S/PV.848 Security Council

The one which was decidedupon at our last meeting.

In that case my objection ta the inclusion of that item still stands. 5. 'l'te PRESIDENT: Shall 1 again put to the vote the agenda of this afternoon's meeting? If thereisno such request, we can proceed. Report by the Secretary.General on the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos, transmitted by a note from the Permanent Mission of Laos tt' the United Nations, 4 September 1959 (S/4212, S/4213, S/4214) 6. Mr. SOBOLEV (UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): 1 feel bound to point out to the Security Council that it is in a rather strange position. No one has put the question of the situation in Laos before the Council, for a11 we have is a report 8. At the Geneva Conference five years ago, the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the People's Repubiic of China, with the participation of repre- sentatives of the Indo(~hinese States, drafted agree- ments concerning the restoration ofpeace in Indochina. Those agrf"ements were an important contribution to the restoraticn of peace and helped to ease inter- national tension. In partiC\llar, the Geneva agreements on Laos prescribed ways and means for the peaceful settlement of an matters relating to the restoration of normal conditions in that country. 9. It is also known that subsequently, in December 1956 and November 1957, the Vientiane agreements, which prescribed specific measures for a political settlement in Laos, were conducted between the Royal Government of Laos and the armed forces of Pathet Lao on the basis of the Geneva agreements. In accordance with those "ientiane agreements, the Government of Laos, and this was confirmed, by a special act, undertook not to permit any discrimination against persons who had fought on the side of or co-operated with Pathet Lao. 10. Oue of the most important provisions of the Geneva agreements was the decision to set up in Laos an International Commission for Supervision and Control consisting of representatives of Canada, India, and Poland. 11. For a number of years, despite the existence of certain difficulties, co-operation between the Govern- ment of Laos and the International Commission in carrying out the Geneva agreements contributed significantly to the maintenance of peace and the achievement of national unification in Laos. The country could begin looking forward to peaceful, independent and democratic development. 12. Recently, however, as we are all weIl aware, the situation in Laos has undergone a drastic change. Today armed clashes are occurring in Laos between the Royal troops and the former fighting units of Pathet Lao. Over Laos, as we have stated, hangs ti.te threat of the outbreak of civil war with aIl its dangerous implications for peace in Indochina and East Asia. 13. We have already said that the responsibility fof' this state of affairs lies with the present Laotian 14. 1 should say that the majority of t.he provisiol'S remain in force. As you yourselves know, Many of these provisions are of a long-term character. 1 will use just one of them to i!lustrate my point. 15. The Royal Government of Laos issued a statement on articles 4 and 5 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. The Laotian Government'SI state- ment reads as follows: lIDuring the periodbetween the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the date of the final settlement of political probl€ms in that country the Rcyal Laotian Government shall requestfo~'eignaid, equipment, personnel or instructors only in the interests of territorial defence and within the limits specified in the agreement concerning the cessation of hostilities. • 16. There are a number of points here which are significant. But one in particular is relevant to the present case and 1 should like to draw attention to it. According to the statement, during the periodbetween the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam- not in Laos, but in Viet-Nam--and the date of the final settlement of polltical problems in that country, the Government of Laos shaH undertake to do such and such .•• This means that the agreements on Laos relate not only to conditions in Laos but also to conditions throughout IndocLina, while the period of time involved. as is indicated here, is not a short- term period but is to continue until the final settle- ment of pol1tical problems in Viet-Nam. 17. You may draw the conclusion, as the Soviet delegation has done) that the Geneva agreements, including the agreements on Laos, not only have not become obsolete but in the present circumstances have, on the contrary, even greater significance for the maintenance of peace in that area. 18. It would, of course, be possible to continue our analysis of these agreements and to cite many more examples to demonstrate the long-term character of the Geneva agreements and the importance of those agreements, including the agreements on Laos, for the maintenance of peace in that area. 19. In examining the situation in Laos, the Security Council cannot disregard the existence of those agreements. 20. Not only has the present Laotian Governrnent declared that it considers itself no longer bound by 21. The United Kingdom representative has told us here that the agreements were carried out in part: elections were held, everything went smoothlj and that was supposedIy the end of the matter. Unfor- tunately, this is not the case. It is true that elections were ùeld but what happened after the elections? What happe.ned after the elections and is happening today constitutes a breach of Vientiane agreements; in other words, the Laotian Government has c,)mmitted a complete breach of the agreements which were intended to lead ta the pacification of the country. As a result, Laos is threatened with civil war and the Security Counci! is embarking on a discussion of the matter. 22. After the elections members of Parliament were arrested and the democratic forces in the country began to be persecuted. In short, if further proof is needed, many facts may be cited to show how the Vientiane agreements have been infringed by the Laotian Government. 23. It is not surprising that, when the Government of Mr. Phoui Sananikone organized provocative armed activities against the units of the former Pathet Lao fighters, those provocative activities 8hould have aroused indignation and produced spontaneous populal' l'eaction. 24. In these circumstances it is, :Jf course, impossible not ta recognize the utter groundIessness of the Sananikone Government's attempt to represent the indignation aroused among the masses ofthe people by a policy which is prejudicial to the country's national interests-indignation which has now reached the stage of armed struggle-merely as the l'esult of non-existent intervention by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the domestic affairs of Laos. 25. The Soviet Government, which participated in the Geneva Conference on Indochina and whose repre- sentative was one of the Chairmen of that conference, has invariably advocated and still advocates strict observance of the Geneva agreements. This consistent policy of fue Soviet Government stems from its deep coneern for the strengthening of world peace and security and it8 desire to prevent hot-beds of dangerous tension from developing in any part of the world, including Indochina. The Soviet Government therefore drew attention to the recent steady deterioration of the situation in Laos and, together with the Govern- ments of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, urged that mea- sures dhould be taken to implement the Geneva agree- ments in Laos and, in particular, to reactivate the International Commission for Supervision and Control in that country. The proposaI to reactivate the Commission received wide support, in particular among the people of Laos, who rightly regarded the strict observance of the Geneva agreements as a guarantee of the peaceful and independent development of that country. 26. It is quite obvious that the Laotian Government, acting in accordance with the Geneva and Vientiane agreements, and in co-operation withthe International Commission, can and must restore normal conditions 27. The draft resolution before us [S/4214] provides clear evidence that the Security Council is being asked to take a step which would subvert the Geneva agreements. 28. The Soviet delegation considera that if the sponsors of the proposaI to set up a sub-committee of inquiry were genuinely seeking to ease tension in that area, the International Commission which already exists under the terms of the Geneva agreements should have been used for that purpose. There is no reason to question the objectivity of the Commission, composed of the represent!l.tives of Canada, India and Poland, which has done much constructive work with a view to implementing the Geneva agreements. Instead, the sponsors cf the proposal to appoint a sub-committee are trying to bypass the existing international agreements. This can only be regarded as an attempt to subvert thOSG agreements and as a measure calculated to incre(>.se tension in the Laof area. 29. The Soviet delegation certainly cannat agree to such an approach. We cannot be a party to the sub- version of the Geneva agreements, which are the corDerstone of the maintenance of peace in the Indochina area, by any action of the Security Council. The Security Council, which bears primary responsi- bility for the maintenance of peace, cannot be a party to meaSlJ.res which would undermine the validity of existing international agreements and the Soviet delegation will vote against the proposal to appoint a sub-committee. 30. The United States representative, seeking to justify the submission of his proposaI, referred to Article 29 of the Charter and said that the proposaI was procedural. It is perfectly obvious that such a proposaI cannot in any sense be regarded afl pro- cedural. On the contrary, this is a question of substance and a question of great importance, on which no decision should be taken without full consideration of aIl its possible political consequences. 31. In conclusion, 1 should like to say that the Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that peace and calm can be restored in Laos. AlI necessary means and con- ditions exist, guaranteed by international agreements. Strict observance of the Geneva and Vientiane agree- ments and immediate reactivation of the International Commission-these constitute the only means of reaching a peaceful settlement of the situation which has arisen in Laos. This course is fully in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and cannot be disregarded.

