S/PV.7990 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Germany to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: a letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/495); the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515); and a letter dated 22 June 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/537). At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and Mr. Sebastiano Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy, in his capacity as a Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: Two years after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Secretary-General is immensely encouraged by the continued commitment by all participants to the agreement. The JCPOA — reached by the E3/EU+3 and Iran on 14 July 2015 — is the embodiment of successful multilateral diplomacy, political will and perseverance. This diplomatic achievement reflects the spirit and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and gives us all hope that even the most difficult issues among States can be addressed through dialogue, understanding and reciprocity. As noted by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini, this agreement belongs to the entire international community. Hence, it is imperative that all JCPOA participants, the United Nations and the international community at large, continue to support the full and effective implementation of this historic agreement. Today’s meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is taking place against the backdrop of steady implementation, cooperation and progress. Since implementation day, on 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has issued seven reports documenting continued implementation by Iran of its nuclear- related commitments. The recent 25 April meeting of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA in Vienna — the fifth meeting since implementation day — noted the continued adherence to JCPOA commitments by all its participants, and stressed the need to ensure its full and effective implementation. The Secretary-General believes that the comprehensive and sustained implementation of the JCPOA will guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful, while allowing for transparency, monitoring and verification. It will also provide Iran with an opportunity for greater engagement with the international community and assist in increasing Iran’s trade and economic relations. It will also bring forth to a satisfactory conclusion the consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue by the Security Council. I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515). The report was submitted to the Council on 16 June pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 7 of the note by the President of the Council issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Let me turn to the main findings of the third report. First, the Secretary-General has not received any report, nor is he aware of any open source information, regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear- related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution. I also welcome the fact that Member States are making greater use of the procurement channel. Since 30 December 2016, 10 new nuclear- related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals submitted since implementation day. Of the 16 proposals, 10 were approved by the Council, two were withdrawn by the proposing States and four are currently under review. The proposals were processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality. The operational linkages established between the Security Council and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission are both effective and efficient. In that regard, I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the excellent cooperation we have with the European External Action Service, especially its Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. Secondly, regarding the implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report notes that, on 29 January, Iran launched a medium-range ballistic missile. Letters were submitted to the Secretary- General by Iran and Israel, and jointly by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, concerning the launch. The letters presented a range of views and interpretations. As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by Iran in March 2016, there was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). In that regard, I would like to quote exactly from the third report of the Secretary-General: “I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches, which have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the region.” (S/2017/515, para. 9) Thirdly, in terms of restrictions on arms-related transfers, the report includes additional information on the seizure of an arms shipment by the French navy in the northern Indian Ocean in March 2016. In January 2017, France invited the Secretariat to examine the seized arms. After examination of the weapons and analysis of information provided, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of Iranian origin and were shipped from Iran. Fourthly, the report also highlights the participation, for the second year in a row, of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) in the Iraq defence exhibition held in March, which may again have implications regarding the implementation of the assets freeze. Since the DIO is an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), its funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi territory should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq, and the Secretary-General intends to report to the Council in due course. The Secretary-General’s report also provides information on additional travels by Major General Qasem Soleimani since the second report (S/2016/1136). The travels were reported by Iranian and Arab media outlets. In addition to the findings I have just mentioned, the report also reflects official information provided by Member States to the Secretary-General, including from Israel, Lebanon, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and Yemen. The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate those reports and will provide further updates, as appropriate, should additional information become available. As we are about to enter into the third year of the implementation of the JCPOA, the Secretary-General would like to once again reaffirm the particular responsibilities of JCPOA participants in carrying forward the full and effective implementation of this agreement. The Secretary-General is hopeful that all participants will continue to make progress in the implementation of the agreement and, in the process, secure its durability. In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi of Italy in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to convey our fullest support to him, as well as to the Security Council, in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. João Pedro Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. Mr. Vale de Almeida: I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. I am honoured again to address the Security Council today on behalf of the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First, I would like to thank Secretary-General, as well as our colleague the Ambassador of Italy, who is serving as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for the excellent cooperation. Let me also express our gratitude to our colleagues in the Security Council Affairs Division for their unwavering support, in particular regarding the running of the procurement channel. I would also like to note our appreciation for their work in the preparation of the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515), as well as the Under-Secretary-General for his intervention in the Council today. Almost two years ago, on 20 July 2015, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed and operationalized the JCPOA. This unanimous endorsement has ensured that the JCPOA, which was born of the efforts of the E3+3 and Iran, coordinated by the European Union High Representative, now belongs to the whole United Nations membership and the wider international community. It is worth recalling that the Iranian nuclear programme was one the most contentious issues on the international agenda, and yet it was possible — through diplomacy and a multilateral approach  — to come to a negotiated solution. In a moment where the world is again faced with the threat of unchecked nuclear capabilities, the JCPOA is a pillar of the international non-proliferation agenda. It needs to be preserved and fully implemented. One of the keys to the success of the deal is that it exclusively focuses on one particular issue — Iran’s nuclear programme This is not to say that other issues are less relevant. They are all an integral part of resolution 2231 (2015), and we expect full compliance. However, we would not be in a better position to address all the other non-nuclear matters without the JCPOA in place. We fully agree with the Secretary-General’s assessment that it is in the interests of the international community, writ large, that this achievement of multilateral diplomacy endure transitions and implementation challenges, thereby cementing our collective commitment to diplomacy and dialogue. Almost two years after its conclusion, and one and a half years after implementation day, we can say that the JCPOA is being properly implemented and is delivering on its objectives. The initial results are clear and speak for themselves: Iran’s nuclear programme has been rolled back and placed under tight inspections; and the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly confirmed  — in six reports  — that Iran is abiding by its commitments. At the same time, and as a consequence of the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions, we are witnessing improvements in Iran’s macroeconomic performance. That is a result of strong growth in trade and foreign direct investment. Oil production has returned to pre-sanctions days. Tourism has been revived, and key infrastructure and investment deals have been agreed, including, for instance, with Airbus and Boeing. Those are only some of the positive indicators pointing to a growing revival of trade and business with Iran. The multilateral nature of the JCPOA and its important role as a cornerstone of the international non-proliferation architecture were recalled by the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union, most recently in November, and also on many occasions by the EU High Representative — for example, when we celebrated the first anniversary of implementation day on 16 January, in her contacts with many world leaders and in her address to the Security Council this spring (see S/PV.7935). However, JCPOA implementation is an ongoing task, and we expect full and effective implementation by all sides throughout the lifetime of the agreement. Taking a look at the JCPOA, in particular its five annexes, we realize the complexity and the wide scope of the agreement, as well as the challenges ahead for us in the coming years. The quality of the deal will also be tested by its implementation, and, as coordinators of the process, we will not settle for anything less than strict adherence to what was agreed by all sides. The EU High Representative, as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the deal, remains fully committed to the JCPOA. Since implementation day, we have already chaired five JCPOA Joint Commission meetings, which have monitored implementation and provided guidance on a number of implementation issues. The rigorous implementation of commitments by all sides continues to be the best way to build trust, strengthen the JCPOA and overcome the hurdles that are part of all comprehensive and far-reaching deals. In order to ensure transparency, the Joint Commission has published a number of important interpretative guidance documents. A lot of the debate about the merits of the deal has been focused on Iran’s nuclear obligations, which are laid out in annex I of the JCPOA, and on the lifting of sanctions, which is the subject of annex II. However, let me today briefly touch upon annex III of the JCPOA, which deals with civil nuclear cooperation. Annex III is key in the overall balance of the agreement and essential for our overall objective of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The EU is already engaging with Iran on a number of concrete projects, which are mostly focused on nuclear safety  — something we are all interested in. That cooperation is outlined in the joint EU-Iran statement on civil nuclear cooperation, which was adopted in April last year. For example, it means that we are inviting Iranian nuclear experts and scientists to participate in civil nuclear-research activities and in conferences of nuclear-safety regulators. A few months ago, we held a high-level seminar on civil nuclear cooperation and governance, which was well attended by Iranian officials and parliamentarians. It led to the important joint conclusion that civil nuclear cooperation and the adherence to international norms on nuclear governance have to go hand in hand. I will now focus on the work of the Procurement Working Group, responsible for reviewing proposals by States seeking to engage in activities with Iran that are for nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end-uses. Since implementation day, the Procurement Working Group, which is made up of representatives of the E3+3 and Iran and coordinated by a delegated coordinator of the EU High Representative, has been in full operation. Setting up a new authorization mechanism, which entered into force after a long prohibition period, was not an easy task. The first proposals received through the procurement channel have been reviewed and approved. It is worth noting that not only is the number of proposals steadily increasing, but so is the number of countries submitting proposals to the procurement channel. That is a demonstration that the established procurement mechanism works. Transparency was one of our guiding principles during the negotiations and a cornerstone of the JCPOA. According to para 6.10 of annex IV of the agreement, the Joint Commission shall report to the Security Council every six months on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues. In that context, on 12 June 2017, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group submitted to the Facilitator, on behalf of the Joint Commission, its third biannual report. The report aims at providing the Facilitator and Security Council members with an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 23 December 2016 to 12 June 2017. The report has been circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/2017/495). During this period, the Procurement Working Group continued to work intensively to further develop the Group’s operational modalities. It also made great efforts to be as transparent as possible, without compromising confidentiality, by reaching out to States Members of the United Nations and promoting a better understanding of its aims, objectives and review process. I would like to conclude by reiterating once more the European Union’s resolute willingness to preserve and protect the JCPOA and to work for its successful implementation throughout its lifetime. The world would not be a safer place without the JCPOA. We therefore call on all other parties to remain committed to the full implementation of the JCPOA in good faith, as well as of resolution 2231 (2015) in all its dimensions. This is essential to continuing to build trust, strengthen multilateral diplomacy, reinforce non-proliferation and promote regional peace and stability.

