S/PV.837 Security Council

The CotlUci! will now vote on the Japanese draft resolution [S/4055jR".lj. A vole was taken by show oj hands. In (avour: Canada, China, Colombia, France, Iraq, Japan, Panama, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of Arne~ rica. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Repul1lics. The resull 01 lhe /Jole was 10 in (avour and 1 against, The dralt resolution was nol adopted, (lie negative voLt! being that oj a permanent member ol/he Cotincil. 10. The SECRETAHY-GENERAL: The Secnrity Council has just failed to taJee additional action in the grave emergency facing us. Howcver, the responsibility of the United Nations to make all elTorls to live up to thc purposes and principles of the Chartel' remains. 11. The Council now has before it two proposals {S(4056, S(4057J for the calling of an emergency special session of the General Assembly, I c:'lIlllol anticipate its decision on those propo:'lals. However, time is of the 8ssellce, and, whatever the outcome of the further consideration in this Council, there is need for practical steps to be taken without any delay. That is tile back~ ground against which I would like to make the following declartltion. 12. In a sbtement before this Couneil on 31 October 1956, I said that the discretion and impartiality imposed on the Secretary-General hy the character of his immediate task must not degenerate into a policy of expediency ['151s( meeting, para. 4J, On a later occasion _. it was 26 September 1957 - I said in a statement before the General Assembly that I believed it 7. M. SOBOLEV (Union (les Republiques socialistes sovietiquel» [ll'I1dllit dll russe] : La delegation sovietique ne s'oppos(: pas a ce que chaque amendemcnt soit mis aux voix separcment. 8. Le PRESlDENT (traduit de l'e~pagnol) : Puisque <lIlCnn membre dn CQm;eiJ n'a propose de voter par division sur les nmendements presentes par l'URSS, bien que le representant de l'Union sovietiqae ait fait S3voir qu'il ne s'opposnit pas a ce qill': ron procedat de cetLe manierc, je v<lis mettre aux voix l'ensemble de ces 3l11cndements [8(4063], II est prQcide nu vole a main levee. Vote pour; Union des Republiques socialistcs sQvietiques. Votenl CDntre : Cauada, Chine, ColomJlie, France, Iral" Panama, Royaume-Uni de Gmnde-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Arne.rique. 8'abMiennenl. : Japon, Suede, Pal' 8 voix contl'e Ilnc, avec 2 abstentions, lcs amendements sont rcjetes. 9. Le PRESlDENT (lradltit de l'cspagnol) : Je met:'l aux voix le projet de resolution du Japan [Sj40fj5/RclJ, 1]. II est procMe all vote it. main lCllte. Votent pour: Canada, Chine, Colombie, France, lrak, Japan, Pe.nama, SU~de, Royaurne-llni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-UrUs d'Amcrique. Vote conl.re : Union dc~ Rcpublique! soeialistes sovietiques. 1l y a 10 voix pour el lIn~ voix contrt. La /Job,: contre etant celle d'Ull rnembre permanent du Conseil, le projet de resollltion n'cst pas adopfe. 10. Le SECRETAJHE GENERAL (traduit de ['angIais) .. Le Comcil de securite vient de se uouvcr dans l'incapacite de prendre d'autres mesures devant la grave crise qui now; preoccupe. Mais la. responsabilite de l'Organisation de,~ l'{ations Dnies demeure, qui est de ne Jicgliger aucur: effort pour agir conformement flUX buts et principcs de la Charte. 11. Le Conseil est muintenant saisi de dellx propositions relatives a la convocation de l'Assemblce gcnerale en se~sion extraordinaire d'urgcllce [Sf4056, 8/4057J. Je ne [Jeux prejuger sa decision a cc sujet. l\1ais le factcllf tempg est capital id, et, quels que Sllient les rcsuitats dlt nOllwl exnmen auquel procede!'" le Conseil, il importe de prendre des mp.5ures pratiques sans aucun delai. Ce que je vais dire s'inspire avant tout de ces considerations. 12. Dans une declaration faite devant (e Conseil le 31 octobre 1956, j'ai dit que la discretion et l'impar~ Halite qU'lmpose au Secretaire general la nature de sa t1'l.che immediate ne saurait'.nt degenerer en une poJitique d'opporcunisme [751n seance, par. 4). Dans une declaration ultcricure - eetait le 26 septembrr 1957 - j'ai dit dcvant l'Assemblce generale qu'a mon 13. It is my feeling that, in the ciTcumst~nces,what I stated ill those two contexts, on 31 October 1956 and 26 September 1957, 110W has full application. 