S/PV.8564 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2019/488, which contains the text of a letter dated 13 June 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/2019/492, which contains the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); and S/2019/514, which contains the text of a letter dated 21 June 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo; His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Permanent Representative of Belgium, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue, endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015), is the result of 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts and technical negotiations. The Secretary-General regards the plan and the resolution as hard-won achievements of successful multilateralism, nuclear non-proliferation, dialogue and diplomacy. He welcomes the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which states that Iran continues to implement its nuclear- related commitments. At the same time, the Secretary-General is concerned about recent developments. He regrets that the United States recently decided not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with Iran and not to fully renew waivers for non-proliferation projects in the framework of the JCPOA. Those actions may impede the ability of Iran and other Member States to implement certain provisions of the Plan. The Secretary-General also regrets Iran’s announcement on 8 May that it would not commit itself to respecting the JCPOA limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and heavy water reserves at the current stage, and that it would further suspend compliance with the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernize the Arak heavy-water reactor should other participants not fulfil Iran’s demands, especially in the areas of banking and oil, within 60 days. He further regrets the subsequent announcement on 17 June that Iran may surpass on 27 June the limit on its enriched uranium stockpile set under the JCPOA. Such actions are not in the interest of the participants of the Plan and may not help preserve it. The Secretary-General encourages Iran to continue to implement all its nuclear-related commitments despite the considerable challenges it faces. The Secretary-General welcomes the initiatives of the other participants, which should be given full effect as a matter of priority. It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the Iranian people. Member States and other relevant actors should also work effectively with JCPOA participants towards the preservation of the Plan. At the same time, the Secretary-General encourages Iran to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restricted measures contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Recent events in the Gulf are a reminder that we are at a critical juncture. The Secretary-General calls on Member States to avoid actions that may result in a further deterioration of the current situation. He urges all parties to engage in dialogue and diplomacy to address their differences, exercise maximum restraint and de-escalate current tensions to avoid the risk of miscalculation and accidents. In that regard, the Security Council has an important role to play. As stated by the Secretary-General in his briefing to the Council on 13 June, “If there is one thing the world cannot afford, it is a major confrontation in the Gulf region.” (S/PV.8548, p.3 ) Let me now turn to the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492). As guided by the Security Council and consistent with our previous reports, the one before the Council today is focused on annex B to the resolution. First, with regard to the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, we have not received new reports on the supply, sale or transfer of items to Iran contrary to annex B, paragraph 2. The procurement channel established for the transfer of nuclear-related items to Iran remains an important mechanism for transparency, and all States and the private sector are encouraged to fully utilize and support it. In that connection, the Secretary-General noted the 3 May announcement by the United States that involvement in certain activities set forth in annex B, paragraph 2, may now be exposed to its national sanctions. He points out that the exemption provisions in paragraph 2 allow for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the JCPOA, subject to the relevant notification requirements. Secondly, with regard to the ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects information provided to the Secretary-General and the Security Council by France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Those Member States conveyed their views on Iran’s test-firing of a medium-range ballistic missile on 1 December 2018, flight tests of additional ballistic missiles from December 2018 to February 2019 and launches of space-launch vehicles in January and February. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches are inconsistent with annex B, paragraph 3, which calls on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. In addition, the report reflects our analysis of subcomponents retrieved from ballistic missiles launched at the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by the Houthis from March to June 2018. We ascertained that those subcomponents were produced from 2000 to 2010 and that some were sold as recently as 2012. In our assessment, those production- and sale-date ranges are incompatible with the Scud missiles known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015. Thirdly, in terms of arms-related provisions, the report reflects information regarding individuals found guilty in the United Kingdom of exporting combat aircraft parts from the United States to Iran through companies located in various countries. The Secretariat also examined a number of additional arms and related materiel recovered in Yemen. Those included a second surface-to-air missile, wings for a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle and a new unmanned surface vessel with explosives. On the basis of design characteristics, markings and types and manufacturers of specific subcomponents, the Secretariat is confident that those arms and related materiel, or parts thereof, are of Iranian manufacture. However, the Secretariat has no indications as to whether those items were transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016. Furthermore, the Secretariat examined samples of a shipment of small arms and light weapons seized by the United Arab Emirates in Aden in December 2018 and observed that part of the items had characteristics of Iranian manufacture. The Secretariat is still analysing the available information on that shipment and intends to report back to the Council accordingly. The report also noted a televised speech of the political leader of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar, and a statement by the Al-Quds Brigades spokesperson, Abu Hamza, in May that pointed to ongoing Iranian military support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Any Iranian arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The report also highlights the continued participation of Iranian entities in foreign arms defence exhibitions. Fourthly, the report provides additional information on previous and new travel allegedly undertaken by the Commander of the Al-Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Major General Qasem Soleimani. It also reflects information received by the Secretariat on an individual and several entities on the 2231 list that may have violated the assets freeze or travel-ban measures. To facilitate the implementation of those measures, the Secretary-General recommends that the information related to individuals and entities on the 2231 list be updated by the Council. In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to assure him once again of our full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Vale de Almeida. Mr. Vale de Almeida: . I am honoured to address the Security Council today on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First of all, I extend my warm thanks to Secretary- General António Guterres, Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve for the great collaboration on these files over the past few months. Additionally, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude to the colleagues in the Secretariat for their dedication and support, in particular in relation to the procurement channel and their work to prepare the latest report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492). We are just a couple of weeks away from 14 July, when it will be four years since the historic conclusion of the JCPOA in Vienna by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, the United States and Iran, as well as the EU High Representative. At this particular challenging moment, it is important to remind ourselves of the achievements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It rolled back Iran’s nuclear programme, blocked access to plutonium and highly-enriched uranium and established the most robust verification mechanism by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and was endorsed unanimously by the Council through the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). It is the only tool available to provide the international community with the necessary assurances on Iran’s nuclear programme. That is why the European Union is resolutely committed to the JCPOA. That is why we continue to support it and why we are determined to work with the international community to preserve it. The European Union has been consistent in its commitment to the continued full and effective implementation of the agreement, as long as Iran abides by its commitments. That has been repeated in numerous statements and in our most recent European Union Foreign Affairs Council conclusions in February. The JCPOA has been delivering on its nuclear goal of providing the international community with the necessary reassurances on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. As confirmed by 15 consecutive reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has continued to implement its nuclear-related commitments, and it must continue to do so. With reference to the Chair’s statement after the 6 March Joint Commission meeting, the remaining participants of the JCPOA recognize that, both the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments and the lifting of sanctions to allow for the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran constitute essential parts of the JCPOA. In that regard, the European Union and all its 28 member States deeply regret the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. The subsequent reimposition by the