S/PV.806 Security Council

Before I proceed to give the floor to the speakers on my list, I should like to point out that it may be desirable that the speakers who are called upon to take the floor should address themselves to sub-paragraph (a) of agenda item 2. 2. M. KIDRON (Israel) [traduit de l'anglais} : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President, de m'avoir invite a prendre place a la table du Conseil. J'aimerais d'abord dire un mot de la procedure que vous venez de proposer.

Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity you have given me to take my seat at the Council table. I should like to say a word, if I may, about the procedure that you have proposed. 3. The provisional agenda for this meeting includes as item 2 " The Palestine question ", which is one item divided into two parts, (a) and (b). I think it will be 3. La question qui fait l'objet du point 2 de l'ordre du jour provisoire de la presente seance - « Question de Palestine» - est divisee en deux parties: a) et b). President: M. Hashim JAWAD (Irak) Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/806) Adoption de I'ordre du jour Question de Palestine: 4. I think it should be recalled that this has been the practice of the Council in the past. Sub-items on the Palestine question have invariably been taken together. As far as my delegation is concerned, we should prefer to pursue the same practice as has been adopted by the Council in the past and deal with both items together.

The Council has heard the suggestion made by the representative of Israel regard- ing the consideration of this item: in other words, that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) should be taken together, as he has suggested. My original proposal was that it would be more desirable that the speakers upon whom I c:ill to take the floor should address themselves, to begin with, to sub-paragraph (a). Naturally it is up to the Council to take a decision on this matter, and I invite comment on this. 6. I see that no member of the Council wishes to speak on this point. Since there is no comment, I take it that the Council approves the proposal of the Chair that all speakers should address themselves to sub- paragraph (a) of item 2 of the agenda for today. It was so decided.

It is highly regrettable that, since the meeting of 6 September, the Israel authorities should have disregarded the express wish of the United States representative [788th meeting, para. 129], who hoped that Israel would heed the view of the Council, which considered unwise the continua- tion of Israel's activities in the no-man's-land at Jebel El Mukabbir and warned that the continuation of these activities was something clearly undesirable. 8. The Israelis, instead of conforming to this advice, have continued to work in the Jebel El Mukabbir area. I have received cables from my Government which report that workers from Israel from are still pursuing their unlawful activities in the area. About fifty labourers with tractors and bulldozers are working day after day in the area, guarded by Israel armed forces. In my letters to the Secretary-General of 8 November [8/8907] and 18 November [8/3914], I quoted the text of cables received from my Government which show the details of Israel's day-to-day activities at Jebel El Mukabbir since the Council received the report of Colonel B.V. Leary, the Acting Chief of Staff. 9. The defiant Israel attitude once more proves that 9. Israel never refrains from aggressive acts or violations les rl~s deux alineas. 4. Je crois utile de rappeler que cette procedure est celle que le Conseil a suivie jusqu'ici. Les a.lineas que comprenait le libelle de la question de Palestine ont toujours ete examines ensemble. Ma delegation prefe- rerait, quant aelle, que l'on s'en tienne acette pratique et que les deux alineas soient examines en meme temps. 5. Le PRESIDENT [traduit de l'anglais] : Le Conseil vient d'entendre le representant d'lsrael faire une suggestion au sujet de l'examen de la question de Palestine, savoir que les alineas a et b soient abordes en meme temps. J'avais auparavant suggere qu'il serait preferable que les orateurs a qui je donnerais la parole traitent, pour commencer, de l'alinea a. La deci- sion appartient naturellement au Conseil et j'invite ses membres afaire connaitre leur opinion. 6. Personne ne semblant vouloir prendre la parole sur la question, j'en conclus que le Conseil approuve la proposition du President, a savoir que les orateurs traiteront de l'alinea a du point 2 de l'ordre du jour de la seance d'aujourd'hui. II en est ainsi decide. 7. M. HAIKAL (Jordanie) [traduit de l'anglais] : Il est tout afait regrettable que, depuis la derniere seance du Conseil, le 6 septembre, les autorites israeliennes n'aient fait aucun cas du desir expres du representant des Etats-Unis,lequel avait exprime l'espoir [7888 seance, par. 129] qu'lsrael tiendrait compte de l'opinion du Conseil qui considerait comme malavisee la. continuation des activites d'lsrael dans le no-man's-land de Djebel el- Mukkaber et avait indique qu'elle etait nettement inopportune. 8. Au lieu de se conformer acet avis, les Israeliens ont poursuivi leurs travaux dans la region de Djebel el- Mukkaber. J'ai re~u de mon gouvernement des tele- grammes m'informant que des ouvriers sont toujours a l'ceuvre dans cette region, oil l'action illegale entre- prise par Israel n'a pas cesse. Vne cinquantaine d'ou- vriers, equipes de tracteurs et de bulldozers, travaillent sans rehiche sous la protection des forces armees israe- liennes. Dans les lettres en date des 8 novembre [8/3907] et 18 novembre [8/3914] que j'ai adressees au Secre- taire general, j'ai cite le texte de telegrammes re~us de mon gouvernement et indiquant en detail les acti- vites quotidiennes d'lsrael a Djebel el-Mukkaber depuis que le Conseil a re~u le rapport du colonel B. V. Leary, chef d'etat-major par interim. Cette attitude de defi prouve une fois de plus que Israeliens ne songent jamais a mettre fin a leurs / 10. I am going to group my remarks under two headings. I will start by discussing some of the points raised by the representative of Israel [788th meetingJ and by the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on the case of Jebel El Mukabbir [8/3892J. I will then make some remarks on the proposals of the Acting Chief of Staff. In my conclu- sion I will submit my Government's request. 11. The first part of my remarks will be on the state- ment of the representative of Israel and on the report of the Acting Chief of Staff concerning the Jebel El Mukabbir case. For the sake of clarity, I will group my remarks about the points raised by the represen- tative of Israel and by the report of the Acting Chief of Staff under the following headings: (1) reasons for bringing the case to the Security Council and the impor- tance of the case; (2) the status of the area; (3) the alleg- ed divisions of the area, the so-called civilian line, and the de facto line; (4) the control and supervision of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the area; (5) rights of ownership in the area; (6) violations in the area. 12. I will now deal with the reasons for bringing the case to the Security Council and the importance of the case. The representative of Israel charged on 6 Sep- tember [788th meetingJ that it was improper for the Jordanian Government to bring this case to the Security Council before using the normal channels afforded by the subsidiary United Nations bodies on the spot. I stated on that date that Jordan had previously re- quested an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission. This Commission is competent to deal with violations of the General Armistice Agreement in the first instance. 13. In paragraph 8 of his report the Acting Chief of Staff mentions the Israel refusal to attend an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel knew that the meeting could only result in the suspen- sion of its activities in Jebel El Mukabbir, because not only was Jordan asking for the stoppage of Israel work in the Jebel El Mukabbir area, but the Acting Chief 10. Mes observations se divisent en deux parties : je discuterai d'abord certains des points souleves par la declaration du representant d'lsrael [788e seanceJ et par le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve [8/3892J, au sujet de l'affaire de Djebel el-Mukkaber; je ferai ensuite quelques remarques sur les propositions du Chef d'etat-major par interim. Dans ma conclusion enfin, je presenterai la demande de mon gouvernement. 11. La premiere partie de mon intervention portera sur la declaration du representant d'lsrael et sur le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim au sujet de raffaire de Djebel el-Mukkaber. Par souci de clarte, je grouperai mes observations relatives aux points souleves par le representant d'lsrael et par le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim sous les titres sui- vants : 1) raisons pour lesquelles nous soumettons l'affaire au Conseil de securite et importance de cette affaire; 2) statut de la region; 3) pretendues divisions de la region, ligne dite « civile; et ligne de facto; 4) contrOle et surveillance exerces par I'Organisme des Nations Unies de la surveillance de la treve dans la region; 5) droits de propriete dans la region; 6) viola- tions commises dans cette region. 12. Je traiterai, pour commencer, des raisons pour lesquelles nous soumettons l'affaire au Conseil de secu- rite, ainsi que de l'importance de cette affaire. Le repre- sentant d'Israel a affirme, le 6 septembre [788e seanceJ, que le Gouvernement jordanien ne pouvait saisir le Conseil avant d'avoir recouru aux voies normales, c'est-a-dire aux organes subsidiaires des Nations Unies sur place. A la meme date, j'ai declare que la Jordanie avait auparavant demande la convocation d'une reunion extraordinaire de la Commission mixte d'armis- tice, organe qui a competence pour connaitre en pre- miere instance des violations de la Convention d'armis- tice general. 13. Au paragraphe 8 de son rapport, le Chef d'etat- major par interim indique qu'Israel a refuse d'assister a cette reunion extraordinaire de la Commission mixte d'armistice. Israel savait que cette reunion ne pouvait avoir qn'un resultat : l'arret des activites israeliennes a Djebel el-Mukkaber, car non seulement la Jordanie demandait cet arret, mais encore le Chef d'etat-major 1 Proces-uerbu% officiels du Conseil de s~c uriU, quatrieme ann~e, Supplement sp~cial nO 1. 14. I will only quote General De Ridder, Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in 1953. In a letter th8.t he addressed to the Jordan delegation on 19 July 1953, concerning another case at Jebel El Mukabbir, he stated, in paragraph 13 of the letter, that if Jordan conliidered that a breach of the General Armistice Agreement has been committed " a complaint for such a breach should be submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission ". 15. Israel's refusal to attend an emergency meeting was officially conveyed to our Foreign Minister by the Acting Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza- tion. 16. Faced with this situation, the Jordan Government lodged an appeal with the Acting Chief of Staff, asking him, as it is within his competence to do, to order the Israelis to stop their activities in the Jebel El Mukabbir area. The Acting Chief of Staff approached the Israelis, but they still refused to discontinue their work in the area. After exhausting these remedies for obtaining a hearing of our complaint on the spot, Jordan was entitled to bringthe case before the Security Council. But Jordan still waited and hoped that the United Nations Secretariat could exercise a moderating influence on the Israelis. Yet, in spite of all the efforts deployed by the United Nations, the Israelis remained adamant in their refusal to stop their activities at Jebel El Mukabbir. Even then, Jordan did not rush to the Security Council to request a hearing. Instead we tried to use the good offices of friendly countries to convince the Israelis to desist from their objectionable activities in the area. It was only after the failure of all these efforts that we brought the case to the supreme com- petent authority in the matter, the Security Council. In fact we had no other choice left. As already reported, the Israelis are still pursuing their activities in the area in spite of the wish expressed by the Council that they should suspend these activities pending a final decision on the case. 17. We are recalling these developments because they reveal how unfounded Israel's charges usually are. It seems to us that Israel did not really want to see this 14. Je me contenterai de citer le general De Ridder, qui etait president de la Commission mixte d'armistice en 1953. Au paragraphe 13 de la lettre qu'il a adressee ala delegation de la Jordanie le 19 juillet 1953, au sujet d'un autre incident a Djebel el-Mukkaber, le general De Ridder a declare que si la Jordanie estimait que la Convention d'armistice general avait ete violee, «une plainte concel~,.ant cette violation devrait etre soumise a la Commission mixte d'armistice)l. 15. Le refus d'Israel d'assister a la reunion extraor- ( dinaire a ete officiellement porte a la connaissance du Ministre jordanien des affaires etrangeres par le Chef d'etat-major par interim de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. 16. Devant cette situation, le Gouvernement de la Jordanie en a appeIe au Chef d'etat-major par interim et lui a demande de donner aux israeliens, comme il avait competence pour le faire, l'ordre de mettre un terme a leurs activites dans la region de Djebel el- Mukkaber. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim a pris contact avec les Israeliens, mais ceux-ci ont persiste it refuser de cesser leurs tavaux. Ayant epuise tous les recours en vue de faire entendre sa plainte sur place, la Jordanie etait en droit de porter l'affaire devant le Conseil de securite. Cependant, son gouvernement a encore attendu, dans l'espoir que le Secretariat des Nations Unies pourrait exercer une influence mode- ratrice sur les Israeliens. Mais tous les efforts deployes par I'Organisation se sont heurtes a leur refus irreduc- tible de mettre fin aleurs activites a Djebel el-Mukkaber. Meme a ce moment-la, la Jordanie n'a pas saisi imme- diatement le Conseil de securite. Au lieu de cela, nous avons tente d'employer les bons offices de pays amis pour amener les Israeliens a abandonner les activites qu'ils avaient entreprises dans la region en question. Ce n'est qu'apres l'echec de tous ces efforts que nous avons porte l'affaire devant le Conseil de securite, autorite supreme en la matiere. A vrai dire, nous n'avions plus d'autre moyen. Comme il a deja ete signaIe, les Israeliens poursuivent toujours leurs acti- vites dans la regi.on en depit du fait que le Conseil a exprime le desir de les voir cesser en attendant une decision definitive au sujet de cette affaire. 17. Nous rappelons ces evenements parce qu.'ils revelent a quel point les accusations portees par Israel sont generalement denuees de fondement. Il nous 18. The Israel representative went to great lengths in his statement to minimize the importance of the case, by saying that Israelis were only planting trees about which they have a particular feeling and that "It was thus with a particular feeling of amazement and lack of comprehension that rhis delegation] heard that Jordan wished to put a stop to the planting of trees in the former Government House area." [788th meeting, para. 30.] It was further suggested that "it might appear that the appropriate place for a discussion of this nature is the Food and Agriculture Organization rather than the Security Council... " [Ibid., para. 29.] 19. It looks as if the Israel representative was not addressing himself to this Council, but was making a display of false innocence for the public audience. Anyhow, his arguments indicate little respect for the intelligence of his public audience. We all have parti- cular feelings for trees and the appreciation of tree- planting is not a monopoly of Israel as the Israel representative seems so naively to assume. Nobody objects to people planting trees on their own fields. But no amount of particular feelings for trees can justify the forcible seizure of other people's properties for that purpose. We could not follow the Israel repre- sentative's logic or understand his conception of inter- national relations when he invoked the planting of trees to justify the illegal crossing by Israelis of the demar- cation lines, and the Israel occupation and utilization of lands which are neither under Israel's jurisdiction, nor, for that matter, the property of Israelis. 20. If trees are to be planted in the no-man's-land area at Jebel El Mukabbir, this should be done by the rightful owners of the land who are Arabs in Jordan, and not by the Israel Government. We also note that the particular feelings of Israelis for trees, which have prompted them to plant trees on other people's proper- ties, do not unfortunately prevent them from uprooting other people's trees on other people's properties. 21. The Acting Chief of Staff refers to the Israel up- rooting of trees on the first page of his report where he states that Israelis have uprooted about sixty olive trees in the Jebel El Mukabbir area [8/3892, para. 2]. These olive trees, and the land on which they stood, belong to individual Arabs in Jordan. Olive trees are something very valuable for Arabs, as revenue from the olives produced by these uprooted trees usually provide a livelihood for many families. 22. The violation of the General Armistice Agreement by Israel at Jebel El Mukabbir is not as simple a case as the representative of Israel would like us to believe, neither is it a trifling affair, as he charged. To describe 18. Le representant d'Israel s'est donne beaucoup de peine pour minimiser l'importance de cette affaire en disant que les Israeliens ne font que planter des arbres, pour lesquels ils ont un amour particulier et que c'eta.it donc «avec un vif etonnement, et sans comprendre, que [sa delegation avait] appris que la Jordanie desirait mettre fin a la plantation d'arbres dans l'ancienne zone du Palais du Gouvernement ll. [788e seance, par. 30.] Le representant d'Israel a ajoute : « Il semble- rait, que l'organe competent pour connaitre [de cette question] soit I'Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture plutot que le Conseil de Securite... » [Ibid., par 29.] 19. Il semble que le representant d'Israel ne se soit pas adresse au Conseil, mais ait plutot cherche a faire figure, d'innocent aux yeux du public. Quoi qu'il en soit, les arguments qu'il a employes montrent le peu de cas qu'il faisait de l'intelligence de son auditoire. Nous aimons tous, certes, les arbres, et les Israeliens ne sont pas les seuls aen planter, comme semble le croire si naivement le representant d'Israel. Personne ne trouve a redire a ce que les gens plantent des arbres sur les terrains qui leur appartiennent; mais quel que soit l'amour qu'on ait pour les arbres, il ne saurait justifier que l'on s'empare, pour les faire pousser, de terrains appartenant a autrui. La logique du raisonnement du representantd'Israel nous echappe et sa conception des relations internationales nous reste etrangere lorsqu'il essaie de justifier par la plantation d'arbres le passage illegal de la ligne de demarcation par des Israeliens, de meme que l'occupation et l'utilisation par Israel de terres qui ne relevent pas de la juridiction d'Israel et qui, d'ailleurs, ne sont pas des biens israeliens. 20. Si le no-man's-land de Djebel el-Mukkaber doit etre plante d'arbres, qu'il le soit par les proprietaires legitimes de la terre, qui sont les Arabes de Jordanie et non le Gouvernement d'Israel. Nous notons egalement que l'amour particulier qu'ont les Israeliens pour les arbres et qui les pousse aen planter sur des terrains qui ne leur appartiennent pas ne les empeche malheureuse- ment pas d'arracher ceux qui sont plantes sur des pro- prietes d'autrui.. 21. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim mentionne l'arrachage d'arbres par Israel a la premiere page de son rapport, oil il declare que les Israeliens ont arrache une soixantaine d'oliviers dans la region de Djebel el-Mukkaber [8/3892, par. 2]. Ces oliviers et le terrain sur lequel ils etaient appartiennent a des Arabes de Jordanie, Ils representaient pour ces Arabes une tres grande valeur, car la vente des olives produites par ces arbres qu'Israel arrache fait habituellement vivre de nombreuses families. 22. La violation de la Convention d'armistice general par Israel a Djebel el-Mukkaber n'est pas une affaire aussi simple que le representant de ce pays aimerait nous le faire croire ; ce n'est pas non plus une affaire de 23. Concerning the status of the area, we would like to discuss now its legal aspect because nobody seems to have dealt seriously with that aspect of the case. The determina,tion of the status of the area is basic to our discussions. Without ascertaining the status of the area only arbitrary solutions could be devised, and arbitrary solutions would only bring more bitterness and have no lasting effect. 24. We were not really surprised when the represen- tative of Israel in his previous statement misrepresented the facts by stating that the Jebel El Mukabbir area was not mentioned in the General Armistice Agreement [788th meeting, para. 34.] No doubt the Israel represen- tative was trying to avoid being charged with violating the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. But with all due respect to the Acting Chief of Staff, we regret to say that the treatment of the basic question of the status of the area in the report was not only casual, but also included contradictory statements. 25. We read in paragraph 3 of the report: "This neutral zone (Jebel El Mukabbir area) was incorporated with minor changes into the cease-fire line signed on 30 November 1948. The General Armi- stice Agreement between Israel and Jordan of 3 April 1949 left the Zone intact (article V, paragraph 1(b), of the General Armistice Agreement stipulates that in the Jerusalem sector the Armistice demarcation line shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 cease-fire agreement)." [8/3892, para. 3.] This means, in the Acting Chief of Staff's own words, that the Jebel El Mukabbir area which is located be- tween the two demarcation lines is a part of the no- man's-land which is governed by article IV of the General Armistice Agreement in the Jerusalem sector. This did not, however prevent a different interpreta- tion from appearing later in the report: " In view of the absence of any provisions in the General Armistice Agreement regarding the status 23. Pour ce qui est du statut de la zone, nous aime- rions en examiner maintenant I'aspect juridique, car personne ne semble s'etre reellement attache it traiter cet aspect de la question. La determination du statut de. cette zone est essentielle it nos discussions. Sans elle ne pourraient intervenir que des solutions arbitraires, et des solutions arbitl'aires ne feraient qU'ajouter a I'amertume existante et n'auraient aucun effet durF 'J~e. 24. Que le representant d'Israel, dans sa precedente declaration, ait presente les faits de falion inexacte en disant que la region de Djebel el-Mukkaber n'etait pas mentionnee dans la Convention d'armistice gene- ral [788e seance, par. 34] n'est pas pour nous surprendre. Sans doute le representant d'Israel essayait-il d'eviter que I'on accuse son pays de violer les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general. Mais, avec tous les egards dus au Chef d'etat-major par interim, je dois dire, it mon regret, que le passage de son rapport qui traite de la question fondamentale du statut de la zone dont il s'agit, non seulement le fait superficiellement, mais encore contient des declarations contradictoires. 25. Ainsi, au paragraphe 3 de ce rapport, nous lisons ce qui suit cc Cette zone neutre [la region de Djebel el- Mukkaber], Iegerement modifiee, a ete comprise dans le perimetre defini par la Convention de suspension d'armes du 30 novembre 1948. La Convention d'armistice general entre Israel et la Jordanie du 3 avril1949 a maintenu cette zone intacte (l'alinea b du paragraphe 1 de I'article V de la Convention d'armistice general stipule que, dans le secteur de Jerusalem, la ligne de demarcation de I'armistice correspondra aux lignes definies dans la Convention de suspension d'armes du 30 novembre 1948).» [8/3892, par. 3.] Cela signifie, selon les mots memes du Chef d'etat- major par interim, que la region de Djebel el-Mukkaber, qui est situee entre les deux lignes de demarcation, est une partie du no-man's-land qui tombe sous le coup de I'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general pour le secteur de Jerusalem. Mais cela n'empeche que 1'0n trouve, un peu plus loin dans le rapport, une inter- pretation differente, que voici : It Etant donne que la Convention d'armistice general ne contient aucune disposition concernant "Article V, paragraph 1 (b) of the Armistice Agreement states that in the Jerusalem sector, the armistice demarcation lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area. This leaves the neutral area and the demilitarized zone in the same status as at the time of the 30 November 1948 Cease- Fire Agreement. " According to paragraph 3 of article IV of the Armistice Agreement, rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the aTea between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement wIth application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI. As I know of no rules and regulations ..• which when the Armistice Agreement was signed, prohibited United Nations personnel from entering the Government House area between the lines, I cannot accept that the word 'civilians' in this para- graph applies to the United Nations . . . and its staff." [8/3909, annex B, paras. 2 and 3.] 27. This letter of the Chief of Staff confirms that the Jebel El Mukabbir area kept the same status that it had at the time of the signing of the Cease-Fire Agreement; that is to say, it remained no-man's-land after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement. Besides, with the exception of United Nations personnel, the rules and regulations prohibiting civilians from crossing the fighting lines or demarcation lines or entering the area between the lines remained. ill force after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement. 28. The no-man's-land status of Jebel El Mukabbir cannot be contested any more than can the no-man's- land status of all other areas between the demarcation lines in the Jerusalem sector. Efforts to change the status of the area while 'h a change is without legal foundation are quite s· ,., dsing. It seems to us that these efforts to change the status of the area will serve only one aim, namely, to cover up Israel's violations in the area. « Au paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice, il est dit que les decrets et reglements des forces arm-ees des parties, qui interdisent aux civils de franchir les lignes de combat ou de pene- trer dans la zone situee entre ces lignes, resteront en vigueur apres la signature de la Convention, en ce qui concerne la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice definie aux articles V et VI. A ma connaissance, aucun decret et aucun reglement... n'interdisait au personnel des Nations Unies, lorsque la Conven- tion d'armistice a ete signee, de penetrer dans la zone situee entre les lignes autour du Palais du gouverne- ment ; par consequent, je ne puis admettre q:ue, dans ce paragraphe, le mot «civils» s'applique it l'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies... et son personnel. » [8/3909, annexe B, par. 2 et 3.] 27. Cette lettre du Chef d'etat-major confirme que la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber a conserve le statut qui etait le sien au moment de la signature de la Convention de suspension d'armes ; c'est-a-dire qu'elle est demeuree no-man's-land apres la signature de la Convention d'armistice general. D'ailleurs, exception faite du per- sonnel des Nations Unies, les reglements interdisant aux civils de franchir les lignes de combat ou les lignes de demarcation pour penetrer dans la zone situee entre les lignes est restee en vigueur apres la signature de la Convention d'armistice general. 28. Que la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber soit un no- man's-land, la chose n'est pas plus contestable qu'elle ne l'est dans le cas de toutes les autres zones situees entre les lignes de demarcation dans le secteur de Jeru- salem. Les efforts qui sont tcntes pour modifier le statut de cette zone alors qu'une modification serait sans aucun fondement juridique sont vraiment surprenants. Il nous semble que ces efforts ne visent qu'un but : dissimuler les violations qu' Israel commet dans la region. 30. The Acting Chief of Staff speaks here about a so-called agreement between the parties which, he claims, has rendered article IV, paragraph 3, inopera- tive in the case of the Jebel El Mukabbir area. This is indeed an astonishing statement. Where is that agree- ment? Why is such a basic document in the present dispute not added as an annex to the report? We, who have read carefully and studied all available documents, as well as the minutes of the discussions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, can assure the Council that such an agreement does not exist, and that the area did not receive a new denomination by being referred to as "area between the lines ". 31. This claim is not borne out after an examination of the documents in the case. Indeed, all no-man's-land areas in Palestine are " areas between the lines ". When the parties discussed the Jebel El Mukabbir area in the Mixed Armistice Commission they naturally referred to it as an area between the lines. This appella- tion could not change the status of the area. The General Armistice Agreement itself refers a number of times to no-man's-land areas as "areas between the lines". Furthermore, article IV, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice .'\greement applies specifically to such areas, and reads as follows: "Rules and regula- tions of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement . . . " We believe that with the General Armistice Agreement itself referring to no-man's-land areas as " areas between the lines tt, it was not necessary for the parties to reach a special agreement for using this appellation concerning the Jebel El Mukabbir area. 32. The Acting Chief of Staff assigns the date of 12 June 1949 to this so-called agreement between the parties to call the J ebel El Mukabbir area "area between the lines ", and it is implied that the no-man's- land status was therefore affected. But even the reading of the minutes of the Mixed Armistice Commission discussions between the parties on that date completely supports our view and completely contradicts the Acting Chief of Staff's statement and the statement of the Israel representative concerning the statns of the area. 33. The following are extracts from the minutes of the Mixed Armistice Commission's meeting of 12 June 1949: «( zone situee entre les lignes)) et rendre inoperant pour cette zone le paragraphe 3 de 1'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general.)) [8/3892, par. 7 alinea b). 30. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim parle ici d'un accord qui aurait ete realise entre les parties et qui, dit-il, a rendu inoperant, dans le cas de la zone de Djebel p.I-Mukkaber, le paragraphe 3 de 1'article IV. Cette declaration est reellement surprenante. Oil done se trouve ce;; accord ? Comment se fait-il qu'un document d'une importance fondamentale dans le present dif- ferend ne soit pas annexe au rapport? Nous qui avons lu et etudie soigneusement tous les documents dispo- nibles, de meme que les proces-verbaux des seances de la Commission mixte d'armistice, nous pouvons assurer le Conseil qu'aucun accord de ce genre n'existe et que la zone n'a pas re~m la nouvelle denomination de «zone situee entre les lignes )). 31. L'alIegation n'est pas confirmee par un examen des documents pertinents. A la verite, toutes les zones designees comme no-man's-land en Palestine sont des,,- «zones situees entre les lignes)). Lorsque les parties "- ont discute de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber a la Com- mission mixte d'armistice, elles en ont naturellement parIe comme d'une zone situee entre les lignes. Cette appellation ne saurait modifier son statuto Dans la Convention d'armistice general elle-meme, il est ques- tion, a plusieurs reprises, de zones ayant le caractere no-man's-land comme de «zones situees entre les lignes)). De plus, le paragraphe 3 de 1'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general s'applique specifique- ment a de telles zones et est redige en ces termes : «( Les decrets et reglements des forces armees des par- ties, qui interdisent aux civils de franchir les lignes de combat ou de penetrer dans la zone situee entre les lignes, resteront en vigueur apres la signature de la presente Convention... » Nous pensons que, si dans la Convention <i'armistice general meme, il est question de zones ayant le caractere de no-man's-land comme de «( zones situees entre les lignes)), il n'etait nullement besoin d'un accord ipecialentreles parties envue de l'em- ploi de cette appellation pour la zone de Djebel el- Mukkaber. 32. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim cite le 12 juin 1949 comme date du pretendu accord entre les parties concernant l'attribution de l'appellation de «zone situee entre les lignes )) a la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber et illaisse entendre que, de ce fait, le statut de no-man's- land s'est trouve modifie. Or le proces-verbal de la seance tenue ce jour-la par la Commission mixte d'armis- tice confirme entierement notre these et contredit for- mellement les allegations du Chef d'etat-major par interim et celles du representant d'Israel quant au statut de la zone. 33. Voici quelques extraits du proces-verbal de la seance du 12 juin 1949 de la Commission mixte d'armistice : "Hamad Bey el Farban" - who was then the Jordanian delegate - "agreed that the area in question was an area between the lines as described in article IV of the General Armistice Agreement. " It was therefore agreed that the area of Govern- ment House lying between the two armistice demar- cation lines was an area 'between the lines' as referred to in article IV of the General Armistice Agreement. " Colonel Dayan said now that the legal situation was clarified, he felt that the provisions of the Rhodes Agreement should be obeyed." [8/3909, annex A.] These explicit quotations make us wonder how the Acting Chief of Staff and the representative of Israel could come to totally opposite conclusions on the subject of these discussions about the status of the Jebel El Mukabbir area. 34. The minutes of the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission of 12 June 1949 confirm that article IV applies to the Jebel Mukabbir area. This view is also supported by the letter I have quoted from General Riley, the first Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, addressed on 12 June 1949 to Colonel Dayan in answer to Israel's query regarding the presence of United Nations personnel in the area. 35. In the Acting Chief of Staff's report, the erroneous interpretation of the minutes which assumes that at the Mixed Armistice Commission meeting on 12 June 1949, the two parties agreed to change the no-man's- land status of the area to the status of a so-called " area between the lines ", with only a demilitarized character, is at the basis of a number of misleading conclusions. rl 36. The above-quoted extracts from the minutes of the Mixed Armistice Commission meeting held on 12 June 1949, and the full text of General Riley's letter of 12 June 1949, concerning the status of the Jebel El Mukabbir area, form the subject of annexes A and B of my letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 11 November 1957 [8/3909], which has been distri- buted to the members of this Council. 37. As to the status quo, obtaining while the Truce Supervision Organization was functioning in the area, « Hamad Bey el Farhan - le representant de la Jordanie it l'epoque - admet que la zone en question est une «zone situee entre les lignes» au sens de l'article IV de la. Convention. « Il est done admis que la zone situee entre les deux lignes de demarcation de l'armistice autour du Palais du Gouvernement est une «zone situee entre les lignes» a.u sens de l'article IV de la Conven- tion d'armistice. «Le colonel Dayan declare que le statut j.uridique de la zone etant desormais clairement defini, il faut appliquer les dispositions de l'accord de Rhodesi.» [8/3909, annexe A.] Le passage que je viens de citer est tres clair. On se demande dans ces conditions comment le Chef d'etat- major pa.r interim et le representant d'Israel peuvent aboutir it des conclusions absolument opposees quant aux discussions sur le statut de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber. 34. Le proces-verbal de la seance du 12 juin 1949 de la Commission mixte d'armistice confirme que l'article IV s'applique it la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber. Cette these se trouve encore renforcee par la lettre que le premier Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, le general Riley, a adressee au colonel Dayan le 12 juin 1949, en reponse a une demande d'Israel touchant la presence de personnel des Nations Unies dans la zone, lettre que j'ai citee. 35. Un certain nombre de conclusions fallacieuses qui figurent dans le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim derivent de l'interpretation erronee du proces- verbal selon laquelle, a la seance du 12 juin 1949 de la Commission mixte d'armistice, les deux parties auraient decide d'un cominUfi accord de changer le statut de la zone, qui ne serait plus consideree comme no-man's- land mais comme «zone situee entre les lignes» ayant uniquement le caractere de secteur demilitarise. 36. Les extraits du proces-verbal de la seance du 12 juin 1949 de la Commission mixte d'armistice que j'ai cites tout a l'heure et la lettre du general RiIey en date du 12 juin 1949, touchant le statut de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber, font l'objet des annexes A et B de la lettre que j'ai adressee le 11 novembre 1957 au Secretaire general [8/3909] et dont le texte a ete dis- tribue aux membres du Conseil. 37. Quant au statu quo de la zone, alors que I'Orga- nisme charge de la surveillance de la treve y exer~ait 38. The report mentions how Jordan promptly protested each time that Israelis violated the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement at Jebel El Mukabbir. [Ibid., annex 1, page 2, footnote 1.] We cannot accept an argument which, if followed out, would amount to a legalization of the Israel violations in the area. Not only would it create a dangerous precedent, but it would be an open invitation to added violations. It would reward aggression and it would undermine the General Armistice Agreement, which remains the only instrument for the maintenance of tranquillity and security in the area. 39. I now turn to the alleged division of the area, the so-called civilian de facto line. It is against all evidence and established facts to pretend that the no-man's-land area at Jebel El Mukabbir has ever been divided between Jordan and Israel. As I said on 6 September [787th meeting], talks took place between the parties in the Mixed Armistice Commission. Not only was no definite agreement then reached but, when the Jordan Government heard of these talks, initiated by Israel, it instructed the Jordan representative to withdraw from the discussions because Jordan was no more prepared at that time than it is today to accept the division of an area which is Arab property almost in its entirety and which is strategically of vital military importance. Israel could only profit from such a division of the area, and that explains Israel's persistence in asking for its partition. But at no time was the area partitioned either through a formal agreement or in practice. 