translated from Spanish]: There are two points to be decided. The first is whether the Council agrees to recess the meeting for exactly one half-hour at 4 p.m. 55. The PRESIDENT [translated from Spanish]: The second point is that rightly raised by the repre- sentative of Iraq. Unless one of the speakers on my list wishes to refer to other matters such as the postpone- ment of the debate, a request for information concern- ing the problems before us, etc., we shall discuss the order of priority of the items on our agenda.

The Security Council is meeting at the request of the Government of Jordan which has complained that activities conducted by the Government of Israel in the area between the armistice demarcation lines in the vicinity of Government House at Jerusalem are illegal. We have heard the reply of the representative of Israel. The representative of Israel has also requested that this body consider at the same time the implementation of the General Armistice Agreement, especially article VIII thereof. 57. The General Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and Jordan in 1949 governs the relationship between the two parties, and this includes their responsibilities along the armistice demarcation lines. This agreement, however, does not provide for the regulation of affairs within the area between the lines in the vicinity of Government House. Neither does it contain provisions similar to those in article V of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement which clearly defines the responsibility of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the general supervision of that demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria. 58. As we heard the statements of the two parties, we found that there is considerable uncertainty about the extent and nature of the authority of the parties and of the United Nations over the area between the lines. In the circumstances, the Council should receive from the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization a report on conditions prevailing in the area between the lines in the vicinity of Government House. 59. The Philippine delegation believes that it would be particularly useful if the report were to encompass, first, a review of the presence and activities of the parties 55. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Le Conseil doit en outre se prononcer sur la question que vient de poser - et a bon droit - le representant de l'Irak. A moins que certains des orateurs inscrits ne desirent faire d'autres suggestions tendant, par exemple~ a ajourner le debat ou a demander des renseignements concernant les problemes dont le Conseil est saisi~ nous examinerons l'ordre de priorite des questions inscrites a l'ordre du jour. 56. M. ROMULO (Philippines) [traduit de l'anglaisJ Le Conseil de securite s'est reuni a la demande du Gouvernement jordanien qui invoque l'illegalite de l'activite du Gouvernement israelien dans la zone situee entre les lignes de demarcation prevues dans la Convention d'armistice, au voisinage du Palais du gouvernement a Jerusalem. Nous avons entendu la reponse du representant d'Israel. Celui-d, de son cote, a demande au Conseil d'etudier en meme temps les conditions de mise en reuvre de la Convention d'armistice general et particulierement des dispositions de son article VIII. 57. La Convention d'armistice general conclue en 1949 entre Israel et la Jordanie regit les relations entre les deux parties et fixe notamment leurs responsabilites le long des lignes de demarcation prevues dans la Convention d'armistice. Toutefois, cette Convention ne contient aucune disposition visant it aplanir les difficultes qui pourraient surgir it l'int6rieur de la zone situee entre les lignes dans le voisinage du Palais du gouvernement. Elle ne contient pas non plus de stipulations identiques a celles de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice israelo-syrienne qui fixe nettement les responsabilites du Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge quant a la surveillance generale de la zone demilitarisee entre Israel et la Syrie. 58. Ayant entendu les deux parties, nous avons pu constater qu'une grande incertitude regne encore sur l'etendue et la nature de l'autorite des parties et des Nations Unies dans la zone situee entre les lignes. Dans ces conditions, le Conseil devrait demander au Chef d'etat-major par interim de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve un rapport sur la situation existant dans la zone situee entre les lignes aux alentours du Palais du gouvernement. 59. La delegation des Philippines estime qu'il y aurait grand interet que ce rapport contienne un expose qui traite, premierement, de la presence et de l'activite 60. Pending receipt of the report on conditions between the lines, the Philippine delegation hopes that both parties will refrain from taking any action between the armistice lines that would tend to increase tensions. In particular we hope that both parties will abide by the provisions of article III of the Armistice Agreement which states that no military or para-military forces of either party shall pass beyond the armistice demarcation lines.

The United States is of much the same mind on this matter as the representative of the Philippines; we find a great deal in his statement that we can support. In particular, the concrete suggestions at the end of his speech seem to us to have a great deal of merit. It would surely be very useful to have a review of the activities of the parties in the area between the lines. It would be a valuable thing to have a review of the existing provisions for regulating the activities there, and, of course, if there is a possibility of recommendations by the Acting Chief of Staff, that would be of great interest and value to the Security Council also. We do hope - and we echo the hope expressed by Mr. Romulo - that, pending receipt of such a report, both parties would refrain from taking any action between the armistice lines that would tend to increase tensions. We think that those are constructive steps that this Council could take which would certainly lead in the right direction.

We have before us the complaint of the Government of Jordan about digging in the area surrounding what was the Government House in Jerusalem, and I have listened to the exposition which the representative of Jordan has given of this complaint. We also have before us the letter of the Acting Representative of Israel and have heard his speech, giving his view of the matter and also covering a variety of issues in a more general field. 63. No one could pretend that the situation in Jerusalem left by the Armistice Agreement of 1949 is a happy one or that the arrangements made can be easy to work. These arrangements are very complicated and very delicate, and indeed it is far from clear exactly what they are. 64. Having heard the statements by the two parties, I feel that the Council should be allowed time for reflection and research. The debate which we had earlier today on the procedural question showed that many members of the Council would wish for more information an; more time before coming to any conclusion on thl" matter. The fact that we have only 60. En attendant ce rapport sur la situation entre les lignes d'armistice, la delegation des Philippines espere que les deux parties s'abstiendront de toute activite entre les lignes d'armistice qui soit de nature a aggraver la tension. Elle espere en particulier qu'elles observeront les dispositions de l'article III de la Convention d'armistice qui stipule qu'aucun element des forces militaires ou paramilitaires de l'une ou l'autre partie ne franchira les lignes de demarcation de l'armistice. 61. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais] : La delegation des Etats-Unis partage, dans l'ensemble, I'avis du representant des Philippines; eUe s'associe a une bonne partie de sa declaration. Les suggestions concretes qu'il a formulees a la fin de son intervention lui semblent notamment tres interessantes. Il serait certes tres utile que nous ayons un tableau general de l'activite des deux parties dans la zone situee entre les lignes. Il y aurait grand interet a ce que nous a.yons un releve des dispositions qui reglementent cette activite et, bien entendu, toute recommandation que le Chef d'etat-major pourrait soumettre au Conseil de securite serait aussi tres precieuse. Nous esperons - rejoignant en cela M. Romu- 10 - que, jusqu'au moment Oll un rapport de cette nature nous sera parvenu, les deux parties eviteront de se livrer, entre les lignes de l'armistice, a tout acte qui pourrait accroitre la tension. Ce sont la, a notre sens, des mesures constructives que le Conseil pourrait prendre et qui sont orientees dans la bonne voie. 62. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais] : Nous sommes saisis de la plainte du Gouvernement jordanien concernant les travaux de terrassement dans la zone qui entoure I'ancien Palais du gouvernement a Jerusalem. Nous avons entendu la declaration du representant de la Jordaniea l'appui de cette plainte. Nous sommes aussi saisis de la lettre du representant d'Israel par interim et nous venons d'entendre son intervention, dans laquelle il a expose son point de vue sur la question et divers problemes de caractere plus general. 63. Nul ne saurait pretendre que la situation qui existe . a Jerusalem a la suite de la Convention d'armistice de 1949 est exceUente ou que les arrangements pris peuvent etre facilement appliques. Ces arrangements sont extremement complexes et delicats, et il est en fait dilIicile de definir en quoi ils consistent exactement. 64. Apres avoir entendu les exposes des deux parties, j'estime que le Conseil devrait disposer d'un certain temps pour reflechir et s'informer. Le debat touchant la question de procedure a montre que bon nombre des membres du Conseil souhaiteraient avoir plus de renseignements et plus de temps pour se faire une opinion sur la question. Cela d'autant plus que nous 65. I agree very much with what has already been said by the representatives of the Philippines and the United States. It would, I think, be useful if we could have a report from the Acting Chief of Staff on the subject of the complaint of the Government of Jordan on the events which have led up to it and, in particular, on the status of the area to which the complaint of the Government of Jordan refers. 66. I also agree that, in view of the item submitted by the representative of Israel, it would also be useful if the Acting Chief of Staff could give us a report covering those points as well. 67. We must, of course, allow a little time for such reports to be prepared, though I hope that they will be prepared as a matter of urgency. In the meantime, the first concern of the Security Council must surely be to seek to avoid any deterioration in the situation on the spot. I, therefore, would echo what has already been said by the representatives of the Philippines and the United States and say that it is the earnest hope of my Government that the Governments of Israel and Jordan will ensure that nothing is done on either side ·which could aggravate the situation. The meeting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 4.35 p.m.