United States of unilateral sanctions and its decisions to not extend waivers with regard to trade in oil and to not fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects are having a significant impact on Iran’s economy. As she recalled in her statement on 4 May, the High Representative — together with the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom — remains committed to contributing to provide tangible results and economic dividends to the Iranian people. The operationalization of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, a special-purpose vehicle conducive to effective financial channels, is moving ahead and will enable legitimate trade with Iran, consistent with international and European laws and regulations. At the same time, the European Union notes with great concern the various announcements made by Iran on 8 May regarding its commitments under the JCPOA. As stressed in the joint statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on 9 May, the EU remains committed to the JCPOA. It does not accept any ultimatums and will assess Iran’s compliance on the basis of that country’s performance regarding its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A number of projects are being implemented in support of annex III of the JCPOA on civil nuclear cooperation, particularly in the field of nuclear safety and regulatory support. Annex III helps us get a better understanding of Iran’s nuclear needs and gradually build confidence in Iran’s programme. It also plays a significant role for Iran, as it balances the limitations of the nuclear programme with civil nuclear development and longer-term engagement. Established under annex IV of the JCPOA, the procurement channel remains a unique non-proliferation, transparency and confidence-building instrument. It is a key mechanism for preventing the misuse of nuclear or dual-use items and to ensure that exports of such items are consistent with the JCPOA. We recognize the challenges brought about by the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions. The procurement channel, however, remains a Security Council mechanism, and the decision on a proposal for transfer is endorsed by all 15 members. In the seventh report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2019/488), submitted to the Facilitator on 13 June and subsequently circulated as a Council document, the remaining participants stated their commitment to continuing to review proposals in an impartial and independent manner. In that context, it is a positive signal that the channel keeps receiving proposals, albeit at a decreased pace. Forty-four proposals have been submitted to date. A substantial amount of outreach has been conducted during the past few years, and countries around the world are aware of the procedures of the channel. Our outreach efforts will continue, together with colleagues from the Security Council secretariat and the Facilitator. We expect that all Council members will continue to support the preservation of the channel, in line with resolution 2231 (2015). While the JCPOA addresses nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a series of events outside the nuclear domain are increasingly worrying. The European Union consistently calls for reducing tension and regional military build-up by all actors. The European Union has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from activities that could deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missiles tests, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The European Union is a strong promoter of multilateral diplomacy and continues to advocate for dialogue and constructive engagement. Thanks to the JCPOA, the EU has been able to hold discussions with Iran on regional issues. Five EU-led discussions with France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have already taken place, with a focus on exchanging views with Iran on regional stability. It is thanks to the JCPOA that this dialogue, as well as other channels of communications between the EU and Iran, has been set up and provides useful platforms for discussions. Today, we may be at a critical juncture regarding the future of the JCPOA. Yet, it should be recalled that the JCPOA is a nuclear agreement that has been working and delivering on its goals. There is also no credible, peaceful alternative to it. The European Union , together with other partners of the international community, will continue to work relentlessly to preserve the JCPOA as long as Iran abides by its commitments.

I thank Mr. Vale de Almeida for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve.

I am speaking here in my capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). That resolution, adopted in July 2015, endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which entered into force in January 2016. The Plan of Action is the result of the diplomatic efforts of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it represents a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. As the Secretary-General recalls in his report (S/2019/492), the Plan of Action is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and in dialogue and diplomacy. It is a cornerstone of multilateralism, peace and international security. Since its entry into force to this day, it has guaranteed the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. It is therefore an honour for me to have taken on the role of Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in January. In carrying out this task, I have been able to rely, first of all, on the excellent work done by my colleague of the Netherlands, my predecessor as Facilitator, as well as on the unwavering support of the Secretariat. To them, I offer my thanks. During this mandate, my ambition is to support and improve the implementation of the resolution on behalf of the Security Council by following the three guidelines inherited from my predecessor: facilitation of dialogue between the parties, transparency in our work and support for trade through the procurement channel. That is not an easy task: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action currently faces many challenges. I will come back to that point. I now turn to the seventh report of the Facilitator (see S/2019/514), which was approved by all members of the Security Council after a comments period and a no-objection procedure. The report informs the Council about the activities carried out and the status of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) between 12 December 2018 and 15 June 2019, in conjunction with the reports of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) and the Joint Commission (see S/2019/488). As the text is rather technical in nature, I will not review all the elements that make it up. My report is at Council members’ disposal for reference and full information. However, allow me to mention the following three points. First, I would like to recall the two meetings of the Council in the 2231 format during the reporting period. On 3 April 2019, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission came to make a presentation on the procurement channel. On 24 June, the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the seventh report of the Secretary-General, prior to its public release. Secondly, in my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Thirdly, there are also references in my report to the two reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the reporting period, in February and May 2019. In its most recent report, the Agency certifies, for the fifteenth time, that Iran is in compliance with its nuclear commitments under the Plan of Action. I wish to underline the central role — impartial, factual and professional — played by the Agency in the implementation of the Plan. Let us be realistic: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is at a crossroads, and my role as an honest broker is not to look away from that reality but, rather to identify, with full impartiality, the points of disagreement so that the parties can find an agreed solution. The various letters circulated within the 2231 format reflect the state of deliberations among the parties. The communications are listed and summarized in my report, including the responses received from the Permanent Mission of Iran. The points of disagreement with respect to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) stand out upon examination. First, with regard to Iran’s activities related to missiles and space launchers, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, I note the various letters sent by several Member States describing those activities as inconsistent with annex B and Iran’s counter- arguments based on a different reading of paragraph 3 of that annex. The differences in the interpretation of paragraph 3 constitute a major and recurring point of contention. Other letters focused on possible Iranian arms transfers in the region, which are another source of disagreement. The exchange of correspondence also included the latest developments with respect to compliance with the entire Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015). I note the concerns expressed following the strengthening of the economic sanctions imposed by the United States since its withdrawal from the Plan, and, more recently, the end of some exemptions for non-proliferation nuclear projects, which affects compliance with resolution 2231 (2015). I also note concerns expressed on the recent announcements by Iran on its non-compliance with some of its commitments. Lastly, I take note of the concern expressed by some Member States, as well as by the Joint Commission in its report, on the impact of the sanctions reimposed by the United States on the work of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. The procurement channel is definitely at the heart of the Plan of Action mechanism: it ensures that the transfers approved through it comply with the provisions of the resolution. In conclusion, I join with the other bodies responsible for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretary-General and the Joint Commission in strongly regretting the deterioration of the current context, which affects compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the Plan of Action. Questions of international peace and security require collective responses, which is the raison d’être of the Security Council. The Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) constitute one of those responses and enjoy very broad support within the international community. Therefore, while referring to paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), I call on all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by refraining from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under JCPOA.

