S/PV.841 Security Council

Before we proceed to the adnption of the agenda. I should like tD sny a word of sincere appreciation to the oulgoing President, 11r. Illueca, who presided during the montll of November. As President, he displayed to a high degree ';he skill 2nd judgement which we alwuys have assDcialtd with our collc~gue fro;n Panama. 2. M. lLL'CECA (Pannl11<l) /lraduit de l'espagflolJ : All nom de man pays et en man nom personnel, je voudrais vous exprim"r, Monsieur le President, IT.es scnumclIls ue profonde gratitude pour les paroles aimablcs et IbUeuscs que vous avez bien voulu pro~

On belmlf of my country and on my own behalf, I wish to express our deep gratitu.de for your very kind «od friendly words. I should also like to wish you every suece.s~ in your delicate task, although I feel sure that, thanks to your experience and ability, the Security Coancll will acqUit itself in t11c most constructive manner possible during your term of office. non~er a mon egard. Je vQudra[s en meme temps former des vceux pour le SUCcE~s de votre tilche dClicate; il est vrai que votre experience et vas hautes qualites nom ~~Sllrent que, sous votre presidence. le Cons,~i1 de sccurite obtiendra des resultats aLlssi fructueux que possible. Hommage AIII me-moire de M Ahmed S. Bokhnri, IlOIlH.Qeeretail'c ii I'iD£onnation Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ahmed S. Bokhari, Under-Se(''l't:tary for the Office of Public lafoJ'mation 3, Le PRESJDENT (traduil de l'anglais) : Les membres du Conseil de securite: mesurent toute l'etendue de la perte subie vendredi demier par l'Organisation des Nations Unies du :ait du deces d'Ahmed Bol<hari. DaEs les diverses salles de conference, des declarations ant deja exprime la tristesse que nuus ressentons taus de savoir qll'il n'est plus des notres,

The members of the Security Council are acutely conscious of tJJe great loss which the United NatiolJs has suffered through the death last Friday of Aluncd Bokhari. Many words haw_ Hlready been said in the chambers of this building testifying to the sorrow which we f~el now that he is no morc with us. 5, I know that this Council will for ever respect and honour the memory of Ahmed Bokhari. Adoption of the agenda The Palestine quCl3rionl letter dated 4 December 1958 from the represcntative of Junel to the President of the Security COlweiI (5/4123) At lIle ilwilalion 0/ the President, ]Ir. Jibba Ehan, representative of Israel, and Mr. Omm' l..oul(i, represen- tative 0/ lhe United A.rab Republic, look places at the Security Council lable, 6. The PRESlDENT; Before calling on the lint speaker, the representative of Israel, I should like to draw the aUention of members of the Council to the letter from the representative of Isrnel to the President of the Security Cour-cLl [S/4128], The report of the Chief of Staff of the United NaVans Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine [SI.f124] has just been circu- lated to members of the Council. 7, Mr. EBAN (Israel): For the fomth time this year, the Security Council is seized of a complaint directed again~l the United Arab Republic by one of tllc neigh- bouring States whosc security nnd peace it has threat- ened, The situation which Israel now submits to the Council's attention comes af~er two years of relative tranquillily on the other frontiers between Israel and the Arab States. On flH the borders except that divid- ing Israel from the Syrian region of the Uuited Arab RepUblic this tranquillity still prevailS. 8. It used to be held in some quarters Lhat infiltra- tions and flttacks from Arnll States against Israel were an inevitflble result of lhe fronUer configuration or of the poiitical and emotional problems left behind by the 1948 contlict. It was sometimes asserted that Arab Governments, despite their formal responsibility, were unable to eOnLrol or restrain such assaults. There was never any substance to tItis view; and the pro- longed maintenance of quiet during 1957 and 1958 ha~ proved conclusively that if Arab Governments decide 5. Je sais que le Conseil respectcra et honorera la mcmoire d'Ahmed BokharL Adoption de l'ordre du jour Question de Palelltine : Lettre, en dute dn 4. de- cembre 1958, adresllce au President du ConseiJ de Securjte par le representant d'Israel (5}4123). Sur /'invitatioll dtl fJl'esidClli, M. Abba ";ban, repre- seniant d'lsracl, el Ai. Omar Lol1t[i, rr:prr:sentant de }a RCptlbliqlle arabe IInie, prl'1lnent place rl la table dll COlIseil. G. Le PHESIDENT (lraduil de l'aJ1!llais) : Avant de donner ia parole au premier orateur inscrit, c'cst-a~ dire au representant d'Israei, ie vOlldrais attirer l'attentioll des membrcs du Conseil sur In lcttre adressec nu President du Conseil de secnrite par le representant d'lsrael [S/4123]. Le rapport du Chef d'etat~Jllajor de i'Organisme des Nations Unics charg,j de la surveillance de la treve Cll Palestine lS/4124J vient d'etl'e distribl](~ aux memlJrcs du Conseil. 7, :'II. EllAN (Israel) [traduil de l'anylals] : Pour la quatrieme fois en l'espace d'ulI an, le COllseil de securite est saisi d'une plainte cootre la Republique urabe unie, formulee par l'LUI de ses voisins, dont la pai..x et la securitc se trouvent menacecs. La situution qu'Israel signalc aujourd'hl1i G. l'attention du Conseil se produit aprcs deux nnnees de tranquillite relative sur les autres frontieres entre Isra(j1 et les Etats arabes. Sur toutes ces [rontieres, a I'cxception de celle qui scpare Israel de la region syrienne de la Republiq,le arabe unie, le calme continue de regncl'. 8. On soutenait recemment encore duns certains miiieux que les infilLraLions et les attaques des Etat~ arnbes contre Israel etaicnt une consequence inevitable du trace des fronticres et de problemes politiques OLI passionnels qui seraient la scquelle dll conflit de 1948. On a parfois affil'me que les gouvernements arabes, en dcpit des responsabilitcs qui sont les leurs, u'ctaient pas en mcsure d'empecher compJetemellt ces attaques. Cette assertion a toujours cite depourvue de fondement; la tranquillite prolongec qui a regne en 1957 et 1958 9. L'ngression commise le 3 decembre 1958 fait l'objet d'ull eXjlose ctetaille dans ma lettre du 4 dccembre adressee ml Prt:shlent du Conseil de sccurite [S/d123]. Le jJoste de l'al'nlee syrienne situe a Darbashiya et 9. The aggression committed on 3 December 1\):")X is described in my letter of 4 December to the President of the Secnrity Council [Sf41Z.Jj, The Syrian army post at Darbashiya and other military positiuns in that area opened fire at llbout 1200 hours that day, first on Israeli sllCpherds grazing their hcrds south of Gonen, and then on a security patrol which came to their rescue when they were trapped in a circle of fin: and unable to tulte their homeward course. This ellgag{;~ ment took place orr Israel territory lying in the area to which the demilitarization provisions 01 the 1949 Armistice Agreement do not apply. In a later develop- ment, defensive fire was directed by Israel exclusively towards and against the posts from which the Syrian attack was being conduclcd. At this stage, Syrian forces opened a heavy artillery barrage on the villages of I-hllata, Gonen, Shamir, NotcT<lh, Ashmura, Gadot and Ma'ale Habashan. A torrent of 600 to 800 shells of varying calibres rained down on the sevell villages along a front of more than sevent£cn kilometres. {l'all~rcs pastes militail'cs de la memc region ont ouvert le feu nux environs de midi, d'abord sur des bel'gcrs israeliens qui gnrdaienl lO'urs troupeaux nu snd de Goncn, pnis sur llne plltrouille de securite qui accourut a leUl' aidO' Lorsque, encercles par le fen, ils furent ruis dans l'impossihilite de regagner leur village. eet enga- gement s'cst produit en territoire israelien, dans la region a lnquelle les clauses de demilitarisation de la convention d'armistice de 1949 ne s'appliquent pas. Par la suite, Israel a ouvert un tir dCfensif, dirige exclu- sivemcnt conlre les postes d'ou l'attaque syrienne ayait ttc declc-nchee. A ce moment, l'artillerie syrienne a ouvert un feu conccntre sur les villages de Hlllata, Gonen, Shamir, Nol,emh, Ashmura, Gadot ct Ma'ale Habashan. Un deluge de 000 a 800 obus de calibres divers s'est abattn SIll' les sept villnges, le long d'lI11 front (k pIllS de 17' lcilometres. 10. All of the facts which I have so far outlined to the Security Council are confirmed even by a superficial reading of the report submitted by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [5/4124], especially parflgraphs 3, 5 and 7 of that report. Syrian initiative in opening fire and also the fact of the artillery bombnrd- ment are fully borne out by the report. The Security Council will observe that the effect of this bombardment was to enlarge the original incident and to prevent any localization or restriction of its efTects. 10. TOilS les faits que j'ai evoques jusqu'ici se trouvent corrobores meme par un cxamen superficiel du rapport etabli par l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance dc la treve [5141241, et en particulicr par ses paragrapher; .1, 5 et 7. Ce document confirme que les Syriens ont OIIvert le fell les premiers el: etablit la materialite du bombardement. Le Conscil de securite notera que cc hombardement a eu pour cffeL d'aggraver la par lee de I'incident initial et d'cmpeclIer toute locali- .~aLion ou limitation de ses conscquenet'.'l. 11. Les attaqlles syriennes dll 3 decembre ont cause la mort d'lIn Israelien; trois alltrcs IsraCliens out ttc blesses, et les uegats materiels sont estim~s a un million de li:vres israeliennes. Un obscrvateur des Nations Unies a egalement ttc blesse. Un poste d'observation des Nations Unies se trouve en effct au centre du secteur ou l'attaque syrienne a debute. Si I'on met a. part I'observateur des Nations Unies blesse, les victimes et les dommages ont ete exclusivement du c!"Jte israelien. D'apres nos estimations, les Syriens ont utilise cinq batteries de 24 pieces. Les obus etaknt surtout du calibre 122 mm; des morLiel's de 81 mm et des canons sans recuI de 82 mm ont egalcment ete utilise... 