This afternoon we had an opportunity to listen to the report submitted to us by the Secretary-General in connexion wj:n the letter [S/4212] addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Laos on 4 September 1959 the contents ofwhichunquestionably faIl within the competence of the Security Council. 34. Nevertheless, the delegation of Panama considers that the documents circulated 8udth-e statements made during the discussion do not provide sufficient data to enable the Council to determine what measures it should take regarding the substance of the prGblem. 35. In those circumstances, it would seem advisabIe to set up a sub-committee, as proposed by the delegation of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in order to ~btain a clearer picture of the problem, which wo·.ùd enable the Council to perform its functions fully and find satisfRctory solutions. 36. Clearly, a sub-committee ofthis type would serve a constructive purpose. Not only would ft prevent recourse to unilateral measures outside the framework of the Charter, but it ",ould i.mply the moderating influence of the United Nations in the search for peaceful solutions, likely to be of benefit to the region concernad. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution have referred to a precedent established on 29 April 1946 and have informed us that the worùingused in the draft resolution under consideration is the sarne as that used by the Council on that occasion. 37. If that is the case-as in fact it ia-the subcommittee's terms of reference make it perfeo:::tly clear that it cannat draw conclusions or submit recommendations but that it will confine itself ta submitting the faets ta the full Council so that the latter may decide on and adopt appropriate resolutians. The setting-up of this sub-committee does not, in our delegation's opinion, imply any judgement whatever of the situation described by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Laos in his letter of 4 September, nor does it imply that the Geneva agreements are being ignored, as alll3ged by the Soviet representative, in spite of the statement to the contrary made by the representative of Canada. 38. In our view, the setting-up of a sub-committee of this type as a subsidialY organ oftheSecurity Council is fully covered by the procedures authorized under Article 29 of the Charter, and is in accordance with rule 28 and rule 33, paragraph 4 of the rules of procedure of the Security Council. 39. Moreover, there is no reason ~o have any apprehensions regarding the work of this sub-committee. Tt will be composed of four countries of high standing wh'lse representatives are our coUeagues on this Council. We are sure that they will do their utmost to perform their work with the most scrupulous fairness, so that the Council's paramount objective will not be distorted in any way. 40. For these reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

1 deem it fit now to say a few words in my capacity as the representative of ITALY. th,~ interference from a foreign country was at the origin of such fighting. And now it has sf'u1. a formaI requf'-st to the United Nations, asking it to provide help in order ta put an end to such interference which has developed-and l quote from the message r0ceived from tl:e Foreign Minister of Laos-into "flagrant aggression". As a mattet:' of fact, the Government of Laos considers the situation so serious as to wa~rant a. request for the urgent dispatch of a Upited Nations emergency force 1.0 the trouble area. 43. In these circumstances, my Government has no doubt that the United Nations is bound to act. In our opinion, it is bound to act at least on two basic counts. 44. Li the first instance, we have the case of a small country, recently born to full independence, which thinks that its freedom and security are endangered. It turns to the United Nations for assistance, that very assistance which the Charter foresees for al! Member States. We believe that the United Nationsand particularly the Security Couneil, which bears the primary responsibility in such situations-would fail in their duty were they not to give immediate attention to the request of such country. They will fail in their duty not only to Laos, but also to aIl those countries which put into the United Nations aIl their hopes for their freedom and their independence. 45. Secondly, we must realize, of course, that the building up of serious fighting in a very delicate reg:'on of the world presents ominous aspects and implications. 46. It seems to metobethedutyof the United Nations to cope immediately with Buch a dangerous situation and to p:covide the means by which the tension and the danger may be eJ.iminated. We must feel this duty the more because the international situation has shown in the past fewweeks, for thefirst time in many years, some new aspects, raising hopes of some change in the general atmosphere. And aH peace-loving r:ountries should more than ever endeavour to act in such a way as to avoid situations developing aIl over the world which might frustrate those hopes anJ possibilitias. 47. This being, in my opinion, the duty of the United Nations and its Security Council in the presence of th€ request of the Government of Laos, it seems to me that the draft resolution introduced by the representative of the United States on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States provides, in the present circumstances, a first satisfactory step in the fulfilment of such duties. It is obvious that the first thing to do is to get a c1ear picture of the situation, so that the Council may have all the elements necessary for reaching a decision. A small sub-committee of the Council itf'elf 1.vill facilitate andexpedite the work of the Council in that direction. 48. May 1 add that the adoption ofthe draft resolution, whose purport is the collecting of information on the 47. des rité, me représentant la constance, plissement chose afin ments sous-comité lérera 48. 50. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, 1 invitemembex-s of the Council to take a decision on the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [Si4214].

