S/PV.831 Security Council

The Hrst item on the provisional agenda is the adoption of the agenda. The second is the letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council, and the third item is the letter dated 17 July 1958 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Council concerning the" Complaint by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of intcrference ilL its domestic nffairs by the United Arab Republic ". 2. In deference to public opinion, whieh is anxiollsly waiting to find out what is happening Oil the Jordanian rront, I would respectfully suggest to the members of the Council that they should deal first with the third item on the agenda, so that the representatives of Jordan and the United Kingdom will have an opportunity, at the request of the Council, to make the President: M. A. ARAUJO (Calombic). Presents Les repreRentants des pays suivants : Canada, Chine, Colombic, France, Irak, Japan, Panama, Suede, Union des Repllbliques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'AmeriQllc. Ordre dujour provUloire (SfAgenda/83Ijrev. I) 1. Adoption de J'ordre dll jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 22 mai 1958, adresscc au President du ConseiJ de securitc par le representant du Liban, cOllcernant If! question 5uivante : «Plainte du Lib3n touchant une situation l:rcee par I'intervention de la Republique arabe uoie dans le.'> Ill1aires iniCrieures du Libnn, et dont la prolongation est suscepUble de menacer le maintien de la paix et de la securite intf'rnationales» (5/4007). 3. Lettre, en date du 17 juillet 1958, adressee au President du ConseL! de securit6 par le representant de la Jordanie, concernullt la question suivante ; I( Plllinte dll Royaume hacMmite de Jordanic pour ingerence de la Hepublique arabe unie dans se.'! alTaires illtericllrl'S Il (S/405.3). Adoption de l'ordre dll jour 1. Le PRESIDENT (ftaduil de I'e~>pagnol) : Le premier point de l'ordre du jour provisoire a trait a l'adoption de J'ordre du jour, le second, a la lettre adressee le 22 mai 1958 au Pre.~ident du Conseil de securite par le representant du Liban, et le troisi{:me a la leUre adressce. le 17 juilJet 1958 au President du Conseil par le representant de la Jordanie, concernant la oc plainte du Royaume hal:hCmite de Jordanie pour ingerence de fa Republique arobe unie dans ses afl'aircs intericurcs. » 2. Par soud de I'opinion publique, qui attend anxieusement d'apprendre cc qui se passe en Jordnnie, je pense que le Conseil pourrait examiner d'abord le troisieme pnint de I'ordre du jOllr, alin que le representant de la Jordflnie et le representant du Royaume- Uui puissent, sur la demande du COIlseil, fournir lcs eclaircissements que l'opininu publique reclame a juste 4. Unfortunately it is very dimcult to judge whether Lhe item merits inclusion in the agenda for discussion by thc Security Council, b0cause the letter consisls of a single sentence reading as follo,vs: "Upon instructions from my Government, } helve Lhe honour to request you, in yow' capacity as Pre- :-;ident of the Security Council, to inscribe the foltowing item on its agenda for urgent consideration: •. Complaint by the Hashemite Kingdom o[ Jordan of interference in its domestic affairs by the United Ar:lh Repuhlic." [S/dOJ3.] 5. As you cnn see, the Ictlcr contains no explanntiolUl, facL~ or information which would enable us to determine how far the complaint is justificd and merits e.xamination by the Council under present conditions; certainly it is eXlremely dimwit for us to decide how far this matter deserves urgcnt consideration. I). However, Lhe Soviet delegation will raise no objec- Lion to the inclusion of the item in the agenda, on the understanding that our consent to its inclusion in no sense implies that we in any way share the poinl of view expressed in the title of tlle item proposed by Jordan, In other words, we C!:lnnot at this time recognize the Jordanian charges of interference in its afTairs by the United Arab Republic as having any force whatsoever. 7. We shall vole for the inclusion of the item in the agenda because iL will give the Security Council an opportunity for thorOllgh consideration o[ a question which has a direct beal"ing on the situation in the Near and Middle East, and pnrticlllarly in Jordan - the question of the armed intervention of the United Kingdom in Jordan. T~lat question, of course, is directly relevant to tile functions of the Security Council and while} shall vote for the inclusion of tile item as worded in the provisional agenda, } propose to discuss it mainly from the viewpoint of the armed intervention by the United Killgdom in Jordan. 8. One final remark concerning the sequence in which the agenda items are to be discussed. For three days now, the Security Council has been considering the matter which is called .. the question of Lebanon" but wllicb is, in reality, the question of the armed intel'~ vention by the United States in the affairs of Lebanon. The Security Council has not yet taken any action, although it must be recognized that the situation in the Near and Middle East is steadily deteriorating, In my opjnion, it is nnwarranted for the Security Council to defer consideration of this question. 4. Il est malheureusemcnt tres difficile de juger dans queUe meSllre cette qnestion !lHhitc cl'etre inscrite £1 l'ordre dl! jOlll' du Conseil de securite, car lu Jettre en question ne comprend IJII'llne phrase, ainsi e00l;ue : (l D'ordre de mon gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de VOllS demander de bicn vouIoir, en votre qllalil1l de President dll Conseil de SCCLldtc, inscrire la qu<',stion snivantC' a l'ordrc du jour du Comeil pour qU'i1 l'exmuine d'urgence ~ "Plainte du Royaume hachemitc dc .Iordanie pour ingerence dc Ja Republiquc r1rabe llllie dans ses afTaires intericur€:l." IS/4053.] 5. Cornme VQl1S le VOYC2, flnClIlle c:-;plication n'est fOllrnie, flUCllll fait n'est iudique, t111cun element n'est ajoute IJui pnisse permettre au Conseil de decider si la plainte est fondce, si elle meriLe (retre examinee Ilnns les circonstanccs actuelles. Aussi nous est-il extn~memcnt di/ficile de juger s'il convient de d/seuter d'urgence de cette affaire. 6. Qlloi qu'il en soit, Jfl delegation sovietiqlle, pour sa part, ne s'oppose pas aJ'inscription de rettc question a l'ordre du jour, mais dIe tient a souligner que cela ne signille nullement que nous appTDuvions tant soil pen le point de vue de la Jordanie te} qu'il appflTBit dans l'intitulc un point propose par cc gouverncrnent. En d'anlres termes, dans l'etat actuel des chases, nous ne sanrions attribuer la moindre valenr aux accusations d'ing(~l'ence dans ses alfuires intcrieurcs que la Jordanie porte contre la RepublkIUe arabe unie. 7. ?'lOllS voteron5 pour l'inscription de cc point a I'ordrc du jour parce que ccla permettra au Conseil de secllritc d'cxaminel' so liS lous ses aspects une question qui est etroitcmenL liee a la si ~l1ation dans le Proclle- Orient et le l'l'1oyen-Orient, et, en particulicl', en Jordnnie, .ii s[\\'oir la question de I'intervention armee du ROyuulllll-Uni dans Cl" pays. Bien entendu, cett!! question-la rcIcve direcLement du Conseil de secnriw, et, en votsnt pour son inscription a l'ordre du jour dans l'enonce figurant a I'ordre du jOllr provisoire, c'est avallt tout l'intervention armee du Royaume-Uni en Jordanie que je vise. 8. Un mot encore, au sujet de I'ordre dans Jeqllel se Mroulera le debat. Depuis trois jours deja, le Conseil de sccurite ctudie Cl.' qu'on a appele (t la question du Liban", c·C.'3t-a-dire, en fail, la question de l'inter· vention armee des Etats-Unis d'Amerique dans les atTaires interieures du Liban. Le Conseil de securite n'a encore pris aucune meSllre, et pourtant, il faut le dire, la situation ne cesse de s'aggraver dans le Prothe· Orient et le Moven-Orient, Le Conse-il de securit6, a mon avis, n'a aucune raison de retarder l'examcn de cette question. 10. Mr. PrcsidenL, the agenda items ean he flrranged in any order and we could put the tllird item in second place. But my proposal - which I believe does not cOllflict witl! your cwn view - is that these two item~ should be considered sim.IiLaneously, Th\~ situation in the Ne[l:' East is >0 serious and is dcteriorajJlg so rapidly that the Security COl.Ulcil must Rake tile besL use of its time and act in such a way as to consider 1h~t its decisions contribute :0 thr. esLnblishmellt of peace ill both Lebnnon and Jordan.

I agree with the representative of thr. Soviet Union that we should pl'oceed to a rapid decisiDll on llw. Lebanese ite:n. 11. M. LODGE (Etats~Vnis d'Amcirique) Itraduit de l'anylais] : Je pense. comme le representant de l'Union sovieLquc, quc nous devons prelldre rapidernent une decision au sujet du point de l'ordre du jour relatif au Liban. l~. I 1I1erefore suggest that the order of tLle agenda lJe left. as it is. 12. Je propose dOllc que l'ordre des points de I'ordre du jOlll' nl'- ,~oit pas madifie. 13. Afin que le Conseil soit promptement informe de la situation en Jordanie, je 5uggere que nous entendions en deImt de seance. les interventions cotlsacrees a ce sujet. et que nons passions ensuite nux points de I'ordre du jam. Je suppose que le~ membres du ConseB auront, co~me cela a to'ljOllI'S ete le cas jll~qu'a present, taute latitude pour di~euter des questions dont nOllS sommes saisis. 13, In tbe interests of providing the Council wi";ll prompt information abO-Jt Jordan, I suggest that we hear special statements on tillS point at the start of the meetillg, Lhcu pl"oceed with the agenda. I assume that members of he Council woulc, as usual, be free to discuss the issu,$ in their speeehes witjJ the sane latitude that has ~revailed heretofore. 14. Sir Pier~on D IXON (RoyaLLme-Uni) [traduil de l'anglaisj : Jeo me borncrai a dire que j'accepte la pro- Cfidllfe propose.e par Jt5 rcpresenLallts d:o l'Union sovietique et des Etats-Unis. l~. Sir PicrsDll DIXON {United Kingdom): I should simply like to say that I agree with the procedure proposed by the representatives of the Soviet Unitln !lnf! tjlP United States. 15. Le PRESlDENT (traduit de l'espogllol) .' Y a-t-il d'autres membres qui desirent prendre la parole sur la question de l'ordre du jour? Etant donne que les opinions exprimees nu sujet (h: l'ordre du jOlUne difTerent ell rien de celle que j'ai cxposce et qu'.f\ucune objection n'a cite formulee, je considerc;'. l'ordre du jour comma adopte.