I listened very carefully to the statement made by the representative of Jordan. I likewise listened with great care to the statement made by the representative of Israel. I find that the two statements contained a considerable number of differences. There are differences, in the first place, in regard to ,,,hat has taken place in the so-called no man's land or the area between demarcation lines. These differences are what we might call differences in regard to facts, in regard to exactly what has taken place or, in other words, what activities have occurred in that zone. In the second place, these two statements contain differences in regard to the understanding of the legal provisions governing what is called the status quo. 69. In the face of such a situation, we would benefit greatly from a report made by United Nations officers on the spot. My delegation therefore welcomes the suggestion made by the representative of the Philippines, that ive should ask for a report from the Truce Supervision Organization. 70. The speeches also convinced me that the two complaints - one by Jordan against Israel, and the ?ther by Israel against Jordan - though related, are III fact separate. The two complaints admit of separate treatment. In fact, if they are treated separately, we could save much time and effort. Furthermore, separate treatment would tend to simplify our task. If we should put them together, I am afraid we would increase L ~~---~ 17 65. J'approuve en bonne partie ce qu'ont dit les representants des Philippines et des Etats-Unis. II serait, je pense, utile que nous disposions d'un rapport, emanant du Chef d'etat-major par interim, qui traite de la plainte du Gouvernement jordanien, des evenements qui l'ont motivee et, en particuIier, du statut de la region auquel se refere la plainte du Gouvernement jordanien. 66. J'estime egalement qu'il serait utile que le Chef d'etat-major par interim nous fasse parvenir egalement un rapport au sujet de la plainte soumise par le representant d'Israel. 67. II faut evidemment un certain temps pour preparer des rapports de cette nature. J'espere cependant qu'ils seront etablis d'urgence. En attendant, le ConseiI de securite doit assurement avoir pour principal souci de chercher a eviter toute aggravation de la situation sur place. Je voudrais par consequent m'associer a ce qu'ont dit les representants des Philippines et des Etats-Unis et declarer 'que mon gouvernement compte que les Gouvernements· d'Israel et de la Jordanie feront en sorte qu'aucune mesure ne soit prise, d'un cote ou de l'autre, qui serait de nature a faire empirer la situation. : La seance est suspendue a 15 h. 30; eIle est reprise 1116 h. 35. 68. M. TSIANG (Chine) [traduit de l'anglais] : J'ai ecoute tres attentivement l'expose du representant· de la Jordanie et j'ai aussi suivi avec beaucoup d'attention celui du representant d'Israel. Je constate de nombreuses divergences entre les deux declarations. J'en ai trouve tout d'abord au sujet des evenements qui se sont produits dans ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le no man's land ou la zone situee entre les lignes de demarcation. II s'agit, pourrait-on dire, de divergences sur les faits, sur ce qui s'est reellement produit, en d'autres termes sur les activites exercees dans cette zone. II y a aussi entre les deux exposes des divergences touchant I'interpretation des dispositions juridiques qui regissent ce qu'on appelle le statu quo. 69. Telle etant la situation, il serait extremement utile que les fonctionnaires des Nations Unies qui se trouvent sur place nous fassent parvenir un rapport. Aussi, ma delegation se felicite-t-elle de la suggestion du representant des Philippines, de demander a l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve de soumettre un rapport au Conseil. 70. Les exposes m'ont, en outre, convaincu que les deux plaintes - celle de la Jordanie contre Israel et celle d'Israel contre la Jordanie -, bien qu'elles soient Iiees, sont en reaIite distinctes. Les deux peuvent etre etudiees separement. Bien plus, si le Conseil les examine separement, il gagnera beaucoup de temps et s'epargnera beaucoup d'efforts. Enfin, cette fal;on de proceder simpIifierait la tache. En les examinant 71. If we are going to have separate reports, I would suggest that the report on the Jordan complaint should reach us as early as possible. That complaint should get at least that much priority in our treatment. The Jordan complaint is, in fact, very specific. I should think that a report covering the Jordan complaint would not take too much time. Therefore, even in the natural course of events, such a report should reach us, and could reach us, much earlier than a report covering all the topics mentioned in the Israel complaint. To sum up: my delegation, too, feels that we should ask for reports from our men on the spot, that we should have separate reports, and that the report on the Jordan complaint should have priority. 72. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [translated trom Russian]: The Security Council's attention has again been drawn to violations of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan, which have strained the already tense rdations between these countries. In his letter and in his statement before the Security Council the permanent representative of Jordan submitted specific facts indicating that Israel has again violated both the Armistice Agreement and previous decisions of the Security Council, which has on a number of occasions examined the complaints of the Arab countries concerning the aggressive acts of Israel. 73. As the representatative of Jordan points out in his letter, Israel, in violation of articles Il, III and IV of the Armistice Agreement, engaged in unilateral action in the neutral zone of the Jerusalem sector, where, under the protection of its police forces, various kinds of construction work, including the construction of roads which have a definite military significance, were carried out. 74. There can be no doubt that the introduction of armed forces into the neutral zone and these unilateral activities which can alter or provide grounds for altering the status of the "neutral zone" are a violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement to which I have referred. 75. The Israel representative in his statement did not deny that Israel was carrying out work in the neutral zone. He only endeavoured to minimize the significance of this work and to pass it off as something in the nature of recreational activity. 76. The Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and, in the present case, for ensuring the implementation 71. Si le Conseil demandait des rapports distinets, j'aimerais suggerer que le rapport sur la plainte jordanienne lui soit soumis le plus tot possible. Dans notre examen, nous devrions accorder au moins eette priorite a la plainte jordanienne. Elle est en effet tres precise. Je pense que la redaction du rapport sur eette plainte ne prendrait pas beaucoup de temps. Par consequent, dans des conditions normales, ce rapport devrait nous parvenir - et pourrait nous parvenir - beaucoup plus rapidement qu'un rapport couvrant tous les points mentionnes dans la plainte israelienne. En resume, ma delegation estime, elle aussi, que le Conseil devrait demander que les representants des Nations Unies qui se trouvent sur place lui fassent parvenir des rapports, que chaque plainte devrait faire l'objet d'un rapport distinct et que celui interessant la plainte jordanienne devrait etre etabli par priorite. 72. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe] : L'attention du Conseil de securite a de nouveau ete attiree sur les violations de la Convention d'armistice conclue entre Israel et la Jordanie, qui ont aggrave les relations deja tendues de ces deux pays. La lettre du representant permanent de la J ordanie et le texte de son intervention au Conseil de securite contiennent des faits concrets qui permettent de dire qu'il y a eu a nouveau violation par Israel de la Convention d'armistice ainsi que des decisions prises anterieurement par le Conseil de seeurite, lequel a examine a plusieurs reprises les plaintes de pays arabes apropos d'actes d'agression commis par Israel. 73. Ainsi qu'il est dit dans la lettre du representant de la Jordanie, Israel a entrepris des actions unilaterales dans la zone neutre du secteur de Jerusalem, au mepris des articles Il, III et IV de la Convention d'armistice : sous la protection de la police, divers travaux de construction y ont ete effectues, notamment la construction de routes ayant une importance strategique certaine. 74. Il ne fait pas de doute que l'introduction de forces armees dans la zone neutre, de meme que les activites unilaterales d'Israel susceptibles de modifier le caraetere de cette zone ou de creer des conditions de cette nature, portent atteinte aux dispositions des articles de la Convention que je viens de mentionner. 75. Dans son intervention, le representant d'Israel n'a pas nie le fait meme que des travaux aient ete effectues dans la zone neutre. Il a seulement essaye d'en diminuer l'importance et de les presenter presque comme d'innocents delassements. 76. Le Conseil de securite, qui a la responsabiIite principale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales et qui, en l'occurrence, a le devoir de veiller m~nt of Jordan had submitted its complaint in the first instance. Thus the Government of Israel not only committed another violation of the Armistice Agreement but in fact did not allow the competent United Nations body responsible for ensuring compliance with the Armistice Agreement to investigate Jordan's complaint on the spot. 77. The Soviet delegation understands Jordan's concern in connexion with this as yet bloodless but serious violation of the Armistice Agreement, because it occurred after repeated warnings to Israel from the Security Council and when all peace-loving States are endeavouring to reduce tension in this area of the world. 78. We may well ask what is the purpose of these incessant provocations by Israel on its neighbours' frontiers, accompanied by a campaign of threats and sabre-rattling directed at the Arab countries. There can be only one answer; the continuation of strained relations between Israel and the Arab countries and the incessant frontier incidents are of advantage only to the aggressive circles in certain States, which use Israel as a tool in their far-reaching plans which are not concerned either with the interests of the peoples of the Arab countries or with the maintenance of peace. It is not by chance that the present increase in tension between Israel and the Arab countries coincides with the pressure that is being crudely exerted by the United States on certain Arab countries. 79. In his statement the representative of Jordan has requested the Security Council to take a number of steps which, in his opinion, are necessary to strengthen the Armistice Agreement. The Soviet delegation considers that these proposals made by Jordan should be studied by the Security Council which must investigate the statements contained in Jordan's complaint, and, if they are substantiated, take the necessary measures to prevent further violations of the Armistice Agreement. 79. Dans son intervention, le representant de la Jordanie a demande au Conseil de securite de prendre une serie de mesures qui sont a son avis indispensables pour consolider la Convention d'armistice. La delegation sovietique considere que cette proposition de la. Jordanie merite d'etre retenue par le Conseil de securite, qui a pour mandat d'examiner les faits relates dans la plainte de la Jordanie et de prendre, au cas oil ils se reveleraient exacts, des mesures appropriees afin d'eviter des violations ulterieures de la Convention d'armistice. 80. Regardless of what decisions it may take as a result of its investigation, the Security Council should here and now formally require the Government of Israel to comply strictly with the Armistice Agreement and respect the obligations it assumed in becoming a Member of the United Nations. 80. Independamment des decisions que le Conseil de securite pourrait prendre apres l'enquete, il doit demander des maintenant et avec insistance au Gouvernement d'Israel de respecter de la fal(on la plus stricte la Convention d'armistice et les obligations qu'il a assumees lorsqu'il est devenu Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. 81. The Soviet delegation does not object to the proposal that the United Nations representative, namely, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization should be requested to submit a report, 81. La delegation sovietique n'a pas d'objection a formuler it la proposition qui tend a demander au representant des Nations Unies, le Chef d'etat-major charge de la surveillance de la treve, de faire rapport 77. La delegation sovietique comprend l'inquietude de la Jordanie en presence de cette violation qui, bien qu'elle n'ait pas, pour l'instant, entraine d'effusion de sang, n'en est pas moins grave puisqu'elle a lieu malgre les multiples avertissements adresses a Israel par le Conseil de securite et a un moment oil tous les Etats pacifiques s'efforcent de reduire la tension dans cette region du monde; 78. Quel est le but de ces incursions incessantes d'Israel sur les frontieres des Etats voisins, incursions accompagnees de campagnes de menaces et de manifestations guerrieres a l'adresse des peuples arabes ? A cette question il n'y a qu'une reponse : le maintien de la tension entre Israel et les pays arabes et les frequents incidents de frontiere profitent uniquement aux groupes agressifs de certains Etats qui utilisent Israel comme instrument de leurs plans a long terme, contraires aussi bien aux interets des Etats arabes qu'a la cause de la paix. On ne sa.urait considerer comme fortuit le fait que l'aggravation actuelle de la tension des relations entre Israel et les pays arabes voisins coincide avec la pression que les Eta.ts-Unis exercent ouvertement sur certains Eta.ts arabes.