14. I am sure that I will be acting in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if I, therefore, use all opportunities alTered to tl1e Secretary~General, within the limits set by the Charter and towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find ourselves. 15. First of all - the continued operation of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon being acceptable to all members of the Council ~ this will mean the further development of the Observation Group so as to give it all the signdicance it can have, consistent with its basic character as determined by the Security Council in its resolution of 11 June 1958 [S/4023] and the purposes and principles of the Charter. 16. The Council will excuse me for not being able to spell ont at tllis moment what it may mean beyond that. However, I am certain that what I may find it possible to do, acting llnder the provisions of the Charter and solely for the purposes of the Charter, and guided by the views expressed around this table to the extent that they have a direct bearing on the activities of the Secretary-General. will be rccognized by you as being in the best interests of the Organization and, thcrefore, of the cause of peace, 17. The Security Council would, of course, be kept fully informed on the steps taken. Were you to disapprove of the way these intentions were to be translated by me into practical steps, I would, of course, accept the consequences of your judgement. 18, The PRESIDENT (ll'anslale.d from Spanish): At this point in our discussion, I wish to make a number of observations in support of a motion 1 propose to submit at the end of this statement. 19. The Council must consider four basic facts which are of utmost importance. In the first place there is the statement made a moment ago by the Sccretary- General in which he made it clear that the United Nations will not adopt the passive attitude of a mere 13, J'ai le sentiment que ce que j'ai declare alors, le 31 octobre 1956 et le 26 septembre 1957, s'applique sans restriction aux circonstallces actuelles. H. Je suis certain d'agir conlormement aux desirs des membres du Conseil si, en consequence, je mets a profit tOlltes les possibilites qui, dans les limites imposees par la Charte et eu egard a I'action entreprise par rOrganisation, s'offrent au Secretaire general d'empecher que la situation ne s'aggrave encore au Moyen- Orient et d'aider it trouver une issue a la situation dangereuse OU nous nous trouvons actuellement. 15. Tout d'abord -le mllintien en activite du Groupe d'observation des Nations Unies au Liban etant acceplable pour tous les membres du Conseil - cela signifie le renforcement du Groupe d'observation afin de lui dOlUler toute l'importnnce qu'il peut avoir, compte tenu de son caractere essentiel, tel qu'il a etl! defini par le Conseil de securite dans sa resolution du 11 juin 1958 [5/4023], llinsi que des buts et principes de la Chartc. 16. Le Conseil m'excusera de ne pouvoir preclser, pour l'instant, les autres consequences a prevoir, Mais je suis certain que tous id trouveront conforme a I'interet bien compris de l'Organisation, et done utile ala cause de la paix, ce que je pourrai faire, en agissant confonnement aux dispositions de la Charte et dans le soud exclusif des buts de la Charte, et en n\glant mu conduite sur les opinl.ons exprimees ici m~me, daus la mesure ou elles concernent directement I'activite du Secretaire general. 17. Il est bien entendu que le Conseil de secnrite serait tcnu pleinement au courant des mesures prises. S'il arrivait que vons desapprouviez la maniere dont ces intentions se traduiraient en pratique, il va de soi que j'accepterais les consequences de \'otre jugement. 18. Le PRESIDENT (lraduii de I'espagnol) : A ce stade dll debat, j'estime qu'il est de mall devoir de formuler quelques observations qui inspirent une motion que j'ai l'intention de presenter a la fm de mon intervention. 19, Le Conseil doit tenir compte de quatrc facteurs fondamentaux de la plus grande importance. Il doit tenir compte, en premier lieu, de l'expose dans lequelle Secretaire general vient d'indiquer que l'Organisation des Nations Unies n'allait pas, dans cette situation , Documen.ts officiels de l'AssembUe !len.t!ral~, douzitme session., St!all£es pUn.ieres, 6900 seance, par. 72. I Ibid" tlar. 73. 