I thank Mr. Vale de Almeida for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Cardi.

I would like to thank you in particular, Mr. President, for calling today’s meeting. I also offer my thanks to Under-Secretary- General Feltman for his briefing on the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/515), and to Ambassador Vale de Almeida for his briefing on behalf of Ms. Federica Mogherini. Today I will touch on three aspects of my report for the period from 16 January 2017 through 15 June 2017: first, the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”; secondly, monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); and, thirdly, developments in the procurement channel and other requests for approval. The full version of the report has been circulated to Council members and has been issued under the symbol S/2017/537. First, with regard to the 2231 format, following the Security Council’s informal consultations on the 29 January 2017 ballistic-missile launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Council held a meeting on 2 March in the 2231 format to further consider the launch. I will summarize our discussion in the second part of my briefing. On 17 March, the Security Council held a meeting in the 2231 format to hear a briefing from the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In his briefing, the Coordinator gave an overview of the procurement channel and of the Procurement Working Group’s functions, activities, processing of proposals and various benchmarks. During the same meeting, the Council also agreed to shift the reporting schedule on resolution 2231 (2015) implementation from July-January to June-December, thereby allowing the Facilitators to brief the Council after six months into and at the end of their terms. In line with paragraph 4 of the resolution, in February and June 2017, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency submitted two quarterly reports on verification and monitoring activities. The February report recalled that on 15 January 2017, the Agency verified that Iran had taken the actions specified in annex V of the JCPOA, namely, the removal of all excess centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and their transfer to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant under continuous Agency monitoring. In addition, the Agency indicated that, on 21 January, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under Agency verification and monitoring, began feeding natural UF6 into a single IR-8 centrifuge for the first time. In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued the construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor based on its original design; had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water; had no more than 5,060 centrifuges that have remained installed in 30 cascades at Natanz; had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235; had not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at Fordow; and that there had not been any nuclear material at the plant. On 2 March 2017, at the 2231 format meeting, the experts of one Member State observed that the medium- range ballistic missile, a Khorramshahr, tested by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January was designed to carry a payload greater than 500 kilograms to a range over 1,000 kilometres (km). The experts noted that “500 kg has been the approximate mass required to carry a first-generation nuclear weapon and 300 km is an internationally accepted range of strategic significance”. They concluded that the test constituted an activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Following the briefing, the issue of the particular sensitivity of the launch, with regard to its regional implications and its relation to resolution 2231 (2015), raised by some representatives, was discussed. A representative emphasized that resolution 2231 (2015) does not provide a definition as to which types of missiles are constructed in such a manner as to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Other delegations said that resolution 2231 (2015) concerns intrinsic capability rather than intent. Since the launch involved a system that was, by design, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, its use was therefore inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). In the light of the views expressed by delegations, I noted that there was no consensus on how this particular launch relates to resolution 2231 (2015). I stressed that it was essential for the Security Council to act in a unified manner in this area, so as to help foster the effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also proposed that, in the framework of my regular contacts with interested parties, including the Permanent Representative of Iran, I would underline the importance, for all parties, of continuing to maintain an attitude conducive to building trust and to implement the terms of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). With respect to procurement channel developments and other requests of approval, since implementation day a total of 16 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the JCPOA. That reflects the growing confidence of Member States in the procurement channel. I am also pleased to note that, on average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 46 calendar days. A proposal to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) was submitted on 23 November 2016 by a Member State that, on 24 February, provided additional information. On 28 February, I informed that Member State that the Security Council had reached no agreement and returned its request. In conclusion, 18 months after implementation day, transparency, practical guidance and outreach remain a priority. In that regard, I plan to engage in new outreach activities on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during the second part of my tenure. In the short term, on 14 July, I intend to convene an open briefing for States Member of the United Nations to raise awareness and understanding of the resolution and its implementation.