11. The Syrian attacks of 3 December caused Israel one death and three injuries, while damage to property is estimated at 1 million Israel pounds. A United Nations observer was also injured. A United Nations observation post is in the centre of the area where the Syrian attack was first launched. Apart from the wounding of the United Nations observer, all the injury inflicted on that day was to Israel civilian life and Israel civilian property. It is our estimate that the Syrians used five batteries with twenty-four guns. The shells were mostly of 122 mm calibre; 81 mm mortars and 82 mm recoilless guns were also used. 12. Je me permets de dem~mder au Conseil d~ securite de ne pas se laisser influencer dans son jugement par le petit nombre de pertcs ell vies humllines. Comme je l'ai dit, 800 obus environ ant ct6 tires sur un front de 17 kilometres et sur une profondeur de 8 kilometres contre des villages consistant en fermes et autres bi'itiments construits en materLaux legers, Si nne attaque de cette intensite n'a pas cause de pcrtes plus lourdes, eela est dll pour une bonne part it des cir- constances heureuses, et aussi a la sage discipline des habihlllts des villages en question : des Ies premiers Ob1lS, ils ont quitte kurs rnaisons et autl"l'S batiments 12. With decp respect, I urgently advise the Security Council not to be governed in its estimate of these events by the small number of casualties to llUman life on that day. As I have stated, about 800 shells were fired along a front of 17 kilometres and to El. depth of flve miles against villages, consisting of farm houses and buildings of slender comtruction. That an assault of such intensity took no heavier toll of life is a result largely of a fortunate but incalculable providence; and partly of the prudent discipline which the villagers displayed alter the first shells had fallen when they left their homes and other buildings, took their children 13. Israel took the initiative of requesting the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to call for an immediate cease-fire, which was set by the Truce Super- vision Organization for 1700 hours. The report now before us states in parabrraph 7: "The Israelis did not fire after 1700 hours. On the Syrian side small~arms fire again broke out after dark at 1940 hours." [S/4124, I para. 7.] 14. When the bombardment had subsidcd, the farmers and settlers of these Galilee villages were able to observe the havoC'. which had iJeen done to their houses, their places of toil and their children's homes. My delegation has senL pictorial testimony of this damage to members of the Security Council. In contemplating this damage, the Security COl/neil should bear in mind that, by the confession and avowal of the United Ar3b Republic authorities themselves, no casuallies or damage had been inflicted 011 Syrian farms or villaglls. Israel machine-gun fire and some arlillery fire were opened only after the Syrian assault had caused fatal results to Israelis on Israel territory - and were even then directed solely towards tile military posts from which Syrian fire was being directed. 15. Our fire, ns the UniteJ Nations Truce Sllpervision Organization report points ant, came after the opening of Syrian fire, and was directed, in the words of the report, towards Syrian positions at Darbashiya and Jalabina. There is, therefore, no argument here of Syrian self-defence. We are faced with an act of inter- national aggression, flagrant and unprovoked, involving a breach of the central provisions of the United Nations Charter and of article 1 of t.he General Armistice Agreement between SYL"i..'l. and Israel.l 16. The position is that a ,,{ember State of the United Na.tions has deliberately I1red 800 artillery shells upon seven villages lying wiLhin the territory of another Member Slate with the intention of destroying life and property. Surely, lhis would he a source of inter- national crisis if it occurred acl'OSS any frontier between States anywhere in the world. Never has such a thing happened witllout serious reaction and grave rep{'r~ cussions. The Charter of the United Nations does not oblige - indeed, does not. allow - any Stale passiYCly to endure such nssaults. 17. The first phase of the attack has Dccn the SlllJject of an early investigation by United Nations military observers, of which the results were conveyed lo my Government. The United Nations military observer writes: .. First I tontacted the investigatiOll party on the other side. . .. This was Israel territory. On this 1 OfT1einl R.ecQJ'(I,~ flt lhe Sr.euri(1J Council. Fourth Yrllr, I Special Supplement No. 2. 13. Israel a pris I'initiativc de demander a l'Orga- nisme charge de la surveillance de la treve d'ordonner un ccssez-Ie~feuimwediat. Celui~ci a ete fixe a 17 heures. Le rapport que nous avons SOllS les yeux precise all paragraphe 7 : « Les Isra6liens n'ont pas tire apres 17 heures. Du cOte syriell, un tir de mousqueterie a de nouveau eclate apres 10 tombee de la nuit, fl 19 It. 40. 11 [514124, p". 7.] 14. Lorsque le bombardement a pris fm, les fermiers et colons de ces villages de Galih\e ont pu mesurer l'etendue des destructions causees a leurs maisons, a kurs lieux de travail et aux foyers de leurs enfants. Ma Mlegatioll a envoye aux membres Ju Conseil de securite des photographics montrant les dommnges causes. Ell examinant ees dommages. le Conscil de securite Jevra tenir compte du fait que, de l'avcu meme des autorites de la RCpllbliquc ambc unie, aucune pcrte ou destruction n'a et6 inlligee aux habitants dcs fel'me~ ou des villages syriells. Du cote israelien, k feu des mitraillcuses et certains tirs d'arLillcrie n'ont commence que ]Msque l'attaque syrienne cut call~e de, pertes sericuses anx Israeliens SIll' leur tcrritoire - ct Hs Ont de diriges cxclusivement vel'S les l)osLes rnilitaires d'ou vcnait le fell syrien. 15, ComOle le sfluligne le rapport de ]'Orgunisme, le tir n'a etc d&lenche du cOte israelien qu'apnis le debut de l'attnque syriennc, et n'a eu pour objeetif, eorome le dit expressement le rapport, que les positions syriennes de Darbashiya et Jalabina. On ne sauralt donc parler de legitime defense de la part des Syriens. 11 s'agit d'un acte d'agressioll intcrnationale, flagrant et non provoque, qui constitue une violation des dispositions fondamentales de la Chnrte des Nations Unies et dc l'article premier de la COllvention d'armistice general s)'":"o-israeJienne 1. 16, La gituation cst celle-ci : un Etat Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies a delibCrement tir~ 800 ohus sur scpt villages situes sur le territoire d'Ull autre Etat Membre, dans I'intention d'y detruire des vies et des biens. Il est evident que, sur t.onte autre frontirre, un incident de ce genre cllt entl'aine une crise internationale. 11 est sans exemplc que des faits semhlables n'aiclIt pas pl'ovoque de reactions et dc repercussions graves. La Charte des Nations Unies n'oblige pas - et en fait n'autol'isc pas - un Etat crucl qu'il soit, it. subir passivemcnt des attaques de cc genre. 17. Lcs observateurs militaires des Nnt:.ions Unies ont proced~ rapidemcnt it une enqnele sur la premiere phasc de l'aLtaquc; les resultats en ont cte commu- niques a man gonvernement. L'observatcur milituire des Nations Unies ccnt cc qui suit: «J'ai d'abord pris contact avec le groupe d'enqne- lenrs de J'untre ct'Jte [...]. Les evenements s'etaient 1 Proet3~verbaux uf1lcieis dll CIJn$l'{i dr secl1ritiE, gua- lrieme nnn~e, SllppUment .~pecial /10 2. " I was able to deduce from the impact of the bullets that the shots were fired from the top of the steep cliIT north-west of the junction of the wadis, and from east between the junction of the two wadis. No other physical evidence could be fauna." 18. It is plain from this description that Syrian forces not only fired from their fixed positions in their own territory, but also crossed into Israel to attack their victims from short range. This is also evident from the fact that the body was despoiled of its equipment. In the investigation conducted by the Truce Supervision Organization, the Syrians have confessed this fact. 19. United Nations observers have now had an oppor- tunity of inspecting the havoc done to the seven Israel villages, especially in HulatiJ and Ma'ale Habashan. Buildings were destroyed or damaged. Water and steam in~tallations were hit. Tractors and vehicles were pnt out of commission. Electrical systems were damaged, Storehouses, kitchens, dining rooms and dwelling places were severely hit, 20. This is the third occasion this year on which Israel villages have been attacked by Syrian artillery; but the intensity of this attack exceeded any previously recorded, Both the number of Syrian guns and the number of shells fired were greater than at any time since the 1948 invasion. Ismel civilian targets were the exclusive objects of this lire, and the villages involved were nearly all remote from and unconnected with the scene of the original attack upon Israeli shepherds oH Gonen by the Syrian post at Darbashiya. 21, To understand the significance of this week's events and of the future prospect, it is necessary to describe some of the topographical features of the area under discussion. The Israel territory opposite the Syrian frontier extends westward for ten kilometres in open and low-lying ground, except for a small sector north of Lake Kinneret, which is situated at a greater elevation. On the olher hand, Syrian territory east of the frontier is marked hy all ascending gradient rising steeply for three kilometres and less sharply for a further distance. Syrian territory is, on the average, 1,500 feet higher than Israel territory in the greater part of this region. On the Syrian side, as the map shows, there is a continuous chain of fixed military positions and deep fortilications. Many of these posi- tions are concentrated very close to the frontier. A considerable part of the Syrmn army is arrayed in 18, 11 ressort nettcment de cette description que les forces syl'ienncs n'ont pas seulement ouvert le feu it partir de lcurs llo::.itions sur leur propre territoire, mais aus::.i qn'elles (Jut penetre en territoire isralllien pour flttaqner leurs victimes a faible distance. Ccla est egalement pl'ouve par le fait que le corps de la victime a 6te depouillc de son ei]uipement, Les SyriC1ls L'ont d'ailleurs reCOllUU all cours [le l'enquete menee par l'Organisme charge de lfl SllTveillance de la treve, 19. Les observateurs des Nations Unies ont eu depuis la possibilite de constatcl' les degats subis par les sept villages israCliens, en particulier Hulata et Ma'ale Hnbashan. Des bil.timents onl eM detruits Oll endom- mages. Des instatlntions pour l'cau et la vapeur ont ete touc!Hles. Des tracteurs et des vehicules ant et6 mis hors d'usagc. Les installations electriques Ollt subi des degats, Des cntrep()ts et des residenees ont ete durement frappes. 20. C'est la troisieme fois cette annee que des villages israeliens sont attaques pHr J'Hrtillerie syrienne; cette attaqlle est neanmoins d'un caractere plus grave que celles qui 1'ont precedee. Le nombre des canons syriens. aussi bien que celui iles coups tires, depasse tout ce que l'on a vu depuis l'illva.