S/PV.838 Security Council

I wish to draw the attention of members to the Secretary- General's report [S/4080] dated 6 August 1958 to the President of the Security Council concerning the credentials of the representativ<J of Iraq to the Security Council and also to the letter dated 5 August 1958 from tJle permanent representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General 15/4081J. In the opinion of the Secretary-General tile eredentials of the representative of Iraq are in order. 2. There is no need fDr me to introduce Mr. Jawed to the CQuncil. \Ve all know him and hphas many personal friends among the members of the Council, on which he has aLready represented his country on several or.r.asions.

I am extremely grateful to the President and pleased with the kind words he has addressed to me. I am certainly gratified to occupy President: M. Guillaume GEORGES-PICOT (France). Presents: Les representants de3 pays suivants : Canada, Chine, Colombie, France, Irak, Japon, Panama, Suede, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretngne et d'Irlandc du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Ordre dll jour pcovuoire (S/Agenda/838) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 22 mai 1958, adressee au President du Conscil de securite par le representant du Libao, concernant la question suivante: ~ Plainte du Liban touclmnt une situation creee par l'inter· vention de la Republique arabe unie dans lea afIaires interieures du Lihao, et dont la prolongation est susceptible de menacer le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales)) (5/4007). 3. Lettrc, en date du 17 juillet 1958. adressee au President dll Ganseil de securite par le representant de la Jordanic, concemant la question sllivante : «Plainte du Royaume hachcmite de Jordonie pour ingerence de la Republique arabe unie dans ses allaires interieure!i )) (5/4053). Pouvoirs du representant de l'Irak L Le PRESIDENT: J'attire l'attention des membres du Conseil sur le rapport, en date du 6 aoOt 1958, adresse par le Secretaire general au President du CODseil de securite [8/4080j, sur III qllestion des pouvoirs du representant de r [rak au Conseil de securite, ainsi que sur la lettre en date du 5 aout 1958 adres.'lce par le representant permanent de I'Irak au Sccretaire general (S/4081J. Le Sccretaire general reconnait que les pouvoirs du representant de l'lrak sont en bonne et dne forme. 2. Je n'ni pas be:;oin d'introduire aupres 1111 Conscil M. Jawad. que nous Cllnnaissons tous et qui compte parmi les membres du Conseil, OU il a deja souvent siege, de nOlllbrcux amis personnels. 3. M. SAWAD (TraIt) {trarluil de l'anglaisJ : Je remercie infiniTnent le President des aimables paroles qu'il a bien voulu m'adresser. Je suis particulierement heureux 4. Allow me to take this opportunity to convey to you all and, through you, to all members of the United Nations the sincere greetings of the Government of the Iraqi Republic. With the coming of the Republic, a new page in the history of Iraq and the Arab countries has been started. A new stage has heen set for the ascending of free national forces to assume their historical mle in building a new world. 5. The patriotic movement which was undertaken by the army on 14 July, with the support of all the Iraqi people, was purely internal. It aimed at liberating Iraq fmm the evils of a corrupt Government and a reactional)' regime. The leaders of this movement have declared from the first that the Iraqi Government will honour its international obligations as dictated by the interesls of the country, and establish its foreign relations with all States and, in particular, with the Arab and Moslem countries in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. My Government, therefore, is determined to co-operate with all members of the Uniled Nations and will endeavour to promote friendly political and economic relations with them in a manner which safegllards the interests of Iraq in international fields and with a view to strengthening the foundations of iuternational peace and justice. For this reason the new Iraqi Government will uphold its international obligations, both political and economic, while it will be endeavouring through peaceful means to develop them in conformity with the requirements and dictates of regional and international conditions. Expression of thanks to the retiring PresidoDt

Before taking up the question of the adoption of the agenda, I want to turn from the representative seated all my left to the representative seated on my right and to pay a lribute to the retiring President, Mr. Araujo, the representative of Colombia. 7. We have had an opportunity to appreciate his wise and timely contributions to the debate as representative of Colombia. I regret that as I was away from New York at the time I did not have the honour of sitting on the Council while he was President in July, but I know from my alternate and from other colleagues on the Council, and from reading the records of lhe meetings held in July, that Mr. Araujo had to pre.~ide over lengthy and difficult debates and that he did so with the wisdom, tact, conscientiousness and courtesy he has displayed in his statements as the representative of his country. 4. Qu'il me soit permis de saisir ceHe occasion pour vous adresser a tous, et, par votre inlermediaire, <itous les Etats Membres de rOrganislltion des Nations Unies, le chaleureux salut du Gouverncmenl de la Republique d'Irak. Avec I'avenement de la Repl1bJique, une nouvelle page est tournee dans l'histoire cle l'Irak et des pays arabes. La situation nouvellc permet la montee des forces nationales libres, qui assumeront leur rOle historiqne dans l'edification d'urJ monde nouveau. 5. Le mouvemenl patriotique d6clenche le 11 jllillct par l'armee et soutenu par le peuple imkien tout entier est une affaire purement interieure. Il vise ;!I lib6rer l'Irak des mallX que llli valaient UI1 gouvernement corrompu et un regime reactionnllire. 5es chefs ant declare d'emblee que le GOllverncment irakien honorerait les obligations internationales que lui dicte l'in~ teret du pays et qu'il etablirait, conforrnement a la Charte des Nations Unies, des relations diplomatiques lIvec tous les Etats, et, en particulier, les Etats arabes et musulmans. Mon gouvernement est done decide a cooperer avec tous les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et il s'efforcera d'entretenir avec eux des relations amicales dans le domaine politique et economique de favon a sauvegarder les interets inter· nationaux de I'Irak et it aJTermir les bases de la paix et de la justice intcl'Ilalionales. En consequence, le nouveau gouvernement irakien respectera ses engagemenls internationaux, tant politiques qu'economiques, toul en s'effon;ant, pal' des voies pacifiques, de les developper conformement aux c-xigences et aux imperatifs de la siluation l'egionale et mondiale. Remerciements au President 80rtant 6. Le PRl!SIDENT : Avant de proceder a l'adoption de I'ordre du jour, je voudl'ais me tourner du representant qui siege a ma gauche vers le representant qni siege a ma droite et rendl'e hommage au President sortant, M. Araujo, representant de la Colombie. 7. Nous avions eu l'occasion d'apprecier les interven~ tions pcrtinentes et sagaces du represen l~Hlt de la Colombie en tant qlle representant. .J'ai regreLtc de n'avoir pas ell l'honneur de sieg:er sons sa presidence pendnnt le mois dejuillet, ayant etc absent ace momentlil. de New-York, mais je sais, par le representant adjoint de mon pays et par nos autres collegues du Conseil, et rai pu constater en lisant les proces-verbaux des reunions qui ont eu lieu en juillet, que M. Araujo avait eu a presider des debats longs et difficiles et qu'il l'avait fait avec cette meme sagesse, cette meme finesse, cette meme conscience et cette ffieme courtoisie que nous avions eu l'occasion d'apprecier deja dans ses interventions comme representant. Adoption of the agenda Adoption lie I'Qrdre du jour Letter dated 22 May 195B from the representative of Lebanon to the Pre~idcnt of the Security Council concerning "COlUplainl by Lebanon in rellpect of a situation arising from the intervention of the l'nited Arab Republic in lhe internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to Lettre, en dale du 22 mai 1958, adressee au Presidenl du CODseil de securite par le representant du Liban, concernant la que"tion suivante : c( Plllinte rlu Liban toucllunt uue situation creee par I'intervention de la Republique srabe Ilnie dans les affaires inttS~ rieures du Lihan, et dont la proJongatiuD est sU8eep~ tiJJle de menaeer le maintien de la paix et de la seen- dte iulerDahonalCll » (8J4007, 5/4056/Rev. I, S/4057/Rev. 1, S/4078) leure, en dale du 17 juilltt 1958, adteseee au President du CODSeil de seclIrile par le rCllresenlllDt de la 101'. dame, concemant la question BWVStlte : u Plainte du Royaume hachtSmile de Jordanie pour ingerence de la Repuhlique arabe unie dans seB affaires inte~ rieDre!;!» (8/4053, S/4&56/Rev. 1, S/4057/Rev. I, S/4078) endan~er the maintenance of international peace and security" (5/40U7, SJ4U56jRev.l. S/4057/Rel'. I, S/4078) Letter dated 17 July 1958 from the representative of Jordan to the President of Ihe S~curity Council concerning "CGmplaint by the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan Gf interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic" (5/4.053, S/4056/Re". I, 5/4057/Rev.I, 5/4078) Sur l'invitation dll President, M. A. Ghaleb Toukan. representant de la JOl'danie, M. KariIll Azkou{. repre- sentant du Liban, et M. Omar Louffi, reprcunlant de la Ripublique «rabe unie, prennenl place Cl le. table du Conseil, At tile inIJilalinn 0/ the Presi.dent, Mr. A. Ghnleb Touknn, representative of Jordan, Mr, Karim Azkoul, representative 0/ Lebanon, and Mr. Gmar £Cutli. repre- sentative 0/ the United Arab Republic, took places at the CQuncil table. 10, Le PRESIDENT: Avant d'aborder la discussion des questions a l'ordre dll jour, j'attire I'attention des membres du Cnnseil ~nr la leUre du representant per- manent de l'Union des R~pubIiques socialistes sovie.... tiques {S/4078j par laquelle ce dernjer a demande la reunion actuelle du Conseil pour que soit ::onsideree la proposi·~ion de I'Union Rovietiqtlc rl~ r.onvol1uer une session extraordinaire d'urgence de J'AssembJee generale des Nations Unies.

Before we take up the items on our agenda, I should like to draw the attention of memoers to the letter from the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/4078] requesting this meeting of tlle CO'.lOcil t.o consider the Soviet proposal for the convening of an emergency special session of the United Nalioll:> General Assembly. t!. J'Mtire t;gnlement )'attention des membres clu Conseil sur les deux projels de resolution anterieure- :nent :rresentes par les represenlr,nts des Etats-Unis d'Amerique IS/4056jReu. 1J et de l'Union des Republiques 3oc.ialistes sovi6tiqlll:s [S/4fJ.'i7jRev, 1J et demandant la convocation d'une session extr:wrdinaire d'llrgence de l'Assemblee generate. 1L 1 would also draw lbl;; attention of members to the two draft resolutions submitted earlier by the representatives of the United States of America rS/4056jRev.l] and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-- publics {Sj4()/j7jRev,lj requesting the calling of an emergency special session of the Genera] Assembly. 12. M, SOBOLEV (Union des R~pub]iques ~ocialistes sovi.etiqucs) {traduil du r!1ss!;] : La delegation sovietique a demande que le Conseil de securite se reunisse d'ur~ gence pour examiner la proposition de I'Union sQvietique Lendant a convoqufOr cne session cxtraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale, Je voudrais brievement exposer les rnisolls qni nailS ant incites i\. demander au Conseil de se reunir de nOilveau pour examinerles questions inscrites D. son ordre du jour. l:J. Mr. SOBOL~V (Union of Sovict Socialist Repulies) (translated fmm Russian): The Soviet delegation has asked for a special meeling of the Security Council to examine the Soviet Union's proposal to convene fln emergency special session of the General Assembly. I should like to explain briefly why we asked tIle Council to meet again to consider the question.~ on its agenda, 13. Plus de 20 joufs se sont ecouIes depcis que les troupes des Etats-Unis et du Royallme-Uni ont 13, Mne than twenty days have passed since United States and United Kingdom forces landed in the ten'ide~ Pe' 00' pleincrnent leur droit impt·cst.:riptillle de rcgll'r exrlA. . f' t' 1eurs alfaires interieure~ it lenr glllse ,et con orm..men ,3 leurs inwltts nationaux. ~outefOlS, .Ics Etats~UnlS d'Amerique, le Hoyaume~Uill et certom.~ l1~~r~s pay~ ont empeche le Conseil de prendre line dCClslOn gut aurait permis de retablir la situation et de r~tnurer IQ paix et la tranquillite dans le Proche-Onent ct 1l." pcacl~ and allowed la exercise. fully ~herr mah~nahle right tn manage their domestic affairs. accordmg to their own lights and their own national mterests. B~t the United Slates, the United Kingdom and e<;rtam other cuuntries prevented the Cou.ncH .from takmg a dedsiun aimed at restoring the slt~a~lUn. to normal and re_establishing peace and tL'anqUIlhty m the Near and Middle East. Moyen~Orient, 14. Le Conseil de sccurile, etunt donne sa COmp?sitio~ actuelle et ['attitude a son cgard rics Etats-UOls, qm detruit son efHcacitc en tant qu'iuslrllll1Unl uc paix, a ere incapable de faire le .lleccssaire pour mcttre imll1~­ diatcment fm a I'agrcsslon et pour aSSllrl'r le rctI1ul des troupes amerieaines ct britalluiques <lu LilJaI1 et de Jordanie. Ainsi, n un moment critique de tension internationale et de menace reelle de gLlCJTe, le Conscil de securite n'a pflS ete en mesure de s'acquittcr des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de III Chart~ des Nations Unies touchant le maintien de 10 paix et de la securire internationalcs. }.1, The Security Council, owing to its present compo- ~ilion and to lhe attitude of the United States towards it, which has destroyed its efficacy us an instrument of peace, has shown itself unable to take me~sures for ille immediate halting of aggression and the Withdrawal of Uniled States and United Kingdom forces from Lcbanon and Jordan. Thus, al a tritical moment of international t.ension and under a rcal threat of war, the Security Council proved unable to entry ou~ the responsibility for the m~in~enance of i,nternatl~nal peace and security v(Jsled III It by the Umted Nations Charter, 15. De plus, aIOl""S que le Conseil examinait It'S mesure... a prendre pour empecher le confiit de s'etclHJre dan, l'Orient arabe, les Etats-Unis ct le Royaumc~Uni c()otinuaient de debarqucr de nOllvellcs troupes nil Lii.lan et en. Jordanie et d'elargir ainsi la portee tic leur agre$- sion. 1:;. l'tloreover, despite the fact that the question of preventing the expansion of the conflict in the Ar~b Eust has been undcr discussion in the Security CouncIl, the United State.5 and the United Kingdom have con~ bnued to introduce an ever-increasing number of anned forces into Lel:mnon and Jordan and thus to expand the scale of their aggression. 16. Dans Cl'S conditions. le GOllvcrnemcnt de l'Union sovietique a, comme on le sait, prOpORe de rcunir d'urgence une conference des chefs <les gouverncments de I'URSS, des Etat.s-Unis d'Amerique, dn Hoyaumc-Unj. de la France et de l'Inde, nvec la participation tlu Seeretoire general des Nations Unit's lS/4(){)0), alin !it' prendre sans tarder des rnCSUl"CS efHeaC1'5 pour mcltf? fin au con/lit arme qui [l l'ic1ate dans l'Orient nrab(!o, Dans cette !'ltmosphere de tension cxtr~Illc, risquanl recllement de provoquer une nouve.lle gucrre lOo11dialt.\ la mesure preconisee par le GOllvernemcnl sovi",Uque constituait le moycn normal et rni~(lllnahl~ de dilllinu£'r la tension militairc et politicyue dam; ~dte nigion flu monde. En outre, le Gouvernemcnt sovictillue s't';.">l declare pret it ee que cette reunion de." cilds de gOUVt'f"- nement ait lieu n'irnporte ou, y compris New-York, et EL C(J qu'elle se deroule en dehors 011 dans le cadt'1" du Conseil de sCCurite, 16, For thesc reasons, the Soviet Union Government, as you all know, proposed to caU a meeting of the Heads of the Governments oL the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and lndia, with the participation of the Seeretary-General of the lJ:lited Nations IS/4050], in order to take early and cfTectiw action to halt the military conflict that has l!cgur, in the r(Jgion of the Arab East. In these cir~ eUlllslallccs of extreme tension, which carries with it the real danger of a new world war, the ~tep proposed by the Suviet Govcl'llment was the natural and rcas~ onallle way la relax military and political tension in that part of the world. As you know, the Soviet (lovernlllcnl also expressed its willingness to hold a meeting of the Heads of Governments at any place, including New York, either separately or within the framework of the S(Jcurity Council. 17" 'This constructive proposal by the Soviet Government provided a realistic way out of the difficult situation that,had arisen, It was warmly welcomed by all 17. Cette proposition constructive du Gouveru('Il11mt. sovietique perrncttait vraiment de so.lir de In ~itllutinn delicate qui a et(i creee. Elle u de chal(mreu,~cmL'llt appuye.e par tous les peuples paciliqucs. Elh~ l\ e.galement ree" l'appui des gouvemcments et d'erniucntli horn,rnes d'Etat de nombreux pays. Notrl'. proposition a ete appuyec par M. Nehrn, premier ministre de l'Indt'~ peace~lovlng peoples. It was also supported by the .~ovcrnmentsand eminent statesmen of many countries, Ihe proposal was supported by Mr, Nehru, Prime Minister of India and by the Government of that very 18. But this proposal by the Soviet Union did not suit the United States Government. After having been forced to agree to a meeting of Heads of GoverfL~ ment within the framework of the United Nations, the United States Government began to invent all kinds of artificial pretexts for preventing such a meeting. The SovieL delegation considers it unnecessary to draw the SecuriLy Council's attention to the details of tlle manceuvres to which the United States has resorted to prevent a meeting of Heads of Government. These mauccuvres are still fresh in the memory of DU tllOse present at this meeting. It is clear to everyone that the tactics of the United States Government in this matter were designed solely to prevent a meeting of I-leads of Government by all the means at its disposal and to prevent the adoption of measures which might bring Lhe situation back to normal in th~ Arab East. It must be admitted that the United States has to some extent been successful. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, ignoring the demands of world public opinio n, have in fact prevented a meeting of the Heads of the £lve Governments, thereby assuming a heavy burden of responsibility towards the peoples of the world. 19. TIle Soviet delegation feels in duty bound to draw the Security Council's attention to the fact that the aggressive activities of the United Stares and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East are continuing and UIat this is certainly not conducive to a relaxation of international tension. The armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom wlIich have invaded the territory of Lellanon and of Jordan are still there. The representatives of the United States are constantly asserting that they are anxious to withdraw the United States forces from Lebanese territory as soon as possible. Under the cover of these reassuring words, however, the United States is malcing every effort to build up its armed forces in the region. While the question was being discussed in the Security Council, the number of United States forces in Lebanon was increased from 3,500 to 15,000 men and even, according to some reports, to 20,000 men. The landing forces are bdng replaced by regular military units. Heinforcements, including tank units, are being urgently sent. It is obvious tliat the United States forces are not going to Lebanon for holidays at Lebanese resorts. The situation in Jordan is similar. The United Kingdom repres.:ntative has also assured the Council that the United Kingdom Government is prepared to take measures to withdraw its troops. But further contingents of United Kingdom armed forces are still being sent to Jordaaian territory and their strength has recently been increased to approximately 5,000 men. 20. It should also be added that new military measures have recently been taken in the countries of the Baghdad Pad, in order to prepare a base for expanding the aggression against the Arab States. 18. Toutefois, cette proposition de l'Union sovietique ne convcnait pas au Gonvernement des EtaL$-Unis. Contraint de eonsentir Et une reunion des chefs de gouvernement dans le cadre de l'OrganisaLion des Nations Vnies, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'est mis a inventer tontes sortes de pretextes artificiels pour eo emp€eher la convocation_ La delegation sovietique jnge inutile d'exposer en detail au Conscil de securite les manrenvres auxqnelles les Etats-Ullis se sont livrcs pour mettre obstacle it la conference des chefs de gOllvernemenL. Ccs manwuvres sont presentes a I'esprit de tOllS les repnisentants. 11 est clair que la tactique du Gouvernement des Etai.'J-Unis n'avait qu'un senl objet : empecher par tous les moyens la reunion de la conference des chefs de gonvernement et contrecarrer l'adoption de meSllres propres it retabIir une sitlldion norffinle dans l'Orient arabe. n faut rcconnaitre que le GOllvernement des Etats-Unis y est parvenu dans une certainI', mesure : au mcpris des exigences de I'opinion mondiale, les Gouvernements des Etatll-Unis et dll Royaume-Uni ont en ffAit emp€che la convoCfAtion de la conference des chefs des cinq gouvernements, et assume ainsi une lourde responsabilite devant les peuples du Olonde. 19. La de18gatioll sovietique estime de son devoir de signaler au Conseil de securite que les agissements agressifs des Etats-Unis el: du Royaume-Uni dans le Proche-Orient et le Mo:yen-Orient se poursuivent, et que cela n'est pas pour contribuer a un relachement de la tension dans le monde. Les forces armees americaineR et britanniques qui ont envahi le Liball et la Jordanie y sont toujours statiounees. Les reprcsentants des Etats-Unill n.e cessent d'affirmcr qu'ils brulent du desir de retirer le plus tot possible les troupes amcricaines du teITltoire libanais. Toutefois, sous le couvert de cos declarations rassurantes, Ies EtaLs-Unis accroissent fcbrilement leurs efJectifs dans la region. Pendant que la question se discutait au Conseil de securite, les efTectifs americains au Liban ont eM portes de 3.500 it 15.000 hommes - et, selon d'Qutres sources, a 20.000 hommes. Les troupes de debnrqnement sont relevees par des unites regulicres, et des rellforts, y compris des unites de cllars, sont envoyes d'urgence dans le pays. De toute evidence, les troupes des E-wts- Unis n'arrivent pas au Liban pour se reposer sur Jes plages libanaiscs. La situation est a peu pres la meme en Jordanie. Le representant du Royaume--Ulli a lui anssi afnrme au Conseil que le Gouvernement britannique est pret a prendre des dispositions pOUf retirer ses troupes. Cependant, de nouvelles lmites continuent de debarquer en Jordanie, les effectifs hritanniqtLes atteignant maintellant 5.000 hommcs environ. 20. Il eonvient d'ajouter que les pays signataires du Pacte de Bagdad ant recemment pris des mesures militaires pour jcier les bases d'une extension de I'agression contre les pays arabes. 22, Thus, tlIc world is slill not rid of the danger of an aggravation of lhe con1lict in lhe Near and Middle East and this is naturally bound to arouse the anxiety of all those who wislt to see an cnd to foreign intervention in the domestic aHairs Dj the Arab State.\; find tJ1e establishment of peace and tranquillity in t]le Amb East. 23. An attempt has been made to jusLify the invasion of Arab countries by United States and United Kingdom forces on the grounds of recent events in Iraq. TIle' whole world knows, however, that the evenls in Iraq, like those in Lehanon, are purely domestie and have not been cuused by any outside inlerference whatsoever. These even ts are the expression of the anger of the peoples of the Arab States, who have risen up against the ~ystems imposed upon them by imperialistic colonialists. 24, Everyone will remember lhe statements delivered here with artificial pathos by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives against the new Government of the RepubliC of Iraq, The United States representative eloquently described the horror of "bloody acts" of the young Arab State, which 11e himself invented. He was closely followed by the United Kingdom representative, who alleged that the new [raqi Government was illegal. Tlw United States and the United Kingdom unsuccessfully tried to deny tlle inalienable right of the people to establish the regime which they themselves wanted. But now they, like other Western Powers, have been obliged to recognize the republican Government of Iraq. Well, better late than never, as the saying goes. The whole world has witnessed the absolute failure of the obstructive tactics which the Uniled States and the United Kingdom tried to employ against the Republic of Iraq and of their endeavours to set up an iron curtain around Iraq. 25. Only three weeks ago, the Western Powers would not allow the legiLirnatc representative of the Republic of Iraq to take his rightful place in the Security Council. They were obliged to make a concession on this point also, and we are glad to welcome Mr. Jawad, the legitimate representative of the RepUblic of Iraq, to the Council table today. 26. The deliberate manreuvring of the United States with regard to the recognition of the Government of the Republic of Iraq enables us to draw the correct conclusions concerning "Mr. Du]]es' talk of so·calIed .. indirect aggression", "infiltration across the frontiers" in Iraq and Lebanon and so on. It is now obvious to everyone what all this talk is worth. 22. Ainsi, le lTlonde n'est toujonrs pas dclivrc du danger d'une liggravation dn conflit dans le Prochc-Orient el le Moyen-Orient, ce qui lie peut manquer d'inquieter tous cenx qui sOllhaitent qll'il soit mts nn terme a I'ingerence etrangere dans les aIJaires inlcrieures des Etats arabes et que la paix et la lrauquillite soient retablies dans l'Orient arabe. 23. On a clwrche a jnstiller l'iJlvusion des troupes amcricaines et britanniques dans les pays urabes par les evenements qui ont recemment ell lieu en Irak, Toutefois, le rnonde entier sait qlLD [cs cV6.nements d'lrak, comrne ceux du Lib:m, onl un caractere purernent inter-ieur et ne sont nullcrnent dus it une intervention etrangere. Ces evenements sont I'expression de la coltre des peuples des pays arubes, indignes par le regime que leur imposenlles colonisaleurs imperialistes, 24. On se souvient des discours emplwtiques que les representants des Etats-Dnis et du Royaume-Uni ant prononces cenlre le nOllveau gouvernement de la RepLLblique d'Irak. Le representant des Etats-Uni~ a decrit avec pittoresque l'horrenr des (( actes sanguinaires n qu'il a attribue.s au jeune Etat arabe, et qui sont le fruit de son imagination. Le representant du Royanme-Uni en a fait autant et a soutenu que le nouveau gonvernement irakien tHait illegal. Leg Etats- Unis et le Royaume-Uni se sonL ell vain efIorces de contester le droit imprescripLible dC.'l peu[1les a adopter le regime qui leur plait, Toutefois, lis ant rmalement ete obliges, comme les autres puissances occidentales, de reconnalue le Gouvernement de la Rcpublique d'Irak. :Mieux vaut tard que jamais. Le mondc est temoin que la tactique d'obstruction que les Etats-Unis et le Roy:mme-Uni ont cherche 3 employer contre la Rcpubiqlle d'lrak, r.t leurs tentatives visant a entourer ce pays d'nn 'I rideau rle fer 11 onl eompletement echoue. 25. II Y a a peille lrois semaines, les puissances occi~ dentales ont empikhe le representant legitime de la Republique d'Irak d'occupcr le siege qni lui rcvient au Conseil dc ~ecuritC. EUes ont ete obligecs de ceder la aussi, et nous sommes heureux d'accueillir aujourd'hui a la table du Conseil le representant legitime de la Repnblique irakienllc, M. Jawad. 26. Les manamvres auxqllelIes les Elals-Unis ont dll se livrer an sujet de la reconnaissance dll Gouvernemcnt de la Republique d'Irak nous perlllettcnL de tirer les conclusions qui s'imposent de~ declaraliolls de M. Dulles conee.rnallt une pretendue « agression indirede I) et nne l( infiltration atravel'S les fronti~res" de l'Irak, du Liban et d'autres pays, Chacun peut juge.r mailltenant de la valeur de ces declarations. 28. TIle second reporl of the Observation Group establishes that these communications have consistently distorted Lhe situation and, in partlcular, t:1at they contain inaccurate descriptians of incidents witnessed by the observers themselves. Onc of the main conclusions of the Group states that: ., III no case llave United Nations observers, who h"ve been vigilanLly patrolling the opposition-held arens and have freq'lently observed tl:e armed bands there, been able to det~ct the presence of persons who have indubitably entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting." [814069, para. 63,J 29. In other words, thc Observation Group found no proof that the rebels figllting in Lebacwn came there from the Syrian area of the United Arab Republic. F'urth"rmore, th" report states tl13t the landing of United States armed lorces in Lebanon made it harder for tile Observation Group ta fulfJl the functions entrusted to it by the Security Council resolution [S/4023j, The report clearly states that the impaGt of lhis event on the inhahitants of oppo.iitionwheld areas and callsed setbcks to the task of observation. 30. It follows from all this that, in undertaking the invasion of (;ountrie~ of the Near and Middle East, tIle United SL<ltes ita:; not only Ils8Llffied the rolil of arbitrator and judge with regard to the existence of a threat to Lebanon from the United Arab Republic, but it has abo taken steps to undcnnine the implementation of the Security Council decision to send United Kations observers to Lebanon, altllOugh the United States representative voted for that decision. This fact shows once again the disregard for Secl.Crity Cot:.ncil decisions shown by the United States in cases when these decisions frustrate the aims of its foreign policy. 31. Although the Governments of the United States anc. tile United Kingdom have rejected the id~a of a meeting of the Heads of the five Governments, it is clearly apparent that the demaJ:ds Df the peoplc~ for the immediate conveni.ng 01 SUCll a meeting In urder to end the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and the determination of peace-loving States to halt aggressio::l in the Near and MiCdle East have forced those who embarked on this armed intervention to refrain at the present jundure from planning allY extension of aggression to oUlcr countries, and prima- ~ infJItwtion \, d'l;ommes ct d'arme~ a travers l~s fron- Uf'o-rcs, donI: il a ete question dans de nombr'euses corn~ munications du Gouv-crnement liban:1is et dans les declarations du representant des Etal<i-Unis. 28. Dans son deuxieme rapport, le Groupe d'ohservJ.~ lion montrc que ces communications ant wmpletemenL deformt la verite et qu'cJle.s ont notamment donne une description ine::<acte d'incidents dont les observateurs avaient euxwnH~mcs ete terooins, Voici une des principales cOllc1ustOllS un Groupe : « Mais il faut dire que les observaleurs des Nati01S Ullies, qui ont patrouillc ovec vigilance les zones aux mains de l'oppositio:l et y ant frequcmment obset've la presence de groupes armes, n'ont pu en aucun cas deceler la presence de personnes ayant indubitablemellt franchi la frontit\re pour cornbattre. 11 IS/4()(j9, par. 83.) 29. En d'autrc~ termes, le GrouFe d'observation n'a trouve aucune preuve ctablissanl que les insurges qui combaLtent au Liban sonl venus de la partie syrienne de la Re.publique arabe ume. En revnnche, le rappllrt indique que le debarquement de troupc~ des Elats-Uni8 l'J.U Liban a empeche le Groupe de s'acquitter des fonctions qui lui avaient lite conftees par la resolution du Conseil de securile [S/4023J. Il est expressement dit dans le rapport que les elfets de cet evenement sur les 1J.abilants tIes I"t:gions aux mains de l'opposition Dnt contraric l'accorr.plissement de la mission d'observation. 30, Il s'ensuit que, par leur intervention dans les pays du Froche-Orie.r;t et du Moyen-Orient, les Etats-Unis J'Ameriquf'_ se !mnt. nOli seulementHroge le role d'arbitre et. de juge quant a l'existence d'une menace de la Repuhlique Mabe ullic contre le Liban, TIl<lis ont entrepris une Ection visall: acontrarier l'application de la decision du Conseil de securite relative it l'envoi d'observate~.lrs de l'Orgarnsntion des Nations U(Ji~s au Liban, decision pour laquelle le representant des Etats-Unis avaiL pourtant vote. Cela prouve une fois de plus ie mepris dans lcquel les Etais·Vnis ticnJlent les decisions du Conseil de securite lorsqu'elles vont ;i l'encontre des objectifs de leur politique exterieure. 31. Bien que ks Gouverne:nents des Etats-Unis et du Hoyaume-lJni aient rejet!! l'idee d'une conference entre les chefs des cinq gouvernemenLs, nOlJS pouv·)ns constater que, san.; aucun dOllb~, :es reclamations des f,leuples qui dcn;anden't la convocation immediate d'::llte telle conference en \;ue de faire cesser l'inti':rvention armee au Liban et en Jordanie, ainsi que la volonte des Etats pacifiques de mettre fin a. l'agression dans le Proche-Orient E:l le l\1o)'en-Orient, ant Dblige les instigatcurs de J'jntervention a s'ahstenir, au stade actLlcl, d'etendre l'agrtssion a d'autres pays, et en prenier 32. The formal recognition of the Republic of Iraq by the \-Vestern Powers does 1Iot mean, however, that the danger of the extension and aggravation of the conflict in that area has been eliminated or that the security of Iraq and the other Arab States has been ensured. The question of the complete cessation of armed intervention in tlle Near and Middle East and of the establishment of conditions which would protect the peoples of that area against foreign intervention still calls for speedy settlement. As recently as 31 July, Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, speaking at New Delhi, said that the presence of foreign forces in Lebanon and Jordan represented a threat to the peace and security of peoples. 33. Foreign troops must be withdrawn from Jordan and Lebanon, and that without delay. Their presence there constitutes a continuing threat to the peace and independence of the peoples concerned and a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, which cannot be condoned by the States Members of the United Nations. If, at this critical time, the United Nations fails to take the necessary measures and thus makes a further concession to the aggressors, it will irrevocably forfeit its authority and tlle confidence of the peoples, and the world may be plunged into the abyss of a world war. 34. The USSR delegation has already pointed out that, owing to the action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Security Council has proved unable to take effective steps to nip in the bud the growing military conflict in the Arab East. 35. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have not accepted the constructive proposals of the Soviet Government to call a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 36. In these circumstances, and also bearing in mind the insistent demands of the peoples of the world for the immediate cessation of aggression by United States and United Kingdom forces in the Near and Middle East, the USSR delegation requests, on behalf of its Government, that a special emergency session of the General Assembly of the United Nations should be called to consider the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon and of United Kingdom forces from Jordan. 37. The Soviet delegation has submitted the following draft resolution: " The Security Council, " Having considered the situation in the Near and Middle East resulting from the introduction of United States armed forces into Lebanon and of United Kingdom armed forces into Jordan, 32. Toutefois, la reconnaissance formene de la Repu_ bliqlle d'Irak par les puissances occidentales ne signifie nullement que le danger d'une extension et d'llne aggravation du contHt dans la region soit completement ecarte ni que la securite de l'lrak et des autres Etats arabes soit assureI'.. La cessation complete de l'inb:f_ vention armee dans le Proche-Orient et le Moyen- Orient et la creation dans cette region de conditions propres a y delivrer les peuples de l'ingerence etrang~re sont toujours des problemes qu'il convient de tllgler au plus Mt. Tout recemment, le 31 juillet, M. Nehru, premier millistre de l'Inde, declarait a New Delhi que la presence de troupes etrangeres au Liban et en Jordanie menace la paix et la securite des peuples. 33. n faut que les forces etrangeres evacuent la Jor. danie et le Liban, et qu'elles le fassent sans tarder. Leur presence dans ces pays ml";nace constamment la paix et l'independance des peuples et eonsUtue une violation flagrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, violation qu'aucun Etat membre de l'Orgauisation ne saurait admettre. Si, a cc moment critique, I'Organisation des Nations Unies ne prend pas les mesures qui s'imposent, si elIe fait ainsi une nouvelle concession aux: agresseurs, eUe perdra irremediablement son fl,utorite et la confiance des peuples, et le monde risquera de glisser vers l'abfme d'une guerre mondiale. 34. La delegation de l'URSS a deja constare que le Conseil de securite, pflr la faute des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni, s'est montre incapable de prendre des mesures efficaces pour tuer dans ramf le conflit arme qui COllve dans I'Orient arabe. 35. Les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni n'ont pas souscrit a la proposition constructive du Gollvernement sovietique tendant a IelIni!' une conference des chefs des gouvernements des cinq puissances, avec la pflrticipation du Secretarre general de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. 36. Dans ees conditions, et compte tCIlU du desir pressant des peuples de voir cesser immediatement l'agression des troupes des ~tats-Unis d'Amerique et du Royaume-Uni dans le Proche-Orient et le Moyen- Orient, la delegation de l'URSS, d'ordre de son gouvernement, demande que soit convoquee une session extra· ordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale des Nations Unies en vue d'examiner la question du retrait des troupes americaines du Libanet des troupes britanniques de Jordanie. 37. La delegation sovietique depose en consequence le projet de resolution suivant : II Le Conseil de securite, «Ayant examine la situation creel'. dans le Proche- Orient et dans le Moyen-Orient du fait de renvoi de forces armees des Etats-Unis d'Amerique au Liban et de. forces armees du Royaume-Uni en J ordanie, "Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assemhly in order to consider the question of the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and of United Khgdom troops from Jordan." [Sj40-57fRev.l.] 38. The Soviet Government hope~ that consideratim (If t.his question in the General Assembly, wllere large and small States alike are represented, will make it possible to find means of removing the danger of war that has arisen in the Near and Middle East as a result of the actions of the United Stat.es and the United Kingdom and wit t1lUs bring tranquillity to that region and lessen tension throughout the world. 38. La deMgation sovietiquc eSlH~l-e que l'examen de cettc question Et l'AssemblCe generale, ou SOllt representes les grands et lcs petits Etats, pennettnl de trouver les meSures propres amettl'e flU ala menace de guerre crcee dans le Proclle-Orient et le Moyen-Orient par les actes des Etats-Unis et dll Royaume-Ulli, de ramener ainsi le calme dans cette region et dereduire la tension internationale.