I should like to point out incidentally that the point which I raised a short while ago regarding the order of the debate has not been touched upon. Nevertheless, after listening to the fltatement of the representative of China, I do not see any reason to insist on this point any longer. The question was fully discussed this morning and, as a matter of fact, I had been convinced that the wisdom of China would prevail in the end. 83. The two questions which are before the Council are separate questions and should have been so considered from the beginning. I do not wish to speak at great length at this time. To enter into the substance of the Jordanian complaint would take a very long time. If I sensed the feeling of the Council correctly, that is not its desire at this time. 84. On the other hand, I shall not reply to the allegations and the naive ideas which have been expressed by the representative of Israel regarding certain matters. We all like trees, but let everybody plant trees in his own country and not cross frontiers to plant them in other people's countries. 85. If I have correctly judged the sense of the discussion this afternoon, I feel that there is a general consensus regarding a new approach to the question. The representative of the Philippines has brought to the Council certain practical and concrete suggestions, and I am inclined to agree with the points raised by him. 86. As the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out, the report regarding the complaint of Jordan should be considered as a matter of great urgency. I repeat: it should be considered as a matter of great urgency. This view was supported by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union and the Philippines. I feel that unless we set l:l time-limit we shall be returning to try to define "a matter of urgency". In this connexion, I might ask the Secretary- General, as he has kept in touch with the matte r since 21 July 1957, to tell us the length of time required for the preparation of the report. 87. Another point on which I agree completely with the representative of China is that priority should be given to the report on the complaint of Jordan. I should say that a high priority should be given to the report on the complaint of Jordan, and that might explain in a certain way what time will be required for the preparation cf this report. 88. Great concern was expressed regarding the increased tension in the area. I wholeheartedly agree that nothing should be done to increase the tension in the area, Consequently, Israel should take measures so as not to intervene any more in this particular area. For that reason I suggest - and this has already 82. l\L JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais] : J'aimerais faire observer - dans un autre ordre d'idees _ que la question que j'ai soulevee tout al'heure au sujet de l'ordre du de-hat n'a pas ete abordee. Quoi qu'iI en soit, apres avoir ecoute l'expose du representant de la Chine, je ne vois plus aucune raison d'insister. Nous avons longuement discute ce matin de l'ordre du debat et, pour dire vrai, j'avais la conviction que la sagesse chinoise l'emporterait. 83. Les deux questions dont le Conseil est saisi sont distinctes et on aurait dll les separer des le debut. Je ne desire pas parler longuement maintenant. Pour traiter du fond de la plainte jordanienne il faut beaucoup de temps. Or, si j'interprete bien l'opinion du Conseil, il ne desire pas le faire pour le moment. 84. Par ailleurs, je ne repondrai pas aux allegations et aux arguments naIfs du representant d'Israel au sujet de certains faits. Nous aimons tous, assurement, les arbres, mais que chacun en plante dans son pays et ne franchisse pas les frontieres pour aller en planter dans le pays des autres. 85. Si j'ai bien compris la signification du debat de cet apres-midi, il me semble que l'unanimite s'est faite sur une nouvelle fal,(on d'examiner la question. Le representant des Philippines a soumis au ConseiI des suggestions concretes et pratiques et je penche pour sa fal,(on de voir. 86. Comme l'a fait observer le representant du Royaume-Uni, il faut que le rapport touchant la plainte de la Jordanie soit etabli d'urgence. Je repete: il faut qu'iI soit etabli d'urgence. Tel a aussi ete l'avis des representants de la Chine, de I'Union sovietique et des Philippines. Je pense que si nous ne thons pas un delai, il nous faudra de nouveau essayer de definir ce que signifie ({ une question urgente ». A ce propos, je me permets de demander au Secretaire general, qui s'est tenu au courant de la question depuis le 21 juiIlet 1957, de nous dire combien de temps il faudrait pour rediger le rapport. 87. Je suis d'accord avec le representant de la Chine sur un autre point : il faut donner la priorite au rapport touchant la plainte de la J ordanie. Il faut donner a ce rapport une importance premiere, et c'est ce qui explique dans une certaine mesure pourquoi je demande quel serait le d6lai necessaire pour l'etablissement du rapport. 88. On s'est beaucoup inquiete de l'aggravation de la tension dans la zone consideree. Je partage entierement l'avis de ceux qui ont exprime cette inquietude. Rien ne doit venir aggraver la tension. C'est pourquoi Isra.el devrait prendre des mesures pour mettre fin a son intervention dans cette zone particuliere. Je sug-