I thank Ambassador Cardi for his briefings. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I thank Under-Secretary Feltman for his briefing today, and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for his comments. The topic of compliance by the Iranian regime with its international obligations reminds me of the fable of the scorpion and the frog. The scorpion asks the frog for a ride across the river. The frog, quite rationally, asks: “how do I know you will not sting me?” And the scorpion replies: “because it would kill both of us. We would both drown.” So the frog is convinced. He lets the Scorpion get on his back and starts across the river. But, sure enough, midway through, the scorpion stings him. With his last breath, the frog asks: “why?” And the scorpion replies: “because it is in my nature.” The Secretary-General’s report (S/2017/515) is filled with devastating evidence of the nature of the Iranian regime. In paragraph after paragraph it documents the Iranian Government’s actions in defiance of resolution to 2231 (2015): repeated ballistic missile launches; proven arms smuggling; illicit procurement of ballistic- missile-related technology. Iran’s destructive and destabilizing role in the Middle East goes far beyond its illicit missile launches. From Syria to Yemen and Iraq to Lebanon, Iran’s support for terrorist groups continues unabated. Iran’s weapons, military advisers and arms smugglers stoke regional conflicts and make them harder to solve. Iran’s leaders abuse their own people. The Iranian people deserve better. The Iranian people know the horror of chemical-weapon attacks, and so it is sad and horrifying  — the irony that the Iranian regime now supports a dictator in Syria who uses the same evil weapons against his own people. But, just as alarming as the actions of the scorpion, is the gullibility of the frog. It has been almost two years since the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015), a resolution that this report confirms has been repeatedly and deliberately violated by the Iranian regime. And yet the Security Council has failed to even take minimal steps to respond to the violations. What is more, these violations are not occurring in secret; they are being covered in the media, and yet the Council has done nothing. Let me give an example. Resolution 2231 (2015) banned Iranian Major General Soleimani from travelling outside of Iran. It gave all Member States a clear and unambiguous obligation to deny him entry. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General’s report cites multiple press photos and reports of the General travelling to Syria and Iraq. And that is not the first time he has openly travelled to other countries. This is a violation of the Security Council’s authority, plain and simple. Furthermore, it is one that is occurring out in the open for the entire world to see. The Secretary-General’s report makes clear that Iran is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). And so the question becomes: what is the Security Council going to do about it? What will we do to make Iran understand that resolution 2231 (2015) means something? We as the Security Council must stand behind the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). We must strictly enforce them and show Iran that we will not tolerate its egregious flouting of United Nations resolutions. Those measures are there for a reason, and the Council should be able to enforce them. For its part, the United States will not continue to turn a blind eye to the Iranian regime’s behaviour. In its national capacity, the United States will do its part to enforce resolution 2231 (2015). We will work with our global partners to interdict cargo that it prohibits, and we will continue to impose our own sanctions on those who abet violations of it. With regard to the parts of the resolution that address the nuclear deal, as we have said previously, the United States is now undertaking a comprehensive review of that policy. Until the review is completed, we will comply with our commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and we expect Iran to do the same. A continuance of the Iranian regime’s destructive, destabilizing behaviour will prevent it from ever having a normal relationship with the United States or the rest of the world, and its continued oppression of its own people speaks volumes about its true nature. At a military parade last September, the Iranian Government first displayed the missile that it fired into Syria last week. The new missiles were accompanied by a banner that read “If the leaders of the Zionist regime make a mistake, the Islamic Republic will turn Tel Aviv and Haifa to dust”. Those are not the words of a peace-loving regime or a responsible member of the international community. They are the words of a scorpion. The Security Council must recognize that and act accordingly.