Does any other member wish to speak on the agenda? Since the views expressed on the agenda do not conflict with my suggestion, and sina Lhere is no objection, I eonsider the ~genoo adopted. Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the repl'eaenlative of Lebanon to the Preaident of the Security COUllciI concerning "Ccmplaint by Lellanon, in respect of a sitllation ariQug from tbe int~rvcntion of the United Arab Republic in the internal a:ffairB of Lebanon, the continuance of which iB likely to endanger the mainteIUlDce of international peace and llecurity "(S/4007 5/404,7. Si4-050 and Con,l) Leth:e, en date du 22 mai 1958, adressee all President du COllBeil de seeuritii par le representant dll lJban, concernant ]a question Sllivante : « Plaintc du Liban touchunt line "ituali41n criec pa.r I'intervention de la Republique arahe unie dans lea affaires interieures du Lihan, et donl la prolongation e.!It BUsceptibI~ de wenacer le maintien de la palx et de la securite' internationnle~ )} (5/4007, 5/4.04,7,8/4050 et Corr,l) Lettre, en date du 17 juillet 1958, adressee an Presi_ dent du Couseil de secwir6 pm le representant de la JOl'dauie, concernant la questron .sWvilDte ; (( Plainte du RoyalIwe hachemite de Jordanie pour ingerence de la RtSpuhlique 11l'abc unit: dans ses affaires iute· rieurcB .. (5/1053) Letter dated 17 laIy 1958 fl'abJ the representative of Jordan to the Pl'esident af the Security Council concerning "eompIaint by the HSBhemite King_ dqm of Jqrdan (If int~rference in ita domeBtic affairs by tbe United Arab Republic" (S/4053) At the invitation 0/ the Preside~t, Mt. A. Ghaleb Toukan, repJesenlative Cl} Jordan, Mr. Karim Azlwu'l, ~holLJd lik~ t.o Ilraw the. attention of the members of the Council to the secoud inLerim report submitted by the United NaLions Observation Group in Lebanon ISI,1032J. 17. TIJe first spcflkeJ on ll1y list:.<; the rt'rre.<;enUttlw of Llle I-[a.<;hcll\ite Kingdom of Jordal;. :8, "Mr. TOUKAr-.' (,)01"(/<111): IJuri:lg the {Ti~i;; thruugh whie~l Uh~ Arab \\'orlll is passing, r si~ with you here with a h~"vy heart for, in addition to nl! Lhe LlJlfor~ I;nLH1~e Ot'Clll'rCnCCS ill L!le Middle East, the i:ldepen~ <knce, ~afety 11l1d sovereignty of my cmml,ry lnve Ill~ell seriollsly threatened. It is seriolls enongh to have allY COlllll:ry's lndepcnul:!f1ce thre<:tlened, hut it is more ~t'riOll~, evt'u irollical, that the inde.pmclence o[ Cl l:ollllLry like .T ul'dan h threatened, and by il sisler .\rab ,')tate. 19. .Jor<l'lll hus always bc~.n [l peaceful eOlliltry :LIld en\nl,ntncll [ecLngs of goodwill for her Arab slstcrs. But fur ov(~~ a year now, Jordan haR been subjlOcler! to (;ontinuous HttClTlpts to oycrthrow iL~ (iovo.;ruIlll'nL iJy ~lthversive elements employed from outside, These attempts manifest.ed themselves clearly ill April 19:i7, when n kw (Jmc~rs, at the lllstig<ltion uf Egypt, trit',(l to uvcrLluow the regimc. But thanks to the counlgt' of I-lis MnjesLy King I-lmiscin, tJIC loyally of the a~InY aud of tile people, the aUempted eorlfJ rUtal flli;lCt! Lo 11Iaterinliz~. 20, T1lCse evcn~s which l\dold~d the piaL of the United ;\r,'1h Hepnbli;: to subvert thc whole machinery of Govcfllment ill Jordan 'l.l1d reduce its existc:1ce as a free and t1enlOcratie Stnt~ an: well kllOWllto you and to the hOllouraiJle members of this CounciL. The cou- rage "nd nle~tlle~s of His Majesty King Hussein Jwvc becomc almost legcndary, and so was the loyalty of the Arab army and 1he penple of Jordan. Th;:y com· llined to frustrate alld nip in the bud the plot of the ,lgents of the U;lited Arab HepubliG and thus rc- 'Is.<;erleu Jaw lInd arder. It migllt be well to remember al: this point that some of the officers and their collabo- r:lLors W]lO attempted the coup d'etai were givcn refuge ill Egypt and Syria and have been allowed to cany on ,\itll tht'.ir activities against the Jordan Govcmmcnt. It is fI well known fact that the whole tnach:nery of Egyptian subversion and propnganda is at their dis- [losal. 21. However, tJlC failure of that en.rJicl" ~ttempt did llot prevenL the United Arab ll~public from openly manifesting its hostility to Jurdan. The 5mlJggling of snbo~ellrs and agents ido tile counl~y, together with dalld~sti:le supplies [)f arms, am;nul1ition and explo- sives, became a common occurrenCt~ alollg~h.lc Un; mustering and bribing of subversive eler'1cnts within .Tordan with tlIe intent to overthrow thf; existing regime. The poisonous broadeas!:s emanating from the Unitcrl Arsb Republic nnd the Press of the United AraJ) fiepubli.c were all intended to create confusion and subversion whieh wns necess1ll')' to bring about tile realization of that sini.ster plan. Tht) Press and radio 17. L.:: pr<:micr oratcur illliCl'it lillr l::t lisLtJ est lu l'tJ]ll'(; senlant du Royallme buclll!milc de Joruflllie. 18. M. TO[JKA~ (.Jurdallie) [lmduil de l'uoq!aisj : Pendallt in erise que traverse uctnelkment le lllom!'.' arabe, c'est le cmur IOUI'd que je siege ici panni VOll~, car, IWll scuJrl1lP-nt dr:s (~VCllc'llenLs regrettables S;! produiscnt dam le !vroyen-Orient, luuis encore l'ind l,- pendunce, la sc(;uritc et la ~ouverai:Jetc de :nol1 pays ,;opt dnngc.:'cll.sement ll1;;mLc';e~. rt c~t dejA 8S5('7 grfLl/(' que l'indcpClldELllce <I'm rays, qU1.'1 qll'il suit, soil mcn3cee, l,ai.s il est plus !;l'[lV(; lm.:;OI'C, lHlllr LW pR., dire ironique, que la mennee vhe nn paYIl ~OllJ:ne J,t Jon]anic et qu'clle iSnLall(' Ll'lill :ml)"c P:lY.'i nmk. 19. l.n JOJ"r!nuie EL IOJJjollrs eLe llll pays pacHiqul'. unime rJ'Ul\C hil'itveillnDcl' illllpLisuhlc pour ses fl'el'l" llrabes. Dcpuis plll5 d'llll DU crpclldant, la Jordll.lli.~ htill'obj('t d'nll::l(fll('~ iJlcl's.~.'l1ltes <I'elemEnts subvCl'siC, diriges de l'extcriellT qui tenteut de renverser SOil gOllVel'llCUll'ul:. Ces tentaltVt'S sont ; PP,'lr!le.~ a.u granit jour en Gvri! 11l57, lorsqllc, a l'illsl:ig:1Lillll 11(' l'Rgyptr. quclques offidcrs ont essayc clL: l"CilVL'l'SCr le l'o.'gimL. !H:lis, gnkt,_ nu coura~e de S. ~L le roi Husseill, a 11 loyaut~ de l'armcc cL dll pCUjlit', le eoup d'Etat l ee:lOtle. 'W, f.es (~v(~ncmcnts, qui O;1t reviile le cOlln]ot ourd par la Rcpublique ambc Ilnie POlll' subvertir les rou:lgl'_\ ctu gOlLvernement ,~t porter attciutc a l'cxistcllce d,' la Jordani", PH tant qll'Etat librc cL dCmOCl'Hliqm, vaus sont bien connus, monsieur le Presidcnt, aimi qu'a tOllS le.'; mcmbn::; un Canseil. Le courage et LJ vigilmlCe Ue. S. ]\'1. le roi Hussein sod nf'vf'.nlls preS(llll' h~gcnd~ire,~, de me:ne lj'lle la lnyauti de l'al'lnce llraDc ct du pl~llplc jordanicn. Grace a eux, le eomplot dc~ ttgents de lu Hepubliqnc arabc Illlie u ele cUjoUG cl etonfl"c dan:'. l'ceuf et l'ordl'e pUhlic u cte mailltenu. A cc propo~, it Il'esl pas inutile de rappeler que dL, olfidcn>, fllILeurs de cc cuup d'Elat munquc-, et ccrtninH de letlt's eomYJliees Ollt trouve ;]sile en Egypt.e et ell Syrie, :Ill ils ont pll poursuivre leurs agissements eontrc le GOl.:vernemooL jOl'UUnicLl. C't'.~t un fait bicH connll 4111: tout l'appareiJ de subversion d de prop[)gande ugyptien est a lenr disposition, ( 21. Toutcfai:s, I'uchec de ceUe premiere tentative 11'a pas (~m?cch~la Rcpublique arabe unie de munifester O\lVeZ'LClllt!llt son hMtilite env('r" la Jorcbllie. II n'a pas Ct{~ rare de voir des agents cL des sab(j~e\1I'S pcm\trer clandesLinr:mf'.nt dam, le pays et illtrodllire en contre- bunde des nrmes, des munitions cL des cxplosifs, eepcnuflnt qu'oo enroJai: et eu'on SOlldoy.1it e.1 Jordanic lllcme des elemenls subversifs en vue de rcnverser le regilm: exi:;tant. Les messages venimemt diffuses p~r la radio et par la presse de la Republiqlle arabe unic visaient tons a sllsciter la confnsion et In subversic'n nccc5saires a ia realisation de ce plan siuistrc, La presse et la radio cc la Republiqtle arnlJe unie se sont ]Jl'illcil)lc~, IL is ',hh; llationnlism Illlt!, WI' Iw!ievc ill ;ll1d who$e ~'D!ils wc aspin' 1{1 attttill, lL is Jlis lIUliUll- al:sll1 'which runs ill OHI' veins ::utd not the nationalism Llrnt is imporlt>l] from Oltt~ir!l~ :md IlOi,IOIWc! \\-illi ue~ ~\TU('.tiVl' doetrine~ of Lota:il:ari:lIlislIl, 2~. ,;onlan tonLinuetl to rlt;ul with [\11 Uw vari~cl forms of au~ressiDll CClllliug frOll1 Llu; UniL".d Arub Hepnhlic Hnd to destroy the evil attempts in Lhcir er<J<11e hrf.m' their lw.rmflll effects ~IJl'ead, unti: it was l'tcenUy LH.'(,d \....i1.h an imminent threat to its safety nllt! idegrity, <1 threat of sllch dimensions ~hnt Jar/lull could not cope wiLh iL wiLlI its own reSOlll'CeS nnd ll"Lelhods, for !'_vents threatened to follow the course of those in Lebanoll ulld in Iraq, evcnLs whose 1l(r:1'01' hf\s eonVlllsecl human feeling everywhere iL the world, D.nd a:lJOIlg whose vietims was the youthful King, gralldiion of OlW of the leaders of tllC Arab renaissance ,md the foundcr of the Kingdoll1 of IruL]. Among tlle ....h;til!l1; or this horrifying aggre.s.sion were also the Crown Prince of l1'm[ [locI a Ia.rge number of leading Iraqi persollulitics. 2:::\, The Ull'ealto Jordnu lay ,ll!lo in the ploL, :'ccenLly discuvered and nipped in thr, bud, to overlhow its existing regime. and also in the move:ncnts of Unit~d Arab Republic troops frcm Syria along its northern borders. Last week a number of "rlily officrrs were arrested find invcsti~lIUuJJ di5clostd that it h:H1 Deen the intention of the plotters to dcsLroy ,krclulJ's indc- pellr!vnec l1nd integrity. 211. F,',Ictd with ,'me:l a Um',at lo its lulcgl'Lty ,\nd independe_nce through imminent foreign fll'illCd aggres- :-;ion and nn aLLemjlt by~he United AralJ HcplIlllic lo create internal disorder and to overthrow the existing rcgime, lhc Jordan Govcrnmellt, with the <lllPiOval er Hi,'; Moje,<,ty the King and basing ibclf LJlon Lhe \lllanimou<; derision of the Jordan N'aLion£l1 Ass('mbly, lrave, in acccl'dance wiLlI the provisions of ArLicL~ 51 d the United Nctions Clw.rter, requested the Govern- ments of the United Kingdom and the United Stale.s of Amcrka Lu come to it~ immediate, il.id, Il:~n~cee.s par l'iml1linencl' d'ullc ngn'Hsien c.rangere mlllce el [Jar le,'; agissemcJll:s de :a Hellllbliquc arabe unie chcr('hU:lt a Sl'mer le dcsordre a j'interieul" dn rays et h reilversCI' le rcgim2, It Cuuvcmenwnt jor- danien, avec l'apvrobation de S, M. le roi et s'appuyallt sur ID decisioll llmmime de rAssemblcc nationale jordallienne, a, cuulonnemcnL flUX dispositions de rArLide 51 de la Charte des Nutlofls Ulli~s. dcm:i.llde aux Gouverrerncnts dn Royallllle-Uni cl des Etats- Unis d'Amcriqnc de \'cnil' i11lmedif1tcment a ~OI1 aide. '25. BriLisb tmops began landing on Jodau lelTitory early this morning in [I generous respom;e to that request, :25. Dc hOlllll' heure ee mal:ir, le.s f oree~ mmce llritflllnif;ll\1s, accedant generellsement a cett.e rcquctc ont commence a nttcrrir sur le sol jordanien. :W. May 1, Mr. President, ill concll\ding thi1; short 2H. Pel'Jncttcz-moi, monsieu le Presidwt, en ter- minant cette breve (!eclal·ation, Cl.'. fairc appel a votre ~latemenL, h:;g your indulgence to reqne~L tint 1 be hearrl again if the necessity arises. indlllgen~e pour YDUS demt\rlder de hiell vOlLloir lll'auto- riser a prendre a llUllVeaLl la parole si bcwin est.