I wish to reply to the question put to me by the representative of Iraq. It is quite correct that we have studied this question for some time, and for that reason I think that the time necessary for a report to the Council can be fairly short. It is always difficult to speak for somebody else, but my guess would be that something like ten days or a fortnight would be sufficient. If the Council were to decide on a fortnight, my own feeling is that we would be on the safe side.

It was agreed this morning that we should place both parts of this item on the agenda and leave until later the consideration of the procedure to be followed by the Council in dealing with it. I note that only the Soviet representative has entered at any length into the substance of the matter. The other speeches have mainly been concerned with the procedure. 92. I merely speak myself at this point in order to assist you, Mr. President, in gauging the feeling of the Council regarding the procedure that it presumably would wish to follow. It seems to me that the position is a clear one. We have heard both parties and I am sure that the whole Council has listened with very great care and attention to the different points that have been made and the information presented. 93. It is quite clear that these two statements present certain considerable differences, in emphasis, in the picture they paint of conditions in the area, differences as regards matters of fact, differences as regards matters of interpretation of the legal position and the status of the area in question. In these circumstances it is the normal practice for the Council to ask the United Nations own authority on the spot, the Chief of Staff, to prepare a report for the information of the Council. While we are awaiting that report, this problem must be considered as in a sense sub judice, and for that reason I am sure the Council would not wish at this stage to take any step that would appear to prejudge the matters on which the Chief of Staff might report to us. 94. I think that in any decision of the Council or any instructions to the Secretary-General in this connexioil, we should refrain from any action that would appear to prejudice the legitimacy of the activities of either party, because those are the very matters that have to be considered by the Council when we receive the report of' the Chief of Staff. There is very general agreement, I think, in the Council that nothing should be done to render the situation more difficult during the period in which this report is being prepared and SUbmitted to the Council, and I am sure that you will already have taken account, Mr. President, of the 90. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais repondre a la question que m'a posee le representant de l'Irak. Il est exact que j'etudie le probleme depuis quelque temps deja, ce qui me permet de dire qu'un rapport pourrait etre soumis au Conseil assez tOt. Il est toujours difficile de repondre pour quelqu'un d'autre, mais une dizaine ou une quinzaine de jours me paraissent suffisants. Si le Conseil decide de fixer un delai de quinze jours, j'estime personnellement que nous ne risquons pas de le depasser. 91. M. WALKER (Australie) [traduit de l'anglais] Il a ete convenu ce matin que nous inscririons a notre ordre du jour les deux rubriques de la question et que nous remettrions a plus tard l'examen de la procedure que le Conseil suivrait a leur sujet. J'ai note que seulle representant de l'Union sovietique a discute aSsez longuement du fond du probleme. Les autres orateurs se sont principalement occupes de la procedure. 92. Si j'ai demande a prendre la parole maintenant. c'est uniquement pour aider le President a degager l'opinion du Conseil touchant la procedure qu'il voudra suivre. La situation me parait claire. Nous avons entendu les deux parties, et tous les membres du Conseil ont surement ecoute avec la plus grande attention les divers arguments avances et les renseignements presentes. 93. On a pu voir que les deux exposes different sensiblement dans la. maniere de decrire la situation dans cette region : ils different par l'interpretation des faits, de la. position juridique et du statut de la zone en question. Il est done normal, dans ces conditions, que le Conseil demande a.u representant autorise des Nations Unies sur place, c'est-a-dire au Chef d'Hat-major, de preparer un rapport pour informerle Conseil. En attendant que ce rapport nous soit parvenu, l'affaire doit etre consideree comme etant en instance. C'est pourquoi je suis sur que le Conseil ne desirera pas, pour le moment, prendre des mesures qui pourraient faire croire qu'il prejuge les questions sur lesquelles le Chef d'etatmajor lui ferait rapport. 94. A mon avis, le Conseil devrait, dans toute decision qu'il prendralt ou dans toute instruction qu'il adresserait au Secretaire general, s'abstenir d'un acte qui pourrait sembler mettre en doute la Iegitimite des activites de l'une ou l'a-utre partie, etant donne qu'il s'agit la de la question meme que le Conseil sera appele a examiner une fois qu'il sera en possession du rapport du Chef d'etat-major. Il y a, me semble-t-il, au Conseil une large majorite sur ce po,int : le Conseil ne doit rien faire qui soit de nature a rendre la situation plus difficile avant que le rapport ne soit etabli et soumis au Conseil. Je suis sur, d'autre part, que le