40. As regards the activities of civilians in the area, it was arranged between the parties that only those who were living there when the General Armistice Agreement was signed could continue to live in the area - that is to say, from the Israel side, the students of the Jewish School and their teachers, and, from the Jordan side, farmers living in their own houses. Jordan has strictly respected that arrangement, which is the only attenuation ever accepted by both parties to the no-man's-land status of the area, and which constitutes what Jordan has often referred to as the status qUQ in the area. We read, in paragraph 7 (b) of the report, that the investigation "has not found any agreement to the effect that civilians living outside the Zone at the signing of the Armistice Agreement would not be permitted to enter the area ". 38. Le rapport n'omet pas de signaler avec quelle promptitude la Jordanie a proteste chaque fois que les Israeliens ont viole les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general a. Djebel el-Mukkaber [Ibid., annexe 1 p. 2, note 1]. Nous ne pouvons accepter une these qui, si on la poussait jusqu'a. ses consequences logiques, aboutirait a. Iegaliser les violations commises par Israel dans la zone. Ce serait non seulement creer un prece- dent dangereux, mais encore inviter ouvertement de nouvelles violations. Ce serait donner une prime it I'agression et saper la Convention d'armistice general qui demeure le seul instrument propre a. assurer le maintien du calme et de la securite dans la zone. 39. J'en viens au pretendu partage de la zone par un~ ligne dite «civile n ou «( de facto n. Il est contraire a. tous""- les faits connus et etablis de soutenir que le no-man's- land de Djebel el-Mukkaber a jamais ete partage entre la Jordanie et Israel. Comme je I'ai dit le 6 septembre [787e seance], des echanges de vues ont eu lieu entre les parties a. la Commission mixte d'armistice. Non seulement aucun accord n'a alors ete realise, mais quand le Gouvernement jordanien a ete informe de ces echanges de vues, entrepris sur l'initiative d'Israel, il a ordonne a. son representant de cesser d'y participer, la Jordanie n'etant pas plus disposee a. l'epoque qu'elle ne I'est aujourd'hui a. accepter le partage d'une zone qui est propriete arabe dans sa quasi-totalite et est, du point de vue strategique, d'une importance mili- taire capitale. Israel ne pourrait que tirer profit d'un tel partage, ce qui explique pourquoi les Israeliens persis- tent a. le demander. Mais a. aucun moment la zone n'a ete partagee soit en vertu d'un accord formel, soit dans la pratique. 40. En ce qui concerne les activites des civils, il avait ete entendu entre les parties que seuls pourraient continuer a. vivre dans la zone ceux qui y residaient au moment de la signature de la Convention d'armistice general, c'est-a.-dire, pour les Israeliens, les etudiants de I'ecole juive et leurs professeurs, pour les Jordaniens, les cultivateurs habitant des maisons qui leur appar- tiennent. La Jordanie a scrupuleusement respecte cet arrangement qui constitue la seule derogation jamais acceptee par les deux parties au statut de no-man's- land de la zone; c'est la. ce que la Jordanie entend quand elle parle de statu quo dans la zone. L'alinea b du para- gra.phe 7 du rapport indique que l'enquete «( n'a revele aucune identite de vues sur la question de savoir s'il fallait interdire l'entree du secteur aux civils qui habi- taient en dehors au moment de la signature de la Conven- tion d'armistice... II 42. With regard to the existence of a civilian line separating the civilian activities of the parties in the Jebel El Mukabbir area, it should be pointed out that the concept of such a line is incompatible with the status of the area. The existence of a civilian line at Jebel El Mukabbir would presuppose the existence of an agreement to divide the area. And it cannot be suffi- ciently emphasized here that such an agreement was never reached. Consequently, this line does not exist, except in the imagination of those who want to annex half of the area. 43. General De Ridder states the following in his letter of 17 July 1953, concerning a tentative agreement to divide the Jebel El Mukabbir area: "The agreement and the map were not signed by the Jordanian autho- rities ". 44. To give more credence to this imaginary line, it has been pointed out that Arab cultivation in the area does not go beyond a certain line. Anyone acquainted with the situation in Jebel El Mukabbir knows that the reason for that situation is that the few Arab families left in the north-eastern part of the area are cultivating their own lands, which at some point happen to extend to this imaginary line. Out of respect for the General Armistice Agreement, the Jordanian Government has never allowed the Arab landowners living in Jordan to cultivate their lands in the area. 45. In paragraph 2 the report refers to what Israel describes as a " de facto line "- a term which we hear for the first time. We have to ask ourselves how this de facto line came into being. The map which is repro- duced as annex B to the report indicates that this so- called de facto line is traced between two civilian lines which had been proposed and were discussed during Mixed Armistice Commission meetings in 1949. This so-called de facto line actually indicates the line reached by Israel violations in the area. 46. The fact that, through successive violations and in spite of Jordan's repeated protests, Israelis have succeeded in extending their cultivation and control of Arab-owned properties to a certain line - which they d~scribe as a de facto line - does not mean that might makes right, or, even less, that such a line was agreed upon. This is confirmed by the last sentence of para- graph 3 of the report and by the following statement in the addendum to the report dated 8 November 42. Quant a une ligne «civile» delimitant les domaines civils des parties dans la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber, il convient de souligner qu'une telle notion est incompa- tible avec le statut de la zone. L'existence d'une ligne «civile» a Djebel el-Mukkaber presupposerait celle d'un accord de partage de la zone. Or, on ne saurait trop insister ici sur le fait qu'il n'y a jamais eu d'accord de ce genre. Par consequent, cette ligne n'existe que dans I'imagination de ceux qui veulent annexer la moitie de la zone. 43. Dans sa lettre du 17 juillet 1953 concernant un projet d'accord sur le partage de la zone de Djebel el- Mukkaber, le general De Ridder precise que « I'accord n'a pas ete signe par les autorites jordaniennes, non plus que la carte ll. 44. Pour donner plus de vraisemblance a l'existence de cette ligne imaginaire, on a souligne que les cultures arabes dans la zone ne depassaient pas une certaine limite. Quiconque connait la situation a Djebel el- Mukkaber sait que cela tient a ce que les quelques familles arabes demeurees dans la partie nord-est de la zone cultivent leurs propres terres, lesquelles, en certains points, s'etendent jusqu'a cette ligne ima- ginaire. Par respect pour la Convention d'armistice general, le Gouvernement jordanien n'a jamais autorise les proprietaires arabes vivant en Jordanie a cultiver leurs terres situees dans la zone. 45. Au paragraphe 2 du rapport, il est question de ce qu'Israel appelle une ligne «de facto», dont nous n'avions encore jamais entendu parler. On est amene a se deman- der quelle est l'origine de cette ligne de facto. La carte qui fait l'objet de l'annexe B du rapport indique qu'il s'agit d'une ligne tracee entre deux lignes civiles qui avaient ete proposees precedemment et dont il avait ete discute en 1949 a la Commission mixte d'armistice. Cette pretendue ligne de facto marque en realite la limite des empietements d'Israel dans la zone. 46. Le fait qu'a la faveur de violations successives et en depit des protestations repetees de la J ordanie, les Israeliens aient reussi a etendre leurs cultures et leur mainmise sur des proprietes arabes jusqu'a une certaine limite - qu'i1s qualifient de ligne de facto - nr signifie pas que le droit soit de leur cote et encore moins qu'une telle ligne ait ete acceptee d'un commun accord. Cela se trouve confirme par la derniere phrase du paragraphe 3 du rapport, ainsi que par le passage 47. With regard to civilian activities in the area, the report states that ". . . in no place in the early records was it found that agreement had been reached... on limiting the Jewish civilians to the compound of the Agricultural School." [S/3892, para. 7 (c).] 48. Since most of the other properties in the area are Arab-owned, we wonder whether it was also found in the early records that agreement had been reached to give the Israelis a free hand with regard to Arab pro- perties in the area. Common sense and private owner- ship rights would rather support the view that civilians allowed to stay in the area would naturally have to limit their activities to their properties, and, like every- where else, interference with other people's properties would be against common law; thus, Israel activities on Arab properties in the area do not need to be specially prohibited by a special agreement. 49. In order not to lengthen this discussion, I shall not quote a number of letters from the Truce Super- vision Organization and a number of statements by the Israel delegation. I can, however, assure this Council that an agreement on the division of the area has never been reached and signed by the two Governments. 50. I now turn to the subject of the control and super- vision of the United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- nization over the Jebel El Mukabbir area. 51. On 6 September, the Israel representative sug- gested [788th meeting, paras. 36 and 37] that the control of the Truce Supervision Organization with regard to civilian activities in the area was withdrawn upon the signing of the General Armistice Agreement. In para- graph 6 of his report, the Acting Chief of Staff recalls General Riley's statement at the 9th meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 12 June 1949. At the same time, the Acting Chief of Staff adds: "In this connexion, it might be pointed out that the same year a Jordanian representative suggested that this Zone be placed under United Nations control." [S/3892, para. 6.] 52. In fact, when General Riley made his statement, the Jordanian Government emphasized to the Chief of Staff that, should the control of the United Nations be withdrawn from the Jebel El Mukabbir area, the United Nations personnel themselves would have to withdraw from the area, as would the few civilians tolerated there. The position of the Jordanian Govern- ment was that the United Nations could not continue to stay there without securing control over the civi- lians; neither could the civilians remain, should the United Nati-::ns withdraw its control. In fact, the United Nations staff remained; and, for all practical purposes, the United Nations continued to exercise supervision and control. To support that view, many instances can be recalled when the Truce Supervision 47. Au sujet des activites civiles dans la zone, on lit ce qui suit, dans le rapport : « ••• nulle part dans les documents initiaux on ne trouve trace d'un accord... sur la limitation du champ d'activite des civils juifs au terrain de l'ecole d'agriculture.» [S/3892, par. 7, alinea c.] 48. Etant donne que la plupart des autres terres de la zone sont des biens arabes, nous nous demandons si l'on a aussi trouve trace dans les documents initiaux d'UIl accord laissant aux Israeliens les mains libres en ce qui concerne les proprietes arabes de la zone. Compte tenu du droit de propriete privee, le bon sens inciterait plutot it penser que les civils autorises it rester dans la zone doivent tout naturellement limiter leur activite it leur propre domaine et que, comme partout ailleurs, tout empietement sur les biens d'autrui est illegal. n n'y avait donc pas besoin d'un accord special pour interdire expressement les entreprises israeliennes sur les terres arabes. 49. Pour ne pas prolonger cette discussion, je m'abstiendrai de citer un certain nombre de lettres de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve et un certain nombre de declarations de la delegation israelienne. Je peux toutefois assurer le Conseil qu'aueun accord sur le partage de la zone n'a jamais ete conelu et signe par les deux gouvernements. 50. J'en viens it I'autorite exercee dans la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber par I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. 51. Le 6 septembre, le representant d'Israel a donne it entendre [788e seance, par. 36 et 37] qu'it la signature de la Convention d'armistice general, les aetivites civiles de la zone avaient cesse de relever de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Au paragraphe 6 de son rapport, le Chef d'etat-major par interim cite la declaration faite par le general Riley it la ge seance de la Commission mixte d'armistice, le 12 juin 1949, et ajoute : « On se rappellera it cet egard que, la meme annee, un membre de la delegation jordanienne a suggere de placer cette zone sous l'autorite de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.» [S/3892, par. 6.] 52. En fait, lorsque le general Riley a fait sa declara- tion, le Gouvernement jordanien a souligne, it l'intention du Chef d'etat-major, que si l'autorite des Nations Unies cessait de s'exercer sur la zone de Djebel el-Mukka- ber, les membres du personnel des Nations Unies eux- memes auraient it quitter la zone, de meme que les quelques civils qui y etaient toleres. De l'avis du Gouvernement jordanien, l'Organisation des Nations Unies ne pouvait etre presente sans avoir autorite sur les civils, et les civils ne pouvaient rester si l'auto- rite des Nations Unies cessait de s'exercer. L'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies est demeuree presente et, dans la pratique, a continue it exercer l'autorite. A l'appui de cette affirmation, on peut citer nombre de cas oil l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve est 53. First, up to the present time, the United Nations flag continues to fly on the main buildings of the area, such as Government House, the Arab College, and the Jewish Agricultural School, although some of the buildings over which the United Nations flag is hoisted do not shelter United Nations personnel or United Nations offices. 53. Premierement, jusqu'a ce jour, le drapeau des Nations Unies a continue a flotter sur les principaux edifices de la zone, dont le Palais du gouvernement, le college arabe et l'ecole juive d'agriculture, bien que certains des b:1timents sur lesquels il est arbore n'abri- tent pas de membres du personnel des Nations Unies ou de services des Nations Unies. 54. Secondly, at one time Israelis tried to substitute the Israel flag for the United Nations flag over the Jewish Agricultural School in the area. The Truce Supervision Organization intervened at once and forced the Israelis to take down their flag and again to hoist the United Nations flag. 54. Deuxiemement, les Israeliens ont un jour voulu remplacer a l'ecole juive d'agriculture le drapeau des Nations Unies par le drapeau israeIien. L'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve est intervenu immediatement et a oblige les Israeliens a amener leur drapeau et a hisser a nouveau celui des Nations Unies. 55. Thirdly, as I mentioned in my previous statement, when in the winter of 1953 Israel civilians tried to take possession of the Arab College buildings, Jordan protested to the Truce Supervision Organization. Commander E. H. Hutchison, Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, himself went to investigate this situation and compelled these Israel civilians, with their guards, to withdraw immediately from the no-man's-land area. 55. Troisiemement, comme je l'ai signaIe dans ma precedente declaration, lorsqu'au cours de l'hiver de 1953 des civils israeliens ont tente d'occuper les hati- ments du college arabe, la Jordanie a proteste aupres de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Le Commander E. H. Hutchison, president de la Com- mission mixte d'armistice, s'est deplace personnelle- ment pour enqueter sur la situation et a oblige ces civils israeliens et leurs gardes a evacuer sans delai le no-man's-land. 56. Quatriemement, le 27 juin 1956, les Israeliens ont pose des fiIs de fer barbeIes autour d'une portion du no-marl's-land attenante a l'extremite orientale de la colonie Talbiot dans !'intention d'annexer ce lopin de terre a ladite colonie. La Jordanie a proteste aupres du Chef d'etat-major, qui est intervenu sur-le-champ et a obtenu des Israeliens qu'ils enlevent ces fils de fer barbeles. 56. Fourthly, on 27 June 1956, Israelis put barbed wire around a corner of the no-man's-land area, adjacent to the eastern part of the Talpiyot colony, in order to annex that portion of land to their colony. Jordan protested to the Chief of Staff, who intervened at once, and obtained the removal of this barbed wire by the Israelis. 57. If the control of the Truce Supervision Organiza- tion had been withdrawn, one cannot see how they could have acted in the way they did to prevent these Israeli civilian activities in the no-man's-land area. The Truce Supervision Organization intervened also in many other cases of Israeli activities in the area, but with less success. If there had not been any supervision or control by the Truce Supervision Organization, the burden of preventing trespassing on the area would have fallen on the two parties, as is the case in other no-man's-land areas in Palestine where trespassing is prevented by shooting at the trespassers. Jordan did not use that right at Jebel El MUkabbir, because Jordan considers that this area, over which the United Nations flag is flying, is under the supervision and control of the Truce Supervision Organization, while in other no-man's-land areas, which are not under the supervision and control of the Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations flag is not displayed. 57. Si l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve n'avait plus eu autorite, on ne voit pas comment il aurait pu agir comme ill'a fait pour empecher ces acti- vites civiles israeliennes dans le no-man's-land. L'Orga- nisme est intervenu aussi dans nombre d'autres cas, mais avec moins de succes. A deraut de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, il aurait incombe aux deux parties d'empecher toute violation de la zone; tel est le cas pour d'autres zones de Palestine ayant le caractere de no-man's-land, oil l'on tire sur quiconque franchit la limite. La Jordanie n'a pas eu recours a ce moyen a Djebel el-Mukkaber parce qu'elle estimt.,ue cette zone oil flotte le drapeau des Nations Unies est placee sous l'autorite de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, alors que dans les zones de no-man's-land oil ne s'exerce pas cette autorite le drapeau des Nations Unies n'est pas arbore. 58. Fifthly, with regard to the rights of ownership in the area, the great majority of the private properties 58. Je parlerai, en cinquieme lieu, des droits de propriete dans la zone. La grande majorite des proprie- 59. The work that Israelis are carrying out in the area is actually done on Arab lands, in violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. In that respect, the report points out that these lands are not under any State's sovereignty: " ... neither Israel nor Jordan enjoys sovereignty over any part of the Zone (the Zone being beyond the respective demarcation lines) " [Ibid.] 60. In such circumstances, we do not understand by what right Israelis cross the demarcation line at Jebel El Mukabbir, bring Israelis workers and armed forces into the area, assume control of Arab properties whose nature they change, while the rightful Arab owners of these properties are prevented from getting across to their properties although they are in dire need of their lands. Such violation, trespassing and confisca- tion of Arab lands by Israel is allowed to take place in a no-man's-land, while the United Nations flag is flying over the area and while the United Nations formally recognizes that no part of the area is under Israel's sovereignty. Is the United Nations going to remain passive while the Arabs watch Israel's citizens, who come from many foreign lands, taking over more refugee properties, which in some cases have remained for generations in the same family, and which were located in an area where the Arabs have a right to expect some United Nations protection of their interests under the General Armistice Agreement? These people are wondering if worse could possibly happen to them under any other circumstances. 