The Soviet representative has given his customary thoroughly false account of what hllS happened in the Middle East, and in the Security Council for that matter. I must take a few minutes, not to argue with Mr. 5000- lev, but merely to preseot the facts. Then you, Mr. President, and the members or the Council can easily judge for yourselves who it is who is seeking to mislead lIH: Council. 39. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [Iraduil de l'anglais] : Le representant (]e I'Unioll ~ovjetique a. comme a son habitude, remlu compte de fa~on a1s01ument erronce des evenements du Moyen~Orient, et aussi, du reste, de la situation au Conseil de securite. II me faudra quclques minutes, non pas pour discuter avec M. Sobolev, mais simplement pour presenter les faits, Le President et les membres du ComeiJ palm·ont alMS voir facilement par eux.-memes lequel de nous deux essaic d'induire le Conseil en erreur. 40. The fact is that on 15 July the troops of tlle United StBtes Wf'.re ~wt to Lebanon at the express request of the Government of Lebanon to assist that country to retain its territorial integrity and political independence. That emergency action was asked for and takcn in the light of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East at that time. 40. Ce qUL s'est passe en realite, c'est que, le 15 juillet, les Etats-Vllis ont cnvoye des troupes au tiban a la demande expressc du gouve:rnement de ce pays pour raider EL maintenir son integrite territoriale et son inde· pendance politique. La situation grave qui regnait alors au Mayen-Orient rendalt ncces~aire cette action d'urgence, 41. On the same day the Council met at the request of the United Stfltf~S. I said at that time that the presence of Coited States troops: "Is designed for the sole purpose of helping the G(lvernment of Lebanon at its request in its e1Iorts to stabilize Lhe situation brought on by the threats from outside. until such time as the United Nations can take the steps necessary to protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon." [82'lIh meeting, para. 35.] and I added these words: "Now I need scarcely say tllat we are the Hrst to 41. Le meme jOlT, le COllseH s'est reuni it la demande des Etats-Unis. J'ai declare alors que la presence des troupes des Etats-Unis et j'ai ajoute : admi~ Lhat the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems, and they will be withdranon as soon as the United Nations can take over." [Ibid., para. 36.J 42. The next day the United States presented a draft resolution [Sj4050] deslgned to maintaiIl the territorial integrity of Lebanon and to help creflte conditions whereby United States forces could be withdrawn. On 18 July [834111 meeting], that draft resolution was endorsed by nine members of the Council. It was vetoed by ~he Soviet Union. Thc Soviet Union opposed 42. Le lendemain, les Etats-Unis presenteient un projet de resolution 15/40.50] visant a maintenir l'integrite territoriale du Liban etA creer des conditions permettant le retrait des forces amerjcaines. Le 18 jUillet [sue seance], cc projet a eM approuve par neuf membres du Conseil. L'Union sovietique y a oppose son veto. Elle faisait ainsi obstacle aux efforts deployes « est llniquemcnt destinee a aider le Gouvernement libanais, sur sa demande, it stabiliser la situation Cl'eec par les menaces de l'exterieur, en attendant que I'Organisation des Nations VOLes puisse faire le necessaire pOUl' proifger l'independance et l'integriM poJitiquc du Liban.» 1827e siance. par. 35.1 <\ Mais nous sommes les premiers a admettre, ai-je he~oin de le dire, que l'envoi de forces des Etats- Duis au Libnn n'est pus la solution idtale du probleme actuel; ces troupes seront rctlrees des que l'Organisfl.tion des Nations Unies sera en mesure d'assurer la re/eve. r (lhid., par. 36.] .. The United States believes that all available United Nations remedies must be exhausted (...] Our purpose in this respect will not be thwarted merely by a veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union." [8341h meeting, para. 71.j 44. Then, because the representative of Japan said that he planned to introduce another draft resolution in the Security Conncil through which the Council might help to maintain the independence and integrity of Lebanon, I refmined from pressing my draft reso· lution for an emergency special session of the General Assembly nt that point. That Japanese draft resolution [S/4055/Rev.l1 was subsequently endorsed by ten out of the eleven members of the Security Council [837th meeting]. The United States wholeheartedly supported this constructive proposal by Japan. This draft resolution, too, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. For the second time in a week the Soviet Union alone prevented the Security Council from helping to maintain Lebanon's independence and integrity. 45. Fortunately, the Secretary-General, realizing that it was important that practical steps be taken without delay, told the Council that he would use all the opportunities offered to him within the limits set by the Charter to develop the United Nations effort and to help prevent a further deterioration of the situation. He promptly began to increase the efTectiveness of United Nations action in Lebanon. This statement by the Secretary-General I837lh meeting] was an event of great imporbmce and it receives the full support of the United States. 46. Then came an appeal to the members of the Council by the then President, our able colleague from Colombia. In the meantime, there had been an exchange of letters concerning highwlevel meetings. The United States, therefore, taking allth ese things into account, again refrained on 22 July from pressing its request for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. We hoped for an end to Soviet intransigence. 47. Since then, President Eisenhower has clearly set forth the view of the United States that the Security Council is the proper place in which to deal with problems alTecting the peace of the world. In his letter of 22 July, the President said: "By Article 2<1 of the United Nations Charler, the Soviet Union, with other Members of tlle United Nations, has conferred on the SeclUity Council , primary responsibility Ior the maintenance of international peace and security' and aU the Members have agreed lhat, in these matters, it 'acts on their behalf·. [that i~, the Security Council] It is also agreed that that Council has the responsibility to 'determine the existence of any threaL to the ,1 Les Etats-Unis estiment qu'aucun des moyens dont l'Organisation des Nations Unies dispose pour remedier a la situation ne doit etre neglige [...J. Le veto de l'Union sovietique au Conseil de securite ne sutnra pas a dcjouer nos efforts dans ce sens. " [8346 ,~eance, pal'. 71.J 44. Ensuite, le representant du Japon l1yant annonce qu'il se proposait de presenter un llonveau projet de resolution qui permettrait au Conseil de securite dc contribuer au maintien de l'indCpendance et de l'integrite du Liban, je n'ai pas voulu insister pour faire mettre aux voix mon propre projet, visant a convoquel' l'AssembIee genera1r en se5sion extraordinail'e d'urgence. Dix des onze membres du Conseil de securite ont approuve par la suite [8.17e seance] le projet japonais [S/4055/Rev. 1J. Les Elats-Unis ont apporte leur appui sans reserve a celle proposition constructivc. Mais le texte japonais a fait l'objet, lui aussi, du veto de l'Union sovietiqne. Pour la deuxieme fois en UllC semaine, l'Union sovietique senIe a empeche le Consei! de securite d'aider a maintenir l'inrlependance et l'iute, grite du Liban. 45. Heurenscment, le Secretaire general, comprenllnt l'importance qu'i! y avait a prendre immediatement des mesures pratiques, a fait savoir au Conseil qu'i1 utiJiserait toutes les possibilites que pouvait lui oITric la Charte pour intensifier l'effort de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et empecher la situation de s'flggraver encore. 11 commenr;a aussitot a accroitre l'emcacite de l'action entreprise au Liban par l'Organisalion. Cette declaration du Secretaire general [S37e seanceJ a ete un evenement extremement important, et les Etats· Unis lui apportent un appui sans re~erve. 46. L'eminent representant de la Colombic, qui prc" sidait a cc moment le Conseil, nOllS adressa alors un appet Un echange de lettres avait ell lieu entre-temps an sujet de reunions a un echelon eleve. C'est pourquoi, le 22 juillet, les Etats-Unifi, tenant compte de tollS cC.'> elements, se sont de nouvcau abstenus d'insister pour que l'AssembIee generale soit convoquee en session extraordinaire d'urgence. Nons espcrions que l'Union sovietique se departirait de son intransigeance. 47. Depuis lors, le president Eisenhower a clairement expose le point de vue des Etats-Unis, suivant lequel c'est au Conseil de securjti: qu'il appartient d'examiner les problcmcs dont depend la paix du monde. Dans sa rettre du 22 juillet, le President ecrivait : «( Aux termes de l'Article 24 de la Charte des Nation.'l Unies, I'Union wvietique, avec d'autres Membl'es de I'Organisation, a (,;onfere au Conseil de securite " la respon.'labilite principale du maintien de la paix et de la .sceuriLC internatiollnles )), et tOllS les Mcmbres .'Iont COllvenus que, dallfi cc domaine, il 11 agit en leur nom J'. Il est egalement entendn qu'il appartient au COllseil de constater" l'existence d'une menace contre la paix ~ et de decider "quelles mesures seront 48. During this same period, the Soviet Union advocated a procedure which would have gravely undermined the prestige and authority of the United Natim:s. Nevertheless, at one point it appeared that the Soviet Union had again recognized the responsibility of the Security Council and was prepared to attend a high level meeting in the Council. The Cniled States, as well as the lhlited Kingdom and Canada, we~comed this and formally asked fur such a meeting. Earlier this week I was in fact enge.ged in consultations with other members of the Council and with thc Secretary-Gencral, Ht his request. to arrange for its convening. 48, Au cours de cette periode, l'Union sovietique a preeolJisc une procedurc qui, si cllc avait eee suivie. aurait porte une gl'ave atteinte au prestige etal'autorite de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. nest pourtant apparu :1 un moment que l'Union sovietique reconnaissait de nouveau les attributions du ComelI de securite et qu'elle 6tait prete aptlrUciper aune reunion a. un echelon eleve qui aurait eu lieu au Conseil. Les Etots-Unis, le Royallrne-Uni eL le Canada accueillirent favorablement ceUe idee et dcm~nderentformellement que la reunion ail lieu. Au ccbut de cctte scrnainc, j'ai efTectivemcnt conslllte d'al.Jtres membres du Conseil Et. sur sa dcmanue, h: Secretaire general, en vue de preparer ladite reunion. 49. Then Mr. Khrushchev made his Lrip to Peking a.nd, after iL, he changed his mind. Future historians may some d"y know why. In !lily case, the Sov;et Union has now again denounced the United Nations Security Council which is prevented from acting solely by the Soviet Union and by 110 one else - and has requested a meeting of thc General Assembly. 49. C'esl alors que M. Kltrouchlchev a fait son voyage a Pekin, et ql1'i! a cusuite change d'avis. Pcut-ctre des Ilistoriens futllrs sauront-ils un jour pourquoi. Quoi qu'i1 en soit, l'Union sovietique denonce de notiveau lp, Consei) de sewrite des l\ations Unies - qu'eIIe, et elle seule, empeche d'agir - et demande une reunion de l'Assemblee generale. 50. In these circumstances, we h:lVC, regretfully concluded that because of the Soviet Union's recent and arbitrary cha:lge of mind the Secllrity CO'l11Ci! cannot continue to fulfil its responsibilities in this respect. We will therefore not presl> for the special high-level Security Council meeting we had requested in our letter of 1 August [8{4074, sec. Ill.] 50. Dans ces conditions, nous avons le regret de con~ elure que, a 1[1 suite de ce retoumement recent et arbiuaire de I'Union sovietique, le Conseil de sccurite ne peut continuer a s'acquitter de la mission qui lui ioeombe. C'e~t pourquoi now; n'insisterons pas pour obtenir la reunion speciale :lu Conseil de s6curite it un echelon 61evc que nous avions demandee dans notre lettre du Iar aout [S/4074, sect. Ill]. 51. While the motives underly:ng this Soviet somersault are not altogether clear, it is clear that the Soyiet rulers do not want a high-level meeting of the Security Council at this time. Perhaps they are embarnssed by the prospect of asking heads of Government to C'lnsider the empty and absurd charges which they have made about the situation in the Middle ER~t. P~ihaps it is because the Council has already decisively t'ejected Soviet proposals seeking to condemn the United State~ and the United Kingdom for aggression in Lebanou and Jordan. But wllatever tile reasOl:, Lhe latest Soviet manceuvre adds considerably to our doubts that the Soviet Government is prepar<1d to participate serionsly in :l eonstructive approach to problems of the Middle East. 51. Qu()ique les motifs de ce revirement sovietique ne soient pas parfaitement clairs, il est evident que les dirigeanls sovietiques ne sodmitcnt pas pour le moment une reunjon it llll ecJH~lvn eleve dans le cadre du Conseil de securite. Pcut-etre sont-ils elllbarrasse.~ it !'idee de demander aux chefs de gOllvernement d'exnminer les accusations absurdcs et depourvues de fOlldement qu'i!s ont fonnulee;; a propos de la situation dans le Moyen- Orient. Peut~~1re est~ce parce que le Conscil a deja rejete categoriquement les propositionfl sovietiques qui visaicnt il. eondnnlller le.'! El::lt~-Uni.'! et le Royamne-Uni pour agression nu Liban e~ en Jordanie, Mais, queUes qll'en soient les raisons, I~ derniere manceuvre sovietique nous fait douter dnwllJtage encore que le Gouvernement sovictiqllC soit prel a participer sCJ1.cuscment n des travnux constructifs touclJant. les probl~mes clu Moyen-Orient. b2. En s'opposallL a une reunion a un echelon eJeve, le Gouvernement sovictiqllc a ern ban d'atLaqller le Conseil de securite, qui a et6 cree pour representer tous les l\1embres de l'Organisatjon des Nations Unies pour les qucstions relatives all maintien de la paiX: et de la secudte internationales. L'LJnion sovietiquc est de~ue. semble-t-H, de voir que les membrcs du Conseil ne sont pas dcs Satellites et qu'ils representent des gouvernernents libres de diffhentes parties du monde preocctlpes U juste titre par les menaces d'agression, passees et prcsentes, et re.solm, a se proteger et a proteger les 52. In rejecting a lligh-level meeting, the Soviet Government has gone out of its WRy to del101mce the Securits Council which has been established to represent all Memuer:! of the Udtcd Nations in the mainten~nee of international peace and security. It wot:ld seem that the Soviet Government is disappointed by the faet thd the members of the Council are not satellites and thBt they represent free Governments f~ulIl diJ'- ferent regions of the world which aIe justifiably con~ cm-ned nbol.Jt past ana present thl'<:'.uts of aggression and which aTe determined to protect themselves and 53. Mr. Khrushchev's argument thal tue Security 53. L'llrgumellt de M. Khrouclltchcv suivant lequellc Council is not an acceptable forum because in it the Conseil de securite n'est pas un lieu de rellcontre accepunited States has II mechanic:'!l majority is very weak table pareI'. que ies Etats-Unis}' disposent automafique. indeed. In fact, it cannot be sustained by factual ment de la majorite est vruirnellt lJ.·es faibk. n n'est proof. At its face value, the argument insults the du reste pas corrohore par les faits. En sDi, c'est title dignity of alllllemuers of :;hc Council who vote on t.he insulte it la dignite d~ t.ous les membres .du Conseil, qui basis of their own opinions and politicies and in the votent selon leur opmlOn et leur politlque et confllr· purfluit of their own ideals. It is the type of tllinking mement it leur ideaL Cette maniere de voir n'a evidem· which one can expec:: from a r~gimc that relics on ment rien (l'etonnant de la part d'un regime qui s'appuie satellite States, but it is clearly not one tllat can be sur des Etats satellites, mais clle n'est certes pas valable applied in the free world. The Governr.lent of the pour le monde libre. Et le Gouvernement sovietique 1~. Soviet Union must be well aware of this fad. suit parfaitement. 54. As I inlerpreL Mr. Khrushchev's reasoning, it I 54. Si je comprends b:en le raiI.onnement cl!! reilects dismay that after many years of eflort the M. Khrouchtcltev, il reflete la consternation de l'Union Soviet Union has been unable to convince tlle world sovietique, qui, apres des annces d'efTorts, n'est pas that it has the answers to atI our problems. This parvenue a convaincre le monde qu'elle possede la clef undoubtedly is a bitter pill, especially to those who de tous nos problemes. La pilule est sans nul doute believe in the infallib:lity of their own system and are amere, surtout pour ceux qui, convaincus de l'inlailli· never willing to consider another man's point of view. bilite de leur systerne, n'acceptent jamais de prendre ~n con.sidcratlOll le point de vue d·antrui. 55. The Soviet charge that the Security Council is incapable of dealing effectivdy with the situation in the Near and Middle East would be quite comic if the implications were not so tragic. What has caused this so~called incapability? What Government lms COJJsis~ tently stood, usually alone, against the expressed will of t.he other memben of the Council? What Govern~ ment ha~ repeatedly sought to disable the Council by its vetoes? All the repre3entatives seated at this table a.nd the people of the world know the answers to these questions. Blame for the so-called incapability of the Security Council to nd decisively in the Middle Eastern situation rests squarely upon the sh,'luldl'.rs of t.hB Soviet Union, and nobody else. 56. For all these reasons, therefore, I request a prompt vote on the United Stntes revi.'lf!d drdt resolution [Sf4056fRev.l]. This draft resolution clearly has priority over tlle Soviet Union drllft resolution [Sf4057/Rev,Z], and ahould Le put to thr:> vote first. It calls for an emergency special sess;on of the General Assembly under the Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled" Uniting for peace". This, let me recall, is the resolution which wt\s adopted in 1950 aIld which enables us to go from the Security Council to the General Assembly when the Security Council ha:; been frus· trated by the veto. 57. At that time, in 1950, this procedure !lnd the reso~ lution which embodied ·It were bitterly opposed by 55. L'Union wvietique accuse le Comeil de securile d'etre inr.apabl~ de prendre des mesures cfftcaces en re ql2i concerne la situation dans lc Prochc-Orient et tbns le Moyen-Orient : l'accusation serait franchemcnt comicp.c si les consequences n'rtaif';nt pa!'l si tragiQufS D'ou vient ccttc pretenduc incapacite? Quel est le gouvemement qui s'est constamment oppose, et tn generd seul, A la volanLC e.xprimce par les BUlre! membres du Conseil? Quel est le gOl:vernement q~i s'est ~tf{)rce a maintes reprises de paralyser le Cons!H par ses vetos? Tous les rl:prcselltanLs qui siegent ici d tOllS les pCllples du monde connaissent la rCJlonse. C'est ['Union sovietique, et cHe seule, qui doit cacoum le hUmc pour cette pretenduc incapacitc du Consei! de secnrii6 a agir de fayon decisive ~our ce qui est du Moyen~Orient. 56. Telles sont les raisons pour lesquelles je demande un vote rapide sur le projet de resolution revise dl'.': Etats-Uni.s [S/4056/ReiJ. 1J. Ce texte a eVdell1mcllt la pdorite sur edui de j'Union sovietique (S/4067/Rev, 1J, et doit etre mis aux voix d'abord. II demnnde la con\'Clcation cl'une session extraordinaire d'urgenec de l'Assemblee generale conformcment a la resolutiun 377 (V) de l'Assemhlee. intitulee u L'union :JOur le maint.i~n de I~ paix 11. Cette resolution, qui, je vous le ra[Jp~tle, a ete adoptl5e en 1950, nous donne la possibilite d'nUl'1 du Conscil de securite a l'Assemble~ generale qlland le Conseil est paralyse par le veto. 57.. A l'.e.poqlll", c'est.-:i-di~e en HJ50. l'Union sovietique , etM vlOlemment "Ppos," A cctte pcocddure et I I', 12 L tal~jng responsible decisions and generally acting as the Charter intended that it should. 58. I now address a few remarks to the SOviet draft rtlsolution [S/4057IRev.1]. 59. The change by the Soviet Union of the wording jn its draft resolutiun from .. intervention" to "withdrawal " does not alter the fact that the Soviet Union has never been truly interested in the with<kawal of United SL:'ltes forces and the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon. If it had been, it would not havc vetoed two resolutions which would have accom~ plished thcse ends. The true Soviet aim is, by condemning the United States, lo prevellt constructive effort to maintain the independence and integrity of small nations. This stands out, regardless of whatever words are use,d to conceal tiw true purpose. The Soviet draft resolution therefore puts the situation in a false light. It ~ims te make more trouble and to aggravate the situation still further, We hope the COuncil will reject it, 60. Then there was the equally tendentious and onesided Soviet reference to the reports of the Unit~J Nations Observation Group in Lebanoll, and I think a word or two is in order on that. 61. The United States considers that both the Uniled Nations Observation Group and the United States forces in Lebanon llave, LlIOUgll in different ways, made valuable positive contributions towards improving the situation in Lebanon to a point where peaceful democratic elections were held - something, by the way, which ~1r. Sobolev rather heatedly stated, only a few days ago, could not be done. Well, it was done. Then there is the added probability that the presence of the United Nations Observu.tion Group - and of the United States forces _ .. may have very materially mitigated the dangerous effects of illegal infiltration. 62. The U:Jited States also thinks that lhe O~~ervation Group has done valuable work in the course of discharging its purely observatory functions. It has confirmed the fnet of infiltration in areas where it could carry Qut observations, even though it had not been. able, up to the date of its last report, to engage in ground observations or undertake night patrols in 58. Je voudrais maintenant presenter quelques observations au sujet du projet de resolution sovietiqI:c [SI4057IR". 1J. 59. Que, dans son text·~, rUnioll sovietiqne ait rernplar.e le mot "illtervention ~ par cellli de «retrait)) ne change rien au fait q-.l'eJle n'a jamais eprouv~ d'inter~t verit<Jble pour le rctr,tit des forces des ELats-Unis et le maintien de l'independance et de l'integrite du Liban. Sinon, elle n'aurait pas oppose ,on veto il deux resolutions dont tel etait precisement le double objet. En condamnant les Etats-Unis, l'Union sovietique v:ise avant tout:\ empp.cner tout effort l;onstructif qui sal\vegarderait l'independance et l'integrite des petits pays. TeUe est I'idee centrnle, ([lIds que puissent em les mats qu'ernpIoie le Gouvernement sovietique pour dissimuler ses desseins reels. AU1;Si le projet de resolution sovic.tique place-l~il la ,situation dans une perspective trompeuse. I1 a pour but d'apporLer la perturbation et d'aggraver erlco.tc la situation. Nous csperons que le Conseil la rejettera. 60. D'autre part, le representEml de l'Union 50vietique a fait unc allusion aussi tendanci~_llse 111Je partiale a;JX rapports du GrOllpe d'ohservation des Nations Unies au Liban, et je crois qu'il me faut ajouter quelques mots sur ee point. 61. Les Etats~Unis considerent que le Groupe d'observation des Nations Unics ail1si que Je.<; trDUpes ameri- Cflin('.~ ant nettement contribue, bien que de fagons differentes, a arneliorer la situation au Liban, a te! point que des elections democratiques ont pu se derouler dans le cahne - ce que, soit dit en passant, M. Sobolev, il y 'I quelqu::s jour.'> a pcille, avait vtllcmentemcnt aJIirme n'etrc pas p)ssible. Eh bien, la chose s'est quand meme fuite. En ontre, il y a tout lieu de supposer Cjue la presenet' rin Grnllpe d'observation des Nations Unies - et des forces des Etats~Cnis - a beaucoup atteltue les dangereux efTets de l'intHtrHtion HJegale. 62. Lcs Etuts Unis estiment flllssi que le Groupe d'abservation a f::;it omvre utile en s'acquittant des 10nctions de simp,e observation qui sont les siennes. Il a confirme qu'il y avait hieD. in1i1tration dans les scctellrS oil. il lUl a ete possible d'efIecttter de~ ob~t:r-. vations, bien que, a la date de .;on dernier rapport, il Cut encore dans l'impossibilite de faire des observations D ne s'ensuit pas cepclIuant que ~cs rapporbl du 63, d' bserv'ltion [Iienl 1111 caractcre compll'.t 0\1 Groupe 0 < 11 '1" (' d"fi 'ti'f II n'ont d'aiIJellfS pas Cl:- l' pre-l'lllOn.•e c 1111 , S _ • t'" t 'I t I'ollpment des r~lpp0l"ls III l'J'lIl11UreS, C' IS son essen t... ,- (",' I 'd t franchemr.nt 'lour tels. Le Troupe ace p us se onnen I . '11' I I' reduis3ut le~ entrees I ego l'S { armes, hcureux en , 'I t" , d'h t de matericl, qUi aVntcn - mo lye SOil cnVfl\ ommes e "1 I' ' 't d I 'g on Nous eSllCrolls <JlI I Illlru par c re ell ans are~· ' .. I °us aviser (fue cc.'! IIlltltflltlOllS ant COIllmesurc (e nv < pletemcnt cesse. " " Hilt ill! Lhis does not mean that the reports of the I, , • h lete or fin'll They Ohs{'rvatiof! Group arc elt er comp . 11'" t ' ' ' 1 d 10 bp They are baslca y III efim do llot pre en v ... • , .' h tl rt'J)()rL~ alld they frankly admit that tlt.IS IS w ~t 1ey n;l~. The Group has had more succ~ss In reducmg Lite illegal How of arms, men and supplies that cause~ i~~ [Juited Nations Lo send it to the area. We hope t ~ Willl'Vclltually br: ahle to say that the flow has entirely sVIJiprd, 64, NOlls ne devons pas lion plus oll,blip!' l!ne :~ut~ forme particnlierement dnllgcreuse d Qgl·l'."~l(l1l l[lth~ reete, Je vcux parler d'attaqucs contrc le:; ]Jl'rSOlllH'-S, f mentees ct dirigees de I'etrangcr. Pour lIne lJonnc °art il esL difficile de le~ observer S~I1S francliir Il.'~" P , 1 G ' d' I, "1' , frontieres du Liban, ce que C'. roUpe () ~erv<l .lOn 11 n evidemment pu fairC'.. Et, 10l'S dc, In pn'ptlratwn flu dernier rapport, lc Groupc n'flVfJIL. dl~ restc pus. eu mission de s'ocwper de ces eas parll.cul~l·~·s d'ngrl'.%lOlI 'ndirecte qu; Ilellvcllt avoir lien l\ l'mtl'rJl'llr till pay:>. I 'I ' , 1l est bien evident qll'une persOnllc 11 cs p:.ls IWc;eSSalrt'- ment avellgle parce qu'clle Ill' [lcllL pa!l vou' Jails H-1, Thcn wc must not forget ~nother particula~ly dallgl'f(lUs form of indirect aggressIOn, l.refer to .V10- knee against persons stimulated and dIrected. from ahroad. Much of this caunot be obse~ved .wlthout going ouLside the borders of Lebanon - which, 01 course, the Observation Group has not been abl~ to do, Nor, at tlll~ time that the latest report wu~ beIng prepared, had thc Group been asked to deal w~th those aspects oC this kind of indirect aggres.~lon wlHell co~ld be met witllin the country. Now it is obvious, [ think, that a pcn;(m who cannot see in the dark is not, for that reason, blind. The Group, which had not been asked to report on thi~ kind of indirect aggression, cannot be criticized lor not doing so. I'obscurit~. On ne ~aurait critiqller lt~ Groupe ]lour n'avoir pas adresse de mp port sllr, cd :::>jll>ct de 1'[lJ.lrl·~. sion indirecte, puisqu'on ne le !tu aVail pas dt'm:\ndt" 65, Before I close, let me repeat that what is really at stake here is the future of the small nations, their right to exist and their safety against being swallowed up by lurger Powers. It is not surprising that tile SovieL Union, which lHIS taken over so many small nations, should have contcmpt for the rights of the small Ilutions, But this is the rock on which the United Nations rests. I ask you: What would the {lnited Nations be witbout the small nations? 65. Avant de terminer, je vOlHJnJi~ rCjJeter eneore que l'enjeu veritable ?e la p~rtic l1:li se tleroulc ,icL c'est I'avenir des pehtes 11a tallls, C l~,~t lCllr tiro It iI l'existence et leur securite devlmt lc~ llWllaCl'S rj'engloll- Lissement que font peser SUI" elles des Eta!:s plus puisk sants. 11 n'est pas surprCllllJll que l'UHion :;ovietiqul', qui s'est rentlue maitressc de tant de petits pa),s, n'eprouye que mepris pour leurs droils. Or, ccs droit." sont le roe sur lequel est bfttic l'Organisation des Nation." UnitS, Je YOllS le demandc : quescrait !lotre organisation sans les petits Etats? li(j. Finally, thc deep-seated troubles in the Middle East 110 not stem from the presence of United States troops in Lebanon, which were sent there at the request vC tllC democratically elected Government of that country and which will be withdrawn whenever that (iovernntellt so requests, The roots of the deep~seated Lroubles in the :Vliddle East go much deeper. They 66. Enfill, les lrOllbles profontls dOlll: le \-Ioyell-Orit'nl est le tllCUtrC lIe provienncnt pas de la prC.'lellCe des troupes des EtaLs~Unis au Libun, oil dies nnL rite envoyees a la demande du gQuverncment lit;moaaliqllc_ ment mu de ee pays et d'ou dies seront retirces d~s qlll' ce gouvernement le demandera. Les causes de C~'!> troubles sont beaucollp plus profolldes, II en a ete qtll'~~­ tion dans nos debats, flans ][l corrcspondancl' diplomatique, ct dans les discussiOilS dout ils ont fait l'objcl dflns le monde enlicr. havl~ been mentioned in our debates, in diplomatic correspuudcnce, and in the world-wide public discussion which has b(~en Laking place. m. Wc helieve the General Assembly will want to deal cOllstructively with tile lundamental and broad problellls involved and not be satisfied with mere stopgaps, The calling of n special session of the General Assemllly hy the Security Council, as the United States has requested, will ill<lkc this possible, 67. Nous sommes persuadl's qll~ l'Assemblel' g(;llcrnle YOlldra recherchc!' des solu bOilS Cotlstrlld i'V('s allX probl~mes fondamcntaux et vastes qui S(~ [H1Sl'll!:, (It qu't'ilt•. ne se contcntera pas de simples palliatifs. C'l'St l't' qu~' rendra possible la convocation cl'une Sl'SSIOIl ['xlr;wrdillllil"e de I'Assemblee generale par le CIJl)St'il rh- .,t.'('uritt'. eomme l'ont demailde les Etats-Unis. !Xl, jug ~i.r Picrson DIXON (United Kingdom): Our meetthIs afternoon has been requested by the repre- 68. Si!' Pierson DIXON (Royullmc-(JIII) [Iradllil dr: l'anglais] .. Nous nOllS reunissons eet npri'ii-midl Jlurrf' 70. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has received Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter with ke;:n disappointment. The IcUer shows that there is a wide divITgenc:e betwcen the views of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on how the problems of the Middle East can most fruitfully be discussed. Her Majest),'s Government has based its approach on two fadors neither of Which [ should have thought Lo be matters of dispute. The fIrst is that under Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council rc:ceived "primary respon$ibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". The other factor is that the governments and peoples of many countries of the world have for some time felt that a meeting of the Heads of Governmer.t of some of the larger Powers might help towards a settlement of some of the problems that vex the world. 71. The Charter of the United Nations provided in Article 28, paragraph 2, a means by wl:ich these two factors could be brought together in a pragmatic way. Under tlH\! Article the Security Council is empowered to hold periodic meetings at which its members may, if they so desire, be represented by a member of the Government or by some other specially designated representative. On 22 July Her Majesty's Government made the proposal, to which it hall conllistcntly adhered, that the Security Council should hold a meetng under Article 28, paragraplt 2, whid\ would be attended by at any rate some Heads of Government [3/4071, sec. IJ. The procedure of the Council is of course flexible. It is the custom of the Council to adjourn, when appro_ priate, in order to allow its members and sometimes other interested Governments to hold privaLe informal consultations which may help the Council towards a successful conclusion of its formal debates. We have always felt that thb: weaus of combining pl'ivuLc and public diplomacy is most valuable and we proposed that it should be used OD this occasion. 71. Au paragraphe 2 de son Article 28, la Charte des Nations Unies detlnit un moyen pntiquc de combiner ces deux elements. Aux termes de ce texte, le Conseil de secm'He est habilite .It te:lir des reunions periocliques auxquelles chacun de :,;cs lllcmbres peut, s'il le desire, se faire representer par un membre de son gou. vernement DU paT qUelque autre representant specialement cte.signe. Le 22 juillet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste a propose - et il ne s'est pas ensuite departi de son attitude - que le Conseil de securite, conIormemer:t au paragraphe 2 de l'Article 28, tienne une reunion a laquelle assisteraient au moins certains chefs de gOllvemement [S/4071, sed. fJ. 11 va de soi que la procedure du Conseil autonse une cerLaine souplesse. Le Conseil a coutume de s'ajouTne:, quaml il y n lieu, pour donmr a ses membres et qLlClquefois it d'autres gouvernements int€resSeS la possibilite de proecder en prive a des consultations officieuses qui peuvcnt perml"Ure aux llP.ances ofTtdclles d'abolltir a des resultato satisfaisants. :KOlis avons tQUjOUTS pense que ccUe fuculte de combiner la diplomatic :mblique et la diplo, matic privee etait extremement predeuse, et nOLlS en avons preconise l'usage en cette occasion. 72. Dans la lettre qu'il a adressee le 31 juillet a M. Khrouchtchev, Ill. Macmillall s'exprimll.it aim;] : 72, In his letter to Mr. Khrusllchev of 31 July, Mr. Mae.- rni1lan said: "In addition to meetings of the whole Council under Article 28 of the Charter, it would of course be possible to arrange less formal meetings of Heads of Government on the question!; which the Security Council is cor.sidering. TIle procedure would thus be flexible and should promote the chances of making progresS. " [S/4071, sec. HI, para. 8.1 70. C'est avec cne pl'Ofonde deception que k Gouve.rnement de Sa Majeoste a tHis connaissance de la dernlere lettre de 1\.1. Khrollrhtrhev. Ell~ reveJe une gr..wde divergence de vues entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Union sQvietique quant a la fayon la plus utile de discnter des problemes du 1Ioyen-Orient. Mon gouvernemcnt fonde ses conceptions ell la matiel'e sur deux elements qui ne semblaicnt pas preter a cOlltroverse, Lp. premip.r, r,'P.llt que, anx termes ele l'Article 24 de la Charte, le Consdl de securite asst:me I{ la responsabilite principale du maintien de la J,aix et de la securite in1.ernationaJes. » Le seccnd, c'est que lcs gouvernements et les peuples de nornl:l1'eux pay::; du monde cstimcnt depuis quelque temps qu'une reunion de:; chefs de gotvernemellt de certaines grandes puissances pourrait cOl1tribuer a regler quelques-uns des problernes auxqucls se heurc('. le monde. « Outre les seances que timdront tou.:; les me:nbre:; du Conseil conIonnement aux clispositions de l'Ar~ Licle 28 de la Chartc, il .serait ividemll1ent p(',s~ibk d'organiser des reunions moins officielles oil les chefs de gouvernement pourraient diseuter seuls des que.,.. tior.s qu'examine le Conseil de securite. La procedure serail done souple et devrait augmenter les chances de progres. 1) [S/40'U, sed. Ill, par. 3.) 74. A la suite de ceLte reaction favornble, le representant suppleant du Royaume-Uni au Conseil flit charge de demander pour le 12 aotH la convocation du Conseil de securite, conformlhnent a rArticle 28 de la Charte. Chacllll .sait que les melllhres du Conscil ont, avec l'assistance du Secretaire general, procedc it New- York ades consultations destimies a mettre au point les details de cette relltlion. Jusqu'a avant-hier, nOllS n'avions aucune raison de douter qU'Il11 accord sur cc." details puisse se faire en temps voulu pour que la reunion ait lieu la semaine prochaine. 7.1. In view of this favoumble response, tlH~ alternate representative of the United Kingdom on this Council was instructed to request that a meeting of the Security Couucil under Article 28 should be held on 12 August. It is a matter of common knowledge that consultations were under way between members of the Council here in New York, with the assistance of the Secretary- General, to settle the details of such a meeting. There was, until the day before yesterday, no reason to doubt that agreement on these details could have been reached in lime for a mccting ncxt week. 75. Or. void que le GOllvcrnemcnt sovietique fait volte-face et que, apnls avoir approllvc I'idec cl'une reunion sptkialc du Conseil. il It'l rcpousse. 11 pretend que le Conseil, et je cite lfl lettre adresscc par M. Khrouehtchev au president Eisenhower, ~ n'est pus en mesure d'aboutir a des conclusionH objectives nu sujet de la situation existant dans le Prochc·Oricnt et le Moyen·Orient» [S/4079, sect. Ill, pur. 23J. Il ajoutc que le Conseil ({ est devenu en fait une sorle de comite compose en majorite de pays membres de I'Orgnni5<1tion dll Traite de l'Atlantiqllc nord, du Pacte de 13ng"dnd ct de 1'0rganisfltion dll Traite de l'Asie dll sud-cst 1I [ibid., par. 6J. CeUe allegation ne correspond pas a la realite et n'est pas corroborce par l'attitnde clu Conseil. La composition de ce dernier n'est regie par les vamx d'aucun Etat ou groupe d'Etats, mais par les dispositions de l'Article 23 de la C1Iorte. 75. Now wc are confronted with a startling reversal of the Soviet position. The Soviet Government, which had previously ngreed to a special meeting of the Council, now rejects Ulllt idea. It argues that the Council, and I quote the leHer from Mr, Khrushchev to President Eisenhower. "is in no position to reach objective con~ clusions on the situ:ltion in the Near and Middle East .. [5101079, sec.lJi, pam. 23]. He further states that the Council" has in effect developed into a sort of committee which is mainly composed of countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. the Baghdad Pact and tile South-East Asia Treaty Organization" [ibid., para. 6]. This is the contention which can find no justification in fact or practice. The composition of the Council is determined not by the wishes of anyone State or group of States, but by the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter. 76. La suggestion de l'Union sovietique revicnt a ne tenir auclln compte d'un oraane des Nations Unie.<; legalcment constitue, pour la s~llle raison que le gOllVet- 7G. What in efTect the Soviet Union is proposing is to ~L'ircgard a legally constituted organ of the United N~tLons mer.ely on the grounds that it does not agree wrtli the poltlical views which it supposes the members of ~li~t org.un to .hold. We all recall the objections of ~ement de cet Etat ne partage pas les opinions polibqueii> qU'~~raient, selon lui, les mCllibrcs de cet argane. U sllllllar kind raised last year by the Soviet Union to the IJisannament Commission of the United Nations cvc.n v.:hen it had been enlarged to take account of ~ersonne ~Cl n'a ollblie que, l'an clernier, I'Union sovietique avmt formulc des objections analogucs u l'encon.tre de In Commission du desarmement des Nations t~lclr vIews. I would only comment that if the prin- ~llIes, meml': apres que eelle-ci eut ete elargic pour repondre au desir de rUnion sovieLique. J e ferai :;irn- ~I(lle were followed to its logical conclusion, we should soon SC? an end to any orderly conduct of business in the Umted Nations. ~Je~ent re~nrguer ~ue, si l'applicatioll de cc principc. e~n.lt pOllssee Jusqu A sa conclusion logiqne, I'expedltl.on nOI'l,?ale des affaires a l'Organisntion des Nations Umes seralt bien vile paralysee. 77. Moreover, the Soviet Union appears to have Ignored the elTarts which Her MaJ"··!Y'. G . ...~ " overnment llas eOlllmtently .made during the recent exchanges to 77. De plus, I'Union sovietique semble avair mcconnu les ef!orts que le Gouvcrnement de Sa MajesLc n'a cesse de falre, au cOllrs du recent echange de corrcspondancC", pOllr la rassllrer. s~r ce point. Dans sa premiere lettre. en date du 22 JUJ.llet, M. Macmillan disail : «n n'entrerait pas dans I~s intentions du GOllVCfnement de Sa Ma" "l' .1 • •• s . , . Jcs e que ues proJcts de resolutIOn OIen~ ?eposes a cette reunion specinle du Conseil de secunte a mOl" "" ent ' . ns que ees proJets ne resultent cl'lIne reu:~e prea.lable. En d'autres tcrmcs. l'objet de la n seralt de parvenirades accords feColld.~ plut~t rca~SllfC the Soviet Union on this point I h" fi I'll' f"2J . nlStrst c er 0.<. 111y, Mr. Macmillan said: " It would not be the intention of Her Majesty's Governlllent thal any resolutions should b t fo~'ard at this special meeting of the Security C~U~~1 unless they arose out of previous agreement I other words, tlle object would be ta rendl f~itfu~ agrecments rather than register differences by votes." 78. Instead, however, of pursuing the idea of a special meeting of the Security Council, which it had previously accepted, the Soviet Union is now asking fOJ the convening of an emergency special session of the General Assembly to discuss the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon Ilnd United Kingdom forces from Jord~n. 79. It is obviously out of the question for my Government to accept the convening of an err_ergency ses:;ion on that basis. The assumption behind the Soviet rp.qlle~t is the same as the assumption behind the Soviet draft resolution which this Council rejected so cecisiveiy ISj40tJ7jRev.1J. This assumption is that the United States and the United Kingdom were in some way guilty of aggression when they responded to the appeals of the Governments of Lp.hanan nlld Jordan for assistance. The Council, by rejecting this Soviet draft resolution, has clearly demonstrated its acceptance of the United Kingdom's case that there is no foundation for that charge. 80. I have made it clenr that the action of the United Kingdom was taken .solely to help the lawful Government of Jordan, in response to a request from them for assistance, to resist an external threat and to protect the political independence and terrilorial ktpgrity of that country. I explained that our action related only to Jordan and that our troops would be withdrawn if the lawful Government of Jordan requested it. We have already entered into consultations with the Secretary-General and wilh the Government of Jordan, the object of which is to work out proposals under which assistance can be given by the United Nations to the Government of Jordan to ensure the preservation of its territorial integrity and political independence so as to enable our forces to be withdrawn. 81. Underlying this difference of approach betwecll Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, there is, it seems to me, a vital difference of principle. This difference is not that the Soviet Union is in favour of change in the Middle East while we are in favour of stagnation. Our record in promoting constructive change in the Middle East dnrin~ the last half century is a sufficient refutati:m of that charge. 82. The difference between the Soviet Union and OUTselves cor:cerns the method by which change is achilwed. We are all familiar with the various techniques hy which one country can interfere in the ~ffairs of another by all means short of direct armed aggression. ]f the legitimate Government of a country helieves that it is faced by a danger to its very existence by the use of these techniqnes against it, it has in international law the right to ask assistance frum ils friends, and such an appeal and the response to it are in conformity with the Charter. It is this right which the Government of Jordan exercised and which the Soviet Union is seeking to deny. I wonder how many Members of the United Nations would be prepared on calm reflection to deny 78. Cependant l'Union sovietique, au lieu de pOW'- suivl'e I'idee, qu'elle avait, deja acceptee, d'une reunion speciale du Consdl de securite, demande ffiaintenant la convocation de l'Assemblee gencrale en session extraordinaire d'urgence pour examiner lit question du Htrait des forces (:es Etats-Unis du Liban et des forces britanniques de Jordanie. 79. De tonte evidence, mon gouvel'llement ne Satlrait accepter la convocation de l'Assemblee gencrale dans ces conditions, Cette dernande de l'Union sovietiquc repose sur It; meme postulat que le projet de reSolution soviCtique que le Conseil a si nettement rejete [SjtJ047jReu. 1], a savoir gEe les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uui se seraient rendm coupables d'ngressions en repondant aux appcls a l'aide que leur nvaient adresses le Gouvernement libanais et le Gouvernement jordanien. En rejetant le projet de resolution sovi6tique, le Conseil a elairement fait sien le point de vue britannique selon lequel cette accLsation est deuuee de tout fondement. SO. J'at bicn precise c:ue le Hoyaume-Uni a agi a seule fin d'aider le gouvernement legitime de la Jordanie, comme celui-ci le lui avait demande, pour llli permettre de resister a une menace exterieure et de proteger l'ind,spendance et I'integrite territoriale du pays. J'ai explique que les mesures prises par le RoyaJme-l;ni ne concernaient que la Jordanie, et que nous retirericns nos troupes si le gouvernement legitime de la Jordanie en faisait la demande. Nous availS deja entame des eonsultotions avcc le Secret.air!', gr,nhal et le Gouvernement jordanien en vue de formuler des propositions aux termes desquelles I'Organisation des Nations Unies aiderait le Gouvernemer:t jordanien a preserver son integrite territoriale et son independancc poiitique, ce qui nous penuell..rait de retu-cr nos troupes. 81. Cette divergence de conception entre le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement sovietique repose it mon sens sur me difference de principe fondunentale. La difference n'est pas que l'Union sOvietique soit en faveur de changement:s au Moyen-Orient et le Foyaume- Uni en faveur de la stagnation. Le bilan des 50 dernieres allnees moutre ql(e nous aVOilS pratique au Afoyen- Orient un~ poJitique d'evolution constructive et suffit a refuter pareille accusation. 82. La difference entre l'Union sovietique et nousmetrres parte sur les methodes a suivre. Nom sommes tous familiers avec les tedmiques varices qui perm<'tJp.nt a un pays de s'lmmiscer par tous les moyens dans les affaires interieures d'un autre pays sans aller jusqu'a l'agression armee directe. Si le gouvernement legitime cl'un pa.ys a des raisons de croire que son existence meme est menacee parce qU'on emploie contre lui ccs techniques, le droit internntional I'autorise a demander l'aide £le nations anties, et il est conforme a I'esprit de la Charte de faire une telle demande et cl'y reptmclre. C'est ce droit que le Gouvernement :ordanien a exerce et que I'UniDIl sovietique voudrait refuser d'adm~tlre. Je me demandc combien de Membre~ de 84. As I have aheady said, we regret the vDIle-lace whiclt ltas caused the Soviet Government to reject the opportunities, which seemed to us so promising. of mal,ing progress through a special meeting of the Security Council. 85. I am now instructed, Mr. President, formally to suspend my delegation's request to hold a meeting of the Security Council on 12 August under Arlicle 28 of the Charter [SI4072]. We regret that Lhe cltange of front by the Soviet Union has made it impossible for such a meeting to be held next wee!(. The procedures which we proposed were llOnourable and fair to all and oITered in Ollr opinion a rCOIl !Jape of making progress. Our proposals evidently had the support of wide sections of world opinion. It is indeed lamentable that, for whatever reasons of its own, the Soviet Union should at the Inst minuLe have turned Lhem down. 86, The United Kingdom h not, however, opposed to a dis(;ussion in the General Assembly of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan, provided, of course, that this is arranged in a way which does not prejudge the issue. We fire quite ready to justify our fiction in Jordan and e.">.plain om' hopes for the future before the General As~embly flS we have done before this Council. 87. We recognize the legitimate desire of members of the United Nations w!lo are not represented on this Council to express a view on the matters wlJiclt we have been discussing here. For these reasons I was instructed by my Government to ask the United States delegation to revise its draft resolution in document 5/4056 so as to bring the Jordanian complaint as well as the Lebanese complaint within the scope of the pro~ posed emergency special sessiOn of the General Assembly. The United States delegOltion Ila~, as you know, agreed to that suggestion und the United Kingdom will vote in favour of the revised draft resolution in document S/4056/Rev.l. 88. Finally, it is our hope and expectation that the General Assembly, in accordance with its high traditions, will approach thi!> problem with the restraint and statesmanship which the problem itself deserves. No doubt wc shall hear from certain qLwrLers false allegation!> and propagandist phraseology designed to play on the emotions and increase tension. But I believe that the Assemuly, guided by past and recent expeR rience, will nut allow itself to be distracted by such mameuvres from the task which confronts it. 89. So far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, our whole endeavour will be to see that the truth prevails and to assist the Assembly's ellorts to make its contribution to 'lite cause of stability and peace in the Middle East. 84. Je le rcpete, nous deplorons la volte-face qui a amcnc le Gouvernement sovietiqlle a cearter une. possi~ bilit6, qui nous semblait prometteuse, de realiser des progres gr:1ce a une reunion speciale dl1 Conseil de secnrite. 85. Monsieur le President, je viens de I'ecevoir pour instructions de retirer la dem1mde par laquelle ma dClcigation vous avait pric de bien vOLLloir convoquer le Conseil de securite le 12 aout, en application de l'Artiele 28 de la Charte [S/4072]. Nous rcgrettons que le revirement de l'Union slJvielique cmpeche cette reunion d'avoil' lieu la semaine prochainc. La procedure que nons proposions dait honomble et equitable pour tous et permettait, selon 1l01lS, d'eseompler de reels progres. De toute evidence, nos propositions avaient l'appui de larges secteurs de l'opinion mondiale, Il est on ne peut plus regrettable que I' Union sovietique ait cru devoir les rejeter a la demier{' minute. 86. Le Gouv~rnemclll du Royaume-Uni ne s'oppose cependflnt pas a ce qlle l'AssembIee generale examine la situation au Liban et en Jordanie, a condition, bien ent~ndu, que le debat soit organise d'une mauiere qui ne prcjuge pas la question. Nous sommes tout prets a venir devant l'Assembh~e generale, comme nOllS sommes venus devant le Conseil, pour justifier notre action en Jordanie eL expliquer les espoir.~ que nous avons pour l'avenir. 87. Nous comprenons fort bien que des Memures de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui ne sont pas reprcsentes au Conseil tiennent aexprimer lelJrs vues sur les questions dont nOli discutons aetuellement id. C'est pourquoi mon gOUVL nement m'a charge de demander a la delegalion des Etats-Unis de reviser son projet de resolution publie sous la cote S/4056 ann que la plainte jordanienne puisse etre examinee au meme Litre que la plainte Iibanaise lors de la session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssembleI'. generale. La delegation des Etats- Unis a bien vou]u, comme \'ous le savez, accepter cetLe suggestion, et ma delegation votera pour le projet de resolution revis(;, qui porte la cote S/4056jRev. 1. 88. Pour tenniner, j'cxprime l'espoir que l'Assemblee generale, fld~le it se... lmutes traditions, abordera le problemI'. avcc 1<1 moderation et I'intelligence politique qui s'imposent. It est a prevoir que eertains lanceront des allegations mensongeres et recourront a toute Hnc phrastologie de propagande pour exploiter Ics emotions et accroitre la tension. Mais je pense que l'Assemblee, se SOllVenant d'experiences lointaines et recente.~, ne laissera pas de telles manceuvres la detourner de la ttlche qui llli incombe. 89. En. ce qui concerne la delegation du Royaume~Uni, lous ses efforts tendront afaire triompher la veritt'. d a aider l'Assemblee a servir la cause de la ~tabilite et de la paix au Moyen-Oricnt. 91. Mr, JAWAD (Iraq): The Security Council has had the opportuniLy to cDnsider boUt the Lebanese and the Jordanian complaints and the queslion of the landing of Gnited States troops in L'~banon and of United Kingdom trMps in Jordan. Tht discussions have revcaled and clarilied the elemmts of those questions, and therefore -,,:e do not find it ncccssEl.ry al this stage to refer to them in detail. 11re Lebanese complaint has been dealt with in the Coundl's resolution of 11 June 1958 {S/4023j, and the essence as weU as the details of tiJ~ matter have been dealL wiLl adequately by~he reports of the Observation Grot:p set up in accordance with that resolutiun. TIlDse reports showed that the charge~ again:>t the United Arab HepuhJic could not be s'.lustantiated. 92. 'nle question lIr:.s laken a completely new turn since the landlng of the Cnited State.'; armed forces in Lebanon. This action has been in contradiction with the sfJirit alld the Letter of the 11 June rcsollltion as well as with the UniLed Nations Charter. Thus it constituted a new phase leading to a crisis which was further aggravatl;d by the simultaneous intr<ldueLotl of armed forc-es of the United Kingdom into Jordan. 93, The latest disCllSsior.s of the Council show a large measure of agreement as to the existence of a serious international situation, as well as a keen desire for its solutbn. The situation remains a threat to international peace and security, not only in the region but also in the world as a whole, and tile Security Council has so far bem unahle to lay down the basis for its solution. 94. The two draft :esolutions submitted ';)y the Ullited States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explicity indicated the urgent necessity of calling upon the Ge:leral Assembly to assume its duties IJis-1-IJis this serious int;:rnational situation. This is in line with the tradition of the United ,[\'ations and in conformity with the obligations of the Members of the United Nations. Nevertheless, at a ccrtain stage the matter was not pressed to its logical conclusion. Efforts were expanded to find a solution at a new intcrnational level or level.~. Bccause these efforts were :tot sllcccssful, the Seenrity Council has heen called upon once again to assume its primary duties and role in maint3ining pellce amI :-;ec;lrity ill the world. Now:l. return lo the rnechanism of all emergency spedal session of the General Assembly is again proposed. IlS. This return shows a negative as wel! 3S a positive aspect of the United Nations eITo::ts. The first was revealed by the lailure of the Security Council to take action, and the second is manifest in the machinery provided for by General Assembly resolution 377 CV) 91. .M. JA WAD (Iral:) (traduit de l'angtaisJ: Le Conseil de sec'.lrite a eu la possibilite d'examiner tant la plainte dll Liban et ceUe de la Jordanie tIue la 4ucstion du debarquemcnt des trcupes des Etats·Uuis au Liban et dcs troupes du Royaume-Uni en J ordallie. Les dis- Cllssions qui ont lieu ont fait ressortir el mis en lllmiere les divers ~kmrnts de ces problemes; nous pc:nsons douc qu'il n'est pas llecessaire, a ce stade, de les reprendre en detail. La plainte c1u Liban a fnit l'objet ue In resolution cln COl1seil tU dak du 11 juin HIS8 [8/4023]. Quant au fond dn probleme et a ses f..spects dCtaillcs, le Groupe u'UbSCTYHLiull (;rcc en appLcation de ('ette resolution S'211 cst oc.cr[lC de fac;OIt ad~quatc, ainsi qu'il ressort des rapports qu'il a soumis. Ce!; rappotts mon~rcnt que les accllsalions dirigees coutre la Repnhliqnr arflbe unie lJ'€t8ient pas justifiecs. 92. La question est apparue sous un jour tout a fait uouveau depnis le dcbarfJlIcment des troopes des Etats- Unis au UiJan. Cette action ehit contraire a. .'esprit "t. 8 la lettre de la resohltion da 11 juin, ainsi qu'aux di.o,positions de la Charte des Nations l'nies; elle a done ouvert une. nouvelk "Jhase aboutissant a une crise encore aggravee IJar l'envci simultane de forces armces du Royau:ne-Uni en Jordanie. 93. Les dernieres deliherations du COllseil montrent que In grande majorite d'entre nous reconnait que la situation internationale est grnve et desire vivement y remectier. Cetle sibatioll continue de faire peser une menace ~ul' la pab.. et la securitc internntionales, non seulement dans le :Moyen-Oricnt. mais nusl:li dans le monde entier, et le Conseil de securitc n'a pu jusqu'ici trouver les bases d'nne solution. \;14, Les deux projets de resoluLion pre.sentcs pal' IllS Etats-Unis d'Amerique et par l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiqnes soulignent explicitement la necessite urgente de convoqller l'Assemblee generale pour qu'eJ:e S'f\(~fJllitte de ses responsabilites touchant ceUe situation internationale grave. Cela esl conforme aux tr<1ditions de l'Org,misation des Natiolls Unics, ain8i qu'aux obligations contracLees par les Memhres de l'Organisation. A un cert.sin stade, cepentlant, la questioll n'a pas ete p(lu~see jusqu'd son nbouti~sement logique. On s'est em;loye a rechel'cher une soludon Selr nn plan iIlternational diff~rent. Ces effort~ n'ayant pas ete couror.nes de succes, It: COllseil de securitc est appele nne fois ne plus a s'ncqui-;ter de sa respollsabilite priu~ cipale et a jouer le rOle qni lui incomhe touchnnt le maintien de la paix et de la scc(tnte da:ts le monde. On en revlcnt maintellant a le. question d'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'A5scmbIee generale. 95. Cc retour Inonire a. la fois l'aspect negatif et l'aspect positif des eITorts deployes par I'Organisation des Nations Unies. L'aspect lH~fatif a ete mis en lumiere par l'impuissance dn Co:tseil de sccurit~ it agir, et a l'aspect positif correspunJ la procedure prcvuc par la 96. We have no doubt that the response of the Member State:> of the United Nations lo the appeal of the Security Council \vill not only be a positive one but will also be of such a nature as to strengthen the principles of the Charter and save the world from catastrophe. In particular, the small States, whose existence would always be in jeopardy if the big Powers went outside the framework of the United Nations, will be the first supporters of effective action through the United Nations. Iraq has no fears of a full discussion of this problem by the General Assembly. In .fact, we are of the opinion tlrnt the United Nations should always be the centre for dealing with problems of this nature. 97. The effectiveness of the action depends, however, on the way tlle question is formulated. As we have already stated, the problems which were the subject of study by the Council centre :uound the presence of foreign armed forces in the territories of two independent States Members of the United Nations. Whatever the nature of the explanation given for such an action, the fact remains that it falls oul~jde the spirit and letter of the Charter, constitutes a discontinuation of the efforts of the Security Council and leads to more complications which go beyond the frontiers of the Stales immediately concerned and which threaten the peace of the region. 98. It is, therefore, essential to make it clear that when this emergency special session of the General Assembly convene!l it will be meeting to deal primarily with the introduction of United States and United Kingdom forces into Lebanon and Jordan and with a view to finding a rapid and appropriate solution for the situation thus created. If SUcll an approach is followed it will not only be an effort to save the peace in the region but will also lay the foundations for future constructive action. This is the way we view the present Middle Eastern situation in its substance as well as in the method for its con:>ideration by the United Nations. 99. The draft resolution submitted by the United Stales [Sf4056fRev.l] refers to the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan against the United Arab Republic - questions which have in our opinion been proved, in effect, without substance, the first by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and the second by the discussion in tlus Council - and we find that no valid purpose would be served by their discussion in the General Assembly. Since tIle Lebanese and Jor~ danian charges were submitted to the Council more than three weeks ago, far-reaching and more substantial developments have taken place. In our view, it is both unrealistic and illogical to confine the matter to these charges. For these reasons, my delegation is not in a position to support the draft resohltion in its present form, even thougll we are in agreement with its purpose regarding the convening of an emergency special session of the General Assembly. probl~mc soit discute de fa~on approfondie par l'Assemblee generale. En fait, nous pensons que I'Organisation des Nations Unies devrait toujours etre le centre d'etude des problemes de cet ordre. 97. Cependant, l'efficacite de cette action depend de la fayon dont la question est formulee. Comme nous I'avons deja declare, le fait essentiel, panni ceux dont le Consei! s'est pnioccupe, est la presence de tronpes etrangeres sur le territoire de deux Etats independants qui sont Membres de I'Organisation des Nntions Unies. QueUe que soit la nature de l'explication donnce pour justifier ce fait, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que la pre~ sence de ces troupes est contraire a I'esprit et a la lettre de In Charte, qu'elle cree une interruption dans le~ efforts du Conseil de securite, et entraine de nouvelles complications dont les etTets se font sentir au-dela des frontieres des Etats immediatement interesses et qui menacent la paix de la region. 98. 11 est done indispensable de bien souligner que ceUe session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssembIee generale, 10rsqu'eUe se tiendra, devra se preoccuper avant tout du probleme pose par la presence de forces armees des Etats~Unis et du Royaume-Uni au Liban et en Jordanie, en vue de trouver une solution rapide et satisfaisante a la situation ainsi creee. En agissant ainsi, on aura non seulement fait un effort pour sauver la paLx au Moyen-Orient, mais ausst jete pour l'avenir les bases d'une action constructive. Voila comment nous voyons la situation actueDe au Moyen-Orient, voila la methode qu'a notre avis l'Organisation des Nations Unies devrait suivre pour y remedier. 99. Le projet de resolution presente par les Etats-Unis d'Arnerique [Sj4056fRev. 1J fait etat des plaintes du Lib:m et de la Jordanie contre la Republique arabe unie - plaintes dont, selon nous, l'absence de bienfonde a ete etablie, pour la premiere, par le Groupe d'observation des Nations Unies au Liban, et, pour la seconde, par les debah du Conseil - et nous estimons que leur examen par l'AssembIee generale n'aurait aucune utilite reelle. Depuis que le ConseB a ete saisi des accusations libanaises et jordaniennes, il y a plus de trois sernaines, il s'est produit des evenements d'une grande portee, des evenements plus concrets. Il est, a notre avis, a la fois peu realiste et illogique de limiter le probleme a ces accusations. C'est pourquoi ma delegation n'est pas en mesure d'appuyer le projet de resolution sous sa forme actuelle, hien que nous sOyollS d'accord sur l'objectif recherche, qui est la reunion d'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssemblCe generale. 101. The Prime Minister o~ CanaO::t stat~rl recently in the House of Commons in 0 tt:;,wa: "We took a lead in this regard because, while we are still one of the smaller nations, we believe that smaller natiom must be recognized and their rights upheld in the United Nations :md th~ assuran('e of their viewpoint being placed before the United Nations maintained." 101. Le Premier Ministre du Canada a declare n3cemment a Ottawa, devant la Charr.bre des communes, que; «nous avons ete les premiers a preconiser cela, parce que, tout en etant encore au nombre des petites nations, nous croyons que les petites nations doivent r.tre rf'.connues, que leurs droiLs doivent etre defendus a l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ct qu'cHes doivent toujours Hre assllrees de pouvoiT y faire entendte Ieur voix. 11 Le Premier Ministre a ~joute : He added: ., It is fur this reason Ulal we blke the view thl.\t a formal COllncil meeting tD initiate taDts ... between the Heads of Government concerned, after the procedure has been determined by the Sccurity Couucil regular membership, should be attended by the IIeads of Government able to be presenL" 102. To this end, my delegation addressed to yOll, Mr. President, on 1 August a request for a special meeting of the COllnci) on 12 Augu,~t [5/4073J. ]n our opinion, a procedure such as this would have made possible informal consultatio:3s among the great Powers and sueh others as might llave been associated with them in tllOse talks. It offered a suitable f1'amework for dealing not only with the problems of Lebanon and Jordan, of which the Council was already seized, but also with those more deep-rooted issues which affect the area as a whole. 103. This is still our view. and we deeply regret that it has not proved possible for the Cour.ell to advance in that direction. Mr. KhrusJlchev has denied to the Security Council, for the time being at least, the possibility of playing a practical role in achieving the objective we have in mind. Nevertheless, the Security Council is charged with important responsibilities for international peace and s~curity under the United Nations Charter and I, for one, am far from persuaded that this Council has come to the end of its capacity for making a fruitful contribution to the substance of the questions before it. For the moment, however, we must seek an alternative way of finding ~ meflinm for disCUS8ion in the Lnited Nation.!> whicll will diminish the tensions existent in the Middle East. 104,. Celle autre metllodc nous est offl'.rte par le proj~t. de resolution des Etats-Unis [S/4056:Reo. 1], qui dernande la convocation d'une session extracrdinaire d'urgellce de I'Assemb:ee generale. La dfh~gatioll canadienne appuie cc projet de resolution, dam l'espoir qu'i1 fournira la possibilite, non pal; de donr.er libre cours a des recriminations steriles, qui ne peuve:lt qu'exacerber les antagonismes et aggraver la situation all Moyen-Orielit, mais d'examiner 1t3 probleroes foodame-ntaux de cette region. 105, A eet egard, notl~ avons tie heureux d'entendre le president Eisenhower declarer hier a sa conference 104. Sllch an alternative is offered by the United States draft resolution [5/4056/Rev.l], calling for an emergency special SEssion of the General Assembly. The Canadian delegation supports this draft resolution in the hope and expectatior. that it will offer an opportunity. not for sterile recILrninatioll, which can only sharpen ~ntagonisms and aggravate the situation in the Middle East, but for an examination of the funda~ mental problems of the area. 105. In this connexion, we welcome the statement of President Eisenhower, as reported in his news confer- « C:'est pc>urquoi nOllS sornmps parl,isnlll; d'une reu~ nio n offLeieJle du Conseil en vue d'amorcer des conversations I...] entre les clefs de gouvernement interesses, une fois 1'1 procedure arrHlie par le COllseil de securite compose de ses membres habituels, reunion it l::lql1elIe devraient assister tous les chefs de gOllvernement en mesure d'y prendre part. >J 102. C'est dans cette intention, Monsieur le President, que ma (JelCgation vous a deJ:l.ande le 1er flout de coovOfluer une reunion extraordinaire du Conse] pOllr l~ 12 auul [S/10~3]. A notn avis, cela 9.urait rendu possible l'organisdion cc consultations officieuses entre les grandes pllissances et les auues pays qui anraient pu se joindre aeUes pour ces entretiens. Une telle reunion allrait perIT.is de traiter non seulemellt des problemes du Liball et de la J{ll'(lanie, doni le Conseil ctait dejll. saisi, mais aussi des problemes plus profondement enracines qui touchent l'ensemble de la region. 103. Ce point de vue est tOlljours le nOtre, et nous regrettons beaucoup ql..i'il ne se soit pas revel~_ possible pour le COllseil d'avll.nccr duns cette direction. M. Khrouchtchev n'a pas vonlu, pour le moment tact all moins, laisser au Conseil de securite la possibilite de joner un r6le pratique dans la vok Clle nOJS nous sommes tl'<icee. Il o'eo reste pas mains qu'aux termes dc la Charte des Natiens Unif's, le Conseil de securite a d'importantes respo:r-.sabi1ih~s dans le domair.e de la paix et de ]a secul"'itc internattoml1es, et, pOllr ma part, je suis loin d'etre convaincu qu'il a epuise tous les moyens dont il dispose pour eontribuer lltilement a ~a I;olution eflectivc des problemes qui lni sont soumis. Pour le moment, cependant, il nOlls faut chercher une autre methode qui permette de diseuter ees problemes au sein de rOrganisatiol'l des Nations Unies et d'attenuer ainsi la tension qui regne au Moyen-Orient. 80 request. 106. Le Canada est dcsireux, GOmlllC il l'n toujOUl'S ere, de faire tout cc qui est en :-;on p()lJvoir pour fnCi_ liLer la solution dn probleme. Nous nons cmploierons done de notre mieux, au cours de In session cl'urgcnce de l'Assembl<~e generale, a faci!iter l'ndoptioll de mC:-llres propres a stabiliser la situation dUll" le l\Ioyen-Orient. I! se pourrait bien - comme nous l'espcrons fermc_ ment -- que, dans le cadre de l'A.<;.scmbleo gcnerale, l'occnsion se presente, pour les pnis.sances direetemcnt interessees, d'entamer des discussions onicieuscs et fruetueuses sur le fond mell1e de ces questions urgenles, Car ce sont ces questions de fond, et nOn le,.; questions de propagande - ce son!; les veritables prohlemes intercssanL la securitc et la prospt;rHe de la region _ qui, selon nous, demandcnt a ctre cLtalics de concert dnns un esprit rea!iste, et cxigent des efforts Constructifs. lOG. CUIl[lda is willing, as it has been all along, to make any contribution ill it;." power to a solution of Uwse problclllll. \Ve shall therefore devote our efforts, in the emergeucy session of the General Assembly, to suppnrLill~ means fOl' the stabilization of the IIEddle Eust. lL lllay indeed be possible - and we certainly hope so that, within the framework of the General Assembly, there will be an opportunity for informal and fruitful discllssions of the substance of these urgent questions among the Powers principally concerned. For it l<, these matters of substance, and not questions of propaganda - the real problems alfecting the security and prosperity of the area - which in our view require a joint approach in a spirit of realism and constructive errort. 1?7.. M. A~.KOU~ (Liban) {lraduit de l'anglais! : .re n a:als pas. I mtenbon de prendre la parole aujollrcl'hlli, mals certames remarques <Iu represenLanL de l'Union sovietique m'obligent a dire quelqnes nlOts, en rcpouse. 107. )l,lr. AZKOUL (Leballon): I did not intend to take part in the deliberations of the Security Council today. However, certain remarks made by the representative of the Sovicl Union compel me to offel' some words in reply. 108. En premier lieu, je voudl'uis qu'il soit rOllsignc dans le proces~verbal que mOll gOllvernCml'lIL ct le peuple libanais ne sauraient admettru que le repres.entant de I'Union sovietique p::nle dll gouvcrllt~Jncnt 108. First of all, I should like to register in the record the fact that my Government and the people of Lebanon resent a?d .protes~ the reference of the representative of the Soviet Ulllon to the Government of Lebanon as a Government imposed on Lebanon by the colonial P0'Yers. The Lebanese people consider such a reference an msult to their aUachment to freedom and independence. The thing which the Lebanese people can be hb~nafs comme. d'un gOllvernernent impost; pnr les pUlssances ~ololllales. Le peuple libanaiil y wit Ilnc lIlsulte, eu egard a son amour de la liberte et de l'hlde.. pendance. S'il est une chose dont le pcuple libanais peut etre f;er, ,c'est bien de jonir pleincment de sa liberte et de ,son lIldependance, au point de 11Ii Inire souhaiLer rro~d of, mainly a,nd essentially, is that they enjoy theIr freedom and mdependence in such a way as to make .then; wisl: tha~ many other peoples in other countries, mcludmg big countries, might enjoy that salIW freedom and might elect their governments as freely as the Lebanese people elect theirs. 9u~ blen d'autres pays, je dirai 1l1i!mc de grands pays, JOUlssent de la n:c;ne liberte et puissent elire leufS gouvernements aussI hbremeIlt que le fait le pcuplc libnnais. 1O\~. Secondly, reference was made by the represeni?9. En ~econd lieu, le representant de I'Union so....ili. dqu~ a ~alt allusion nux constataLiOlls et COI1Clll,~iOfls NUt' eux~~e rappo;t du Groupe d'obsCTvatiun dC's t~bve of the Soviet Union to the results and conclu- ~HII;S of the second report of the United Nations ObservatIOn ~roup in Lebanon [S{4069]. He interpreted the c(:ncluslOllS of this report as a denial of the char es m,ule by Lebanon. g co' wIn~ files au Llban [S/40691. Il u inLcr]JreLC ccs ne USlOns comme un d < t' , j ' " crnell I aux aCCusatiOns [ormu ees par le Llbnn. I1\), r must say lllllt if this report and the previous one - ~lIld perhaps subsequent reports _ of th 110. Je dois dire que si r"d t . cc rapport, comme le rapport P ""de Gen - et peut-etrc Jllcme les rapports llltl~ri('Urs - u rOUpe d'observatio' " ',' me It t t" . n, n est pas It! CO!lsn('llClcllSevO~lnee. e~ en ler, et SI I'on n'accordc pas I'attl'ntion a c aque paragraphc, on risqnt'. d'etre iIHlllit en :~:~t comnte d~ns le cas de tout autre l('xte tlont n'n est p,rt"uCnU'j".partleten l:isolallt de 5011 c{)llLexll'. Celll leremen vral pou' d ou' j b ' cs rapport" de cc genre cs 0 Servateurs s'efJo j" • nOmbre de choses ou.' rccnt ( expllqller Ill! grand comprend" j P 'jct~yer convcnn.blement ou fain, , eurs cone US10ns Il f d'attention et d d . aut done l!ellUt:Oup e pru enee P , our Jugur Ges r,1pporLs. :n.l~~~vatlOn (~rour, are n'?t read carefully and in thei~ entllcLy, and If full attention is not givell to each rt then they b' pa . may e as misleading as any other text !~o~n :whdl one tnkcs only 8 part and leaves th t I~Il.~ IS t-'SpecialIy so ill reports of this type whe~er~~~ o ser~ers endeavour to explain many things in order ~ ~:Idlj,tehe ndcces,sary d.background fOr their conclusions ,uners'unmgofth' j' , cure and utt t' I Id elr COne USlOns. SpeCial cnlOn SlOU be sd' , d' reports. u e In]u gtng these the~e was or was not infiltration, or to find Olll how much or how little there was. It Was establisLled, in accordance with the terms of t]le Security Council resolution, as an observation group to ensure tliat ther,;: was no illegal infillmtion into Lebanon and across tlte borders of Lebanon, which mean,~ that the pt:rpose and mission of the Observation Group are not to inform us whether or not there is jnfiltratioll, but to stop jnriJtra~ tion if inf1!tration i~ taking place; in a way and ideally spealdlJg, I would say tl1at the last persons to be 2ble to see the inliltr::ltors would be the observers. Why? Bec.ause if it is true th~t tile observers have been sent to Lebanon to stop inftltration, it goes without saying that wherever there is an observer - no matter what part of the countr}' he is in - he should not find an inflltrator in that area, It is [;rue, therefore, ideally speaking, that the last persons to be irl n position to inform us on the existence of infiltration would be the observers, bec<luse their presence is 0. deterrent to inftl_ tration. Wherever they go, there should be no infil~ tration. In spite of this, if they transmit a report in which they say first that they have discovered arms and ammunition which were brought to certain regions from abroad, this should be a very important statement to take note of in spite of the fact that in prhciple they cO',lld not or should not be able to observe these things because they arc usually hidden md the infiltraturs di~appear when they approach, In spite of tilis, they were :::.hle, in their report, to speak about a certain amonnt. of infiltration and smug~led arms and ammunition. 112, As to He persons whom they could not see and whose presence Uley could not establish, and 3:l to whether or not these persons came f~om across the berder, the explanations are to be fOllnd in the report, which sho·.tld be read in full and carefully - not just a phrase or a sentence. Before arriving at that conclusion, the observers say~ "As regards the question of the illegal infiltration of personnel, the nature of the fDuller, the existence of traditional trib81 and otiJlOr band~ on both sides of it, the free movement of produce in both diredions, are among the factors which must be taken into account in makhg an evaluation. It must, llOwcver, be said that in no case have 'Cnited NuLioIJS oiJ~~rYers, who have been vigiLantly patrolling the oppositionheld areas and have frequenlly observed the armed b::mds there, been able to detect the presence of per- 112. En ce qui concerne les persor-nes qu'ils n'ont pu voir e~ d,ml: LS n':mt pu clablir la presence, et quant a savoir s; ces pel'sonnes avaient traverse la frontiere, nous trouvons toutes les explications nccessaires dans ce rapport, qu'il faut lire enLiere:nent et aLtcutivement, et dont il ne faut pas extraire seulement une expression ou une phrase. AV3nt d'en arriYer a ceUe conclusion, le~ observ2teurs cl6clarenL : «En ce qui concerne I'infiltration ilIegale de personnel, la nature de la frontiere, I'existence de liens trac.itio:J.neh, trihanx et autres, des deux cotes de ceIle-ci, et la Iibre circulation des produits dnns JC5 deux directions, sont autant de facteurs dont il fant tcnir ccmptc pour proceder a nne evaluation, Mais il faut dire que les obscrv::lteurs de~ Nahons Unies, qui ont vatrouille avec vigilance les zones aux mains de l'opposition et y onc frcquemment obsC'.rve la presence de groupes armes, n'ont pu en auenn cas 114. As this is a very important question, r should like. with the permission of the President, to mention very briefly some of the statements of the observers in tMs connexion. 115. If we take the Akkar plain, which is nortb of Tripoli, and which was mentioned with some optimism in the first interim report [5/4051], we see that on 2 July full freedom of access to the area north of Tripoli, and to the borders, was offered to the military observers by the loeal opposition leader. This gives the impression that since 2 July the observers have in fact been able to have access to this area and to observe movements freely, What does the report say, which covers the period from 2 to 15 July, a period of less than two weeks. It says: " Military observers could not establish permanent observation posts in the Akkar plain" - this region which I mentioned - .. as the filII freedom of movement demanded was not forthcoming." [8/4069, para. 18.] The observers recognize that what they hoped for then was not realized at that time. Therefore, anything they could say today about the Akkar plain oould not be substantially different from what they could say in the first interim report. 116. In another region, the north Bekaa Valley, did they go further than th",y had previously? Yes, a little bit, But this is what the report says: .. Access to the area was restricted at first, but subsequently our patrols were in a position to reach every part of it during the day. Until 11 July" - 114. Etant donne l'importunce de cette question, je voudrais, avec la permission du President, citer tre:; brievement it ee propos certains passages du rapport des observateurs. 115. Si nous prenons la plaine d'Akkar, qui s'etend all nord de Tripoli, et qui a ete l'objet de ref~rences assez opttmistes dans le premier rapport interimaire [S/4051J, nous constatons que, le 2 juillet, la liberb! d'acceder a la region situee au nord de Tripoli, ainsi qu'aux frontieres, a ete offerte aux observateurs militaires par le chef local de I'opposition. Nous en retirons ('impression que, depuis le 2 juillet, Ies observateUfs ant eIIectivement pu se rendre dans cette region et observer en toute !iberte le.s deplacements. Que dit le rapport, qui a trait a la periode du 2 au 15 juillet, et qui parte donc sur mains de deux semaines? On y lit ced: uLes observateurs militaires n'ont pu etablir de postes d'observation permanents danf> la plaine d'Akkar" -- dans la region dont j'ai parle - « faute d'avoir ohtenu la complete liberte de mouvement qu'ils avaient demandee. 11 [S/4069, par. 18./ Les observateurs admettent qu'ils n'ont pas encore pu obtenir El cette date ee qu'i}s esperaient alors. Dans ces conditions, tout Cl'. qll'ils pourraient dire aujourd'hui au sujet de la plaine d'Akkar ne saurait etre different, en substance, de cc qu'ils pouvaient en dire dans leur premier rapport interimaire. 116. Dans une aatre region, la Bekaa septentrionale, sOnt·iIs alMs plus loin que precedemment? ~ui, un pelL Mais voyons Cl'. que dit le rapport: «L'acces El eette zone a d'abord ete limite, mais par ta suite, nos patrouilles ant eM en mesure d'en atte.indre tous les points pendant le jour. Jusqu'au When the observers say "frequent poor visibility", they mean that the observation took place from afar and that a clear sky was needed to see fro:n afar the people or vehicles on the roads. Even that was not possible for them to observe. The paragraph continues: .. Beginning on 11 July, day pntrols from ChtauT8 Dutstation began to reach the fronti.:;r in this area and on 15 July" -- the last day of the period covered by the report - "agreement was readIed with the local opposition leaders to establish stations al Baalbek and near the northern frontier." lIbid.J It A partir du 11 juilleL, des patrouilles ant pu etre effectuees de jour dans cette region, depuis le poste de Chtaura jusqu·i\. la frontiere, et le 15 juillet ~ - dernier jour de la periode qui fait l'objet du rapport -, « a In suite d'un accord aver le!'; cheh locaux de l'opposi.tion, on a pu etablir des pastes aBaalbek et pres de la Irontiere septentrionale. n [Ibid.] t 17. Therefore, until 15 July, the last day of this period, the ob5ervers were still waiting for agreements and for the implementation of these agrilements to 117. Ains! done, jllsqu'au 15 juUlet, danier jour de la per-iode consideree. les observateurs ont atte:ldu la conclusion et l'application d'accords qui devaient leur permettre de s'acquitter de fa¥on satisfaisante de leur mission d'observation. Its disent eux~memes que rela s'adresse it ceux qui veulent. Hre leurs conclusions. Us dernandent de ne pas c005tdercr ces conclllsior.s independammcnt des limitations qui leur Ont ete imposees par les ciIconstances. perrlli~ Lllt:m to fulfil and curry Qut :J.dequate ob~f'.r­ vation. They say themselves that this lS said ta tllOse who want to read the conclusions. They ask that the concll:.sions should not be taken independently of the li:nitations imposed on them by the nature of thing:;. 118. Passons a une autre region. NOlls lisons ce qui suit au paragraphe 40 ; «L'observation au sol, dans cette region [BekM meridionalcj, Cst eiJectuee a partir d'un poste auxiliaire sit.tle a Rachaya, sur lcs contrcforts nord du moot Hermon, et de celui de Sflghbine, d'oo. on domine, de l'ouest, la vallee de la Bekaa. 1:ll poste secondDire d'observatiO:l de nuit)) - voila qui est 118. Let us take another reRion, In paragraph 40 we read: "The ground observation in this area [Southern Bekaa] is carried out from a sub-station at Rachaya on the northern foothill:; of Mount Berman and tha.t of Sagllbine at a point overlooking the Bekaa valley fro:n the west. A subsidiary night observation post" - this is very interesting: there was already a night observation post - "was established on 11 July near Kafraya on the Saghbine-Chtaura road." tre~ interessant ; il y avdt done deja un poste. d'oh.~er­ vation de nuit - l( a ete etabli le n juillet pres de Kafraya, sur la route de Saghbine a Chtaura. » KotonE; done, en passant, que si Cc poste a fonctionne, il n'a fonctionne que pendant qllatre joms, et la OU il est situe, a Kairaya, sur la route de Saghbine a Chtaura, il e~t dans nne region aux mains du gouvernement, et non IOn territoire rcbelle ni pres des fron.., tieres. By the way, if this post was working, it had lJet:11 working for only four days, and there, at Kafraya, on tlte Saghbine..chtaura road in the territory held by the Government, and not in rebel territory or near the borders. li L'acces £lUX. z.ones frontalieres des environs de Dcir eJ AachAyer}j -- sur la frontihe - u n'a pas presente de difficulte particuliere, et un poste d'obser· vation de jour y est etabli en pennanence. Cependant 11 - et eeci est tres interessant -, « les observateurs ne sont autorises A accMer a celle rt:gion que par la route :lOrd.)) - N'etaient-ils done pas autoris~s a utiliser les autres routes? Pourquoi? je l'ignore, mais "Access to the frontier areas near De'ir-el· Aachayer .. - on tbe border - .. has ]lresented no particular difficulty and a day observation post has been established in the region on a regular basis. However," - and this is an interesting point - the observers have been allowed to use only the northern road into this area." - Were they not allowed to not the otber roads? Why not? I do not know, but you can draw conclusions from the following: "Traffic on the road leading to Kfar Kouk has not been posgible since 26 June, since the road is said to be mined." (5/4069, para. 40·1 There were limitations on their free access to this region: VOU! pauv~z titer wlUs-ml!mes les conclusions d'spres ce qui suit. - « La Circulation a du etre interrompue depuis le 26 juin sur la route menant a KfaI' Rouk, car on croit savoir que la route est minee. l} [514069, par. 40.] Ce sont la des restrictions a la liberte d'acces a cette region. 120. In paragraph 53 of the report we read the following: " In certain of the communications received from the Lebanese Government, t1le area around Chebaa " - the headquarters - "IIUS been mentioned as the starting point of routes for the dispatch of mule·trains carrying arms to the Chouf and other opposition-held meas in the interior. The Group has made no direct observations, either from the ground or the air, Lending to confIrm this. In any case, it intends to establish sub-stations at Chebaa and Khcrouia in the area in question." [5/4069, para, 53.] The Group still intends to establish the necessary posts for adequate observation. 121. If you take every section of the border or every area held by the rebels you find that the observers give tile necessary information to qualify their conclusions (paragraphs 61 to 66), 12:d, It is interesting to note that there was a mention of nigh.t observation. What did they observe? In paragraph 4.9 of this report, we read: .. Previous negative observations would tend to suggesL that any infiltration which has laken place has occurred in the recent dark nights and not in the previous period of moonlight." [8/4069, para. 49.J This means that the infIltration not only does not take place, normally speaking, during the day, bllt thnt it takes place only during dark nights when tile conditions preventing observation are completely fulfilled. 123. It is also interesting to see what they did observe. We read in paragraph 45 of the report: .. Night watches have been kept at the sub~station at Saghbine and, since 11 July, at an observation post in a building at Kafraya with a good command of the area." - [This gives hope that they will now see somebody during the night.] The following observations were made: "(a) On the night of 7-8 July, a number of moving lights indicated that there was traffic between Balloul and Lela. 120. Au paragraphe 53 du rapport, noUs lisons ce qui suit: 11 Dans ccrtaincs des communications reyues rIu GOllvernement libanais, la region autour de Chebna ) - c'est-a~dire ce meme quartier general - (( est presentee comme la base de depart de convois muletiers qni transportent des armes vers le ChoM et d'autres regions de l'interieur tenues par l'opposition. Le Groupc n'a fait aucune observation directe, que ee soit au sol ou par avion, qui tende Et confirmer ces declarations. De toute fayon, it a !'intention d'etablir des postes alLxiliaires a Chebaa et a Khe- TOllia, dans la region ell question. 11 [5/4069, par. 53.J Le Groupe a toujol1rs l'intention d'etablir les pastes necessaires pour des observations appropriees. 121. Prenez chacune des sections frontalieres ou chacune des regions aux mains des rebelles, et vous constaterez que les observateurs donnent taus les renseignements dont il faut tenir compte pour interpreter les conclusions du rapport (paragraphes 61 :i 66). 122. II est interessant de noter qu'il est question dans le rapport d'une observation f<:lite de nuil. Qu'a-t-on observe? Au paragraphe 49 du rapport, nous lisons : «Compte tenu du resultat negatif cl'observations ant6rieures, il semblerait que les infiltrations qui ont pu se produire soient survenues pendant les nkentes nuits sombres, et non pendant la periodc anferieure de d~ir rle lune." r5/4069, par. 49.1 Cela signifie non seulement que les infiltrations n'ont generalement pas lieu pendant le jour, mais qu'eHes se produisent uniquement pendant Ies nuits sombres, lorsque tout concollrt a empecher les observateurs d'observer La moindre chose. 123. Il est ligalement interessant de noter ce qu'lls ont effectivement observe. Nous lisons, au paragraphe 45 du rapport: KUne gal'de de nuit a ete organisee au poste auxiliaire de Sughbine et, depuis le 11 juillet, a un poste d'observation installe dans un immeuble de Kafraya d'ou 1'on domine tOllS les environs. ~ - Voila qui permet d'esperer fll1'ils velTonl maintenant quelqu'un pendant la nuit. - «On a pu faire les observations suivantes : I( a) Dans la nuit dll i all 8 juillet, on a repere des lumieres mobiles permettant de conclure a des deplacements entre Balloul et Lela. 12·1. The observers say, rightly at the end of thei.r report, that it was impossible, in view of these lirnit:Jtioll.') - not in view of the fact that there were none, because they could not know whether there were any or not - to ascertain whether a cerLHin person came from abroad or not. 125. 1 think this is tile right way to read and interpret this report, I am sllfe that it was the inl:.ention of the observers, when they wrote it to give all the details necessary to permit a real and adequate judgement. 126. Anyhow, as I said before, we do not expect, we did not expect and we did not ask that observers be sent to check on the truth of the allegations, evidence or facts which we broll.ght before you. \Ne wanted the observers and we aeeepted them because we felt - and we still feel - that, wherever they went, their presence would be a deterrent to any infiltration. We hope that they will be abLe to leach all the borders so that the valuable work which they could carry out simply by thl'jr :presence and by their watching will bring about the situation which we hope for - the stopping of the inftltration and smuggling of arms across the Lebanese border,