I feel it my duty to point out to the representative of Iraq that the Council has not yet decided whether to discuss items (a) and (b) of the agenda separately or simultaneously. 97. I made no ruling on the point of order raised by the representative of Iraq, because I was wlliting to hear the views of the other members of the Council and because I considered, as I still do, that the representative of the Philippines proposed something for which provision is made in rule 33 (point 4) of the rules of procedure, that is, that we ask a rapporteur - in this instance the Chief of Staff whose duty it is to supervise the truce in Palestine - to submit two reports: one on the Jordanian complaint and the other on the complaint submitted by Israel. 98. I have noted that there is unanimous support in the Council - or at least support from a large majority - in favour of requesting those reports. 99. I also understand that a majority of the members feel that it is particularly urgent that we should request the report concerning the Jordanian complaint and allow a fortnight for it to be submitted. 100. I also believe that the majority in the Council is in favour of informing the parties that they are to refrain from taking any steps which may increase tensirm in that part of Palestine. That is my interpretation vf the views put forward. If any representative considers that I have not accurately represented the view of the majority, he is, of course, entitled to say so.

I feel it my duty to thank you, Mr. Presider.t, for the explanation which you have kindly given regarding the point of order that I raised. I wish also to thank the Secretary-General for the precision which he has given to the word" urgency". I am sure that you, Sir, have given a correct interpretation of the opinion and ideas expressed in this Council; there is nothing for which you can be reproached. I feel, however, that I, personally, have not fully understood your interpretation or that the opinions which have been expressed on this particular point have not taken a very definite shape in my mind. I should like to know whether the statements with regard to decreasing tension by refraining from acts which would lead to its increase mean at the same time that the activities of Israel in the Jebel El Mukabbir area should be stopped immediately and completely while the Seeurity Council awaits the report of the Acting Chief of Staff. 96. Le PRESIDENT (traduil de l'espagnol) : Je tiens a preciseI' a l'intention du representant de l'Irak que jusqu'ici le Conseil n'a pas decide si les alineas a et b du point a l'ordre du jour seraient examines isolement on ensemble. 97. Je n'ai pas pris de decision sur la motion d'ordre sonlevee par le representant de l'Irak parce que j'attendais de connaitre l'avis des autres representants dn COllseil et parce que j'estimais - et j'estime encoreqne le representant des Philippines a fait une suggestion conforme a l'alinea d de l'article 33 dn reglernent interieur : demander a un rapporteur - en l'occurence le Chef d'etat-major charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine - de rediger deux rapports, l'un sur la plainte de la Jordanie et l'autre sur celle d'Israel. 98. J'ai constate que tous les membres dn Conseil, ou tout an moins la tres grande majorite d'entre eux, aimeraient que ces deux rapports soient demandes. 99. Je crois comprendre egalement que la majorite des membres du Conseil aimerait que le rapport touchant la plainte de la Jordanie soit etabli d'nrgence et parvienne au Conseil dans un delai de quinze jours. 100. Je pense enfin que la majorite des membres du Conseil desire que les parties soient informees qu'elles doivent s'abstenir de prendre toute mesure de nature a aggraver la tension dans cette partie de la Palestine. TeIle est mon interpretation des opinions qui ont ete exprimees. Si un memb .~ du Conseil juge que je n'ai pas fidelement interprete l'opinion de la majorite du Conseil, il a tonte liberte de prendre la parole sur ce point. 101. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduil de l'anglais]: Je tiens a vous remercier Monsieur le President, de l'explication que vons avez bien voulu me donner au sujet de la motion d'ordre que j'ai presentee. Je desire egalement remercier le Secretaire general des precisions qu'il a apportees au sujet du sens du mot « urgence n. Je suis sur, Monsieur le President, que vous avez correctement interprete les opinions et les idees exprimees au Conseil. Aucun reproche ne peut vous etre fait. Peut-etre, cependant, n'ai-je pas, sur un point particulier, tres bien compris votre interpretation ou saisi exactement le sens des opinions emises. J'aimerais savoir si les membres du Conseil qui ont preconise que, pour diminuer la tension, les parties s'abstiennent de cornmettre des actes qui pourraient l'aggraver, voulaient dire par la qu'il convenait de mettre fin immediatement et completement, en attendant que le Conseil de securite soit saisi du rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim, aux activites d'Israel dans la region de Djebel el-Mukkaber.

When I stated that I was in agreement with the suggestion made by the representative of the Philippines, I understood his third suggestion - which followed logically upon tht second - was that all activities should be stopped. It may have been my own interpretation of his words. However, the representative of the Philippines is here in the Council and will be able to explain the point. But I should merely like to invite attention to the fact that when the Council is considering a complaint, and a logical and clear statement has been made proving beyond any doubt that there has been a violation of the Armistice Agreement and that certain activities have been carried out, whether or not of a civil nature, a risk is involved. If these activities are to be followed up, by the time we receive the report of the Acting Chief of Staff, most of the data involved will be out of date. Consequently, the Council might ask for another report, because developments will be going on all the time. 104. I think we will be underestimating the danger involved in this matter if we agree that all Israel's activities should be continued as not endangering the situation there. In 1953, when the question of the Jordan waters was considered by the Council, all activities were stopped pending a report on the question. It is only logical, it is only in the interests of peace, it is only in the interests of facilitating the work of this Council, that all activities should be stopped. As a matter of fact, the Council should have gone further and asked the representative of Israel for an undertaking that his Government would not do anything of the kind until the matter was discussed once more by the Council. 105. If this matter is not understood in the way I have put it to the Council, I think I shall have to change the attitude which I have expressed and withhold my agreement to the whole measure which has been proposed by the representative of the Philippines.