20. J\-1ais le ConseD doit egalement tenir compte d'un second facteur : nul n'ignore que le ParLement libanais sem en mesure d'elire un nouveau president a la fin de cette semaine. Cette election, qui peut etre le rcsuItat d'un accord negocil~ dans un esprit de patriotisme entre l'opposition libanaise et le parh qui appuie le gouvernement, ferait beaucoup ;Jour le reglement de cette situation complexe qui risque de provoquer un conflit. Il est impossible de prevail' la date a laqueUe aura lieu cette election; aux termes de la Constitution libanaise, clle doit avail' lieu a partir du 24 juillet. 20, The Council must, however, consider a second factor. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Lebanese Parliament will he in a position to elect a new President at the end of this week. The election of a new President, which may be done as the result of a patriotic agreement between the opposition and the Government party in Lebanon, would do much to clarify the compLex: and confusing sitllation which exists today. The date of the election, which under the Lebanese Constitution should begin on 24- July, cannot be anticipated. 21. Dans ccs conditions, tout parte a croire que le Conseil ne doit pas ecarter une solution de compramis qui permettrait de supprimer radicalement les causes des mouvements qui bouleversent le Moyen~Orient. 21. In the circumstances, everything seems to indicate that the Council should not close the door to a compromise solution which would eliminate the causes of the unrest which has been keeping the Middle East in turmoil. 22. n est un troisieme facteur, qui est, sinon plus, du moins tout aussi important que les precedents : le President du Conseil des ministres de l'Union sovie~ tique a invite les chefs des gouvernements des Etats- Hni!; d'Amerique, du Royaume-Uni. de la France et de l'Inde a tenir, le plus tM possible, avec la pgrticipation du Secretaire general des Nations Unies, une conference ( au sommet D pour rechercher une solLttion dont on puisse recommander l'adoption au Conseil de securite, de maniere amettre fin ataus les differends qui dechire.nt actuellement le Moyen-Orient [5(4059]. 22. But there is a third factor, just as important as those I have mentioned, if not more so: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union has invited the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France and India to meet with him as soon as possible at a summit conference, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to seek a solution which could be recommended to the Security COlLllcil as a means of settling all the disputes which so gravely disturh life in the Middle East today [S(4059]. 23. Nous ne connaissons que quelques-unes des reponses des gouvernements a l'invitation dont je viens de faire mention, Le Secretaire d'Etat aux afIaires etrangeres du Royaume~Uni a annonce publiquement que son gouvernement serait dispose a participer a une conference de ce genre a condition qu'elle ait lieu dans le cadre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le Gouvernement des Etats~Unis d'Ameriq!le a fait une dE!claration d'une teneur analogue et d'une egale importance. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux affaires exte~ rieures du Canada a fait savoir, dans son imporlante intervention d'hier [835e seancej, que son gouvernement, vu les recents evenements du Moyen~Orient, jugeait oJlportun d'examiner a une conference au niveau le plus eleve les probIemes concernant cette region. Nous savons tous que les minislcres des afTaires etran~ geres des autres pays sont en train d'etlldier la proposition du President du ConseD des mjnistres de l'Union sovietique, et hien que, pour des raisons 0videntes, ces pays ne soient pas invites a parliciper a la conference, nil ant le devoir, al'egard de leurs pe.uples et al'egard de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, de bire conr.aitre cc qu'ils pensent de l'invitation en question. 23. We have learned the reactions of only some of the Governments concerned to the important invitation J have mentioned. TIle Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom stated publicly that his Government would be disposed to take part in a conference of Lhis sort within the framework of the United Nations. The Government of the United States llas made a similar statement which is equally important. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the important statement he made yesterday [835th meeting]. said that in view of recent developments in the Middle East his Government felt the time had come to discuss these problems in a conference on the highest leveL. We all know that the other foreign ministries are studying the proposal made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and although for obvious reasons they are not invited to the conference it is their duty to their own peoples and to the United Nations to make known their feelings and reactions with regard to the invitation. 24. Enfin, il faul tenir compte d'un quatri~mefadeur, qui est egalement de la plus grande importance : la 24. There is still another factor of the greatest impor~ tance: the delegation of the United States and the dele~ 25. These factors, whicb I have tried to list us briefly as possible, show that the United Nations is going to play all effective part in the area in which world peace is endangered and secondly, that the foreign ministries of the world have before them a series of proposals which it would be sheer madness, if I may use so strong an expression, La underestimate or disregard. Accordingly I take this opportunity to appeal to all the countries which arc in any way involved in tlJe conflict in the Middle East to do nothing, however insigrlilicallt it may seem, that might aggravate the complex situation existing in that crucial area. 26. In the light of these consideJ'Il.tions I propose to adjourn the meeting in accordance with rule 33, paragraph 2, of the Council's rules of procedure. The Council will be reconvened immediately on the request of any member, after eael] member of thc Council has been consulted.. , 27. Although I have proposed that the Council should adjourn in accordance with rule 33, paragraph 2, of its rules of procedure, I am ready to call on the representative of the Soviet Unian.

I am aware, Mr. PreM sident, that under the rules of procedure a motion for the adjolll'llIJIent of a meeting is decided without debate, blLt I was convinced that you, as President, would give the members of the Council an opportunity, before adjournment, to express their views on our furtller procedure, not with regard to the adjollrnment of the meeting but with regard to what the Council should do in order to reach a decision on the extremely important item that is on its agenda. I thank you for giving me this opportunity. 29. The proposal that the Council should interrupt its work without setting a date £01' its next meeting places it in a difficult position. The adoption of this proposal by the Council will mean tlhlt the world will not know when the Security Council is to resume its work, although everyone realizes that this work has not been completed. Tll.e entire world knows that there are specific propo~als before the Security Council regarding whnt action is to be taken by the United Nations when the Security Council is nnable to acL If the motion for adjournment is adopted, world opinion will have no indication as to when the Security Council will discuss these proposals and take a definite decision on them: tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, at the end of the week, next week or a month from now. In the meantime, events arc running their course and, I might S<'1.y, an ominou:'i course. 30. Mt'. President, you have referred in particular to an event which is to occur in the next few days and whicll. you have adduced as a reason for defcrring con- 25. Ces facteurs, que jf: me suis efforce d'analyser le plu~ brievement possible, montrent que l'Organisatioll des Nations Unies va continueI' a jouer un role actif et efficace dans 18 region OU la paix du monde est en pel'iL el que les ministeres des affaires etrang~res de tOllS les pays dn monde etudient une serie de propositions dont il scrait, si j'ose m'exprimer flinsi, insellse de sous-estimer Oll de meconnal:trc !'importance. C'cst pourquoi jc saisis cette occasion pour fnire appcl a tons les pays qui sont meles d'lIne mani~re quelconque au conflit du MoyenMOrient arm qu'ils ne contribuent en aucune fa!<on, si peu que te soit, it aggraver la situation deja forl complexe qui existe dans cette importante region du monde. 