I thank Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

I thank our briefers this morning. The United Kingdom welcomes the Secretary- General’s seventh report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492). We extend our thanks to the Secretariat staff for their continued professionalism and the support they provide to the Secretary-General in producing a thorough and well- evidenced report. When I last addressed the Security Council in this format in December (see S/PV.8418), I explained that the policy of the United Kingdom towards Iran was motivated by three objectives. The first, and most critical, of those objectives was to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear capability that would threaten the Middle East and Europe beyond it. The United Kingdom participated in negotiations on, and we remain committed to, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We believe that is the best way to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. The JCPOA is an essential part of the global non-proliferation architecture. It is critical for our national security and for the shared security of our partners and allies. We therefore once again express our regret at the United States decision to leave the JCPOA, reimpose sanctions on Iran and not fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Plan. Those actions are contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015). We continue to work hard to operationalize the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) to ensure that legitimate business with Iran can continue. We have also participated in core projects within the deal, including taking on a co-chairing role on the Arak modernization project. As long as Iran remains in full compliance, the United Kingdom will do everything it can to support the deal. We are working extremely hard on INSTEX with our E3 partners, France and Germany. We welcome the latest International Atomic Energy Agency reports of February (see S/2019/212) and May (see S/2019/496) and the Secretary-General’s report (S/2019/492), which confirm that Iran continues to uphold its commitments under the JCPOA, as we heard from our briefers this morning. But we are deeply concerned that this meeting is taking place just as Iran is threatening to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA by exceeding its low-enriched uranium stockpile limit. If Iran does go over these limits, the non-proliferation benefits of the deal will be eroded. I therefore urge Iran not to undertake activity that will go beyond the limits specified in the JCPOA and to continue to implement its commitments in full. The second United Kingdom objective, as I shared with the Council in December, was the necessity to constrain Iran’s actions, which threaten the stability of the region. I made clear that while resolution 2231 (2015) was an endorsement of the JCPOA, it was understood by all in the Council at the time of adoption that it was designed not just to address nuclear issues, but to continue to impose binding restrictions to curb Iran’s ballistic-missile and proliferation activity, which, as I said earlier, threaten the region and beyond. As we also heard this morning, Iran continues to conduct ballistic-missile activity that is inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Iran has denied that these activities are inconsistent with the resolution because it claims it does not intend to put a nuclear weapon on those missiles. As the Secretary-General’s report notes, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have set out clearly in letters to the Council how these missiles are designed to be capable of delivering a nuclear payload. To be clear, “designed to be capable” means having the capabilities by virtue of technical design. The stated intent is irrelevant. As our letters set out, we use Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category 1 to make our assessment of nuclear deliverability. The technical specifications under MTCR Category 1 constitute the only widely internationally accepted definition of nuclear deliverability. In addition to the 35 States participating in the MTCR, these criteria have also been widely adopted among non-MTCR Governments with respect to implementing obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). These are therefore the most objective criteria available to assess consistency with resolution 2231 (2015). Just to quote from the criteria: in the context of resolution 2231, and consistent with the MTCR criteria, “designed to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon” means capable of carrying a payload of 500 kilograms or more over a range of 300 kilometres or more. Iran has also transferred missiles to a number of armed groups, in violation of several Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2231 (2015), 2216 (2015) and 1540 (2004). The latest report of the Secretary-General contains concerning information regarding the firing of a surface-to-surface missile in January from the area of Damascus towards the Golan Heights and the transfer of technical know-how for unmanned aerial vehicle production to Iraq, in violation of arms-transfer restrictions. It also mentions the attack on Abha airport on 12 June, although the type of projectile used in the attack has yet to be determined. The United Kingdom considers the transfer of such weapons to be in contravention of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015). There is firm international consensus that such proliferation of missile technology to non-State actors is destabilizing for the region and escalates already high tensions. We call for these activities to stop. The actions are part of a pattern of Iranian behaviour that poses a serious danger to peace and stability in the region. On Monday, I told the Council in closed consultations that following our own assessment of a range of evidence, the United Kingdom had concluded that it was almost certain that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carried out attacks on two tankers on 13 June. We are also confident that Iran bore responsibility for the 12 May attack on four oil tankers near the port of Fujairah. There can be no justification for attacks on maritime traffic that contravene international rules on freedom of navigation and maritime transport and that further threaten peace and security in the region. The current tensions and instability serve no one. As the Secretary-General has made clear, the world cannot afford a conflict in this region. Therefore, I want once again to call for de-escalation, for dialogue and for full respect for international rules. The final objective I set out in December was the hope that Iran could normalize its economic and diplomatic relations with the region and beyond and assume its rightful role as a prosperous, responsible Power constructively engaged. We still believe that this is possible. The United Kingdom will continue to play its full part alongside international partners to find diplomatic solutions to reduce the current tensions and to uphold the landmark JCPOA nuclear agreement. I urge Iran to join us and do the same.

I should like to begin by thanking Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo for her seventh semi-annual report and the Secretary-General for his report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492). Let me also congratulate our colleague Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Permanent Representative of Belgium, in his capacity as Facilitator, for his outstanding work thus far to promote the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It is also my pleasure to welcome Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, Head of the European Union delegation and Coordinator of the Joint Commission. Four years after its conclusion and its endorsement by the Security Council through resolution 2231 (2015), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the aim of which was to address the concerns of the international community regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, is more than ever at a critical juncture. Indeed, the concerns regarding the viability of the agreement are being stoked by a series of adverse events as we prepare to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The unilateral withdrawal of one of the key actors and the mounting tensions in the Persian Gulf are undermining the foundations of the agreement, which was secured after many long years of multilateral negotiations. Despite the oft-reaffirmed commitment of the other parties, the combination of the aforementioned negative factors is undermining the Iranian nuclear agreement. Like any other human endeavour, it is imperfect; however, it remains an inclusive framework designed to temper the military nuclear ambitions of the Iranian side. For that reason, Côte d’Ivoire is of the view that we must pool our efforts to prevent the undermining of the consensus around the JCPOA and therefore, despite the stumbling blocks, maintain the level of international mobilization and support for the agreement, which, in our view, is fully in keeping with multinational efforts to tackle nuclear proliferation. Côte d’Ivoire fervently hopes that responses to the potential shortcomings of the JCPOA will be crafted within the framework of the Joint Commission, as provided for in annex IV, so as to devise dynamic, consensus-based solutions, taking account of the observations and concerns expressed by all parties. My country holds the deep conviction that a multilateral approach is the only way to dispel, through frank and proactive dialogue, mutual distrust and come up with mutually acceptable solutions. My country holds the view that keeping the Iranian nuclear agreement alive is contingent on the commitment of the signatory parties and a de-escalation of current tensions, which have the potential to spark an armed conflict with potentially disastrous consequences for the Middle East in particular and for the world in general. Given our strong commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, my delegation would like to urge the parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from any hostile action that would undermine international peace and security. Côte d’Ivoire therefore condemns the recent attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and the threats that they pose to the security of international trade. We call for an impartial investigation to identify the perpetrators and bring them before the relevant judicial bodies. My country encourages the Iranian authorities to uphold their commitments under the JCPOA and to continue to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that regard, we note that the fifteenth report of the IAEA on the verification of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments (S/2019/496, annex), circulated on 14 June, concludes that Iran is in compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA, in particular with regard to its enriched uranium quota. That is why Côte d’Ivoire sincerely hopes that the Iranian authorities will renounce any decision to withdraw from the agreement. The history of international relations teaches us that the greatest tragedies experienced by humanity often stem from the inability of nations to engage in constructive dialogue, which is essential to the reconciliation of partisan interests so that peace prevails in the world. At a time when belligerent rhetoric is increasing and becoming more radical, with the prospect of an armed conflict looming in the Gulf region, Côte d’Ivoire would like to join the urgent calls for the establishment of a robust dialogue between the parties in order to protect humanity from the ravages of a major conflict, which we can do without.

I thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Ambassador Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and Mr. Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador of Belgium, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for their very enlightening briefings. I also wish to commend the professionalism and commitment of the Secretariat, which has produced a high-quality, very detailed and balanced report (S/2019/492). The challenges that bring us together within the Council are more numerous and more serious than ever and our responsibilities are immense with regard to both non-proliferation issues and all regional issues with which we have to deal. In that context, our responsibility is to be fully engaged in preventing and resolving crises. From 2003, at the initiative of the E3 and with the support of the Council, that collective commitment and engagement made it possible to chart the way for negotiations with Iran, which led to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The agreement was formalized by the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), which was supported by the five permanent members of the Council, reflecting their unity and our collective unity on non-proliferation issues, which are at the heart of our security. France remains firmly committed to the preservation of that framework and will actively continue its efforts to implement its obligations under the JCPOA, with its partners in the European Union, as long as Iran respects its nuclear commitments. The JCPOA, which put an end to a serious nuclear proliferation crisis, is a cornerstone for the stability of the entire Middle East and an essential non-proliferation instrument. As we witness a worrying increase in tensions in the region, everyone must refrain from statements and measures that could weaken the JCPOA and precipitate an escalation. The withdrawal of the United States from the agreement last year, followed by the American sanctions, started a very worrying period of uncertainty. France, in conjunction with its partners and in line with the Secretary-General, has clearly expressed its regret and concern about the decisions of the United States. In that context, recent Iranian announcements with regard to non-compliance with the provisions of the JCPOA, which the Secretary-General has also regretted, are extremely worrying. I would like to reiterate my country’s position on that point: it is imperative that Iran continue to fully and rigorously implement its nuclear obligations. Apart from the announcements, Tehran must refrain from any measure that would constitute a violation of its commitments. The JCPOA is the outcome of a fragile balance. Any suspension, even partial, of Iran’s commitments would have negative repercussions in terms of the threat of nuclear proliferation and would further destabilize the region. As France has said in the Chamber on many occasions, the preservation and full implementation of the agreement must go hand in hand with compliance with all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), which endorses it. Everyone knows that the collective commitments made in 2015 do not end with the JCPOA framework. In that regard, I would like to express France’s concern over the various elements identified by the Secretary-General in his report concerning Iran’s continued non-compliance with several of the provisions, in particular with regard to its ballistic activities and the transfer of various arms to other actors in the Middle East. Iran is conducting highly destabilizing missile activities, whether it be its efforts to develop a ballistic missile programme, contrary to resolution 2231 (2015), or transfers to State and non-State actors in the Middle East, which place Iran in breach of several resolutions of the Council, including resolution 2231 (2015). It is therefore essential that Iran cease such activities and fully comply with the resolutions adopted by the Council. Allow me to make an urgent appeal for pragmatism and clear thinking. Given the risk of escalation caused by the incidents in the Gulf of Oman, it is crucial that all the actors concerned exercise the utmost restraint and prioritize the path of dialogue and peaceful settlement, thereby urgently contributing to regional de-escalation. France encourages and supports all mediation efforts between the parties. Ways must be found towards pacification through the efforts of all the actors involved. The crisis should also be an opportunity to pursue regional stabilization and security mechanisms. The collapse of the JCPOA would represent a dangerous step backwards, bringing uncertainty and potentially far-reaching consequences for the region, the non-proliferation regime and our collective security. We must all work to prevent such a scenario, the price of which we would all pay, and to preserve the nuclear agreement. I call on everyone around this table to rally behind that goal. As members know, France advocates a comprehensive approach, supported by the European Union, which seeks to ensure the preservation of the JCPOA while also addressing the long-term framework of the Iranian nuclear programme and Iran’s conduct in the ballistic sphere and in regional conflicts. Given the worrying developments under way, I would like to conclude by calling, on behalf of France, for all stakeholders to exercise restraint, disengage their autopilot and shoulder their responsibility through respect and dialogue in order to find common ground and achieve de-escalation. Let us not sleepwalk into a military confrontation but be actors in an exclusively political solution. The Council may rest assured of France’s resolute commitment to that end.