I wish tf) st.ate my delegation's position very briefly, I associate myself with the statement just made by the representative of Iraq, whicll coincides with our view of the (haft resolution submitted by the United States representative [S/4056/Rel'.1J, We are ready to disrmss all these questions in the General Assembly; we shall do so objectively in the hope of ftnding an appropriate solution in confornity with the United Nations Charter. 128. However, the reference, in the preamble of the United States draft resolutiull, to the complnints of Lebanon and Jordan appears to ignore the fact thaL the complaints havl'_ not been substantiated. In the case of Lebanon, a glance at the two reports of the United Nations Observation Group will show what I mean. 1 have therefore tile fullest reservations on thnt point. 128. Toutefois, le considerant du projet de resolution des Et~ts-Unis, lorsqu'il cite les plflintes du Liban et de la Jordanie, ne semble nas tenir compte du fait que le bien-fondc de ees plaintes n'a pas eM etJ.bli. Illl'est que de jeter un coup u'u:il, en cc qui concerne le Libtln, sur les deux rapports du Groupe d'observation des Nations Onies pour se rendre compte de ce que j'avancc, AlIssi, sur ee poiut, fais-je les plus amples re,,8rves. 129. In that connexion, I must say that I was s1lrpri~ed by the United States representative's interpretation of the Observation Group's second report 124, A la fin de leur rapport, les observatellrs discnt qll'illenr a ete impossible, du f<lit de ces limitationsnon pas du fait qu'll n'y avail vas d'infiltration, car ils ne pouvaient pas savoir s'il y en avait DU pas -, de .~'nSSl1rer ~i telle personne venait ou non de l'etrangex. 125. Je pe.nse que c'est ainsi qu'il faut lirl'l et interpreter le rapport. Je suis sur que l'inteation des observatcurs, quulld ils l'ont l'edige, etait de donner tous les detaIls nccessaire:; pOUf pCl'nlectre de se f{lire une opinion fonch~e et juste de la situation. 126, Cependant, comme je l'a! deja dit, nous ne nous attendons pa5, no us ne no us sommes jamais attendus et nous n'avons jHmais demande que l'on nollS envoie des observateurs pour verifier nos afllrmations ou faire la preuve des frots que nous awns r.xposes, NODs avons demandc ees obscrvaleuo; et nous lcs llYOaS Qeeeptes paree que n(ms pensions - et nOllS le penSO:ls toujours -- que lenr prt'-.sence, oil que Cl.' soit, mettrait obstacle aux in:jltrations. NOU5 espcrons qu'ils poulTont $.cteinrlre toutes les frontieres, afin que l'a:uvl'e utile qu'ils ont pll realiser par leur simple presence et par leurs observations permette de creer la situation que nollS souhaitons voir s'etablir - c'est-a-dire l'arret de l'infiltration et des envois illcgaux d'ormes il tr:'lvers la frontiere libanaise. 127. M. LOUTFI (Republique ::lrabe unie) : Je me born('.rai a deflnir en quelques mots la positiDn de ma delegation. .le m'assoeie a l'illLervention qui u lite faitc par le representant de l'lrak et qtIi c'Jtncide avec notre point de VHe sur le projet de resolution depose pax le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique (S/4056/Rev. 1J. Nous sommes prets a discuter tOlltes ees questions 3 l'Assemblee generate; nOllS le ferons d'une maniere objective, pour trouver une solution adequate, eonformement it la Charte des Nations Unies, 129. Je ne pcux, dans eet ordr~. d'idees, qu'etre surpris de l'interpretation que le representant des Etats- Unis a donnee aujourd'lmi al! deuxi(}l!1e mppDrt ell! 131. However, an attempt has been made to minimize the work of the observers and the report itself suggests a very different conclusion. In paragraph 61 we read: " It will be clear from the report that considerable progress has been made in extending and intensifying observation activities over most of the significant areas, both along the borders and in the areas adjacent to them. "[S/4069, para. 61.] 131. On a tente aussi de minimiser I'activite des observateurs. En lisant le rapport, je suis arrive a une conclusion tout a fait differente. On lit au paragraphe 61 : «Il ressort du present rapport que des progres consid6rables ont ete accomplis en ce qui concerne I'extension et l'intensification des activites d'observation dans la plupart des regions importantes, aussi bien le long des frontieres que dans les zones adjacentes. )) [5/4069, par. 61.] Et, au paragraphe 65 : and paragraph 65 reads: "These observations are based upon the results of incessant patrolling both in the air and on the ground. Whatever information has been received, whether from the Lebanese Government liaison committee or from other sources or clues, has been followed up with great care. Intensive air patrolling has been carried out by day as well as by night, and the observations thus made have been closely clecked against the results of ground patrolling and observation. All-night watches have been instituted at the outstations and sub-stations and occasionally, observers have patrolled at night." [Ibid., para. 65.] « Ces observations se fondent sur les resultaLs de patrouilles aeriennes et terrestres incessantes. Le Groupe a examine avec le plus grand soin tous les renseignemenLs qu'il a pu obtenir, soit du comite de liaison du Gouvemement libanais, soit a d'autres sources ou d'apres d'autres indications. Des patrouilles aeriennes intensives ont eu lieu jour et nuit, et les observations ainsi faites ont ete attentivement confrontees avec les resultats des patrouilles et observations terrestres. Les postes principaux et les postes auxiliaires ont organise des gardes pour la nuit entiere, et les observateurs ont parfois effectue des patrouilles de nuit. ~ [1bid., par. 65.J 132. Tclle est l'activite des observateurs. n semble que la conclusion de ce rapport et les passages que je viens de dier se passent de commentaire et constituent une reponse pertinente a ce qui a etc avancc ici tout it l'heure. 132. This is what the observers have been doing. The report's conclusion and the passages I have just quoted need no further comment and are a pertinent reply to the arguments that were advanced a moment ago. 133. D'ailleurs, je crois que notre collegue le representant des Etats-Unis se rend quelque peu compte de la faiblesse de son argumentation. C'est pour cela qu'il nous a parle ensuite de ce qu'il qualifie d'agression indirecle. Il n'a d'ailleurs pas precise. On a beaucoup parIe d'agression indirecte. Nous aurons l'occasion d'en discuter longuement devant l'AssembIee generale. Il est superflu, je crois, de le faire aujourd'hui. A notre avis, la situation nouvelle creee par renvoi de troupes etrangcres dans le Moyen-Orient - et les debarquements de troupes se poursuivent=devrait ~tre principalement examinee par I'Assemblec generale, car cette situation est de nature a porter atteinte it la paix et a la sccurite de cette region. 133. In anv case I believe that our United States colleague is not unaware of the weakness of his argument. That is why he went on to talk of what he calls indirect aggression. He did not go into details. There has been a great deal of talk about indirect aggression and we shall have an opportunity of discussing it at length in the General Assembly. I feel, therefore, that it is unnecessary to do so now. In our opinion, the new situation created by the landing of foreign troops in the Middle East - and more troops are being landed now - should be the main topic considered by the General Assembly, because that situation could constitute a threat to the peace and security of the region.

