S/PV.847 Security Council

Before entering upon the business of the day, 1 should like to paya tribute ta the retiring President, Alilbassaù;.)r Bérard, the representative of France. He has been amongst us for a comparatively short time and has already shawn eloquence, clarity and ability in presiding at the Councn's last meeting. 1 believe that 1 speak for all of us when 1 say that he has our congratulations and deep appreciation. 1 was not present at the last meeting, and 1wish to take this occasionta express ta Ambassador Bérard, with whom 1have hadthe pleasure of being associated in the past, my personal wishes for a most successful mission in this Councn. It is especially fortunate that the COlmcn will have the benefit of his wisdom and well known experience in international affairs.

Mr. President, 1 should like ta say a few words to express my gratitude for the very kind remarks you have just made about me. These remarks were far too laudatory and were, 1 suspect, inspired as much by friendship as by truth. 1 should like ta tell you tao how gratified 1 am that a meeting of the Counci! as important as today's will be presidedoverbya persan of your standing. 1 have known you for a long time and have thus had ample opportunity to appreciate your intelligence and wide experience which will be of great value ta the Councn in the work it is called upon to undertake. 1 feel certain 1 am speaking for an the members of the Counci! when 1 express my gratification that you are presiding at this meeting.

The first business before the Council is the adoption of the provisional agenda [S/Agenda/847]. Before proceeding to it, 1 should like to make a brief statement. 5. In convening this meeting of the Security Council, 1 took into consideratior. various elements which seemed to me of paramount importance in this issue. My request is based on rule 1 ofthe ,t1rovisional rules of procedure of the Security Council which enables the President to undertake sllch a step "at any time he deeros necessary". It seems to me that the necessity for such a meeting clearly arises out of the foll~wingfacts. 6. There was first a letter ajdressed to me, on behalf ofthe Secretary-General, containingthe suggestion to initiate consultations with the representatives of the Governments of Council members regarding a message dated 4 September, 1959 (S/4212] addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, regarding certain developments in tbat country and calling for prompt action by the United Nations. The consultations which ensued from such a "uggestion showed that the overwhelming rnajority of the members ofthe Security Council concurrerl in the view that to holdthe meeting would be advisable. 7. In the second place, in a subsequent letter dated 5 September [S/4213], the Secretary-C"l€neral requested me to c'"'nvenE: urgently the Security Council for the consideration of tte item entitled "Report by the Secretary-General on the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affair!'J of the Royal Government of Laos, transmitted by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations, 4 September 1959". 8. The result of my consultations and the formaI request by the Secretary-General have convinced me that the convening of the Council was in Une with the provisions contained ln rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure. 9. 1 should like to add at this point that, having just received a message from the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 1 deemed it opportune to have it distributed for the information of members. 10. BefOTe proceeding to the adoption of the agenda, 1 give the fIoor to the Secretary-General who wishes to make a brief explanatory statement.

ln asking for the inscription on the agenda of the item entitled "Report by the Secretary-General on the letter re0eived from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, transmitted by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations, 4 September 1959", 1 have based my action on a practice which has developed over the years in the Security Council. According to this practice, the Secretary-General, when he requests it, is grantedthe fIoor in the Council in order to make such statements 12. What 1 said should be enough to clarifythe constltuUonal situation when, in thts case, 1 have asked for an opportunity to report to the Council. It snould, thus, be clear that the request is not based on the explbit rights granted to the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter. li it hadbeen sa based, the Councn, undel' rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure, would not have been free ta refuse the Secretary- General to address it-as it is now free to do-and it would have meant the insc:ription by the 8ecretary- General of a substantive issue on the agenda. In this latter respect it would necessarily also have involved a judgement as to facts for which, in the present situation, 1 have not a sufficient basis. 13. 1 add these words of explanation to my request to the Council to be permitted to address it ora11y on the rnes~age received from the Government of Laos. 14. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) :Before commentingon the inclusion in the agenda of the item which has been proposed by the Secretary-General and which appears in the provisional agenda, 1 should like to draw the attention of the President and of the othor members of the Council ta what 1 regard as a number of irregularities in the convening of today's meeting of the CouncU-irregularities of a procedural nature. 15. Firstly, there is the question of the provisional agenda. It is proposed inthe provisional agenda that we should hear a report by th~ Secretary-General on the letter received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, tl.'ansmitted on 4 September 1959 by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations. Rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council states inter alla: "Only items which have been brought ta the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items coveredby rule ID, or matters which the Security Council has previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda." 16. Let us deal with this question by a process of elimination. In the first place, this is not a matter wh!.ch the Security Council has previously considered. Thus, the third category of items does not apply. In the second place, it is not an item covered by rule ID, because that rule also provides for inclusion, in this case automatic, of items previously considered bythe Security Council. In other words, under rule 6, the Secretuy-General shall bring to the attention of aU representatives matters for the consideration of the Security Council. But li we read the relevant note of 4 September 1959 from the Permanent Representative of Laos, which has been circulateà to us, we find no indication that the Government of Laos i5 submitting the matter for the consideration of the Security Counci!. Therefore, the Secretary-General's l\1tter would not seem to be covered by the procedure laid down in rule 6. 