~ion de 1948. Seuls des objectifs civils ont cte vises; lcs villages atteints etaient prcsque tOllS eloignes - rien ne les rattachait aux lieux de l'flttaque contre les bergers israeliens alaquelle se sont livres, devant Gonen, des soldats dll poste syrien de Darbllilhiya. 21. Pour bien apprccier la portee des evcnements de cctte semaine ct comprendre les perspectives futures, il convient de decrire les caractcristiques topographiques de la region dont il s'agit. Le territoire israeLien,pres de la frontiere syrienne, est cIJnstitue sur 10 kilometres vers l'ouest par des terra:ins ouverts et asscz bas, it 1'exception d'un petit secteur au nord du lac KinnerH, qui est plus Cleve. En revanche, le territoire syrien, a I'est de la Irantil~re, s'eLeve de fa<;:on tres marquee sur les trois premiers kilometres, la pente devenant mains forte ensuite. En moyenne, le territoirc syrien surplombe de 1.500 pieds le territoire israelien dans la plus grande partie de cette region. Du c6te syrien, comme le moutrc la carte, il existe une liglle continue de positions militait'es permanentes et de fortifications profondes. Ban nombre de ces positions sont concentrees a proximite immediate de la frlJnti~re, sur laquclle une 22, Geography thus accords great strategic advantage to the Syrians. Israel's civilian tnrgets llrc numerous, easily visible and well within range, Clvilian activities such as fanning, grazing, ploughing fllld digging of irrigation eannls can be obstructed nlmost at wdl, without a great deal of militQry valour or immediate risk. The Israeli targets are ci\'ilian in character, including women, children and livestock, and are all above ground. The Syrians cnjoy the advantage of height and their positions are mostly of a military character, well dug in and mostly beyond visibility or easy range. 23. This situation creates a problem for Israel which I wish to share with the Security Council in full candour. The absolute starting-point of our position is that the Israel villages in this area must and shall bc protected against such danger and assault as that which charnc~ tcrized tlle events of 3 December. 24. The defence of its territory and citizens against attack is the first obliga'l;ion of a government. This obligation is recognized and endorsed by the law of nations as expressed in our Charter. That Syrian artillery shall not be allowed with impunity to fire upon Israel farms and villages is an axiom lying beyond any need of vindication or approval. Attacks such as those made 011 these seven villages on 3 December catlnot be sullcrcd to occur again. While I have dc!\cribed the advantages which topography bestows upon Syrian forces, I do not mean to indicale that it was beyond Israel's technical capacity, in the exercise of its inherenl right of self-defence, to silence Syrian artillery attack. But because of the spec:al conditions of terrain which r have described, military measures of self-defence against attacking Syrian artillery would require a response more drastic and extensive than the easy assault which the Syrian forces organize from their points of geographical advantage. The Government of lsrael is ardently anxious to avoid this contingency if it can. We huve therefore buried our dead, tended our wounded, begun the rccollsLmction of our shattered farms and homesteads and have turned to the SecuriLy Council of the United Nations for peaceful redress, and still more for vigorous deLerrence. 25. We come to the Security Council in recognition of its "primary responsihility for the maintenance of internationHl peace and security." Wc come here because the alternatives to United Arab Republic renunciation of the kind of activity which it initiated on 3 December are of a gravity that we prefer not to contemplate. And the moral and psychological influence 22, La geographie donne ainsi Ull grand fJV<l.utage strategique aux Syriclls. Lcs cibks qnc constituent les agglomerations israCliennes sont nOll1breuses, aisc- ment discernables, et situees a bonne portee. Des activites civiles telles que la culture tles champs, la garde des troupeaux, lcs lllbours el la construction de t;anaux d'irrigation pcuvent ctre tntravees presquc a volonte, sails avoil' a deployer un grand courage mili~ taire ou a cOllrir un risque immediat. Les objeeUfs isracliens sont des objectifs civils, comprennent des femmes, des enfallt~, et <ltlssi dlt betail, et sont tous a decouvcrt. Les Syriel1s jouissent de l'avantage de l'altitude; lell]'S ]losiLiollS ont surtout un caractere militaire, WJll bien reLranchecs, ct generalement peu visibles et dimcilcs a aLLcilldre. 23, Cette situation crec pour IsraEl un probleme que je voudrais exposer franehement au Conseil de securite. Le principe dont nous partons est que les villages israeliens situes dans la region doivent ~tre proteges - et seront proteges - eontre tout danger et toute attaque du genre de ceux que comportaient les eve~ nements du 3 dccembre, 21. Vile des premieres obligations d'un gouvcTllement est d'assurer la deIcnse de son terdtoire et de ses citoyens contre tou~e attaque. Cette obligation est reeonnue et appuyee par le droit des g~ns tcl quc le conS8cre la Charte des Nations Unies. Que l'artilleric syriennc ne puisse impuncment ouvrir le feu sur des fermes et des villages israeliens eonsLitue 1111 axiomc qui n'a besoin d'etre ni prouve 1Ii a\Jpt'ollve. Le reLour d'attaques comme celles qu'ont ell a subir sept villages le 3 decembre ne saurait etre to1erc. Si j'ai indique les avantages que la topogn.phie (Ionnc aux forccs syriennes, cela ne signifie nnllemenl: qn'Israel n'a pas les moyens techniques d'exercer SOll droit de legitime defellse et de reduire an silence l'artillerie syrienlle. Cependant, en raison des v"rlicdaritcs du terrain que rai decrites, des mesnn.'s militaires de legitime defellse contre les atta(']ues de l'artilJ~rie syrienne impliqueraient une riposLe beaueollp plus eategorique et de plus vaste t'llvergure que les faciles figressions organisees par les forces syriellnes a parlir dc lieux qui leur donnent l'avantage. Le Gouvernemcnt israelien souhaite ardem- ment pouvoir evitcl' d'en venir la, Nons avons done enterre nos morts, soigne nos blesses, commcnce la reconstruction de nos fermes et foyers dcmolis, et nous nous touTllons vcrs le Conseil de securitc, dont nou,~ nttendons unc reparation pacifique, et, plus encore, !les mesures energiques qui empecheront le retour de semblables evenements. 25, Nous nous adressons au Conseil de seenrite en raison de sa (( responsabilite principale " touchant le 11 maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales ~. Nous le faisons pareI.' que, si la Republique urabe ume ilC renonce pas a des actions dll genre de celle du 3 decembrc, les autres recours possibles sont d'une gravite telle que nous preferons ne pas les envisager. 'Xl, Radio Cairo on 6 December 1958 at 1815 hours made the following broadcast in Hebrew to the people of Israel: " What heppened last Wednesday was hut a small blow and neverthdess it shocked Ben-Gurion .• , Why did he go to the Security Council'l He lIO dO\lbt fears a breakdown in Israeli nerves, therefore he fights a war of nerves against us in order to soothe his citizens. This is an old system which will not succeed, ., The Israeli towns arc removed from our border, but incidents are likely to spread and nol only the border settlements but all Israel's inhabitants will be luut." 28. The Cairo Radio programme entitled" The Sphinx Talks" said on 4 December 1958: "Listeners will recall our warning when we declared that Syrian guns will return heavy fire <Ind that the settlers in Israeli colonies near the border will suffer. , . It is possible that such incidents will grow and turn into larger affairs and then the big city dwellers of Israel will suffer , •• Yesterday the north-€astern. border areas of Israel tasted Arab gun fire, but it can be said that this taste is not bitter enough and surprises await the citizens of Israel if they follow Ben-Gurion into provoking the United Arab Repub- lic . .. The Arab giant has reached ltis full stature and he will not bear a trial of strength by a little bug which he can tread down ..." 29, Now two problems are raised by this murky stream of invective springing from the depths of dark and tormented minds. At previous discussions, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, many delegations have emphasized the eiIect of viru- lent radio propaganda in increasing tension between States. For months past the Cairo media of propa- ganda and the Egyptian President himself have been <tVOllS des raisoIl~ de ~railldre que, si le Conseil de secnritc n'use p.'lS vigoureusement de SOli influence, ces bornhardempnts pOllrront se renouve!er, avec dE::!\ nipercnssions bien pins graves gue cclles dn bombnr- dement du 3 deccmbrc. Je ne sais [Jus s'il y a, a l'Orgll- llisatioll dcs Nations Unies, rll'S Etats dont le territoire et la population aienL eu it suhir un bombardement de centaines d'obus vmwnt du territoire cl'un Etat voisin. Mais jc slIis tout fi bit certain qu'il n'est pas un ex.emple d'Etat gui ait admis pa.ssivement la repe- tition de telles attaques. Nous €C()uterons ayec jnteret ce que le representant de la Rcpublique arabe unie pourra dire au sujet du passe, et plus encore au sujet de l'avenir, mais Ct! que nous savons actuellement de l'ctat cl'esprit et des intentions de son gouvemcment ne 13isse pas de 1l011S inqllieter profondement. 