I should like to make some observations in connexion with the statements made here today, in particular by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. 134. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe] : Je voudrais formuler quelques observations sur les declarations qui ont eM faites aujourd'hui, notamment par les repnisentants des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni. 135. There has been some discussion here as to why and how the proposal for a meeting of Heads of Government was abandoned. The attempt to befog the whole issue has, of course, failed, because the correspondence was public and accessible to everyone. It would be 135. On a essaye d'expliquer pourquoi la proposition relative a line conference des chefs de gouvernement n'avait pas eu de suite. Cest en vain, evidemment, que I'on s'efforce d'embrouiller l'afiaire, car la correspondance echangee en la maticre est ouverte et accessible 137, In its place they put forward another proposal couched in very obscure terms, namely, that a meeting of the Heads of Government should be convened wiLhin the framework of the Security Council. The Soviet Government agreed to this proposal because it was explained that this would give the Heads of Governments an opportunity to meet and exchange views informally and to seek agre<:ment, not here, at this table, in the public view and in the glare of the tele~ vision cameras, but by the ordinary, normal method, that is ta say, by ].('.gotatioILS, which take place daily not only between two Powers but between various combinations of all States. This proposal was in fad rejected, Sir Pierson. Although the United Kin,qdom Government was in favour of informal negotiations proceeding side by side with the fonnal talks here around the Security Council table, the Uniten States Government did not agree to this. You are aware of this. What, then. WO'lld the meeting of Heads of Govermnenls around the Council table lw.ve led to? If it had led to the sort of exchange of views in which we :ire now engaged, it would not have lJeen very useful, for, as you know, the St:cl1rily Council has not so far talcen any constructive decislon on the situation in. the Near and Middle East. Why has it not done so? More could be said on this point, for Ulert: is much to say about it. 137. On n propose ensuite, dnns des termes ussez vagues, de reunir une conference des ehefs de gouvernellIenl danB le cadre du Conscil de semrite. Le Gonver· nement sovietique a accepte cette proposition, paree qu'il y etait precise que les chefs de gouvernement allraie:J.t l'oc(:asiou de. se rencontrcr, de proceder 9. des echanges de vues officieux. et de rechercher nne entente, non pas A cette table, en plllllic et devant les cameras de la television, mab par la voie nurrnalc, hnbituclle, par la voie des negociations qui ant lieu quotidiennement, non seulement entre deux pUissances, mais entre tous les Etats, sous diverset> formes. En fait, il n'a pas ete donne suite a cette proposition, sir Pierson Dixon. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a accepte de proceder a des echanges de vttes oflkeux paralleIement aux negociations officieUes qui auraient lieu au Conseil de securite, mais le Gouvemement des Etats- Unis n'a pas donne son assentimellt. Yous le savez bien. A quoi se serait ramenee uue reunion des chefs de gouvernement qui aurait eu lieu a la table du Conseil? A un echange de vues comme celui auquel nous procedons maintenant? Cela n'aurait pas servi a grandchose, car (m sait que le ConseiI de securite n'a pris jusqu'a present au-cunc decision consLructive sur la situation dans le Proehe-Orient et le Moyen-Orient. Pourquoi? Nous y H~vi.elldrons, et nous aurons beaucoup a dire. 138. l.e l'f'_prese..ntant des Etats-Unis a souleve une question tres importante lor~qu'il a dit que les troupes americaines avaient debarque au Liban paree que ce pays etait menace d'une intervention etrangere dans ses n'l'aires intericures. Tout est la. Seion qu'it y a effectivement menace d'intervention etrangere dans les aHaireB intcrjeul"l.~s du Lihan Oll qu~ ct:tte menace n'existe pas, la situation change du tout au tout. 13K The United Stales representative brought up a very important question. He said that the United States forces had been ilent to Lebanon because of the threat to that country of outside iuwrvt:ntion in its domestic affairs. That is a crucial point. If there was a real threat of outside intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs, that is one thing. But, if tlll:re was no such threat, then the situation L~ quite different. t39, Qui a. etahli I'('.xistence d'une menace d'intervention etrangere dans les affatres inb~rieures du Liban? Le repn~sentant des Etats~Unis salt fort bien que c'est preeisemcnt cette question quI': la Comeil de securite examinait jusqu'au 15 juillet, date du debarquement des troupes des Etats-Unis au Liban. Le Conseil discutait la plaintc IibD.nni~e, ear le Liban lwait etlective- Ineot depose une plainte. Mais le CODsei! ne s'est pas prononce sur l'existence d'une teIle menace. Or, seul le ConselI de s~curile, en Lant qU'organe int('matlOTIlll. peut etablir l'cxisteJlce d'une menace contre la paix et la securite. Je dis bien : le Conseil de securite en tant qu'organe international. Il a cette fonction aux termes de la Charte des Nations Daies. l'>fais le COilSeil a·t-il etabli l'existence d'une teUe menace? Non. 11 a examine la question, mais n'a rien ~tabH. Les Etats-Unis le savent parfaitement, car Us ont vote pour la resolation 139. Who decided that there was a threat of outside intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon? As the United States representative knows, this very question was being disc:ussed by the Security Council up to 15 July, up to the very moment when United States troops entered Lebanon. The Security Council was discussing Lebanon's complaint; there was In faet such a complaint. But the Security Council cid not decir\e that there was such a tbreat and only the Seen· rity Council, as an international body, can establish the existence of a threat to peace and security. The Security Council alone, I say. as an international body. Th:s is its function under the Charter of the United Nations. Did the Security Council decide that such a threat existed? No, it did not. The Security Council discussed this questior. but it came to no conclusion. And the United States knows that perfectly welt because T' ',l"'[ SlaLcs forces landed in Lebanon. The Um.e un ~ , ··"d . L nbon States Government decided that QULS1 e l~ erve "I was taking place tllI're. Il WDS not the SecurILy Coune} ur ih!' Vuikd Nation~that look tile decisi·Jll but, ra~l~~r, Llw Gowrnmcnl of llle United StaLes, I'eganlless 0 Tile Culled Nations actiolls. What happene~ then? , :e Sl'(llrily Council did not suppol'L the UllltNl SLates tn [hi» llIat:Ler. [,11. Uf WJfSe the United States has friends in tile Sl'curily CO:Incil __ its ::lilies, or rather, 1 would say, it!'> partuers illllliliL:.l.ly blocs, Wll.o.are Ol.lly t.0.o ~lad to associate themselves with its P,)SltlOn. All tlus IS t~UE. But the Security COJllci! as an organ of the Un:ted Nations did nuL support this United States .contention. Consequently the UUlted States .forees l:re, In L~banon for some otlter reaSO[l and not III eonneXlOll With Lhe threat of intervention. TlIat is a mere ~l'e.text - a far-feklleG pretext - rar-fctched, uecausE ll~ Its rcp?rts to the Security Council, the properly auUlOrlZed Um~ed N!lLions hody, the Observation Group, says.sometlllng quite difi"crent from what the representative of t.he Unitcd Sta;es has been tellir.g us here. The SOViet dcIegaLion, [or it.s llurt, prefers to b~se its judgem~nt un the reports of the United Nabons OIJservatlOn Group. 142. Thl: Security Council has been pam]ysed in its efforts to obtain the withdrawaL of the United States forces. For after all, this is tile vital question, not the situation in Lebanon, which the Security Council has bren considering since June without fmding any threat la peace iI'. that situation, but a very real threat to pfuce and security was created the moment United States forces wcre introduced into Lebanon. What hns the COlllleil done about this? Und~r tile influence of the United State" the United l{ingdom and t110s[; who vutl:U with them, the Security Council rejected tl:e Soviet Union proposal calling upon the Government of the Unit.ed States to remove its troops from Lebanon immediaLely. The Council therefore remained inactive. 143. H is true that there was another proposal, by the United Stales. Th€ United states submitted a draft resolutioll, the main provision of which called for United Nations approval of the United Stales' armed Intervention in Lebnnon. Could the Security Council Iw.~sib]y lltlvc adopted such ~ resolution? The Soviet Union, for its part, considered that it would not be fullilling its duty as a Member of thc United Nations if it voted for a proposal of this kind. Wc therefore wted agahst it and we believe that we acted in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 14<1. There was another proposal in the same United S~utes draH resolu:ion - namely, that the United Nations should assemLJle contingents and send them to Lebanon to replace the United States forces. As soon as United Nations forces arrived in Lebanon the 140. Pourquoi des nbservatcurs de l'Organisation ontil~ ete cnvcyes au Liban? Pour determiner s'il y avait ou non intervention elrang6re. Le 15 juillet, les troupes des Etats~Uilis debarquaient au Liban. C'est le Gouver~ nement des Etats-Unis qui a decide qu'il y avait inter~ vention etnmgere. Cc n'es! ni le Conscil de securite, ni ]'Orgflnlsation des r\ations Unles, mais Lien le GouvernemellL des EtUb-Unis, qlli a pris cette decision, uu mepris de l'action cntreprisc ~ar l'Or¥ani.sa.tio~. Que s':;sL-il pn~sc nlors? Le Consed de sccunle n a pas ItpPIJY~ le.s Etats-Ullis. 141. On lrOllvera sl1ns doutc parmi les membres du COllseil des collaborateurs des Etats-Unis, des allies, je dirui mi)me des" eo-pnrLi.cipnnls »~ des blocs mi.li~ lalrCS, ljlll purtugtllL YOJOlltw'.'> ce POlllt de vue, SoIt, mais le Consdl de scwrite, en tanl <ju'Ol'gane des Natiolls links, n'a pas souSCl'it a celtc tilliflnation des Elnts- Vnis, Lcs troupes amcricaines se tl'onvcnt done au Liuan. non pas a cause CUl1e menace d'intc.rvcnLiorl, mais pour unc autre raisun. 11 lle S'::lgit la que d'un pn5tc:<te inventc dc lOlltes pii:<.:cs. En dTet, dans ses rapports au Conscil de sccurite, I'organe competent de I'Orga~ nisation, le Groupe d'observ::ltion, tire. des elincLusiollS tout a fait difT4rclltes de celles du representant des Etats-Unis. Pour ee qui est de la delegation sJvictique. elle prefere. fonder SOil jugemcnt sur les rnpports du Oroupc cl'observation des Nations Unics, 142. Le Conseil de. securitc s'est trOllve paralyse en cc qui cor.cerne le retrait d~s troupes des Etats-Unis, C'est la le problcme essentiel. Il ne s'agit pas (le la situa~ tion au Liban : le COllseil de scenrittS s'en est OCCllpt des le IDois de juin san>; avail' COllstatc l'CXLslcllce d'ul1e menace contn: la paix, mais, nU !nomen t du debarquement des ';roupcs des EtaLs-Unis, la paix et la securile ont etc veriLablemcllt menacCes. Qn'a donc fDit le Con- ~eil? Sous l'influence des Etats-Ulli~, du HoyaUlm.~-Cni ct des pays qui ont vote cOJUll1e CllX, le COllliCil de seeu· rite II rejeLe la proposition sDvictique tt.'.ndant a inviter le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis If rc.lirer ilUlllcdiate. mcnt ses troupes du LilHIll. Le Conseil est done l'\'-ste iU3Ctif. 143. II est vrai que lcs EtaLs-Unis avaieut. presenle line antre propositioll. Le pflragraphe prinripal de leur projet de rcsoluticn tcuduit a cc que l'Organis-ation des Nations Unies flJlproUYC letlr intervention armee au Liban. Le Consei! de sccuriLe pouvait-il adopter lme teile resolution? POLlr sa part, l'Union snvictique a estime qu'clle n'<lllrait pas fait son devoir {Jr. :'Ilemhre de I'Orgnnisution des r-;ntions Unies si elle avait \"Ot~ POUf une tclle proposition. C'est ponrquoi no liS ll\'OnS vole contre, et neliS sOlllmcs convainCllS 1l'3voir ngi conIormement allX principes dc IQ Charte des Nations Unies, 144. Le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis tendait aussi a eOllstitllP.I' IInl'. f'o:'('.!"l des Natinns Uni('s Q~i aurait ctc envoyce au Liban pour n~lcver les troupes amerieaincs. AussitOt que la Force des Nntions L"nies alTiverait au Liban, les troupes des Etats-Unis par- 14-5, It has been said that we used the veto, rn fact we voted against the draft resolution. Does our vote against violate the principles of the United Nations Charter? Mr. Lodge knows very well that it does not, for the Charter accords the right to every Member of the United Nations, including a permanent rnemb€r of Lhe Security Council, to vote for or against or to abstain. This is a matter for each Member of the United Nations to decide, And we voted in accordance with our convictions llnd our nnderstanding of the prin~ dp1es of the United Nations. We. still believe, :.vIr. Lodge, that our vote in this instance was in the interests of the small countries - not of the large countries, not of the Soviet Union, but of the small countries. Why? Because we voted against a proposal in the Security Council which would have endorsed the intervention of a greot Power in the affairs of a 1imall State and permitted the formation of a United Nations force for the purpose of intervening in the affair:>; of a small State. We consider that it was our duty to vote against this. And if there are further pruposals along the sam~ lines we shall vote against them too, 146. The Council now has berore it two draft resolutions requesting the calling of a special emergency session of the r,f'.neral Assemnly, a Soviet Union draft and a United States draft, What is the main differ~ ence between t.hem? Both drafts are agreed or. the [leed to call an emergency session of the General Assembly. But, as for the purpose for which the General Assembly is to be convened ~ there the two drafts differ. 147. The Soviet Union, in its draft resolution [Sj4057/Retl.l], consic-ers it necessary that the emergency special session of the General Assemhly should cOH;;ider the question of and take steps to ensure the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and United Kingdom trODpS fr'Jm Jordan. Why? Because attention is focused .on this matter; because the presence of United States armed forces in Lebanon and United Kingdom armed fOl'r-ps in Jr,rdan has cre::rte.d a dangerous situation ill the Neat' and Middle East, which could precipitate a new war. The United Nations function, therefore, is to rectify the situation, put an end to this intervention, and talce steps to have these. troop~ withdrawn, This is the main purpose of the special session of the General Assemhly. 148. How are the terms o[ reference of the special session formulated in the United States draft resolution [S/405G/Rev.ll? It says: "cI11C Security Council ... decides to call an emergency special session of the 145. On dit que nous availS fait usage du veto. Sffecuveme!!t, HOllS avons vote contre un projet de r0solution. Mais est-cl'. la une violation des prineipes de la Charte des Nations Unies? .1'£. Lodge sait parfaitcment que non, car la Charte dOllne a tous les Membres de J'Organisation, y compris le, membres permanents du Conseil de securite, le droit de voter pour ou contre ou de s'ahstenir. C'est it chaque Etat Membre de decider. Nous avons vote c,)nformement a nos convictions, selon notre conception des principes des Nations Unies. Nous demeurons convaincus, Monsieur Lodge, qut: HUUS avons vote non pas dans l'infenH des grandes puissances, y compris l'UniCln sovictiqllc, mnis dans l'interet d~s petits Etats. Pourquoi? Parce qlle nous avons vote. contre \lne proposition par laquelJe le Conscil nurait approuvc l'ilJlervcotion d'une grandc puis$ance dans ks affairos d'un petit Etat et aurait autorise la constitution d'une force armee des Nations Dnies en vue. d'une ing~rence clans les affaires d'un peLit Etat. Nons estimons de notre devoir de voter contre. de tels projets. Si deg propositions sl3mblnbles sOnt presentees dans l'avemr, nom continuerons de voter contre. 146. Le Congeil est maintenant saisi de deux projets de resolution demandant la convocation r]'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee gene-rale : celui de l'Union sQvietique et eeIui des Etats-Unls. En quoi ces textes different-Us es~entiellcmenL? Tous deux font etat de la necessite de convoquer nne session extraordinail'€ de l'Assemblee, Mais a quelle fin? C'est sur ce point que les deux projets different. 147. Pour ce qui estdu projet sovietique[ S/405'ljRt!v. 11 nous estimons indispensable que la session extraordinaire d'lIrgence s'occupe du retrait immediat des t,oupes des Etas-Unis dn T.iban et des troupes du Royaume- Uni de Jordanie, et qu'elle prenne des lll<,,,sures a cet efIet. Pourquoi? Parce que ce problCme est au centre de tontes les preoccupations; parce que la presence de forces armees americaines nu Liban et britannjq~les en .Tordallie a crec dans le Procllc-Orient et le Moyen- Orient une situation dangereuse qUi risque rle degenerer en une nouvelle guel're. L'Organisation des Nations Unies se doiL done de remcdier a cette situation, de mettre un terme a !'intervention et de prendre des mesures en vue d'assurer le retrait des troupes. Telle sera la Ulche principare de la session extraordinaire de l'Assemblee generalc. 148. Comment la tache de la sessLoIl extraordinairc est-elle definie dans le projet de resolution des Etnts- Drus fSj40f'iG/Rev. lp,Je cite: oc Le Conseil de securite [...] decide qU'lme session cxtraordinaire d'urgence de 149. It is for this reason that it is important whir.h draft resolution should be put to the vote first. Are we to vote first, as the representative of the United States proposes, on the United States draft which says nothing and gives no terms of reference to the General Assembly, Ignoring the gravc danger implicit in the present international situation? Or, as the Soviet delegation proposes - and we hope that the Security Council 'Will support the proposal to call a special session of the General Assembly to consider the impoltant question which is perturbing the entire world and which has brought us together here now - are we to vote first on the important proposal for the withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and United Kingdom troops from Jordan? 150. I put this question to the Security Council, for its consideration. I feel tllat the Council would be acting correctly if it were to vote and take a decision on the convening of an emergency special session on the basis of the proposaL in the Soviet delegation's draft resolution rather than on tile basis of the proposal in the United States draft resolution. It seems to me that a Council decision based on the Soviet draft reso· lution would coincide lUore closely with the expectations of the peoples, the expectations of all Members of the United Nations, who are looking to the Council for decisive and speedy measures to put an end to the dangerous military conflict which is deVeloping in the Near and Middle East.