61. We hear much nowadays about the bitterness and discontent prevailing in the Near East. It is not enough to regret what has happened, it is our common duty to inquire into reasons for the present unrest in the region. It is also our duty not to allow the repetition of the same wrongs. And we can affirm to this Council that Israel's policy of encroaching on Arab lands, either by aggressions or in some other form, is deeply affecting Arab feelings in Jordan, where about 600,000 refugees live, victims of Israel's aggression in Palestine. Repercussions of the present illegal activities of Israel in the Jebel El Mukabbir area are in that respect beyond ordinary expectations, and it can be assumed that if these violations are not stopped at once and if Arab property rights are not respected, the damaging effect of the situation will prove very detrimental to the security and tranquillity of the area. 62. Sixthly, with regard to violations in the area, the Acting Chief of Staff's report and its attached maps graphically indicate that Israel is intending to annex more than half of the no-man's-land area. The Israelis 59. Les travaux que les Israeliens poursuivent dans la zone s'effectuent en fait sur des terres arabes, en violation des dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general. A cet egard, il est souligne dans le rapport que ces terres ne relevent d'aucun Etat, etant donne que « ... ni Israel ni la Jordanie n'exercent leur autorite sur aucune partie de la zone (celle-ci se trouvant au-dela des lignes de demarcation respectives) ». [Ibid.] 60. Dans ces conditions, nous ne comprenons pas de quel droit les Israeliens franchissent la ligne de demar- cation· a Djebel el-Mukkaber, introduisent des travail- leurs et des elements armes dans la zone et s'emparent de biens fonciers arabes dont ils modifient la nature, tandis qu'on empeche les proprietaires legitimes de ces biens de se rendre dans leurs terres qui leur font pour- tant grandement defaut. Et on laisse les Israeliens commettre ces violations, ces empietements, ces usur- pations de terres arabes dans un no-man's-land, alors que le drapeau des Nations Unies flotte sur la zone et que l'OND reconnait officiellement qu'aucune portion de ce territoire ne se trouve sous l'autorite d'Israel. Les Nations Unies demeureront-elles passives? Les Arabes devront-ils continuer a voir des citoyens israe- liens, venus de divers pays etrangers, s'emparer de proprietes appartenant a des refugies, de proprietes dont certaines sont dans la meme famille depuis des generations et qui se trouvent dans une zone oil les Arabes ont le droit de compter que leurs interets seront proteges par l'ONU en vertu de la Convention d'armis- tice general? Ces malheureux se demandent si rien de pire eut jamais pu leur arriver. 61. Nous entendons beaucoup parler en ce moment de la rancreur et du mecontentement qui regnent au Proche-Orient. Il ne suffit pas de deplorer ce qui s'est passe; nous avons en commun le devoir de rechercher les causes du malaise actuel dans la region. Nous avons aussi le devoir de ne pas permettre la repetition des injustices commises. Et je puis affirmer au Conseil que la politique israelienne d'empietement sur les terres arabes, soit a la faveur d'agressions soit de quelque autre maniere, souleve une profonde emotion en Jor- danie oil vivent environ 600.000 refugies, victimes de l'agression israelienne en Palestine. Le retentissement des activites illegales actuelles d'Israel dans la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber depasse a cet egard ce a quoi on aurait pu normalement s'attendre et tout laisse pre- sumer que, s'il n'est pas mis fin immediatement aces violations israeliennes et si les droits de propriete des Arabes ne sont pas respectes, il en resultera des conse- quences tres prejudiciables ala securite et au calme de la region. 62. Je considererai en sixieme lieu le detail des viola- tions commises dnns la zone. Le rapport du Chef d'etat- major par interim et les cartes jointes indiquent qu' Israel a l'intention d'annexer plus de la moitie du no-man's- 63. Israel's violations in that area are of two sorts: violations of a military nature and violations of a civilian nature. Annexes E and G of the report list the following violations of a military nature by Israel: (1) Israelis have been recently - and I wish to emphasize this word " recently" - constructing three emplacements around a water tower; (2) A ruined house has been fortified and is surrounded by firing positions; (3) A barbed wire fence of a military nature extends for 200 metres ; (4) Another house in the area has also been fortified by the Israelis and is occupied by Israel's border police, and, according to the Chief of Staff's letter addressed to the Israel delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion on 12 October 1956 [annex El, " This house must be considered a military outpost and not a normal civil police station". This military post endangers the security of the Arab part of Jerusalem; (5) A two-storey concrete block house, built in 1949, has been camouflaged by Israelis in a way which makes it suitable for rifles or light machine guns, and the south side of the lower storey is described by the Chief of Staff as "ideal for a medium machine gun " ; (6) A stone house, a cement block house and a concrete block house in the area have been camouflaged by the Israelis for similar purposes ; (7) Three diggings are reported by the Chief of Staff in Appendix G, and it is indicated that the holes were "newly dug" ; (8) Other Israel military works installations were also reported. The Chief of Staff, in the letter mentioned, asked the Israelis to destroy all military positions, but Israel refused to consider that request, and its violations of the General Armistice Agreement are still continuing. 64. Concerning civilian violation by Israel in the area, the maps attached to the report as annexes Band C indicate that Israel constructed a number of houses and roads in the area. They also illustrate the progres- sive advance of Israel cultivation of Arab lands in the no-man's-land area in violation of the General Armistice Agreement and the status quo of 1949. Annex C indicates that Israel is now holding more than half of the Jebel 63. Ces violations sont de deux sortes : militaires et civiles. Dans les annexes E et G du rapport, les viola- tions militaires suivantes sont enumerees : 1) Les Israeliens ont depuis peu - je tiens a souli- gner les mots « depuis peu )) - construit trois emplace- ments aux abords d'un chateau d'eau; 2) Vne maison en ruines a ete fortifiee et elle est entouree de postes de tir; 3) Vne cMture de caractere militaire en fil de fer barbeIe s'etend sur une longueur de 200 metres; 4) Vne autre maison de la zone a ete fortifiee et est occupee par la police frontaliere israelienne ; et - comme l'indique la lettre en date du 12 octobre 1956 adressee par le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve au representant u'Israel [annexe El a la Commission mixte d'armistice - «cette maison doit etre consideree comme un poste militaire avance et non comme un poste de police civil ordinaire». Ce poste militaire constitue une menace contre la securite de la partie arabe de Jerusalem; 5) Vn blockhaus de beton arme de deux etages, construit en 1949, a ete camoufle par les Israeliens de fa~on a permettre l'utilisation eventuelle de fusils ou de mitrailleuses legeres; conformement a la description donnee par le Chef d'etat-major, l'etage inferieur pos- sede une ouverture vers le sud qui serait « tout a fait indiquee pour une mitrailleuse moyenne )) ; 6) Les Israeliens ont camoufle a des fins analogues une maison de pierre, un blockhaus de beton et un autre de beton arme ; 7) Dans l'annexe G, le Chef d'etat-major signale l'existence de trois excavations «amenagees il y a peu de temps»); 8) II est fait mention en outre de divers autres ouvrages militaires israeliens. Dans la lettre citee, le Chef d'etat-major a demande la destruction de toutes les installations militaires, mais les Israeliens n'ont tenu aucun compte de cette demande et ils continuent aujour- d'hui encore a violer la Convention d'armistice general. 64. En ce qui concerne les violations civiles commises par Israel dans la zone, les cartes jointes en annexes au rapport (annexes B et C) indiquent que les Israeliens ont construit un certain nombre de maisons et de routes. On y voit aussi l'extension progressive des cultures israeliennes sur les terres arabes du no-man's-land en violation de la Convention d'armistice general et du statu quo de 1949. De l'annexe C, il ressort que les acti- 66. Naturally, the maps also indicate the encroach- ment of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road. But we cannot stress enough the fact that this road was not built in violation of the General Armistice Agreement, but by both authorization of the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization and at its request. 67. I should like to clarify here the special circum- stances in which this road was built Before. the Israel aggression on the Arab part of Jerusalem in 1948, the Old City was connected to Bethlehem by a road crossing this part of the city from north to south. But Arab communications with Bethlehem were cut by the Israel occupation of the southern A.rab quarter of Jerusalem. Pilgrims and tourists could no longer visit the Bethlehem and Hebron districts without passing through Israel- held territory. Further, there was no longer any direct communication between Government House, the head- quarters of the Truce Supervision Organization, and the remaining Arab part of Palestine except through Israel. 68. Before the end of the hostilities in Palestine, the Jordan military authorities in Palestine opened a mili- tary road connecting Jerusalem and Bethlehem, but that new road was both long and dangerous. While, pre- viously, Bethlehem could be reached by car in ten minutes, it took two hours by this new military road. The Consular Corps and various religious authorities in Jerusalem were pressing the Jordan Government to open a shorter and safer road to Bethlehem. The present road was then opened. 6S. By reason of the topographic conditions of the land, the shortest road could not be built without slightly entering the eastern side of the Jebel El Mukabbir area. The Truce Supervision Organization authorized those plans and ask('rl the Jordan authorities to link Government House wi., the road by a forking which passes on the side of Jebe.: El Mukabbir in order 66. Bien entendu, les cartes montrent egalement que la route de Jerusalem a BethIeem empiete sur la zone. Mais nous n'insisterons jamais assez sur le fait que la construction de cette route ne constitue pas une viola- tion de la Convention d'armistice general puisqu'elle a eu lieu avec l'autorisation et sur la demande de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve. 67. Je tiens a preciser les circonstances particulieres dans lesqueIles cette route a eM construite. Avant l'agression israelienne contre le secteur arabe de Jeru- salem, en 1948, la Vieille Ville etait reliee it Bethleem par une route traversant cette partie de la cite du nord au sud. Mais les communications arabes avec Bethleem ont ete coupees par suite de l'occupation par Israel de la partie sud du quartier arabe de Jerusalem. Les pelerins et les touristes ne pouvaient plus se rendre a Bethleem ou it Hebron sans traverser le territoire controle par les Israeliens. De plus, il n'existait plus de communica- tion directe entre le Palais du gouvernement, le quartier general de 1'0rganisme charge de la surveillance de la treve et le reste de la partie arabe de la Palestine, si ce n'est a travers le territoire israelien. 68. Avant la fin des hostilites, les autorites miIitaires jordaniennes en Palestine avaient construit une route reliant Jerusalem a BethIeem, mais eIle etait a la fois longue et dangereuse. Tandis qu'auparavant on pou- vait parvenir a BethIeem en dix minutes en auto, il fallait deux heures pour s'y rendre par la nouvelle route miIitaire. Le corps consulaire et diverses autorites religieuses de Jerusalem demandaient avec insistance au Gouvernment jordanien une route plus courte et plus sure jusqu'a Bethleem. C'est alors qu'a ete construite la route actuelle. 69. Etant donne la topographie de la region, la route la plus courte ne pouvait etre construite sans empieter legerement sur la partie orientale de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber. L'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve a approuve les plans et a demande aux autorites jordaniennes de desservir le Palais du gouvernement par un embranchement longeant Djebel el-Mukkaber de 70. The fact that the new road happens to pass through the eastern side of the Jebel El Mukabbir area does not indicate that Jordan considers itself more at liberty on this side of the area than on other sides. Jordan never had any intention of working in any part of the Jebel El Mukabbir area before a definite settle- ment of the problem. There is no possible comparison between the limited encroachment of the Jerusalem- Bethlehem road necessitated by the configuration of the land, and the carrying out by the Israelis of inde- pendent projects in the area, including the construc- tion of military posts, as well as the changing of the nature of Arab properties in the region by opening roads, building houses, afforestation, etc., under the protection of Israel armed forces. 71. The representative of Israel charged on 6 Sep- tember [788th meeting, paras. 40 and 48) that Jordan had built a police post and a school in the area. These build- ings were not erected after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement. They are old buildings which were already there in 1949, as is indicated in notes 1 and 2 of the map published as annex B, report of the Acting Chief of Staff. Further, when Colonel B. V. Leary mentioned these counter-charges by Israel to the Jordan Government, our Foreign Minister answered that Jordan was ready to change the course of the new road, so that it would not encroach on the Jebel El Mukabbir area although it would lengthen that road, provided that Israel stopped all objectionable activities in the area and co-operated in restoring conditions to the state in which they were in 1949, that is to say, re-establish the status quo existing at the time of the signing of the General Armistice Agreement. 72. I should now like to comment on the Acting Chief of Staff's proposals to solve the difficulties regarding Jebel El Mukabbir [8/3892, para. 9]. 73. I shall start by discussing the proposal contained in subparagraph (c). This proposal seeks "to arrive at an arrangement which would take into account to some extent at least, the changes which have taken place since 1949". It appears that the Acting Chief of Staff considers that this proposal offers a reasonable basis for a solution. What we are being asked to do is, it seems, to recognize the fait accompli. This solution, if accepted, would amount to a legalization of Israel's violations in the area. 74. Proposal (c) envisages that "civilian activities should continue " and the Acting Chief of Staff indicates that, in this connexion, the following principle should be respeL~ed : that ownership rights of land be established by a thorough search of land registry so that" no Arab- 70. La nouvelle route traverse la partie est de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber, mais cela ne signifie pas que la Jordanie estime avoir les mains plus libres dans ce sec- teur qu'ailleurs. Elle n'a jamais eu l'intention d'effec- tuer des travaux dans une partie quelconque de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber avant que le probleme ne soit definitivement regie. Il n'y a pas de comparaison possible entre les empietements limites de la route de Jerusalem a Bethleem, rendus necessaires par la configu- ration du terrain, et l'execution par les Israeliens de diverses entreprises, dont la construction de postes militaires ou la modification de la nature des biens fonciers arabes de la zone par la construction de routes et de maisons, des travaux de boisement, etc., sous la protection de forces armees israeliennes. 71. Le representant d'lsrael a, le 6 septembre [788e seance, par. 40 et 48], accuse la Jordanie d'avoir construit dans la zone un poste de police et une ecole. La construction de ces b:1timents n'est pas posterieure a la signature de la Convention d'armistice general. Il s'agit d'anciens edifices qui etaient deja la en 1949, comme l'indiquent les notes 1 et 2 de la carte faisant l'objet de l'annexe B au rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim. En outre, quand le colonel B. V. Leary a porte ces contre-accusations israeliennes a la connais- sance du Gouvernement jordanien, le Ministre jorda- nien des affaires etrangeres a repondu que la Jordanie etait prete a modifier le trace de la nouvelle route de fal;on qu'elle n'empiete pas sur la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber, bien que la route dlit s'en trouver allon- gee, a condition qu'lsrael mette un terme a toute acti- vite reprehensible dans la zone et coopere au retablisse- ment de la situation qui existait en 1949, c'est-a-dire au retour au statu quo existant au moment de la signa- ture de la Convention d'armistice general. 72. J'aimerais maintenant faire quelques observations au sujet des propositions faites par le Chef d'etat- major par interim en vue de resoudre les difficultes rela- tives aDjebel el-Mukkaber. [8/3892, par. 9.] 73. J'examinerai d'abord la solution mentionnee a l'alinea c. I1 s'agirait de cc parvenir aun accord qui tien- drait compte, du moins dans une certaine mesure, des changements intervenus depuis 1949)). Aux yeux du Chef d'etat-major par interim, cette solution offre une issue raisonnable. Or, il semble bien que ce qu'on nous propose la, c'est de reconnaitre le fait accompli. Cette solution, si elle etait acceptee, equivaudrait a Iegaliser les violations dont les Israeliens se sont rendus cou- pables dans la zone. 74. Selon la proposition visee al'alinea c, «les activites civiles se poursuivraient)), et le Chef d'etat-major par interim precise a cet egard que le principe suivant devrait etre respecte : les titres de propriete devraient etre etablis par une verification approfondie des registres 75. Concerning the exercise by Arab owners of their ownership rights, proposal (c) makes two provisions that, if accepted, would severely curtail these rights. These provisions read as follows: "Civilian activities should continue. However such activities should be restricted in order not to create new causes of incidents and tension. Therefore, the civilian activities of the two parties should be kept separate" [8/3892, para. 11]. 76. The first provision is dangerous, because in view of the existence of the Jewish Agricultural School it could be used by Israelis as a pretext to provoke inci- dents and tension, so as to prevent Arab owners from using their lands located on the western side of the area. 77. The second provision, which aims at separating the activities of both parties, will probably result in depriving Arab owners from cultivating a gr,>at part of their land because of the existence of the small Jewish Agricultural School in the centre of the area. 78. For these reasons my Government cannot accept to take into consideration the proposal set forth in sub-paragraph (c) in its present form. To become just and practicable, this proposal, should read as follows: "Civilian activities of both parties in the area should continue on the basis of ownership rights as established by a thorough search of land registries by the Mixed Armistice Commission, so that no Arab-owned land would be used by Israelis and, vice versa, that no Israel land would be used by Arabs." 