Before this proposal is put to the vote, 1 think we must say a few words about the nature of the proposal before the Security Council. An effort was made to depict this joint draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States-there is no indication of the subject, as the draft resolution has no title-as procedural in character, which would mean that the vote would be on a procedural matter. In other words, the voting procechlre would be such that the unanimity of the permanent members would not be required for the adoption of the resolution. Of course, those who referred to the procedural nature of the resolution did not go so far as to make an E'xplicit statement to this effect. But naturally, that was what they meanwhen they said that the draft resolution was procedural. 52. We must, 1 think, make it clear at the outset that this draft resolution is not procedural. It relates to the substance of the question now before the Security Council and, if adopted by the Council, might have far-reaching consequences. As, however, the question of its procedural character has been raised, it might be usefu1 to refer to the practice of the Security Council. 53. Mr. Lodge cited one case from the practice of the Security Council, a case in which a resolution to establish a committee or sub-committee on the Spanish question was adopted with one of the permanentmembers abstaining. This case, which did indeed occur, does not depart from the established votingprocedure in the Security Council because, when a permanent member abstains, its vote does not couut. 54. There are, however, other precedents for consideration by the Security CoUDcil of proposaIs to appoint individuals or to establish various kinds of committees, commissions, and sub-committees, all of which might be classified as "subsidiary organs". In these casel3 the Security Council has invariably followed the practice of treating the question of establishing a sub-committee or committee of that kind not as a procedural but as ~ substantive matter. And the vote on such a question has been considered a vote on a substantive matter, in other words, as being subject to the unanimity rule contained in Article 27 of the Charter. 55. In order ta substantiate my statements, 1 shall refer to the valuable document entitled Repertoire of 56. For example, Case 19 on page 190 reads as follows: "At the 194;th meeting on 25 August 1947, in connexion with the Indonesian questirm (II), the representative of the USSR submitted several amendments to a joint Australian-Chinese draft resolution, one of which provided for the establishment of a commission composed of the States members of the Security Council 'to supervise the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of 1 August'. The amendments were not adopted. There were 7 votes in favour, 2 against (one vote against being that of a permanent member) and 2 abstentions."Y TI pas Conseil termes, fond In this case, then, there is a direct statement tbat the proposal was not adopted because one permanent member of the Security Council voted against it; in other wordsr the matter was considered substantive and not procedural. suit: 57. Case 13 on page 189 reads as follows: "At the 70th meeting on 20 September 1946, in connexion with the Ukrainian complaint against Greece, the representative of the United States proposed to establish a comm.Ission of three individuals nominated by the Secretary-General to investigate the facts relating to the border incidents along the frontiers between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, and to submit to the Security Council a report on the facts disclosed by its investigation. The draft resolution was not adopted. There were 8 votes in favour, 2 against (one vote against being that of a permanent member), and 1 abstention."y You will note that this case, too, dealt with the submission of a proposaI to establish a commission, or what is termed in English a "fact-finding commission". The proposaI was not adoptedbytheCouncil because one of the permanent members of the Council voted against it; in other words, the vote on the proposaI was not procedural but substantive, and the unanimity rule was applied. Cette sition qulun termes, de nimité. 58. l do not wish to burden the Council with a list of other precedents. The Secretariat has been very meticulous in this respect and has assembled aIl the available cases. Unless l am mistaken, in no case has a proposaI for the establishment of a commission or committee by the Security Council in connexion with a question such as the one now before us been considered procedural. In every case such a proposal has been considered substantive and the unanimity rule has been applied to the vote on it, as provided in Article 27 of the Charter. montré exemples propositions 59. What is the proposaI now before us? We are asked to appoint a sub-committee consisting of Arconstituer V United Nations publication. Catalogue No.: ~4.VII.l. y Paragraph quoted in Engllsh by the speaker. 61. Can this really be regarded as a procedural matter, when the sub-com.mittee is to consider the question of dispatching an emergency force? The sub-committee will have before it the request l have mentioned or, if it does not, it may receive such request and others of the same kind. Moreover, this request and many of the statements made in the Security Council contain accusations of aggressive activities by a soverdgn State. Under the terms of the resolution, the sub-committee will examine these accusations and determine whether or not, in its opinion, aggression has been committed. And since it is free to conduct IIsuch inquiries as it may determine necessaryll, obviously it will conduct such inquiries. 62. In short, attempts to represent this sub-committee as technical, Il innocuous ll , prooedural and so forth are groundless. The committee will unquestionably have great political significance, and in taking a decision on the resolution, the Security Council must apply the procedure laid down in the Charter for the adoption of decisions of this sort. 63. There is another document l can use to illustrate the position in regard to this question. This subcommittee is essentially a sub-committ6e for investigation. Whatever it is called, the fact remains that the sub-committee will conduct an investigation in Laos. The question of the possible ccnsequences of an investigation by the Security Council was given special attention at the San Francisco Conference in the earliest stages of the United Nations. At th~ time the voting procedure in the Security Counoil was being worked out, a close etudy was made of various cases and of the line the Security Council should follow in those cases. For instance, the declaration of 7 June 1945 of the four sponsoring Governments (the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and China) at the San Francisco Conference, with which France later associated itself, deals with the question of investigations.;V 64. Paragraph 4 of this declaration points out "..• decisions and actions by the Security Counci! may weIl have Iilajor political consequences •••". 'li United Nations publication. Catalogue No.: 55.V.2 (VoUI), p. 105. 1 should like to repeat this phrase: "ThIs chain cf events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation." 65. The declaration continues: "It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute." 66. Thus, this basic document defining voting procedure in the Security Council specifically states that a vote on an investigation requires the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council. 67. 1 would remind the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of this document. They can scarcely deny that the adoption of a decision such as the one we have to take today is a decision regarding an investigation. 68. To sum up, 1 should like it to be clear to the members of the Council that the vote on the draft resolution before the Security Council is a vote on a substantive matter and is subject to the unanimity rule. 69. Should anyone have any doubt on this score, the four-Power declaration, with which France aosociated itself, indicates in its concluding sentence the procedure for resolving such doubt: "Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the prelimina:r.y question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members." In other words, if there is any doubt that the question i8 procedural, the Council has no alternative but to decide thu question by the procedure 1 have just mentioned, which was approved by all the Members of the United Nations at San Francisco. 70. 1 shaH, therefore, put the ques'i:ion-does anyone have any doubt that this resolution is not procedural?