27. Le B dCc€lllbre 1958, it 18 h, 15, Radio~Le Caire a difIuse en llcbrllll, a l'intention du peuple d'Israel. la decl:'lration suivante : (( Cl'. qui s'est passe mercredi dernier ll'etait qu'un coup mineur, et cependant cela fl secoue Ben Gllrion... Pourquoi a-t-il saisi le Conseil de securite? Ben Gurion a sans doute peur tju'Isr21!1 ne fa.sse nne depression nerveuse; il se livl'e a \,1nl'. guerre des nerfs contre nous pour calmer ses compatriotes. C'est Ut une vieille astuce qui ne reussira pas... Les villes israc- Uennes sont eloignees de notre frontiere, mais les incidents risquent de se propager, et Cl'. ne sont pas seulement les villages des frontieres d'Israel. mais tous ses habitants, qui en supporteront les consequences. J) 28. Radio-Le Caire declnraiL le ,1 decembre 1958, dans son programme intitule ({ The Sphinx Talks 'j : ~ Nos auditeurs se sOllviendront que nOlls aviOllS prevenu les iuteresses que les canons syriens ripos- teraient par un feu concentre et que les populatioDs des villages isracliens voisins de la frontiere en supporteraient Jes consequences•.. Il se pent que les incidents deviellmmt des affaires plus importantes et aient nIDI'S de graves consequences pour les habitants des grands ccn Lres israeliens", Hier, les regions frontieres du nord-est d'Israel ant eu un av:=mt·gout de Cl'. qu'est le tir des canons arabes, mais il semble que eela ne suffise pas. Des surprises )lcnihlcs <lttendent les citoyens cl'Israel s'ils continuellt de suivre Ben Gnrion et provoquent la. Rcpublique arabe unie.., Le geant artibe se dresse maintenant de toute sa taille, et n'admettra pas d'~tre d6tiC par un insecte qu'il peut aiSfll1ent ecraser... )~ 29. Deux probJemes se posent, devant ce flot d'invec- tibes bOlleuses issues du trefonds d'esprits sombres et tourmentes, Lors de debats precedents, au Conseil cc securite et a l'Assemblee generale, de noml>reuses deJe- gation~ ont sOllligne combicn une propagnnde radio- phonique virulente contribuait a accrottre la knsion entre les Etats. Depnis des mois, les moyens de propa- gande dLl Caire et le President cgyptien lui-m~me ont 30. It is vitally urgent fol' the Security Council to impress the United Arab Republic with the g~avity of this position. We have suffered the aggressIOn of 3 December and have co·operated with the United Nations in an effort to bring it to a halt. It is my duty to inform the United Arab Republic that the bombard- ment of Israel villages by Syrian artillery must be regarded as an act of war. How else can such deli- berate bombardment be regarded? We therefore urge the Security Council to induce the United Arab RepUb- lic to look at this sitnation in its true and grave light, and noL in the complacent and mendacious manner of the Cairo broadcasts. In addition to the provisions of the Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement of July 1949, I refer to resolution 1237 (Es.-llI) adopted unanimously by the General Assembly 011 21 Au~ gust 1958. The United Arab Republic was one of the sponsors of this resolution which: "Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the prin- ciples of mutual respect for each other's te1'ritorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual bencflt, and to ensure that their conduct by wOi'd alld deed conforms to these principles." 31. Israel is certain that the Security Council will wish to deal with this problem bdore the chain of vio- lence is renewed and extended. Israel's sole purpose in bringing this item to the Security Council is to ensure that assaults such as those of 3 December shall not be repeated. The Government of tile United Arab RepUb- lic is able, by the exercise of its authority and the issuanee of appropriate orders, to enslU'C this result. Indeed, it is inconceivable that such a heavy and sns- tained artillery bombardment as that conducted by Si~lification encore plus pl'ofonde. Elles signifient que, lom de regretter le bombardement do 3 decembre et de promettre de ne pas recidiver, Le Caire et Damas jubilent et sont lres contents d'eux-mt>mes, Deux nouvelles attaques syriennes se sont produites depuis le 3 decembre, la premiere le 6 decembre, la seconde le 7. L'attitude agrcssive des forces syriennes s'etait deja manifestee par nne longue serie d'attaqueg sur la frontiere, dont l'une avait cause la mort de Mme Doran, femme de l'Attache de l'air britannique en Israel, le 17 novembre. Les ~utorites de la Repu- blique arabe unie semblent s'etre convaincues ~ nOllil ne savons comment - qU'elles peuvent a I'avenir utiliser impunement l'avantage que leur confere la geographie pour attaquer notre peuple et notre terri- 'loire, alors qu'eHes-me-mes demeureraient a J'abri de touies represailles. 30. 11 est indispensable que le Conseil de sccurite fasse comprendre a la Republique arabe unie toute la gravite de J:l situntion. Nous avons subi l'agression du 3 decembre et notls avons coo[lcre avec l'Organi- sation ties Nations Unies pOUl' y metlre fin. J'ai le devoir d'informer la Rcpublique arabe unie que le bombardement des villages israeliens par l'artilterie syrienne doit etre considcre corome un acte de gucrl'e. Comment pourrait-on d'ailleurs voir autre chose dans ce bombardement delibere? Nous demandons par consequent au Conseil de securite de faire en sorte que la. Republique arabe unie voie la situation sous son vrai jour et avec toute sa gravite, au lieu de la voir de la maniere satisfaite dont tcmoignent les emissions mensongeres du Caire. Outre les dispositions de la Charte et les clauses de la Convention d'armistice general de juillet 1949, je veux mentionner la reso- lution 1237 (ESMIII), adoptee a l'unanimite le 21 aout 1958 par l'Assemblee generale. La Republique arabe unie ctait l'un des anteurs de cette resolution, laquelle : « Invite taus les Etats Membres de l'Ol'ganisation des Nations Unies a agir en stricte conformite des principes du respect mutuel de l'integrite territoriale et de la souverainete de chacun, de non-agression, de stricte non-ingerence dans les afIaires interieures de chacun, et d'avantages egaux et mutuels, et a faire en sorte qtle lellr conduite, en paroles et en actes, soit conforme aces principes. )) 31. Israel est convaincll quc le Conseil aUl'a a cceur de s'attaquer au probleme avant que l'enchalnement des violences ne se renollvelle et ne s'etende. Israel a saisi de l'aITaire le Consei] de securite a seule fm de prevenir la repetition d'attaques comme celle du 3 decembre. Le Gouvernement de la Republique arabe unie peut. en exen;:ant son autorite eL en donnallt des ordres appropries, rendre cc resultat possible. Il est d'ailleul's inconcevable qu'un bombardement d'artillcrie aussi intense et prolonge que celui auquel les forces -32. Faced by acts thc continuance or repetition of which would threaten international peace and security, the Government of Israel, strongly desiring the main- tenance and strengthening of peace in the Middle East, turns to the Security Council to ensure an immediate end to such aggressive acts, 32. En presence d'actes dont la persistance mcnaCe la paix et la secUl'ite internationales, le Gouvernemcnt d'Israe1, ardemment dcsireux de l1laintenir et de ren~ forcer la paix au Moyen·Orient, s'adresse au Conseil de securite pour qu'il soit mis fin immediatement a ces actes agressifs, 33. Mr. President, members of the Security Council, it is onr feeling that a responsibility and an opportunity lie in your hands. We confidently hope that by their speeches and their resolution the members of the Security Council will be able effectively to impress the United Arab Republic with the vital necessity of avoiding the recurrence of these grave events, 33, Monsieur le Pl'esident, messieurs les membrcs du COllseil de se.curite, nons avons le sentiment qlle vous avez a la fois le devoir et L'occasion d'agir. Nous esperons l"Jue, par leurs discour:; et la resolution qu'ils udopLeront, les membl"(,;s du COllseil sauront persuadeI' la HepubUque arabe unie qn'eviter ]e retour de ces evenemcnts graves est llne nccessite vitale, 34, M. LOUTFI (Republique al'abe unie) : Le Conseil de securite a ete saisi le jeudi 4 deccmbre 1958, d'llne plainte d'lsrael, que vous avez sous les yeux [5/4123]. pour examiner un acte de gmve agression qui, parait-B. aurait ete commis le 3 dccembre 1958, par les forces armees de la Republiqnc arLbe unie contre le territoire d'Israel dans la region du luc de Honle, dans le nord- est de la Galilec. Dans telte plainte, OIl demandait la convocatioIl c1'urgence du COllsei! de securitc. Heureu- sement, les memures du COnseU ont decide qu'ils n'etaient pas saisis d'une plainte qui presentait un caracLere cl'UJ'gence et n'ont pas estime qu'unc relution immediate du Conseil s'im}losait. 34. Mr, LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (Imnslaled from French): On Thursday, 4 December 1958; the Secu- rity Council was seized of a complablt by Israel, which you have before you /5'/4123], requesting you to con- sider a grave act of nggression allegedly committed on 3 December 1958 by the anned forces of the United Arab RepubliC ngainst Israel territory in the Hnleh area in north-east Galilce, This complaint called for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Fortunately, the members of the Security Council decided that the complaint was not an urgent matter and they did not consider it necessary to call an immediate meeting of the Council, 35. Ce n'est pas la premiere fois qu'Israel utilise le Conseil de securite, la plus haute autorite de l'Organi- sation des Nations Unies, a des lins de propagande tcndancieuse. dans le but de deformer la verite, d'ugiter I'opinion publiqllC, altn de servir des dcss('.ins bien connus. Cette attitude d'Israel ne pellt que porter atteinte all prestige du Conseil. Il aurait mieux vaIn pour Israel, au lieu de venir pretendre qu'il est l'objet d'une ngression grave, de se tenir tranquiJIc et de faire oubher au monde les agressions commises par lui pendant ees dernieres annec.~ - dont l'une n'est pas Iointaine, et VOllS la corrnaissez tOilS. Israel semble oubHer le nombre de fois qu'i! a ete condamne par le COllseil pour ses agressions armees premeditees, En outre, la demande de convocation d'urgence du Conseil ptocMe de la meme iMe, it savoir agiter l'opinion publique et essayer de mOlltrer que nons nous tronvons en face d\m incident tres grave. 3.5. This is not the first time that Israel has used the Security Council, the highest authority of the United Nations, for tendcntious propaganda purposes, in order to distort the truth and stir up public opinion to serve its well-lmown aims, This attitude on the part of Israel can only detract from the Council's prestige. Israel would have been better advised, instead of coming here to claim that it was the victim of a grave aggression, to keep quiet and let the world forget the aggressions which it has itself committed dul'ing the last few years, one of which OCCurred only recently and is familiar to all of you, Israel appears to forget the number of times it has been denounced by the Council for its premeditated acts of anned aggression. Further- more, this request for an urgent meeting of the Council is based on the same policy of stirring up public opinion and attempting to show that a very serious incident has occurred. 