I call on the representative of the Philippines to explain whether I correctly interpreted his proposal or whether the interpretation of the representative of Iraq is the correct one.

The President has made a correct interpretation of my proposal. When I said that, pending the receipt of the report on conditions between the lines, we hoped that both parties 103. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais] : Lorsque j'ai dit que j'approuvais la suggestion de representant des Philippines, j'avais compris que sa troisieme suggestion - consequence logique de la deuxieme - tendait a faire cesser toutes les activites. C'est peutetre une interpretation toute personnelle. Le representant des Philippines, qui est parmi nous, pourra m'eclairer sur ce point. J'aimerais simplement appeler l'attention du Conseil sur le fait que lorsqu'il examine une plainte et qu'un expose logique et clair a ete fait d'oil. il ressort de toute evidence qu'il y a eu violation de la Convention d'armistice general et que certaines activites - civiles ou non - ont ete entreprises dans la region, le Conseil ,court un certain risque. Si ces activites se poursuivaient, la plupart des elements que contiendrait le rapport demande au Chef d'etatmajor par interim ne seraient plus d'actualite au moment oil. ce document nous parviendrait. En sorte que le Conseil pourrait desirer alors - la situation evoluant sans cesse - qu'un nouveau rapport lui soit soumis. 104. Ce serait, je crois, meconnaitre le risque que nous courons que de permettre a Israel de poursuivre toutes ses activites dans la conviction que rien de grave ne pourrait en resulter. En 1953, lorsque la question des eaux du Jourdain est venue devant le Conseil, tous les travaux en cours ont ete interrompus jusqu'a ce qu'un rapport ffit presente. Il est logique, et il est de l'interet de la paix et de l'interet des travaux du Conseil, que toutes les activites prennent fin. En fait, le Conseil aurait dft aller plus loin et demander au representant d'Israel de donner l'assurance que son gouvernement ne poursuivrait pas ses activites aussi longtemps que le Conseil n'aurait pas repris l'e~amen de la question. 105. Si l'opinion du Conseil n'etait pas celle que je viens d'exprimer, il me faudrait revenir sur la position que j'ai exposee precedemment et renoncer a accepter toutes les suggestions du representant des Philippines. 106. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Je donne la parole au representant des Philippines pour qu'il precise si j'ai correctement interprete sa suggestion ou si l'interpretation du representant de l'Irak est la bonne. 107. M. ROMULO (Philippines) [traduit de l'anglais] : Le President a correctement interprete ma suggestion. Lorsque j'ai dit qu'en attendant d'etre en possession du rapport sur la situation qui existe entre les !ignes 108. Therefore, in making the proposal that it did, the delegation of the Philippines did not envisage the suspension of the activities of Israel, as interpreted by the representative of Iraq. It seems to me that there would be no need for any report if we decided that these activities are illegal. It is precisely because we want to know the facts that we wish to have this report. That is the design of the delegation of the Philippines as the author of this proposal. 109. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republi~s) [translated from Russian]: I have already stated the Soviet delegation's position on this question quite clearly, but I should like to comment on what the President and the Philippine representative have just said. As I see it, the President's explanation cannot possibly be interpreted to mean that the Security Council has given its approval or sanction to the activities which were undertaken by Israel in the "neutral zone" and which were the reason for the complaint by Jordan. I wish to forestall any such interpretation; it should be made perfectly clear that neither the explanation of the President nor that of the Philippine representative in any way implies endorsement of those activities by the Security Council.

Before calling on the ,,;presentative of China, I should like to make it clear that nothing I have said should be taken as implying that the Council is sanctioning acts committed by Israel. In my view - and that is also the view of the representatives of the Philippines, the United Kingdom and Australia - all that the Council has so far done is to make a preliminary examination of the question and to discuss the possibility of requesting reports to enable it to take action. The proposal implies nothing but what it says; it merely proposes to request reports and to urge the parties to refrain from any action which may aggravate tension in that part of Palestine. 111. Having made that clarification, which I believe to be necessary, I now call upon the representative of China.

I am very much afraid that we have found ourselves in another difficult dilemma. It would seem very difficult to decide upon a course of action. The difficulty, is in the first phce, that we do not know what the activities are which 108. En presentant sa suggestion, la delegation des Philippines n'envisageait donc pas une suspension des activites d'Israel, comme l'a interprete le representant de I'Irak. Aucun rapport ne serait necessaire, me semble-t-il, si nous decidions que ces activites sont ilIegales. C'est precisement parce que nous desirons elucider la situation que nous desirons disposer de ce rapport. Tel est le sens de la proposition des Philippines. 109. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe] : J'ai deja expose tres clairement la position de la delegation sovietique sur cette question. J e voudrais toutefois dire quelques mots au sujet de ce que le President et le deIegue des Philippines viennent de dire. Je pense, en ce qui me concerne, que l'explication donnee par le President ne saurait en aucune maniere etre interpretee comme une approbation ou une justification par le Conseil de securite des actions entreprises par Israel dans la zone neutre et qui ont donne lieu a la plainte de la Jordanie. Je desire mettre en garde le Conseil contre une telle interpretation; il faut bien faire entendre que les explications du President et du representant des Philippines ne sauraient d'aucune fa<;on impliquer que le Conseil approuve ces activites. 110. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Avant de donner la parole au representant de la Chine, je tiens a preciseI' qu'en aucune maniere on ne saurait conclure de ce que j'ai dit que le Conseil enterinait les activites d'Israel. Avec les representants des Philippines, du Royaume-Uni et de I'Australie, j'estime que le Conseil s'est borne jusqu'ici a examiner la question d'une fa<;on toute preliminaire et n'a fait qu'envisager la possibilite de demander des rapports qui lui permettront de se prononcer. Il ne faut pas voir dans la proposition ce qui ne s'y trouve pas. Elle tend a demander des rapports et a inviter les parties interessees aeviter de faire quoi que ce soit qui puisse aggraver la tension dans cette partie de la Palestine. 111. Apres cette precision que je jugeais necessaire, je donne la parole au representant de la Chine. 112. M. TSIANG (Chine) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je crains vraiment que nous nous trouvions encore devant une alternative embarrassante. Il parait difficile de se prononcer sur la conduite a suivre. La difficulte vient, tout d'abord, de ce que nous ignorons la nature des 113. It has been held that that question of right is still undetermined. If we say that Israel could continue to plant trees, do we or do we not acknowledge Israel's right to do that very thing? Of course, if we say that Israel should stop, people will interpret it to mean that the Council has prejudged the question, that Israel has not the right. What the Council wants to do at this moment is avoid deciding on that point. 114. Ma reaction devant ce probleme est typiquement chinoise. La solution que je propose n'est pas logique, mais elle est pratique. Tout d'abord, je ne pense pas que le Conseil doive decider si Israel a le droit ou n'a pas le droit de planter des arbres en cet endroit. C'est la une question qui sera tranchee plus tard. D'autre part, je pense qu'il n'y a pas grand mal a interrompre la plantation pendant .deux ou trois semaines. 114. I have a typical Chinese reaction to this. It is illogical, but a practical way out of. this. In the first place, I do not think that the Council should lay down whether it is r~ght or wrong for Israel to plant trees at that spot. That is a question to be settled. In the second place, I think that delaying the planting of trees for two or three weeks cannot do much damage. 115. Le representant des Philippines a dit que si le Conseil adoptait cette procedure, tout pays pourrait empecher tout autre pays d'agir ; illui suffirait de deposer une plainte. C'est juste, mais, en l'occurrence, nous avons la chance de pouvoir fixer un delai. Il serait de deux semaines, ou, au plus, de trois semaines. 115. The representative of the Philippines made the point that if that procedure were adopted, any country could stop another country from acting by lodging a complaint. Of course, it has that effect, but in this particular case we are happy that time is limited. We would limit it to two weeks, or at most three weeks. 116. With regard to the planting of the trees, let us not be too logical about that matter. To be brief, I would say this. I hope that you, Mr. President, will find it possible to make a personal appeal to Israel to refrain from planting trees during this interim period before the Council comes to a decision. But if our friend from Iraq asks the Council to determine the issue today by stating that Israel shall stop planting trees as of now, I feel that we shall be undertaking too much.