18. Adrnittedly, the Secretary-General is himself entitled to bring any matter to the attention of the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter. But we have just heard the Secretary-General etate that he doee not propose to do this, that he is not submitting the question raised in the Laotian representative's note for the consideration of the Security Council on the basis of Article 99 of the Chllrter. He has said that he is not submitting the question. 19. What then is the position? The Government of Laos is not submitting the question to the Security Council nor is the Secretary-General doing so on the strength of the rights gTanted to him by the Charter. Who then i8 submitting the question? It is nevertheless the Secretary-General. That is quite cIeal'. It is true that the Secretary-General is entitled to make communications ta the Security Council, andwe are always glad to hear such communications. The Soviet delegation is the first to acknowledge the Secretary-General's rights in this respect. The range of questions on which the S.ecretary-General may address the Security Council is, however, specüicaUy limited by rule 22 of the Council's rules of procedure. This rule reads as follows: "The Sscretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it." 1 stress the final phrase: "any question under consideration by it". But the question which we are proposing to deal with today 18 notyetunder consideration by the Security Council and consequently rule 22 is not flllly applicable in this case. 20. The President has just told us that he convened this meeting of the Council under rule 1 of the rules of procedure, which reads as follows: "Meetings of the Security Council shaU, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days." 21. 1 have discussed the matter at such lengthbecause this meeting of the Security Council has been convened as a matter of urgency. Hence great importance attaches te' it, as it does to every meeting of the Security Council, and it would therefore seem particularly dp.- sirable that in this instance, there should be strict complia..nce with aIl the Council's rules of procedure, which we have drawn up with such ca.re and by which our work is governed. 22. 1 am forced to state that this meeting ci the Security Council has been convened in violation of the rules of procedure. The Soviet delegation does not understand why this had to be done. It does not see why it was necessary to caU a meetingof the Security Council in violation 01 the rules of procedure. 23. 1 have already e;tplained the grounds for this view and should like to receive an explanation, If that iE possible, on the matter Ihave just raised. 1 reserve tho right to speak further on the item of the adoption of the agenda.

1 should liketo say a fewwords in replytothe questions addressed, 1 think, to t le President and ta me regarding the procedural situation. 1 shall naturally limit myselfto the questions whicl! refer directly to me. 25. The l'epresentative of the Soviet Union referredto rule 6 of the rules of procedure and, with the President's permission, 1 should like ta read out that rule again: "The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Councn all communications from Stat'ils, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council ...". "... or the Secretary-General": 1 emphasize those words. In this case, 1 have received a message which ends by asking the Secretary-General to apply the appropriate procedure to the request ofthe Government of Laos. 1 may later have a word to say about that. But the message from the Government of Laos containirig that request, combined with my letter to the President containing the request for a meeting, constitute the full documentation for this question, a11 communications which are relevant under rule 6- and they have been duly brought to the attention of the Security Council. 26. The representative orthe Soviet Union likewise referred to rule 22, which reads: "l'he Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Counoil concerning Ilny question under consideration by it." As 1 think is clear from my initial statement, 1 do not request the right to make a statenient to the Security 28. My responsibility in the present picture Is two-fold. One is to caU the meeting and the second is te approve the provisional agenda drawn up by the Secretary-General. 1 will take the seccnd question fir::lt. On this question the Secretary-General has already ldven expIe"'lations concerninghis responsibility. 1 sh'.Juld like to add a few words concerning my responsibility. 29. The representative of the Soviet Union has considered that rule 6 of the rules ofprocedure could not apply to the case in question because there is no request by astate to convene the Council. Rule 6 states: "The Secretary-General shaU immedhtely bring to the attention of aU representatives on the Security Council aU communications from states, organs of the United Nations, or the Becretary-General concerning any mattor for the consideration of the Security Counc,l in accoïdance with the provisions of the Charter. " Rule 6 clearly speaks of communications from States and not of formaI requests from those states in order to have the Council convened. Consequently, lconsider that the requirements of rule 6 have been fully taken into consideration in convening the Council and in establishing the provisional agenda. 30. Taking the other responsibility of mine, that of convening the Counon, 1 should like to go back to my statement in which 1 made it clear that my request was based on rule 1 and not on rule 2 or 3 of the rules of procedure, as has been mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union. My request was based on a rule which, in my opinion and according to my judgement, and to the literaI intel1Jretation ofthe rule, gives to the President ofthe Security Council complete discretion in caUing meetings at any time he deems necessary. It is true that there is a second clause related to the interval between meetings, but thal: clearly is not intended to imply a limitation of the powers of the President to caU a meeting at any time he deems it necessary. As regards the necessity for the meeting, 1 hope 1 have given enough explanations in my initial statement. 31. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republies) (translated from Russian): 1 should like to thank the President and the Secretary-General fûr their efforts to clarify the points 1 raised, although 1 must admit frankly that their explanations have not dispeUed my misgivings nor provided an answer to my questions. 1 do not wish, however, to take up the time of the Security Council with any further discussion of the matter. The attitude and position of the Soviet delegation on these controversial issues have been placed on record, and this is sufficient for my purpose at the present time. 34:. A dangerous situation has recently develoF~d in Laos, a situation distu.rbing to everyone interested in the maintenance and strengthening of world peace. We are nllturally led to ask what caused this situation to arise. 35. As we know, the 1954 Geneva agreements concerning Laos provided for the peaceful settlement of aH domestic problems and also charted the course for the independent and dernocratk development Gfthe country. The Vientiane agreements of 1956-1957, concluded between the Government of Laos and the Pathat Lll.O forces, laid down specific measures for a political settlement in Laos. The strict and faithful fuHulment of these a~eement3 was and still is an assurance of peace and tranquillity both in Laos and in Indo-China as a whole. 36. Fowever, the Government of Ml'. Phoui Sananiküne, wbich recently came to power, has elected to disregard the Geneva agreements and MS officially stated that it no longer considers itself bound by the obligatiûllB arising from these agreements. The Sananikone Government has consequently initiatEd in Laos an intensive campaign of repression and persecution against the country's democratic forces, against the former participants in the Pathet Lao national liberation movement. Thousands ofparticipants intbis movement have been al'rested, tortured and imprisoned, and many have been killed. 37. The Royal forces have finally opened direct hostilities against the former fighting units of Pathet Lao with the result that Laos is seriously threatened by the possibility of civil war, with all its dangerous implications for peace in Indo-China and South-East Asia. It is particularly alarming that the actions of the Sananikone qovernment are directly linked with foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Laos, interference designed to turn this country into a foreign base for strategic and military operations in South-East Asia. Increasing quantities of war materi.als and equipment of various types are being imported into Laos and foreign militarypersonnel are arriving there, which is in itself a flagrant breach of the Geneva agreements. 38. Furthermore, to facilitate the scrupulous fulfilment of the Geneva agreements regarding Laos, an International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, ccnsisting of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, was set up and still exists today. This Commission did extremely useful work with a view to secu·,.'tng the implementation of the agreements, work which earneduniversal recognition. However, the Government of Laos, having chosen to thwart the execution of the Geneva agreements, is aIso impeding the work of the International Commission. 40. We feel compelled to point out that the appeal from Laos has been addressed te the United Nations and the matter has been taken up in the Security Counoil at a time when there are signs of a relaxation in world tension. Does this not point to the fact that such action has been t.aken for the discreditable purpose of poisoning the world atmosphere? LfJ. any event, those responsible for initiating such measures cannot count on the support of the Soviet delegation in this harmful activity. 41. The Soviet delegation will vote against the inclusion in the agenda of the item concerning the situation in Laos.

Since apparently no other representative wishes to speak, 1 shall now put to the vote the provisional agenda [SiAgenda/847].

As stated in the Introduction to my annual report to the General Assembly for this year, various communications on the difficulties that have developed in Laos have in the course of the yearbeen addrassedtothe Organization. At the time of writing the report, the United Nations had not been formally seized of the question. However, as 1 pointed eut: "The development has been found to calI for infoI'mal studies and consultations regarding the possibilities open to the Organization to be of assistance, obviously without impairing the Geneva 44. comme cernant tées outre, veux j'ai dans 44. In the course of the first haU of this year, as stated, various communications regarding Laos were received and were brought to the attention of the Members of the Organization. Apart from these communications, personal contacts were matntained. Especially, 1 wish to refer to conversations 1 had with the authorities in the country in the course of !l. visit to Laos early this spring. 45. des duction Ces j'ai cipal pourraient cultés entamé mesure je bilités 45. These communications and contacts provided the background for the studies mentioned in the Introduction to my report to the General Assembly. The studies were undertaken on the assumptions quoted by me a moment ago. Their main aim was to help towards an agreement on procedures which might be applied in an effort to overcome the difficulties that Laos was facing. 1 entered upon such consultations with others as were necessary for that purpose and possible for me within the framework of the United Nations rights and l"Bsponsibilities. 46. The consultations 1 undertook were running parallel with consultations between the two Co- Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and may be considered as having been supplementary to these lastmentioned diplomatie efforts. Being conducted at the request of the Government of Laos, they were naturally kept strictly within the limits set 'Jy the Government itself, as also within the limits set by the position of the United Nations and by the Geneva agreements. 46. parallèles coprésidents être ù~Ti1tère mande rellement fixées dans l'Organisation 47. The development may, from the United Nations point of view, be considered as having entered a new phase when the Governrnent of Laos, on 4 August 1959, addressed a message to me regarding the difficulties it was facing. In accordance with the request of the Government, Member States wer.'e informed about the content of this message. pourraient besoin. 48. Later, on 20 August, a special emissary of the Government of Laos, His Excellency Mr. Ngon Sananikone, came to Headquarters, transmitting a letter from the Government, dated 13 August, in which it requested me to suggest such procedures or steps as, in my view, might be helpful in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the problems. The special emissary would be available for discussions and would give me all information of which 1 might be in need. The Government of Laos did not, in this context, formulate any demand or suggestion beyond the one which 1 have just quoted, that is, the request for advice on possible proceedings. 