The COllI1- cH Ims just heard the statement of the representative 27, Sir Picrsol1 D lXON (Royaumc-Ul1i) [traduit de l'cmgfais] , Le Conscil a enlendula declaration que le 22, La Jonbnie n conli1Jue (I et)'!,) ell buLlc a de,'; alttH[lIC!l de loutes s(jrl:(~s vellues de In Republique arabc unie et ~ faire ayoJ'lcr lcs tenLutivcs ma1fais~lnteH avant qu'cIles n'aicnt eH le teups de faire sentir Iellrs dIets nCfnstes, jusqu'au moment (IU elle s'esl: trouvee en presence d'une mcnace si imnlincntc et si dallgereusc pour sa securite et son integritc qu'elle n'a pu y faire fuec avcc .~es sCldes I"CSSOltrces et parse5 pl'op:-es rnoyelis, cur les choses risquaiclIt de sl:ivrc Itn coms analogue .i eelui des cvenemtmls dll Liban el: ,1lISS: de l' [talt, cvcncments t:onL l'hclTeur a lloulevcn;e l'JllllllUllitc tout entiere et qui out fait uotnmment comme victim<: le jClIne roi, petit-lll~ de l'ull drs dwf~ de la renaissance arabt'" fondatcur du royaume u'Irak. L~ prince hCritier d'Irali et IHl grand no:nbrc de peI1iolll1alite~ irakicllnes de premiCl' pIon ont et6 egalement all nombrC', lIe,'; vic:timcs tic (;cLLe horri1JI~' llgH:~sioll. 23. Ln .IDrdanic tLnitJlJCllilCee en (H!tre IlIll'le complot, I'CccllImenL decOllvert ct C~OLllk dan~ I'mnf, qlli visait a rcnverscr le regime existrUlL. .lillSi 'tHe pal' les Jnouvements (les troupes de la HCjJubliqlll' llrahe Juie en Syrie, le long cl( no~ fmnlii',rrs seplclllrionoles, La senHllIlC dt',rnicrc, UIl r:crl:.\in nomb!'!.: d'olliciers ont etl~ arrOtc"s, cl l'cllquete n r~\'6Ie ql\e k~ conjllrlis ,e pro- (J0SfllCllL de dClmire l'ilH.'<Jpead1\JlCl' cl l'inccgriLe de In Jordunic, ::H. Voyaut ttinSl son iJlLt~gtJL\! tL SOil illde[J~ndallcl1 .. A revolution 11QS started ill Iraq and one in :""'ebanon, and tomorrow flnot:le.r revolu'Uon will start in Jordan. Stfnggllng Jonlan tomorrow w:ll rise in a great revolution to break it:; clraim just as they were brol{cn in Iraq and wipe out the rotten monarchy jmt as it waR wiped out in Iraq." 28. In these circumstances, what could be more natUl'ul than 111e appl'.:1l of Hi~ Majesty King I-Iussein and the Govermnent of Jordan for assistance from friendly Governments ill maintaining their country's independence? My Government was one of those to whom thi~ <lpJ)eal was made and we have Tcspondo=d to it. Here was an apped from a Government whic.h felt certain that the independence lmd integrity of its mllntry was imperiIIed. 29. The represcntative of Jcrdan has told us why hi.> Government took this view and wby it appealed to its fricnds. It is my view thnt tlle Government of Jordan was, in the circumstances, entirely justiiied ill maldng this appeal. We are also certain that it was entitlr::d to ll1<lke the nppeal undcr internat:orral law, just as Her l\lajesty's Government ill the United Kingdom was entitled to respond. There is nothing either in the Charter or in the e>tablished rules in internat.ionfil Illw to inhibit a Government from asking a friendly Government for milital'y Ilssistance as a defensive measure when it considers itself to be in dwger. Nor is there anything to inhibit the Government thus appel'iled t<J from I·csponding. 30. It was in these cil'cmnstanecs that Hc)' Majesty's Govel'nment decided to accede to the reqlLest of the Jordan Government for military aid and is accordingly dispntching forces by air to Amm211. As the Council w:U be aware, this movement has alrcadv started. These British forces arl' in Jordan for the purpose of h€lping the King and Government of that country to preserve its political independence and territorial integ~ rity. We are not there for any military purpose of <mr own and our preseJl(;e does noe constitutD a threat to any other country. If arrangements ean be made lly the Security Council to protect the lawful Govern~ ment <If Jordan from external threat and so maintain If Vne revolution a commcu.:e en Irak, une autre an Liban et, dernain, une nouvelle revolution cornmencera ell Jorrlani~. La Jorc'lf.lnie, qui se debat <lujomd'hl:.i, se dressera demain pour faire LLne grande n\vollltion et POlll' briser scs chaines, comme l'a fait l'lrak, ct pour balayer la monarchie pourrie, comIne 1'a fait eg<llemeull'Irak. " 28. Vu ces cireonstanccs, quoi de plus naturel gUt' l'appel lance par S. M. le roi Hussein et par le Gouvernement jordanien pour demander it dell goltvernements amis de les aider a mainte:lir I'independtncc du pays? Mon gouvernement a efe I'u:} de ceux auxqueb cet appel n r.te adresse. et iI y a repondu. C'etait l'appel d'llll gouvernemcnt convaineu que l'independancr et l'integriLc de la patric etaient ell danger. 29. Le f€presentant de la Jordanie nOllS a dit pourquoi son gouvernement est arrive a eette conclusior. et pourquoi il a fait aiJ.lsj appel a ses Rmis. le p€llse pour ma part qu'en l'oecurrence le Gouvernement jO.l'da:lien etait parfaitement en droit de fuire eet appeL Naus sommes egalement conVilLneus qu'it y etait autQrise par le droit international, tout comme le gouvernel:Jcnt de Sa il1<ljeste britanniquc ctult autorisc a y repondrc. Ri8n dans la Chartf'. ni dans les rEgles gelleralement acceptec:s dll droit international n'empeche un gou~ verncment de dem:Lnder une aiue militaire a un gou· vel'nemeut ami pour se dCfendre s'il s'estime e:l danger, Rien non plu~ n'emp&elle le gouvernement qui w;oit cet. appel d'y repondre. 30, C\~st duns ces conditions qll€ le gouvernement de Sa Majeste a decide d'aeccder a la demande d'l:tide mJiLaire d\:. Gouvel'l"lement jordonien et qU'il (Il.vaie actuellement des troupes a Am:nan par avion. COlllrne le ComeiJ ne l'ignore pas, cette operation <l en efTet deja comme:"Jce. Ces forces britanniqt:es sont en Jordanie pour alder le rui et le gouvernement a preserver I'independance poliLiquc et l'jntegrite territoriale du pays, Nons ne sommcs pas h\-bas pour prote-got" des interets milituires britanniques, et notre presenr:~ TIl' r:onstitue une menace pour aueun pays. Si le Conseil de securiLC peut prendre des dispositions pou::, proteger le gou· Vffnement legitime de la Jord:mie contre les menaces :l2. III conclusion, I wonld "imply SHY this. Aggression can Lake wallY forrn~. Thc mtllwu o/' indired ,Iggre3sioll Lhc method of sl1hversion and the aUempt to overthrow the constituLed authority -" Can be jnst as dangerom; as the opm varicty. We nJl abhor the laUc!'; we sbould equally ~lbhor the former. This is tlH' common factor linking the situations in Jordan and LeballOn, the fador of indirect aggression. Aggres~ sion by fomenting civil strife in the interest of ~ foreign Power is onc of Lh£: §ravest offences tlgainst Pi'-IlCC <lnt! security, W~ arc conlident LhaL the Dniled Nations will contintLe to recognize these principles which thc (;cneral Assembly formulated and adoJlled ill re!>oln- Iion 380 (V). :1:1. No doubL we shall hear from one member of lhe Council that our action ill response lo the .Qppeal from Jordan is all [lart of SOlllC great colonialist imt)e~ rialist ploL. I do not believe the world will heed such libelous propaganda. Not for the first time in Our long history wc arc activated in what we have done by ;j sense of responsibility and l~ desire tJ se~' truly peace- [ul and stable conditions in tllC world. My Governltlent is pmticularly sensitive for historical reasons Lo any threat to the nlltional i:ldependencc of JlC Arah Stales of the Tl1iddle EosL 1'11e major parL which the United Kingdom played in estaLlishing tlLese States is liometimes forgotten. We are proud of our relatiollship with them and it has been a constant aim of our policy to nssist in their nntional renaissanCE. ;i'I. But if t:le peoples o[ the Arab world are Lo develop in political freedom and economic prosperity, they and their governments musl bE free from the cOllstanl threat of insurrection, fOlOe:1.ted from out3ide in the interests of other Powers sCleking to dominate their policies and dt>stroy their independence. :35. Mr. LODGE (United StaLe~ of America): The United States GovelllIl1l'llt support" tl1e ncliDn of the G()vemment of tlle Uniled Iungdom in responding atllr:natively lo the urgent appeal of Jordan for assistance in the defence of Jordan's independence and integriLy. The United Sta~es believes tha: it is El jnstJ-ned exercise of the inherent right of nations to call [or assistance when threatened. 35, AT. LODGE (Etats-Ullis d'Amcrique) (traduil de l'anl]laisJ : Le Gouvernernent des Et;Jt.s-Unis ~PJlrouve les mesures prises par le Gouvernerr.ent £In Royaume- Uni pour reponclre a l'appel urgent que la Jordanie lui a adresse en vue d'obtenir llne aide pour la defenst: de son indcpcndance et de SClI integritc. Les Etats-Unis estiment que cc pays a fail usage a jusle titre du droit qu'a toute nation de demander de l'aide qua:Jd elle es1 menacee. 36. The United St"tf'S deJegntion ha~ just circulated the revised texl of its draft resolution rS/4050/Rev.l:. 3G, La d61egalioll des Etats-Uni~ vient de faire distribucr le texLe dp son ]ll'ojct de rcsoluLion revise 32. Pour conc]urr, jt! dirai simplemcnt ccLi. I.':agressioll peut revetir des fonnes multipLes. La rncthodc dr I'agression indirecte _ la methode de la subversion et les tent£ltives de reaversemenL des ponvoi:'s constitues - peut eue flussi dangerCllSt que I'agrcssion directe. Now; cprouvons tous une profonde aversion pOllr cette derniere; notre aversion pour la premiere ne doit pas ~tre rr.oinrlre. L'ugression jmlirecte csl I'ele.meltt commun qU'on retrouYe en lordallie et all Uban. Cette agression, qui consbte a fonentcr la gurrre civile dans I'intcret C'une puissance etrangere, est run des crimes les plus graves contre la paix et la securiM. Nous SOlllmrs certnins que l'Organisatioll ues ~ations Unies restera lidele aces principcs, que I'As:;cmblCe general€ a formulcs et adopt.*,s rl:ms Sf) resolution 380 (V). 33. Sam aucnn douLc, run des IJ1cmbres uu COllseil nOli.'.; dira que ['action que nOlls avons enlrcprise en reponse a l'afJpel de la JOl'danie n'est qu 'un episode d'un vaste cornplot colonialiste et impel'ialin{'. .le IlC pense pas que le monde preteril l'oreille iI Ime jlfopElgandc Rtlssi caromni~use. Cc u'esl pas la pnomierc fah; dam notre longue 11istoire que nous agissons POllSS£S par notre sent; des respollsabilitcs et par notre <lesir de "voir s'instaurcr dans le ;nond!.' ulle sitmtioll reellement paciflquc et st2ble. Pour des raisons 1l:sloriqucs, mon gouvcorncment est particulierCllwnt sensible utout cc qui menace ],independ~mce nationalc des Eta";s arabes du Moycn-Oricnt. OIl ollblie parfois Ip" rllle importnnt que le Royaumc-Uni a jellc dans la creation de ccs litats. Nous :;ommcs fiers de uos relations avec Cl'S pays, et notre politiqllC a tOlijours violS a aider leur renaissuncc nationalc. 3'.1. Mais si les PCllpleS du mondc urabe doivent se developper dans la liberte politique et la prosperhe economique, it faut que ccs peuples et leurs gouvernement.s soient libenis de la menace constante. d'une insurrection ellCO{{ragce de I'exterieur dam l'intcret de ptlissances ctrangeres qui clJercllent a dominer leur vie politique cl El detruire [eur indcpcndance. ;:"7. In the second paragraph of the preamble, tile words "and the encouraging achievements reporteu " /mve been added. These words were inserted to reflect, among other things, the recent report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon that it will in the future be able to functioIl in :lreas previously dosed to it, 38. Then the fifLh paragraph of the preamble has nndngone a revision to tenect more precisely the Jan· gUlIgf'. employed by the representative of Lebanon in his ~Latemenl to the Council [827111 meeting]. The change consisted primarily in replacing the word .. appeal" by th~ word "requested" and in addi:l.g tile words" further assistance from the Security Council to uphold its integrity and independence," 39. We have reurrang~d the operative paragraphs nnd in tile new uperative paragraph 1, we have replaced l1Je words "eonLinuc and" by the words ~ contir.ue tu H. In the new paragraph 2, wc llave deleted the words "such additional" and added after the woril .. arrangements" the words" for additional measures ". ·10. We hope thaL this revised text, which takes into consideration the various suggestions wldeh we hEve been given, will receive prompt nnd widespread support and that i'.. will be adopted today, 41. \Ve attach the greatest importance to the continuance and enhancement of the activities of the Unil~d .'Jat/om Obsen'ation Group and to tlie United Nations' assuming be functions set forth in this resolution. And, fral:kly, we regret that OLU colleague, the representative of Sweden, should have suggested that the Group might have to suspend its activities [~30lit meeting, para. 18). To us the situCltion dcrn:mds n prompt expansion and intensiflcation of these activities and an increase in the l;nited Nations ,olc through t1:e e,'m· tingenls mentioned in the resohttion, and :lot a suspension of the work of tlte United Nations. We think that if ever there was <t time for the United Nations not to withdraw htlt l!) step more lctively into the field, this is it. When the patient is sick, it is no time [or the doctor to leave. 42. To us there is an unanswerable argument in the unanimous view of tIle United Nations Observation Group in the report which has just reached the Council today [5/40.52J, which says that further stations and permanent oL~ervation posts SllOUld be established clOSe to the frontier, and that the ~ize of the Group should be increased to a total of some 200, which is about dO'clhle its present strength, Evidently, tlie Observation Group do~s not think it sJlOuld suspend its activities. 37. Au deuxieme considerant, nOllS avotls ajoute k~ mots «et les resultat!': emourageants signnJcs)\ C"fte insertion s'explique notnmment por le fnit que le Groupe d'observation des Natiolls Unies au Liban It recemmf'.l1t signalc qu'il serait dorenavant en tnesure d'exercer ses fonet/ons Jans des zones qui ne lui etaier:t pas acccssibles auparavant. 