I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for yesterday’s debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (see S/PV.7985). I would like to thank today’s briefers, particularly Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for his presentation of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/515). France welcomes this solid, balanced report and presentation. I would also like to thank Ambassador Vale de Almeida of the European Union and Ambassador Cardi of Italy, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Over the years, the international community, whose voice the Security Council should echo, has built a solid, enduring system of collective security, at the heart of which is the current non-proliferation regime that we have painstakingly constructed. It is based on robust international instruments that we all value and of which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded on 14 July 2015 in Vienna between the E3+3 and Iran, has been in force for almost 18 months now. It has become part of the framework defined by these instruments and is designed to reinforce them. By its endorsement of the agreement through its adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), the Council was able to respond robustly to a major proliferation crisis. It puts in place a 10-year guarantee that Iran will not develop a military nuclear programme. That represents a key step both for our international non-proliferation efforts and for international peace and security as well as a historic achievement for the Security Council. France has already emphasized that we have a duty and a responsibility to ensure that it lasts. This is an issue linked to the stability of the Middle East, which is already in the throes of numerous crises. Mr. Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, brought it up just today during his talks with Mr. Zarif, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. Consolidating the Vienna agreement and ensuring its durability requires a robust and balanced implementation of all the commitments made by the parties to the agreement, carried out with the necessary transparency and effectiveness. France would like to highlight the fact that on 2 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency noted that Iran had not failed to meet any of its nuclear commitments during the verification period. We welcome the reports that the procurement channel is functioning well, based on the reviews of the proposals for transfers that have been submitted. We reiterate that all the requests submitted under the established procedure will be carefully and rigorously reviewed. Incidentally, France’s bilateral cooperation with Iran has significantly increased in value since January 2016 and the JCPOA’s entry into force. Our purchases of Iranian crude oil have reached €2 billion since then, and our two countries have begun discussions on the launch of bilateral cooperation in various specifically civil nuclear areas strictly within the framework outlined by the JCPOA. However, we should make it clear that the commitments made almost two years ago do not end with the JCPOA, as a framework, nor with the substance of its nuclear aspects. The establishment of an atmosphere of lasting trust entails full and total respect for the commitments undertaken in their entirety and outlined in resolution 2231 (2015). The specifics in the Secretary-General’s report regarding Iran’s failure to respect several of its important provisions can only raise serious concerns, the first being the missile launch that took place this winter and that France condemned. This kind of action contradicts resolution 2231 (2015), which clearly calls on Iran not to proceed with ballistic- missile activities capable of carrying nuclear weapons, including launching such missiles. Furthermore, those actions are being undertaken in a fragile regional context and runs counter to the process of restoration of trust established by the Vienna agreement. It is vital to regional stability and international security to ensure that Iran ends any activity that could result in an escalation of the situation. We are also concerned about the implications of weapons that have been seized and that are suspected of or known to be either originating in or destined for Iran, including by my own country, and that have been reported or confirmed by the Secretariat. Such transfers are violations of resolution 2231 (2015) and fuel animosity in a fragile regional context. Lastly, we are also worried about the information concerning foreign travel by Major General Soleimani, who is still under a travel ban. We urge all States Members of the United Nations to comply with their obligations, especially where assets freezes and travel bans are concerned. Maintaining a firm collective commitment to the flexible but rigorous implementation of provisions that we ourselves have agreed on is of course essential, as the Secretary-General emphasizes in his report. But it should also be clear that this commitment should be maintained in the same spirit of cooperation that led to the agreement, through a demanding and comprehensive dialogue between all the parties concerned. To be precise, what I mean is that ensuring the continued success of this diplomatic effort requires strict and consistent respect for the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) in their entirety and for the JCPOA. France will be vigilant and will work to ensure that the Security Council, with the firm and constant support of the Secretariat, will also monitor the entire process.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, and Ambassador Cardi, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. My country fully supports and strictly implements resolution 2231 (2015), as it is crucial for ensuring the proper implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Kazakhstan attaches great importance to that historic agreement, which is reckoned as the most momentous achievement of multilateral diplomacy in recent decades. We are pleased that Kazakhstan had direct involvement in that process and had an impact on its success. As part of our initiative, we organized two rounds of talks in 2003 in Almaty, which paved the way for that agreement. As part of it, in 2015, Kazakhstan supplied Iran with natural uranium on commercial terms as compensation for the removal of low-enriched uranium from that country, as specified in the JCPOA. We are ready, should there be any further need, to continue our supply, in accordance with the requirements of resolution 2231 (2015) and other documents related to the uranium-related nuclear programme. As noted in the third report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515), the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to verify and monitor the Islamic Republic of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related obligations. In that regard, we commend the commitment of Iran to comply with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We would also appreciate more comprehensive reports dealing with all relevant parts of resolution 2231 (2015). As for the allegations in the report relating to the violations of some of the provisions of annex B of the resolution, we will expect more detailed information, as promised in that text. We therefore call for the transparent and impartial investigation of those cases. That process requires more active interaction among the Secretariat, Iran and all interested parties. Implementing the JCPOA has had a significant impact on normalizing the situation in the region and beyond. The Plan of Action will also have a positive effect on the revitalization of economic activities in the region. In conclusion, I would like to underline that Kazakhstan will continue to support and strictly implement resolution 2231 (2015). Moreover, it affirms its right to cooperate with Iran within the framework of the implementation of the JCPOA. We believe that the implementation of the JCPOA and strict observance with its obligations by all parties are crucial for strengthening non-proliferation and regional security. We stand ready with others to contribute to its further practical realization. Finally, we believe that the Security Council, as a guarantor of international peace and security, should always insist on full compliance, and Kazakhstan will play its part in that collective action.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Mr. Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Mr. Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, for their comprehensive and detailed briefings regarding the follow-up on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We are of the view that the Security Council should always be credible and earnest when addressing the risks of nuclear proliferation, without selectivity or politicization. We have always underscored that principled position in all international forums. In that same vein, Egypt’s efforts to promote the universality of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime bear witness to our firm national position. Egypt has on previous occasions welcomed the nuclear agreement with Iran enshrined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We view that agreement as a step towards the consolidation of security and stability in all the countries of the Middle East. Nevertheless, resolution 2231 (2015) goes beyond the provisions of that agreement, as it forges clear technical and legal regulations governing the transfer of conventional weapons and related technologies by Iran. We stress the significance of the accurate and succinct implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in accordance with its purpose, namely, addressing the risks of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, Iranian nuclear activities should be subjected to the necessary international controls in order to ensure Iran’s compliance with its international obligations. That should eventually be integrated into the wider context of the implementation of international resolutions relating to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We consider the accurate, succinct, comprehensive and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) to be an important element for stability in the Middle East, which will also prevent the launch of a regional arms race. It presents a rather significant opportunity to limit turbulence in the region, which is further exacerbated by Iran’s regional behaviour, in particular the following subversive acts. First, Iran has been fuelling conflicts in hotspots of armed conflict in the Middle East, especially in Yemen and Syria. Secondly, it has participated in the illicit smuggling of arms and weapons for militias and armed groups, which runs counter to resolutions of the Security Council and the provisions of international law. Thirdly, Iran has continued to intervene in the internal affairs of Arab States and has, in that connection, exported destructive and chaotic ideas that incite sectarianism, violence, extremism and terrorism. In that vein, the previous Secretary-General spotted several instances of Iran violating its obligations. Mr. Feltman mentioned them in his briefing, and I will not reiterate them. However, I would like to highlight certain points. First, there was an arms shipment seized by France in March 2016. In fact, the report proved that that shipment was of Iranian origin and had been shipped from Iran with Somalia as its destination. Secondly, the continued ballistic missile tests will eventually exacerbate regional tensions. Thirdly, we look forward to the completion of the investigation of the Iranian shipment seized by Australia in early 2016. We call upon the Secretariat to inform us as soon as possible of the relevant technical conclusions. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that resolution 2231 (2015) and compliance with it by all parties should be comprehensive and integrated. The Security Council shall be held accountable by the international community and international public opinion to verify how earnest and serious that compliance is. Any failure or omission in that regard will eventually undermine the value and credibility of Security Council resolutions. In that connection, we would like to pay tribute to the Permanent Representative of Italy and his delegation as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We stress the centrality of that role in following up and briefing member States of the Security Council on any developments, whether they be irregularities, violations or contraventions, in a timely manner in order to allow the Procurement Working Group, and thereby the Security Council, to undertake the appropriate measures. In that regard we welcome Ambassador Cardi’s intention to hold informative meetings open to all States Members of the United Nations.