49. 1 had repeated consultations with Mr. Sananikone as a result of which, in full agreement with him on the next steps that should be taken, I submitted certain suggestions of a procedural nature for the informai consideration of those immediately concerned. These initiatives had not-any more than the other diplomatie efforts-yielded results when, on li Official Documents of the General Assembly. Fourteenth Session. Supplement No. lA. p. 4. 51. In the message to me, Laos requests "th'3 assistance of the United Nations, of which it is a Member", and "ls doing so under Article l, paragraph 1, and Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter". Buch assistance in general terms also obviously includes continued consultations and similar diplomatie efforts along the lines already followed. In this respect, the request reiterates in a more definite and formaI way the stand taken previously by the Government of Laos, for example, in the aforementioned letter of 13 August. 52. However, the Government of Laos in its message of 4 September goes on to request "in particular..• that an emergency force should be dispatched at a very early date in o"':"der to hait thèl aggression and prevent it from spreading". This is the first Ume in the history of this question that a specifie request for action has beer; addressed to one of the main organs of the United Nations. From my side, this initiative of the Government of Laos obviously renders necessary the consideration of steps beyond what previously, in full agreement with the Government of Laos and as outlined earlier in this statement, has been done in order to render assistance. 53. While those previous efforts, as already indicated, were aIl orientated towa:ds the finding of a procedure by which the political difficulties could be resolved by diplomadc means, the present suggestion envisages a field operation somewhat similar in purpose and character to some other field operations undertaken by the United Nations in recent years. The r'.:lquest of 4 September, therefore, confronts the United Nations and the Secretary-General with problems entirely different from those which have been faced sa far in this case. The same, obviously, would be the situation with aIl such further steps by the United Nations of a non-diplomatie nature as might be covered by the present demand for assistance in the broad st,nse in which this demand !.S addressed to the United Nations. 54. The specifie request for the urgent dispatch of an emergency force falls within a field in which, in the first place, the Security Council carries the responsibility. Therefore, when the Government of Laos in its recent message finally asks me to apoly to their request the appropriate pl'ocedure, 1 have, in order ta meet their demand, ta report to the Security Council on the request receivedfor such consideration and such initiatives as the Council mayfindcalled for. 1 have found that this could not be done simply by circulating the letter to the Secret,~ry-General as a Security CmIncil document, but that 1 should, to the information thus given ta the members of the Council, add orally the information regarding rny previous

1 shall speak briefly about the note addressed ta the Secretary- Genera] [S/4212] which, as '!Je all know, includes ~d transmits the letter from the Government of Laos. Accordingly, this letter is now officially before us. présence frontières 57. Once again the United Nations confronts an appeal wWch puts us to the test. It is an appeal for help from Laos, a small State of recent membership in the United Nations. The appeal tells of threats ta its integrity and independence by lorces from outside its own borders. Clearly, we cannot ignore this appeal. It calls for action of some kind, andthis Councn must decide what this action should be. peut par 58. The United States believes that there is no doubt at all that agg.1:ession is being committed. The newspapers are full of it. It is common knowledge. We realize, of course, that there may be those around this table who do nût agree. But, certainJy there can be no doubt about one fact, and that is that the Government of Laos believes that it has been the vic,tlm of aggression, and that when the Government of any Member State, large or small, appeals to the Security Council, the Security Council cannot turn a deaf ear and pass by on the other side. The telegram fI'om the Foreign Minister of Laos, in and of itself, is prima facie evidence of the need for the Security Councn to act, and ta act quickly. 59. For this reason, the United States, in co-operation with other members of the Secarity COUilcil, has introduced a draft resolution [S/4214]. To keep the parliamentary situation clear, 1 hereby move its adoption. tuellement employés 60. Now, the language of this resolution is virtually identical with language which has been used before, notably in the action under Article 29 of the Charter. in the Spanish case in 1946 [39th meeting]. In that case the vote in the Security Counci! was 13 for, none against, and 1 abstention; and the member who abstained was the then representative ofthe SovietUnion, Mr. Gromyko, wh() is now the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. This resolution is squarely witWn the provisions of Article 29 of the Charter. It is a step which is necessary for the Councn to take in the performanc~ of its functions in this case. Tt will be a subsidiary organ which will in effect providefor the continuation of the Council's consideration of this subject. 61. This draft resolution has the great advantage that it enables the Security Council to react without uudue delay to this appeal from a small country. This draft resolution should, in a short Ume, result in finding facts which will he of value to thewhole councn. This 62. Finally, members should understand that if the Security Council shrinks from taking this very modest step the alternative courses of action may be mucl! more far-reaching, much harder to control and much more dangerous. 63. This draft resolution will have a good affect if it is voted promptly. But if we present to the world a spectacle of hair-splittiiig and hagglir~. its effectwill be much reduced. 64. For these reasons, we think that the Counci! should anact this draft resolution promptly. In fact, 1 hope that we will not hesitate to hold a night meeting if need be so that we may do our full duty to the world and once again inspire the confidence of world opinion in the United Nations.