38. Au cinquieme considernnt, nOt,s avollS J'omllni6 le texte pour suivre tle plus pres les teflltcS que lr. representant dn Liban a e;nployes dans sa declara:ion ati CQnscil [S2'1~ siance]. Ce. rpmaniemi'.nt a cons'tste essentiellement ~\ rempla~er le TIlot l( uppelll, qui figurllit dans le texlc primitif, par les r.1ot~ « a demand!! ~ et a ajouter i[ nne nouve}lc assistance du Conseil de securit6 pour d6rcnd1'e son integritc et son Lodepcndllnce. " 39. D'autre part, nO\H; [lVOtlS cllangc J'ordn dc\ paragraphcs du dispositif et, dans le nouvean paragrap~.e 1, nOllS :lvons rempJace les mots ff Poursuivr~ et a! par les mots "continueI' UU ». Dans le nouveau paragraphe 2, nons nvons templace le mat « ~on:ple­ mentarres ') ?ar le mot «supplemenLaiIes. 11 40. Nous cspcrons que ce texLC revise, pour lequcl MUS awns tcou compte des diverses suggestions qui nous ont etf!; faites, 1'ecevra sans turtler un tres JargQ appm ct qu'i! sera adopte aujourd'IJui. 41. NOlls attachons la plus grande importan~e i Cc q:.<e les activit~s du Gronpe d'observation d~s NlltioQ.' Cnies au Liban se poursuivent et s~ developpent et il ee que l'Organisation des Nations Unies assume les fonetions qn'r.rmmere le projeL de resolution. Ell toute franchise, nous regrcttons que le representant dllla Suede ait emis l'idee que le Groupe d'observation pourrait etre ametle ;\ ~u~Jlendri: ses activite" [830C seance, par. 48]. A notre avis, la situation exigc une extension et uoe intensification rapides de cc, activites, et veut que l'Organisation des Nations UJlj~s, loftl de met';re fm a l'adion qu'clle a entreprlse, jour un 1'61e aecru p~r l'intlmnedillire tIes contingents men· " tO~ll,es dans le projet de resolution. Si tant est qu'il )' nit jamais ell un moment at) l'Organisation d~Yoil non pas renoncer a agir mais jouer un role ll]uS a~W, e'est bjen cclui-ci. Cc n'est pas Iorsque le malada soufire que le metlecin uoit s'cn allcr. ,, 42, A notre a"is, le Crroupe d'obserVfl.tion dcs Nation; Unies nous fournit un nrgument :rrCfutable lorsque, dallS le rapport. distribuc aujourd'hui au COllse!! [Sj4052], i.l declare a l'unanir.lite qu'il y a lieu de crecr dp. noUVeaux postes ou postes d'obscrvntion permancnts it proximite de la frontiere et que le nombre total des observateurs devra <!tre porte a 200 environ, C'(lSt·~­ dire a peu pres au dO'.lble de l'effectif actuel. De toule evidence, le Groupe d'ob5ervation n'eslime pas devoir ' suspendre se:; activites. >I ,14. Till: Governmen( ol Lelmnon, wldcll i~ after all primarily responsible for the 5ccllrity of the eoun-lry, and which the Observation Group has been sent to assist, clearly felt that the sharpened intensity of violent events in the Middle East thrcatclled its security tn a new way. Obviously, this is a type of evalu(\tion which is beyond the scope of the observers. I also cited yesterday [829lh meeting] some events which we know have happl!ned, whirll thp !Tnited Nations Observation Group in Lebanon could not have repotted, bee[luse the Group has not been outside Lebanon. ,If). Then we should remerrber this. It ,>,'as only yesterday that we were told [829th meeting] that the Observation Group had finally reached agreement to enalJle il tu gel Lo the frontiers of Lebanon all thc way aronnd. That agreement was only received on the <1ay, may I point out, that our forces landed, and with great respect I submit that our efforts may already have been helpful to the work of the United Nations. The fact that on 15 July the Ob~ervntion Grou~ received permission to reach the frontiers of Lebanor. is a cause for gratification. But, obviously, it do~s not mean that the work of the Observation Group is linished. On the contrary, it mean'> that they are now in a much beLter position than they have eVer been ta go ahead. It marks the end of the beginning - the end of the beginning - as far as the Observation Group is concerned, and the beginning of a ph~se which Can be of even greater usefulncss. So I think we ollght to be clear about that. 46. Now to go to another but related aspect. There are those who would fasten DU Arab nationalism the label of violence, of assassination, of mob rule and of subvemion. The yeo.rnings of Arab peoples fol' growing international stature, for economic growtll, for increasing social justice, for full dignity, for closer regional understanding and independence, arc all commendable. The United States is not only not opposed to tllese developments; it believes in them, rUle United State~ believes in change and constructive evolution, a patll which it has fnllowed itself. so much so that some people have said that the United States is in a perpetual stat-e of revolution, so much so that milliol15 UpOIl ldllions of Americans have come up in their economic .'ltatus. We p~netrer profondement dans beaucoup de. secteurs frontaliers comptant pal'mi les plus importants, ni d'entreprendre serieusement des patrouines de nuit. 44. Le GouvernemenL libanais, qui. apres tont, est responsnhJp all premipr chef de la securite du pays et que le Groupp. d'obsfrvation a pour mission d'assister, a vi~iblement estime que la violence accrue des eve~ nements du Moyen-Orient constituait pour sa securite line menace d'un caractere nouveau. De taute. evidence, cc jugemcnt se situe sur un plan qui depasse la competence des observateurs. }'ai fait ~f,'3..Iement etat hier (82ge seance] de quclques evenements que nous SaVons qui ont eu lieu, mais que le Gronpe d'observation des Nations Unies all Libl1n n'a pas pu signaler parce que le Groupe n'est pas sorti du Libnu. 45. Il Y a en outre une consideration que 1I0US ne devons pas perdre de vu.::. C'est hier seulemenl [82ge seance] qu'on nOIlS a dit que le Groupe d'observntion avnit finalemcnt conclu un accord lui permdtant d'acceder it la frouL:cre libanai~e sur toute sa longueur, Cct accord n'a 6te realise, me sera-t-il pennL~ de le dire, que le jour 01\ nos troupes ont <iebarque, et je pense, r.n toute modestie, que nos clIoti~ ont dejA contriJ..lIle it aider I'Organisation des Nations Unies. On peut se feliciter de voir que le Groupe d'observation a recu le 15 juillet l'autorisation de se rendec sur le." frontimes dll Liban. Cela, touterois, ne signifje petS, bien entendu. que la mission du Groupe d'ob~rvation soit terminee. CcIa signilie all contraire que le Groupc est a present dans une situation bien mcilleure que jamais pour filler de l'avant. C'est la fill du conunencement - je dis bien : la fin du commencement - pour le Grollpe d'observation, et le debut d'une phase qui pourra ~Lre plus uLile encore, C'est pourquoi je pense qll'il convient d'evite: tOllt malentendu sur cc point. 46. Je voudrais aborder maiutenant un autre aspect de la meme question. Aux yeux de celiains, le nationalisme arabe se caracteriscrait essentiellement par la violenl'c, l'Es:;:1ssinat, le regne de :0. populace et la subversion. Le desir des peuples arabes de jauer un rOle plus important sur le plan international, de devclopper leur economic, de eonnaitre plus de justic-c sociale, de voir Jellr dignite pleinement respcctee et de voir plus de comprehension et pllJ.s d'independance sur le plan regional, est parfaitement louable. Non seulement les Etats-Unill ne s'y opposent pas, mais ils y croicnt. Les Etats-Unis croient au cllangement et a I'evolution consl:ructive; c'est la voie qu'its ont ellx-memes ~uivie, D Lel point qu'on a pll dire que les ,17. :'>io\\' 1 {;(JllK tl my COlll;]usion wiLlI a rather heavy heart, beer.USe I am going to utter some words which are as seriolt!; and as fateful as any ~hal the Uniled Stales has ever ~pokell in the live n~d a half years that 1 have represented my country in the Security Council. Somctirr,es, we in the United Nations get loo clcse to the de:ails to scc what is really ha;Jpening. H ever there was a time wbfOn we must see the big picture, tllis is the time. If ever there was a time when we must not allow oursclvlOs to be diverted hy technical administrative consjder"Li{lIl~, thi~ is the Lime. ,t8, What is reaty happening is plain for all to see, if we but lift up DUI' eyes, The overthrow of the lawful government of Iraq, whicll began with the llssassinatioll of the Crown Prin~e a!ld "Which was 10Jowed by a wave of assassinationslhroughouL that un]:appy country, is oM dreadful fact. Then, the attempL to subvert and overthrow Jordan, of which wc have just h(~:Hd. is another. And, of c:}urse, the effort directed from without, to subvert Lebanon, is [3miliar to everyone. One event wJlich precipitated and inc['ea~ed the nccc:ssity of these sessions of the Security Council was the overthmw of th;>: Government of Iraa hecause It became clear that there is, in the Middh Ea"sL, a common purpose to take ov~r everywhere, all at O:lce. Clearly, Lhcre is a common llUrpose, masLr-r-minded from One source. You can read all about it in the Cairo ncwspapers, or listen to the incessant radio broadcasts from Cairo to other Arab coUlltries. 11\). In filet, a l,rDrnine!lt Cairo newspaper is openly urging the assassination of President Chamoun. Furthermore, the ambass3rlor of the United Arab Hepublic stated on .\'fonday that United States aid to the Governmenl of Lebanon wode1 JnI.'Rr1 lll(! nssas,in3Uon of the President and the Porcign Minister of Lebanon, who, he said, had been condemned to deatll by "Arah natiollalists ", with tt.e sentellce tu be executed following \Vestern intervention. \Vlwt kind of hellaviour is that'? aidl~r ceux qui ne se gouverneJlt P2!\ P-Jl['ore cux-menJe~ a obtenir leur autonoraie. Mais nOlls pensons que cela doit se flljn~ par des moycm paciliqucs et sans provoqucr de convulsion internajulla[e. Le progrcs ne doit pas se payer si cbeI'. Nous ne crayons ni i.l l'llssassinat ni nla violence, ni au rcgne de la populace, Ili a la subversion, et nous ue VOlilol\s pas vDir ees malll( sevir dans l'ur. des Etats indcpelldants les plus dClllOeruLiqncs cL les ~ll1s lihri"s Jl'::>litiquement dlL }[oye[r- Orient, le Liball. n ne faul pas dejouer ainsi les aspi_ raLions des peuJlles arnbes .''\11 progrc.- et a J'ullite. II ne faut pas d€tuurner a des fins cgolstes le potenticl d'cnergie du naii:)[lfl]jsme arahc. Jl ne raut pas que son sueccs soit subordonnc au reeO\lfS a l'nssf.l.ssinat, au n~gn(' de :a plJpubee, Ii la su;wcrsion et D. J'jfl{l]- traticn. 47. Je vO\ld~ais conclurc, non saw; ':lll'il m'cll eJllll' d'ailleurs, cur je vais pf{lIlOIl~Cr des pamlcs qui SOllt peut-(I.l:m le~~ plus imporlantes et \cs plus graves que les Etats-Unis flient jamais f[lit cntendre deJmis que jl' fepl"csente mOll pays till CDllseil de sccurite, e'est-a-dirc uepu:s cinq [lOS el de:ni. A l'iJrgrl1liSilr.ion des NatjDns Unies, it nots arrive parfois de rcgarder le> details de tro]J prcs, cc qui nO'J:> empechr', de vf\ir les evcllerr.er\ls tels qU'ils sonL ::ii jarnab il y u. eH un momenl oil nous ayons ell le devoir de consider~r l'enscmble clll iIlblean, e'est bien celui-ci. Si jamais iI y a eu Itn moment ou nOlls "vons w le devoir de lle pas nOllS laisser distl'aire par des eousideratioJl,i administrative:; et technique;;, e'est bien eellli-d. 48. Ce qui se passe en re<llite, toul le lllollde peut le Y'JJr it suffit de. regarder. Le renversel1lent !lu gonvernf.mcnc legitirr.e de l'Irak, qui a cGlIlmencc por l'assassirLat du prince hcritier et qui a ctc suivi d'U1IC vague d·a~sa,sillals dans tout eet infort\\l1c pays, ('~t un fait, et UIl fait terrible. I: y en a eu un autre: la tentative de subversion et de renversement du gauvernmnent jordanien, dont on vienL de \lOUS porter, Et, bien entendLl, chacun est au eourant des efforts dirigcs d<:> l'r.xh~rieur qui viscmL a subvertir le Lih'lU. C'est le renversement du gouvernemcnt irakien qui n. hdte les reunions acLuelles du Conseil de s~curito lJt lcs a rtJldue~ plus ncecssuire& encore, car il est rlevenu evident que l'unique but visc au Moyen~Orienl est de s'emparer du ]Jouvoir partout a la fois. Il est clair que ]'on pO\lr~uit LlI1 objecti[ unique, et qu'uue scula puissilllee dirige le mouvemenl. 11 suInt, pour S'Cn convain,~rc, de lirc les jQLlrllaUX du Caire ou d'ceoutcr le,.<; bulletin;; radiophoniqlles que Le C<lire diffuse eon,lamtneut <i. I'intention des autres pays arabes. ,m. c'....~t llinsi qU'ufl des pri:lcipallx journuux (lu Caire reclame Ollvcrtement l'assllssil1<lt dn president Chamoun. Ell uulre, l'<lmb.u,sadctll' de la nep(lblifJlll~ arabe unie a dCclflrc lundi que l'aide apporbk par les Etats-Ullis au Gouverlletnent libanais entrainernit l'nssassinat du President e~ du lVIinistre ces :i1Taires etrangcres de ce pays, lesql.lcls, a-t-il ajoute, avaiellt de. cOlldamlle~ a mort par les ( nationalistes am])e!i Il, la I'entencc devant etre eX'~cutee apres l'intervention 1:-; tr.£:: United Nations to condone snbvcfsion in plnin clothes, controlled froIll out~ide a '~ountry'! li the United Nations cannot deal with indirect aggression, the United Nations will break up, This could surely he thc rock on whicli this Organization eould fOllnder. 51. Remember this too: if the United Nalions does not meet this c!1allcnge, it will invite subversion all over Lhe world. Wc cannot pass by on lhe othel' side of the street and salve our consciertcf's by doing nothing. If Uniled Natior.s inacLion is interpreted as condoning mdirect aggresslDn, the imaginaLiull ~Utgger~ at what r.hc conscquences of Lhis could mean to world peace. 1)2. To no group of men has tile opportuniLy cver been given to rise to a more fateful occasion. I hope, and I belicve, that wc will noL fail humanity,