79. We do not think that in practice allowing Arab owners to enter the area and cultivate their properties would give rise. to incidents and tension if the area were properly supervised. The situation should be less tense than along the demarcation lines, because the area is under the supervision and control of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. 80. Solution (b) : to " revert to the conditions existing on 3 April 1949 " does not seem advisable to the Acting Chief of Staff, and he supports his point of view by suggesting that it would not be in the best interest of Jordan. He explains that this solution would entail the closing of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebron road. We I thank the Acting Chief of Staff for his solicitude. But 75. En ce qui concerne l'exercice par les Arabes de leurs droits de propriete, la proposition visee it l'ali- nea c contient deux dispositions qui, si elles etaient acceptees, porteraient gravement atteinte it ces droits. Elles se lisent comme suit : «Les activites civiles. se poursuivraient. Toutefois elles devraient etre reglemen- tees, de maniere it ne pas susciter de nouveaux motifs d'incidents et de tension. En consequence, les activites civiles des deux parties devraient etre nettement separees. »[8/3892, par. 11). 76. La premiere de ces dispositions est dangereuse, etant donne I'existence de I'ecole juive d'agriculture car les Israeliens pourraient en prendre pretexte pour provoquer des incidents et creer une situation tendue, de maniere it empecher les proprietaires arabes d'utiliser leurs terres situees dans la partie ouest de la zone. 77. La seconde disposition, qui tend it separer les activites des deux parties, aboutirait vraisemblable- ment it mettre les proprietaires arabes dans l'incapacite de cultiver une grande partie de leurs terres en raison de l'existence, au centre de la zone, de la petiteecole juive d'agriculture. 78. C'est pourquoi mon gouvernement ne peut accep- ter de prendre en consideration la solution visee it l'alinea c sous sa forme actuelle. Pour que cette propo- sition soit juste et viable, elle devrait avoir la teneur suivante : «Les activites civiles des deux parties dans la zone devraient se poursuivre compte dftment tenu des droits de propriete, etablis par une verification approfondie des registres fonciers it laquelle procede- rait la Commission mixte d'armistice, de sorte qu'au- cune terre arabe ne serait utilisee par des Israeliens et, reciproquement, qu'aucune terre israelienne ne serait utilisee par des Arabes.» 79. Nous ne pensons pas qu'en pratique, le fait de permettre it des proprietaires arabes de penetrer dans la zone et de cultiver leurs terres pourrait provoquer des incidents ou creer une situation tendue, si le secteur etait controle de fac;on appropriee. La situation serait moins tendue que le long des lignes de demarcation parce que la zone est sous l'autorite de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve. 80. La solution visee it l'alinea b - «revenir aux conditions qui existaient le 3 avril 1949» - ne paratt pas indiquee au Chef d'etat-major par interim, qui laisse entendre qu'elle ne servirait guere les interets de la Jordanie. Il precise que cette solution entratnerait la fermeture de la route Jerusalem-BethIeem-Hebron. Nous remercions le Chef d'etat-major par interim de sa 81. Solution (a) would "transform the area between the lines into a no-man's-land and apply article IV, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement prohibiting any person from crossing the demarcation line into the Zone, except United Nations personnel, who should have access to the Government House area and to the Arab College." [8/3892, para. 9]. To this should be added "and to the Jewish Agricultural School ", which is also located in the Zone. 82. Before expressing our opinion on the merits of that solution, I would like to point out that the applica- tion of solution (a) would not require a "transforma- tion " of the status of the area. Its legal status cannot be disputed: it is a no-man's-land in the terms of the General Armistice Agreement and this status has never since been altered. Article IV, paragraph 3, ought to be applied to the area and all activities in the area are violations of the provisions of that article. 83. The Acting Chief of Staff seems to think that proposal (a) is not advisable either, and he bases his opinion on concern for Arab interests. He explains: " Solution (a) would entail inter alia the evacuation of an entire Arab village, and the closing of the Jerusalem- Bethlehem-Hebron Highway, and of the Jewish Agri- cultural School" [8/3892, para. 10]. 84. A close examination of that statement in relation to the actual situation existing in the area shows that the "entire Arab village" mentioned does not exist. Arab properties in the area belong to inhabitants of two Arab villages outside the area, one to the north of the area called Silwan and one to the south of the area, called Sur Bahir, and to some other Arab owners now living in Jordan. Only a few Arab dwellers are living to the north of Government House. The enforcement of the no-man's-land status would not affect many Arab residents in the area, because since 1949, Jordan has never ceased to consider the area a no-man's-land and in view of the provisions of article IV Jordan has forbidden property owners living outside the area to cultivate their lands in the area. 85. Concerning the Jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebron road, my Government is quite ready to change the present course of the road although it would make it longer, as I have already stated. 81. Quant a la solution prevue a l'alinea a, elle est la suivante : «Transformer la zone situee entre les lignes en no.:.man's-land et appliquer le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general, qui interdit a toute personne de franchir les lignes de demar- cation pour penetrer dans la zone, sauf aux membres du personnel des Nations Unies qui doivent avoir acces au secteur Oll se trouvent le Palais du gouvernement et le college arabe» [8/3892, par. 9]. Il faudrait ajouter ici : «ainsi qu'a l'ecole juive d'agriculture», qui est egalement situee dans la zone. 82. Avant de discuter le fond dr- cette proposition, je tiens a faire remarquer que son application n'exigerait pas une «transformation» du statut de la zone. Juridi- quement parlant, aucune contestation n'est possible: il s'agit d'un no-man's-land au sens de la Convention d'armistice general, et son statut n'a jamais ete modifie depuis. Le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV s'applique en l'occurence et toutes les activites auxquelles on peut se livrer dans la zone constituent des violations des dispo- sitions dudit article. 83. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim parait estimer que la proposition a n'est pas indiquee non plus, et i1 fonde son opinion sur la necessite de sauvegarder les interets arabes. Il precise en effet que «la solution a entrainerait notamment l'evacuation de tout un village arabe et la fermeture de la route Jerusalem-Bethleem- Hebron ainsi que de l'ecole juive d'agriculture» [8/3892, par. 10]. 84. Si ron compare cette affirmation aux faits, on constate que l'expression «tout un village arabe» ne correspond a aucune realite. Les terres arabes de la zone appartiennent aux habitants de deux villages situes hors de la zone, l'un au nord, du nom de Silwan, l'autre au sud, du nom de Sur Bahir, ainsi qu'a quelques autres proprietaires residant actuellement en Jordanie. Seul un petit nombre d'Arabes vivent au nord du Palais du gouvernement. L'application du statut de no-man's- land n'affecterait pas beaucoup de residents arabes de la zone, car, depuis 1949, la Jordanie n'a jamais cesse de considerer cette zone comme un no-man's-land et, conformement aux dispositions de l'article IV, elle a interdit aux proprietaires residant en dehors de la zone de cultiver les terres qui s'y trouvent. 85. Pour ce qui est de la route Jerusalem-Bethleem- Hebron, mon gouvernement est parfaitement dispose a modifier son trace actuel, bien que, comme je I'ai deja dit, eIle doive s'en trouver allongee. 87. In conclusion I will refer in the first place to some of the points raised by the report, after which the I will sum up the findings of the case. 88. The main points on which the report of the Acting CbJef of Staff is based have proved to be without legal or factual foundation. (1) Paragraph 7 of his report refers to the absence of any provision of the General Armistice Agreement regarding the status of the Zone. The General Armis- stice Agreement does not need to refer specifically to the geographic names of the various component parts of the no-man's-land in the Jerusalem sector. The General Armistice Agreement refers to thE.. whole area between the two demarcation lines, which includes Jebel El Mukabbir, as no-man's-land. The map of the Jerusalem sector attached to the General Armistice Agreement clearly shows Jebel El Mukabbir, as well as other areas, as being located between the demar- cation lines, and all that part of the Jerusalem sector is clearly meant by the General Armistice Agreement to be no-man's-land. A rapid glance at the Armistice map together with the careful reading of the text of the Agreement leave no doubt in that respect. (2) The report states in paragraph 7 (b) that" the only known agreement reached by the parties in regard to civilian activities (on 12 June 1949) was to call the Zone • area between the lines', and render article IV, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement inoperative for this Zone". It is difficult to understand how the Chief of Staff, after stating in the first sentence of paragraph 7 of his report that there was a total absence of any provision in the General Armistice Agreement regarding the status of the Zone, could tell us in the same paragraph that the parties arrived at a so-called special agreement, in order to render article IV inoperative for the Zone; the Chief of Staff thus himself recognizes by implication that before that so-called agreement, article IV of the General Armistice Agree- ment was indeed operative for the Zone. Anyone acquainted with the problem who has read both the text of the General Armistice Agreement and the minutes of the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion of 12 June 1949, would arrive at an opposite conclusion. On 12 June 1949, General Riley, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, sent a letter to Colonel Dayan confirming that the Jebel El Mukabbir area is no-man's-land, governed by article IV of the General Armistice Agreement, and that military and civilian personnel with the exception of the United Nations personnel are prohibited from entering the area, as they are prohibited from entering all other no-man's-land areas. It may be asked, too, why the Acting Chief of Staff did not make any mention in his report of General Riley's letter. This misinter- 87. Pour terminer, j'evoquerai certaines questions soulevees par le rapport, apres quoi je resumerai les conclusions qui se degagent de la discussion. 88, Il appert que les principaux arguments sur les- quels se base le Chef d'etat-major par interim, dans son rapport" sont juridiquement sans fondement ou ne correspondent pas aux faits : 1) Le Chef d'etat-major par interim ecrit, au para- graphe 7 du rapport, que la Convention d'armistice general ne contient aucune disposition concernant le statut de la zone. Il n'est pas necessaire que la Conven- tion mentionne expressement l'appellation geogra- phique des divers lieux constituant le no-man's-land dans le secteur de Jerusalem. Dans la Convention, l'ensemble de la zone situee entre les deux lignes de demarcation (qui comprend Djebel el-Mukkaber) est considere comme no-man's-land. La carte du secteur de Jerusalem qui est jointe a la Convention d'armistice general indique clairement que Djebel el-Mukkaber est situe - ainsi que d'autres zones - entre les )ignes de demarcation, et que toute cette partie du secteur de Jerusalem est manifestement consideree dans la Con- vention comme no-man's-land. Il suffit de regarder la carte et de lire attentivement le texte de la Convention pour ne conserver aucun doute a cet egard. 2) Au paragraphe 7 b, le rapport dit ce qui suit: 11 ...les seuls points sur lesquels, a notre connaissance, l'accord ait ete realise (le 12 juin 1949) entre les Parties concernant l'activite civile, ont ete les suivants : appeler la zone l( zone situee entre les lignes» et rendre inope- rant pour cette zone le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general n. On voit mal com- ment le Chef d'etat-major, apres avoir declare dans la premiere phrase du paragraphe 7 du rapport que la Convention d'armistice general ne contient aucune disposition relative au statut de la zone, peut affirmer un peu plus loin que les parties ont abouti aun pretendu accord special tendant a rendre l'article IV inoperant pour la zone; ce faisant, le Chef d'etat-major lui-meme reconnait implicitement qu'avant ce pretendu accord, les dispositions de l'article IV de la Convention d'armis- tice general etaient effectivement applicables a la zone. Quiconque connait le probleme et a pris connaissance tant du texte de la Convention d'armistice general que du proces-verbal de la seance du 12 juin 1949 de la Commission mixte d'armistice ne peut qu'arriver a une conclusion opposee. Le 12 juin 1949, le general Riley, chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la sur- veillance de la treve, a confirme dans une lettre au colonel Dayan que la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber etait un no-man's-land auquel s'appliquait l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general, et que l'acces de la zone, comme celui de toutes les autres zones ayant le caractere de no-man's-land, etait interdit au personnel militaire et civil a l'exception du personnel des Nations Unies. On peut aussi se demander pourquoi le Chef (3) The Acting Chief of Staff, in paragraph 7 (b) of his report, states that he has " not found any agreement to the effect that civilians living outside the Zone at the signing of the Armistice Agreement would not be permitted to enter the area. . . ", but article IV of the General Armistice Agreement, which stipulates that civilians should be prevented from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, made it unnecessary for the parties to negotiate a special agreement in order to reach that result. (4) In the same paragraph, the Acting Chief of Staff states that he did not find any agreement to the effect that "civilians residing in the Zone should restrict their activities to their own properties." But are agreements ever considered to enforce limitations which are already edicted by common law? I do not think that anyone of us, for instance, needs to enter into a special agreement with his neighbour to under- take not to put his hand on the other's possessions and that in the absence of such an agreement anyone of us wrmJrt feel free or entitled to steal from his neigh- bour. 89. The findings on the case can be summed up as follows: (1) The General Armistice Agreement remains the only legal agreement governing the status of the Jebel El Mukabbir area. This area located between the Armistice demarcation lines is, in the terms of the Armistice, a no-man's-land area. The fact that this status has been violated a number of times since 1949 does not affect the legal status of the area. (2) No agreement for the division of the area has ever been signed by the two Governments. Consequent- ly, no amount of inconclusive discussion on the subject has, at any time, altered that fact. (3) The area has remained all through under the supervision and control of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which has intervened on numerous occasions, and sometimes with success, in trying to check violations of the General Armistice Agreement in the area. (4) Both under common law and under the specific terms of the General Armistice Agreement, neither of the parties has any right to make use of or appropriate the other party's properties. Interference with rights of private ownership in the Jebel El Mukabbir area cannot be justified or tolerated on any account. (5) Israel's penetration and activities in the area constitute flagrant violations of the General Armistice Agreement and of the status quo. All argumentation which seeks to cover up Israel activities in the Jebel El Mukabbir area cannot change the fact that these activities could not take place exeept in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. 89. On peut resumer comme suit les conclusions qui se degagent de la discussion : 1) La Convention d'armistice general demeure le seul instrument juridique regissant le statut de la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber. Cette zone situee entre les lignes de demarcation de l'armistice constitue un no- man's-land au sens de la Convention. Le fait que ce statut ait ete viole a, maintes reprises depuis 1949 ne change rien au statut juridique de la zone. 2) Aucun accord prevoyant le partage de la zone n'a ete signe par les deux gouvernements. Toutes les discussions qui ont pu avoir lieu a ce sujet n'ont jamais modifie ce fait. 3) La zone est constamment demeuree sous l'autorite de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la sur- veillance de la treve, qui est intervenu en maintes occasions, et parfois avec succes, pour s'opposer a des violations de la Convention d'armistice general dans la zone. 4) Ni le droit commun, ni les termes expres de la Convention d'armistice general n'habilitent l'une quel- conque des parties a utiliser les biens de l'autre partie ou a se les approprier. Il n'est pas possible de justifier ou de tolerer, pour quelque cause que ce soit, une atteinte aux droits de propriete privee dans la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber. 5) La penetration et les activites israeliennes dans 1:1 zone constituent des violations flagrantes de la Convention d'armistice general et du statu quo. Aucune argumentation visant apresenter sous un jour favorable les activites israeliennes dans la zone de Ljebel el-Mukkaber ne peut changer le fait que ces activites n'ont pu etre entreprises qu'en violation de la Conven- tion d'armistice general. (3) That the MLxed Armistice Commission be directed to determine rights of property ownership in the area and ensure the respect of these rights, i.e., that one party should not be permitted under any circumstances to use the property of the other party. (4) That the supervision and control of the Truce Supervision Organization over the Jebel El Mukabbir no-man's-land area be confirmed by reason of the presence of the Truce Supervision Organization head- quarters in the area. (5) That Israel should be asked to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, which is the compe- tent organization to deal with violations of the General Armistice Agreement. 91. We believe that a decision along these lines would prevent a deterioration of the situation, discourage new violations and greatly enhance the respect due to the United Nations authorities in the area. 92. In the evm,t of Israel persisting in its activities in the Jebel El lvf'ukabbir area, my Government would have no alternative but to take the necessary steps and measures to ensure the respect of the no-man's- land status of the area, as well as to protect the property rights of Jordanians in the area and the security of the Arab part of Jerusalem. 93. I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak again on the subject should it be necessary.