Mr. President, the summation which you gave a few moments ago represented the view of my delegation and, I believe, of the majority of the member of the Council. I was happy to note that a moment ago the representative of the Philippines accepted your summation, and that was particularly valuable because your summation was based on his summation. 118. As I see it, the position is that, having heard the complaints of Jordan and Israel, we as a Council are proposing to ask for reports from the Acting Chief of Staff on the two complaints, and we expect to receive the report on the Jordan complaint within a matter of a couple of weeks. That was the interpretation which the Secretary-General kindly gave us as to what was the time that might be expected in the circumstances to elapse for the production of a report which, it was understood, was to be produced urgently. 118. A mon avis, la situation se presente comme suit: ayant entendu l'expose des plaintes de la Jordanie et d'Israel, le Conseil se propose de demander au Chef d'etat-major par interim des rapports sur ces deux plaintes ; il espere recevoir dans deux ou trois semaines le rapport sur la plainte jordanienne. D'apres l'explication du Secretaire general, c'est le temps que, dans les conditions existantes, demandera l'etablissement d'un rapport qui - la chose est entendue - doit etre prepare d'urgence. 113. On a soutenu que ce droit pouvait etre conteste. Si nous disons qu'Israel peut continuer a planter des arbres, ne reconnaissons-nous pas, par la meme, son droit a le faire ? Il va de soi que si nous disons qu'Israel doit s'arreter de planter ces arbres, on en conclura que le Conseil a prejuge la question et qu'Israel n'a pas ce droit.Ce que le Conseil veut en ce moment, c'est eviter de se prononcer sur ce point. 116. Quant a la plantation des arbres, n'essayons pas d'etre trop logiques. J'espere - et je me resume - que le President pourra adresser personnellement un appel a Israel lui demandant de s'abstenir de planter des arbres d'ici le moment ou le Conseil prendra une decision. Si le representant de l'Irak demandait au Conseil de statuer aujourd'hui meme et de decider qu'Israel doit cesser, a partir de maintenant, de planter des arbres, je lui repondrai que ce serait aller beaucoup trop loin. 117. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais] : Monsieur le President, les conclusions que vous avez tirees dans votre resume de tout a l'heure correspondent bien a l'opinion de ma delegation et, je pense, a celle de la majorite des membres du Conseil. Je me suis felicite de constater que le representant des Philippines acceptait votre interpretation, ce qui etait d'autant plus heureux que vos conclusions se fondaient sur les siennes.

I apologize for asking to speak once more. By doing so I hope to state the views of my Government regarding this particular matter. 121. After listening to the different observations I was impressed by the fact that there is an attempt, whether conscious or unconscious, to over-simplify the matter and to put in terms of trees. This is a very dangerous way of looking at a matter of this nature. As you know, over-simplification always leads to very risky consequences. 122. The matter, as was stated this morning [787th meeting], arose out of the fact that Israel entered a no man's land - and the implications of such an act must be obvious to everyone - and started digging and ploughing in the ground under the protection of armed forces. The matter was raised with the Mixed Armistice Commission, and no action was taken. The act by itself has increased the tension between the two parties. 123. Therefore the statement that it is only a matter of planting trees and that trees will grow neither taller nor broader in two weeks is a dangerous interpretation of this matter. 124. Israel has admitted its activities, and its activities, as you know, are in violation of the Armistice Agreement. On the other hand, the Council is asking the two parties to refrain from any activities that would lead to the increase of tension. Well, the tension has arisen out of the fact that Israel has gone into this area and started doing unlawful acts. 125. What I tried to interpret in the words of the representative of the Philippines was a provisional suspension of these activities. In this case we are not prejudging the matter of the complaint one way or the other. This matter, as I said before, has already been raised in the question of the waters of the Jordan. Here I have been advised that at the 631st meeting of the Council, when the complaint by Syria against Israel concerning the work on the west bank of the River Jordan in the demilitarized zone was raised, the President suggested that a provisional suspension should be observed. Here, the representative of Israel stated: " I am empowered to state that the Government of Israel is willing to arrange such a temporary suspension in the demilitarized zone for the purpose of facilitating the Security Council's consideration of this question. This is, of course, as we all understand, without prejudice to the merits of the case itself." [631st meeting, para. 4.] Another speaker went into the matter and explained that this was a step taken in the right direction. 120. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je m'excuse de demander une fois de plus la parole. C'est parce que j'espere pouvoir presenter les vues de mon gouvernement sur ce point particulier. 121. Ecoutant les diverses observations qui ont ete presentees, j'ai ete frappe de constater que l'on s'efforgait, consciemment ou non, de simplifier a l'exces la question en la ramenant a une question d'arbres. C'est une fagon tres dangereuse de considerer une question de cet ordre. Comme vous le savez, a simplifier une question a l'exces on court toujours de graves risques. 122. L'affaire, comme on l'a dit ce matin [787e seance], a pour origine la penetration d'Israel dans un no man's land - et on connalt toutes les consequences que peut avoir un tel acte - oil il a entrepris de faire creuser et labourer le sol sous la protection de forces armees. L'affaire a ete portee devant la Commission mixte d'armistice, oil aucune suite n'y a ete donnee. Cela seul a suffi pour augmenter la tension entre les deux parties. 123. Aussi, dire qu'il ne s'agit, en somme, que de la plantation de quelques arbres et que deux semaines ne feraient pas grand-chose en l'affaire, c'est donner du probleme une interpretation dangereuse. 124. Israel a admis s'etre livre a certaines activites. Or, vous le savez, ces activites constituent une violation de la Convention d'armistice. Par ailleurs, le Conseil demande aux deux parties de s'abstenir de toute action qui serait de nature a accroitre la tension. Or, la tension vient precisement de ce qu'Israel a penetre dans cette zone et y a entrepris illegalement certains travaux. 125. Ce que j'ai crn comprendre dans l'expose du representant des Philippines, c'est qu'il fallait suspendre provisoirement ces travaux. Et en demandant la suspension, nous ne prejugeons ni dans un sens Ili dans l'autre la question qui fait l'objet de la plainte. Le meme cas, je le repete, s'est presente a propos des eaux du Jourdain. On vient de me rappier qu'a la 631 e seance du Conseil, lorsqu'a ete examinee la plainte de la Syrie contre Israel au sujet des travaux sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain dans la zone demilitarisee, le President avait propose un arret provisoire des travaux. A cette seance, le representant d'lsrael a declare: «Je suis habilite a declarer que le Gouvernement israelien est dispose a faire le necessaire pour assurer l'arret temporaire des travaux dans la zone ctemilitarisee, afin de faciliter la tache du Conseil. Nous sommes tous d'accord, bien.entendu, pour considerer que l'interruption des travaux ne prejuge pas le fond de la question elle-meme.» [631e seance, par. 4.] Un autre orateur, parlant de la question, a indique que c'etait bien la decision qu'il convenait de prendre. 127. This, then, has been the practice of the Council. It is only logical that the matter which ledto the tension should be suspended at least for the time being until a report on the spot is submitted to the Council. This is the point of view of my delegation.