At the end of his statement, the representative of the Soviet Union referred to what seems 10 me a point of particlllar importance concerning the substantive part of the two draft re~olutionsbefore the Security Council, that is to say, the United States draft resolution and the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. 152. Mr. SoboIev said that, in his opinion, the differ~ ence between the two draft resolutions was that the United States draft resolution does not state the Jlurpose for which the emergency special session of the General Assembly to be convened by Lhis Council would meet, while the Soviet draft resolution does state its specific purpo~e. 153. There are, I believc, differences of substance and form, but it would not be appropriate to consider them now, However, I do believe it is important to show clearly that Ivlr, Sobolev's statement is unfounded. It is unfounded for these reasons: both draft resolutions call for an emergency special session of the General Assembly; rules 8 and 'it of the rules of procedure of ~he rA~semblee? 11 est inutile de convoquer l'Assemblee si elle doit e.xaminer les protestations du Liban et de In Jordanie, car le Conseil de securite s'occupe de cett.c question et pouITait continuer de la debattre. Sinoa, qu'on nous disc pourquoi l'Assembtee generale est con. voquee en ses.>ion extraordinaire. On ne lui propose aucune tache. 149. La question .>e pose done de savoir quel projcL de resolution sera mis aux voix le premier. Devonsnous commencer, comme le propose le representant des Etats-Unis, par le projet americain, qui ne dit rien de la tache de t'Assemb1ee generale et ne tient allcua compte du principal danger qui menace la situation internationale actuelle? Ou hien, comme le propose la delegation sovietique - et nous esperons que le Conseil de securite adoptera notre proposition tendant a con. voquer une session extraordinaire de l'Assembh!e ann d'examiner 17 problel?e .essent!el, celui qui preoccupe le monde entlCr et qm faIt I'oblet du present debat_, devons~nousvoter d'ahord sur la question fondamentale du reLrait des troupes americaines du Liban et des troupes britanniques de Jordanie? 150. Le Conseil de securite doit se prononcer. A mon avis, it agirait avec sagesse s'il decidait dc convoquer la session extraordinaire d'urgence en adoptant le projet de resolution de l'Unioll sovietique, et non celui dl'.S Etats~Ullis. Il me semble que si le Conseil adoptait l~ projet sovietique, sa decision repondrait davantage allx espoirs des peuples, aux espoirs de tous Ies M~mbres de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, qui attendent de nous des mesures promptes et decisivc.'> propres ametln fin au dangereux contlit arme qui couve dans le Proche- Orient et le Moyen-Orient. 151. M. ILLUECA (Panama) [lraduil de l'espo!]nPij: A la fin de SD declaration, le representant de rUnian sovietiquc a fait allusion a une question, a man avis d'une importance particuliere, qui a trait a la partie essentielle des deux projets de re.>olution dont le ConseiJ de securite est saisi. Je veux parler dll projet de r&olution des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et du projet de resolution de l'Union sovie~ique. 252. M. Sobolev a declare qu'fJ son avis la difIerenre qui existait entre les deux projets de resolution consist~it en ce que, dans le projet de resolution des Etats-Ullis, la fin precise a laquelle le Conseil de securite devnit convoquCt une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssembIee generale n'etait pas indiquee, tandis qll'elle I'etait dans le projet de resolution de rUnion sovietiquc. 153, Je crois Cju'il existe egalement entre ces deux pro2Jositions des difh~rences de fond et de forme, qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner en ce moment. Par contre, j'estime qU'il est nece.ssaire de determiner avec preci· sion les raisons pour lesquelles la declaration de M, Sobolev esL depourvue de fondement, A mon nvis, ccs raisons sont les suivan~es : Ies deux projets de 154. In my view, the only way in which the Security Council can convene an emergency special session is that set out in the United States draft resolution. I believe therefore that Mr. Sobolev ha~ raised a strictly technical point which should he dealt with dispassionately. He says that we should express ourselves dearly flnd in my opinion. the Uuited States draft resolution does so. It says that, having considered the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan, the Council decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly. 155. Mr. Sobolev thinks that the emergency special session of the General Assembly should be convened to consider the withdrawal of United State3 troops from Lebanon and of United Kingdom troops from Jordan. Nobody in the Security Council has objected to consideration of that question. The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States have referred to the matter during the discussion. But that is not the item which appears on the agenda of the Council. The agenda is contained in document S{Agenda{838 and the items on it are the letter dated 22 May 1958 concerning the Lebanese question and the letter dated 17 July 1958 concerning the question of Jordan. 156. In conclusion - for I do not wish to prolong thi~ statement - I wish to emphasize that the Soviet draft resolution cannot be considered :n the light of the General Assembly's rules of proceuure Of in the light of the functions of the Security Council under resolution 377 (V) because it does not relate to the case submitted to us for consideralion. The question to which it refers is not on the agenda of the Council. And that is one of the essential requirements of resolution 377 (V). Operative paragraph 1 of th.at resolution specincally refers to cases in which, beCause of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the main~ tenance of international peace and security. 157. The resolution obviously refers to the Mse or cases before the Council. In this instance, what are the cases tite Council is considering? The cases are cited in the first paragraph of the preamble of the United States draft resolution: .. Having considered the complaint~ of Lebanon and of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan •.. " aod t11e operative part of which reads: .. Decides to call an emergency special session of the 154. J'estime que les seules couditions dans lesquelles le Conseil de seenriM puisse couvoquer une session extraordin£ire d'ur§'ence sont les conditions prevues par le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, et je crois qu'a cet egard, M. Soholev a souleve une question purement technique, que nons devans ex.aminer sans trap de passion. Le representant de I'Union soviebque affirme que l'on doit s'exprimer clairement. Or, je pense que le projet de resolution des Etats~Unis est fort clair : il y est dit que, apres avoir examine les plaintes du Liban et de la Jordanic. le Conseil deciderait de convoquer une sessio:J. extraordinaire d'lugence de l'AssemblCe generale. 155. M. Sobolev juge que cette session extraordinaire d·urgener. de l'Assemb!ee generale doit e:re consacree it I'cxamen de la que:;tiGn du retrait des troupes des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni qui se trouvent respectivement an Liban et en Jordanie. Personne, au Conseil de secnrite, ne s'e.st oppose a ce qlle l'on examine cette question. Au cours du debat, les representants du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Ameriqtte en ont fait mention. Mais ce n'est pas la la question qui figure a l'ordre clu jour du Conseil. A l'ordre du jOllr publie sous ta cote S/Ageuda/838 figurent la leUre en date du 22 mai 1958 relative a la question du Liban et la lettre en date du 17 juillet 1958 relative a la question de la Jordanie. 150. Pour conclure, car ie ne voudrais pas prolonger mOll intervention, je Hens a indiquer cJairement que, faute de mentionner la question que nou,~ debattons, le projet de r~sobtion Je l'Ullion sovietiql1~ n'p.~t pas eonforme au reglcment int6rieur de I'Assemblee generale et ne rcpond pas aux attributions du Conseil de sccurite lenes qu'elles sont del1nies dans la resolntion 377 (V). La question qui y e~t mentionnee ne flgure pas a l'ordrc du jour du Consei!. Or, la resolution 377 (V) prevQit LIne condition cssentiellc; en efIet, au paragraphe 1 du dispositif sont enumeres les cas dans lesquels, du fait que l'un:mimite n'a pu se reHli.~er panni les membres permanents du Conseil de securile, celui-ci manque a s'acquitter de sa responsabilite principale dans le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. 157. 11 est dit dans cette res{)Jution ; (dans tout cas oU... n. Or, quels sont, eu 1'0Gcurrence, les cas dont s'occupe le COllseil de sccurite~ Ces cas sont mentionnes au premier considerl'lnt du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, oil. il est dit : !( Ayallt examine les plaintes dlL Liban et du Royaume hael.J.emite de Jordanie )!. et dans le dispositif, qui est redige comme suit: !( Decide qu'une sessior. extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee 159. The only way to alter or change the agenda is also the subject of a rule of procedure, and that is probably what led the Soviet representative to word his draft resolution flS he did. 1 consider that his text is out 01 order and therefore cannot be put to the vote. The only way to alter the ugenda is indicated in the last part of rule 19 of the ruLcs of procedure, which was also amendcd jlUrsuant to resolution 377 (V). It states: "During an emergency special session, additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution 377 A (V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting." J consider that tllat is the only way in which the agenda may be changed. 160. Accordingly my delegation - for reasons of substance and form and basically, for t.echnical reasons - will vote for the United States draft resolution. It considers that the Soviet draft resolution is not in conformity with the terms of resolution 377 (V), the only basis on which an emergency special SesSiOl\ o[ the General Assembly can be convened.