Mr. President, in accor- dance with your ruling, I shall address myself this afternoon to sub-paragraph (a) of item 2 of the agenda in the hope that my delegation will be given the oppor- tunity at the next meeting of the Council on this agenda to complete its case. I am sorry that these two sub- items are today not being discussed together in accor- dance with the usual custom of the Council. The precedence granted to sub-paragraph (a) is based on time alone, a matter of twenty-four hours, and not on merit, because it is surely obvious that there can be no possible comparison between a trivial complaint about the planting of trees and the grave charge of persistent violations of three basic provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. 5) Qu'Israel soit invite a cooperer avec la Commis- sion mixte d'armistice, qui est l'organisme competent pour traiter des violations de la Convention d'armistice general. 91. Nous estimons qu'une decision dans ce sens empe- cherait une aggravation de la situation, decouragerait toute violation nouvelle et renforcerait grandement le respect dO. aux autorites des Nations Unies dans cette region. 92. Au cas OU Israel poursuivrait ses activites dans la zone de Djebel el-Mukkaber, mon Gouvernement se verrait oblige de prendre les :nesures necessaires pour assurer le respect du statut de no-man's-land de la zone, ainsi que pour proteger les droits de propriete des Jordaniens dans le secteur et la securite de la partie arabe de Jerusalem. 93. Ma delegation se reserve le droit de prendre a nouveau la parole sur ce sujet, si besoin etait. 94. M. KIDRON (Israel) [traduit de l'anglais] : Confor- mement a la decision prise par le President, je traiterai cet apres-midi de l'alinea a) du point 2 de l'ordre du jour, en esperant que ma delegation se verra donner l'occa- sion de completer l'expose de sa these lors de la prochaine seance que le Conseil consacrera a l'examen de la ques- tion a l'ordre du jour. Je regrette que les alineas a et b ne soient pas aujourd'hui examines simultanement, conformement a la pratique generalement suivie par le Conseil. Si l'alinea a s'est vu accorder la priorite, c'est une priorite d'ordre purement chronologique, due a une anteriorite de 24 heures seulement; elle n'a rien a voir avec l'importance du sujet, tant il est evident qu'on ne saurait etablir de comparaison entre une plainte banale portant sur la plantation d'arbres et l'accusation grave d'avoir viole de fac;on persistante trois dispositions essentielles de la Convention d'armistice general. 96. It would seem to me that the United Nations as a whole, and the Security Council in particular, deserve an explanation of this peculiar treatment that the Government of Jordan has meted out to them. The questions which demand an answer are: first, why was this trivial matter, a matter affecting an area less than three-quarters of the size of Central Park in New York, ever brought to the attention of the Secu- rity Council? Secondly, if the matter was as urgent as the Government of Jordan claimed it was, why did it let the whole month of October pass before requesting the Council to convene to discuss a report which was available a full week before the end of September? 97. The answers to these questions and the explanation of these manceuvres will immediately be apparent to even the most casual observer of international affairs. During the last two weeks the newspapers and radio broadcasts have been full of bitter recrimination be- tween Egypt and Jordan. Each side has accused the other of treachery to the Arab cause, consisting princi- pally of making concessions to Israel and of conducting negotiations with it. 98. The former Government House area, known in Arabic as the Jebel El Mukabbir area, played quite a prominent role in the Egyptian attacks on Jordan. For example, in the early part of November the Voice of the Arabs Radio Station at Cairo included the following passage in an onslaught on King Hussein: " He (King Hussein) began to hand over Jordan to Israel. He sent Colonel Sadiq, Jordan's Director of Intelligence and the former head of the Jordanian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission, to reach agreement with the Israelis. It was agreed 96. I1 me semble que l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble, et le Conseil de securite en parti- culier, meritent qu'on leur explique le curieux procede dont le Gouvernement jordanien a use a leur egard. Plusieurs questions appellent une reponse. Tout d'abord, pourquoi ce probleme insignifiant, qui concerne une region dont la superficie n'egale pas les trois quarts de celle de Central Park, a New-York, a-t-il ete porte a1'attention du Conseil de securite? Ensuite, si l'affaire etait aussi urgente que le Gouvernement jordanien 1'a pretendu, pourquoi a-t-illaisse s'ecouler le mois d'octo- bre tout entier avant de demander au Conseil de se reunir pour examiner un rapport qui etait publie a la fin de la troisieme semaine de septembre? 97. Les reponses a ces questions et l'explication de ces manceuvres apparaitront immediatement meme a l'observateur le moins au fait des pratiques interna- tionales. Au cours des deux dernieres semaines, les journaux et les emissions radiophoniques ont retenti des recriminations ameres echangees entre l'Egypte et la Jordanie. Chaque cote a accuse l'autre de trahir la cause arabe, principalement en faisant des concessions al'Israel et en negociant avec ce pays. 98. La zone de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement, connue en langue arabe sous le nom de Djebel el- MUkkaber, a joue un role de premier plan dans les attaques egyptiennes contre la Jordanie. C'est ainsi qu'au debut de novembre, le poste emetteur du Caire ({ La Voix des Arabes) diffusait, au cours d'une attaque extremernent violente contre le roi Hussein, le texte suivant: « I1 [le roi Hussein] a commence de livrer la Jor- danie a Israel. I1 a envoye le colonel Sadiq, directeur du Service de renseignements jordanien et ancien chef de la delegation jordanienne aupres de la Com- mission mixte d'armistice, rechercher un accord "When the Israeli forces occupied Jebel El Mukab- bir the Arab people of Jordan revolted and called for the withdrawal of the Israel troops. The Jordan Government received orders to delay these demands and to delude the Jordanian people in every way, so that they would forget this heinous crime. The procrastination of the Jordan Government forced Colonel Leary, the head of the Mixed Armis- tice Commission, to recommend to the Security Council confirmation of Israel's occupation of Jebel El Mukabbir. This step was followed by several others." 99. There is no need for me to go on, except to say that this Egyptian outburst was followed almost imme- diately by the Jordan representative's request that the Council be recalled into urgent session to discuss his complaint. And it is of course no coincidence that similar accusations made by the Egyptian radio pre- ceded the lodging of the original complaint by Jordan I on 4 September. 100. The Jordan reply to these attacks took two forms. One was to accuse Egypt of far worse things than those of which Jordan itself was accused by Egypt. The other was to demonstrate its loyalty and devotion to the Arab cause by bringing in a complaint against Israel before the Security Council. Any complaint would have done, but, as Jebel El Mukabbir, or the former Government House area, had formed the subject of an Egyptian complaint against Jordan, it was accordingly pressed into service against Israel. The complaint about the planting of trees in the Israel sector of the former Government House area is thus merely an incidental by-product ( .. a quarrel between two Arab States. This is an artificial, trumped-up affair designed for no other purpose than to meet the exigen- cies of Jordan's internal and external political situation. 101. It is unmistakably clear that the policy of the Jordan Governement is to increase tension by every available means. There is also a ludicrous attempt by Jordan to prove that it exceeds every other Arab State in extremism and intransigence. 102. Since Wednesday of this week two more pretexts 102. Depuis mercredi dernier, deux nouveaux pre- for public quarrels with Israel have been trumped up. textes ont ete inventes pour chercher publiquement On Wednesday, the regular supply convoy to the querelle it. Israel. Le convoi regulier de fournitures Hebrew University at Mount Scopus was arbitrarily destinees a I'Universite hebraique du mont Scopus a halted by Jordan, with the utmost publicity, despite ete arrete mercredi par des Jordaniens, de favon arbi- the fact that its manifest had been apprcved by the traire et avec la publicite la plus eclatante, bien que United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Yester- sa lettre de voiture el1t ete approuvee par I'Orga- day the routine arrest of an infiltrator from Jordan nisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Hier, into Israel was blown up into a major incident, accom- II'arreetation parfaitement normale, d'un individu qui panied by threats and an ultimatum. I have been tentait de passer illegalement de Jordanie en Israel, a 99. Je n'ai nul besoin de poursuivre, si ce n'est pour dire que cette algarade egyptienne fut presque imme- diatement suivie par la demande du representant de la Jordanie que le Conseil de securite se reunisse d'ur- gence pour examiner la plainte qu'il avait formuIee. Et ce n'est, bien entendu, pas par coincidence que des accusations similaires lancees par la radio egyptienne ont precede la presentation par la J ordanie de sa premiere plainte, le 4 septembre. 100. La reponse de la Jordanie aces attaques a revetu deux formes. L'une consistait a accuser I'Egypte de faits beaucoup plus graves que ceux dont I'Egypte l'accusait. L'autre consistait a faire la preuve de sa fidelite et de son devouement a la cause arabe en portant une plainte contre Israel devant le Conseil de securite. Une plainte quelconque aurait suffi; mais comme Djebel el-Mukkaber - ou la zone de l'ancien Palais du Gouvernement - avait donne matiere a des accu- sations de I'Egypte contre la Jordanie, on l'a fait servir contre Israel. Lorsque la Jordanie se plaint que des arbres ont ete plantes dans le secteur israelien de l'ancien Palais du Gouvernement, il n'y a done la que la consequence accidentelle d'une querelle entre deux Etats arabes. C'est une affaire artificielle, montee de toutes pieces, et qui n'a d'autre but que de satisfaire aux exigences de la situation politique interieure et exterieure de la Jordanie. 101. De toute evidence, la politique du Gouvernement jordanien est d'accroitre la tension par tous les moyens dont il dispose. On constate egalement chez la Jordanie une volonte ridicule tie prouver qu'elle depasse tous les autres Etats arabes par son extremisme et son intransigeance. 103. Israel does not see any reason why it should be expected to tolerate this Jordanian frenzy and hysteria indefinitely and will certainly not surrender any of its legitimate rights merely because of Jordanian petulance and threats. 104. However, as Jordan has seen fit to bring the matter of the trees before the Security Council, I have no alternative but to treat the complaint as if it were indeed a real issue. The substance of the Jordanian case is to be found in the representative of Jordan's statement before the Council on 6 September [787th meeting] I now propose to analyse this statement and, by reference to the report of the Acting Chief of Staff and to other official documents and records, to demon- strate that there is nothing in it to answer. 105. The Jordanian arguments fall under three main heads. 106. The first is that the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization has control over both military and civilian activities in the former Government House area. 107. In his report the Acting Chief of Staff states: "The United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- nization considers itself competent to exercise sur- veillance over the Zone in order to maintain its demilitarized status. The Truce Supervision Orga- nization does not, however, possess any specific authority or terms of reference with respect to the civilian activities in this area." [8/3892, para. 6]. 108. It should be emphasized that the competence of the Truce Supervision Organization to exercise mili- tary surveillance over the Zone derives from article IV of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibits the cross- ing of the demarcation lines by military forces of the parties, and not from any formal declaration - which has never been made - to the effect that the Zone is a demilitarized area. It is demilitarized de facto because it is completely surrounded by demarcation lines which armed forces are not permitted to cross. That the Truce Supervision Organization has not possessed authority over civilian activities in the Zone ever since the signing of the Armistice Agreement on 3 April 1949 is attested by a statement of General Riley, the first Chief of Staff, at the 9th meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 12 June 1949, which Colonel Leary quotes. General Riley said, inter alia: 103. Israel ne voit nullement pourquoi il serait tenu de toIerer indefiniment cette frenesie et cette hysterie, et l'agitation et les menaces jordaniennes ne suffiront certainement pas a lui faire jamais abandonner aucun de ses droits Iegitimes. 104. Neanmoins, puisque la Jordanie a juge bon de porter l'affaire des arbres devant le Conseil de securite, je n'ai pas d'autre choix que de traiter cette plainte comme s'il s'agissait en realite d'une question serieuse. Le fond de la these jordanienne se trouvr dans la declaration faite par le representant de la Jordanie devant le Conseil de securite, le 6 septembre [7878 seance]; je me propose maintenant de l'analyser et, en me referant au rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim et a d'autres documents et pieces officiels, de demontrer que rien, dans cette affaire, ne comporte de reponse. 105. Les arguments de la Jordanie se rangent en trois groupes principaux. 106. La Jordanie allegue en premier lieu que I'Orga- nisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve a competence pour contrMer a la fois les acti- vites militaires et civiles dans la zone de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement. 107. Dans son rapport, le Chef d'etat-major par inte- rim declare ce qui suit: « ••• L'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve s'estime competent pour exercer une surveillance sur la Zone afin d'assurer qu'elle reste demilitarisee. Mais il ne possede aucune autorite ni aucun mandat special en ce qui concerne l'activite civile dans cette region» [8/3892, par. 6]. 108. Il importe de souligner que la competence de I'Organisme des Nations Unies pour exercer une sur- veillance militaire sur la Zone decoule de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general, qui interdit aux forces militaires des parties de franchir la ligne de demarcation, et non du fait que cette zone aurait ete, a un moment quelconque, declaree officiellement zone demilitarisee. La :lone est demilitarisee de facto, parce qu'elle est entierement entouree par des lignes de demarcation que les forces armees ne sont pas auto- risees a franchir. Que I'Organisme de surveillance n'ait aucune competence en ce qui concerne l'activite civile dans cette zone depuis la signature, le 3 avril 1949, de la Convention d'armistice, cela est atte~te par une declaration du general Riley, le premier chef d'etat- major, a la neuvieme seance de la Commission mixte d'armistice, le 12 juin 1949, declaration que cite le colonel Leary. Le general Riley a notarnrnent declar6 ce qui suit: Colonel Leary goes on to point out, in the same para- graph of his report, that in 1949 a Jordanian represen- tative suggested that the Zone be put under United Nations control, but that this suggestion was not further discussed. So much for the contention that civilian activities in the area of the former Government House are under United Nations control. 109. The second point made by Jordan is that the afforestation work undertaken by Israel is a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. 110. This contention is refuted not only by the refu- tation of the first argument - for, if there is no United Nations control over civilian activities in the area, it is manifest that no civilian activity conducted there can be in violation of the Armistice Agreement - but also by the categorical assertion of the Acting Chief of Staff in paragraph 7 of the report that there are no provisions in the General Armistice Agreement regarding the status of the Zone. 111. In a document submitted on 11 November 1957 [8/3909] the representative of Jordan elaborated on his claim that the Armistice Agreement, specifically article IV, paragraph 3, of the Agreement, governs civilian activities in the area, and that the planting of trees by Israel in the area is a contravention of that article. The representative of Jordan contends that the Acting Chief of Staff's statement in paragraph 7 (b) of his report to the effect that " the only known agree- ment reached by the parties in regard to civilian activities (on 12 June 1949) was to call the Zone 'area between the lines' and render article IV, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement inoperative for this Zone" [8/3892, para. 7] is an erroneous statement and the basis for a series of erroneous conclusions in the report. However, there is nothing in the represen- tative of Jordan's letter or in the two documents which he annexes to it which in any way supports his plea. All that annex A says is that it was agreed that the area in question, the area of the former Government House, was an area between the lines, as referred to in article IV of the Armistice Agreement. All that annex B says is that the United Nations personnel are permitted free access to the area. In neither docu- ment is it suggested by so much as a hint that the prohibition on the entry of the armed forces of the parties into the area applies also to civilians. The reason for this is very clear. As General Riley pointed out at the same series of meetings of the Armistice Commission, on 12 and 13 June 1949, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had had no control over civilian activities in the area since the signature of the Armistice Agreements, and civilians were still residing in it in both the Arab and Israel sectors. The representative of Jordan, of course, does Le colonel Leary souligne ensuite, dans le meme para- graphe de son rapport, qu'en 1949, un representant de la Jordanie a suggere de placer la zone sous l'autorite des Nations Unies, mais qu'il n'a pas ete donne suite a cette suggestion. Voila qui repond donc a la these selon laquelle les activites civiles dans la zone de l'ancien Palais du Gouvernement sont placees sous le controle des Nations Unies. 109. La seconde affirmation de la Jordanie est que les travaux de boisement entrepris par Israel constituent une violation de la Convention d'armistice general. 