26. En cOllsequence, je propose, conformement a l'alinea b de l'artiele 33 du I'eglement interieur dl1 Conseil, de lever la seante, et de convoquer de nouveau le Conseil a la demande de tout Etat Membre, apres consultation de tOllS les membres du Conseil." 27. Bien que faie propose de lever la seance conformement it !'nlinea b de t'article 33, je suis pret a donner la parole au representant de l'Union sovietique. 28. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Hepubliques socialistes sovietiques) [/raduil du russe] : Monsieur le President, je sais qlLe, aux termes du reglement interieur, il est statue sans debat sur toute proposition touchant la levee dc la seance, mais j'etais certain que vous permetlriez aux membres du Conseil, avant la fm de la seance, d'exposer leur point de vue sur la procedure :l wivl'c, c'est~a-dire non pas sur la levee de la seance, mais sur ce que le Conseil doH faire pour regler la question extremement grave inscrite a son ordre du jour. .le vous remercie de m'llvoir donne edte possibilite. 29. Si le COllseil adoptait la proposition tendant a interrompre la discussion sans ftxer la date de la prochaine seance, il se trom'erait place dans une situation difIicile, n en resulterait que le monde ne saurait pas quand le Conseil repl'cndra ses travaux, alars que nul n'ignore que Il.OllS n'avons pas termine notre tache. Lc monde entier sait que le Conseil de securite est saisi de propositions concretes sur cc que I'Organisation des Nations Unies doit faire si le Canseil n'est pas ell lllesure d'aglt'. Si la motion d'ajournement est adoptee, I'opinion publique mondiale ne saura pas quand le Conseil de securite abordera l'examen dt: ces proJlositioll.s et se prononcera a leur sujet : demain, apres-demain, a la fin de la semaine, la semaille prochaine OlL dans un mois. Pendant ce temps, les evenements suivent leur cours, et je dirai meme qn'ils ne presagent Tien de bono 30. Monsieur le President, vous avez mentionne en particulier un evenement qui doit se produire ees joursMci et vous y avez vu une raison d'ajourner l'exa- 31. My second point is this. You, Mr. President, have also very properly drawn attention to the Soviet Government's proposal for a meeting of the I-leads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations rS/40591, to study the situation in the Near and Middle East with a view to fmding some solution to the present threatening situation, which is fraught with considerably greater dangers than those facing us now or any that we can imagine. 32. It is a fact that such a proposal has been made and that it has not yet been answered, although the date for such a meeting was fixed, provisionally, for 22 July. Let me assure you, Mr. President, that this proposal was by no means inLended to delay the work of the United Nations for the restoration of peace ill the Near and Middle East. On the contrary, its pur_ pose was to speed up the search for a settlement which would, on the one hand, satisfy the national interests of the people of that area and, on the other hand, lead to a removal of the threat to peace and security now hanging over not only the Near and Middle East but also the entire world. It is therefore difficult for me to accept that the Soviet Government's proposal should be used as a pretext for interrupting the operation and action of the Security Council or of the United Nations as a whole, In my view, such an interpreta. tion of the Soviet Government's proposal is not in l{eeping with the noble aims embodied in that proposal. 33. The Security Council today had an opportunity of fulfilling the duty entrusted to it by the peoples and by the Charter to maintain peace and security. It had an opportunity to adopt a resolution that would have been in complete accord with the Charter and the expectations of the world, If the Security Council had accepted the Soviet amendments to the Japanese delegation's draft resolution and had adopted the draft m its amended form, it would have taken a decision 31. Deuxiemement, vous avez mentionnc, monsieur le President, tres justement d'ailleurs, la proposition du Gouvernement sovietique prevoyant la reunion d'llne conference des chefs des gouvernem~ts de l'Union sovietique, des Etats-Unis d'Amc)'ique, du RDyalllne- Uui, de