36. L'incident du 3 decelObre 1958, qui fait l'objet de la plainte israelienne contenue- dans le dor-ument 5/4.123, et dont Hne version deformee vient de vous 36. The incident of 3 December 1958 which is the subject of the Israel complaint in document S/4123 and of which a distorted version bas been presented to 37. It would be superfluous to mention the long list of complaints already addressed by the authorities of the United Arab Republic to th(O Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission and dealing with specific inci~ dents provoked by unlawful Israel activities, either within tlle demilitarized zones, or on Arab land. We shall spare the Council a detailed listing of these unlawful activities which take muny dilTerent forms: military activities, violations of Syrian air space, presence of Israel police, various forms of trespass on Arab land and property, penetration of !JiC border in the Syrian region, expulsion of the Arab population, etc. 3&. We should. llOwever, like to mention one example as an illustration of this type of activity; fortunately, it appears in the Israel complaint itself, Among the Israel villages which are alleged to have bcen bom- barded by the Syrian artillery, the name of Dardara deserves special comment, This village lies witllin the central demilitarized zone. With its fortifications, trenches and weapons, it now constitutes a starting or termination point for intensive Israel military activities which threaten the entire central demilitarized zone. No military activity whatever is permitted within a demilitarized zone. The existence of a fortified Israel village to which United Nations observers do not have access is, you will admit, a constant violation of the General Armistice Agreement. During the month of September 1958 alone, to mention only one example among many, twenty-four complaints concerning Israel military activities which originated in or tenninated in Dardara were lodged with the Mixed Armistice Com~ mission, 39. As for tlle Israel civilian activities, we have empha- sized on several occasions that these activities have always been accompanied by military activities prohi- bited by the General Armistice Agreement and that, in most cases, they have tended only to provoke incidents which are useful for Israel propaganda purposes or which provide the basis for extravagant Israel claims inspired by an expansioni~t policy. 37, nest superflu de mentionner la loague liste des. plaintes qui ont el6 jusqu'ici adressees par les autoritrs. de la Hepublique arabe unie a la Commission mixte d'armistice syro-israelienne, et qui portent sur des incidents precis provoques par des activites israelielltleS illegale.5, soit Et l'interieur des zones demilitarisees, soit sur des proprietes arabes. Nous ferons grace au Conseil de l'enumeration dCtaillee de ees activites illegales, dont le caractere est assez varie : activites militaires, vio- lations de respace aerien syrien, presence de la police- israelienne, empir,tements de diverses sortes sur des proprietcs el des terres arabes, penetration Et l'intericllr des frontieres de la region syrienne, expulsion de la population arabe, etc. 38. Nous vouurions cependallt citer un seul exemple pour illustrer de telles activites. Cet exemple nous Q lite heureusement foum! par la plainte i.'lraelienne elle- meme. En elIet, parmi les villages israeliens mentionnes dans ladite plainte, et qui auraient lite bombardes par l'artillel'ie syrienne, le nom de Dardara merite un commentaire special, que nous nous empressons de faire. Ce village est situe a l'interieur de la zone demili- tarisee centrale. Ii constitue a l'heure actuelle, de par ses fortifications, ses tranchees et ses armements, un point de depart ou d'aboutissement d'une activite militaire israeIienne intense, qui menace toute la zonc dcmilitarisee centrale. Dans une zone demiIitarisee, ancune activite militaire n'est permise. La presence d'un village israelien forti fie et dont l'acceB est interdit aux observateurs des Nations Unies est, on doit le reconnaltre, ulle violation quotidienne de la Convention d'armistice gl:il1eral. Au cours du seul mois de septembre 1958, pour ne citeI' qu'ull exemple entre hien d'autres, 24 plaintes portrmt sur des activihis militaires israe- liennes, paltant du village de Dardara ou y oboutissaut, ont eM deposees aupres de la CommissiOll mixte d'armis- tice. 39. Quant aux activites civiles israeliennes, nous avons eu l'occasion a plusieurs reprises de sQuligner, d'une part, que ecs activites etaient toujours accompagnces d'activites militaires prohibees par la Convention d'armistice general, et, d'autre part, que ces activites ne tcndaient, dans la plupart des cas, qu'a provoquer des incidents qui s'averent utiles a la propagande isnuilienne ou qui se prop0.'lent d'appuyer des pl'e- 41. We regret having to make our commcnts on this incident when the Ismel-Syrial1' Mix.ed Armbtice Com- mission, Lhe body competent to deal with such matters in the jjr~L instance, lJas not been able to consider il and ascerLain where the blame lies. 42. We have only just received the report of the United Nations Truee Supervision Organization [SI.J124] and I must confess that I have not yet had time to study it. 43. Observons toute.Eois que riell ne fflit defaut a la plainte israelienne contenue dans la lettre {hl 4 decembl'c 1958 et all communique de presse israelien du 5 decembre public it l'Orgaaisatioll des Nations Unies pour produire l'efIet de propagande desire. Ni la mort prcmaturec et regrettable de la femme de I'attache militaire britan~ niquc, ni le labenr salutrtire et pacifique israelien de plusieurs annees l'eduit a nen.lIt, ni Ies enlants israeliens miraculeusement epargnes par les bombardemel1ts de l'artillerie syricnl1c alars qu'Us allaient retrouver leurs parents travnillant aux champs, ne manquent au tableau sa"nmment presente pnr ecs deux documents. ']3. You will note, however, tnat nothing is lacking in the Israel complaint contained in the letter of 4 December 1958 and in the Israel press release of 5 December published at the United Nations to create the desired propaganda e{fect. Neither the premature .and regrettable death of the wife of the British Military Attache, nor the undoing of all the useful and peaceful Israel work of several years, nor the Israeli children miraculously spared by the Syrian artillery bombard- ments as they went to join their parents working in the fields, are missing from the picture cleverly presented by those two documents. 44. A eause du rapport qui vieElt d'etre distrihue. jJ est dilTIcile a nUl delegation d~ prendre reellemeut position sur l'enqtI.He, mais d'aprcs mes renseignemenls, et aprcs un rapide examcn du rapport, le 3 decembre 1058, it 12 ll. 10 (h~llrC' locale), des hCl'gers israe!iclls Se heurLen'.llt ii la population civil~ al'abe et cchangerent des coups de feu avec la police loealc. Sur ccs entrc- faites, lJllC force armec israelienne vinl se joindre aux bergers. Cctte force arm6c israelienne se retiI'a par la suite. L'cchnnge de fen des "rmes legercs en cc premier incident: s'flrrNa a 15 h. 8. Quinze minules apres eel <lrret, les postes de I'armee israeliel111e ouvrirenL le feu de leur artHlcrie sur les villages syriens de Aill Mamoun et de Darbashyia. EI1 legitime defense, I'artillerie syriennc dut riposteI', mnis eUe ne le ilL qu'apres l'ouverturtl du feu pm l'artiLlerie israeIienne. C'~$t la sr.ulc chose que je puis trouver dans ce rapport, pour autant que faie pu l'examiner. II y est dit que l'illi~ wativc de I'action a cle prise par les Israeliens et qu'en legitime uCfense les Syriens Ollt dO. repliquer. C'est ee que je lis au paragraphe 5 dn rapport. Le tir cessa du cote syrien quand l'ordlU de cessez-le-feu donne par l'Organisme des Natiolls Unies charge de la sur- yeillance de la lreve eut ete communique aux autorit~s competenles de la RepubJique arabe unie. 44. In view of the facl that the reporL has just ,been circulated, it is difficult for my delegation to tnl,e a position on the investigation, but, from the information availabl~ Lome, and from a quick glance at the report, it appears that at 12.10 hours (local time) on 3 December 1958, Israeli shepherds clashed with Arab civilians and exchanged shots with the local police. Thereupon, an Israel armed force joined the shepherds; it later withdrew. The exchange of small-arms 1lre during this first incidr-nl stopped at 15.08 hours (local time). Fifteen minutes after this tIring had ended, Israel army posts opened artillery fire on the Syrian villages of Ain MamOlln and Dar~ bashiya. The Syrian artillery had, in self-defence, to return the fire, but it did so only after the Israel artillery had opened fire. That is all I have so far been able to find in this report, It says that Lhe action was initiated by the Israelis and that the Syrians had to retaliate in self-defence. That is what I read in paragraph 5. 'fhe firing from tile Syrian side ended when the cease-fire ordered by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organizatioll had been communicated to the competent authorities of the United Arab Republic. 4,5. Je voudrais egalcment faire observer qlllJ la dele- gation de la Republique arabe unie a In Commission rnixte d'armistice a porte plainte et a demande l'ouver- ture d'une cnqucte sur les divers aspects de ces incidents. D'ailleurs, un incident important s'etait dc.roule le 21 novembre 1958. Quinze soldats armcs iraeliens s'inf1ltrerent a l'intcrieur des terres arabes ~t se heur- terent a la police civile locale, avcc laquelle ils echan- gerent. des coups de feu. Le m<Jrne jour, a 5 h. 42 (heure locale), un peloton arroe isniclien franchit la 45. I should also like to point out that the delegation of the United Arab Republic to the Mixed Armistice Commission lodged a complaint and requested an inves~ tigation of the various aspects of these incidents. Another major incident had occurred on 21 No- vember 1958. Fifteen armed Israeli soldier$ inftl- trated into Arab territory and clashed with the local civil police with whom they exchanged gun-lire. At 05.42 hours (local time) on the same day, an anTIed Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line in front of 42. ;\IOIlS venous mailltenrlllt de reccvoir le rapport de rOrganisme des Nations Unics cllarge de hI. sur- veillance de la treve [8/41241, et je n'"i pas, je l'avoue, l'.U le temps de l'etudier. 46. Israel has circulated here. ai the United Nations, a press release which mentions a broadcast in Hebrew by Radio Cairo. I would like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that the alleged text of the Hebrew broadcast by Radio Cairo to which the Israel press release of 4 December 1958 referred has no basis in fact for the simple reason that no programme in Hebrew was broadcast by Radio t.:uiro 011 4 December. Tll(~ only broadcast made on that date was an Arab-language broadcast, the tenor of which does not correspond to the text of the Israeli press release. ~oreover, the press release itself makes reference to Israel provocations, which sometimes call tor a r~ply. 47. Since we are on tlle subject of radio broadcasts, I should also mention that, in a broadcast by the Israel radio Oil 5 December 1958 and a second })roAf!cast I'lt 13.30 hours on the same day, Mr. Ben Gurion stated that the Israel Army would shortly move towards the Negeb area; he thereby threatened to create a state of tension in tlie Gaza sector. Tllese thrcats announcing Israel troop ffilWp.ments are adequale proof of Israel's aggressive designs and the desire of the Israel alltho- ri-ties to increase tension in that part of the world. 