I realizc that the r.our is getting late, and therefore I will not take long. However, certain matters have come up concerning which I should mal,e a statement. 262. Mr, Sobolev made one remark particularly which arrested my attention when I heard it in the simullaneous En.glish interpretation; I then listened to the consecutive French interpretation and the consecutive English interpretation to be sure I had heard him correctly. He said that the United I';:ingdom had accepted the idea of informal talks in connexion with tile proposed high-level Security Council meeting, that is, of unofficially exchanging views, of using normal channels of negotiation. Then Ilk Sobolev said that the United States did not accept this idea and therefore, to use his own words, the idea was rejected. Mr. Sobo1ev is totally mistaken in making tlmt statement. It is completely wrong. It was United States policy in the event that sueh a high-level Secllrity Council meeting were to be held to tah part in informal meetings, In fact, President Eis~nho\Vcr specifIcally intended to hold himseLf available for this very type of informa.l talk. I merely remark that, if this is a typical example of Soviet accuracy, then we can well wonder 159. Il existe une seule maniere de modifier l'ordre du jour; il en cst egalement question dans un article du regJemcnt inLerieur-. c'est la probablcment la raison qui a incite le representant de l'Union sovietique a redigcr commc il ra fait son projet de resolution, qui, amon avis, cst irrecevable et, pour cette raison, ne peut etl'e mis aux voix. La seule mani€re dont on puisse modifier l'ordre du jour est indiqnee dans la seconde phrase de l'arliclc HI du reglement intcrieur, qui a luimeme cte modifIc en vertu de la resolution 377 (\7), et cette phrase est redigee de la maniere suivante : (( All cours d'une session extraordinllire d'urgence, des questions nouvelJes se rapporLant aux slljets qui fonl l'objet de la resolution 377 A (V) peuvent etre ajolltees al'ordre du jour par decision prise ala majorite des deux tiers des membres presents et votants. 11 J'estime que c'est la la seule manie.re dont puisse etre modifie l'ordre du jour. 160. Aussi ma delegation, pour des raisons de fond et de forme, et essentiellement ponr des raisons d'ordre technique, votera-t-clle pour le projet de resolution pn\sente par les Etats-Unis, car eUe estime que le projet de resolution de l'Union sovietique n'esL pas conforme aux dispositiollS de la resolution 377 (1/), seul instrUlntnt qui permette de convoqc.er une session extrnordinaire d'urgenee de I'Assemblee generale. 161. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amenque) [Lraduit de l'anglaisJ : Je sais qu'i\ est tard, et mon intervention ne sera pas 101lgue. 11 y a toutejots certains points qui ont ete abordes et sur lesquels je souhaitc revenir. 162. III Sobolev a fait LIne observation qui a retenu mon attention quand je l'ai entendue dans l'interpretation simultanee qui cn a tte donnce; j'ai ecoute l'interpretation consecutive en fran9ais et l'interpreta~ tion consecutive en anglais poar etre sQr d'avoir bien compris. M. Sobolev a dit que le Royaume-Uni avait ar.cepLe l'idee de conversations offideuses dans le cadre de la re.union proposee, all niveau le plus eleve, du Conseil de secmite, en d'autres tcrmes, d'cehanges de vues offideux se faisant selon des voies offieielles. M, Sobolev a ajoute que les Etats-Unis n'uvaient ]Jas accepti cette suggestion et qu'en cor,sequence, pour reprendre ses propres termes, elle avail ete rcjetee. M. Sobolev est compIetcment dans l'errcur. CeUe affirmation est absolument erronee. Au cas ou cette reunion, au niveau le plus eLevc, du Conseil de secllrite aurait eu lieu. le Gouvernmnent des Etats-Unis avait l'intention de participer a des reunions officieuses. En fait, le president Eisenhower se proposait precisement de participer personneUement a cet echange de vues offJcieux. J e me 163. Then I come to a second matter. The Soviet representative has attempled la provide us with a new definition of aggression. The Sovi~t Union has usserted categorically that, and I am quoting: "introduction of foreign troops on foreign territory must be regarded as an act of direct aggression," It is of minor illlpor~ tance to note that by its own defmition the Soviet Government confesses itself to be guilty of direct aggression througllOut Eastern Enrope. What is more important is the fact that the Soviet statement has omitted an references to the wishes of the Government concerned. Now the implications of this warped defi~ nition are really staggering because, if such a definitioa were accepted, no nation would have the right to ask any other nation, inclwJing the UniLed Nations itself, for help in protecting its territory against either direct or indirect aggression, Each nation would be obliged to rely exclusively t{pon its own reSOllTces against every kind of threat. The sovereign right of every nation to participate in collective defence would be lost and the whole Charter of the United Nations would be a dead letter. It seems clear that this is actually the true Soviet purpose in attacking the United States assistance to Lebanon. The Soviet rulers are not nearly so interested in conducLing a tiresome propa~ ganda campaign against the United States as they are in undermining the systems of collective defence which have been erected as a barrier to Soviet imperialism. Nothing could be more valuable to the Soviet programme for world domination, which they never con~ ceal, than to compel every State to isolate itself hom its neighbours and to forbid it to ask help in protecting its independence and integri1:y. Su<:h an arrangement would leave some na.tions everywhere completely at the mercy of aggression and subversion. Let us remind the Soviet Union that nationaJ sovereignty inchldes a sacred right to co~operate with other sovereign States. 164. The Government of the United States respects the right of any nation to choose a courge of neutrality or to choose a course of isolation, but the right of all nations large and small to seek the nd\'antages of collective security must certainly be given equal respect. 165. It was the original determination of the Govern~ ment of Lebanon - not the United States - that indi~ red aggression was taking place in Lebanon. We did not invent it. It was the Security Council - not the United States - which was sufficiently impressed with Lebanon's complaint about indirect aggression to establish the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon -- and I am quoting from the United Nations resolution [S/40Z3} - " ... to ensure that there is no 163. J'en viens llwintenant aun autre point. Le repre~ sentant de l'Union sovilHique a essaye de nous donner une nouvelle defInition de l'agression, 11 a categoriquement affirme - et je cite ses propres paroles - que (c le fait d'introduire des troupes etrangeres sur un territoire etranger doit etre considere comme un aete d'agression diIecte I~• .le remarque en passaut que, en proposant cette definition, le Gouvernement sovietique se reconnait coupable d'agression directe dans toute I'Europe orientale. Ce qui ese plus important, c'est que la declaration sovietique ne fait pas entrer en ligne de compte la volonte du gouvernement interesse. Cette dCfmition tendancieuse conduit a des resultats stupefiants ; si elle etait admise, aUCnn pays n'aurait le droit de demander assistance a un autre pays - DU a l'Organisation des Nations Unies -- pour proteger son territoire eontre une agression directe Oil innirecte. En cas de menace, cllaque nation serait obligee de compter llniquement ~ur scs propres ressources. Le droit souver<.tin de chaque nation de participer a la defense collective serait ilItLsoire, et toute la Charte des Nations Unies serait lettre morte. 11 parait e"vident que c'est preciscment le but que l'Union sovietique cherch~ it atteindre lorsqu'elle critiquc ]'interllention des Etats- Unis all Liban. Il ne s'agit pas tant, pour les dirigeants sovieti(jllCS, de mener une fastidieuse campagne contre Ies Etats~Unis qUi'. de saper les systemes de defense collective, qui constituent u:.ttant de barrieres contre l'imperialisme sovietique. Rien ne serait plus favorahle au programme sovietique de domination mondiale. dont on ne nous dissimule pas I'existcnce, que d'obliger chaque Etat a se rlCsolidariser de ses voisins et de l'em~ pecher de demander une aide pour defendre son independance et son integritC. Un tel systeme laisserait nombre de nations A la merci de I'agression et de la subvcrsion. Qu'il me soit permis de rappeler a l'Union sovietique que la souveraindc nationale comporte le droit sacre de collaborer avec d'autres Etats sOllverains. 164. Le Gouvernement des Etats~Unis respectc le droit de toute nation de choisir la lleutralite ou I'isolelllcnt, mais le droit de toute nation, grande ou petite, de chercheraproll.ter des avantages offerts par la defense coJlective est certainement auss1 dignlJ [le respect. 165. C'est le Gouvernement libanais, et non le Giluvernement des Etats~Unis, qui a determine l'existence au Liban d'une agression indirectc. Nou~ ne l'avons pas inventee. C'est le COllseil de securite, et non les Etatg~ Vnis, qui a juge la plainte du Liban au sujet d'unc agression indirecte suiflsamment serieuse pour ereer le Groupe d'obSC1'vatioll des Nations Unies au Liban afin de - et je cite Lci le tcxte de la resolution des Nations Unies [S/402JI ......:... «faim en sorte qu'aucune 166. The Soviet Government demands that its judgement be accepted in preference to that of tlle Lebanese Government and in preference to tllat of the remaining members of the Security Council. Frankly, I doubt that the world is prepared to do this.