The situation in the Ne....r and Middle East is growing more complex ll)' the hour. The United States nol only has not taken measurcs la wlUldraw its armed forces from t]IC territory of Lebanon but. is moving more and more of its troops into that region. New codinf,~Jlts of Unitcd St8les troops arc landing in LebnEOn. 54. There are reports that a Unil',ed States armed unit from 'West Germany ha:; been hastily transterrtld to Turkey and staLior_ed at bases near the fronters of Syria, All Lhe armed forces of the United SLates are being fl.'.verishlS mobilized and p]a~ed in 11 condition of combat :eadincss. 55. Tile Utllted States Pacinc and AtlaJ.tic fiee"ls have been placed on a four-hour combat alert. On 16 July, tile United Statc.s Department of Defense announced that all wa:ships which had previously been scheduled for decollllllissionir.g were to be placed in combat reDdlness forthwith. 56, i\.ccording to United States Air Force headquarters in Europe, all units under it:; COlluuand !Hl.v~ been placed in c:ombat readiness, Troops are being hur~ dedly transferred from the Un[led Slates lo \VesLel'O Europe. 57, Returning from EniweLok island, where the United States is continuing to conduct atomic wecpons 'tests, Mr. Neil H. McElroy, Lnitcd States SecreLary of DcfcfiS.:o, [lnnounccd that al! Unitf'd States armed forces had been placed in readiness. 51, Happ('-lez~yous cgruelllent ccci : si l'Organi!l.ation des NaUons UnieH ne re!l'.ve pas ce defi, cUe encouragera la ~l1bvcrsion dans le rnonde en.;ier. Ncus ne pouvons pas IIOUS eor:tenter {le fermCl' les ,)'tlJX et d'apaisernos tllllSclellccs ~ll ne faisant rien. Si, par SOll in~[:tion, l'Orgallis"tioll donllc I'impression qH'clle tolel"c l''l61ressio:l inrlirectc, l'imUfiination resLc con:ondl1e dcvant le!'l repercussions Que r.ettc <lttitnde pOllrl'ait avoil' Sill' la paix l:londialc. 52. .Tmnais aucull gruupe d'holllHlCS n'a Cll l'oceusion (le s'elever <'I I" huuLenr d'une situ:l.lion ,nJssi I01ll"(Jc de consequences. J'es[Jere, je sUs convaincu, que nous ne traIJirons pas la cQnrtanee que rhumanite a placec en llOlt~. 53. M. ,sOBOLEV (U[lion des [kpubliqucs socialistes so\'ietiqlles) [tradult dll rlJ8.~eJ : La situation durlS le Proclle·Oricnt ct le Moycn-Orient conlinue as'aggraver d'hcurc en hClire. !\lOT) sr_lllr;mcnt les Etats-Unis n'ont pris aucune mesure pOllr retircr leurs forces annccs du tcrritoire libnnais, mais enCClre ils Dl"Oc~dent a de nouveaux truJlsfert:; de trouprs dUll; ~ette region. De nouvcaux contin5ents de tr()UJl'~$ amcricaincs debarqttcllt -au Liban. 54. Selon certai lies illfOI·maLior.s, des formations al'll~ces des Etats-Unis, Cll p:'ovenance de l'Allemagnc OCc1 H dent<lle. out de el1'voy5es (J'llr?''ente vcn la Tlll'quie, et clles onl pris position prcs dc la fronW:re syriellnc, La mobilisation s'eJIectw' en !:IwLe hilLe ct ~oul.es le.,,, forces arOlees des Etnts-Uni3 sout en e[at d'aIcrte. 55, Lc:> flotles O,merieainf'.~ del'Atantlqllc et du Pacilique sDnt pretes it entmr en netion dUllS lcs quatre heLll'cs. Le le juillct, le Dcpartcmen; dela dcl"ense des Etats-Unis 8 de.d3J"e qu'il fll11aiL [lrner immcdiutemcnL pour .[ gncrre LOI:s les bUtimcnts qui deVrtient ctrt desnnnes. 5G. D'apres l'ctat-rra)or de~ fr.rces aerienncs des Etats·l1nrs ell Europe, loutcs lcs unites qUi deplmdent de ce commtl:ldcmenl sont pretcs a pdsscr a I'iletion. Des troupes sonL tra:1sferocs d'urgence des Etats~Unis veri> l'Europt'. oecider.tale. 57. Le Secrctaire a la dCfcnse des Etats~rllis, M. Ncil H. McElray, qld revicnt J'En.iwetck al") les Et1b;-Unis poursuivent burs essais d'armes atomiques, a (16clare que {oule.~ le.'! forcc/i artm~es des Etals-Unis se trollvnient en etat d'ale,rtc. 60. The world is witnessing not only the threat buL the direct use of force by United States imperinlism against the freedom-loving peoples of the Near and Middle East. 61. A report was received today, which has beel] :011- firmed here in the Security Council by the Ulllted Kingdom representative, that British paratroop u~lils have landed in the territory of Jordan. The United Kingdom Government is employing the very same manreuvre to justify its armed intervention in Jordan as that used by the United States Government. It asserts that a request for such intervention has been received from King Hussein. However, this sort of camouflage cannot conceal the real reasons underlying United Kingdom intervention in the affairs of the Near and Middle Eastern countries. G2. My. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, declared today in Parliament that King Hussein of Jordan had requested military aid from the United Kingdom because he feared an "imminent attempt" to overthrow him by the United Arab Republic, similar to the action taken in Iraq. Mr. Macmillan added that British intelligence reports showed that Hussein's fears were "well founded" and that the attempt was to take place today. Yes, today was the date I For this reason Mr. Macmillan stated that the United Kingdom Government had decided to accede to Jordan's request without delay and to dispatch its troops immediately by air from Cyprus to Jordan. I must say that this flounds just like a t~lc from The Tlw[LSand and One Nigh/s. u3. I should like to mention onc typical detail. Mr. Macmillan reported to the United Kingdom ParliamenL that Jordan's request had beer. received a few minutes after the parliamentary debate on the Near Eastern situation had ended yesterday. The Jordan Government's request was received a matter of minutes ufter Parliament had concluded its debate. What a fortunate coincidence I Parliament concluded its debate, the rcquesl was received and, in the absence of Parliament, it was a simple matter for the United Kingdom Government to take a swift decision to send its troops to Jordan. Thus, Mr. Macmillan was unable to consult ParliamenL. He did not" have time" for tlmt. However, My. Macmillan not only found time tu consult Washington, but, he tells us, obtained its full approval. And in fad Washington did give full approval to the dispatch of United Kingdom troops to Jord'm. 64. As you see, this time the United Kingdom Government showed greater foresight. Whereas in the attack on Suez in 1956, it was in no hurry to co-ordinate its GO. Le monde ne se lrouve pns 5culement en presellce d'lltlC menace, il voit J'imperialismc dl',~ Etats-Ulli~. [[line dircctemcnt usage dr la force contre les penplcs. dn Proch('-Ol'ient et tlu IVloyen-Ol'icTlt r.pl'is de liLerL6. 61. On a (lnJlonce llujourd'hui -- et Cl'tte llOl1vdJe <I ele cOllnnmk ici m~me, all COllseil de securite, pal' le representant dn Royaume-Uni - qUl' des unites de parachutistes brit31miqlles avaicnl atterri en Jordunie. Pom justificr' eeUe intcl'Vcntion armcie en Jordanie, le Gouvernemenl clu Royulllr.c·Ul1i invoqllc le meme pl·etexte que le Gouvel'llemenl des Etats-Ullis, Jl pretend repondre a un appel qui uvait cite lance pal' le roi Husseill. Ce camounugr ne saurail ccpeudRnt dissimnler ks l'aisons veritables qui ont inspire J'iulcrvention britnnnique dans les afTaircs intericllres des pays dll Proche-Orient et un Moyen-Oriellt. 62. Le Premier Ministre dn Royanme-Ulli. M. [l,Jacmillan, a declare aujolll'd'llUi au Parlement qlle le roi Hussein de Jordanie avait demande l'aide militaire brjtanniqlle parce qu'il craignait un~ "tentative imminente" de III Republique araIJe unie visanl a le dctn)ner suivant les memes methodes que cell..!> qui oat ete l1tilisees en Il'uk. M. Macmillan a ajoLlte que It'S rnpports du .~ervice de renseigllemenL:i hriLanlliquC'. tndiquaienl que Jes crainles du l'Oi I-Iusseio cblicllt " Lien fondees II et que ceUe tentative devait nvoil' lieu nujourd'hui: Prccisemenl aujourd'lltli! C'e.st. pour edte raisoll, a declare M. Macmillan, que le (ioLlvernel1lent du ROYl{lllne-Uni a decide de repondl'c favornblemcllt et sans delai a la requcte jOl'danienne et d'envoyer lmmediatemcnl en Jordanie, par avian, des troupes hritanniques stationnees it Chypre. Je dais dire que eela ressemhlc fort it un conte des MiIlc et Une Nuits. 63, II Ya un detail signiflcatif. M. ;\IaclUillau a declare au Parlemellt britannique que la demande de la Jordanie emit parvenue au Royaume-Uni hier, quelques minutes apres la fin du debat consacre par le ParlemcnL britannique a la situation au Proche-OrienL. La seance du Parlement venait de se terminer quando quelques minutes plus tard, la demande de la .!ordanie est arrivce. QueUe heureuse coincidence I Le Parlemcnt leve la seance, la requete arrive, et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, en l'absence du Parlenw.nt, peut sans diffIculte s'empresser de prendre la decision d'envoyer des troupes ell JOl'danie. Ainsi, 1\1. MacmiUan n'a pu consulter le Parlement. n n'en a (( pall ell le temps D. Pourtant, M. Macmillan a eu nOll seulcment le temps de consulter Washingtoll, mais, cOlllme il l'a declnre, il a r~u l'approbatioll complete du t;ouvernemcnt des Etats-Unis. En eiIet, \Vashington a pleinement apprOllVe l'envoi de troupes britunuiques en Jordanie. 64. Commc vous le voyez, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni s'est montrc, ceite fois-ci, plus prudent qu'en 1956. Lors de l'agression de Suez, en 1956, n 68. Thus, the specific purpose was not lo help repel an imaginary threat which both he and Mr. r-,{acmillan clflim was hanging over Jordan, but to help Hussein crush the rev(}!lltion in Iraq. This is not an isolated assertion on my part. It has been set ont in black and white and is being circulated by the British propaganda machine for the guidance of tlle people of the whole world. 69, In Washington, responsible diplomatic circles have ilastcncd to confirm that this is prl'_('i~t!.ly the purpose ill view. Again I quote from tIle same report: "In \Vashington, diplomatic sources said that the United States had rejected any idea of immediate United States or allied intervention to restore pro- Western control in Iraq. II draw YOllr attention to the word .. immediate "; the idea of all immediate invasion has been rejected.] But the State DepartmeIlt did nol rule out the possibility t!lat it might encourage King Hllssein to march on Baghdad with the loyal Jordanian and loyal Iraqi troops and try to restore a pro-Western government in lraq."l 70. This is what they are saying in Wasbington - not some old wives' t..'1le - and a direct reference is made to Washington diplomatic sources, We know that when suclI an expression is used in a report by an authoritativ~ news service, official SLate Department circles arc usually behind it. 71. It is perfectly obvious that the United Kingdom Government's explanation of the reasons for the landing of United Kingdom troops in Jordan is a deliberate lie intended to deceive public opinion, particularly in the United Kingdom itself. This lie is cumparaLk in magnitude only to the one put out in the fall of 1956. 1 The speaker read the text in English. (( Les parachutistcs J)ritanniques ont debarque aujourd'hui en Jordanie pour nppuyer le roi Husscin dnns la campagne qu'il lllene en vue d'ccrnscr le~ insllrges d'rrak t't recollquerir cc pays dn Proche- Orient, d'une importance capitale pour l'Occident. )) - 11 s'agit de l'Irak. 68. Ainsi, il ne s'agit pas ct'ecartcr une menace imaginaire, comme sir Pierson l'a dit hli-meme, et comme I'll dit M. MncmiIJan, resant sur la JordaniE'., mais bien d'aider le roi Husscin a re-primer la revolution en Irak. C'est a cette Jin que les troupes britanniqulOs out eM envoyees En Jordanie, et cc n'est pas moi qui le dis. c'est ecrit noir sur blanc dans les bulletins d'information britanniques, et c'est crtte information que ditTuscnt les services de propagande britanniques Jlour orienter I'opinion mQndiale. 69. A W:uhington, les nilieux diplomatiques responsablcs se sont hates d'approuvel' eet objectif. .le cite encore le communique en question: ~ A W:lslIington, les milieux diplotnatique~ ont declare que les Etat5-Unis avaient rejete l'idce d'une intervcIltion immedinh·. des Etats-Unis ou de: leurs allies en vue de retablir le regime pro-accidental en hak)) J'atUre votre attention sur le mot (( immediate \): on rejette l'idee d'll1le intervenLion immediate. ,,?o.Lus ]<" nt\.partelllf',llt ri'Etat n'a pas ecarte la possibilit~ d'encOluagCl' le roi Hnsscin a marcher sur Bagdufl Hvec des troupes jordanicnJleS et irakicnncs ndeles pour cssnyer de rctablir un gOllveruement Pf(Hlecj(l~nta] en lrak 1,;) 70. Voilil cc que 1'01l dit a W:tshington. Il ne s'agit pas hi: d'!Jistoires de bonnes femmes, mais de declarations e.manant diredement des milieux l.liplomatiques de Washingtoll. Ot·, !lOllS savons qw'. I'expression «les milieux diplomatiql\P..5 de Washington~, dans unc depeche d'une agence de presse serjeuse, siguifie ge.neralernent : les milieux officiels du Departement d'Etat. 71. De toule eYidcnce, l'cxplicnti(ln que donne maintenant le Gou\,cmemel1t britnnnique au slljet du debarquement des forces armees d\l Royaume-Uni en JOl'danic constitue Lln mensonge delibere qui vise a tromper i'opinion pllblique, et en tout premier lieu Cf'lle du Royaume-Uni. Par son cnormite, (',e mellsonge n(! peut 1 Ttxte dt,:; en ungluis par I'orateur. 72. Thus, no one has threatened Jordall nor is anyone preparing to attack it. Consequently, all the references to measures of self-defence arc merely a pretext for intervention against the peoples of tile Arab world, 73. The fact is that, as demonstrated hy the illYaSlon of Jordan by United Kingdom troops following the invasion of Lebanon by United Stales troops, an agreement exists between two imperialist Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom - which, judging from the information avallabIe, are now apparently being joined by France - on joint action <lg;;,inst the freedomloving peoples of the Near and 1Iidd1e East. A broadly conceived plan exists· and is being carried into effect for combating the Arab peoples' movement for national liberation and ,mifiealion. The statement by :iVIr. Macmillan, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, that the lJnited Kingdom regards Arab nationalism as aggression shows that this is precisely the case. The United Ki.ngdom, said J\lr. l\Iacmillan, faces" nationalism that feeds upon aggression". }.ill'. Macmillan did not conceal the fact that the real reason for sending United Kingdom armed fortes to the Near and Middle East was the desire to prcserve tlw United Kingdom's sources of oil. 74. The facts show that there is an agreement between the United Kingdom and the lJnited States Lo exleml military oper<ltions to further areas and this, of course, creales a real danger of an att<lek on otller Amb eOllntrie..