We would like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for preparing the latest biannual report (S/2017/515) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We note the professional work of Mr. Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy and Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and his team. For us, one thing is clear. The arrangements concluded two years ago on the Iranian nuclear programme must serve as a basis for cooperation and not a source of confrontation. In that regard, we note that, compared with the two previous reports, we see a serious attempt by the Secretary- General to give the text a more calibrated nature. At the same time, we would like to flag some specific provisions of the report, so as to avoid repetition of such mistakes in the future. For example, the calls upon Iran to avoid ballistic missile launches carry far-reaching political ramifications that could potentially increase tensions in the region. Such statements have no place in that kind of report, which is devoted exclusively to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The resolution includes a call that allows no misinterpretation, namely, a call upon Iran to refrain from launching ballistic missiles that are built in such a way as to carry a nuclear warhead. We also find it dubious that the weapons found on the vessel seized in the summer of 2016 were of Iranian origin or were being transported from Iran. Nor is there proof of other cases quoted in the report. In the cases of some of the incidents a number of States have carried out investigations in accordance with their respective legislation without reaching any result. Unproven, unsubstantiated facts have no place in the report. It is unacceptable to use in the report information that is unsubstantiated by concrete information, even if such information comes from a Member State. Such information must first be conveyed to the Security Council, which is authorized to take decisions on follow- up steps, including the carrying out of professional, objective and impartial investigations. We do not understand the allegation that the Iranian vessel Bushehr, which stopped for repairs in a South African port, could have been in violation of any obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). We note the statement from Pretoria and would like to read it out loud. “[T]he assistance provided to the Bushehr related to emergency repairs undertaken in accordance with South Africa’s international obligations to assist a vessel in distress”. (S/2017/515, para. 28) All of the actions undertaken were in line with South Africa’s international commitments, since the ship was forced to stop owing to an emergency. I wish to devote further attention to the following circumstance. With regard to the leaks that appeared in the media some time ago from parts of the then still unpublished report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), we would stress the fact that such actions are unacceptable. The Secretariat must hold the report closely under review, and members of the Security Council must not resort to such irresponsible actions. It is our belief that such publications are aimed at exerting pressure on the Secretary-General. We see that even the slightest attempt to give the text a more balanced nature tends to incur the wrath of some of our colleagues. We trust that in this matter a due level of integrity will prevail. It is unacceptable to turn the report into a political document. That defeats the whole purpose and thrust of resolution 2231 (2015) and will inevitably lead to the undermining of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In accordance with the note of the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/57), the Secretary-General’s report should relate exclusively to implementation of the resolution, without any kind of political connotations. In conclusion, I would like to note Russia’s commitment to categorical, comprehensive implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which represent outstanding achievements in the world of diplomacy that have allowed us to tackle one of the most complex issues. The importance of this nuclear deal is recognized by the vast majority of the members of the international community. That arrangement can serve as a template when tackling other pressing problems. The agreement showed that, in the presence of political will, agreements of that kind can serve as a fundamental pillar for forging inclusive international and regional cooperation, which will open the window of possibility for sustainably addressing the numerous conflicts in the Middle East. It is within our power to achieve the successful implementation of the agreement. It will require refraining from the language of threats and sanctions and focusing on scrupulous implementation of the commitments voluntarily undertaken by all parties — bar none — in line with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

China thanks you, Sir, for convening today’s meeting. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Cardi and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their briefings, and I commend the parties for the work they have done. Since its start, over one year ago, the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been steady, leading to gradually increasing, positive effects. The conclusion of the JCPOA represents a firm step towards a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. It did not come easily. Now it is imperative to continue to promote follow-up implementation and the steady and long-term progress of the JCPOA. China would therefore propose the following. First, the important significance of JCPOA implementation must be fully understood. The JCPOA is a successful example of addressing international and regional hotspot issues through political and diplomatic means. It means a lot in terms of strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international and regional peace and security. Certain difficulties and challenges are unavoidable in the implementation of the JCPOA. The parties must proceed from the bigger picture, consolidate political will, avoid external influences and build confidence regarding the prospects of implementation. Secondly, parties should earnestly implement their respective obligations and commitments. As indicated by the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has implemented its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. China appreciates Iran’s efforts to implement the agreement and calls on the parties to continue to be guided by the JCPOA, stick to the step-by-step approach and the principles of reciprocity, equity and balance, honour their respective commitments and build mutual trust. Thirdly, existing mechanism must be well-utilized. China has taken note of the report (S/2017/495) on the activities of the Procurement Working Group submitted by the Joint Commission to the Council. We welcome the briefing by the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group to the implementation mechanism of resolution 2231 (2015). We will continue our active participation in the activities of the Joint Commission and the Procurement Working Group. It is China’s hope that the working mechanisms can work within their mandates, yet form a synergy to jointly promote the implementation of the JCPOA. The parties should demonstrate mutual understanding and accommodation, and resolve their differences properly within the existing framework in an effort to seek consensus. The Secretary-General’s reports must be well balanced. China has taken note of the report (S/2017/515) submitted by Secretary-General Guterres. The Secretary-General’s reports are an important part of the process of implementing the resolution and the JCPOA. Parties should bear in mind the larger picture and consider the Secretary-General’s reports in conjunction with the overarching goal of implementing the resolution and the JCPOA. It is vital for the reports of the Secretary-General to reflect the efforts of the parties to fully implement the resolution in an objective and balanced way. The reports should send a positive message, namely, that the parties are committed to implementing the resolution and the JCPOA. China notes that the Secretary-General has, in his report, underscored the significance of the conclusion of the JCPOA, and China has encouraged parties to support that historic agreement by fully and effectively implementing the agreement, so as to ensure that all participants can benefit. With regard to Iran’s missile launches, the parties should accurately interpret the relevant Council resolutions and handle that issue with great care so as to avoid undermining the implementation of the JCPOA. The Secretary-General’s reports should benefit the maintenance of regional peace and stability, while relevant information should be accurate and credible. China has taken note of some legitimate concerns of Iran about the content of the report, and hopes that those concerns can be reflected in the document in the future. China has always maintained that the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through political and diplomatic means. We are committed to the consolidation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international regional peace and stability. China firmly supports and safeguards the JCPOA, which is a historic achievement, and is working actively to promote the renovation of the Arak heavy-water reactor, thereby playing a constructive role in promoting the implementation of the resolution and the agreement. China will continue its active participation in the implementation process of the agreement, push for continued materialization of the dividends of the agreement to the benefit of the parties, so as to make our contribution to the comprehensive, long-term and proper settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