1 think 1 may point out that many of the speakers have already expressed their opinion on whether the draft resolution is procedural or note In any case, 1 think that the question which has been raised by ,the Soviet representative could more properly be taken up after the vote on the draft resolution which has been submitted by the United States representative together with the representativcs of

The past practice of the Security Councn has varied and there have been a number of cases in which the Council, before voUng on a proposal or a draft resolution, has taken a decision on whether the vote was to be of a procedural or a substantive character. Such a vote took place, for example, on 24 May 1948 [30Srd meeting], when a preliminary decision was taken on whether the vote on the draft resoluUon under discussion would or would not be procedural. 73. In order, therefore, to avoid any later procedural difficulties, 1 request the President to settle the question of the voting procedure immediately, before the draft resoluti0n is put to the vote. In other words, 1 request that a vote should ne taken on the question whether the vote on the draft resolution is to be considered a procedural vote. 1 request that a vote should be taken on that question and the voting procedure should be in accordance with the four-Power declaration which 1 have just read out. 74. The PRESIDENT: 1 would like to note again that the cases in which the votes on the draft resolution have been taken first are quite numerous and 1 think that they outnumber the cases of tbe reverse order by at least one. But in any case, 1 think that 1 understand correctly that the Soviet representative wants me to put to a formal vote the question whether the draft resolution under consideration is a procedural one. and we shall proceed accordingly. 1 will now put to the vote of the Councn the following question: Should the vote ou this draft resolution be considered a procedural one?

1am afraid that 1 am not quite olear what we are voting on.

We are voting on the following motion: Should the vote on the draft resolution submitted in document S/4214 be considered a procedural one?

Just a parliamentary inquiry. Those who think that the draft resolution is procedural should vote "yes", and those who think it is not procedural should vote "no".ls that correct?

Yeso Those who believe that it is a procedural matter will say "yes Il and raise their hands.

The President's interpretation of the vote is at variance with the Charter of the United Nations, at variance with the procedure laid down in the four-Power declaration issued at the San Francisco Conference on 7June 1945 and at variance with the whole practiceofthe Security Counoil. 1 mentioned some examples of that practice a few moments ago. 81. 1 have just quotedfrom the four-Power declaration of 7 June 1945 in which the four Powers, with the adherence of France, established the procedure for deciding the preliminary question whether a procedural vote might be taken in a particular case. That procedure provides that such a vote shall be subject to the unanimity rule, in other words, the adoption of an affirmative decision shan require the concurring votes of an the permanent members. 82. In the vote which has just taken place, a vote on this very question which is dealt with in the declaratlon and to which the procedure 1 have mentioned applies, the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, voted "against". 83. Consequently, the President's interpretation is at variance with the Charter, with the declaration of which 1 have just spoken and with the practice of the Security Council. Renee 1 protest against his ruling. 1 consider that he has announced the results of the vote incorrectly. The vote on the draft resolution, which he intends to put to the vote, will be a vote not on a procedural matter but on a matter of substance, to which the unanimity rule is applicable. 84. 1 am surprised at the attitude of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, who were parties to the San Francisco declaration of 7 June 1945. Row can they consider this ruling, this announcement by the President, to be in accordance with the Charter, withthe practice of the Security Council and, most important of all, With the four-Power declaration? 85. In short, the President's Interpretation of the vote is illegal. It is at variance with the Charter, it is at variance with the four-Power declaration to which 13 "1 now put to the vote the following question: Should the vote to be taken on the draft resolution be considered a procedural vote?":Y [303rd meeting, p.19.] There were 8 votes in favour, 2 against (1 vote against being that of a permanent membe!'~ and 1 abstention. The President then stated: Il••• 1 interpret the vote which has just taken place as a decision to consider the vote on the resolution as one of substance. IIi! [Ibid., p. 21.] 87. 1 should like to remind vou that the President at that meeting was the represe~tativeof France and that he said: 1'1••• The Presitient, as a representative of a permanent member of the Security Council, cannot ignore the San Francisco declaration."i/[Ibid., p.19.] He added: "... in the circumstances, the final provision of the Declaration, according to which the concurring vote of the five permanent members is necessary to decide whether a question is a matter of procedure, retains its importance"i/[ibid., pp. 20 and 21]. 88. At another meeting the representatlve of the United Kingdom stated: " .•. my Government stands by the San Francisco declaration" [305th meeting, p. 33]. 89. Accordingly, 1 should now like to ask the representatives of France and the United Kingdom whether they uphold their statements that they continue to regard the San Francisco declaration as being in force. 1 should like an answer to that question. 90. Ml'. BERARD (France) (translated from French): Following the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 should like to dispel any incorrect interpretations wmch might arise from the votewhich we have just taken. Every matter put before this Council must be regarded as a separate case; every resolution adopted by the Council i8 first of all subject to individual appraisal by every State represented here, in the light of the texts which are binding on aIl the Members of the United Nations, of the purpose of the resolution and of the consequences which it tnvolves. 91. We have now been asked by a sovereign State, in accordance with the Charter, for the assistance it is entitled to expect in the name of international solidarity in the service of peace. We are today taking a prelimli Passage quoted in English by the speaker. 92. The decision taken is based on Article 29 of the Charter; it is in answer to a request made by a 130vereign State, a Member of the United Nations, in connexion with events which have taken place in its territory; it affects only members of the Council and provides those members with appropriate means, l'nder present circumstances, to cas: further light on the situation. 93. Accordingly, l am convinced that the resolution before us is procedural in character, and that this character arises out of the Charter, our rules of procedure, the San Francisco declaration and the role we intend to assign to the sub-committee.