Let me first thank all our briefers this morning for their insightful presentations. Germany welcomes the report of the Secretary- General (S/2019/492) on the ongoing implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It is a key contribution to monitoring compliance with resolution 2231 (2015), and we consider its current scope and methodology fully appropriate. We also welcome the update on the activities of the procurement channel and remain fully committed to the procurement channel process. It is important to recall that resolution 2231 (2015) endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is an important contribution to the global non-proliferation architecture. It is an important asset to security in the region and beyond. This is a key moment for the JCPOA and for the efforts of the international community to preserve it. Along with our European partners, Germany remains fully committed to the JCPOA and its implementation, provided Iran stays in full compliance with its JCPOA commitments. Germany deeply regrets the unilateral decision of the United States to leave the JCPOA, reimpose United Nations sanctions on Iran, cease extending the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with Iran and discontinue the full renewal of waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects. The non-proliferation waivers are crucial to ensuring the JCPOA’s non-proliferation function and are key to our shared security. We are deeply concerned about Iran’s announcement that it will not commit to respecting the limits of enriched-uranium and heavy-water reserves. We urgently appeal to Iran to fully respect its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA and to refrain from any steps that would result in a breach of those commitments. On that basis, Germany will continue to work together with the remaining JCPOA participants to ensure that Iran can receive economic benefits from sanctions relief. In that context, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is part of European efforts to preserve and safeguard the JCPOA, and as we heard this morning, INSTEX will soon be operational. The full and effective implementation of the provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) in all their aspects is also of key importance to regional and international stability. We encourage all States to continue taking appropriate steps to ensure that they are respected and complied with. Germany agrees with the Secretary-General that issues not directly related to the nuclear deal should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement. Those issues can be most effectively addressed while the nuclear deal remains in place. Regarding Iran’s transfer of arms, including missile technology, to non-State actors in the region, and considering Iran’s ongoing transfers and ballistic- missile activities, the findings of the Secretary-General are cause for deep and serious concern. Those activities have a destabilizing effect in the region and also negatively affect all European security interests. Germany is concerned about the possibility of Iran continuing to advance the scope and precision of its ballistic-missile arsenal. We consider that Iran’s programme for developing ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), and we accordingly call on Iran not to conduct any further ballistic-missile launches or related activities inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), and to refrain from unacceptable rhetoric accompanying those activities. We note with concern the indications in the Secretary-General’s report of Iran’s transfer of ballistic- missile technology to the Houthis in Yemen and of possible transfers to Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip. Such transfers would constitute violations of resolution 2231 (2015) and transfers to the Houthis, in particular, may also constitute a violation of resolution 2216 (2015). In that context, we also want to recall that resolution 1540 (2004) forbids the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to any non-State actor. Furthermore, the transfer of arms and missile technology to the Houthis endangers the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement in Yemen. Beyond that, the proliferation of missile technology to increasing numbers of non-State actors in the Middle East is a deeply worrying development. If not stopped, it will have the effect of exacerbating current and future armed conflicts in the region. Germany therefore strongly urges Iran to refrain from any transfers of ballistic missiles or missile technology, as well as the transfer of any other arms or related material from Iran, and to fully respect annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). We have taken note of the Secretary-General’s suggestion in his report that updated and more detailed entries would facilitate the implementation of the annex B restrictive measures of resolution 2231 (2015). Germany stands ready to support efforts to provide factual updates and clarifying specifications to the list of entries as needed. Before concluding, I would like to say once again that Germany remains fully committed to the JCPOA and to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We call on all States, and Iran in particular, to make greater efforts to build trust with its neighbours and play a more constructive role in the region. All of us, including the Council, must focus on de-escalation and dialogue, and we call on all actors to remain level- headed and work to prevent any actions that could lead to a military escalation.

We thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and Mr. João Vale de Almeida for his briefing. We note the work of the Permanent Representative of Belgium as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of the resolution’s provisions. We share the Secretary-General’s position on the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the reimposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran, which are contrary to the aims of both the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), and undermine Iran’s ability to comply with their provisions. We want to remind the Council once again that the JCPOA and the Council’s unanimous adoption on 20 July 2015 of resolution 2231 (2015) constitute a historic achievement of global diplomacy and multilateralism in general. They have proved that even the most acute problems and crises can be overcome by political means if the will to do so is there. Iran is conscientiously fulfilling its obligations under the agreements in the framework of the JCPOA. Numerous reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency attest to that. In that sense, the JCPOA has become an extremely important instrument for ensuring the international non-proliferation regime, and Iran is one of the most verified countries in the world. Currently, the only way to preserve the JCPOA is for all its remaining States parties to fulfil their voluntary commitments in good faith. In this context, we note that the Secretary- General’s report clearly testifies to Iran’s strict observance of all its nuclear-related commitments, albeit in the face of considerable challenges. In every international forum we have repeatedly condemned irresponsible attempts to torpedo agreements and expressed the hope that matters of global security and stability will no longer be held hostage to the domestic political intrigues of individual States. Unfortunately our appeals have been ignored and the unique potential of the JCPOA has been jeopardized. Having unilaterally withdrawn from the JCPOA and undermined its agreements, which are fundamental to regional and global security, the United States is now trying to shift the blame onto everyone else. Not only is it refusing to implement resolution 2231 (2015), which it endorsed, it is also trying to inflict worse punishment on every other Member State for implementing Security Council decisions. And from Iran, on the other hand, it is demanding that Iran absolutely and unquestioningly fulfil all obligations. However, there are many similar examples of doublethink in the steps taken by the American Administration. It proclaims that no one is planning regime change in Iran while simultaneously threatening obliteration and new sanctions. It calls for dialogue and at the same time publicly declares its intention to increase its military presence in the region. Such signals, which are beyond the skill of even an experienced cryptologist to decode, can only bring the situation to a point of no return. The only practical step that can be taken to save the JCPOA is the remaining parties’ implementation of their obligations under the agreement. We must abandon fear and selfish motives and prioritize the tasks of maintaining the viability of the JCPOA. We believe that constantly raising the stakes and one-upping each other about who cares most about the agreement will only result in extreme attitudes. The forces that believe that the only way to resolve any international issue is with political pressure, economic strangulation and blackmail through military might must not be allowed to gain the upper hand. Since the very moment that the JCPOA was concluded, its effectiveness has been defined by the unity and political will of all its participants and their joint focus on the end result. It means that today we must also work together to create the conditions that will enable us to confidently resolve the challenges facing those who remain committed to the JCPOA. We are in favour of preserving the JCPOA, and we want Iran to remain committed to it. But we understand Tehran’s deep disappointment with the situation that has developed, whereby its full compliance with its obligations is demanded with nothing proposed in exchange, which was why the deal was made in the first place. On top of that, this is going on against the backdrop of Washington’s efforts to strangle Iran with economic sanctions, not to mention military threats. All of the parties to the JCPOA must make genuine rather than token efforts to ensure that Iran understands what it is implementing its obligations under the JCPOA for. That is a legitimate demand from Tehran. We are sorry to see that the report suffers from a chronic lack of evidence in the parts concerning Iran’s missile programme, supposed arms shipments out of Iran as well as various alleged violations that Tehran has permitted of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) on assets freezes and travel bans on individuals. The problem of amateur inspections by representatives of the Secretariat who do not have the necessary skills or mandate to conduct them persists. The language about confidence in the Iranian origin of various missiles and other weapons that representatives of the Secretariat were allowed to study ultimately proves nothing. The problem is compounded by the reservations about issues that the Secretariat is not in a position to confirm, to the effect that Iran sent the aforementioned missiles or the wings of some military drones overseas after the JCPOA had entered into force. Which leads one to ask why, if the Secretariat cannot confirm or produce the necessary expertise to show that there was a violation of resolution 2231 (2015), does it constantly include these subjects in its reports? We can see that the situation in the Persian Gulf is being artificially ramped up and is jeopardizing peace and security in the region, as well as international efforts to resolve the conflicts there. We are not convinced by the so-called proofs presented of Iran’s guilt. In general, the impression we get is that a casus belli is being conjured up. The loud rhetoric about Iran’s ties to Al-Qaida and the attacks on tankers, which should be of less interest to Iran than anyone, are increasingly reminiscent of the events of March 2003, when arguments were fabricated to justify an invasion of Iraq. We all know what the consequences of that were. We believe that there is an alternative to those provocative actions. We have to strengthen the general atmosphere of trust in the region. We would like to point out that in resolution 598 (1987), the Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to work together with the States of the region on measures to enhance its security and stability. That work is now needed more than ever. Russia is ready to support that by working in contact with our regional partners and all interested parties. The ultimate aim must be to form a genuinely inclusive security architecture that encompasses every State in the region. Our concept for strengthening security in the Persian Gulf under international guarantees remains relevant, and its implementation could begin with the holding of a conference with the participation of the States of the subregion with a view to eventually including other States in the Middle East. Needless to say, we support the Secretary-General’s call for taking every possible step that could lead to de-escalation. In conclusion, I would particularly like to emphasize that the Russian Federation remains committed to the unconditional implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We support the Secretary-General’s call in his report for refraining from provocative statements and actions that could have a negative impact on regional stability. We will continue to strive for dialogue aimed at finding compromises and a balance of interests. That is the only way. Only coordinated collective efforts can bring the current situation back under control.