I thank Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman for the presentation of the third report (S/2017/515) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I am also grateful for the briefings provided by Ambassador Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy and Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and by Mr. Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union. The information provided in the briefings and the reports has some positive elements, which deserve to be highlighted, as well as some challenges and some elements of concern. Uruguay is a country strongly committed to non-proliferation and to strengthening the disarmament regime. As Council members are aware, we do not have nuclear weapons. We are members of the world’s first nuclear-weapon-free zone through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which has just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The latter covers the 33 States of the region that are signatories to the Treaty. We are also party to the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For all of those reasons, Uruguay welcomed, with satisfaction and optimism, the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed on 14 July 2015, in Vienna between Iran, the five permanent members of the Council and Germany on the Iranian nuclear programme. That agreement represented a key achievement for non-proliferation and a significant contribution to international peace, security and stability. It eliminated one of the main sources of tension in the troubled Middle East region. The steps taken by the parties to the agreement show that, with political will and through the path of diplomacy, positive results can be achieved, even in cases where such results seem, a priori, out of reach. As we did a few days ago in Vienna at the Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Uruguay expresses its full satisfaction at the progress made in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and at the way in which the verification and monitoring activities of the IAEA in Iran are being carried out and the confirmation by the IAEA that Iran has complied with all of the provisions of the agreement. It is important for all the parties to continue complying with the provisions of the agreement and resolution 2231 (2015). We note with concern the allegations contained in the report on the possible violations by Iran of some of the provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). All missile activity by Iran has the potential to heighten tensions in the region. We therefore call on the Iranian authorities to act with restraint and caution in the future. With regard to the report of the Secretary- General, six months ago we expressed our interest in the following, namely, that in addition to the detailed analysis of Iran’s compliance with annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), future editions of the report should also include the degree of compliance with other aspects of the resolution, including annex A. Annex A is nothing more nor less than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action itself and the obligations arising from it for all parties to the agreement. It is therefore essential for us as Council members to receive reports about its implementation. We hope that such information will appear in future reports. Uruguay continues to call upon all the parties to the agreement to adopt all necessary measures stipulated in resolution 2231 (2015) and to comply with its provisions in order not to jeopardize the historic agreement reached, which is the fruit of more than two years of intense negotiations. In that regard, we urge the parties to act with moderation and caution and to refrain from any action that might endanger the agreement. The Security Council, as a guarantor of international peace and security, must ensure full compliance of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

I thank Under-Secretary- General Feltman, Mr. Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, and Ambassador Cardi of Italy, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), for providing factual and substantial reports on the status of the implementation of both the resolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and for providing detailed presentations on the work conducted in that area over the past six months. We highly commend the concerted efforts of the Secretariat, the European Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Facilitator’s team to ensure the full and proper implementation of those crucial instruments, which have contributed to the strengthening of non-proliferation and export-control regimes in general. In particular, Ukraine fully supports the IAEA’s long-term mission of the verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, with the goal of reaching the overall conclusion of the matter. During the past six months, we witnessed a continuation of the smooth and effective functioning of the procurement channel mechanism, with the approval of several proposals to supply Iran with relevant goods and technologies. As a staunch supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ukraine stresses the importance of diligent compliance with the JCPOA, which aims at striking a balance between the legitimate right to develop nuclear energy and the need to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That historic nuclear deal fully respects such a balance. With its nuclear-weapons past, Ukraine remains committed to the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fully respects the restrictions and prohibitions introduced by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Iran has been proving its intention to use nuclear technologies exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the same time, we also acknowledge the existence of varying interpretations regarding the applicability of resolution 2231 (2015) to its ballistic missile tests. Referring further to the third report of the Secretary- General (S/2017/515) on the implementation of that resolution, I wish to recall that the existing restrictions on arms-related transfers as well as the assets-freeze and the travel-ban provisions stipulated by annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) should be fully adhered to. While recognizing that report to be an informative document that is based on public and open information and States’ notifications, we consider that it is important to ensure that any concern it contains does not provoke further tensions but rather would be addressed and resolved through negotiations. In that context, let me reiterate Ukraine’s openness and readiness to continue constructive interactions with the Secretariat, including with regard to the incident that occurred in January in the airport in Kyiv, when an attempt to smuggle components of military goods to Iran was prevented by the Ukrainian law enforcement authorities. As soon as the pre-trial investigation of that case is finalized, all additional information will be shared in due course. We fully support the intention of the Secretary-General to continue examining all cases of concern and obtaining additional verified information. Having stressed the imperative of full compliance with the relevant obligations, I would like to re-emphasize the importance of further outreach on the Iranian issue. The proper and diligent implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), with all of its annexes, will be a key contribution to regional and global security and stability.

I thank the three briefers for their statements on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Japan fully supports the Secretary-General’s call for all Member States to act in accordance with, and in support of, the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to avoid provocative actions and statements. Japan is committed to working closely with Council members, Iran and all other Member States to enable the most effective possible implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Let me turn now to Iran’s ballistic missile launches. In his recent report (S/2017/515), the Secretary-General called upon Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches that have the potential to increase tensions. Japan believes that such launches as conducted by Iran in January are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). As other delegations have already noted today, we are concerned by the ballistic missile launches, which can be destabilizing for the delicate situation in the Middle East. On that note, we should recall the JCPOA’s enormous potential to contribute to peace and security in the Middle East. In March, the Permanent Representative of Iran circulated a letter to the Council expressing Iran’s willingness to take effective measures to end the crisis in Syria, including via humanitarian assistance. Iran can and should play a constructive role in peace and stability in the region, particularly in Syria and Yemen, and in the international community more generally. We hope that Iran will implement the commitments outlined in its March letter. Japan welcomes the steady implementation of JCPOA parties’ nuclear-related commitments and commends the critical role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) critical role in verifying and monitoring those commitments. We underscore that Iran’s application of the additional protocol and the transparency measures is key not only for full implementation of the JCPOA, but also for regional confidence-building. Japan will continue to support the independent and objective work of the IAEA. One and a half years after the adoption of the JCPOA in January 2016, the uniqueness of the format of resolution 2231 (2015) has become increasingly clear. The format does not include a subsidiary body, but requires extensive data collection, analysis and reporting by the Secretariat. Given those challenges, Japan commends the Secretariat’s efforts in preparing six-month reports with a high degree of independence, objectivity and expertise. In the recent report of the Secretary-General, we see some pending issues on which the Secretariat will need to update the Council in future reports. Given the particular challenges of data collection under resolution 2231 (2015), we encourage the Secretariat to utilize such tools as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), concerning Somalia and Eritrea, to obtain relevant information. An objective and credible report will allow the Council to fully understand the situation and take appropriate action.