la France et de l'Inde, avec I<l. participation du Secretaire general de l'Organisation des Nations Unies [Sj4059J, en vue d'cxamin('r la situation dans le Proche-Orient et le Moycn-Orient et de trouver une issue a cette ~itllation grave, qlli risque d'avoir des consequences heaucoup plus dangerellses que nous ne pouvons i'imaginer maintennnL 32. Gette proposition existc en effet, et, jllsqu'a present, eUe est restee sans reponse, bien que la date de la conference envisagee ait etd fixee, it titre preliminaire, au 22 juillet. Mills je vous assure, monsieur le President, que eette proposition n'avail nullement pour ohjet d'enlraver l'Organisation des Nations Ullies dans l'execution de ses fonctions touchant le r6tabIissement de la paix dans le Procile-Orient et le Moyen-Orient. Au contl'aire, clle apollr but d'accelerer la recherche d'une solution qui, d'une part, serve les interets nationaux des peuples de cette region et, d'autre part, ecarte la menace a la paix et it la sCcurite qui pese non seulement sur le Proche-Orient et le Moyen-Orient, mais sur le monde entier. C'est pourquoi, monsieur le President, il m'est difficile d'admettre que cette proposition du Gouvernement sovictique puisse servir de pretexte pour empechcr le COflsei! de securite ou l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble de fonctionner ct d'agir. Je pense qu'une telle interpretation de la proposition du Gouvernement sovietique mcconnait les nobles intentions qui J'inspirent. 33. Le Conseil de sccurite pouvait aujourd'hui s'acquitter du devoir que lui conferent les peuples et la Charte touchant lemail1tiendelapnixetdelasecurite.Il pouvait prendre une deci~ion entierement conforme a la Ch:.ute et aux aspiratioll~ des peupJes. Si le ConseiJ de securit.C avait actoptc Jes amendement~ de l'Ullion sovietique au projet de resolution du Japan, et ~'il avait adopte ce projet ainsi modi fie, jJ aurait pris precisement la decision qu'uttendent de tui les peuples 34, The Council, however, has again been paralyzed by the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom in their opposition to the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union, Sir Pierson Dixon has said that the vote of the United States and the United Kingdom in this instance is not a veto. That, however, is incorrect. The vote of the representatives of these two countries against any proposal is just as much a veto as any other negative vote by a permanent member of the Council, because, as Sir Pierson must be perfectly aware, his vote against a pW[Josal, irrespeclive of the vote of other representatives, means that the proposal will not be adopted by the Council. TJlUs, again today, the attitude of the United States and of the United Kingdom has been decisive in paralyzing the Council and making it incapable of acting in accordance will! its responsibilities as defined in the Charter. 35. If the Security Council is incapable of acting, there are other proposals b!!fore it which would open the way for bringing into operation another important organ of the United Nations: the General Assembly. In my view, the Council would have done right to study these IJroposals and take a decision on them. This is pre~ cisely what the peoples of the world expect of the Security Council. 36. In my view, the meeting SllOUld not be adjolJrned without a date being set [or the next meeting of the Council. In the face of the continued deterioration of the situation in the Near and Middle East, the Council cannot defer its decision for long, It would have actcd properly if it had continued its work tomorrow, not suspending it for an indefinite period but acting quickly, resolutely and with a sensc of 1ll'gency. 37. TIle PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council itas before it a question of procedure, the representative of Lebanon having usked [or the floor. I am inclined to the view that there should be no debate on the motion submitted under rule 33, paragraph 2, of the Council's rules of procedure. Nevertheless, in view of the circumstances in which the representative of Lebanon is participating in this discussiull, and in order not to interpret rule 33 too strietly. I will, it there are no ohjections by members of the Council, call on the Lebanese representative to make a brief state~ ment.