I would like to begin by thanking the briefers for their detailed and insightful presentations. My delegation joins others in welcoming the seventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and I want to reaffirm South Africa’s commitment to its full implementation. South Africa welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the greatest diplomatic achievement in the area of nuclear non-proliferation since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty in 1996. The JCPOA is a milestone deal, reached on 14 July 2015 after 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts and complex negotiations by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that regard, my delegation fully supports the Secretary-General’s view, expressed in paragraph 2 of his report, that such “diplomatic efforts and hard-won achievements must be preserved and built upon”. South Africa welcomes the fact that Iran has complied with all its nuclear-related commitments as confirmed by the fifteenth report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, submitted to the Council on 31 May. It continues to be crucial for Iran to continue to comply with the provisions of the JCPOA. It is important that all the remaining parties to the JCPOA fully implement and comply with the provisions of the agreement. South Africa deeply regrets the decision by the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA. Furthermore, we share the disappointment expressed by the Secretary-General in his report regarding the decision of the United States not to renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the JCPOA. It is our view that the decision by the United States will affect Iran’s ability to fully implement the provisions of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). It is important to recall that the lifting of sanctions, especially on certain nuclear-related materials, was part and parcel of the JCPOA. While we commend the benefits of the JCPOA as an essential instrument of nuclear non-proliferation, we want to stress that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee that they will never again be used by anyone under any circumstances. South Africa would like to remind the Council that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament will inadvertently affect the gains made on nuclear non-proliferation. South Africa underlines the importance of respecting the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. South Africa is a staunch supporter of nuclear- weapon-free zones as one of the major contributors to nuclear non-proliferation and critical building blocks towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In that regard, we want to highlight the urgent need for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. South Africa welcomed General Assembly decision 73/546 of November 2018, mandating the convening of a conference to establish such a zone, to be held in November 2019. We call on all countries of the region to actively participate in good faith to ensure that the conference is indeed a success. South Africa wishes to reiterate the fact that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as other agreements made during subsequent Review Conferences, remain valid until they are fully implemented by all of us. Finally, regarding the broader security of the region, South Africa joins others in expressing its concern about the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf and its impact on international peace and security. South Africa urges all parties involved to exercise the utmost restraint and not to allow the situation to get out of hand. The Council must support initiatives aimed at the restoration of peace and stability, not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the broader Middle East region.

We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the important briefings given by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Ambassador João Pedro Vale de Almeida. We also thank Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve for his valuable briefing as well as for his work as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Peru attaches high priority to compliance with and implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), by which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. We are of the view that the Plan, and the subsequent verification and monitoring regime, reveals the value of multilateralism and diplomacy in peacefully resolving international disputes and in maintaining international peace and security, and in that regard must be preserved. We are paying close attention to the implementation of the Plan, both within the scope of the Security Council and that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors. In that respect, we take note of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2019/492), and we wish to emphasize that, as verified by the IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been complying with all the provisions of the Plan. However, like the Secretary-General, we regret the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and the taking of other actions that may impede the ability of the parties to implement certain provisions of the JCPOA and of resolution 2231 (2015). In the face of the decision of other parties to the JCPOA to maintain their commitment to the Plan and their support for the verification work of the IAEA, we regret the announcement made on 8 May by Iran that it would not commit to respecting the limits on enriched uranium and heavy water reserves at the current stage if the other parties to the agreement failed to meet its demands within 60 days. On the other hand, we stress the need for strict compliance with all the restrictive measures set out in annex B to the resolution, which include transfers related to nuclear energy, ballistic missiles and weapons to or from Iran, as well as provisions on the freezing of assets and travel bans. Specifically, and in line with annex B, paragraph 3, to resolution 2231 (2015), we urge the Iranian authorities not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to launch nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. We consider it of the utmost importance that the Iranian authorities conduct themselves with prudence and moderation, bearing in mind that the development of their ballistic missile programme may be perceived as a provocation and/ or an arms race, capable of increasing tensions in a particularly unstable region. We support the work that the procurement channel has been developing as a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism that ensures that transfers are consistent with the provisions and objectives of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). We underscore how important it is that the Council remain united in its duty to guarantee full respect for the JCPOA and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), with a view to guaranteeing the validity of the non-proliferation regime and maintaining international peace and security. Finally, given the delicate situation that has arisen in the Persian Gulf, we join others in calling all parties to exercise caution, de-escalate tensions and resolve differences through dialogue.