Ijustwanted to say this. Of course, we stand by the San Francisco declaration, but what we stand by is its applicability to the cases to which it applies. This is Dot one of them. That is ail l think it necessary at this moment to say in response to the direct question which the representative of the Soviet Union put to me. l do not think that ft would be popular, nor is it really necessary, for me at this stage to expound in detail my views on this whole question. l sha11, however, hope to do so at a later stage in our proceedings. 95. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l note that the United Kingdom representative has given a direct answer to my question to the effect that he considers the United Kingdom Government to be still bound by the San Francisco declaration. That is a very important statement and l am glad that it is consistent with the past. That being so, however, l would urge the United Kingdom representative to act accordingly, in other words, to abide by that declaration in its entirety, from beginning to end. 96. The represenLtive of France did not give a clear answeI' to my question. He expressed the view that the resolution before us is a procedural resolution. He is entitled to hold that opinion and l respect it. Nevertheless, in accordance with the San Francisco declaration, to which France subscribed, a11 the permanent members must be unanimous on this point. If any permanent member takes a different view, what happens then? Then, obviously, the other permanent members, who signed that declaration, must respect the opinion of the member of the Security Council who thinks differently, for the simple reason that, under the terms of the declaration in question, they undertook to decide whether a particulaI' question is or is not procedural by a vote whjch is subject to the unanimity rule. For that reason, l say that l respect the opinion of the representative of France. If, however, the French Government stands by this declaration, l ask that, in accordance with its terms, respect should be shown for the opinion of another member of the Security Council who takes a divergent position on this question and who considers that the resolution before us is not procedural. This situation is specifically covered by the San Francisco declaration. 99. MI'. LODGE (United States of America): Let me assure MI'. Sobolev that 1 intend to deal with all the points which he has raised, to the complete satisfaction of everyone here, and that 1 expect to reveal some of his errors and omissions and some of his fallacious reasoning. But 1 wish to do it after the vote. This is a very urgent situation in Laos. 1 think we ought to vote on this draft resolution, and after thevote 1 shall ask to be recognized, at which time 1 shall give total justification in explanation of all the points which MI'. Sobolev has raised. 100. MI'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (transJated from Russian): If the President intends to put the draft resolution to the vote now, 1 should like to make one more statement before the voting takes place. 101. The PRESIDENT: As 1 said before, 1 would like to put to the vote the drait resolution before anything else. But, if the representative of the USSR wishes to make a statement before we come to the vote on the draft resolution, 1 give him the floor again. 102. MI'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 should just like to add a few words to my earlier statement that the draft resolution before us concerning the appointment of a sub-committee to examine the situation in Laos is not procedural in character but substantive and concerns a question with major political implications. Certainly no ruling by the President can repeal the Charter or documents supplementing the Charter such as the four-Power declaration of 7 June 1945, nor of course can such a ruling impair the validity of the procedure established by the Charter and by that declaration. Accordingly, the action which the becurity Counci! now appears to be contemplatingwouldundermine the very foundations of the work of the Security Council, the very foundations of the Charter of the United Nations.