First of all, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Cardi and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their engagement and briefings this afternoon. We see the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a milestone that represents an important example of dispute resolution conflict prevention. Its continued implementation benefits international peace and security and stability in the region. There are encouraging developments and there are issues of concern. We should be open about both. We welcome the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/515), which shows that the implementation of the JCPOA continues to be broadly in line with expectations. That the procurement channel is working according to plan is encouraging, as is Iran’s general compliance with its nuclear-related obligations — as evidenced by reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is important that the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to provisionally apply the additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. In addition, we look forward to Iran’s early ratification of the additional protocol. In spite of the general positive picture, I would like to mention three areas that remain of concern. First of all, we have previously expressed our concern over ballistic missile test, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Secondly, the seizure of arms, apparently originating in Iran, in contravention of the measures in resolution 2231 (2015), is deeply disturbing. Unless exempted, any transfer of arms to and from Iran requires the authorization of the Council. We will carefully future reports from the Secretary-General relating to confiscated material as more information becomes available. Finally, like others, we reiterate our concern over the continued contraventions of the travel ban. It is important that Member States provide to the Secretary- General all the information necessary to carry out the reporting requirements set out in the resolution. We call on the Government of Iran to formally respond to allegations as identified in the Secretary-General’s report. The July 2016 agreement of the JCPOA underscored the power of dialogue to make progress in non-proliferation. However, reaping the full benefits of the agreement will require the long-term commitment of all sides. We echo the call of the Secretary-General for all States to act in accordance with and in support of the agreement and to avoid provocative rhetoric or action. Mutual trust is essential for this historic agreement to succeed.

I would like to start by thanking Under-Secretary-General Feltman; the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Cardi; and the observer of the European Union, Ambassador Vale de Almeida, for their briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We have noted from the reports before us today (S/2017/495 and S/2017/537) that the International Atomic Energy Agency continued verification and monitoring of the implementation of the nuclear- related commitments. The continued implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as the fact that the Secretary- General and his predecessor have not received any reports on the supply, transfer or exports of nuclear and dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to Iran, is encouraging. We have noted that five out of the 10 additional proposal submitted to the procurement channel were approved, which indicates that the procurement channel continued to work very well. In that regard, we welcome reports on the growing confidence by Member States and the procurement channel. We also welcomed the smooth cooperation between the Security Council and the Joint Commission as indicated in third six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The planned outreach activities concerning the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) by the Facilitator during the second part of his mandate, as well as the continued engagement by the Procurement Working Group, is commendable. Such activities contribute to fostering awareness, as well as the enhanced participation of Member States in the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). As we have stated in our previous meetings on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the JCPOA participating countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, deserve to be commended for demonstrating strong commitment under the Plan of Action. Nevertheless, we also recognize that challenges and difficulties, including the ones included in the report, may be encountered in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It is therefore important that the JCPOA participants continue to address those challenges and contribute to the full implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) so as to bring the issue to a satisfactory conclusion. In that regard, we join the Secretary-General in welcoming the commitment by the JCPOA participants to its full and effective implementation in April. With regard to the launching of ballistic missiles, we reiterate our previous position that such launches will impact the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We concur with the Facilitator that all parties need to continue to maintain an attitude conducive to building trust and continue to implement the terms of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We therefore join the call by the Secretary-General in his report on the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid ballistic-missile launches, as they have the potential to increase tensions. We note with concern the findings in the report of the Secretary-General in connection with the arms shipment from the Islamic Republic of Iran bound for Somalia and subsequently seized by France, because such actions entail regional consequences.

First of all, I would like to thank the Bolivian presidency for taking the initiative to convene this meeting on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). My thanks also go to Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Ambassador Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy and Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their respective briefings. In having adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action through the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015) on 20 July 2015, the Security Council sealed the nuclear agreement with Iran, which was the culmination of 12 Years of historic diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The third report (S/2017/515) of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which we are considering today and has been submitted pursuant to the provisions of annex B of the resolution, comprehensively sets forth the terms linked to the nuclear issue, ballistic missiles, travel bans and assets freezes, as well as those relating to fostering the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Concerning the provisions related to the nuclear issue, the report clearly states that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to respect its commitments, as underscored in the most recent reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency on its verification and monitoring activities in that country, as well as Iran’s follow-up of the implementation of its commitments linked to the nuclear issue within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Moreover, we note with satisfaction that Iran will continue to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency the use of online enrichment measurement and electronic seals, which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors and facilitate automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices. With regard to the procurement channel, we welcome the cooperation between the Security Council and the Joint Commission, which was established within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as has been exemplified by the various forms of notification in connection with provisions, sales or transfers concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran. The interface thereby set up between the members of the Security Council and the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is functioning well, thus ensuring visibility, inclusivity and transparency. Furthermore, efforts by the Secretariat and the Facilitator within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular concerning practical information provided through the procurement channel, deserve our full support and cooperation. Accordingly, thanks to a wealth of information and outreach, Member States have access to the information necessary not only to properly fulfil their commitments, but also to ensure follow-up on violations of resolution 2231 (2015), the procurement channel, confidentiality and notifications, as well as issues of transparency and the dissemination of information. The launch of a ballistic missile by Iran on 27 January was the subject of a number of Security Council meetings, within the “2231 format”, without our having been able reach an agreement as to whether that action constituted a violation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). Nevertheless, the Senegalese delegation calls on the various parties to show the necessary restraint so as to diffuse tensions in the region. In conclusion, I would like to note that the Senegalese delegation believes that the biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is overall positive and would like to encourage the Facilitator, as well as all stakeholders concerned by Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the States Members of the United Nations, to persevere in that direction.