I would like to thank today’s briefers — Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under- Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Ambassador João Vale de Almeida — for their respective, very informative briefings. Allow me also to thank Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve for his work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Poland supports the procurement channel and the Procurement Working Group, as well as the coordinating role of the European Union. Poland welcomes the seventh report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (S/2019/492). Similar to previous reports, it is a thorough and balanced document. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which constitutes an integral part of the resolution, is an important achievement of multilateral diplomacy, a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. We welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency’s efforts to strictly monitor and verify the commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to guarantee the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the JCPOA. We note that the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran is effectively implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and the fact that the Agency itself continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. However, in that context, we are extremely concerned about Iran’s announcement that it will not commit itself to respecting the limits on enriched uranium and heavy water reserves and that it will furthermore suspend compliance with uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernize the Arak heavy water reactor. We share the Secretary-General’s view that such an ultimatum is counterproductive and may not help preserve the Plan or the interests of the Iranian people. It will be difficult for the international community to defend the JCPOA after Iran ceases to fully implement it. We call on Iran to refrain from actions that could undermine further implementation of both the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), which is even more important now, as it refers not only to the activities under the scope of annex B. We urge Iran to uphold its commitment never to seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons and to continue to apply the additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and formally ratify the protocol in the near future. The restrictive measures described in annex B constitute an integral part of resolution 2231 (2015) and need to be implemented thoroughly. We believe that more needs to be done by all regional actors to find lasting, peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, given the fact that the high level of confrontation across the region can have extremely dangerous repercussions not only in the region, but elsewhere as well. In that regard, we note Iran’s engagement in the provision of military, financial and political support to non-State actors across the region. Bearing in mind Iran’s important role in the region, we encourage Iranian authorities to cooperate closely and constructively with the international community in efforts aimed at de-escalating the current tensions in the Middle East. Iran’s ballistic missile activity, especially as related to long-range missiles, goes far beyond its defence purposes. Ballistic missile launches are inconsistent with the provisions of resolutions 1540 (2004), 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). Together with other members of the European Union, we underline that tensions and distrust in the Middle East should not be further exacerbated. We call on Iran to play a constructive role in that regard and avoid unhelpful rhetoric.

We thank Under- Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Vale de Almeida of the European Union delegation and Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve of Belgium, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings to the Council on the implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015). We also thank Ms. DiCarlo and Mr. Pecsteen de Buytswerve for presenting the reports (S/2019/492 and S/2019/514). I think that everyone would agree that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a historic achievement in multilateralism, or, in the words of the Secretary-General, a hard-won achievement of successful multilateralism, nuclear non-proliferation, dialogue and diplomacy. In that regard, I would like to highlight the following points. First, we continue to support the full implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2105) as a whole. We commend Iran’s compliance, which to date has been verified by 15 reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We hope that Iran will continue to comply with the JCPOA and cooperate with the IAEA in the performance of its verification mandate. We of course deeply regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, which continues to present difficulties with regard to its implementation. On the one hand, we understand that challenge; on the other, we are also concerned about Iran’s intention to reduce its JCPOA commitment. It is in the interests of all parties to preserve the JCPOA. Therefore, we would like to urge all parties to refrain from taking actions to the detriment of the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) as a whole. We further urge all JCPOA participants to live up to their commitments to preserve the JCPOA by faithfully fulfilling their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). Secondly, we strongly urge all parties to continue engaging in constructive dialogue to resolve differences that arise from the interpretation and implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Implementing sanctions, in particular unilateral ones, is essentially not the way forward sought by the international community. In the same vein, we ask Iran to consider relevant concerns when carrying out its activities in order to sustain stability in the region. Thirdly, we should keep other issues not directly related to the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) separate. We need to be very cautious in addressing the issue of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), as its implications might go beyond the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. Their delicate balance needs to be preserved. It is also our collective obligation to ensure that the proper consideration of the JCPOA issue contributes to improving the overall situation in the region. We acknowledge that, to some extent, the situation in the region influences the implementation of JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). In that regard, we urge all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from taking actions that could exacerbate the situation. It is pertinent for us to create stability and a conducive environment for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). That responsibility does not exclusively fall upon the JCPOA participants or Council members, but the entire international community. Let me conclude by reiterating our main objective of ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran and protecting the legitimate interests of Iran. Within a broader scope, our objective is to maintain peace and stability and uphold the rule of law in order to enjoy a safe and prosperous world for all.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Vale de Almeida and Ambassador Pecsteen de Buytswerve of Belgium, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. I commend the parties concerned for their work. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — a multilateral agreement endorsed by the Security Council — has the effect of international law. It is an important achievement of multilateralism and is of crucial importance for safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East. The implementation of the JCPOA is currently at a critical stage. The parties concerned must bear in mind the overarching and long- term goal, remain committed to resolutely upholding and implementing resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA and fulfilling their responsibilities and obligations. The International Atomic Energy Agency has verified on 15 consecutive occasions Iran’s compliance with its nuclear-related commitments and the JCPOA. The coordination between the Council and the procurement channel has been going well. China appreciates Iran’s efforts to implement resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA and hopes that Iran will continue to implement it. China hopes that other parties will effectively honour their commitments, respect Iran’s legitimate requests and take positive measures to maintain the balance of rights and obligations under the JCPOA. China regrets the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and its unilateral sanctions on Iran. We call on the parties concerned to properly address the difficulties related to maintaining normal economic and trade ties with Iran. The report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) is an integral part in implementing resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. In his report, the Secretary- General calls on all parties to jointly preserve the JCPOA, safeguard free and lawful trade with Iran, support the procurement channel and maintain regional stability. China views that positively. Given that, China believes that the report should provide an objective, balanced and complete picture of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and fully accommodate the legitimate concerns of Iran. The Secretariat should fulfil its functions strictly as mandated. In the current circumstances, all parties must address with caution Iran’s missile and space-launch issue and accurately interpret the relevant Security Council resolutions to prevent an impact on the larger picture, namely, the implementation of the JCPOA. China has noted that, on many occasions, Iran has indicated that its missile programme is of a conventional and self-defensive nature. We encourage Iran to engage in dialogue on an equal footing with the parties concerned so as to jointly maintain regional peace and stability. China appreciates the efforts of the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and his team. We have taken note of the most recent report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2019/488). China will continue its active participation in the Joint Commission and the Procurement Working Group. Recently, the situation in the Middle East has escalated, which is worrisome. China calls on the parties concerned to remain calm and exercise restraint, resolve disputes through dialogue and consultations and refrain from any action that might escalate tensions. Ensuring the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA is not only a requirement in resolution 2231 (2015), but also a realistic and effective way to defuse tensions in the Middle East and resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take concrete measures to preserve and implement the JCPOA, in the best interests of the international community. China has always favoured political and diplomatic means to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. We are committed to consolidating the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and safeguarding international and regional peace and stability. China has recently engaged in close coordination and cooperation with the parties and facilitated major new progress in the modernization of the Arak heavy-water reactor. China will continue to work in an objective, impartial and responsible manner. We will work tirelessly, alongside the international community, to uphold and implement resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA.