MI'. President, before we proceed to the vote, 1 should like to explain why 1 considered as correct your ruling that the drait resolution is subject to a procedural vote. 104. The issue l'aises 'natters to which we attach considerable importan' affecting the practice of the Seeurity Council. ~'he representative of the Soviet Union has sought to show that because on a 105. In view of what has been said, 1 should like-I must, 1 think-to enlarge for a moment on this point. It is quite true that in the past the practice of the Council has not been entirely consistent. But 1 should like to make it clear that the attitude and the view of the United Kingdom-that is aIl 1 can speak for-have been fully consistent throughout. For example, at the 303rd meeting of the Council on 24 May 1948, the Council considered a draft resolution for the establishment of a sub-committee in connexion with the situation in Czechoslovakia. On that occasion, while he did not directly challenge the President's ruling which had the effect of concluding that the decision was a substantive one, Sir Alexander Cadogan, then the British representative, gave as his view that it was perfectly clear that the establishment of a sub-committee by the Security Council was a question of procedure under the Charter in accordance with the rules of procedure and in accordance with the Declaration of San Francisco. On that occasion, he said: "What is proposed here is merely that we should caU upon three of our members to study further a matter which is already subject to investigation by the Security Council, and 1 cannot conceive that that is a question of substance. "There have been several occasions-I can recall one or two-when the Security Council as a whole has asked the five permanentmembers to get together and examine some question further. There has never been any question as to whether that was a matter of substance or not, and therefore my complaint is that this question should never have been raised. There should be no difference on a matter which, to me, is sa absolutely clear." [303rd meeting, p. 22.] 106. In similar circumstances in 1947 during the discussion in the Security Council at which the Council decided to appoint a sub-committee to secure information in connexion with the incidents in the Corfu Channel, Sir Alexander Cadogan said that as the vote which was to be taken was a purely procedural one he presumedhe could exercise his vote even though the United Kingdom was a party to the dispute. He did so and voted in favour of the establishment of the sub-committee. The attitude of the Soviet Union on that C'Ccasion was not so entirely consistent with the opinions which have been advanced this afternoon by the present representative of the Soviet Union. It is true that the Soviet Union representative on that occasion spoke against the establishment of a subcommittee and argued that a vote to do so should not 1 l 107. In the present instance likewise the United Kingdom has no doubt that it is in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Charter that a decision by the Council to establish a sub-committee of itself to assist it in its work should be treated as a matter of procedure. Indeed any other attitude must appear as dictated by a desire to irustrate the Council in the discharge of its responsibilities. 108. The representative of the Soviet Union has also referred to the San Francisco declaration.~towhich my Government as weIl as his was a party. He quoted paragraph 4 of this declaration to the effeet that the unanimity of the permanent members was required when the COUDcil decides to make an investigation. or determines that the time has come to calI upon States to settle their differences or makes recommendations to the parties. l think the phrase clearlymust be read as a whole. and ft seems to me to apply to a stage in the consideration of a dispute or situation which in the present case has not arisE::n. 109. It seems to me quite clearly that we are at the present within the framework of paragraph 2 and not of paragraph 4 of the San Francisco declaration. Paragraph 2 deals with the situations which can be taken by a procedur'll vote and it includes aroong these the establishment 1y the Council of "SUC'l bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions". 110. As l have already said, my delegation 'las in the past consistently taken the view that this paragraph in the declaration covers the establishment of suhcommittees such as that for which provision is made in the draft resolution now before the Council, and this remains our view today. 111. The representative of the Soviet Union also referred to the last sentence of the San Francisco declaration and argued that this fs a case when the question of whether a matter is procedural must be decided by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurr:ng votes of the permanent members. We should also read paragraph 1 of partII ofthe declarationwhich immediately precedes that paragraph. It says: "In the opinion of the delegations ofthe tlponsoring Governments, the draft charter"-as l.C then was- "itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the COUD.cil." 112. The second paragl'aph of part II on which the Soviet representative relied was therefore clearly intended to apply only when the Charter did not give any guidance; it was intended to apply to those cases where there was genuine doubt as to whether a matter was procedural or substantive. In the present case. Article 29 of the Charter gives a clear indication, namely, that, as a matter of procedure and adminis- ~ United Nations publication, Catalogue No.: 1955.V.2 (VoUI), p. 104. 114. soviétiques) sentant détaillée donné que On une de 114. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As the United Kingrlom representative has referred in considerable detail to the four-Power declaration and has given an Interpretation of several parts of that declaration with which r cannot agree, r am obliged to come back to this question again. An attempt is being made here to treat a question of great political significance, a substantive question, as one of procedure. 115. Francisco. 115. Let us take a closel' look atthe declaration made at San Francisco. 116. que quelconques, procédure; président;1I "s'organisera façon sessions tions mes sement sécurité le prévoit l'Organisation à seront conque, l'examen relative tions par 116. Paragraph 2 of that declaration reads: "••• the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure"-that is a procedural matter-and will Il determine the method of selecting its President"-also a purely procedural matter. It will 1I0 rganize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetingsn-this too is procedural. Tt willllestablish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions Il. One such body has, for instance, been set up by the Security Council, namely, the Committee of Experts whose task was to draw up the rules of procedure. This is precisely the sort of action that is envisaged in the paragraph r am quoting. The Council will lIinvite a Member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and invite any State when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute Il. The matters enumerated, relating to procedure, are matters which are decided by a procedural vote. 117. Then the declaration goes on to other matters. Paragraph 3 reads: 117. Le -Further, no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention under paragraph 2, SectionA, Chapter VITI. Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Connoil. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any member of . the Council from reminding the Members of the ! Organization of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement of international disputes. Il 118. Beyond that point, all questions are substantive. That was the understanding at San Francisco, thatwas the agreed interpretation of the Charter and ft was a written, not an oral interpretation. Itwas not simply an 118. ce on interprétatiC'n 119. The sponsors of the draft resolution cal1 this an inquiry but it is an investigation. There is no point here in hiding behind words. In saying that the subcommittee shall examine statements, receive further statements and conduct such inquiries as it may deem necessary, they are saying precisely the same thing as paragraph 4 of the San Francisco declaration. Sir Pierson Dixon does not wish to heed this provision. That is his affair; he is free to heed it or to disregard it. Yet it says in the declaration that "decisions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences". Let us consider this point. Surely it cannot be said that the question which is under discussion today has no political significance? Is it to be classed merely with questions such as the selection of the time and place of meetings of the Security Council? AState i8 being accused of aggression. That is what we read in the document which members of the Council have before them. 120. This is the question: Will the committee or subcommittee which is to examine this question concern itself with procedural matters such as the placing of water glasses and microphones or the seating of members of the Security Council? OrwiJl itdetermine the method of selecting its President? It would harclly seem so. The sub-committee which it is proposed we should select will deal with a question having major political consequences. In other words, it will deal with precisely such matters as are covered by paragraph 4 of the declaration. 121. Further on, in paragraph 5, we read: •••• in ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation-which may involve calling for reports, li-and here you have it in writting : the sub-committee is to submitreports- "hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, or other means-might not further aggravate the situation. Aftel' investigation, the CounCL. must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. Ifit so determines, the Council would be under obligation totakefurther steps. Similarly, the decision ta make recommendations, even when aU parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfil their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities·. 122. The reason 1 have read this out is simply to show that paragraph 4 of the San Francisco declat'ation 11. la San en d'une 123. pour jusqu'à vous-même suivie ensemble, déterminer procédure. présent. été nant, déclaration Conférence au 123. As far as the question of yodng is concernecI, the declaration has the sarne force as the Charter itself. l would point out to Sir Pierson Dixon that that has hitherto been universally recognized. He himself has said that it has been the practice to apply the declaration in its entirety, including the part which deals with the question of determining whether or not a mr:',,,, is procedural. He has said that this has been ..c:.e case hitherto. Hence it must be concluded that the present situation in the Security Council has been deliberately engineered and that it marks a turning point towards shelving the four-Power declaration on voting procedure in the Security Council, adopted at the San Francisco Conference. 124. et passé 124. It is obvious that this practice is about to be introduced. This is how today's events in the Security Conncil must be interpreted. 125. av(\!r orateurs, déclaration de àe trois de respect San 125. The PR ESIDENT: After the exhaustive comments that we have heard from the last speakers, l think that ft would be only natural for me to limit myself to a very brief statement concerning the remarks that the representative of the Soviet Union has directed to me and to my ruling. l think that his remarks fall mainly into three categories. One is the observance of the past practice. Another is my abidance by the Charter. The third is the San Francisco declaration. 126. As far as concerns the first category that l mentioned, 1 think that the past practice, and more recent than that mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union, shows that there has been at least one case similar to the one to which my ruling applies. As reported in the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, 126. remarques, pratique sentant cas Dans organes "At the 507th meeting the President ..• asked the Council to vote on whether the Ecuadorian draft resolution voted upon that morning was a procedural matter. There were 9 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention, the vote against being that of a permanent member, and the President declared adopted the proposal to consider the matter procedural." f2/ 127. As far as concerns my abidance by the Charter, l wish to reiterate that my interpretation is based on the firm conviction that the draft resolution which has been submitted falls clearly within the scope of 127. je ma clairement §j Ibid•• p. 80. 128. Furthermore, l would add that l also was guided in my ruling by the conviction that the tasks entrusted to the sub-committee established under the resolutioI> clearly define the nature of this body and of its work. It should not itself conduct investigations or make recommendations. The sub-committee should collect information and present the facts in order to clarify the present situation and te., enab1e the Council itself to make decisions. Rule 40 of the rules of procedure of the Council states: "Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter .•." It is the purport of the Articles of the Charter that has guided my decision. 129. As far as the third category Is concerned, repeat that the Chair can act only in accordance with the Charter and with the rules ofprocedure. Any other document cannot be binding if its interpretation might run contrary to the Charter itself. 130. It is not my intention, after so many comments have been heard around this table on the San Francisco declaration, tu enter now on any argument about the validity of the San Francisco statement on voting procedure to which speakers have been referring, but l feel obliged to stress again that this document cannot be interpreted in a wav inconsistent with the Charter, which is the only document to which we must adhere in any case and to which l have tried to adhere most strictly in my decision. 131. The PR ESIDENT: If there are no other speakers l should like to proceed now totake a vùi,e on the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/4214]. Since Isee no obj0ction, we will now proceed to the vote.