110. Cette affirmation est dementie non seulement par la refutation du premier argument - car s'il n'y a pas de controle des activites civiles par l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans la zone en question, il est bien evident qu'aucune activite civile qui y est entreprise ne saurait constituer une violation de la Convention d'armistice -, mais aussi par la declaration categorique du Chef d'etat-major par interim qui, au paragraphe 7 de son rapport, dit que la Convention d'armistice general ne contient aucune disposition concernant le statut de la Zone. 111. Dans un document presente le 11 novembre 1957 [8/3909], le representant de la Jordanie a develop- pe son argument et a affirme que la Convention d'armis- tice - notamment le paragraphe 3 de son article IV - regit les activites civiles dans la Zone, et que la planta- tion d'arbres par Israel dans ladite zone est en contra- vention de cet article. Le representant de la Jordanie soutient que le Chef d'etat-major par interim a tort de dire a l'alinea b) du paragraphe 7 de son rapport que cc ••• les seuls points sur lesquels, a notre connais- sance, l'accord ait ete realise (le 12 juin 1949) entre les parties concernant l'activite civile, ont ete les suivants : appeler la Zone cc zone situee entre les !ignes» et rendre inoperant pour cette zone le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general». [8/3892, par. 7.] Il pretend qu'une serie de conclusions erronees en ont ete tirees. Pourtant, rien dans la lettre du representant de la Jordanie ni dans les deux docu- ments qui y sont joints ne vient corroborer le moins du monde cette these. L'annexe A dit seulement qu'il a ete convenu que la zone en question - la zone de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement - etait une cc zone situee entre les !ignes», et c'est ainsi qu'elle est designee dans l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice. L'annexe B ne fait que constater que le personnel des Nations Unies peut penetrer librement dans cette zone. Ni l'un ni l'autre de ces documents ne donne en rien a entendre que l'interdiction faite aux forces armees des parties de penetrer dans la zone vaut egalement pour les civils. La raison de ce silence est parfaitement claire. Comme le general Riley l'a souligne les 12 et 13 juin 1949 lors de la meme serie de reunions de la Commission d'armistice, l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine n'exerce, depuis la signature des conventions d'armistice, aucun controle 112. Moreover, and this is the crux of the matter, at the time the Armistice Agreements were signed there were no rules and regulations of the Israel Armed Forces which prohibited the entry of civilians into the area. judging from the fact that the village of Jebel el Mukabbir continued to be occupied throughout the period of the hostilities it would also appear that there were no such rules or regulations of the Jordanian Armed Forces. Therefore it is clear that the general prohibiton of the crossing of the Armistice demarcation lines by civilians was inoperative in this case by reason of the fact that on neither side were there any rules or regu- lations prohibiting civilians from crossing the armistice lines into this specific area. As the Active Chief of Staff states, "civilians of both parties have crossed into the area freely and at no time after the Zone had been declared an 'area between the lines' was such a crossing considered a violation of the General Armistice Agreement." [Ibid, para. 7 (b)] 113. In the same context the Jordan representative claims that the area of the former Government House was a no-mans-Iand, similar to those in other parts of Jerusalem, to which access by civilians of each party was prevented by the fire of the other. In his report, the Acting Chief of Staff records that at the 24th Mixed Armistice Commission meeting, on 22 No- vember 1949, both parties agreed to ask a United Na- tions military observer to propose a divison line for the zone [Ibid, para. 7 (d), footnote 3 (b)]. The report of this observer, Major Durre, which was presented to the Mixed Armistice Commission meeting on 29 No- vember 1949, included the following passage on the subject of the no-mans-Iand. " The Government House area, following decisions taken in the MAC meeting with Colonel Dayan representing Israel, HamadBey el Farhanrepresenting Jordan, and General Riley as Chairman, was consi- dered by the MAC decision of 12 June as 'area between the lines'. However, civilians of both par- ties have always been allowed to remain in the area during hostilities, during two truces, after the signing of the 30 November Cease-Fire Agreement, and also after the signing of the General Armistice Agree- ment at Rhodes. It would be senseless now to create in the area concerned a complete no-man's-land for the sole reason that it is in an 'area between the lines'. The permission for civilians of both parties to remain in the area concerned was granted by each party in pursuance of article IV (3) of the General Armistice Agreement. Regulations of the Armed Forces of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which authorized civilians who were in the area before 3 April 1949 to stay in the area, remain in effect". 113. De meme, le representant de la J ordanie affirme que la zone de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement est un no-man's-land, identique a ceux qui se trouvent dans d'autres secteurs de Jerusalem, oil les civils d'aucune des parties ne pourraient penetrer qu'en essuyant des coups de feu de la partie adverse. Dans son rapport, le Chef d'etat-major par interim rappelle que, a la 24e seance de la Commission mixte d'armistice, tenue le 22 novembre 1949, les deux parties sont convenues de demander a un observateur militaire des Nations Unies de proposer une ligne de partage de la zone [Ibid., par. 7 d, note 3 b.] Le rapport de cet observateur, le commandant Durre, qui a ete presente a la seance de la Commission mixte d'armistice en date du 29 novembre 1949, contient le passage suivant relatif au no-man's- land: c( A la suite des decisions prises a la seance de la Commission mixte d'armistice oil le colonel Dayan representait Israel, Hamad Bey el Farhan la Jordanie, et oil le general Riley presidait, la zone du Palais du gouvernement a ete consideree, par decision de la Commission mixte d'armistice en date du 12 juin, comme c( zone situe entre les lignes». Cependant, les civils des deux parties ont toujours ete autorises a rester dans cette zone pendant la duree des hostilites, pendant les deux treves, apres la signature de la Convention de suspension d'armes du 30 novembre, et aussi apres la signature de la Convention d'armistice general it Rhodes. Il serait absurde de creer a present dans la zone en question un no-man's-land absolu pour l'unique raison qu'il s'agit d'une «zone situee entre les lignes I). Chacune des parties a permis aux civils ressortissants de l'une ou de l'autre partie de demeurer dans la zone conformement au paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice general. Les reglements des forces armees d'Israel et du Royaume hachemite de Jordanie autorisant les civils qui se trouvaient dans la zone avant le 3 avril 1949 a y demeurer sont toujours en vigueur. » 115. If further proof of Jordan's violation of the demilitarized character of the Zone is required, it is provided in map No. 987 which forms appendix 1 to annex G of the report on which is marked the extensive trench and fortification system in the Jordan sector of the Zone. 116. The third point made by Jordan is that the status quo of the area has been violated. It is not easy to deal with this argument because nowhere in his long statement of 6 September did the representative of Jordan define precisely what he meant by the status quo, or why he thought that his understanding of this nebulous condition should be accorded the status of a formal agreement between the parties. At one point, as I have already noted, the representative of Jordan describes the Zone as a no-man's-land; that is to say, an area from which all inhabitants ought to be barred. At another point, he says that it has been always understood that the number of civilians allowed in the area was to be limited, and that this limited number could not engage in civilian work outside their own properties. He does not say by whom it has been under- stood or in which formal agreement or tacit arrange- ment between the parties this understanding was enshrined. At a third point he claims that there has never been any agreement allowing inhabitants from outside the area to cross the armistice demarcation line and to engage ill civiiial1 work in the Zone. It is just as true to say that there has never been an agree- ment prohibiting persons from outside the area from crossing the line and engaging in civilian work in the Zone and, in point of fact, as the Chief of Staff confirms, civilians from outside the Zone have freely crossed the demarcation Hne from 1948 to this day and have worked in their respective areas of the Zone up to the civilian line. The Active Chief of Staff points out specifically [8/3892, para. 7 (aJ] that the road from Jerusalem to Bethlehem passes through the Zone in two places; that the school built on the Jordanian side of the civi- lian line in 1952 is attended by children from outside 115. S'il est besoin d'apporter une preuve supple- mentaire de la violation, par la Jordanie, du statut de secteur demilitarise de la Zone, cette preuve est fournie par la carte nO 987 - qui constitue l'appendice 1 a l'annexe G du rapport - oil l'on peut voir le reseau etendu de tranchees et de fortifications qui existe dans le secteur jordanien de la Zone. 116. Le troisieme argument du representant de la Jordanie est que le statu quo de la region a e16 vioIe. 11 est difficile de repondre a cet argument parce que nulle part, dans sa longue declaration du 6 septembre, le representant de la Jordanie n'a defini avec preci- sion ce qu'il entendait par le statu quo; il n'a pas explique non plus les raisons pour lesquelles il estimait que sa fa~on de comprendre cette notion nebuleuse devait etre consideree comme un accord formel entre les parties. Comme je l'ai deja fait observer, it. un cer- tain moment, le representant de la Jordanie declare que la Zone constitue un no-man's-land, c'est-a-dire un secteur dont l'acces devrait etre interdit it. tous les habitants. A un autre moment, il affirme qu'il avait toujours ete convenu que le nombre des civils pouvant penetrer dans le secteur devait etre limite et que ces civils ne pourraient travailler que sur leurs propres terres. 11 ne dit pas par qui cela avait ete convenu, ni dans quel accord formel ou tacite entre les parties. A un autre moment encore, il soutient qu'il n'y a jamais eu d'accord autorisant les personnes etrangeres au secteur a franchir la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice et it. se livrer it. des travaux civils dans la Zone. On pour- rait dire tout aussi bien qu'il n'y a jamais eu d'accord leur interdisant de le faire ; en fait, comme le confirme le Chef d'etat-major, les civils residant hors de la Zone ont librement franchi la ligne de demarcation depuis 1948 et ont travaille dans leurs secteurs respectifs jus- qu'a la ligne civile. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim precise [8/3892, par. 7 a] que la route de Jerusalem a BethIeem traverse la Zone en deux endroits, que l'ecole construite du cl'lte jordanien de la ligne civile en 1952 est ff€iquentee par des enfants habitant hors de la Zone, qu'un restaurant construit en 1951-1953 sur la route 117. Il est donc evident que le seul statu quo dont le Conseil de securite puisse connaitre est celui qui tient compte des evenements qui se sont produits da.ns la region avec le consentement des parties depuis la. signa- ture de la Convention d'armistice, le 3 avril 1949. Un des elements de ce statu quo do;'t necessairement etre l'existence d'une ligne qui, que ll). Jordanie le veuille ou non, partage effectivement la region depuis 1949 en un secteur israelien et un secteur jordanien. Comme l'ecrit le Chef d'etat-major : 117. It is thus obvious that the only status quo of which the Security Council can take cognizance is one that takes into account the developments that have occurred in the area with the consent of the parties since the signature of the Armistice Agreement on 3 April 1949. This status quo must of necessity take into account the existence of a line which, whether Jordan now agrees with it or not, has, since 1949, effectively divided the area into an Israel sector and a Jordan sector. As the Chief of Staff states: "It is a fact that both Jordanian and Israel civi- lians have inhabited the Zone continuously since the signing of the Armistice Agreement and that they have remained apart. This would to some extent support the view that there has existed some kind of a division line. This is the more so as in no place in the early records was it found that agreement had been reached on the creation of a buffer zone or on limiting the Jewish civilians to the compound of the Agricultural School. Furthermore, there has been to our knowledge no cultivation since 1949 by Arabs beyond a certain line which roughly coin- cideswiththeso-called civilianline." [Ibid., para. 7(c)]. 118. It is, therefore, this civilian line which was established by negotiation between Israel and Jordan representatives on 23 June 1949 which is the basis of whatever status quo exists in the area. It does not very much matter now that Jordan later refused to ratify the agreement or that the representative of Jordan in the Security Council now claims that it is imaginary. The fact is that since 23 June 1949 until today this line has been recognized and respected alike by Israel, by Jordan and by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as the line which effectively divides the Israel and Jordanian sectors of the area of the former Government House. The line appears on all the maps and is referred to in all official records during the past eight years. 118. C'est donc sur cette ligne civile qui a ete etablie ala suite de negociations entre les representants d'Israel et de la Jordanie le 23 juin 1949 que repose le seul statu quo existant dans la region. Peu importe, mainte- nant, que la Jordanie ait ulterieurement refuse de rati- fier I'accord ou que le representant de la Jordanie au Conseil de securite en conteste aujourd'hui l'existence. Le fait est que, depuis le 23 juin 1949, la ligne a ete reconnue et respectee aussi bien par Israel que par la Jordanie et l'Organisme de surveillance des Nations Unies comme separant effectivement les secteurs israe- lien et jordanien de la zone de l'ancien Palais du gou- vernement. Cette ligne figure sur toutes les cartes et est mentionnee dans tous les documents officiels de ces huit dernieres annees. 119. One final comment at this stage on the question of the status quo. The Security Council will have noticed that Jordan's demands that the undefined status quo be restored has been accompanied by the threat that the Government of Jordan - and here I uuote from the representative of Jordan's statement of 6~September­ ".... would have no alternative but to take the neces- sary steps and measures to ensure the safety of the area 119. Derniere observation sur la question du statu quo: le Conseil de securite aura note que les exigences de la Jordanie qui demande que ce statu quo non specifie soit retabli ont ete accompagnees d'une menace - et je cite la declaration faite le 6 septembre par le representant de la J ordanie : cc ••.la seule solution pour le Gouverne- ment jordanien serait de prendre les mesures neces- saires pour assurer la securite dans la region et y pre- server le statu quo II [787e seance, par. 96.] Cette decla- ration a un accent sinistre, et je suis convaincu que le Conseil de securite tiendra a savoir quelles mesures le Gouvernement envisage exactement. • and the preservation of the status quo" [787th meeting, para. 96]. This statement has an ominous ring and I I feel that the Security Council would be interested to \ know what steps and measures the Government of Jordan has in mind. / 120. The one new feature in the Jordan representa- tive's argument is the extraordinary proposal made today that everything grown or constructed in both the Israel and Jordan sectors of the area since 1949 should 120. Le seul aspect nouveau dans l'argumentation du representant de la Jordanie est le passage vraiment singulier de son intervention d'aujourd'hui oil il pro- pose que tout ce qui a ete construit, tout ce qui a pousse cc C'est un fait que des civils jordaniens et israeliens continuent d'habiter la Zone depuis la signature de la Convention d'armistice et y occupent des terri- toires distincts. Cela viendrait dans une certaine mesure appuyer l'argument selon lequel il existe une sorte de ligne de partage. D'autant que nulle part, dans les documents initiaux, on ne trouve trace d'un accord qui aurait ete realise sur la creation d'une zone-tampon ou sur la. limitation du champ d'acti- vite des civils juifs au terrain de l'ecole d'agriculture. En outre, depuis 1949, les Arabes n'ont, a notre connaissance, mis en culture aucun terrain au-deIa d'une certaine ligne qui coincide a peu pres avec la ligne dite civile.» [Ibid., par. 7 c.] 121. I should now like to deal briefly with the Acting Chief of Staff's report. I have already quoted extensively from this report in order to demonstrate that not a single one of the propositions advanced by the represen- tative of Jordan in his statement of 6 September is supported by the findings of the Acting Chief of Staff. 122. On the other hand, practically every single one of the conclusions in my statement on 6 September is vindicated in the report of the Acting Chief of Staff. I said then: "1. The General Armistice Agreement contains no provisions determining the legal status of the area between the lines and does not define the re- spective rights and obligations of the parties in the area. However, the prohibition applicable to the crossing of the demarcation line by military forces also applies of necessity to the entry into this area, as it is completely surrounded by demarcation lines" [788th meeting, para. 48]. Paragraph 7 of the report confirms my statement regarding the legal status of the area and the rights and obligations of the parties in every particular. Para- graphs 5 and 6 of the report confirm my statement regarding the prohibition on the entry of military forces into the area. 123. I continued : "2. Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Armistice Agreement provides that the rules and regulations of the armed forces of the parties prohibiting civilians from entering the area between the line shall remain in force. As no such rules were applicable at that time to the area under discussion, it is not subject to any restrictions in this connexion under the Armistice Agreement" (I bid.). In paragraph 7 (c) of his report the Acting Chief of Staff confirms that there are not now and there never have been any restrictions on the access of civilians to the area in the terms of article IV, para. 3, of the Armistice Agreement. 124. I also said: "3. All subsequent arrangements concerning rights and duties of the parties in the area have been the result of agreements between the parties. Such agreements have been either of a formal nature or 011 the basis of tacit consent withDut any limitation as to the duration of their validity. "4. The mDst impDrtant arrangement that has been made between the parties was the drawing, eight years ago, of a civilian line running through the area dividing it between Jordan and Israel. As 121. Je voudrais a present parler brievement du rap- port du Chef d'etat-major par interim. J'ai deja cite abondamment ce rapport pour montrer qu'aucune des propositions faites par le representant de la Jordanie dans sa declaration du 6 septembre ne trouve de justi- fication dans les conclusions du Chef d'etat-major par interim. 122. En revanche, pratiquement toutes les conclu- sions de ma declaration du 6 septembre se trouvent corroborees dans le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim. J'avais dit alors : «1) Il n'y a pas, dans la Convention d'armistice general, de dispositions qui fixent le statut juridique de la zone situee entre les lignes et definissent les droits et devoirs respectifs des parties dans cette zone. De toute evidence, cependant, l'interdiction de franchir la ligne de demarcation qui s'applique aux forces militaires vaut egalement pour l'entree dans cette zone, entierement a l'interieur des lignes de demarcation. II [788e seance, par. 48.] Le paragraphe 7 du rapport confirme en tous points mes observations sur le statut de la Zone et les droits et devoirs des parties. Les paragraphes 5 et 6 corro- borent ce que j'ai dit de l'interdiction faite aux forces armees de penetrer dans la zone. 123. Voici en quels termes j'avais poursuivi : «2. Le paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Conven- tion d'armistice stipule que les decrets et reglements des forces armees des parties interdisant aux civiIs de penetrer dans la zone situee entre les lignes reste- ront en vigueur. Etant donne que de tels reglements n'etaient pas applicables, a l'epoque, a la Zone en question, cette derniere n'est a cet egard soumise a aucune restriction aux termes de la Convention d'ar- mistice ll. [Ibid.] A l'alinea c du paragraphe 7 de son rapport, le Chef d'etat-major par interim confirme que l'acces des civiIs dans la Zone n'a jamais ete lirnite par l'application du paragraphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armistice. ~j 124. J'ai encore dit ce qui suit: «( 3. Tous les arrangements subsequents relatifs aux droits et devoirs des parties it l'interieur de la Zone decoulent d'accords conclus entre les parties. i Ces accords sont de veritables instruments ou resul- ;l tent d'une acccptation tacite, sans limitation quant '1• a la duree d'application. ~ l( 4. L'arrangement le plus important qu'ont pris les parties a ete le trace, il y a huit ans, d'une ligne civile qui traverse la Zone et la partage entre la Jordanie et Israel. Depuis lors, les civils qui sont 125. I continued: " 6. Hence no activity which is civilian in charac- ter, carried out by either party within its own sector of the area between the lines, can be considered to be in violation of either the General Armistice Agree- ment or of any other binding arrangement between the parties." There is no need to elaborate further on this conclusion as it is fully borne out by the excerpts from the Acting Chief of Staff's report to which I have already referred. " 7. Evidence that this has been the view not only of Israel but also of Jordan is to be found in the fact that since the establishment of the civilian line, Jordan has constructed a road from Jerusalem to Bethlehem which runs through the Jordanian sectar of the area between the lines, and all the villagers of Jebel El Mukabbir have returned to their houses in the Jordanian sector of that area." «( 7. Que ce point de vue n'etait pas seulement celui d'Israel, mais aussi celui de la Jordanie, on en a la preuve dans le fait que, depuis l'etablissement de la ligne civile, la Jordanie a construit une route reliant Jerusalem a BethIeem et traversant le secteuf jordanien de la zone situee entre les lignes, ainsi que dans le fait que tous les habitants de Djebel el- Mukkaber sont rentres dans leurs foyers, dans le llecteur jordanien de cette zone." 126. I concluded my statement by saying: " 9. Theonlyviolation of such agreements are those which are being committed by Jordan: first, Jordan has erected military fortifications inside the area which have been manned on many occasions by Jordanian troops. Secondly, Jordan has set up a sentry post, m::\nned by a soldier or soldiers, near the eastern gate of Government House inside the area. Thirdly, military traffic has continuously used the highway constructed through the area. These acts constitute flagrant violations by Jordan of article Ill, paragraph 2, and article IV, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement" [Ibid.]