~, It was for precisely this reason th"t jUr. Sclwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary of the United l{ingdom, new to Washington for discllssions. The United Kingdom Government is ob\'iously hasteElng to take advantage of the situation to set its colonial affairs in order in this pmt of tlle world. The landing of United Kingdom troops in the lerritory of Jordan is a desperate attempt by decrepit Britisll imperialism to retain its fool:hold in tl,e cOHnlrics of the Ne<ll" and Middle East. 75. As we kno\v. the Ullil:ed Kingdom and France trier] to re-estJblish colonial domination over Egypt by force of arms in 1956. Evcryone knows how shamehIlly that gamble ended. However, no lesson has been drawn from I:hat failure. The imperialist circles of the Western Powers, which are still unable to abandon their former policy of colonial brigandage, are evidently trying to take some sort of revenge for the failure of the aggression against Egypt and for that of the adventure agoinst Syria. Experience shows, however, that caleulaliolls of this sort rest: on very slH:tI,y ground. There i~ no doubt that this time, Loo, llrmcd inlervention aguillst the pe_opIes of the Near and Middle East will cnd in complel:e failure. 72. Pc.rsonne ne menace la Jordanie. Personne \le ~{' prepare il. l'attaquer. Taute reference iJ de.~ mesurc;; de legitime defense ne sert qu'a fournir un pretexte pour justifier une intervention eontre les pCllplcs dll mOllde arabe. 73. li y a ell tout d'abord I'irrllption des forces armees des Etats-Unis au Libanj immcdiatemcnt apres, il y H eu l'irruption des forces armees brihmniques en Jordunic. C'est bien la preuve qll'il existe un eomplot entre deux pays imperialistcs, les Etnts-Ullis et le Hoyaume-Uni - auxquels, a en jnger d'apres les dcpeehes reC;lles, la France va appflremmellt se joindrc - en vue d'un(~ action eomlmme tonLre les [lcll[lles des pays du Proehe- Orient et du [\loyen-Oricnl cpris de Uberlc. all n eonltu un plnn de grande envergurc ponr eombattl'C' le InOllvemenl de liberation nationale et d'uniDeatioll des puys nrabes, ['t on est passe a l'aetion. C'est ec qui rcssort prceisemcnL de la declaration dn Premier Ministre britnnllique, M. IVlatrnillan, selon laquclle It' Hoyaume-lJlli r,onsidere le nationalisme arabe eomml' agressif. Le Hoyaume-Uni, a dit M. MaernilIan. SI' Lrouve f<lce a un nationalisme qui entretient l'agressioll. 1\'1. M<lcrnillall n'a pas dissimule que l'envoi de troupcs brit..1nniques dans le Proehc-Orient et le rVIoycn-Orien.l procede en realite du desir de conserver <111 Hoyallllll'- Uni ses ressourtes petrolieres. 74.. Les fails montrent que le HOY<lllIllC-Ulli et les Etats~lJnis se sont entendus pour elendre les operations militaires a d'autres regions, cc qui fnit evidemmenL peser une menate reelle d'agression SlIr d'aulres rays arabes, C'est rrecisement pour ectLc rui~oll que le Secrctaire d'Etat aux affaiff~s etrangcres du Hoyaume- Uni, M. Selwyn Lloyd, a pris I'avion pour 'Iller delibel'er a Washington. Le GOllvernemellt dll Hoyuume-Uni SI' hate munifestement de proJiter de la .~il1la~ion POll!' rdablir ses intcrets coloniaux dans cette partie du monde, L'atterrissage des forces britanuilJues sur ll' territoire de l::l JOI'danie est lllle tentative desespcree de l'imperialisme britanllique suranne qui cherche ~I maintenir ses positio!l.~ dans Lcs p<lys du Proche-Orient et du Moyen~Orient. 75. Commc on le sait, en 1956 deja, le Hoyaull1e~Unj elln Frallce ayaient tente de retablir par la force des flrmes ICllr domination coloniale sur l'Egypte, Le denollcmcnt lIontellx de ceUe avellture est eneon' present ti la memoire de chaeun. Pour tan t, cel rehel· n'a p<lS scrvi de le<.;on. De tonte evidence, les milieux imper~a[istes des puissanees occidcntalcs, qui ne Jlilrviel:nent tonjours pas a renoncer a leur vieille politiquC' de banditisme colonial, s'efforcent de prendre en quclque sorte lellL" revanehe upres I'echee Lie leur agrcssion coutre l'Egypte el cellli de lCIll" avelltUf(' syrienne. Mais l'experienee montre que CeS cSIJoirs nl' sont guere fondes. 11 n'y a p<lS de dOllte que, cdte fois encore, l'intervention armee contre les peuples du Proche-Oricnt et du Muycn-Oricnt ~e tennine1'fI par un tiuseo complet. 77, The revolution in Iraq occurred on the eve of the scheduled conference at htanbul of t11C Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, at which the imperialists hoped to organize the suppression by the nations of the Baghdad bloc of the popular uprising in Lebanon. At precisely that moment, Iraq cast oft the shameful garment of the Baghdad Pact, in order La embark on the path of independent dcvelopmcut together with the other Arab countries. All those who sympathize with th8 desire of any people for national independence could not but welcom8 the course of events in Iraq. And it is only thOS8 fond of growing rich on other peopl8H' wealth, of enslaving nations at the price of uther people's blood, who couid, undeJ· the impact of the events in Iraq, rl1sh headlong into armed interventioll, thereby threat,~ning the world with a new glob[l1 war. 78. The vain attempts of the offici[ll representatives of the United SLates and the United Kingdom to justify the completely unprovoked aggression against the peoples of the Arab East are pitiful and hypocritical. They refer to external interference of some Ilind in Lebanon, hut these slanderous fabrications are refuted by the United Nations Observation Group which was sent to Lebanon. They speak of their security, but surely the countries of the Arab East, which lie ll. thousand kibmetres from United States tei"ritory, do not threaten the seclIrity of the United States or the United Kingdom. 7~', They speak of protecting t.h~ livp,~ of United StaLes and British citizens. But doei1 international law permit foreign powers to send their armed forces to the territory of other States for suel] purposes? 1l1e real reason for United States military intervention in Lebanon and for United Kingdom intervention in Jordan is well ltnown~ it h the c!Pfiire of the oil mono- DoHes to maintain their domination in the Countries of the Neur and Middle East, to preserve the superprofits they obtain by plundering the national wealth of those countries. 80. Neither the aggressive Baghdad Pact nor the notorious Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine hns proved capable of safeguarding the interests of the oil magnates of the United States and the United Kingdom, The peoples of the Arab East have decisively rejected those instruments of imperialist policy. 81. Convinced of the failur~ of till'. Rflghdad Pact and the DuDes-Eisenhower doctrine, the ruling circles of the United States have promulgated the new Roekefeller doctrine - the doctrine of the oil kings. The basic tenets of this doctrine were formulated in the much publicized report of the Rockefeller group, which was rele~5ed early this year. In this report, the oil magnates put down in black and white their demand that the arms race should be intensified, that the entire 77. Le coup cl'Etat en Irak s'est produJt a la veille de 1B I.;oldercnct' qllr. dt'vait'(lf: tenir i Istanbul les pays IIlLLsulmans signataires du Pacte de Bagdad et a laquelle les impel'ialistes comptaient organiser la repression du soul~vement populaire lib..1nais par les pays appurtenant au bloc de Bagdad. Juste ace moment, l'Irak s'8,<;l dCbarrasse de l'abjecte livree de signataire du Pacte de Bagdad pour s'engager, avec les uutres pays arahes, dans la voie de l'emancipation nationale. Tous cenx qui ont a ceeur les aspirations d'un peu[lLe a l'independance nationale n'ont pu que se feliciter des evenemellts d'Irak. Seuls ceu){ qui veulent s'enrichir s\lr le dos d'autrlli, qui cherchent a asservir les autres peuples en repandant un autre sang que le Iellr, ont pu reugir uux ev€nements d'Irak en se IUllf;ant t~te baissce dans une intervention armce, <lU risque de deeIeucher une nOtlvelle guerre mondiale. 78. Panr justifier Icur agre~sion contrc les peuples de l'Orient arabe, que rien absolllment n'avait provoquee, l\::,; representants officicls des Etll.ts-Unis et du Royaume.Uni ont recours a de lamenLables pretextes hypocrites. IIs parlent cl'une. pretendue intervention d'lln pays ctranger dans les aO"aires du Liban. Mais ees fables calomnienses sont dementies par le Groupe d'observation des Nations Ul1ies que l'Organisation a envoyc c10l1H. cc p!tys. Les ~utellrs de ('intervention invoqnent lenr securite. I\oIais les pnys de l'Orient arabe, sitlles a des milliers de kilometres des Etats-Unis d'Ameriqne, peuvent-ils vraimrnt menflcer la securite des Etats-Unis ou du Royaume-Uni? 79. On invoqne la necessite de proteger la vie des citoyens americains et britanniques. Mais le droit internationt.ll permel-il a des puissances ctrangere., d'envoyer a des flns de ce genre leurs troupes sur le territoirl'. d'autres Etats? Les raisons veritablcs de l'intervention armec des Etats-Unis au Lib~n et dn Royallme-UnJ en Jonlanie sont. biell connnes : c'est In volonte des monopoles petroliers de maintenir leur lH~gemonie dans les pays du Proche-Orient et du }Ioyen· Orient et de conserver les benefices excessifs qu'ih tirent du pillage des richesses nationales de ces pays. 80. Ni le pacte agressif de Bagdad, ni la trap fameuse doctrine Dulles-EisenllOwer, n'ont permis de sauvc-- garder les intef(~ts des magnsts du pCtrole des Etats- Unis et du Royaume-Uni. Les peuples de l'Orient arabe ant rejete l'esolument ces instruments de la politiquc impcrialistc. 81. Aynnt eonstate I'echec tlu Pacte de Bagdad el de la doctrine Dulles-Eisenhower, Ies milieux dlrlg~a[lts des Etats-Unis ont eu recours a une nouvelle doctrine, la doctrine Rockefeller - celle des rois du pctrolc. Les principe;; fondamentaux de cette doctrine .'lont formules dans un rapport publie au debut de cette annee par le groupe Rockcfcller et qui a fait gra,nd bruit. Les magnats du petrole y demalldent.noir Bur blanc, l'intensifJcation de la course aux armemcnt5, 82. OfTkial slatemenls in \Vashinglon leave 110 doubt lhat the iutcl'ventioll of United States troops in LeLnlloll is merely Uw first slep in a colonial war againsl the peoples of the Arab East. The nexl step, al'.cording lo thc enUre press, is military intcrwulion hy lhr United States and the Uniled Kingdom in lhe <llfHirs of Iraq. 83, I wish lo draw the Council's altenlion Lu one further fact which rounds out tIll: picture, of lhe United States militarists' criminal actions. In dis[J<llehing its [Junitive forces to crush the national IiheraLioIl movement of the people~ of tlw Arab Eusl:. lhe Uniled States is flagrantly infringing llw sovereignty of other States, As we know, ti1e Ausl:rian GovC'rnmcnt, indignant [It the flights of Unil:ed Stlltes mililary aircraft lhrollgh Austrian air ~pace, sent n note of [Jrotest to the United States in which it declared that it could noL permit such It violation of its sovereignty over its airspace nnd that at present it was unable to grant the requested permission for such llights, According to the Austrian authorities, however, United States aircraft arc eon- Unuing to violate Austrian neutrality in spite of Lhis proteflL. 8<1. United States imperialist circles, supported by their \Vesle1'll [Jarlners, have dropped the mask flncl entered upon overl aggression against the peace-loving Arab peoples. Whereas dllring the British ::md French aggression againsl Egypt in 195f) the United SLates gave only concealed SUPPOl:t to tllL' illlervcl1Ljol1i~ls, today it has decided to interfew. openly in the afTairs of the Arab peoples, Some Arabs lll,ly Iwve lwd iIlllsions ahoul lhe !'eal aim~ of United SLat!;:; policy in the Near and Middle East. No\'\' these illusions ancl misconceptions have vanished, [or the peoples have seen with their OWll eyes the UniLed SLales' aggl'l~5sivc, expansionisL plans concerning the COlll1tl'iC5 of lhe Arah world bcin!-( carried into clTecL. 85. The aclions of L!le Unitcd Stales imperialists and their partners are creatill~ a serioLls lhreat to peace and security throughout tile world. That is why lhe Hews of the. invasion o[ Lebanon by United Slates hou[Js aroused Bm]) iJldignation alUoug nIl the pe.aee-- loving peoples, 86, This aggressive act is unanimously condelllned hy the peoples of thc Soviet Union and the People's Hepnblic of China, the peoples of all thc socialisL CO\ln~ lries, the l){'oplcs of India, Indoncsia, Bllrmn, Japnn and other States or Asio, the peoples oJ Western Europe and Latin America. All the Arab peoples, which see in the actions of the United Sl~tes find thc United Kingdom a gross infringement of their independence and sovereignty, arc expressing their wr3tl, and indignation. 