There are 10 votes in favour, 1 against, and no abstentions. l consider therefore the draft resolution adopted.

The Presidenthas just said that he considers the draft resolution adopted. However, his statement is not in accordance with the procedure for voting in the Security COUDcil laid down in the Charter. A vote against this resolution, which deals with a question of substance, was cast by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet ddegation. Therefore, in accordance with the Securi.ty Council's rules of procedure and withthe Charter, this resolution cannatbe regarded as adopted, 135. The San Francisco declaration is an interpretation of the Charter and cannot be opposed to the Charter, since it is an Interpretation upon which formal agreement was reached. Itis the ooly document adopted at the confe:;:ence concerned with the interpretation of specifie provisions of the Charter. andby virtue of that fact those parts of it which relate to the Charter are as important as the Cbarter itseJi. 136. It is clear from today's proceedings in the Security Councn that the action taken here today fol1owed a preconceived plan. The Council began by violating its rules of procedure, as we pointed out at the very outset. It went on by breaking v.ith the San Francisco declaration and ended by flagrantly violating a number of basic provisions ofthe Charterthe provisions dealing with voting. 137. AIl those who are genuinely concernedto ensure that the United Nations functions in accordance with the Charter and its principles should ponder the implications of this practice on the part of the Security Councn. 1 think nobody can doubt that the decision just taken by the Security Councn sets a very dangerous precedent which may have far-reaching repercussions on all the activities of the United Nations. 138. We are witnessing a first step towards a revision of the Charter. a revision in practice and in facto 1 believe that this will give many Members of the United Nations room for though1. If today the Security councn's rules of procedure can be broken. if one of the fundamental documents defining the basis of the Security Council's work-the San Francisco declaration-can be violated, we must consider what thlJ next stage will be, what fate lies in store for the United Nations Charter. 139. The Soviet delegation wishes to state once again that it ragards this resolution as non-existent. illegal and hence not binding upon anyone. 140. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has spoken serious and grave words. They strike. 1 would say. a note dissenting from the one 1 had hoped to see prevan in this meeting today when 1 recalled to the members of the Council that we were here to implement that part of the Charter which speaks of us as lia centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

Let me first express gratification that this resolution has been adopted, and by such a very large vote. There is no question whatever that it has been legally adopted and that there is absolutely no flaw at aIl in its status. 1 am confident that the four nations mentioned in the resolution will immediately address themselves to the work prescribed in the resolutionandI am sure that this will have an excellent effect on opinion throughout the world and will receive and merit the applause of aIl those who value the rights of small nations. 143. Ambassador Sobolev is a man of forensic talent and experience, who can be counted upon to make the strongest possible argument for any cause that he espouses. The fact that he was not able to make a better argument is therefore no reflection on him, but it does show that the cause which he was espousing had him on very weak ground indeed. 144. Of the cases which he cited, with the possible exception of one, not a one was analogous to the issue which we confronted here tonight. In fact, he even cited a case on page 190 of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Couneil, which was a case providing for a commission to supervise the impIementation of Seeurity Council decisions. Of course, one eannot imagine anything more substantive than supervising the implementation of Security Couneil deeisions. This is at the opposite extreme from this very mild sub-committee that we propose here. 14·5. Then Ambassador Sobolev :'1ad a great deal to say about the San Francisco declaration. Now Ihappen to think that the San Francisco declaration is significant largely as a matter of attitude. 1 agree with the President that the thing that governs us here is the Charter and the rules of the Seeurity Council. The President has made many wise observations tonight, but never more so than when ~e made that statement. That gets us back to fundamentals. 146. But 1 would like to quote something from this famous declaration of San Francisco to which Ambassador Sobolev referred so often. In this dec:laration there is a list of things to which the veto shall not oe applied. There are a number of them, but 1 will just read the part which affects this question: "For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire Section D of Chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any of its seven members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; .•. establish such bodies or agencies as it may 147. So Ambassador Sobolev, who based his case on the declaration of San Francisco, must recognize that the whole foundation is knocked out from under this argument by this quotation which 1 have just read. 148. 1 woulà like to make afewmoreremarks on this subject to summarize the position of the United States both on our procedure today and on the four-Power declaration. The United States has consistently taken the view that the so-called double veto cannot be used to make substantive a matter declared by the four-Power statement to be procedural. This was clearly expressed before the Council by Ambassador Gross, the United States representative, on 29 September 1950, nearly ten years ago, in these words: lISection n,. paragraph 2 of the San Francisco declaration was never intended, and cannot properly be construed, as giving the five permanentmembers of the Security Council the right to use the device of the double veto to determine unilaterally as non-procedural, matters which according to the Charter, or by agreement contained in Part 1 of the San Francisco declaration, are procedural. lI [507th meeting, pp. 9 and 10.] That was ten years ago, but that continues to be the view of the United States. 149. This resolution which we have just adopted establishes a sub-committee of the Council to receive statements and documents and to conduct such inquiries as it may determine necessary. We regard such action as a normal and accepted procedure by which the Council can make its work more orderly and efficient. This is truly, and 1 am quoting from the Charter now, a subsidiary organ which the Council deems necessary for the performance ofitsfunctions, which is the precise situation covered by Article 29. 150. Such a subsidiary organ is specifically considered procedural in the Charter in Article 29, which says: "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. lI It is also procedural under rules 28 and 33 of the rules of procedure. And 1 would like to read rule 28. It says: "The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question." 2/ Ibid•• p. 104. "1. to suspend the meeting; '2. to adjourn the meeting; "3. to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;" And as regards No. 4, let us note this weIl; "4. to refer any matter to a committee. to the Secretary-General or to a. rapporteur;" Then it continues: 115. to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or "6. to introduce an amendment. "Any motion for the suspension or the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate. 1I Now, that part in there to refer to a committee is put right in with all these other procedural things. Can that be just accidental? Would that have been done if that was a question of substance? 151., This matter is procedural under Part I, paragraph 2, of the four-Power declaration which l have already read. And it is procedural under General Assembly resolution 267 (li) which reads: "The General Assembly •.• "1. Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to any other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural, the decisions set forth in the attached annex be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly;" And one of the decisions referred to was: "Establishment of such subsidiary organs 2.S the Security Councn deems necessary for the performance ofits functions. 1I That is a vote of the General Assembly which states categol'ically that what we have just done is procedural. Let me calI the attention of the Council to the fact that the authority to refer "any matter to a committee" in the Council's rules of procedure Is found in rule 33 which gives the order of precedence of obviously procedural motions, and l am quoting, lIover aIl principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subjectll • 152. It is both illogical and contrary to the fundamental intention of the Charter that the Security Councn should be prevented by a double veto from obtaining assistance from subsidiary organs which it deems necessary for the performance ofits functions. But beyond that, in the reso1ution which we have adopted, the Council stands on a precedent of long standing in reaffirming that establishment of such a sub-committee is a matter under Article 29. Irefer, of course, to the Spanish case in 1946. The draft 153. Now, as a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has already tacitly conceded that under circumstances similar to those pertaining today, the Council can determine a resolution to be procedural without the concurring votes of all the pèrmanent members. Iwill tell you when that happened. That happened when the Council, on 29 September 1950, considered the agenda item, "Complaint of armed aggression against Taiwan (Formosa)". The Security COUDcil decided an issue in that case against the negative vote of one of the permanent members and the Soviet Union made no complaint. Because its political interests are different now, the Soviet Union takes an entirely different point of view from that which it took in 1950. 154. Now in contrast to that, let me point out that the United States has consistently taken the position since 1946 that resolutions of the type which we have today, setting up sub-committees of the Security Council, are procedural questions under Article 29. We 'took that position in the Spanish case, in the Corlu Channel case and in the Czech case. In the Czech case, which the Soviet Union has cited to support its position, the Council will remember that a majority of the members of the Council voted that the resolution was procedural. The UnitedStates made an explicit reservation to that effect and announced that regardIess of the àecision at that time, we would feel free to act in the future on the basis that resolutions establishing sub-committees were procedural. 155. But even more important than this, the United States concurred during the complaint relating to the Taiwan discussion in 1950, that the resolution was procedural and that a negative vote of a permanent member could not prevent it from being procedural. And we did this even though we were opposed to and voted against the resolution. That is the side we were That was our position then and that is our position now. There is no cloud of any kind on the resolution which we have just adopted.