I thank Jeffrey Feltman and João Vale de Almeida for sharing their analyses with the Security Council today. I am glad that my last open meeting in the Council is focusing on one of the most important diplomatic achievements in recent memory. As the third report (S/2017/515) of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) shows, at its core, this is a diplomatic achievement that endures. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed Iran’s continued full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments. Iran’s total stockpile of uranium remains within agreed limits, and Iran has continued to permit and facilitate monitoring of its nuclear sites. I reiterate in this Chamber today the United Kingdom’s commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and our support for its full and equitable implementation. To ensure the deal’s continued success, all parties must fully uphold their commitments and improve mutual trust and cooperation across a full range of issues. Sadly, the latest report of the Secretary-General highlights some less than positive issues, which must be addressed in relation to the provisions of annex B as set out in resolution 2231 (2015). The first of those relates to the 29 January launch by Iran of a Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile. Since we have already had several Council meetings on this important issue and further consideration in the “2231 format” of the Council, I will not dwell on it, but just for the sake of clarity I want to reiterate our position that this launch was inconsistent with the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). We reiterate, too, the Secretary-General’s call on Iran to refrain from any future launches that contribute to regional instability. We are also concerned by the continued reported violations of restrictions prohibiting conventional arms transfers, as set out in the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2017/515), including new evidence of an attempted arms shipment from Iran to Somalia. Furthermore, the widespread reports of multiple violations of travel-ban provisions, including new infringements by Major General Qasem Soleimani, are particularly worrying given the regional sensitivities. So putting all these issues together, it is clear that these activities are having a detrimental impact on regional security. Yes, we agree with Iran that the biggest threat to the region is a shared threat to us all. We all need to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and defeat terrorism. Yes, we want the international community to work with Iran, to encourage it to play a more transparent and constructive role in regional affairs. But we cannot turn a blind eye to activities undertaken by Iran that violate Security Council resolutions and sponsor proxy forces in regional conflicts. This further complicates efforts to reach peaceful settlements and undermines Iran’s future prosperity and security. Finally, it is important that we remember the inherent reciprocity of the JCPOA, so we encourage all Member States and parties to the agreement to uphold their commitments, including ensuring that the Iranian people gain further tangible benefits from sanctions relief. We are encouraged by the progress being made to promote trade and investment opportunities in Iran, and we hope that the next six months will build on these successes. Full implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) by all parties is the only way to ensure the continued success of this important deal. As this is my last meeting in the open Chamber, I also wanted to say a very brief word of thanks to the interpreters for making me comprehensible in six languages. It is not easy; my aunt used to do it. Secondly, I thank all Council members for the cooperation that they have shown me and for the work that they do in what is a massively important institution that is very, very important for the most vulnerable people on this planet.

I wish the representative of the United Kingdom all the best in future.

It is hard to be the next speaker at this emotional moment. Italy believes that the international community should continue to take every action to ensure that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains a positive element in the global effort against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we believe in the importance of the full and thorough implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Good-faith implementation of both the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) will benefit regional security. In this perspective, we appreciate the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/515) for both its reference to the importance of the JCPOA and its compliance with the relevant provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). We agree with the assessment by the Secretary-General that the JCPOA is an achievement of multilateral diplomacy from which all participants should benefit. We also share his view that the JCPOA provides an example of the benefits of diplomacy leading to the reduction of tension among States. I wish to reiterate the Secretary- General’s call for all Member States and other relevant organizations to support the implementation of this agreement. The robust and comprehensive structure and the solid verification mechanism of the JCPOA are crucial to upholding mutual trust and the credibility of the Plan. Therefore Italy will continue to support the International Atomic Energy Agency in its work relating to the JCPOA. Italy commends the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for her leadership in coordinating the Joint Commission established by the JCPOA. We encourage all stakeholders to continue to promptly address and resolve any possible issues through dialogue by exploring the relevant mechanism set up by the JCPOA. The Security Council also plays a key role within its competencies and responsibility, and my country will continue to do its part, also in its capacity as Security Council Facilitator, to foster the smooth implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Bolivia wishes at the outset to thank Mr. Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, Head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations; and Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi and his team, as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Bolivia shares in the satisfaction expressed by the Secretary-General in his third report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515) at the efforts and commitments of the States involved in the implementation of this historic agreement. Bolivia reaffirms its commitment to the diplomatic triumph represented by the adoption of the resolution, which endorsed the Joint Competitive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and highlighted the compulsory nature of its implementation by the parties as well as their commitments. We believe that the progress made in this area represents an important milestone in joint diplomatic actions in the quest for horizontal, transparent dialogue in good faith and with reciprocity. The International Atomic Energy Agency, on 15 January, verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had removed all excess centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and their transfer to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant under continuous Agency monitoring, in compliance with the agreed timeline. My delegation sees this as a clear sign of the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the fulfilment of the commitments made under the JCPOA. We also wish to highlight the efforts of the procurement channel, in accordance with the JCPOA, which processes the transfer by States of nuclear or dual-use goods, technologies and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. These activities, along with periodic reporting, strengthen transparency as regards the proper implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the activities set out in its annex B. As on a previous occasion, my delegation expresses its concern at the fact that the report contains no reference to annex A. We believe that both annexes, A and B, are integral and complementary parts that are required for the comprehensive implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Finally, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, as a pacifist State, reaffirms its commitments in the framework of respect for the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States. In this particular case, I wish to stress that politicization, provocative rhetoric and zero- sum logic are completely contrary to and incompatible with diplomatic means and purposes, multilateralism and what has been agreed upon on the issue that brings us together this afternoon. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the Permanent Representative of Germany.

Germany thanks Ambassador Peter Wilson for years of excellent cooperation and wishes him Godspeed in his new functions on the continent of Europe. Germany would also like to thank the Secretary-General and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for the third report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515). Allow me to make three brief points. First, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015) is an outstanding success of diplomacy in an extremely volatile region. It is a well-thought-out agreement that builds on and strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. One and a half years into JCPOA implementation, there is no doubt the deal as such is working. All participants are keeping their commitments and the deal has clearly promoted security and stability in the region. But all parties to the agreement must continue adhering to the JCPOA for the full duration, if the deal is to fulfil its long-term objectives. What matters most is that all participants continue to strictly implement the deal in all its aspects. Secondly, to date the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified, in six reports, that Iran is abiding by its nuclear-related commitment. Going ahead, verification and monitoring by the IAEA will remain essential to re-establishing trust and confidence and to reassure the world that Iran’s nuclear programme serves exclusively peaceful purposes. The easing of sanctions resulted in economic consolidation and growth in Iran’s gross domestic product. The full and comprehensive implementation of the JCPOA provides a basis for this trend to continue. Germany remains committed to the goal of fully re-establishing economic ties with Iran to the benefit of all parties concerned. Thirdly, equally important for the building of mutual trust and confidence is the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) itself. Germany remains particularly concerned by Iran’s missile programme. While the ballistic missile test conducted by Iran in January did not violate the JCPOA, we regard such tests as inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). We call upon Iran to refrain from any activities that exacerbate tensions and deepen mistrust. We urge Iran to play a constructive role in the region and to contribute to lasting political solutions. In conclusion, the Vienna agreement and resolution 2231 (2015) are a victory for the principles of the United Nations. The JCPOA negotiations showed the power of persistent multilateral diplomacy in addressing major international challenges. Germany is proud of its involvement in the JCPOA and remains firmly committed to its continued and full implementation.