48. The foregoing shows clearly that Israel does not respect the Armistice Agreement signed with Egypt, which Mr. Ben Gurion, incidentaUy, has referred to several times as non-existent. 49. Today, Mr. Eban lla~ used highly provocative words and threatened us with reprisals. This idea originates in the. same instructions from Mr. Ben Gurion. I wish to inform him that the United Arab Republic does not fear Israel reprisals and bat it is prepared to repel any aggreSSion. 50. We are surprised to note that the Security Council has been seized of this matter before the Mixed Armis- tice Commission has had all opportunity to consider it. Under article VII, paragraph 7, of the General Armistice Agreement signed on 20 JUly 1949 between Syria and Israel, it is to that Armistice Commission that complaints of tllis type must be referred. This paragraph reads as follows: 50. Nous sommes surpris de constater que le Conseil de securite a ete saisi de I'aiTaire avant que la Commis- sion mixte d'annistice ait eu la possibilite de l'examiner. EH eITet, conformemcnt flUX dispositions du paragraphe 7 de l'ar~icle VII de la Convention cl'armistice genernl signee le 20 juillel1949 entre la Syric et Israel, c'est a cette commission que des plaintes de Cl". genre doivenl eLre referees. NOlls lisons a ce paragraphe : "Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall he referred immediatelv to the Mixed Armistice Com- mission through its Chairman. The Commission shall tal{(, such action on all such claims or complaints hy means of its observation and illvestigation machinery 40. Israel a distribue ici, a l'Organisation des Nations Unies, un communique de presse dans lequel etait mentionnee une emission emanant de Radio-Le Caire et faite en hebrcu. Jc voudruts attit'cr l'attorrtion des membres du Conseil sur le fait que le pretelldu texte de l'emission en Mbreu de Radio-Le Caire, auquel le communique israiHien du 4 deeembre 1958 fait allusion, est denue de tOllt fondem(mt, pour la simple raison qu'aucune cmissi()n en hebteu n'a He diffusee par la radio du Caire le <1 decembre. La seule emission diftusee a la date indiquee est une emission ell langue arabe dont la teneur ne coincide pas avec Cl". que c()ntient le communique iSl'aelien. D'ailleurs, ce communique lui- ml!me fait all11sinn Hl1X provocations israeliennes. qui demandent quelquefois une reponse. 47. En outre, puisque nous parl()ns d'emissions de radio, je dirai que le 5 dccembre 1958, dans une emission de la radio israelienne, et le meme jour, dans une deuxi~me emission radiodifTusee a I3 h. 30, M. Ben Gurion declara que l'armee israelienne se dirigel'a prochainement vel'S la region du Neguev, et, par cela, il lUenace de crecr un etat de tension dans le secteur de Gaza. Ces declarations mena<;anles annon<;ant des mouvemcnts de troupes isracliens prouvent snUisam- ment les desseins agressifs d'IsraeI et le dlisir des autorites isracliennes de faire monter la tension darn cettc partic du (;10nde. 48. Ce qui precede montl'e clairement qu'Isra~l ne respecte pas la Convention d'al'mistiee signee avec l'Egypte - que, par ailleurs, M. Ben Gurion avait a plnsieu:·s reprises considcree comme non existante. 49. Aujourd'lmi, M. Eb;m luj aussi a prononce des paroles pleines de provocation, et it nous menace de represailles. Cette idee proeMe des memes directives de M. Ben Gm'ion. Je veux lui dire que la Repllblique arabe unie ne craint pas les represames israeJiennes et est pretr.: lJ. rep0ll.sser toute agrcssi()n. « Les reclamaLions 011 les pJaintes pl'csent<tcs par l'une all l'autre partie. rclativement a l'appHcation de la presente Convention, devront etre soumises immedintement a la Commission mixte d'armistice pal' l'intermediaire de son president. La Commission prendra, au sujet de ces rcelamations ou plaintes, .51. This text is perfectly clear and it is for this reason that the United /\rab Republic referred the incident in <{uestion to the Mixed Armistice Commission. 51. Ce textc est tL'CS clair, et C'Gst pour ce motif que .a RepubIique arabe unie a saisi du meme incident la Commission mixte il'arm;stice. 52. Accordingly, there is no doubt that, in bringlng this matter before the Security Council in disregard of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, Israel is seeking only to muke propaganda or is doing so only for reasons of domestic policy into which I do !lot want to venture. 52. Il n'y a pas de doute qu'en portant cette ufJaire au Conseil de securite sans knir compte des dispositions de la Convention d'armistice generlll, ISrll:el ne poursuit quc d\l~ Iml.'.l de propugundc, DU ne le fait que POlll' des motifs de politiqlle intericul'c dans IcsqueIs je ne veux pas m'avclltllrer. 53. De plus, la pratique de Conseil de securite a tou- jours ete d'n.ppuyer la mi,~e en ceuvre de ce textc et de danner a In Commission mixte d'annistice l'oppor- tunitc d'examiner les plaintes de ce genre. En e1et, je vais me permettre de vous citer ce que, au cours d'une discussion all Conscil oil il etait traite de la Commission mL'\:te d'armi~tiee, if' l·('.nrt~:>.t".ntant des Etats-Unis, M. Wadsworth, a declare: - 53. Furthermore, it has always been the Security Council's praGlke to support the application of the Agreement and to give the Mixed Armistice Commis- "5ion an opportunity to consider complaints of this type. I shall take the liberty of quoting a statement made in tIle Security Council by Mr. Wads\V0rth, the United States representative, in wllkh lie referred to the Mixed Armistice Commission: "We cannot stress too frequently or too strongly the importance of the: parties using the ruacllinery available to them for the settlement of their dif.er- eUCles. In our view, the most constructive role the Sewrity Council can play is to empll:lsize tile neces- sity fol' using this machinery, and then to reinforce whatever decisions may result from resort to that machinery." [&84ll1 m('('ling, pl/ra. 1.7.] M. Other Council member3 expressed the same. point of view on that occasion. Tl1is principle has been applied when more important matters, such as tlle complaints of aggression against Gaza, Qibya, Nahhalin, etc., have been discussed in the Council. 55. In conclusion, my delegation cannot conceal its surprise at seeing the Security Council seized of this matter when no decision has been taken by the Mixed Armistice Commis~ion. Israel's tennentious propa- ganda gives this incident proportions which it coes not really have. We hav~ noted, together with the Israel letk.rs, an organized press cD.mpaign which o]so strives, by supporting tlte Israel view, to magnify the illllJurtance of thi5 incident by distorting the facts. Tltis very day tlte Israel delegation held a press con- ference only a few minutes before presenting its case to the Security CounciL. Photographs were even produced. We would have preferred Israel to have given the United Nations ubservers jJermis~ion to visit the arcas in person so tlIat they could lcll us what actually happened. For us these photographs are meaningless. Above all, I fuil to understand how Israel, which bas been condemned by tlle Security Council for very grave acts of aggression in whlch many 11111Uall lives were unfortunately lost, thinks that it can come and present tlus complaint 'iil'ectly to the Security Council today. <l Nons ne: saurions rappeler trap frequemmeltt ou trop fermement que les plllties doivcnt avoir recours, pour regler kIrs diITerends, aux instances misr.s a lem disposition. A llotre uvis, l~ rl'lh: le plus construetif que le Conscil de ~ccllrite puissc jouer est de rappcler qu'il est neces8aire de l'ecourir a ees instances et d'appuycr de son autoritc les decisions qui pourraiellt etre prises u cette occasion. )) [684- seance, par. 11.] 54. D'alltres memhres du Conscil, it cette occa5.ion, ont exprime le meme point de VIIC. Ce principe a ete mis en ceuvrr. quand des questbns plus importaatcs ant ete discu16cs au Conscil, comme les plaintes Concer~ nunt les o.grcllsions contre Gaza, Qihyn, Nnll:Hl.lin, etc. 55. En. condusion, l:1a delegation ne peut cacher sa surpri:se de vnil' le Conscil de securite saisi de cette question sall.'> qu'f1ucune decision nit cite plisc pat· la Commission mixte d'armistice. La propagande tendan- dense d'!sraiH donne a eet incident une proportion qu'il est loin d'avoir. Nons avons COllstate, a c{)tI~ des kttrcs israeliennes, line earnpagne de pressc organisee qui essaie aussi, en soutenant le point de vue israeliell, (1('. dOllner a eet incident line trcs gnmde importance, et cela en dcformnnt les faits. La delegation d'Israel vicnt, aujourd'hui 1l1~me, de tenir llne eonierence de presse, quelques mimltes avant de wumeUre sa these an COllsei] de sliCllrite. Des pl10toS ont mClll€ etl! pro- duites. Nous :mrion~ prefere qu'Israel donne nux observateurs des Nations Unies l'aulorisation de visiter eux-m(~mes ccs localites a.nn de p(lliVOir nOllS dire ce qui s'est vrniment passe. Pour nous, ces photo, ne signiilent den. Ce qui, surtout, me dripasse, c'est qu'Isracl qui a He conrl8mne par le COllseil de sricuritc pour des actes d'agression tres graves, ou 011 tl eu a de}lorer de !lombreuses pertes de vies humaines - pensc pouvoir venir anjourd'hui presenter directemen.t lei cette pl<linLe an Conseil de secudte. 56. I ghould simply like to recall sev('!ral incidents which occurred, in violation not only of the Armistice Agreement, but o.lso of tl1e United Nations Charter. 5G. Je voudrais seukment rappeler quelques lllciLienLs qut sont survenus, eL qui etajent en VlDlation non seulement des conventions d'amtisllce mais aussi de .. Expresses its grave concern at the fnilure of the Goyernment of Israel to comply with its obligations; " Calls upon the Governmcnt of Israel to do so ill the future, in default of whicll the Council will have to consider w]lal further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace." 57. Finally, I should like to recall that the Arab countries have never been denounced by the Security Council for violations 01 the armistice agreements and that Israel, although frequently denounced, con- tinues to follow its aggressive atld expansionist policy, which threatens peace and security in that part of the world. 58. If peace and security are to prevail there, the provisions of the armistice agreements must be imple- mented. We, for our part, shall continue to implement them.