. In paragraph 5 of the :~port, the Acting Chief of Staff confirms that Jordanian troops were seen in the Zone and that trenches and positions ',','~~re renovated. These trenches and positions are to be found on the Map No. 987, attached to the report as Appendix 1 to Annex G. He further confirms that there has been a continual violation of the demilitarized status of the Zone by Jordan through the use for military traffic of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebron highway which enters the Zone in two places. This standing violation 126. J'ai conclu mon intervention du 6 septembre en disant ce qui suit: «9. Les seules violations d'accords de cette nature sont le fait de la Jordanie : Premierement, la Jordanie a construit, a l'interieur de la zone, des fortifications militaires qui, en maintes occasions, ont ete occupees par des troupes jordaniennes; deuxiemement, la J ordanie a etabli un poste de sentinelle, garde par un ou plusieurs soldats, pres de la. porte Est du Palais du gouvernement a l'interieur de la zone; troisiemement, les forces militaires n'ont cesse d'utiliser la grand-route construite a travel'S la zone. Ces actes constituent des violations flagrantes par la Jordanie, du paragraphe 2 de l'article III et du paragraphe 2 de l'article IV de la Convention d'armis- tice general.» [Ibid.] Au paragraphe 5 de son rapport, le Chef d'etat-major par interim confirme que des troupes jordaniennes ont ete aperl;ues dans la zone, oil des trancbees et des positions militaires ont ete remises en etat (ces tranchees et positions sont indiquees sur la carte nO 987, qui constitue l'appendice 1 a l'annexe G du rapport). 11 confirme d'autre part que la Jordanie a de fal;on continue porte atteinte au statut de secteur demilitarise de la zone en faisant emprunter a des vehicules mili- taires la route Jerusalem-BethIeem-Hebron qui coupe 127. The Acting Chief of Staff's report consists of five chapters. The first four of these, comprising para- graphs 1 to 8, describe the factual situation in the former Government House area, and, as I have shown, support the Israel position in nearly every particular. Chapter V, comprising paragraphs 9 to 13, gives the Acting Chief of Staff's own conclusions, recommenda- tions and expectations. Some of these, particularly certain parts of paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 are, I am afraid, so clearly unrelated, by any process of logic, to the facts presented in the first four chapters of the report that they seem hardly to belong to the same document. 127. Le rapport du Chef d'etat-major se compose de cinq chapitres. Les quatre premiers [par. 1 a 8] decrivent la situation de fait dans la zone de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement et, comme je l'ai montre, corroborent, presque point par point, la these soutenue par Israel. Au chapitre V [par. 9 a 13], le Chef d'etat- major par interim formule ses conclusions, ses recom- mandations et ses espoirs. Quelques-unes de ces remar- ques - certains passages, notamment, des paragra- phes 9, 10, 11 et 12 - n'ont si manifestement aucun lien logique, semble-t-il, avec les faits exposes dans les quatre premiers chapitres du rapport qu'elles semblent a peine appartenir au meme document. 128. In paragraph 9 the Acting Chief of Staff very properly rejects as inadvisable two extreme suggestions for dealing with the problem, that is to say, the transfor- mation of the area into an uninhabited no-man's-land, and reversion to the conditions existing on 3 April 1949, as they wo~ld cause quite unmerited hardship and make land which has been justifiably cultivated barren and unproductive. He then proceeds to say in paragraph 11 that a reasonable basis for a solution would be to arrive at an arrangement, by agreement between the parties, which would take into account to some extent at least the changes which have taken place since 1949. With this view the Government of Israel has no quarrel; it has always been our contention that the developments, the perfectly legitimate developments, since 1949 must form the basis of any solution to the problem of the former Government House area, if, indeed, any real problem exists. The records of the Mixed Armistice Commission and of the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization will show that since 1949 Israel has consistently striven to eliminate the points of friction constituted by the so-called "areas between the lines" and "no-man's-lands" by the equitable division of these areas between the Parties. As the Acting Chief of Staff points out in footnote 3(a) of his report [para. 7(d)], most of the no-man's-land north and south of Jerusalem has, happily, been eliminated by agreement between the parties. Obviously, there- fore, my delegation agrees with the Acting Chief of Staff's conclusion that "the civilian activities of the two parties should be kept separate" [8/3892, para. 11.] This is precisely what is happening today by means of the de facto civilian line. 128. Au paragraphe 9, le Chef d'etat-major par interim rejette avec raison deux solutions radicales qui ne lui semblent pas indiquees et qui consisteraient, l'une, a transformer la zone en no-man's-land, l'autre a revenir aux conditions qui existaient le 3 avril 1949 : ces solutions entraineraient des epreuves immeritees et feraient retomber en friche des terres que les parties ont jusqu'ici Iegitimement cultivees. Le Chef d'etat- major par interim dit ensuite - au paragraphe 11 - qu'une issue raisonnable serait un arrangement, convenu entre les parties, qui tiendrait compte, dans une cer- taine mesure au moins, des cha~g~lments intervenus depuis 1949. Le Gouvernement k~:ct.in!cn ne voit pas d'objection a cette suggestion; nv,!;; avons toujours soutenu que les amenagements effectues depuis 1949, - amenagements tout a fait Iegitimes - commandent toute solution du probleme du secteur de l'ancien Palais du gouvernement, si probleme il y a. Les dossiers de la Commission mixte d'armistice et de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve montrent que, depuis 1949, Israel s'est toujours efforce d'eliminer les causes de friction que constituent les zones dites «zones entre les lignes» et les zones de «no-man's-land», en preconisant leur partage equitable entre les parties. Comme le Chef d'etat-major par interim le fait observer dans la note 3 a de son rapport [par. 7 dj, la plus grande partie du no-man's-land au nord et au sud (l,e Jerusa- lem a ete fort heureusement eliminee grace a une entente entre les parties. Ma delegation approuve done certainement la conclusion du Chef d'etat-major par interim qui estime que « les activites civiles des deux parties devraient etre nettement separees» [8/3892, par. 11]. C'est precisement le resultat obtenu aujourd'hui grace a la ligne civile de facto. 130. That ownership should have been considered by the parties to be irrelevant was neither accidental nor exceptional. On the contrary, that has been the norm throughout. As the Acting Chief of Staff points out in footnote 3 of his report [para. 7(d)], the ownership of the land was never a criterion when no-man's-land areas were partitioned north and south of Jerusalem in 1949, and was not a criterion at the end of 1949 when both parties agreed to ask a United Nations military observer to propose a division line for the Zone. If the principle were adopted that the permission of the other party would be required in every case of work on a particular piece of land, the way would be opened for constant interference in activities carried out in the sectors into which the Zone is divided, and no effective division of the Zone would then be possible. The introduction of the criterion of former ownership in the present case would thus vitiate the common purpose of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, of Israel, and, one hopes, also of Jordan, which has been to reduce the points of friction by replacing complex ambiguities and uncertainties by a clear-cut and uncomplicated arrange- ment. To try now to substitute a patchwork of private claims and counterclaims for the existing system would bring about the very opposite of what the Acting Chief of Staff hopes to achieve by it - " tranquillity and stability in the area." [8/3892, para. 11.] 131. But quite apart from the practical and immediate dangers with which such a suggestion is fraught it is also completely unwarranted on the basis of any known legal considerations applicable. When two or more sovereign States agree, in the exercise of their sove- reignty, to divide a given area which itself belo';5s to no third State, but the sovereignty over which is, as between the two States concerned, a matter of disagree- ment, that division cannot be set up by either party against the other as a basis for any rights whatsoever, 130. Il n'y a rien de fortuit ni d'exceptionnel a ce que les parties aient juge qu'il n'y avait pas a prendre en consideration les titres de propriete : tel a toujours ete le principe suivi. Comme le Chef d'etat-major par interim le souligne dans la note 3 de son rapport [par. 7], les titres de propriete ne sont jamais entres en ligne de compte ni lorsqu'il y a eu partage du no-man's- land au nord et au sud de Jerusalem en 1949, ni lorsque les deux parties sont convenues, a la fin de 1949, de demander a un observateur militaire des Nations Unies de proposer une ligne de partage de la zone. Poser en prin- cipe qu'il faudrait l'autorisation de l'autre partie chaque fois qu'il serait question de travaux sur teUe ou telle par- celle, ce serait donner matiere a des ingerences constantes dans les travaux effectues dans les secteurs qui composent la zone, ce qui rendrait impossible toute division effective ce ladite zone. Si l'on admettait que les anciens titres de propriete doivent etre pris en consi- deration dans le cas present, on s'ecarterait du but commun de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve, d'Israel et, il faut l'esperer, de la Jordanie, qui se proposaient de diminuer les points de friction en remplac;ant un ensemble d'ambiguites et d'incertitudes par un arrangement net et simple. Essayer maintenant de substituer au systeme actuel tout un assemblage de revendications et contre-reven- dications emanant de particuliers aboutirait au resultat absolument inverse de celui que le Chef d'etat-major par interim espere obtenir : «la tra,nquillite et la stabi- lite du secteur». [8/3892, par. 11.] 131. Mais, outre les multiples dangers pratiques et immediats que cette suggestion presente, il est impos- sible, pour la justifier, d'invoquer des considerations juridiques pertinentes qui soient generalement admises. Lorsque deux ou plusieurs Etats souverains conviennent, dans l'exercice de leur souverainete, de partager une region donnee qui n'appartient a aucun Etat tiers, mais sur laquelle la souverainete donne lieu a contes- tation entre les deux Etats interesses, aucune des deux parties n'est fondee a faire valoir contre l'autre 133. Le paragraphe 12 du rapport renferme cinq recommandations qui visent a resoudre la question selon les principes indiques aI'alinea C du paragraphe 9. 133. Paragraph 12 of the report contains five recom- mendations designed to secure a solution on the lines suggested in paragraph 9 (c). 134. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim recommande d'abord que les parties se rencontrent pour discuter des activites civiles dans la Zone. Comme nous I'avons indique sans equivoque des le debut, Israel est pret a examiner ces problemes avec la Jordanie a n'importe quel moment. 134. The first recommendation is that the parties should meet and discuss civilian activities in the Zone. As was made quite plain right at the beginning of this case, Israel is prepared to discuss these matters with Jordan at any time. 135. The second recommendation is that these discus- sions should be conducted through the Mixed Armistice Commission machinery. As the Acting Chief of Staff states in paragraph 8 of his report, in recent years Sub-Committee meetings have normally dealt with questions relating to civilian activities in the Zone. Israel is prepared to meet with Jordan in the Sub- Committee, which is the normal procedure, or in the Special Committee constituted under article 8 of the General Armistice Agreement, which is also competent to discuss such a matter, or in a meeting arranged in the context of the Jerusalem area commanders' agreement. 135. Le Chef d'etat-major par interim recommande ensuite que les echanges de vues aient lieu dans le cadre de la Commission mixte d'armistice. Comme ille declare au paragraphe 8 de son rapport, au cours des dernieres annees, le Sous-Comite a normalement traite a ses reunions de questions relatives a I'activite civile dans la Zone. Israel est pret a participer avec la Jor- danie aux travaux du Sous-Comite, ce qui est la proce- dure normale, ou du Comite special constitue en appli- cation de I'article 8 de la Convention d'armistice general. qui est egalement competent pour discuter la question ou a une reunion organisee dans le cadre de I'accord entre les chefs militaires de la zone de Jerusalem. 136. The third recommendation is that pending the outcome of such discussion the Government of Israel should suspend its afforestation project within the Zone in order to create an atmosphere which would be more conducive to a fruitful discussion. Whatever justification there might be for asking one party alone to refrain from exercising its legal rights in order, by its passivity, to create an atmosphere which is being poisoned by belligerent and provocative propaganda from the other, the suggestion is at the present time of purely academic interest. It has been overtaken by events. As reported by the Acting Chief of Staff in Addendum 2 to his report "United Nations Military Observers did not observe any such work proceeding in the area in question since 8 November 1957." [8/3892, Add. 2.] 136. Le Chef d'etat-major recommande en troisieme lieu que, afin de creer une atmosphere plus favorable a des discussions fructueuses, le Gouvernement israelien suspende, a I'interieur de la Zone, I'execution de son projet de boisement en attendant I'issue des pour- parlers. Quelle que soit la maniere dont on justifie III demande adressee a une seule des parties de s'abstenir d'exercer ses droits Iegitimes afin de creer;par sa pa:;si-, vite, une atmosphere favorable, alors que I'atmQs- phere est empoisonnee par la propagande belliciste et provoca.trice de I'autre partie, cette suggestion n'a, a l'heure actuelle, qu'un interet theorique. Elle est depassee par les evenements. Comme le Chef d'etat- major par interim le signale dans I'additif 2 au rapport. « les observateurs militaires des Nations Unies n'ont pas observe de travaux de cet ordre dans la zone en question depuis le 8 novembre 1957». [8/3892, Add. 2.]' 137. In his latest communication to the Security Council [8/3914] and in his statement today, the repre- sentative of Jordan has charged that work has been proceeding in the area since 8 November. I state 137. Dans sa derniere communication au Conseil de securite [8/3914] et dans sa declaration d'aujourd'hui. le representant de la Jordanie a pretendu que les travaux se sont poursuivis dans le secteur depuis le 138. As to the fourth recommendation that work should continue to be suspended for two months and that its resumption even after that period should be dependent on the outcome of such discussions, my Government rejects it as being completely unwarranted and as being in contradiction with the existing rights and obligations of the parties, as recognized by the Acting Chief of Staff in his report. 139. It has been established that the work on the Israel side is perfectly legitimate and that Jordan has no justification whatsoever for interfering with it. Therefore a suggestion which would make resumption of the work dependent on Jordan's agreement - for that apparently is what is implied by the phrase " pend- ing the outcome of such discussion" [8/3892, para. 12] - would be the payment in advance of a premium to Jordan for obstinacy and non-agreement. Having had every single one of its claims thrown out through the front window in the factual part of the Acting Chief of Staff's report, Jordan is now apparently to get all it wants by having it smuggled in through the backdoor of the report's recommendations. This is manifestly unacceptable. 140. We naturally have no objections to the fifth recommendation, that the Security Council be advised of the result of the discussion, nor, obviously, with the Acting Chief of Staff's hope that the parties will fully co-operate with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in restoring the demilitarized status of the Zone. As all the violations of the demilitarized status of the Zone are to be found on the Jordan side of the civilian line, we look forward to hearing, through the Acting Chief of Staff, about the steps which the Jordan authorities have taken to put an end to them. 141. I conclude my statement by urging the Council once again to dismiss this frivolous Jordanian complaint as being without foundation either in fact or in law. TI;.~ meeting rose at 5.50 p.m. 138. Quant a la quatrieme recommandation, selon laquelle les travaux demeureraient suspendus pendant deux mois et leur reprise, meme ala fin de cette periode, dependrait de l'issue des pourparlers, mon Gouverne- ment la rejette, car elle est absolument deplacee et en contradiction avec les droits et devoirs des parties, reconnus par le Chef d'etat-major par interim dans son rapport. 139. nest etabli que les travaux entrepris du c6te israelien sont parfaitement legitimes et que la Jordanie n'a aucune raison de s'en meler. Par consequent, subordonner la reprise des travaux au consentement de la Jordanie - c'est apparemment ce que signifie le membre de phrase «en attendant l'issue des pour- parlers» [8/3892, par. 12] - ce serait donner d'avance une prime a la Jordanie pour son obstination et son refus de cooperer. Alors que chacune de ses pretentions a ete reduite aneant dans l'expose des faits que contient le rapport du Chef d'etat-major par interim, la Jordanie obtiendrait entierement gain de cause par le biais des recommandations du rapport? La chose n'est manifes- tement pas acceptable. 140. Nous n'avons naturellement pas d'objections con- tre la cinquieme recommandation, qui tend ace que le Conseil de securite soit informe des resultats de la dis- cussion, et il nous parait evidemment normal que le Chef d'etat-major par interim espere que les parties coopereront sans reserve avec I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve pour rendre a la Zone son statut de secteur demilitarise. Comme toutes les viola- tions de ce statut de la Zone se produisent du cote jorda- danien de la ligne civile, nous sommes impatients d'apprendre, par l'intermediaire du Chef d'etat-major par interim, quelles mesures les autorites jordaniennes ont prises pour y mettre fin. 141. Pour conclure, je demande instamment au Conseil de debouter une fois encore la Jordanie de sa plainte en la declarant denuee de fondement tant en fait qu'en droit. La seance est levee a17 h. 50. Oraers and inquiries Irom countries where sales agen's have nol yet been appoinferl m.y b. senf to: Sales anrl Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.5.A.; or Sale. Section, Unit.d Nations Oll;ce, Palo;, cle' Nations, Geneva, Switzerlcrnd. Printed in France Price : $U.S. 0.30 ; 2/- stg. ; Sw. fr. 1.25 (or equivalent in other currencies) 13363-September 1958-1,800 Les commanaes e' clemandes J. ,enseignemen', emano"' •• pays ou if n'exisfe pas encore cle aeposi'a;rer peuven' e". oarene.s a la Section des ven'es e' de la JiJf,ibution, Organisa';on cler Nations Un;"" New·York (Etats·Un;1 cl'Am;'· rique), ou Cl la Section des venfes, Or90n;,at;on Jar Nofion, Un;esl Patois des Nations, Geneve (SuiSle). .