82. Les d{\clarations officiGlles emanunt de \V~1shin"L0lL ne laissent n\lcnn doute sur le fail qlle l'inlcl'vcli"'lioll des lrollpes :llIll\rieaincs un Liban n'csL qu'ull 11l'1~lllier ]Jas sur la voie de la gllerre eoloniale conlre!cs pe~lpll~s de l'Orienl arab!', Le pas suivallt, e()Ill!IlC l'illdl\]lLe l'ensell1ble de In pressc, esL l'inLerventtnll miliLnire des EtQts-llnis cl dll Hoynllme-Uni dalls les Hf'faires interil\llreS dl' I' frak, 83. .re voudrais attirer l'"tlcntiOll dll COllsei! sur 1111 autre fail Clleore, qui eompleLc le LalJlcau des acth'ilcs cl'ill1inelles dc la elique mililnrisle amcl'ieainc, En lrallS]Jortant Ics Lrollpes clltlrge,~s de l'exflcditioll punitiYl' qui yist' l\ cerust'-]' le LrlOllVl'menl de libcralion llatiollaJe des pt'llplt·g ut'- I'Oril.'lIl arabe, lct; Etats-Unis violent hrtJl::llel11ellllo suuveraillete d'autres ELats. On sail que le (iollvemt'-mclll ilntriehicn, indignc de voil' des aViOl\5 militaires amcricains survolcr son lerritoire. a adressc lIllt' !l1)Le de proteslation au Gouverncmeni des Etals-Unis, disant Cju'il ne pouvnit admettrc plH'eille violatjOll de SOli espace acricn et qu'a l'l\eurl' flctuclle le Gouvl'mcme.nt autrichicn n'etail jlQS ell m('!,;ure d'accorder I'autorisation de Sllrvol qui 11Ii a etc delll!lndee. Cepeudant, les autorites autriehiellnes signalent qu'en depit de ccUc protestation dt's avions de ]'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis cOlltillUel\L {k violeT In ne~~lralitc autrichienne, 84. tl's milieJlx impcrialisLes de;; Elats-Uni;;, ,lppllyes, par [eurs assoeics oecidenlnux, anl jetlS ll' masqlle cl sonl passes O\lverlcment a l'agressioll eOlltrl: ks pcupll's urabes cpris de paix. Lors de l'agresSil?ll franco-bri· tanniquc contre l'Egyple, cn 195o, les Elals-Unis n'avaienl prete qll'lln tl[Jjlni diserl'L aux inlerven- LiolllJistes, lllais Hl1jourd'hni ils olll dc<:jd<~ de s'illlmiseer Illlvcl'll\J1lcnl clans le;; ,dTaires des jll'u[Jks arabes. Peut-eLre cerlaim Arabcs ont-ils eu ell':> lllllsions quulll aux objeetifs reels de III poliLique fUllcrieainl' dans le Proche-Ol'ient et le ?l'loycn-Oricnl. Mainlenant, ees illusions, ees errems, !;(' sonl c,'I"LainCllll'nt dissi[Jces :. les penples ()llL pll voir lle lcurs propres yellx la mise en LCllvre des pions agressi[s d'expnnsiolJ que les. Elats-UJlis :Ippliquelll <lUX pays du lllondl' nrahe. 85, Lcs :\gis~l:ITIl'!lls des illlpcrialis-Lt's <Jmerieains cl de ll:ul's flssocics crcenl une grave menace pour la paix. et In secllritc dnlls k monde entier. C'l'st precisement la rnison POlll" laquelle tOllS les peuples pfleiliques ont ac(;ueilli a\'EC tHnt d'indignation la nOllvclle dl' I'in'up- Lion dcs troupes des EtnLs-UIUS all Libun. 8G. Les pcuples de l'Union sovietique, de la He]JlIblique lJOpnlaire de Chine, de tlJUS les pays socinUsl!,s, dc, l'lndl', dc !'Indoncsic, dc la l3irmanie, till .Japoll cl d'aulres [Jays de I'Asic, de meme que It,~ p!;lIplcs de !'Europe occidentale et de I'Alllel'ique lalillc, sont ullanimes a condamner cet acLc d'agression. Tous Ies pays ambes, qui voient clans ces Hctes des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Ulli llne viola Lion Ongrantc de lcurindcpendanee et de leur sOllverainetc, sont sOllleves, de colere et d'indignation. 'Uniol~ delegatioll ~hows llOW tlH~ Security Couaeil cnu lake eHceliv('. nwaSlll'~s tu rcsl()j'(; llcace ill thc Near 'and Midtlil> l~asL IUlIl prevent l1w wodd [\'Om sliding into l'. new \Yorld wm. :RS. III \,lCW '11 Uw lal('~t cvcnb, the Sovid ddegatillll ,tlerlns it llC(;('~sary to re.vise its dl'l\ft resolution ,5/4047] to indudl'. a demand for the withdrawal of United Kingdom armed forc;:s from .Ionian. Therel'ore, 011 behalf of thC'. Soviet drlegalion, I Sllblllit a nwi>l'll draft l'{'solution whLell read, l1.~ follows: . The Semrily CrtUllril, "flavin!1 Ilr:ord the nnllfHlJlCCmc:IL [\1,1(/" by the I'qm:sentaLive of the United States of America (;on- ~C'rning tIle introduction (If United Statc~ armed forees within the conlines of Lebanon and olso the :l1lnnnnCelllent mrllle by the representfitivc of the lJl1itccI Kingdom 01 Great Britaiu a:ld Northern Ireland eOlleenLillg the inlrodudion of United Kingdom armed forers into Jordun, a Rc{~orlni:;inq that sueh action [',ollstitules gross intervention in the domestic Mrail's of the peoples of Ll\1.; Arab CCllllltries and is ,~ollscqucntly contrary to Uw purposc~ and principles of the United Nations as sd forth in its Clull'tcrund, in pw-Licular, in Article 2, paragraph 7, whicll prohibits interv'3ution in mutters wl,idl arc €'ssentially wiLhin the domestic jurlsdiction ol' any State, .. (;onsidr.rillg that LlH~ acLion~ oJ~he United States Ilwl tlie United Kingdolll oonsLitutc a serious threat Lo illlernalioual peace and security, " Calls Upon the Governments of the United States 01' America and the United Kingdom of Gr8at Britain and Northern Ireland to ~ease armed intet'ventioIl in the dom('~Lic ail'air.'l of the Arab States and to remove their Lroops from the territories of Lebanon and .lordan immediately," [S/4047/Rev.l.] 89. 'fhe S()\'iet delegation requests that l.hi~ draft resoLtLion should be considered and put to LIte vole at tOday's mceting. 89, L(I dd{\gf1tioll sovi<Hique d"llIan(:(~ que n', projet de resolutiou soit exnminc cl mic; aux voix ri la scUnc['- d·anjonnl'hui. 90. If the Secnrity COllJlcil proves to be paralyzed ,and i~ unable Lo adopt tlw draft resolution nhmitted by the Soviet delegation, the Soviet Union will demand the ill1l11ediatc eOlivening of a special session of ~hc GeIlEral Assembly to consider tlle question of United States uml llnilcd Kingdom intcl'venLiOIl in Lebanon ,and Jordan. 90. Si le Conscil de sccnritc SI' trollve parnlyse et Ill' pent adopter :c texte cl~posepar hI delegation s[)VietiqllC', I'URSS demandera q~J'nnc se:>sioll cxtraordil1airc d'nrgenee de l'Assembli:e gcncrille soit imml\rliatcmcllt COl1Yoqu0.e alin d\iturJier la CjI.teSL[Of[ de l'il1tc:-VCtltioll des Etals-UlIis et du HOYf\lnne~Ulli au LilHlll et ell Jordanie. 91. M, TSlANG (Chil1C) flraduil de ['any/aisl ; ll. la 827c seance du Conscil de seenI'ILe-, le l'ept'el;ell~nltt de l'Union sovicLique a nppele l'aLtention <lu (;O;1SCi! sur les contradictions qui c.xistaicnt, d SOil avis, entrc le premier rapport tlu Groupc d'Obsel'v<1tion des Notions Unics au Lihan [S/4U10 et Corr. 11 et la sitlla~i()11 de ce pays telle que M. Malik et ilL Azkonll'avaient cxposr,e '91. 1Ir, TSIANG (China): At the 827th meeting of the Security Council, the reprEsentaliv~ of tlt~ Soviet UniGn called the t1llmtion of the Ccuncil to what he; ,considered to be discrepancies in tlle I\no] ~epClrt of the United Nations Observation Group in Lehanon '[S/4040 rmd COff.l] and the case of Lebano:l f\S presented to tllc Council by Dr. Charles Malik and l~ fair~ sans tarder et avcc fermete. Le projet de resolutlon depose pal" la de]egntioll de l'Ullion iHlvieUque l:race 1:1 voie d:w.'; laqudlc le Consei! rk seeurilc doit s'ellgag{~l' s'il vent prelldr~, des 1l1t;Sllfes cffieaees en vue de l'eLahlir la pnix lbns 1(-'. Proche-Orient et le Moyen-Ol'ient et rJ'elOpccher k lllonde de glbsel' vel'S l1nr~ llollvC'llc gllct're mondiniC'. 88, En raisoll des dcrniers ~venements, la deMgation sovicLique a .iugc neccssaire de l'cviser le textE initial de son projet de rc.~Ollltion [S/4(47), ~e II1flnierl~ ;l }' inclnrc l"exigcnec d( Ictrail del; trollJles hritanllklllc~ de Jordanie. En eo(\sequemx:, au nom J~ la delegation de l'UFlSS je depose le projCL de resolution revise ainsi COTIQll {{ te ComeO tIc s(:wrili, I' ,~!J(mt entendu la comlllLlllicalion cll\ reprc.:;elll;lllL des ELats-Unis d'Amcrique concerllaJlt l'cllvoi 0('. forces arm~es flmericaines iJ. l'interi81lr des limiLe~ <In LiI)[IIl. nin.'ii que III COllllmmlL:<1Lion du re[ir~­ selllanL dl! Hoyaume-l]lli (,Oll[;CrJIflll~ I'envoi de I()n:l.:s annces brilanniqllcs l'n .J ordalllC', ff Rr.cQnnaissant ([llC de lels netcs ('ollslitucnt 1111<-: intervention flagrante tlnlls ks nlTaires intcl'ielll'es des peuples des pays .wabe,,> el, ell eOL1.sCqucncp, sont contraires llIlX huts el J'rineipe~ (It' l'Organisation des N:1lions l]J1k, <'llQIICeS :1<11\5 la Chal'lt', et notamment all [laragraphe 7 de l'Article 2, qui interdit toute inLclventioll <1ans :es ,lfi'aires qUi releveut csscnl:.ie.llcment de la (;{J1np~,t.elll;l· uatiollall' d'un Etal, {( C<JfIsidcranl que ks aett's des EtaLs·Unis el d\[ Royaume-Uni c()mLituent I1nc wave lllenace contre la paix et la scellritc illterno.tionales, ii Fflil nppel all GOllVel'llCllHml: des Etfl~s·Unis et all C,ollyernellH'nt d~l l:oya\lme-Ulli pOle qu'ils mdtcllt fin a l'intcrventiol1 llrmce duns les afTaircs intcrie.uTes des Etats araoes et reLirt~nt illllliMilltement leul's troulws ell'S tl'rritoires cln LihHn et de la ,J()]'(lnnil'. II [S/4(JJ7/Rm. 1./ 93. It seems to my delegation tlIat there is nu justifi~ cation for arguing that what does not exist in the reports does not exist at all. The case of Lebanon <IS presented on 6 June by Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon (823,.d meeting], remains an impressive alId substantially truthful document. Yesterday [829lh meeting] the representative of the United Sl:atcs communicated to the Council some vital supplementary evidence collected independently by agencies of the United States Government. Furthermore, the tragic events in Iraq have thrown a flood of light on the developments in Lebanon. \ 94. The even Is in Lebanon and the evell'ts in Iraq arc scenes of the snme tragic drama. The Baghdad Radio, as reported a moment ago by our colleague from the United Kingdom, now under the control of the conspirators, admits and proclaims the connexton between Lebanese and Iraqi events. It is proclaiming daily and hourly that the victories in Lebanon and Iraq will soon be followed by victories in Jordan. 95. Today, considering the grave situation in the Near East, the Security Council would be irresponsible and unrealistic if it continued to view the crisis in Lebanon in isolation as if nothing had happened in Iraq or as if thc tragic events in Iraq had no connexion with developments in Lebanon. 96. Viewing the i\'1iddle East scene as a whole, I believe that the Security Council should take additional measures for the protecljon of the independence and integrity of Lebanon. The GovernmenL of Lebanon appeals to us for additional aid. In an emergency, as a temporary measure, the Goverumellt of Lebanon asked for military assistllnce from (riendly States. The United States has granted some military assistance as a temporary measure find proposes now to the Council t{) create a United Nations force to replace the forces of the United States. 93. De l'avis de ma delegation, on ne saurait pretendre que ce qui ne figure pas dans les rapports n'a pas d'existence reelle. M. Cllarles MaJik, ministl'e des. afTaires etrangeres du Liban, tl presente le 6 juill l823e seance] le dossier de son pays, qui constitl1e un document impressionnant et, dans I'ensemble, veridique. T-lier [829 G seance], le representant des Etats-Unis a cornmunique au Conseil des ren~eignements complCmentaircs d'importance capitale qui ont ete recueillis a cl'autres sources par des organismes du Gouvernemenl des Etats-Unis, De plus, les tragiqlles rvellements d'Irak ont jete line lumiere nouvelle sur Ju situation au Liban. 94. Les evellelllenLs du Liban et d'Irak sont en efTel des scenes d'llne memc tragedie. eomme vient de le signaler le representant du Royallme-Uni, la radio de Bagdad, qui est maintenant entre les mains des conjures, rcconnait et proclame le lien qui existe entre les evenements du Liban et ceux d'Irak. Elle proclame chaque jour et chaque heure que les victoires dans ces deux pays seront bientot suivies de victoires en Jordanie. os. Aujounl"hui, compLe tenu de la gravite de la situation dans le ProclIe-Oricnt, le Conseil de securite manf]uerait du sens des rcsponsabilites et de realisme s'il continuait it voir dans la crise libanaise un fait isole, comme si rien ne s'etait passe en Irak ou commc si les tragiques cvenements qui viennent de s'y produire n'avaient aucun rapport avec la situation au Liban. 96. Considerant le Moyen-Orient dans sa totnlitc, jc crois que le Conseil de sccurite devrait prcndre de nouvelles mesures pour proteger l'independance et l'integrite du Libfln. Le gOllvernement de ce pays fait appel a nous pour obtcuir UIl sureroit d'assistance. En tant que mesure d'urgence temporaire, il a demandc raide militaire d'Etats amis. Les EtaLs-Unis lui ont aCl:orde cette aide militaire a ti Lre temporaire. et proposenL maintenant au Co\)seil de creel' une force des Nations Unies pour remplacer leurs troupes. 98. Today, we can no longer limit our action to obser~ vatioll. We have no right to gamble with the independence and the integrity of a country, even though it is a small country. Neither do we have the right to stake the prestige and the future of the United Nations on mere observation. If we did this, I am afraid that we would be making the Security Council the laughing ~tock of the world. 99. The representative of Sweden argued yesterday that Article 51 of the Charter could not be applied in Lebanon at this moment because, as he [Irgued, of the absence of armed attack [830lh meeting, para. 48]. In other words, he would limit the application of Article 51 to cases of direct aggression. My delegation does not share in that interpretation. We have always held the view that in the present p,eriod of world history, indirect aggression is as dangerous as direct aggression. I should know, being the representative, as I am, of a country which has suITered so much from indirect aggression by the Soviet Union. The organs of the United Nations in dealing with matters of this kind must keep in mind the .. Peace through deeds " reso~ httion of 17 November 1950 [General Assembly reso~ lulion 380 (V)]. My delegation will, therefore, vote for the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States. 100. Before I yield the floor, I wish to add that my delegation finds that the Jordanian appeal to the United Kingdom Govcrnment for military aid is a legitimate exercise of Jordan's inherent right of self~ defence. We find further that the granting of such assistance by the United Kingdom is completely proper.