I do not donbt that members of the Security Council will wish to take under careful study the complaint that has been put before them. The observations of the representative of the United Arab Republic do, however, require one brief word of clarLfication and reply. 60. In the course of his long address the representative of the United Arab Republic hl1s not denied or attempted c~lllmlse pa!' I~r~rJ sur la .frontiere syrienne pres de El I-Iulfl, <[Ill a ete condamnee par le Conseil de securite le 18 mai 1951 [5/21.57J. Le massacre dc Qibya est encore prcseut a to\]te;; les mellloircs. Ceite agresslon contre Qibya a elc condan1llcc par le Conseil de secmite par sa nfsolutioll du 24 novembre 1953 [S/3139/Hev, 2) cc qui n'a pas empeche qu'l1ne nulre agrcssion, qui; pris les memcs proportions de brutalit6 et de violencl' ait lieu les 28 et 29 mars 1D54 conhe le village u~ Nahhalin. On se souvient, ensuite, de l'ngl'ession contre Gaza du 28 fcvrier 1955, qui 0. etl!; condo.mnec pfll'le Conseil le 28 mars de la meme annee [S/3378]. et 0(1 la Commission mix:le d'armistice a reconnu que cetlc attaque prnmeditee avait ete organisee par les atltoriles israelienllcs. .Te ne veux pas m'etendrc sm ]'agression coutre I'Egyptc survenue en octobre 1956, car lrs membres du Conseil en connaissent tous les dctnils Je voudrais seulclllent rappelel' l'agression armL~ pl'cmeditee commise contre la Syric le 11 deccmhrc 1955 dans la region du lflc de TiberinJe, et qui a ct6 consideree par le Conseil comme une violation flagrante des termes de la Convention d'annistice general syrotsraelienlle, (C'esl ceUe meme convention que, pretend Israel, nOlls vcnons de violcr, avec un incident auqllcl, en deformant les fails, ;yr. Eban essaie dc donner UIl!} grnnde importance, snns meme altcndrc la decision de la Commission mix:te d'a1'lllistice.) Cetie agression du lac de Tibcriade, ainsi gU'OH le sait, a fait plus de 50 morts du c6te syrien. Aussi le Conseil de securite a+il du, dans la resolution gn'il a adoptee le 19 jallvicr 1956 [S/3538], dire ce qui suit: « Exprime la serieuse inquietude qu'il ressent devanl les manqucments d'lsrueI a ses obligations; «Invite le Gouvernement d'lsrael n y satisfairc dans l'avenir, faute de <[uoi le Conseil envisagera leg mesures ultericures, dans le cadre de la Charte, propres a mailltenir Oil a retablir la paix. » 57. Je voudrais rappeler, en conClusion, que leg pays arabes n'ont jamais eLe condamnes par le Conseil de secllrite pour des violations aux conventions d'armistice, et qu'lsrael, malgre de nombreuses condamnatiolls, poursnit sa politiquc agrcssive et expansionniste, qui porte atteinte a la paix et ;\ la securtte dans cettc partie dn monde. 58. Si on veut que regnent la paix et la securite clans cette region dll monde, II fnut que les dispositions des conventions d'armistice soient mises en reuvre. Ponf notre part, nous continuerons a le fa ire, 59. M, EBAN (Israel) [lrauuit de l'anglais] : Je sni~ sur que les membrcs du ConseU de secmite voudronl etudicr soigneusement la plainte qui 'Vient de lellr etre soumise. Les observations du representant de la Republique arabe unie appellent ccpendant certnillS commentaires et eclnircissemellts, 60. Dans sa longue declflratioll. le representant de)a Repubhque ambe unie 11'a paR lIie .- (..1; n'a pa5 tent6 'G1. The view that he has expressed appears to be that, in order to uphold the armistice provisions, and ,especially to ensUI'e the demilitarized cllameter of Dardara, it is necessary and justified to shower that village .and other villages with hundreds of shells. Because the Government of the United Arab Republic has some juridical theory about this village, it feels entitled to ·open fire from many guns and to shower shells and mortar bombs and ammunition from recoilless guns upon these seven villages. '62. The only other point that emerges with clarity from his address is that the United Arab Republic con- 'siders that events which he deems to have occurred in 1955 and in 1956 justify his Government in bombard~ ing seven Israel villages on 3 December 1958. I Jihould like to point out that the complete absence of relevance or of truth or of any statement of peaceful intention in that address mWjt deepen the anxiety which attends this discussion. 63. My only other c()mment at this stage is to soy that we have had an opportunity of studying the report presented by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. It hears out every single one of the salient features in the development of tbi:l situation which I have submittco to the Sccurity Council. 64. Paragraph 3 of this reporL confirms that the firsL use of fire was 011 tile Syrian side: "At approximately 12.10 hours (local timc), Israeli shepllerds and a herd were SCCll at approxi~ mately fiOO to 600 mctres cast of the United Nations obsen-alion posts /.. ,] in Israeli-controlled territory. A, few minutes later, small-arms fire was opened from the Syriall side, and one shepherd was wouncled. The other shepherds started to pull back wcstwards, but were pinned dowr: by Syrian fire when trying to remove che wounded man [...1 Throughout this firsl stage, the opet'ations officer of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission was in continuous contact with the Syrian delegate, endeavouring to stop the shooting." [8/4124, para, 3.] 65. I am forced to wonder whether the representative of the United Arab Hepublic has received a copy of the same United Nations Truce Supervision Organization report as that which lies before my delegation. 66. Similarly, paragraph 5 or the report fUlly conftrms the account that I gave of Israeli shepherds being pinned down by Syrian ftre in that area, and it also confirms the fact of the bombardment: "The Syrians [, ..] answered with the same type of fire and shelled the following villages: J-Iulata [, . ,] Khoury Farm [, . .] Shamir [...] Dardara Farm [...] 61. 11 semhle l'essortir de ~a declaration que, pour mettre ell ceuvre les clauses de l'armistice, et en parti~ culier pour assurer la demilitarisation de Darclarll, it esL necessaire et juste de lJeverser des ccntaines d'abus sur Cl". village et d'auhes villages, Prtrce que le Gouvcrnement dc la Hepublique arabe ullic a echaf:mde une certaine theorie j uridiquc uu sujet de cc: village, il estime avoir le droit de declenchcr un barrage d'artillerie et de deverser dcs obus, des bombes de lllortiers et des projectiles de canons sans l'celll sur ces sept yillflges. 62, Le seut autre point qui se degage elairement du diseours du representant de la Republiqlle arabe unin est le suivant : III Rcpubliqne urabe unie considere que certains evenements Sllrvenus selon cUe en 1955 et en 1956 tienaent lieLl de justification a son gOllvernement P0lll' le bombardement de sept villages israeliens le 3 decembre 1958, Je tiells a dire que I'absence nbsolue de toute pCltincnce, de toute verite, de toute declaration d'intentions paeiftques dnns le discour.., que nous venom d'entendre ne peut qu'uugmenter notre anxiete. 63. A Ce stade du debat, je me contenterai d'ajouter que nous avans pu ctlHlier le rapport I'cdige par le Chef d'ctat~major dc l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la tr~ve. Cc rapport corrobore ehacune des pril1cipales observations que j'ai fOl'lnulces qllant a In succession des faits. 64. Le paragnlplie 3 de ce docnment confirmc que c'csL dn cClLe syrien qtlC les premiers coups de feu ont 6t6 tires : ~ Vel's 12 h. 10 (hemc locale), dtS bouvicrs isracliens ayec Jeur trol1PC~ll ant 6t6 VllS a cnviron ;;00 on GOO mdll'.S it l'est ,Ill poste d'obscrvatioll des Nntions Ullies [...], en territoire israelien. Quelques minntes plus Lard, un tir {le mOllsqnctl'.l'ie a ete declenche dn cMe syrien et l'un des houviers a ete blcssc. Lcs antres ont commence a se rctirer vers l'ouesL, muis ont cite immobilises par le feu syrien lorsqu'i!s c!isayaient de I'amasser le blesse [... ). Pcndant tOllte cette premiere phase, 1'0 flicier charge des operations de la Commission nJixte d'armistice syro-israelienne est reste en contact permanent avec le dc16gue syrien pour essayel' de faire cesser le feu. '! 18/4124, par. 3·1 65. Je sllis amene a me demander si le representant de la Republique aralJe Ilnie a. re~l1 un exemplaire du rapport de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve que j'ai eutre les mains. fiG. De l11!mc, le paragl'aphe 5 du l'npport appuie entierement cc que j'ai dit au sl1jet dc !'immobilisation des bergers israeliens du fait du feu syrien dans cc sectellr; il confirme egalement le fait du bombardement: '( Les Syriens ant [.•.] riposte et bombarde les villnges suivants : Hulata [...1, la ferme de Khoury (...], Shrunir [...], la ferme de Dardara [...], Lahavot 68. The report also beal's out tlle point that, after the establishment of the cease-fire, it was violated on the Syrian side. The reference is to paragraph 7: "The Israelis did not fire after 17,00 hours, On the Syrian side small-arms fire again broke out [...1." (Ibid., para. 7.J 69. In respect of the Israeli action, paragraph 5 confirms the account that I gave to the Security Council, namely, that the only Israeli heavy fire was directed, in the words of lhe Truce Supervision Organization report, .. towards Syrian positions at Darbashlya and Jalabina" -- after the initiation of this conflict by Syrian forces as described in paragraph 3. 70. On the othe.r hand, in paragraph 13 of the report, the United Nations observers fully bear out the result of the investigation on the Israeli gide, while they say that on the Syrian side there were no significant tracks of men or cattle found. hl other words. they reject the evidence on which the Syrian complaint Wll..-; founded. 71. Therefore, whatever our interest is in the history which the representative of the United Arab Republic has brought before tile Security Council, I would urgein all solemnity that what stands for illternationnl discussion and judgement is the action on 3 December, beginning with the attaek on Israeli civilians of Gonen, and culminating in thig violent artillery bombardment, a bombardment which falls jar outside the scope and the range of any local skirmish, ana which bears the classic impress of a characteristic act of war. 11lose are the events which lie before the Security Council. They are confirmed by the report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. They are in no sense undermined by the 11istorical irrelevancies to which wc IL'lve just listened. 72, And gravest of all, in the course of this debate so far, is the absence of any hint of asurance from the United Arab Republic tl1at irrespective of its view on the past, it will abstain from such artillery bombardments in the future,