1 have listened with the greatest attention towhat you, Mr. President, and the Secretary-Generalhave saidin order ta refute certain objections and put today's meeting in proper perspective. My delegation fully subscribes ta this conception of the role of the Secretary-General and the task ofthe Security Council. Tt is, in fact, highly gratified by such an approach, which it regards as enabling the United Nationsto cape with its duties and responsibilities in a case particularly worthy of its concerne 66. We have before us a letter of 4 September from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Laos addressedto the Secretary-General. In some quarters it appears to be regarded merely as an excuse for procedural wrangling and legal quibbling, but we can in no way share this attitude. My Government for one is deeply moved by this appeal from a small nation in danger, and it feels that our Organization cannot fail to respond to it without being untrue ta its principles, failing in its duty, and seriously losing prestige. 67. For more than half a century, there have been particularly close ties between France and Laos. Since that Kingdom achieved fllll independence, the affectionate friendship and mutual trust of our Governments and our two peoples have in no way been weakened. Rather, they have sceadily incr6ilse.d; the memory of trials gone through side by side not so long ago has also helped to strengthen. them. This long association and experience in common has given my country a better opportunity than any other to become weIl acquainted with the Government and people of Laos and to appreciate their qualities. There has never bean a gentler., more peace-Ioving people. No one who has lived in Laos will ever forget its inhabitants' charm and graciousness, the simplicity andgentleness of their way of life, the warmth of their hospitality. Heirs of an ancient civilization impregnated with the principles of Buddhism, the Laotian people abhor violence and fanaticism. Never in their history have they engaged in an expansionist policy; on the contrary, 69. 1 do not propose to trace today the history of the crisis now confronting Laos, although much could be said regarding both its immediate and its more remote causes. My Government, for its part, has no doubt whatever as to the identity of those responsible or the ends which they pursue. But this is the first time that the United Nations has been called upon to deal with this problem and it is perfectly nJrmal that the Council should wish to seek further informaticn before reCû:illmending a practical course of action. It is the mast realistic and practical way of providing Laos with immediate and tangible proof of the attention we are giving ta its appeal. This is, of course, only an initial step, and to some it may appear incommensuratewith the degree of danger involved, but we must not act with undue precipitation. 70. When Laos, one of our newest Members, joined our Organization, it was with the conviction that, if its unity and independence was endangered, it could depend upon the United Nations ta give it the assistance which all nations are entitled to expect of it. Respectful of the commitments which it has undertaken, Laos itself does not have military forces capable of dealing with the danger which now threatens it. Inthe grave and anxious situation in which it is placed, its Government has applied ta the Secretary-General for United Nations assistance in whatever form is considered most expeditious. It is the Security Council's duty to respond j.<) this llppeal promptly and effectively. 1 am sure that I.hose of us who serve on the proposed sub-committee will be fully aware of their responsibilities and the task incumbent upon them and will do their utmost to prove to Laos and the world that a threatened country does not turn to the United Nations in vain. 71. In this connexion, it is my duty, as representative of one of the signatories ta the Geneva agreements, to challenge the Soviet Union's strange interpretation of these texts. 72. The Geneva agreements, in so far as they concern Laos, sanctioned the independence and territorial integrity of that country. They in no way placed it under permanent trusteeship. The International Commission for Supervision and Control was set up by the Geneva 73. May 1 conclude by expressing the hope that the members of the Counci! will unanimously adopt the resolution before it. 74. Sir Pierson DlXON (United Kingdom): We have all heard the Secretary-General's report andhave seen the communication which he hal'> received from the Government of Laos, dated 4 September. The Government of Laos informed Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the terme of its appeal to the United Nations shortly after it had been made. It is clear from the terms of the Laotian Government's letter that it is gravely concernerl. about the state of affairs on its northeastern frontiers. The fact that the Secretary-General has thought it his duty to respond to the appeal from the Laotian Government by askingfor an early meeting of this Council is a reflection of the seriousness of the Laotian Government's anxiety. 1 should like to say that 1 listened with close attention to the Secretary-General's explanations on this point and find myself in full agreement with them. 75. Thus there can, 1 think, be no doubt that the Council is confronted with a deeply disturbed situation in Laos. No doubt it wo..ùd be possible to draw fine distinctions as to the nature and origins of this disturbance. It is notoriously difficult to define aggression or to be certain about the border line between civil strife and foreign Interference. 1 think that the past experience of this Council shows that distinctions of this kind are often rather academic when measured against what is actually happening on the spot. The fact is that a small country that has recently achieved independence believes that its integrity is now in peril and believes that the peril has been contrived by its neighbours. 76. In these circumstances, the Laotian Government has decided to exercise its undoubted right to appeal to the United Nations. It haB judged that the proper remedy for the serious situation with which it considers itself to be confronted is the dispatch of a United Nations force to the area. 1 might say in passing that the United Kingdom has for some time favoured the creation of a stand-by force which would be available to the United Nations. Butthe factis that no such force exists. 77. In any event, the dispatch of a United Nations force to a troubled area is a grave step and not one upon which the United Nations can or should embark without very serious consideration and full knowledge of the facts. 78. Nevertheless, it is clearly the responsibility of the Security Council to respond positively and immediately to the appeal which the Laotian Government has made to the United Nations. In the view of Hel' Majesty's Government, the most appropriate and th'd most practical Immediate step the Council can take:.6 to make speedy arrangements to gothoroug-~yintotbe situation in Laos in order to determine the facts. It will then be in a position to decide what is the appropriate remedy. 80. The United Kingdom accordingly supports the proposaI made by the representative of the United States, and we have joined with the United States and France in sponsoring the draft resolution which is before the Council. l take this opportunity to express my confidence in the ability of the Governments of Argentina, Italy, Japan and Tuniaia to act in this way on behalf of the Security Council, and my confidence in the sincere desire with which they will certainly be animated to make in this way a contribution to the fulfilment of the purposes of the Charter and the responsibilities of the Security Council. We believe that, by setting up a sub-committee promptly, this Council will demonstrate its interest and concern and will thus already exercise a tranquillizing influence on the local scene. 