I crave the indulgence of the Council to aJlow me at this late hour to make some very brief remarks on a point in the second statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, which I feel should not be allowed to p<lSS without comment. Mr. Lodge has in fact already touched on tIle same point. 168. Mr. Sobolev implied - and I think this accurately represents the drift of his remarks -- that I was, so to speak, disingenuous in criticizing the Soviet Union for rejecting the British Prime Minister's proposal for a speciaJ meeting of the Security Council, because, as he said, we knew that the United States did not agree with the proposal. 169. We have just heard from :Mr. Lodge something which shows that tire facts are totally different. In faet, Mr. Sobolev was totally mistaken, and in fart tile United States Government was ready to take purt in just the kind of high-level private talks which were envisaged in Mr. Macmillan's propo~als. 170. There really is no getting around tlle fact that the Soviet Union has executed a volle-Jace in this matter and in thc course of doing so has abandoned a most promising avenue of conciliation. Thus the Soviet Union bears a heavy responsibility for prolonging and heightening the pre~ent tension. 171. It is, as I am sure Mr. Sobolev will agree, very important to adopt methods, and especially promising methods. Good methods arc necessary for achieving good solutions. The Soviet Union has thrown out of the window onB of the most promising methods of getting down to certain current problems. I can only guess at the reasons and I do not propose to go into them. But if the Soviet Union is genuinely concerned in reducing tell~ion and promoting peace and security, 1 do urge it to pay some attention to this question of methods, and I cau only hope that now that we are embarking, owing to this volte-face on the part of the Soviet Union, on a new procedure - a meeting of the General Assembly - we shall find that the matter will be approached in debate in the spirit which animates my delegation - and I believe tile great majority of member nations - that is, the desire to reduce world tension and contribute to security and peace. 166. Le Gouvemement sovietique demande que son point de vue prevale sur celui du Gouvernement libanais et sur celui des autres membres du Cellseil de stkurite. En toute franchise, je doute que le monde soit dispose a le lui accorder. 167. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royuume·Uni) [lraduil de /'anglaisJ : Je demande au Conseil toute son indulgence pour pouvoir, a cette heure tardive, faire quelques breves observations a propes de la seconde intervention du representant de l'Union sovietique, mais j'estime qu'll est un point de sa declaration que je ne dois pas laisser passer sans le commenter. En fait, M. Lodge est deja revenu sur cette question. 168. M. Sobolcv a laisse entendre - je crois que c'est bien lA le sens general de ses observations - que j'etais, en somme, de mauvaise foi lorsque je reprochais a l'Union sovietique d'avoir rejele la proposition du Premier Minislre britannique tendant it convoquer une reunion speciale du Conseil de securite, parce que, selon M. Sobolev, nous savions que les Etats-Unis n'~Laient pas favorables a cette proposition. 169, M. Lodge vient de montrer que la reaIiteest Lout autre, En fait, M. Sobolev se trompe completement, et le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis etait dispose a participer a ce genre de conversations otncieuses au niveau le plus eleve, preconisees par M. Macrnillan. 170. 11 est un fait qu'on ne peut eluder: I'Union sovie.. tique a opere une volte-face, et, ce faisant, elle a reiele une des methodes les plus fecondes de conciliation. Par la, elle risque d'avoir une 10urde responsabilite dans la prolongation et l'aggravation des difficultes actuelles, 171. 11 impone au plus haut point, je suis sur que M. Sobolev en conviendra, d'adopter des methodes, et surtout des methodes fecondcs. Les bonnes methodes sont indispensables si I'on veut trouvcr de bonnes solu~ tions aux problemes. L'Union sovietique a rcjete l'une des methodes les plus efficaces qui soit pour regler certains problemes actuels. Je ne puis que deviner Ies raisons de I'attitude sovietique, et je n'ai pas l'intention dc les passer en revue. Mais si l'Union sovietique tient vraiment a rMuire la tension internationale et a servir la cause de la paix et de la securite, je l'invite vivement aaccorder quelque attention acette question de methode. Au moment ou, en raison de ceUe volte-face de l'Union sovietique, nous nous tournons vers cette procedure nouvelle qu'est la reunion de I'AsscmbJee gencrale, je ne puis qu'esperer que nous aborderons le probleme dans l'esprit qui anime ma delegation - et, ie crois, la grande majorite des Etats Membres - c'cst-a-dire avec The idea is clear: we have the Security Council on the one hand and, on the other, procedures fu: reaching agreement between the Heads of Governments. This idea Was accepted by the Soviet Union. 174. lVIr. Macmillan's letter of 31 Jnly includes tlte following passage: "In addition to meetings of the whole C<luncil under Article 28, it would of course be posslble to arrange less formal meetings of Heads of Government on the questions which the Security Council :5 considering." [Ibid., sec. Ill, para. 3.] The letter then repents: "It would not be our intention that any resolutions should be put forward at this special meeting of the Secur:ty Council unless they arose out of previous agreement" (ibid.]. 175, Here again we have the idea of negotlations between the Heads of Government ,)uhide the frame M work of formal Security Council meetings. 176. As I understood the position of the Ur.iLed States Government, as it is defmed in the President's message5, this aspect of the proposed meeting of the Heads of Governments did not meet with the approval of the President of the United States. If I am mistaken, I would ask Mr. Lodge to tell me which message [rom the President expresses agreement with this proposal of the United Kingdom. which Wa3 accepted by the Soviet Union.

As there are no further speakers on my list, I should like to say a few wonh as representative of FRANCE. In view of the late hour, I shall not speak for more than three minutes. 178. The French Government's position concerning the problem now before the Council has been clearly stated on a nwnber of occasions. In the course of the meetings held to discuss the complaints from Lebanon 173. Dans sa lcttre du 22 juillct, M. Maemillan propose de tenir une reunion du Conseil de seCl/rite a"ec la par~ ticipatioll des chefs de gouvernernent. Il eCrit notam~ ment: (, Il n'entrerait pas dans les intentions du Gouver~ nement de Sa. Maje.c;te que des projets de resclution soient deposes a cette reunion speciale du ConseiI de securite, amoins que ces projets ne resultent d'une entenle prealable. En d'autrcs termes, l'objet rIp_ 1:'1 reunion serait de parvenir a des accords feconds plut6t que d'enregistrer des divergences de vtes par des votes. )J [5/4971, sect. I, par. 6.1 L'idee est claire : cl'une part le Conseil de sfCUrite, d'autre part des vOles permeltant de parvenir a une entente entre leg et.efs de gouvernemellt. L'Union sovibtiquc a accepte ce:te proposition. 174. Dam; sa le.ttre du 31 juillet, M. Maemillan ecrit er. qui suit: ~ Outre les seances q:ue tiendront tous les membrcs du Conseil conformemenl aux dispositions de l'Article 28 de la Charte, nserait evidemment possible d'organiser des reunIons moins offidelles DU les chef::! de gouvernement pourraient discuter seuls des qlles~ tions qu'examille le COl1seil de secllrite. ~ {IMd., sed. Ill, par. 3.) Et M. Macmillan nipete. : !( n<lllS ne eroyons pas qu'iJ. cel.le reunion spc~ialll il faiUe deposer des prcjets de resoluti,)n, a mobs qu'ils ne resultent d'une entente prealable II [ibid.). 175. On trouve ex.primee une fois de plus l'idee de negociations entre 11:s chefs de gouvemcment, en de:lOrs des I;eances officiclles du Conseil de ser.urite. 176. Si j'ai bien compris la position du Gouvemement des Etats-Unis teUe qu'elle ress{)"t des rnessages dll Pre~ sident des Etah-Unis, celui~d n'aecepte p~s cette partie de la reunion des chefs de gouvernemellt qui est envisagee. Si je me Lrompe, je semis heurwx que M. Logde m'indjque le message dans Iequelle president Eisenhower souscrit n la proposition du Royaume~Uni, qui a ete acceplee par I'Union sQvittique. 177. Le PRl!SIDENT : La liste des orateurs e.tant epuisee, je voudrais dire quelqucs mots en tant que repreSf'-llt:'lnt de la FRANCE. Vu I'heure tardive, je limiterai mon intervention it trois minutes. 178. La position du Gouvemement fran~ais vis·a~vil'I du probleme flctucllement soumis au Conseil a ete clairetnent deHnie a p:usienrs reprises. Lors des seances consacrees a l'examen des plaintes dlt Liban et de la Jor- 179. The French position at that stage of the debate was based upon the following considerations. The United Nations had been seized of the problem and it wa5 therefore for the competent organ, the Security Council, to find a solution and 1I0t to disappoint the hopes of those who had appealed to it. If, and only if, the Security Council was unfortunately unable to take action, the French Government was prepared to take part in a conference of the Heads of Government of the principal Powers concerned to discuss the Middle East question, provided that the conference was care~ fully prepared and could be held in a calm and objective atmosphere. 180. The French Government's attitude has remained unchanged. ThlO Government of the Soviet Union, however, later gives its support to a different formula - a special meeting of the Security Council attended by Heads of Government. 181. Today the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invites us to adopt a tllird formula and is calling for a special hession of the General Assembly. That is a far cry from the meeting in a spirit of "reason and calm " which Mr. Khrushchev originally proposed [8/4059). 182. The French Government, for its part, is convinced that a meeting of Heads of Government to discuss tile Middle East is in the interests of the whole world and tllat no effort should be spared to make sueu a meeting possible. But, just as we did not oppose the proposal to hold a special session of the Security Council, we will not oppose the convening of a special session of the General Assembly if that is what lhe members of the Security Council desire. Onr reservations and mis~ givings persist, but if I refer to them here it is mainly to voice a warning concerning the hazards that must at all costs be avoided if we want this special session to pave the way for a constructive solution of the problem, 183. These are the considerations by which the French delegation will bf' guided in voting on the draft resolutions before us, We will t.hlOreforc vote for the United States draft resolution (S/4056/Rev.1].

Before you proceed to a VOR. - since I understand that you are about to put tJle United States draft resolution to the vote, no mem- I 179. La position francaise, a ce stade des debats, a ete fondee Slit les considemtions sllivantes. L'Organi~ sation des Nations Unies etait saisie du probleme. 11 appartenait done a l'organisme competent, le Conseil de securite, de trouver une solution et de ne pas decevoir les espoirs de ceux qui faisaient appel .a lui. Si, malheureusement, le Conseil de securit.e n'etait pas en mesure d'agil', et rlalls cc cas :;culement, le Gouvernement francais acceptait de prendre part a une conference des chefs de gOllverncment des principales puissances interessees au sujet du Moyen-Orient, a condition qu'elle filt preparee avec soin et put se derouler dans une atmo~ sphere d'objectivite et de serenite. IBO. L'attitude du Gouvernement francais n'a pas change. Le Gouvernement de I'Union des Republiquf'.'l socialistes sovietiques s'est, par la suite, rallle a une formule differente, celle d'une reunion speciale du Consei! de securite, avec participation des chefg de gOllvernement. 181. Aujourd'hui, c'est une troisieme formule que l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques nou~ invite i'l. adopter: eile reclame la convocation d'une se~sion extraordinaire de ],Assembh~e gem!rale. Nou~ sommes loin de la reunion" dans la rai50n et le calme n que M. Khrouchtchev avait, iJ. I'origine, proposee [8/4059]. 182. Le GOllvernement franl«'lis reste, pour sa part, convaincu qn'une reunion des chefs de gouvernement au sujet du Moyen-Orient est conforme a l'interet du monde et gu'allcnn effort ne devrait et.re neglige pour susciter les conditions necessaircs a une telle rencontre. Mais, de meme gu'il ne s'ctail pas oppose a la proposition d'unc reunion speciale du Conseil de securite, il ne s'opposera pas a la convocation d'une session extraordinaire de ]'Assf'mblee generale si tel est le vceu des membres du Conseil de securite. Les reserves, les apprehensions que nous avans exprimees subsistent, mais si je les rappelle ici, c'est surtout comme llne mise en gardc contre les ecueils qu'il s'agit a tout prix d'eviter si nous voulons gue cette session extraordinaire ouvre la voie a une solution constructive du probleme. 183. Telles sont les considerations qui guideront la delegation fran1(aise au moment du vote sur les projets de resolution qui nous sont soumis et pour lesquclles elle votera en faveur du projet des Etats-Unis d'Ame· rique [S/4056jRev. 1]. 184. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [tmdult dll russe] : Avant de passcr au vote, qui, si j'ai bien compris, portera sur le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, car aucun membre du Conseil 185. These are the amendments: (1) Suppress the first paragraph of the preamble, which reads: "Having con!;idered the Gomplaints of Lebanon and of the I-Iashemite Kingdom of Jordan." This paragraph is only a statement of fact which does nol; affect matters one way or the other. Its omission would merely serve to cJ..nrify the situation. (2) In tlIe operative paragraph, which reads: .. Decide> to call an emergency :special SeSSiQll of the General Assembly, as provided in Gcnerfl.] Assembly resolution 377 (V) ", replace the words" ill General Asse:nbly resolution 377 (V) " by the words "in rule 8 (b) or the rules of procedure," so that the p<.Jragrnph would then rcad: "Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in rule 8 (0) of tlle nies of proced'Jre of the General Assembly." 186, Mr. LODGE (United States o[ America): I should like to comment on the amendments proposed by the representative of the Soviet UnlOll, :lS7. Mr. Sabolev suggests striking out the first paragraph (" IJauing considered the complaints of Lebanon and of the Hashemite Kingdo:n of Jordan "), which is a simple statement of facl. This is a procedural dra:t resolutiun. It does not pass any judgemellt one way or the other on the facts, Bd the first paragraph, of course, contains theh asic fact on which we are proceeding lmrler the "Uniting for peace" resolution. I would have to oppose eliminating it because that would take away a great deal of the rais~n d'&.re of what we are contemplating here. 188. As fnr as a seeon d suggestion is concerned, M:. Sobolev would substitute rule 8 (b) of tile r:.J.les of procedure of the General Assembly, Rrle 8 (b) reads as follows: "Emergency special sessions pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3i7 A (V} shall be colt\lened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary~General of a request for such a session from the Security Council, on the vote of any seven member!'\ thr.TP,of, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a majority of Members as pl'Ovided in rule 9." Resolution 377 (V) covers this, T:he second amendment is just another way of saying the same thing. Therefo:-e, I have uo objection to that. But as tl1~ !'\pon!'\or of the draft resolution, I do not think that I can accept the first amendment which was proposed. 185, Voici ces am~ndemenl:s : 1) Supprimer le premier ccn:siueranLaiusj CODQU; (( Ayw!l c:camlne las plaintcs uu Liban et du I10yaumc hachcI:litc de Jordanie ~. 11 s'agit selllemcnt dans cet aline::! d'une constatation de fait qui n'ajoute riell ct dont la di::lparition n'enleverait ri:~n au textc. Si on sllpptime ccs mots, la situation n'ensera que plus claire. 2) All dispo.'dtif, qui se lit comme 5\lit : ttDecide qu'une se!'\sion ~:xtraordinaire cl'nrgence de l'Assemblee generalc sera convoquee conformement RUX dispositions de la resolution 377 (V) de l'Assemblee generate 11, remplacer les mats" la :esobtion 377 (V) ~ par les mots "l'alinea b de l'article 8 du reglement intcrieur )). Le dispositif se lirait ainsi : (' Dedde qU'une session exLnlOnlul<iire d'urgcncc de l'Asserr.blee generale sera convaquce conformcment aux dispositions de l'alinea b de l'arlicle 8 du reglement inb~riel1T dp. l'A!'\!'\emblee generale. )) 186. M. LODGE (EtatsMCnis) [tradw'i de I'anglais] : Jc voudrais faire quelques observations slIr les amendementiS proposes par le represent.:mt de l'TJnion sQvietique. 187. M. Sobolev suggere de supprimer le premier alinea (I( Ayan! ~xumille les plaintcs du Libon et du Royaume hachCmite de Jord,mie '1), qd est une simple cOllStatation de fait. IJ s'agit d'une resolution de procedure, qui ne prejuge nullement lcs bits dalls lln sens ou dans l'autre. Mais ralinea en quest:on rappelle le fait essentiel qui donne lieu :l l'application de la resolution" L'llruon pour le maintien de la paix~, le suis done oppose :l la suppression de ces lOol;s, gu: expliquent pour une gr.'lnde part la mesurc en qu~sti():l. 188. Quant it la scconde suggestion de M, SoJ.;olev, eUe consisterait a remplacer les mots "de la re~o­ lution 377 (V) », par « l'allnea b de l'articIe 8 du reglement intcricur~. Cet alinea b de l'nrtide 8 dispose : u L'AssemhIee generalt se reunit en sessioll extraordinaire d'urgence, conformement a sa resolution 377 A (V), dans un delai de vingt-quatre heures aprcs la reception par le SeCretaire general cl'une demande a cet effzt e:nam.nt wit du Conseil de securite. a la suit:: d'~:1 mtc affirmatif de sept membres de ce Consell, soH d~ III majorite des Memhrcs exprimee au cours d'un vote de la Commission intCrimaire ou autrernent, soit de la majorite des Membrc!l comme il est prcvu ~ l'article 9,») C'est aussi ceque prevoit la resolution 377 (V). Le second amendement sovietiqile revient donc a dire la meme chose sous une autre fonne" eL jc n'y vois pas d'ob}ection, Mais, en tant qu'uuteur du projet de resoluLion, je ne crois pas pouvoir accepter le premi~r aJnend~ment qui a ete propose.

Lib everyone else here tonight, I bave had only a moment to consider tile two amendmeds proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union. At the outsel, I Ieel I should associate myself with the representative of the United States in saying that I would be opposed to the amendment which would exclude the fltst paragraph of the pl'eamble of the draft resolution. 191. Having considered the reasons which Mr. Lodge gave as to the second amendment, it 5cems to me that I what the Security Council does is to eaU an emergency special session in virtue of a General Assembly reso- I lution; it does not call the seffiion in virtue of the ruleS! of procedure. Rule 8, whieh is familiar to the Council, merely prescribes what shall be done (that is, that the session shaD be convened within twenty~four hours) when the decision has been taken. The rule in itself is not the basis on which the session is convened. 192. I wonder if it might meet the point of the repre~ scntative of the Soviet Union if one brought nut both these thoughts and drafted the text as follows: .. Decides in accordance with rule 8 (b) of the rules of procedure of tho General Assembly to call an cmer· gency special session oi tue General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly resolution 377 (V)." 193. It is always a good thing to have the best oi both worlds, if you can. As a matter of formality, I should asl, the representative of the United States to take this sug~estion into consideration as a means of circumventing this point which has arisen at th!s late hOUT in our proceedings.

I should like to say something about the proposal just made by the rcpre· sentati"e of the United Kingdom for the inclusion in the draft resolution of references both to rule 8 of the rules of procedure <tIllI to General Assembly resolution 377 (V). 195. This may well be acceptable to the United Kingdom representativc but it is not so, unfortunately, 1.0 the Soviet delegation. for the purpose of my proposal was, precisely, 1:0 exclude any reference to resolution 377 (\I) from the draft resolution we are considering. TIle reason, I think, is ckar. There is no point in repeating the history of this affair. We agree, however, that there is rule 8 of the General Assembly's rule~ of procedure, which was adopted by all Members of the United Nations, and that on the basis of this rule we 190_ Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) (traduit df l'lluglai3J : Comme taus les autres membres du Conseil, je n'ai eu que tres peu de temps pour examiner les deux l'lmcnclements proposes par le representant de l'Union sovietique. A premiere vue, je erois pouvoir m'associer au representant des Etats-Unis pnur m'opposeral'amendement tendant a supprimer le premier considerant riu projet de resolution. 191. Quant au deuxierne amendement, compte tenu des expLications fournies par M. Lodge, je pense pouvoir dire que c'est en vertu d'une resolution de l'Assemblee generale, et non en vertu du reglement interieur, que le Conseil de securite cOllvoque une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assembh~e generale. L'article 8 du reglement intirieur, que lc ConseiJ connait bien, se contente d'indiquer ce qu'il faut faire (a savoir Con· voquer la session dans les 24 heurcs) une fois que cette convocation a cte dccidec. Le reglement interieur en llli-meme ne saurait servlr de fondement it la convocation cl'une session de cette nature. 192. Peut-etre pourrait-on donner satisfaction au represcrJtant dc fUnion sovietique en conciliant les deux points de vue et en redigeant le texte comme suit: II Decide, conformcmcnt al'alinea b de l'article 8 du regtement inbirieur de I'Assemblee generale, de convoquer une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generalc, comme prcvu dans la resolution 377 (V) de l'AssembIee generale. j) 193. Il est tOlljours ban de retenir le meilleur de chaque these, si c'est possible. Je sOllhaite que le representant des Etats~Unis tienne compte de ma suggestion pour rCsoudle cette dimculte, qui se presente it une heuce aussi tardive. 194. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistei sovictiques) [Iradult du russeJ: le vOlldrais dire quelques mats au sujct de la proposition que vient de faire le representant du Royaume-Uni et qui tend a mentionner, dans le projet de resolution, aussi hien 1'artide & du reglemellt interieur que la :resolu:tion 377 (V) de l'A~semblce generale. 195, CcUe formule cnnvient peut-ctre au representant du RO)'allme-Uni. mais cUe ne convient malheureusfrment pa5 it la delegation sovictique, ear ma proposition avait precisement pour objet d'exclure du projet de resolution que nous examinons tOllte mention de la resolution 377 (V)_ Nos raisons sClnt cJaircs. n est inutile de faire l'historique de la question. Mais nons admettons qu'i[ existe un article 8 du reglcment interieur de l'Assemblee gelll~'ale, adopte par tous lM Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et qu'cn 196. As I see no objection from the United States representative all: this score I tllinti we could, perhaps, if we made some effort, and if we took advantage of the representative of Panama's proposal for a short recess, rear,h a point at which the Security Council could adopt unanimously a resolutioll on the convening of a special session of tbe General Assembly. We have already gone half-way towards this goal. Perhaps if wc give the luattet some thought, we shaH succeed in covering the rest of the road. I would therefora once again ask the representative of the United States to reconsider the question of deleting the first paragraph of the preamble of his draft resolution. Here again, I repeat, we may perhaps meet ea~h other half-way. 19ft Etant dOllne que le repre~entant des Etats-Unis n'a pas, A ma eonnaissance, eleve d'objeetion a eet egard, il me semble que nous poumons, moyennant quelques eUorts et apre.. la breve suspension de seance proposee par le representant du Panama, arriver a adopter a l'unantmite une resolution rdative a la eon\'ocation d'une session extraordinaire de l'AssemblCe generale. La moiti~ du chemin est deja faite. En y ref]p.~hissant. nous trouverons peut-ctre le moyen de faire l'autre moitie, Je vourJrais done demander enCQre au represeutant des Etats-Unis d'examiner it nouveau la possibillte de supprimer le premier considerant de son projet dc r~solution, Je le repetQ, nous pourrions la aussi trouver un moyen terme. 197, M, LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [lraduit de l'anglais] : Je youdrais dire sans flmbflgp,.q a :\1, Sobolev que je cOInprends pourquoi il sauhaite voir supprimer toute mention de la resolution 377 (V) de I'Assemblee generate; en eITet, rai assiste aux discussions de 1950, lorsque M. Vychinsky a attaque la resolution ((L'Union pour le maintien dela paix JJ. Mats il me !autbien ajouter que l'amendemtmt de M. Sobolev ne Iui permet pas d'tHuder cette resolution, puisqu'il mentionne l'article 8, alioea 0, du feglement interieuf, oil it est dit : ({ L'As~ semblee generaJe se nlunit en sessiol1 extraordinarre d'urgence, conformement asa resolution 377 A (V)". n, ee aont lea termes memes que M. Sobolev ve:Il supprimer,

I should like to say to Mr. Sobolev with the greatest llilluour that I understand wby he would like t<l eliminate any reference to resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly, because I Wll.!'; here in 1950 when Mr, Vyshinsky made this attack on the "Uniting for peace" resolution. But in all frankness, his amendment d<les not get Mm out from under that resolution because ills amendment refers tu rule 8 of tberule~ of procedurennd paragraph(/» of rule 8 says: "(b) Emergency special sessions pursuant to Ge:teral Assembly resolution 377 A (V) , , ," That is the very language :Mr. Soholev wants to take out. 198. Bien que le projet de resolution de I'UniDn sovietique ne mentionne pas la re,solut.ion l( L'union pour le maintien de la paix ~I, ce projct utilise la prQcedure etablie dans cette resolution, ctant donne qu'il n'existe pas d'autre moyen d'eyiter le veto du Conseil de securite et de s'adresser a l'Assefllblee generale. C'est la senle procedure possible, de sorte que, malgre taus les efforts qu'll deploie et lode la pebe qu'iJ se donne, M. Sobolev ne peut se dHaire de la resolution « L'union P0Ul" le maintien de la paix 1'1. 198. While his own draft resolution does not mention the "Uniting for peace" reSOlution, that is the procedure under which he is going because there is no other way to avoid the veto in the Security Council and go to the Gf\neral Assembly. That is the only procedure there is, so, no matter how hard he struggles and how hard he tries, he cannot get out from under the "Uniting for peace" resolution. 199. J'aimerais lai poser ueux questions: si son amendement au dernier alinea du projet de resolution est adopte, "Votera-t-il pour ce projct de resolution, et, dans I'alfumative, que compte-t-il fsire de SOil propre projet de resolution? 199. I should like to ask hint two questions: if his amendment to the last paragraph of the draft res,)lntion is adopted, will !le vote for this draH resolution, and if so, what does he intend to do about his own draft resolution? 200, M. lLLUECA (Panama) (trarfuit de I'espagnol] : 11 y a quelques instants je vous ai demande, Monsieur le President, de bien vOllloir suspendre la seance pendant cinq minutes, Je crois qUil cette suspen.sion de ~ellnce serait utile, parce qu'elle permettrait aux membres d u Conseit de proceder a des echanges de vue sans etre retardes par l'interpretation consecutive.

A few moments ago I asked the Preside:tt to be good enough to suspend the meeting for five minutes. 1 believe a recess would be usefuL Members could ask more than two questions and receive answers without having to wait lor the consecutive int€fpretation. 201. Le PRESIDENT: le suis saisi par le representant du Panama d'une proposition fannelie de suspendre la seance pendant cinq minutes afin de permettre un

The representative of Panama has formally proposed a fiv~-minllte recess to permit a mo~ rapid I!nd con- 203. The quesLioll was: if my amendments were accepted, would r voLe fol' the draft resolution? My answer is: if both my amendments are accepted, I shall vote [or the United States draft resolution. 204. If this draft resolution is adopted, as amended, I shall natur.'l1ly noL tnsist on a vote on my own draft. 205. The PRESIDE.NT (Il'QIlSlated Jl'Om French): I have before me a proposal to suspend the meeting which, according to rule 33 of the rules of procedure, should be decided without debate. If there is no objeclion, the meeting will !lll suspended. 11 was £0 decided. The meeling was suspended a[ 8.25 p.m. and resumed at 8.30 p.m.