I must thank you, Mr. President, and the Council fol' this opportunity to say a few words at the close of lhe debate. The Council has made commendable efforts to find a solution to the problem of foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon, but unfortunately they have led to no concrete result. I must therefore express my Government's regret that these efforts, although substantial and sincere, have not succeeded in helping my Government to avert the danger which 34. Or, le Conseil de securite s'est trouvB paralyse une fois de plus en raison de la position des Etats~Unis et du Royaume-Uni, qui se ~ont prononce.s contre leg amendemenh de l'Union sovietique. Sir Pierson Dixon a soutenn que le vote des Etats~Unis et du Royaume_ Uni n'elait pas en l'occurrenc~ un veto. Cela n'est pas exact. II y a veto chaque fOls que vous, sir Piersoll ou le representant des Elats-Unis, vous pronQnce~ contre line proposition, de meme que Lorsqu'un autre membre permanent du Conseil de securite emet un vote negatif, car vous savez fort hien que, quel que soit le vote emis par les autres representants, votre vote negatif sigllifie que la proposition mise aux voix ne sero pas adoptee par le Conseil. C'est done en raison de la position des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni que le Conseil de securitc se trouve aujourd'hui encore paralyse, incapable d'agir conformement nux obligations qui lui sont imparties par la Charte. 35. Si le Conseil de SeCUl'ite n'est pas a m~me d'ogir, d't\utl'es propositions pcrrneLtent A un autre orynne important de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ~ savoir l'AssemblCe generale, d'intcrvcnir, Je pense que le Consei1 ferait hien d'examiner ces propositions et de se prononcer a lenr egard. C'cst ce que les peuples du monde attendcnt du COlLseil de securite. 36. Jc pense que I'on ne pent lever la seance 5ans fixer la date de la prochaine seance. Dans 11'.5 circonstances actuelles, alors que la situation dans ie Proche~Orient et le Moyen-Orient continue de s'aggravcr, le Conseil ne securitc ne peut stlfseoir longtemps asa decision, et il femil bien de poursuivre ses travaux des demain, sans les remettrc ;) plus tard, et d'agir rapidement, resolument et snns delai. 37. Le PRESIDENT (tradllil de l'espagnol) : Le Conseil se trollVC en presence d'ulle question de procedure. Le representnnL du Liban a demande la parole. Je suis d'avis ql1'il ne devrait pas y avoir de ctebnt sur la motion que j'ai presentee ell vertu de l'alinea b de {'article 33 dtl reglement interieur du Conseil. Mais en cgal'd a la situation specialc dans laquelle se trouYC le representant du Uban ct de peur d'interpreter de fa~on trap etroite l'articlc 3:~ dtl reglemcnt, je vais donner la parole a cc representant, si les membrcs du Conseil n'y voient pas cl'objection, afin qu'il puisse fflirc la breve intervention qu'il a o.nnoncee. 38. M. AZKOUL (Lihall) : .le vous remercie, monsieur le President, ainsi que les lllcmbres du Conseil, de m'avoir donne la possibilitc de dire quclques mots ;\ la fill de ce dlillat. Les efTorts IouabIes deployes p~r Le Conscil pOllr trouver une solution nu problemc de l'intervenLion extericurc clans les atIujrcs interieurcs du Liban n'ont mfllheureusement pns abouti a un resultat COncrct. Je dois done exprimer le regret de man gouvernemcnt que ccs efforts, (!Ii depit de leur amplc~r et de La sillccritc qui les a anirnes, n'aient pu Il.voir ·It.l. The PRESIDENT (transla(ed from Spanish): The Council has before it tbe President's molion to adjourn in .:.lccordance with rule 33, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure. }t vole was laken by show of htlnd~.. In favour: Canada, China, Colombia, France, [rag, Japan, Panama, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Arrainsl: Union of Suviet Socialist Repllblics. Tht'- motion was I1dopted fly 1() votes 10 1. The meeting f'(Jse at 4.46 p,l1l. <1D. Le PRESIDENT (tradllil de l'espagnol) : Le ConseiL est soisi de la motion d'ajournement que j'ai Ilr~scnlee conformement U l'alinea b de l'article 33 du reglcmcnt interieur. II I'.sl pror.r.de au vote d main lev~r.. Voiclll pOUl' : Canada, Chine, Colombie, France, Irak, JapolL, Panama, Suede, ROYUllLllcwUni de Gl'ande- Bretagne c.t d'Irlunde du Nord. Etats-Unis d'Amerique Vote contre .' 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