81. We have heard the suggestion that the proper machinery for dealingwith the present situationin Laos is t.he hternational Commission for Supervision and Control which was set up under the Agrclement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos in July 1954. As representing one of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference which brought about that agreement, 1 should like to say something about this suggestion. 82. Hel' Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the Commission has performed a useful task in controlling and supervising the application of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. But it is necessary, in our opinion, to take account of th~ changes which have occurred in Laos since the ceasefire agreement was achieved. These changes inevitably affect the ComIr..i.ssion's l'ole. As members of the Council wiU be aware, a political settlement was achieved in November 1957 between the Royal Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao movement. In May 1958, elections were held in which aIl parties participated. In July 1958, largely as a result ofthese developments, the Commission decided to adjourn sine die, and it has not since met. 83. To come now to the present day, Hel' Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the Geneva agreements are still inforce. Our deliberations here cannot, of course, affect the validity of the obligations undertaken by aU parties to the agreements, In his capacity as co-chairman of the Geneva COl.- ference, the United Kingdom representative held frequent consultations with, and made proposaIs tothe representative of the Soviet Union as the other cochairman. The Royal Laotian Government, for its part, has made it clear that it will continue to abide by the obligations which it assumed at Geneva in 1954. Indeed, in our opinion, it has throughoutcomplied, and continues to comply, with the provisions of the agreements. But the Laotian Government maintains that, once the political settlement with the Pathet Lao had 84. The real pointatissue, as Iseeit, is this: Laos is a sovereign State and a Mernber ofthe United Nations, entitled under the Charter to have recourse to tbis Organization. It would surely be quite wrong for this Counci! to deny Laos the right of recourse to the United Nations and to insist that she submit herself again to the supervision of an organization wbich was established before she became a Member ofthe United Nations and whose presence on her soil she evidently considers incompatible with her newly-gained sovereignty. 85. 1 would like in conclusion to remind the Council of paragraph 12 of the Final Declaration ofthe Genova Conference, dated 21 July 1954, inwbicheachmember of the Conference undertook "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the urüty andthe territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States"-that is, Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam-"and to refrain from any interference in their internaI affairs". 1 do not think it would be in harmony with tbis undertaking, wbich binds the Soviet Union together with other members of the Geneva Conference, to seek to impose the International Commission upon the Laotian Government against its will. Nor would it be in harmony with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. 86. From what 1 have said l hope it will be clear that, in the United Kingdom's view, it should not be the purpose of the Council to engage in polemics. In our view, the Council'8 objective should be to give Laos what help it can in the restoration of tranquil conditions, so that that country may pursue in freedom its life as a young independent State in amity with all its neighbours.

The Security Council has been requested, as my delegation understands it, to act upon the situation in Laos, wbich could be considered as fraught with danger to international peace anà securit'j. 88. In the present circumstances, where many factors need to be explored and defined, my delegation feels that the draft resolution as presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States recommends an appropriate measure in the light of what we know. 89. My delegation wishes to make it clear, first, that we are espE ~ially interested in having full information collected on t.he developments in the areas concerned; second, that in our opiniol1, therefore, it is at tbis time premature to discuss the substance ofthe matter; and, third, that we hope that the United Nations presence in the area in the form of such a subcommittee will contribute to easing the tension wbich seems to exist. 90. My delegation is the view that the setting up of this subcommittee In . <.:ordance with Article 29 of the Charter is a matter of pure procedure. However, 1 should like to take tbis opportunity, if 1 may, to "One appr(lach tC'wards that end would be to find ways and mb~ to clil"b an excessive use of the veto power, which in the past has caused a sense of frustration, discouragement, and helplessness in the conduct of international relations." [809th meeting, paras. 12 and 13.] 91. Ml'. RITCHIE (Canada): Laos, aState Member of the United Nations, has made an urgent appeal addressed directly to the Secretary-General. Inthe view of my delegation, the Secretary-General has actedboth wisely and correctly in reporting this appeal immediately to this Council which, under the Charter, has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. He could not have done less than this. Equally, he properly feels that he cannot, without further guidance, do more than this. It is now up to this Counci! to decide what procedure it should follow for the next step. 92. The Laotian communication to the Secretary- General is the latest of a number of developments in the area which have, over the past several months, given rise to intei'national concern. As the Secretary- General has pointed out, the United Nations has not, itself, been formally seized of these developments so far, but the Secretary-General has been kept informed of them and, as he has told us today, he has been a party to informaI consultations regarding the possibilities open to the Organization to be of assistance. 93. Canada, as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control set up by the Geneva Conference, has also been particularly concerned with these developments and has kept in close and continuing touch with other Governments concerned. The Canadian Governmenthas always been, and still is, prepared to consider any steps which would, in fact, help to reduce tension in the area. In so doing, it has beenthe consistentpos!tion ofmy Government thatthe principles ofthe Geneva settlement should he maintmned in Laos, as elsewhere in Indo-China, and that the obligations arising out of that settlement l'est on aU. the parties whoparticipatedin it. It is clear that the Secretary-General's report deserves immediate consideration. 94. As things stand atthe moment, there are a number of facts regarding the situation in the area which are unclear. Some prompt and impartial report on the facts of the situation would, t..herefore, appear to be necessary before the Council could usefully deal with the substance of the commlmication to the Secretary- General. 95. The most urgent task facing the COUDCi! at this time, in our opinion, is to agree on a procedure for obtaining these facts. We do not believe, however, that the Security Council would be justified in attempting t.o impose the International Commission on the Royal 17 l• 96. It is to be hoped that the procedures envisaged in this draft resolution will command the unanimous support of members ofthe Security Council and that the work of the proposed sub-committee will proceed quickly and effectively, with the full co-operation of aIl concerned.