I have no intention today of discussing with 1'11'. Eban the report which has just been circulated and which requires some study. However, Mr. Eban has alleged that I said something which I did not say. I never said that Syrian artillery had bombarded localities in Israel. I said that Syrian artillery llad replied to Israel artillery fire. That is an entirely aifTerent thing. The responsibility for an action certainly rests with the party which began it. bles~e) ". 68. Le rapport conflrme egale1l1ent que lorsqu'un cessez-lc-fcu eut ctc decide, i1 a ete viol~ du cote syriclI. Je citerai a cc sujet le pamgraphe 7 : «Les IsraeIicns n'ollt pas tin~ apres 17 heurlJll. Du cOte syricn, un tir de mousqueterie a de nouveau eclale [...]. I1 [ibid., par. 7.] 69. En ce qui concerne I'attitude israelienne, le paragraphc 5 confirme cc que j'ai dit au Conseil de sccurite. a savoir que le seul feu concentre des Israeliens !I He dirige, aux termes memes du rapport de l'Org,mismc charge de la surveillance de la treve, «( sur les posjtjon~ sYl'iennes de DariJashiya et de Jalabina » - apr~ que les Syriens eurcnt Mclenche I'incident de la mnnihe rappelee all paragrnphc 3. 70. D'autre part, au paragraphe 13 du rapport, lcs observaLeurs des Nations Unies ronfirment absolumellt les resultats de l'enquete menee par Israel, en dis[lIlt que, dLl cot{~ syrien, its n'ont trouve aucune truce discemable du passage d'hommes (lU d'animaux. En d'autres termes, its rejettent cc qui fonnait la base de la plainte syriellne. 71. Par consequent, qllelque intcret que plLissc presenter l'!!istorique que vient de faire devant le Causeil le rcpresentant de la Republique arahe nnie, j'affirme solenncllement que cc qui est soumis a l'examen et au jllgement de I'Organisatioll interuationale est I'incident dn 3 decembre, qui a commence par J'attaque dirigec contre des civils israeliens a Goncn et a atteint son point culminani avec tin violent bombardement d'm'titlerie - bombardement qui a eu beaucoup plus d'amplcur qu'uu engagement local et parte la marque classiqlle d'un acte de guerre caractcrise. Tels sont les cvrnemellts dont le Conseil de securite est saisi, et qu'atteste le rapport de I'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve. Les digressions historiqucs que nous venons d'enlclldre n'en diminuent. nullcment la porMe. 72. Enl1n, et ceci est plus grave encore, dans tontc la discussioll qui vient de se derouler, nOIlS n'aVOM rien entendn qui indique ou assure que la Republiqut: ambe unie, quelIes que soient ses idees sur le passe. s'abstiendra n l'avenir de tous bombardements de ce genre. 73. M. LOUTFI (Republique arabe unie) : Je n'oi pas dn tont l'intention de discuter, aujourd'hui, ave~ tlL Eban du rapport qui \-1ent d'etre distribue et qui demnnde une certaine etude. Mai:; M. Eban me fait dire \lne chose que je n'ni pflS dite. Jc n'ai jamais dit que I'artillerie syrienne avait bombarde des localites israeliennes. J'ai dit que l'artillerie syrienne avait repondll au tir de I'artillerie israelienlle. 11 y a unc grosse difTerence. Les respollsabilites incombent certainemcllt a qui commence. 75. The time and. date for the next meeting will be announced hy the Presid.ent of the Security Council., after consultation with those concerned. 75. La dah-, et l'heure de la prochaine seance seront annoncees par le President du Conseil de securite, apres consultation des interesses. La seance cst [cuee a 18 h. 26. 1~.~3, Gu.'.",ol. CIIy. HAITI LI.,.id. " I. C.,."II.... J.~. po".I. 111·S. P.If ·Pd,,,. HOriWR"'S lIb,,,I. h,.",,",""", T.G.".ol~. IIONG KotIG·1I0NG·KOIlG Th. S~T"d•• loo. Co" ~~ Na'~•• R,,,d. K....loo•. IClLANO.ISLANOI Sat""."l,. 11.1"., f,",".d"a,or N. f., A.'lu"" •• ~ ID. ~""I..I1,. INO'...·INOE 0,1••1long""''', 1;.1,""., Do."boy, Mo· d.." N.w O.IM .. H.d.,.ba', Oxfo,d 5..... 1,.110••,. C•.• N.w D.I),1 11, C.I,a~o. ,. Y.,.d.,h.,y 11, Co.• M.d,.,. IIlDOHElI....INDDNElIE P."'.o"G.n"". lid., 00,0," S.h.,1 a~, ,,,~. 110... ~..~,h.p....."'<. N,,..,.po" • f Coyl,., P.O. I•• 244. C.l.mbo. CHlli·CHItI Edll.,I.1 d,l, ""<IfI,., Ahom.d. ffl, S••tlog•. lIb,.,lo I...,. CoJII. 2nJ, SanlT.go. CHINl-l:HlNi Tno Wo,ld lool: Co.. ltd.. ~ ehuog King R••d. 101 5.<1'." T.lp.h, Tol..o•• Th. "01",.,01.1 P,.". Lld. 211 H••an lid .. Sn.,ghaT. Dlok.~o. I_AN "C;.IIy", 411 ,.,,j.w,1 ......"., T."',,",. IIlAO.IRAlC M.,k••d.', Aoo\,~.p, .~gbd.d. IRHAND-IRlAND! St"II•••'1' 0'11.., D••II•. 15RAfl Slum",I.'. Soo....,.,. 35 ....1I.,by Rd. and ~B N..hl., ,",1.",1. l'•• T.I ....iv. rrAIY.ITA1IE lI'o..,I. C.....I..I.,.<1. So._I, VJa GI•• C.P!"'.I 20. fllO.,", &, Y1~ O. A. A,"nl 1".... R..... 1...' ...N,J...PON Mo,"", C."'p.'y. llel., 6 T.<I.NI<l•• ~,. Nlho.b.,h!, T.'y•. JORDAN.)ORllANIE J'..ph I. I....", &. C•.• 00,...1-1(.,,1:>. So, a<l, "'Mm,,". KOR!"'-CORli f.l-Y"" Publl.~\.~ C•.• Lld.• 5, 2.k.... Ch.,""". 5...1. tn"'NON-LIIAH k),a••I'. C~II.~. ""'.. Co.~".,r.. CO~OMBlA·COlOMB!' L1b...I. a.,h~.I., llagol&. 11\,,,,,1. ",,,,.1'1'•• M.d.llln. \lb,.rlo No,10,.I, Ltdo" lla"."q.Wa. eOSPA RICA Imp,..lo ~ Ub,o<lo T,.r.', ......,lod. 1313, Soo Ja". C'-a.-. l. C.,. 1.lg•• O·R.llly ~55, lo H.b.... CZiCH05LClVAKIA_TCHECOSlOVAQUIE e:."ollavoo,~; 5pl...ol.l. Na,.d,1 #lda 9, P,.h. 1. OINMAU·DANfl<\",RK El••• Mu'''U••,d. Lld.. N~,IoG.d. 6. Kfb.,h.\'II, K. I>OMINICAN RliPUIUC- REPUIlIOUE DOMINlo:AlIU lib,.,). 0.011.1,",•• M"'.~" ~~, Cl.· dad T,.lm., ECUADO~_~UATtUR Llb,.". CI."lln,o, C;.'y.q"'1 .. Go"". n SAtVAIlOR·I...W ...llOR Ma,u.1 Na,a, 1 Cl••• 1.........,Ido '"' 37. Son S.I..d." ETHIDPI..._ETHlO,IE 1".,oall","ol P.... .l;'.<Y' r.o. Ba. 120, Addl' Ab•••• fINUlNJ).fII'lUNDE Ako,....I••• Kh\.~o"ppa,2 K.,k••kolu, lI.hl.kl. fRANCE 92·9~. ru. 511.., ~.I,,'. '.IBERIA J. Momalu Kamo'o, Mo"."•. lU)L:EH.BOUAG Ub,al,l. J. 5,h".. ~.,. l".",ba.'G' M1XICO.MEJ:lllUe Idll"I.1 H.,..,~ U, IGnocl. Mo,I".1 ~1, Mhl",. D.F. MOROC:CO.""-'UOe 5u,.... d"'od" .1 d. pallldpotl." Ind""d.II.,. g, '0' Mlcllaox·B.llalro. Rabal. HErH ER I'" NDl-P",VI,IAS N.V. Monl." Ntlh.lf. lo.go V••,h.ul ~dltlon' A, "d.ft., l~, ,••. SoVffJoI, P.,I. (V.). OIRMANY.....lltMAGNE ~. EI>,n"hmld~, S<~wCCIII"'I.. SI,.". '9, F,••kFu,t/MaI•• 1I-"." &, M.u,." H~,p!o".'" lQl, I.,llo.!.U".bo,g. .o.1....d., !l.,n. Sptog.I..... g, 11'1... ~, ·~G,·,,"~.g·, NIW n""ANO·HoUV&!E.ZlLANDE U.It" N"l1.", Alla,I"llon.r N,w Z,.· I.,d. C.P,O. 1011, W,II1,.'.". NoRWAY·NORVEG' Jah.. G".dl Too.m f.d'g, ~" .... 1I.,I'lI'. 7A, 0.10, ~.o••. W. E. S••,ba.h, G.If'ud.......... ~D. ~ar. 1\1. 0,<1." 0'. I,,~"J,I., 'rom ••uM,I.. ..ho" ,.1" .go". ~"'" n.' yot b••., o~p.J.,"d ~.y l>o '"., ,., 50'" .0. C:".lolI•• S.clfo., 1I011.d N"Io." N.w Vo,l, tI.S.A" " Sol., 5",1••• Lt.II.<I 101.11••, om". ,.101, <I., Noli.", G,.",o, Swll..,I••d. SPAIN.ESPA~l tlbrorlo Bo..h, 11 Ro.d. Unl....,old.d, Bo".I,,"". lIb..rI. Mu.dl.r'...... C••,.1I.37, Mo_ drld• SW'DEN·SUEDE C. ~' f,a,,', Ku"g!. Ho.b.kh••d.1 A.B, ,..d.o.'"" 7, S"',khol",. SWlTlIRLAND-5UrSlE lIb"hl. 'oy.t, S."'., la.",,"", o..,,~•. Ho" R.unho,dt, KI"hgo". 17, ZDrI,b 1. T~"'I\"'Kn.'H"'llANDE P,o""on MI'. L,d •• ~5 "0"0_, ~.od. W., T,I. ~"'G"ok. TLlRKfY.TUIOllIE Ilb,olrl. Hod,,'.., .M? "lIkl.1 Caddod. hyogl•• '''a.bal. UNION OF SOUTH ARUC.... UNiON SUO.AfRICAINt V.o s<n.lk·. ~.otd.,. IPIy.), lid.. e.. 1l~. P'.'o>la. UNiON 0' SOVIET SOCI...Uff ~IPUBIIC$oUN!ON DES RFPUIl.1QUES 10a...L1STES SOVIETIOUEl Mo"d••o,.dnayo Knyl.a. S"",I•••~oy. PI.,h,h.d. M.,.... UNtllD ARAB REPUBLIC. ~EfUBI\QUE "'RABE UNII lIb'olrl. ··L. R.,a!l"'o," d'Egyp'o", 9 Sh. A,Hy Po,~o. CoT.a. UNITED K1NGOOM-ROYAU....E.UNI H. M. 510110••" off"., P.O. Do. ~69. Lood." S.~I. UNITED STATU OF ...MUlo:A· ET...rs·UNIS D·...MIAIQ.UE 1.1.,••01.,.1 D."",••" S."'l«, e.laM· bl. U"I.o"Uy P,.... '9~n a...d"oy, Now Y.,k 27, N, ,. URUGU...' A.p''''.'.<l60 d. Edlto,I.lo.. P",F. 11. O·II!•• Plo•• c.Goo,h. 13~2. I" gl"', M,.,..ld••• VI"nUELa. lIb"rI, d,1 I"., A•. MI,••d•• No. 52. Idl. Gollp6n. C.,.,o,. VIET.N",,,, lIb,."I•.pn.,,,,I. J(.~" Tha, 18!. ,•• T•.ll•• S.'. 21l, Sai••". YUDOI'AVIA·YOUGOSLAVII Cont.,I••• Z.I.tbo, LI,bl~.a,SI•••ola, 0,;.,... p(O.".t.. J.g.,I.......ko K.jlg•• To,••ll' 27/11, eootl",d. P..,.I.'., 5, T,g B'ol...... I J.dl,,"'a. IoG",b. 100Rll t.. 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