As the sponsor of this draft resolution [Sf4056/Rn>.1J, I have given a great deal of thought to the proposal which has been made, and I have tried to consult with as many members of the Council as possible because, of course, any suggestion that is made by a member of the Conndl is entitled to very serious and careful consideration. 207. My conclusion is that the first paragraph cannot be eliminated without serious effects on the rest of the draft resolution. I cannot see why this paragraph should be offensive to anybody. It does not pass a judgement at alL It is a mere statement of the fact that these matters have been considered - which is a fact that nobody here can possibly deny - and it is on that factual basis that we are now taking the matter to the General Assembly. Thus, I do not think that we can eliminate that first paragraph. 208. As I have already said, the change which the Soviet representative advocates for the last paragraph does not really change the meaning at all and, as I have told him. I do not think it eliminates hiB embarrassment because, no matter what happens, if we go to the General Assembly it will be under the "Uniting for peace" resolution. He told me, when I asked him, that even if his amendment to the last paragraph were accepted he still could not vote for the draft resolutioll. I see no point, therefore, in making that change. It does not improve the draft resolution ut all, and if it is not going to bring his support then I see no point in making it. 208. J'ni deja dit que la modification que le repre~ senlant de l'Union soyietique propose d'apporter au dernier alinea du projet de resolution ne changerait pas r6ellement le sens de cet alinea, et, comme je le lui ai fail observer, ceHe modification ne le tirera pas d'embarras, parce que, quoiqu'iI arrive. si nous con~ yoquons l'AssembJee generale pour examiner ces questions, cc sera en vertu de la resolution « L'union pour le maintien de la paix ». Lorsque je lui ai demande queUe serait son attitude si son amendement au dernier alinea etait accepte, il m'a repondu qu'il ne pourrait quand meme pas voter le projet de resolution. Par consequent, je ne vois pas de raison d'accepter cette modiftcation. Eile n'ameliore nullement le projet de resolution, et si son acceptation ne nous vaut pas l'appui du representant de l'Union sovietique, je ne vois vraiment pas a quoi eUe servirait. 209. Pour ces raisons, je suis oppose aux deux amendements de l'Union sovietique. 210. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais] : Je souhaite retirer la suggestion que j'ai faite 209. For those reasons, I intend to oppose both the amendments. 210. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): I should like to withdraw the suggestion I made for an amend- 203. On m'a demande si je voterai pour le projet de resolution au cas oil. roes amendements seraient acceptes. Je reponds par I'affirmative : si mes deux arnendements sont aecepLes, je votcrai pour le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. 204. Si cc projet de resolution est adopte sous sa fonne modifiee, il va de soi que je n'insisterai pas pour que notre projet soit mis aux voix. 205. Le PRESIDENT; Je suis saisi d'une proposition de suspension de seance, sur laquelle, conformement a l'artiele 33 du reglement interieur, il est statue sans dcibat. S'il n'y a pas d'objection. la seance est suspendue pour un instant. II en est ainsi decide. La seance est suspendue a 20 h. 25; eile est reprise iJ. 20 h. 30. 206. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [lraduit de l'anglaisJ : En qualite d'auteur du proj~t de resolution [S/405G/Rev. 11, j'ai bcaucoup rel1echi a la proposition qui a ete faite, et j'ai essaye de consulter autant de membrcs du Consei! que je pouvais, car toute suggestion faite par un membre dll Conseil merite naturellement la plus grande attention. 207. le sui::> arrive il la conclusion que l~ premier conf;iderant ne peut eLre supprime sans que le reste du proje\: de resolution en soufire gravement. Je ne vois pas en quoi le texte de cet alinea pourrait offenser qui que cc soit. Aueun jugernent n'y est emis. Le Conseil se contenterait d'y constater que ees questions ont ere examinees -- person ne ne peut le nier - et e'est en se fondant sur ce fait que nous portons maintenant la question devant l'Assemblee generale. Je ne pense pas que nous puissions eliminer ce premier alinea. ~11. Mr. ILL~.JECA (Panama) (translated {rorT, Spanv;h): In an earher statement, 1 referred to the manner in whic.1t General Assembly resolutioll 377 (V) should be applied. I pointed out that there is only one type of eme:gency sp~cial session, tlle type provided for ir. resolution 377 (V). I should like to make a further effort in the hope; of demonstrating that the small nations which are not permanent members of the Securitv Cou:l.cil can malie a positive contribution in finding solutions acceptable to the Member States of the United Nations. 212. Acc'Jrdingly, I should til\c to Sllbrr:it an amend. ment, which would be an amendment to the Soviet amendment, for your consideration, It would amend tllC first prcamhtllar par::Jgr~ph of tlte United States draft resolution to read as follows: ,. Hat'ing considered the items on its agenda (S/Agcnda/83Bj ..•" This amendment is, I admit, merely a parapllrase of the corresponding part of Lhe original lext, but it contains an official reference to a document prepared by the Secretariat. 213. I formally move that amendment in the hope Ulat, if it is accepted by the LHited States and the Soviet Union, the Unit~d States dr~ft resolution IWly be aclop. led this evening unanimously. I think we could do something of historic significance tonight.

The Soviet delegation thanks the representative 01 Panama for his proposal, which it finds acceptable.

As I understar:d the proposal of the representative of Panama, it is that the first preambular paragraph be revised to read as follows: .. Having considered items 2 and 3 of its agenda (S{Agenda/838) ". 216. It cannot be that he means that we should reconsider item 1, adoption of the ogenda, each time - at least I would !Jot thinl, so, If tlmt is what is me;!;nt, that is exactly what our text means, and we would he glad to accept that amendment.

J ~h0111d like to be ClcflT a/Ji)ut th~ situation. The representative of the United States has accepted the formula proposed by b.e rcpl'csentative of Panama - Ll[lt is, to amend Ule first paragraph of the preamble roughly as [ollows: .. Havbg CO:J.sidered items 2 and 3 0: the agenda of the present meeting ". If the representative of t1ll< United Stales call, at the same time, accept my second amendment for the delegation, in the last paragraph, of a reference 211. M. lLLUECA (Pannma) /lraduit de l'espagrlO{J : Dans I'une de Des interventions precedentes, j'ai parIe de la manie.re dont on devait appliquer la resolution 377 (V) de l'As~em;)lee generalc. J'lli indillue it eet cgard qu'it ll'exi~tait qu'une categorie de sessions extraordin::lil'es d'llrgence, a savoi!" celles qui sont convoqllees aux. termes de l'inshumeUl juridiqlle Ifue conrtitue la reso!ntion 377 (V). .re voudrais tcntc;r un nouvel eITort dans i"espoir de montrer au Conscil que les petits pays non memhres permanent" dll Consei) de stctlriM peuvent contrwucr de IUiluierc positive :i trouver des formulcs qlli soient Hcceptn.bles pour les Etats Membres de l'OrgBnisation des Nations Unics. 212. C'est pourquoi je voudrais presenter un amendement a l'amcndement de l'UnirlIl sovietique, et desi· rerais que ma suggestion sait prise en consid6ratioJ.. Cct amendement consist~ a modifier comme SIlLt le premier c;onsiderant du pro:ct de resolution de.~ Etats~ Unis : "Ayant eX2mine les questions inscrites a son ordre du jour (SjAgendaj83S). , Je reconnnis que cet amendemeJt n'a?porte ;tucune modification au {onri an texte initial, mais ce texte ferait ainsi mention d'un dGCumeIlt redigc j)ar le Secretariat. 213. .le propose formellcment Cet amendement da:1s i"espoir que, s'jl est acceptc par les Etats-Ullis d'Ameriqlle et I'Union sovi·~tiqllc, le prQjet de resolution des Etats~Unis pOl:.rra Cire arlo)lte ce soir a l"unanimite. Lot s~ance de ee soil' marqucl'f::.it ainsi, dans nos travaux, un moment historique. 214. M. SOBOLEV (Union des RepubJiques sociaUstes sovietiques) [trulluit du russeJ : La rldegation sovie- LitIUl.: relncJ:cie le representant du Panama de Sf! pro~ position, qu'cJle accepte. 215. M, LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglaisJ : Si je comprends bien la proposition du rep:esentant du Pr.nama, eIJe tend a modifjer comme suit le premif'.r considera:J.t : « Ayant examine les points 2 et 3 de SOIl ordre du jour (SjAgenda)838). )) 216. Le representar:t du Panama ne veut certainement pas que n011S reexaminior.s chaque fois le point 1 : adoption de l'ordre du jour - du moins je ne le pense pas. Caa ctant, tel esl prccisel1lcnt le I\ens de notre proposition, et nOIlS scrons heureux d'accepter eet amendement. 217. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Hrpllbllques socialistes sovictiques) rlr-adu{t du Jlw'eJ : Je voudrais preciser la situation. Le representant des Elats-Urlis a acceptC la proposition uu rcpresenlnnt dll Panama tenuant a modifier le p:-ernier consid<hant de fa~on qu'iJ se lise f/rosso modo com1llC suit; , Ayant examine les points 2 et 3 de l'ordre du jour de la preserlte seance I). Si, d'autre part, le representant des Etats-Unis accepte notre deuxicme amcndernent, Lcndant 11 lIltlltionllcr l'article 8, alin6a b, du reglement interieur all lieu de

As regards the wording of the last paragraph, I have already stated earlier in this procedural debate that I find it illogical for the Security Council to go on record as calling this emergency special session under rule 8 of the rules of procedure. In my view, it should call the session under the Assembly resolution. 219. I recognize, as we all do, the difflculty that the representative oL the Soviet Union has with regard to the mention of this particular resolution. Mr. Lodge has already pointed out that in fact yOll can only call an emergency special session in one way - under that resolution. That being so, I do not think we need to mention it. Perhaps by the suppression in the present draft resolution of the mention of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) we shall meet the point of tlle repre~ sentative of the Soviet Union. 220. I would therefore suggest that the last paragraph should read as follows: ,. Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly."

Mr. Lodge, of course, ought to have the first word on this matter, since it is his draft resolution which we are proposing to prune. However, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the United Kingdom representative's proposal is perfectly acceptable. We agree to putting a full stop after the words "to cal! an emergency special session of the General Assembly".

ill the simultaneous English translation of Mr. Sobolev's remarks, he was quoted as saying that my draft reso· lution is being cut down. Then in the consecutive translation, he was quoted as saying that my text is I being tnmcated. I will point out that my draft resolution is being neither cut down, truncated, butchered, watered down, dilutlOd, nor weakened in any way. We are using other language in order to save Mr. Sobolev understandable embarrassment. 223. I will accept the United Kingdom suggestion for the last paragraph, so that it will read~ " Decides to call an emergency special se~sion of the General Assembly", because there is only one way an emergency special session of the General Assembly call be called, and that is in accordance with the "Uniting for peace" resolution, 224. Perhaps I had better read the draft resolution as amended. The gentlemen of the Press might wish to have me do so, as might the membl'.rs of the Council. In order that there will be no misunderstanding, I will I 218. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [lraduil de l'anglaisJ : En ce qui concerne le libelIe du dernier alinea, j'ai deja dit au cours de ce debat de procedure qu'il etait illogique, a mon avis, que le Conseil de secnrite demande la convocation d'une Session extraordi_ naite d'urgence de I'Assemblee en vertu de !'article 8 du l'cglement. A mon sens, le Conseil doit se referer a la resolution de l'Assemblee. 219. Je vois bien, de meme que tous les autres reprc. sentants, la difficulM qu'eprouve le representant de I'Union sovietiqlle en ce qui concerne la mention de cette resolution particuliere. M. Lodge a deja sOllligne qu'en fait il n'y a qu'un moyen de demander la convo. cation de cette session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssembIee : en application de cette resolution. Puis. qu'il en est ainsi, je ne pense pas que nous ayons besoin de faire mention de cette resolution. Pellt~etre donncrions-nolls satisfaction au representant de rUniO!! soviCfique en supprimant, dans le projet de resolution, toute reference a la resolution 377 (V) de I'Assemblcc generale. 220. Je propose donc que le dernier aHnea soit ainsi concu : «Decide qu'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssembIee generale sera convoquee.)) 221. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Repllbliques 90cialistcs sovietiques) [lraduit dll russe] : C'est evidemment a M. Lodge de parler le premier, puisque c'est son projet que l'on envisage de tronquer. En ce qui concerne 2Q delegation sovietique, la proposition du representant du Royaume~Uni nous parait entierement acceptable. Nous consentons a ce que l'on mette un point final apres les mots «une session extraordinaire d'urgence de I'Assemblee generale sera convoquee 11. 222. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais) : D'apres I'interpretation simultanee en anglais, j'ai cru comprendre que M. Sobolev disait qu'on etait en train d'amputer man projet de reso· lution. Puis, d'apres l'interpretation consecutive, it aurait dit que mon texte etait en passe d'(~tre rnutU6. le tiens seulement a dire que mon projet de resolution lie sera ni ampute, ni mutile, ni massacre, ni edulcore, ni affadi, ni affaibli en aUCune faQon. Nous changeons seulement notre libelle pour tirer M. Sobolev d'un embarras comprehensible. 223. J'accepte la suggestion dll representant du Royaume-Uni tendant a ce que le dernier alinen se borne a dire : «Decide qu'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de t'AolIsembMe generale sera convoquee I, eL ce parce qu'i1 n'existe qu'une maniere de convoquer l'Assemblee generale en session extraordinaire d'urgence : en vertu de la resolution (( L'Union pour le main· tien de la paix 11. 224. Peut.E~tre devrais-je, a l'intention de.s representants de la presse comme des membres du Conseil, donner lecture du projet de la resolution ainsi modilie. Arm d'eviter tout malentelldu, je vais lire le textll du

If no other members of the Council wish to speak, we shall proceed to a vote on the United States draft resolution [S/4056/Rev.1] in the amended form which Mr. LOdge has just read oul. A vole was taken by show of hands. The draft re.'JQlution. as amended, was adopted unanimously.

In view of the results of the vote on the resolution just adopted by the Security Council, the Soviet delegation does not insist on a vote on its own draft resolution [S/4()57/RelJ.l].

Now that ail emergency special session of the General Assembly is to l>e called to discuss the question of the Middle East, I wish to express my delegation's fervent hope that the Assembly, at Uds special session, will find ways and means to effect a permanent settlement of the problem, a settlement which will assure stability and peace in the region, and at the same titne will have due regard for the sound nationalistic aspirations of the peoplc$ concerned. The session will also help create the conditions conducive to the 'Withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from the area. In my delegation's view, if at this session tite General Assembly fails to produce some constructive pro- 227. M. MATSUDAIRA (Japon) [traduit de l'anglaisJ ; Mailltenant qu'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'AssemhIee generale doit eu'e convoquee pour examiner la question du Moyen-Orient, ie tiens aexprimer J'espoir fervent de ma delegation que I'Assemblee trouvera, a cette session extraordinaire, le moyen d'arriver a un reglement permanent du probleme, a un reglement qui assurera la stabilitC et la paix dans cette region et qui tiendra en meme temps dflment compte des sames aspirations nationales des peupJes en cause. La tenue de cette session aidera egakment a creer les COnditions qui permettront le retrait des troupes des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni de cette region. De I'avis de ma delegation, si, a cette session, l'Assemblee generale ne parvient pas a mettre au point un programme constructU sur ce point, elle aura failli a la responsabilite que nailS lui aurons conilee. C'est dans cet espoir que ma gramm~ on this score, it win have failed to live up to the responsibility which we now entrust to it. In this hope my delegation has voted for the United States draft resolution as amended. deh~gationa vote pour le projet de resolution des Etats- Unis tel qu'it a ete modifie. 228. I should like to add some remarks concerning a technical point. TllC discussion of Jordan, as you know, has not been exhausted in the Security CounCil. From a procedural viewpoint, the question of Jordan does not have :he same status as the question of Lebanon. (accept the amended lIniterl States draft resolution with the understanding that this should not constitute a precedent for the future. 228. Je: vorrnrais ajouter quclques observations sur un point technique. La discussion sur I~ ~ituation en Jordanie, vous le savez, n'a pas ete epuisee au Conseil de securite. Du point de vue de la procedure, la question de la Jordanie n'a pas le meme caractere que la question du Liban. J'acceptc le projet de resolution des Etats- Unis sous sa forme modiiMe, etant ~ntendu qu'il ne. s'agit pa3 la d'un precedent.

The Soviet delegation voted for the proposal to call an emergency special session of the General A&'lcmbly on the clear understanding that the principal task of such a session would be to devise effective measures for easing the international tension primarily cue to the action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan. 229. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit rill rus.~el : En votant pour la convocation d'une session extraordinaiTe d'urgence de l'Assemblce generale, la delegation sovietique considere tlvidemment que la tache principate de cette session sera d'elaborer des rnesures emeaces pour reduire la tension internaUonale provoquee avant tout par les agissements des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni au Liban et en Jordanie. oc Prenant note que le manque d'unanimite des membres permanents du Conseil de securi1i aux 834e et 837e seances a empeche le Conseil de s'acquitter de sa respomabilite principale touchant le mainticn de la paix et de la securite internationales, I( DtcirIe qu'une session exhaordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale sera convoquee. n 225. Le PRESIDENT: Si aucun autre membre du Conseil ne demande la parole, nous aUons proceder au vote sur le texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis [S/4056/Rw. 1], amende dans la forme ou: M,Lodge vient de nous en donner lecture. Il est procede au vole a main levee. A l'unanimiU, le pMjel de resolution ainsi all/eruIt t!.'Jt adopt/!. 226. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) ltraduit du russel : Etant donne le resultat du vote sur la resolution qui vient d'etre adoptee pat" le Conseil de securite, la delegfltion sovietique n'insiste pas pour que son projct de re.solution (Sf4057fRev. 1] soit mis aux voix. 231. Dans son message dn 5 aout au president Eisenhower, M. Khrouehtchev, president du Conseil des ministres de l'URSS, a notamment declare: 231. 1n Ilia message of 5 August to Preside,fit E~sen. hower, Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, makes the following statement concerning the General Assembly: " The Soviet C'1Gvermnent hopes that considenltion of this question in the Genera] Assembly, where lar~{'. and small States alike are represented, will make It possible to Hnd means of removing the. milit:uy danger that has arisen in the Near and Middle East as a result of the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom and will bring tranquillity to that region." (5/4070, sec. [If, para. 28.J 232. The Soviet delegation to the General Assembly will be guided by precisely this aim, Le., the restoration of peace in the Near and Middle East.

In voting for this draft resolution with all its amendments, particularly the one that eliminated the rmal clause in the operative part, it is my understanding that the Council did not establish a precedent whereby an emergency special session of the General Assembly could be called other than on the basis of General Assembly resolution 377 (V). In fact, it was clearly explained to us by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States that such an emergency special session of the General Assembly could only be called on the basis of that resolution. That is also the understanding of my delegation, and I wish this point to be included in the record.

I had not intended to speak again tonight. but when I heard the last remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union, I tllOught that I ought to make this statement. 235. ~Ir. SODole\' l\as talked (I good deal today about w~at the peoples of the world - that is his phrase - thmk aboll~ what!s go.ing on. Unfortunately, the people of the SOVlCt Umon Itself, 3S well as those peoples of Eastern Europe who remain under Soviet domination ha~e no w~y of learning about the discussions and th~ ~ctions ';Vlllci~ take pla~e wit!lin this great forum here 1I~ .the. Secunty Councll ~~ m .the G~neral Assembly which IS about ~D m~et. 1hat lS because radio broad- ~asts from outsl.de the Soviet domain are constantly Jam~e~l and SDV.id newspapers are drastically censored. yet It IS the Soviet Government itself which stresses the Im~ortance of the discussions and the deliberations wInch are about to take place. I am sure that Mc Sobo- Iev ,",:ould agree, if he told us what he really thought, tha~ It wo~ld be a wond~rfu~ thing for the people of the SOV1C~ LImon .to hear ~hlS dIScussion that we havc had here Just a little wlnle ago about dropping out tl mention of the" Uniting for peace" resolu" " IOn. « Le Gouvernement sovietique espere que l'examcn de ceUe question ::'t l'AssemblCe gC>lerale, oi! sont representes aussi bien les grands que. les petits Etats, permettra de trouver le moyen de sllpprimer le danger de guerre erce dans le Proche-Orient et le Moyen- Orient par le~ aetes des Etats-Unis et du ROYllnme~ Uni, et retabhra le calme danscette region. Jl [S/4079, sect. Ill, par. 28.1 232. La delegation sovietique a l'Assemblee geOl!rale s'inspirera prceisement de eet objet, a savoir le retablissement du calme dans la region uu Proche-Orienl:. l,'.t du Moyen-Orient. 233, M. TSIANG (Chine) (tradllU de l'anglaisl : J'ai vote pour le projet de resolution et tous le~ amende-- ments, particulib:ernent celui qui a eliminc le dernier membre de phrase du dispositif, mais a mon sens le Conseil n'a pas cree un precedent selon lequel une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale peut etre convoquec autrement qu'cn vertu de JIl resGlution 377 (V) de l'Assemblee gem!rale. En erret, le representant du Royaume-Uni cl cclui des EtaL!>-Unis nous ont clairement explique qu'une session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale ne peut ~tre convoquee qu'aux. termes de cette resolution. C'est aussi le sentiment de ma delegation, el je desire que me position soit consignee dans le compte rendu. 234. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amcrique) [traduiL de l'anglais] : Je n'avais pas I'intention de reprcndre la parole ce soir, mais mainLenant que rai cntcndu lcs dt'.rnieres observations du representant de l'Union sovietique, je crois de mon devoir de faire la declaration suivante. 235. rvf. Sobolev a parte iJeaucoup anjourd'hui de Cl'. que les pcu[Jles du monde - je reprends ses paroles - pensenl de ce qui se passe actucllement. Malheureusement, la population de l'Union sovietique elle-Illl!me, de meme que les peuplcs de l'Europe orientale qui sont encore sous la domination sovidique, n'ont le moyen d'etre informcs ni des discussions qui se defOulent a la tri?u~,e du Co.nseil de s.ccuritc et de l'AsscmbLee generale, qUl slc.gc.m bIent?t. nJ des mesures qui y sont prises: les emISSions radlOphoniques vcnunt de l'extcrieur sont con.stamment brouilJees dans les pays sovic.tiques, et les Jonrnaux sovietiqucs sont impitoyabJement censures, Ccpenda.nt, c'est le Gouvcrnrmcnt sovictiqnc lui-lllcllle qUI souhgne I'importance des discussions et dcs d@bC.. ratio~s qui auront bicntet lieu. le suis sur que M. SollQlcv convlendra, s'il nous dit ce qu'd pense rcellement, que po~r le peuple de l'Ullion sovictique cc semit mer· y~iJl~ux d'entendre ID discussion que nous avons cue ICI, II Y a un moment, quand il s'est agi de supprimer 237. I: the Soviet Government is sincere in professing a desire for peace, if it has the slightest interest in making a concrete contr:bution to the relaxation at' international temions, there is nothing it could do which ~ould be more ltelpful than to permit the fresh air of the truth to flow into the minds fllld hearts of the Soviet people. If the Soviet Government wishes us la believe that its purposes with respect to tile Middle East situation are seriolls and constructive, I am sure it will not turn a deaf ear to this request.

T had no intenLion of speaking again, since I had said all that 1 wanted to say. However, Mr, Lodge's lnst statement compels me to add a few words. 239. I think the President and all the other members of the Council will have noted, a~ I have mysclf, that Mr. Lodge was not speal.illg on the subject which is on today's agenda of the Security Council. What was the reason for this? It is that Mr. Lodge had nothing to say on the substance o~ the malter unrierdiscussiou. He did not tall:c up the q"Jestions which are heing considered today; he prefert'ed to evade them R:Jd to raise new issues which have nothing to do with the Secllrity Council, of who is giving news, and how, in certain countries. 240. I can as~nre Mr. Lodge that the Suvicl ptul-'Ie are no less informed about what is happening in the world than oBler peoples; probably, they nre more fully informed. The Soviet people understand quite well when aggression is taking place. by whom it is being committed and <lgailliSt whom it is directed. I can assure M~. Lodge that in this respect, too, tle Soviet people can offer an example to other peoples in 237, Si le Gouvernement sovietiqlle est sincere lorsqu'il de-dare desirer In paix, s'il a le moindre desir de contribuer de !al,'oll CQlll,;rCte it une diminution des tensions internationales, il ne saurait mieux faire que de laisser l'air frais de la verite penctrer dans l'esprit et da:r.s le cceur du pellplesovietique. Si le Gouvemement sovictique veul nous convaincre que ses buts en Cl'. qui concerne la situation dans le Moyen-Orient sont seriHlx et constructifs, je suis silr qu'il ne restera pas sourd a notre demande. 238. M. SOBOlEV (Union des Republiqucs sociali~tes sovietiques) [traduit dll rilS'S'eJ : le n'avais pas !'intention de reprendre la parole, wr j'ai dit tout ce qlle j'a,,'~iB a dire, mills la derniere intervention de yt Lodge m'oblige a ajollter quelques mots. 239. Je pense que le President et les membres riu Conseil aumnt r~marqlle, cornme je l'gi moi-rneme COTlstate. que 1Iot. Lodge s'est ecarte de la question qui flgure al'ordredu jour du Conseil de seeurite. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il n'avnit den iI dire sur le fond de la question a I'examen. M, Lodge n'H. pas traite des questions que nOllS examinons aujourd'bui; il a prCfere s'en ecarter et en sQ'Jlever d'autres qui n'ont rien avoir avec le ConseiJ de sccurite, comme les methodcs et organe-s d'information des divers pays. 240. Je puis assurer a M. Lodge que le pellple sovili. tique n'est pas mains informc que les autres de ce qui se passe dans le mondej it est sans doute mieux informe. Le peuple sovietique sait parfaitement reconnaitre quanel une agression a ete commise, d'ou elle vient, et eontle qui est-elle dirigR~. .le VOllS assure, )1ons:eur Lodge, qu'a eet egard le peuple sovietique pourrait montrer aux autres peuple~ comment reconnaitre les

I call upon the Secretary-GeIltJrlil who wishes to make a brief statement.

I should lilm to inform the members of the Security Council th~t messages convening the General Assembly will be sent out tonight to aJI delegations in aceordance with rule 8 (b) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. The tirst meeting will be set for tomorrow afternoon, 8 August. at 5 p.m, T/u>. meelin{{ I'ose at 9.1[, p.m. 241. Le PRI!:SIDENT : La parole est au Secretairl' general pour une brilve c(JJnmllllication. 242. Le SECRETATRE GEr-IERAL (traduil de. l'cmglais) : Jc tiens a informer les membres du Conse;l de securite q~e des communications portant convocdion de l'Assemblee generale seront envoyees ee soir a toutes les delegations conformement a l'alinea b de l'arlicle 8 du reglement interieur de I·A.'t~emh!ee gemlrale. La premiere seance est prevue pour demain apres~midit 8 aout t a 17 heurcs. La s~aTlce Clil leve.t a 21 h. 15. :o~~~:,:A~'~"'I'•.fl"O.'I.,.< 6a ;.", ~:;R~~3~~.".m•. ...lIlT" · Ul.tlCNE G...ld ,. C•., G,.b..o ~I, \VI". I. 5. 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