The Security Council has under consideration a draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom iilld the United States whereby a sub-committee would be established to examine the statements concerning Laos, to undertake such inquiries as it might deem necessary, and to report on them to the Counci! as soon as possible. 98. First of a11, li; seems to us that in this whole matter there is one question of prime importancetr-e degree of faith we should place in the word of one of our Members when that Member requests our assistance. In the first stage of this debate there was some discussion as to whether the meeting which we are now holding had been properly convened or note So far as my deI 3gation is concerned, our reply to this question is ca.egorically in the affL.:.native: What is at stake here, over and above any considerations of form, is in our view the mutual trust we should have in each other as members of the sarne organization, united by the same objectives. If we were to decide, on the basis of presumptions orsolelybecause of information which we ourselves might have, that a request for assistance should be rejected out of band, we should be doing irreparable damage to that principle of mutual trust upon which our relations are based. 99. The Kingdom of Laos states that it has been attacked, and requests our assistance. Can we do anything less than investigate the facts on the spot? But it is not merely our obligations towards Member States which should move us to aet without delay in the present case. It iB also our concern for the Organization's prestige and authority, of which this Council is, in a special way, the cuctodian. It is an open secret that the confidence of wo~ld opinion in the United Nations as an effective instrument of security and peace has bee!! weakened by ;.he relative ineffectiveness of some of its main organs. My colleagues cannot have failed to see that this we~ening is principally due to the difficulties we have encountered in bringin~ before the United Nations some of the major problems endangering international peace and security. If our silence were ta be ascribable to the fact that we had declared ourselves unauthorized to meet a specifie request, the peoples of the world might rightly ask themselves, and us, whether the highest international body was fulfilling the purpose for which it was created. 101. My delegation supports the view that this subcommittee should he established under the terms of Article 29 of the Charter. This course is entirely admissible and, in support of it, l should like to refer to the statement wlùchmypredecessor, Dr. José Arce, made on a similar issue before this sarne body. On that occasion the Argentine representative said !haUt was not a case, strictly speaking, of undertaklng an investigation, butrather a matter ofrecelving information; and he added that if the idea that the question under discussion was one of substance and not of procedure were to be accepted, the wrongfulne,ss and baselessness ofthe privilege grantedto certain Powers would be very clearly demonstrated, since its incompatibility not only with legal reality but also with common sense would become obvious. 102. The investigation process provided for in Chapter VI of the Charter is a species of formai action involving decisions 1:y the investigating body. In the present case, our objective is more limited. The proposaI is simply that a small group from amongst ourselves should undertake something which it would be difficult for the Council itself to undertake as a body: going to the scene of events to see what is happening. This sub-committee is therefore nothing more than an extension of ourselves and, as such, it clearly comes within the procedural powers vested inus by Article 29. 103. With respect to the case of Spain, which was mentioned by the United States representative, my delegation considers that it constitutes another irrefutable precedent for the correctness of the Council's interpret.:tion of the powers which it is able to vest in committees under Article 29. Mydelegationmerely desires to explain that the admission of the case of Spain as an enlightening precedent implies no retrospective judgement on its part as to the substance of that resolution, with which my country did not, at that time, agree. 104. We have said that the draft resolution we are supporting is non-controversial and that it does not prejudge the events which have occurred. For our part, we wish to respect its spirit, and to level no accusations against the parties in dispute. This freedom of judgement with respect to the facts cannot, however, prevent us from giving our support to any measure which safeguards the territorial integrity of States and upholds the principle of non-intervention in. the affairs of others. 105. An indispensable prerequisitetothe maintenance of peace is respect for the integrity and sovereignty of other States. If there ia a violent upheaval within a aountry and, as a result, a change of government occurs, that is fi. matter which concerna that country alone. But we cannot condone the systematic and continuous exploitation of domestic elements ofrebellion for the purpose of creating a situation resulting in 106. For these reasons my delegation' cherishes the h0pe that this draft resolution, which gives offence to no one and ensures that we can continue to act effectively, will be approved Wlanimously. Although we are persuaded that such Wlanimity is not, legally speaking, essential, we are convinced that it would eXE\rt a decisive moral influence towards therestoration of calm in the Indo-Chinese peninsula and the creation of an atmosphere of mutual Wlderstanding amongst those primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace. We trust that, once this draft resoluticn has been voted, everyone, without exception, will give it the firmest support and that all will cooperate, to the best of their ability, in enabling the sub-committee to perform its work rapidly and effi~ ciently. 107. We should not like to conclude withoutextending our cordial congratulations to the Secretary-General for the efforts he l,as exerted in the defence of peace throughout this unhappy affair. and for his excellent report to which we have listened this afternoon. We would aIso express our whole-hearted appreciation of the way in which the President of the COWlcil has managed this debate. lOS. In view of the considerations lhavesetforth and of the statements made by other members of the COWlcil, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution Wlder discussion.