The statement just made by the United States representative compels me to make certain comments. 157. The United States representative said that Part 1, paragraph 2, of the San Francisco declaration lists those actions of the Security Council which are procedural in nature. He specifically quoted the part of the paragraph which says that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, that is to say by a procedural vote, "establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions ". There is such a provision and there have indeed been cases in which the Council has established bodies for the performance of its functions on the basis of a vote of that kind in view of the procedural nature of the bodies concerned. We can cite, for example, the Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure of the Security Council and the Committee on the Admission of New Members, and there may weIl have been others. But 1 would point out to Ml'. Lodge, that "eference to committees and commissions is made not only in this part of the declaration. He is very well aware that reference to the establishment of commissions, and hence of committees (since "commission" is the generic term for commissions, committees, sub-committees-the precise title is immaterial) is found not only in this part, not only in paragraph 2 of the dec1aration, but also inparagraph 5. It is in this paragraph that reference is made to actions taken by the Council in connexion with questions of peace and security. And this is of the essence. When paragraph 2 of the declaration, like Article 29 of the Charter, says that the Security Council will "establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions", it i5 referring to bodies, to committees, sub-committees or commissions, which have no connexion with questions of peace and security, that is, with matters within the scope of Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. The San Francisco declaration is absolutely cleal' on this point. 158. You would be quite right if committees and commissions were referred to nowhere but in paragraph 2 of the declaration. But the point is that they are mentioned not only in paragraph 2 but elsewhere. And different procedures are laid down for the adoption of decisions. There is a procedure for such subsidiary organs of the Council as committees and commissions which are procedural in nature, which have no connexion with the maintenance of peace and security. This we concede. It is in accordance with the Charter. 159. par divergence de ment mais J'ai citer de propos et de la d'application et sous-comité vote la produit établie suffisamment déclaration cela, la établie France, de 159. Herein lies the difference. It is no accident that in some cases there is no dispute in the Security Council over the establishment of commissions or committees, because the matter is quite obviously procedural, while in other cases a dispute arises. 1 have quoted a number of cases-and though 1 do not propose to do so, 1 could quote another dozen-in which the Council took a decision for or against the establishment of subsidiary bodies to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security by a substantive, not by a procedural vote. This has been the practice of the Security Council, a practice which is based on fifteen years ofcompliance with the Charter. There is not a single case, and Mr. Lodge did not cite a single case, where a committee, sub-committee or commission was established to deal with a question involving the maintenance of international peace and security on the basis of a procedural vote. There neither are nor ever have been any such cases, because the Council has adhered to the practice establishedby the Charter, and where the Charter is not absolutely explicit, it has adhered to the San Francisco declaration. Indeed it was to help the Security Council to interpret this part of the Charter that the declaration was prepared jointly by the United States, France the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. 160. auteurs aujourd'hui, qui les Par France pris sert peut-être partie déclaration accepter celle tance qui façon forme cisco, l'ont pendant Mais nouvelle la violent. 160. 1 am bound to say that it is the sponsors of the San Francisco declaration who must bear responsibility today for the Situation which has arisen in the Security Council. It is they who are responsible for violating the San Francisco declaration, and in so doing, the United States, the Uliited Kingdom and France have violated the solemn obligation they assumed under that declaration. And it is of little avail to assert that they accept paragraph 2 and, as has been said here, perhaps paragraph 4, but that Part TI of the declaration does not suit them. A declaration is a declaration, and it is not possible to accept one part and not to accept another, in this instance, the part which has the greatest relevance ta the Security Council's present deliberations and which specifically indicates how a controversial issue is to be settled. The declaration is a single whole. \Vhen it was drafted at San Francisco, the United States, the United Kingdom and France regarded it as suitable. They thought it unexceptionable for a long time, apparently until today. But today it appears thata new practice is being introduced. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have decided to disavow their commitments and to trample them underfoot. 161. Therefore, we cannot consider the committee or suh-committee proposed in the resolution as a subsidiary body established in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter. This body is being set up in connexion 161. comité résolution créés The meeting rose at 1.15 a.m. Litho in U.N. Priee: $U.S. 0.50; (or equivalenr