I have before me the complaint submitted by the representative of Jordan. To my mind it is not suffIciently substantiated, it is not even aCCompanied by an explanatory memorandum; the facts are vague, they relate to events which took place over a year ago. Why then is it being submitted now? The answer is simple: a pretext has to be found for Britishintervention in Jordan, a pretext has to be found for the dispatch of British troops to re~occupy Jordan. I can but regret the decision of the ,Jordanian chief of State to request the return of British troops to his country. 102. There are no facts. The charges are very vague. Nobody is threatening Jordan. On the contrary, Jordan is seeking to threaten the new Government of Iraq. The representative of the United Kingdom cites broadcasts made today by Radio Baghdad which allegedly threaten Jordan. But this intervention was decided upon long before the broadcasts to which the United States representative also referred today. If the United 101. :\1. LOUTFI (Rcpublique arabc unie) : Je suis en presence aujourd'hui de la plainte qui a eM deposee par le representant de la Jordanie !S/4053]. A man avis, cette plainte n'est pas assez precisee : elle n'est memc pas accompagnec d'un m<~moire explicatif; les faits sOnL vagues, ils ont trait a des evenements qui se sont deroules deplds pillS d'un an. Pourquoi, messieurs, esL~ce en ce moment~ci que cette plainte est soumise'l La rcponse est bien simple: il faul lrouver des pretextes pour l'intervention britannique en Jor~ danie, it faut lrouver des pretextes pour l'envoi des troupes anglaises afin d'occuper de nouveau la Jordanie. Jc ne peux que regretter la decision du chef de l'Etat jordanien de demander que les troupes anglaiscs retournent dans son pays. 102. 11 n'y a pas de faits. Les accusations sont bien vagues. Personne ne menace la Jordanie. C'est de la Jordanie que 1'on veut menacer le nouveau gouvernement de l'Irak. Le representant du Royaume~Uni a mentionne notamment des emissions de la radio de Bagdad, diffusees aujourd'hui, qui seraient mena- Itantes pour la Jordanie. Mais voyons, messieurs, cette intervention etait decidee bien avant ces emissions 103. The United Kingdom Government is very expert in matters of aggressive interventions. We ought to know; we have had recent experience; last time, the United Kingdom intervened in order to halt hostilities between Egypt and Israel, this time, in order to pro· teet Jordan. But the truth is that an attempt is being made to return to the colonial and imperialist policy which it unfortunately seems impossible to change. 104. The international situation has deteriorated since yesterday. Today, we are confronted with a new factor which will undoubtedly endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This British intervention has no justification, particularly in view of the present circumstances and the prevailing political tension in the area, and may create a situation likely to endanger international peace. 105. I have already told the Council that, in order to justify the landing of United States troops in Lebanon, we have been made the target of groundless charges combined with malicious propaganda designed to persuade the world that thc United Arab Republic is responsible for the disturbances in Lebanon, Wl1ich are merely the unhappy consequence of internal differences provoked by President Chamoun's desire to be President of the Lebanese Republic for another sixyear term. 106. In today's papers we can read the intelligence reports made public by the United States StaLe Department. The reports are not very different from those the Foreign Minister of Lebanon has placed before the Security Council on several occasions. They are mere assertions, intelligence reports, with no evidence to support them, on which the Security Council cannot possibly b3se a decision. Moreover, in its resolution of 11 June [Sj4023j, the Council itself showed that it was far from convinced by Mr. Malik's assertions and can hardly therefore be impressed by mere intelligence reports, 107. If I were not anxious to save the Council's timc, and if we l1Ud not completed that stage of the debate, I could analyse these charges, which are in general not very weighty, and demonstrate to the Council that they cannot establish any responsibility on the part of my Government. As for Mr. Lodge's charges today, I reany do not understand his argument, but I must say that there are other radio broadcasts, from ccrtain other countries, which incite to the assassination of responsible leaders of the United Arab Republic, and I must state that foreign intervention is the cause of the violent reactions taking place in the countries of this area. s?ti~ns, .qni, gC;lCralcment., n'out pas llIIe grtlnd(~ slgnlficatlOll, et demonLrer au COllseil qu'c]]es ne pellven t en. aucun ~s etublir une. responsabilih; CJuclconqnC" qUI engagerUlt mon gouvcrnelllcnt. Quanl iJ. Cl' qll'a dit M. Lodge aujourd'hui, je n'ai vrailllcllt pas cOlltluiss~nce de ~e .qu.'il u avancl\ lllais jt dois dire qu'il y n d ~u?,e~ em'~SI?nS d~ radio, tle ccrtuills anlrcs pays, qm mCltent a.l assasslllut de personnalites rcspollsablcs. de la Rcpubhque arabe unie, et jc dois declarer id que s'il y a des violences dans les pays de cette partie du monde, elles ont pour cause l'intervention etrangcre. 109. I have repeatedly argued tJat Article 51 of be United Nations CharLt:r i:; llul applicable, In his state. ment yesterday, the representative of Sweden made that very clear. I shall take the liberty o[ qUOtillg one sentence which is particularly relevant: " One of the cow.liLiDllS for Article 51 of tIll; Chllrter to be applicable is tllat an armed attack has occurred against a Member Stale. The Swedish Government does not consider that this cO:1dition has been ful~ filled ..." [8JOlh meeting, para. 48.] In my opinion, that is a perfectly correct interpretation of the United Nations Charter. It follows logically that the United States had no justifcation, either in law or in fact, for intervening. What I have just said also applies to the intervention of th~ United Kingdom in Jordan. 110, A further argument put forward to justify United States intervention was the prlJtection of American nationals. This pretext is also not justified, in law or in fact. The dlplom:Hic history uf t.he nineteenth century shows that the alleged protection of a country's nat.ionals was originally used as a pretext for the armed intervention oj the great Powers in the internal alIairs of other States. It is our view tllat with the establishmenL uf the system created by the United Nations Charter, this practice, which was a necessary corollary of an outmoded colonial system, should have disappeared, the more so as the lives and interests of Americans have been fully respected during the sixty~ftve days tile Lebanese crisis has lasted. We have received no report that any United States citizen has bcen molEsted. 111. Therefore, neither the Charter, nor the principles of international law, uor the present situlltion in Lebanon - particularly alter tlle entry into force of tIle United Nations resollLLion - ean in any way justify the serious decision taken by the United States Government. What is more, the situation in Iraq, which is strictly an Imqi internal affair, hns been stabilized. 112. According to press reports, and particularly those in The New York Times of this morning, "the troops 11Sd returned to their harracks .•. and women went shopping" as usual in the streets, The landing of Briti:;h troops in Jordan has unfortunately aggravated the international situation. That explains and corroborates ::he view] have repeatedly expressed ill the Council that the reason for the landing is not the situation in Lebanon, which can easBy htl seWed in Lebanon itself, if. for instance, the ejections of the President of the Re- 109. .rai deja explique, a plusieurs reprises, gut" l'Article 51 de In Clmrte des Nations Ullies :le s'appJi<::t1<! pas en la matiere. Le rcprcsentllnL de la Suede, dans son inlervention d'hier, a bien eJ\prime ce point de vue. .Ie me pcrmets de citer un passage de son inter· vention qui est tres perUnent : "L'uue des conditions qui cloivent ctr<! remplies pow' que l'Article 51 de la Charte sot applicable est qu'une aUaque armee ait eu lieu contre un Etal Membre. Dc l'avis du Gouvemement slcdois, cette cDndition n'cst pas remplie dans le cas !=l'cscut [...1. " [S3n~ seanc,~, par. 48.] A mOn avis, c'esL lA une interpretation tr~s cOITeete de la Charte des Nations Unies. La consequence logi<;ue que je tire de ce qui precede, c'est que les Elats-Unis n'avaient, ni en droit ni en fait, de motif pO:lr intervenir. De meme, ce que je dis s'appliqll," exactement a l'inter· vention du Royaume·Uni en Jonlanie. 110, On a invoque aU8si, pOul justifier cette ink-rvention des Etats-Unis, la protection des ressortissants amcricains, Ce pretexte non plus u'cst pas justifie, ni en droit ni en fait. En eUeL, l'histoire diplomatiqui'. du XIX" sEcle nous enseigne qu'a l'origine cette pretendue protection des ressortissants d'un Etat n cite utilisee CDnlme un prctexte pour l'interventlon armee des grandes puissances dans Les affaires interieul'es des atttres Etats. NOllS p"~timons que, avec !'inauguration du systerne cree par la Charte des Nations Unies, cette pratique, qui formait un complement nccessaire d'un systemE colonial perime, aurait dtl prendre fin, d'autant plus que, alors que la crise libanaise a dllre 65 jours, la vie des Amencains ou lenrs intcirets ant etc complCtement respectes. Nous n':l,vons aucunc information relatant qu'un su:ct americain ait litd molesl£. 111. Done, nj la Charte, ni les princijJes du droit international. ni la sltllation actllelle du Liban - sllrtout avec la mise en (Cuvre d'llllercsoIutioll dtOS Nations Vnies - ne sauraient, en aUC:.l1l cas, justifier cette grave decision qui a etc prise pur le Gouvernement des Etats-UIlis d'Amerique. De plus, la siLuation en Irak, qui est line alIaire purement interieure irakienne, s'est stabilisee. 112. D'apres les iluormalions des journaux, et notamment cencs du New York Times de ce matill, nous pouvuns lire que ({ les lroupes etaienL rentrecs au quartier [...] et les femmes se trouvaient dgn~ lef' rues, faisant le maJ'cM n comme d'habitude. Le debarquement des troupes britanniques en Jordanie a malheureusement aggrave la situation internationale. Cela explique et corrobore la these que j'ai SOil tenlle a plusieurs reprises devant Jp. Conseil, it savok que le motif de ce debarquement n'est pas la situation qui 113. Thus, the aggressive position taken without any justification by the United States and the United King~ dam can but endanger the maintenance of peace and security in this area of the world. Those who took this decision have assumed the responsibilily, and history will not forgel it. The movements of fleets, troops and aircraft in this part of the world are a sinister forecast of what may come. World public opinion has been alerted. From the world's newspapers today, in particular The New York 'l'imes, it is clear that responsible political leaders and eminent journalist have reaLized tile threat to world peaCe represented by these unjustified interventions. Even the members of the Opposition in the British Parliament have expressed their disapproval, as have many United States senators. I note, for example, that Senator John F. Kennedy said that the" general feeling was tllat it was an unwise move to send troops into Lebanon." 2 Similarly, Senator J. William Fulbright said that "the impli~ cations of pulting troops into the Middle East were tragic." 2 The Prime Minister of India has said that ,. if outside Powers inter-"ene in the internal affairs of Iraq and Lebanon, thcre is a danger of the total annihilation of humanity, because if one outside Power enters tlle area, anotber Power is bound to jump in." ~ I do not wish to burden the Council witll further quotations; fortunately, there are still wise men in this world. 1H. For its part, the United Arab Republic will continue its policy of co-operation with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, by which we abide. In our view, that is the only way to preserve peace, mankind's most precious gift. I ~5. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Since I have several speakers on my list and sillce tlle delegations which have su?miUed draft resolutions hope thal the present debate Wlll end as quickly as possible, I suggest - unless I hear any objection .__. that the Conndl reconvene at 8.30 p.m. The speal(er rend tile lllxt in English. 113. Done, l'attitude agrcssive prise par les Etals- Unis el k Royaume-Uni, altitude qui Il'a aucllue justification, ne peut que porter atteinte au maintiCtl de la poix et de la securitc dans le Moyen-Orient. Ceux qui ont pris cette decision ont engage leur l'CS- ponsabilite, d l'lIistoire le retiendra. Ccs mOllVemCl1t~ d'escadres, de troupes et d'avions dans ceUe partic du monde sont un sinistre presage de ce qui peul s'y derouler. Deja. I'opinion mondialc a ete alerlie. Nons voyons aLljourd'hui dans la presse de toIlS les pays, notamment dans le New York Times de cc mnLin, que des politiciens l'esponsablcs, des journalistes t;mi- nents, ont compris le danger que font couril' a In paix du monde ces interventions injustifiees. !\lelllC les membres de l'oppositioll au Parlemcnl britalllliqlle ont exprime leur desapprobation, ainsi que beaucoup de senateurs americains. .re vois que le senatL'Ul· .roltn P. Kennedy aurail cxprime le (( sentiment gen6ral " en dhmol (( que c'etait une mesure malavisee que d'envoyer des lroupes a\l Liban II 2. De meme, le senateul' J. William Fulhright a dit que !( I'envoi de troupes au Moyen-Orient pouvait avoir des inci- dences tr:>giqlles 11 2. Le Premier "Ministre de l'Iude a egalement declare que I( si des puissallcc:-; 6lrangeres interviennent dans les afTaires de l'Jrak cl du Liban il existe un danger cl 'all\~anlissemen l total de l'humanite: car si une puissance pcnetre dans la region, une aulm puissance ne manqucra pas d'y cntrcr cgalement n ~• .re ne voudrais pas continuer a faire dcs citations de: ce genre; heureusement tontefois qn'il y ;1 l'ncore des gens sages dans cc mondc. 114. La Republique nrabc nniC', de !>Oll c(He, POUl'- suivra sa politique de cooperation avcc I'Organislltion d~ N'ltions Unics conformcment ,l1lX disposition,<; de la Charte, que nous respectons. A notre avis~ c'esL le seul rnoyen de conserver la pai"" ]e hien le plus precieux de l'humanite. 115. Le PRf1SIDENT (lradllil de I'espaqnol) : Etnnt donne que plusieurs oratcurs sont inscrils sur la liste et que res delegations qui ont presente des projets de resolution desirent que Le present debut s'acheve ll\lssi rapidement que possible, je propose - a moins qu'on n'y voie une objection - que le Conseil se reuniss(~ a 20 h. 30. La seance esl leVCI' iI 18 h. :dO. Tt'Xl~ tile COli anglais pat' I'O[·atCllr.