In his second intervention in this debate, the representative of the Soviet Union characterized the situation in Laos as dangerous and alarming to all who are concerned with the peace and security of the worId. My delegation likewise considers the situation in Laos as dangerous and aIarming. For this very reason my delegation is grateful toyou, Mr. President, and to the Secretary-GeneraI for having taken the initiative in convening the present urgent meeting of tfle Security Council. 110. Laos is a small cOWltry. It is aIso one of those countries of Asia and Africa which have achieved so-;",reign independence in recent years. Unfortum.tely 10r Laos, ever since it reached an amicable settlement with France, international communism has subjected it to continuous infiltration and subversion and now to armed invasion. 111. Nobody suspects Laos of aggressive or even unfriendly designs against any of its neigbbours. In fact, nobody has accused Laos of hostile ambitions of any kind. 1was glad a moment ago to hear my colleague from France testify to the profoWldly peaceful character of the Laotian people. In the international community, therefore, Laos deserves the friendship of an peaceful peoples and GovernmentG. 112. There is, however, something peculiar about Laos. This cOWltry occupies a geographical position of great strategic importance in South-East Asia. The integrity and independence of Laos would be most 113. In recent years, the Government of Laos has done weIl in economic development and in building up a sman defensive force. With this peaceful progress of the Laotian people, the chances of success for internal subversion are not gooà. lB not that the reason why now, in addition tosubversionfrominside, armed invasion from outaide is resorted to? So it Beems that international communism regards selfimprovement by a small and under-developed country in a strategie position to be a crime for which puniBhment must be meted out. This is how my delegation views the situation in Laos t.>day. 114. 1 would like to say a few words in regard to the drait resolution presented to us by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is a thoughtful lirait resolution. It may be helpful to Laos. It is good ,',;3 far as it goes. 1 would be less than frank if 1 did Ilot express on this occasion my feeling that the drait resolution is grossly inadequate. We have before us a request from the Royal Government of Laos that the United Nations send to that country an emergency force. Now we are asked to appoint a sub-committee to gather information. The disparity between the request and the response is glaring. The disparity between the gravity of the problem and the means proposed here ia almost tragic. 115. Although 1 will vote for this drait resolution, 1 have taken the liberty ofputting on record my feelings, my sense of the inadequacy of the measure proposed, because 1 feel 1 owe fuis expression to the people of Laos and to freedom-lovlng peoples aIl overtheworld.

We have listened with great attention to the report which the Secretary-General has just made to the Council, and should like to thank bim for bis objectivity and clarity. The letter of 4 September, which the Royal Government of Laos addressed to him andwhich was the subject of the report, appeals for United Nations assistance and asks in particular for the urgent dispatch of an emergency force toputan end to the aggression of which it complains and to prevent it from spreading. 117. My delegation must first of all express regret that the Royal Government of Laos did not see fit to its complaint directly to the Security Council, andthat it did not itself request a meeting of the Council. Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which it invokes, would seem to refer rather to the General Assembly. However, the request for assistance against aggression andparticularlythe request for the dispatch of an emergency force are sufficiently grave to come within the Council's purview. As a result of the Secretary-General's report, the Council, therefore, bas before it a letter from the Government of Laos reporting the erossing of its frontierbyforeigntroops and attacks against Laotian garrisons which have forced them to evacuate their posts. In this letter of 21 L ..;.... 118. But my delegation wishes to point out that there is nothing in the letter of 4 September and inllie other documents at present before the Council which is sufficiently definite to enable it to form a judgement regarding the reaJ. gravity of the alleged aggression or the responsibility of the Democratic Republic ofViet- Nam for buch aggression. 119. For example, my delegation would like to know whether the foreign troops spoken of in the letter withdrew &fier the attacks or atood their ground and continued to occupy theposts formerly held by the Laotian garrisons. In other words, are these real acts of aggression coming from outside and following a definite plftn, or are they isolated acts which, although repeated and serious, are more inthe nature of l'rontier incidents such as have unfortunately become common recently? 120. It is obvious that the choice made among the various solutions open to the Security Council will depend largely upon a judgement of the real nature and scope of these infiltrations. 121. My delegation feels thatthe Cv.mcilunfortunately does not possess enough definite informationto enable it to form afirm conclusion atpresent. Doee that mean that the Council should avoid taldng any action in the matter on the pretext of such lack of information? We cannat ta1œ thiB view. 122. Laos, a Member of the United Nations, achieved its full sovereignty only a few years ago. It needs peace and security in order to build up iw position. The Tunisian delegation feels that Laos would not have found it necessaryto requestUnited Nations assistance and the quick dispatch of an emergency force if it had not feIt a serious threatto its own security and, hence, to international security in this sensitive regionofthe wfJrld. The Council should therefore, in our opinion, devote very serious attention to the situation, and should make a very thorough and detailed study of it before deciding on the specific request made by the Royal Government of Laos in its letter of4 September. Such an objective study of the situation seems emineutly desirable, and inmy delegation's opinion, indispensable. It would not in any way prejudice the Council'.s eventual conclusions, and would certainly ènable it to see the situation more clearly. The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m. ARG!NTlNA-ARGENTINE Editorial Sudamerlcana, S.A., AI.lna 500, Buena. Aire•• AUSTRALlA.AUSTRALlE Melbaurne University Pre..,369/71 Lon.. dale Sireet, Melbaurne C.l. 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