It is very clear to the United States delegation that there are legal and practical considerations with which we are confronted here. We have already urged that the parties do their utmost to avoid any action between the armistice lines that would increase tensions there. It seems to us that it is quite clear that the Council, while not wishing to take a decision on the legal issue and wishing first to have a report on the situation there, at the ~ame time does not feel that the activities which have been going on there are wise in the circumstances. 129. We feel that we can expect that the parties will heed this feeling and ~ense of the Council, and we would include in our feelings that Israel would heed this view of the Council. Therefore, it seems to us that the continuation of the tree planting at this time for this short period that is involved is something which very clearly may not be desirable. 130. While we do not wish to take the decision, which the representative of China has said so well, we would think that as a practical matter this view would be given the most serious consideration by the Governments concerned.

Ishould like to say for the record, first, that at no time during the debate did I express a personal opinion on the substantive issue, with regard to which I have no information whatsoever; secondly, that I cannot change the views of the representatives on the Council: I can only endeavour to interpret them. I tried to interpret the proposal of the representatives of the Philippines, the United Kingdom and Australia as accurately as I could and I am gratified that the three representatives have confirmed that my interpretation was correct. 132. In accordance with the suggestion of the representatives of China and the United States, I would suggest that the Council decide to request the two reports - one of them to be submitted not later than two weeks from now - and that copies of the verbatim record of our debate be sent to Jordan and Israel so t~at both Governments may be duly informed of the Vlews expressed in the Council. It was so decided. 127. TelIe est la pratique qui s'est etablie au Conseil de securite; d'ailleurs, il n'est que logique que I'activite qui a provoque la tension soit suspendue au moins provisoirement jusqu'a ce que le rapport fait sur place soit soumis au Conseil. TelIe est I'opinion de ma delegation. 128. M. BARCO (Etat~-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de I'anglais] : Aux yeux de la delegation des Etats- Unis, il ne fait aucun doute que, en I'occurrence, des considerations d'ordre juridique et d'ordre pratique s'opposent. Nous avons dejA demande aux parties de faire tout leur possible pour ne rien entreprendre dans la zone situee entre les lignes de I'armistice qui puisse accroitre la tension. Nous pensons que le Conseil, qui, avant de prendre une decision sur I'aspect juridique, desire etre saisi d'un rapport sur la situation qui s'est creee sur place, n'en estime pas moins que les activites exercees dans cette region ne sont pas judicieuses, da.ns les circonstances presentes. 129. Nous pouvons escompter, croyons-nous, que les parties comprendront ce desir du Conseil, et qu'Israel tiendra compte de l'opinion du ConseiI. Il semble bien qu'il soit evident qu'il serait peu souhaitable que la plantation d'arbres se poursuivre, pour l'instant, pen- dant le bref laps de temps prevu. (c·-. 130. Nous ne demandons pas que le Conseil se pro- nonce formellement en ce sens, mais nous voudrions, comme le representant de la Chine I'a si justement exprime, que dans leurs actes les gouvernements inte- resses .accordent la plus grande attention a cette opinion. 131. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Je tiens adeclarer tout d'abord qu'it aucun moment, pendant le debat, je n'ai exprime une opinion personnelIe sur le fond de la question; je n'aurais d'ailleurs pas pu le faire, ne disposant d'aucune des donnees necessaires pour cela. Ensuite, si je ne peux rien changer aux opi- nions exprimees par les representants au Conseil, je dois m'efforcer neanmoins de les resumer et de les interpreter. J'ai interprete du mieux que j'ai pu la pro- position des representants des Philippines, du Royaume- Uni et de l'Australie, et j'ai ete tres heureux d'entendre ces trois representants dire que j'avais correctement interprete leurs vues. 132. Comme les representants de la Chine et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, je suggere que le Conseil decide de demander les deux rapports - dont l'un dans deux semaines au plus tard - et de faire envoyer des exem- plaires du compte rendu stenographique des debats a la Jordanie et a Israel pour que les gouvernements de ces deux pays soient a meme de prendre connaissance des opinions exprimees au Conseil. II en est ainsi decide. La seance est levee a18 h. 10. Les commanJes et clemancIes J. renseign.ments eman.nt •• pays ou iI n'existe pas encore Je clepositaires peuvent etr. aclressees -a ta Section des ventes at da la tlisfriltufi.n, Organisation clet Nations Unies, New~York (Efats~Unil cl'Am'- riqua), ou er la Section cles ventes;, Organisation d., Noliens Un;." Palais des Nations, Genev. (Suissa). . Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may b. sent to: Sale. and Circulation Section, Uniled Nations, New Yorle, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Notions Office, Palais·clas Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Printed in France Price : $ V.S. 0,25 ; 1/9 stg. ; Sw. fr. 1. (or equivalent in other currencies) 13254-August 1958-1,800