My delegation warmly thanks Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Ambassador of the European Union to the United Nations; and Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their comprehensive and detailed briefings. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea welcomes the contribution of the balanced and comprehensive seventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which characterized an intense diplomatic effort on the part of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and culminated in the agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The resolution, adopted unanimously by the Council on 14 July 2015, was the result of the persistent efforts of the international community. It is an important achievement in the sphere of non-proliferation and remains a vital element in the global architecture of multilateral diplomacy. We continue to commend the rigour, professionalism and impartiality of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous organization mandated to verify, monitor and lend unwavering support for the full implementation of the JCPOA and provide confirmation to the international community of its effective supervision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the light of resolution 2231 (2015). In fact, in several reports submitted to the Council from January 2016 to date, the Agency confirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been fulfilling its nuclear energy commitments under the JCPOA. We welcome the Agency’s confirmation that Iran also continues to comply with the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. On the other hand, we continue to note with concern the impact of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018, its subsequent decisions and their consequences. We nevertheless appeal to the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue fulfilling its obligations under the JCPOA. It should be noted, however, that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action represents only a fraction of resolution 2231 (2015). Several of the provisions set forth in its annex B — which sets out restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as assets freeze and travel ban provisions — continue to raise concerns for some Member States, especially with regard to alleged violations of the travel ban by listed individuals, in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). In that connection, we call on the relevant institutions with the appropriate mandate to update that list in the proper forums, thoroughly and comprehensively analyse any information that may or may not corroborate those concerns and inform the Security Council of their findings in due course, and we urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to duly reflect upon the concerns of annex B. The current climate, characterized by a spirit of greater tension, clashes in the Middle East and the recent announcement by the Iranian side that it will soon surpass the established allowable limit of enriched uranium under the nuclear agreement signed in 2015, is quite alarming and of concern to my Government. We therefore encourage regional and international actors to mobilize to safeguard the JCPOA, a fundamental tool for regional and international peace and security. Therefore, through dialogue and diplomacy, we appeal to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to reconsider this new position. Finally, pursuant to my country’s foreign policy goals and ideals of peace and stability, we reaffirm our commitment to preventive diplomacy, non-interference and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States. We therefore encourage all parties involved to continue to work effectively with the participants in the JCPOA, to promote unity and create the necessary conditions for safeguarding the agreement.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, the Permanent Representative of Belgium and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations for their briefings. The seventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/492) reflects the same tone of concern and increasing alarm of many Member States over the past several weeks. The report comes as Iran continues to destabilize the Middle East, not only through support to terrorist groups and proxy forces but now through attacks on commercial shipping. The findings and information presented in the Secretary-General’s report add to the deeply troubling picture of Iran’s behaviour. The report details the Secretariat’s inspection of arms and related material, recovered in Yemen, that were clearly manufactured in Iran, including a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle and a new unmanned surface vessel. The inspection negates the repeated excuse that that weaponry was in Yemen’s arsenal prior to the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). It clearly was not. Groups supported by Iran still openly talk of the military assistance they continue to receive from Tehran, in violation of the United Nations arms embargo. The report cites a televised speech by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and an Al-Quds Brigades spokesperson in May, each of whom spoke of Iran’s military shipments to Hamas and to Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. Pursuant to the arms embargo in resolution 2231 (2015), all Member States must take the necessary measures to prevent arms transfers from Iran unless they are approved by the Security Council. Coordinating Iran’s military support efforts is Major General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of the Al-Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whom the report notes continues to travel freely in the Middle East despite the travel ban provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). That is not the first time the Secretary-General has reported to the Security Council on the Major General’s travel. The report notes that other designated Iranian officials are also travelling in violation of the travel ban. The fact that those violations continue for years on end is evidence of lax implementation of the restrictive measures outlined in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Meanwhile, we see concrete examples of how Iran is destabilizing the region by threatening international shipping and air space, prolonging the violence in Yemen and supporting the expansion of terrorist groups and proxies throughout the Middle East. These data points lead us to the conclusion that Iran continues to send weapons across the Middle East, in blatant violation of the Council’s resolutions. On 8 May, Iran announced that it would take steps to cease performing certain core nuclear commitments — a step that most agree threatens to undermine peace and security in the region and beyond. As a first such step, Iran said it plans to expand its stockpile of low-enriched uranium beyond 300 kilogrammes by 27 June. It also said that, if its conditions are not met, Iran will also start enriching uranium to higher levels in a return to a nuclear-reactor project at Arak that was well suited to producing plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already reported that Iran has installed additional advanced centrifuges and is operating them in numbers that violate its agreed limits on such mechanical testing. Iran is taking these steps even as it refuses to acknowledge that it hid and preserved a secret nuclear- weapons archive from the world. Had Israel not removed that archive from Iran, it could have been a source from which Iranian scientists could have drawn should the regime decide to reinitiate its previous nuclear-weapons programme. Iran’s actions are deeply counterproductive and will increase it Iran’s isolation. Notably, resolution 2231 (2015) provides a mechanism for the Council to address significant non-performance by Iran of its nuclear commitments. Iran’s defiance of the Security Council and its reckless behaviour threatening peace and security globally must not be downplayed in the name of preserving a deal that does not fully cut off Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon. Iranian provocations have been relentless and its excuses for every provocation — from launches using ballistic missiles technology to procurement of prohibited items, to support for the Houthi, to flagrant violations of the arms embargo — strain credulity. Responsibility for Iran’s economic woes belongs to Tehran, whether through gross economic mismanagement, corruption or the redirection of its money for militaristic purposes around the region. Iran’s own behaviour has caused its economic decline. The false narrative that the United States is to blame for Iran’s economic woes strays beyond the bounds of annex B’s intention in resolution 2231 (2015). References in the report to other Governments’ efforts to work around those measures are inappropriate. The report of the Secretary-General outlines in detail some important facts: that are Iranian arms and related materiel are showing up beyond its borders in conflict zones in the region, that its missiles and related technologies are hitting civilian targets, and that its terrorist proxies, Hizbullah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are speaking openly of the support Iran provides to them. Does anyone really believe that Iran is not behind these transfers? The United States has made clear its willingness to engage in dialogue with Iran to negotiate a deal that will better serve international peace and security. But in the meantime, we will not — and the Security Council should not — sit idly by while Iran perpetrates attacks on our partners in the region and on commercial vessels in the Gulf. We intend to do everything in our power to curb malign Iranian behaviour, including through updates to the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which, as the report of the Secretary-General highlights, are necessary to ensure implementation. We hope our partners on the Council will join us.

I will now speak in my national capacity. First of all, I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union for their briefings. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a masterpiece of multilateralism. It is above all one of the great successes of nuclear non-proliferation. Since its entry into force more than three years ago, it has guaranteed the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian programme, as has just been confirmed for the fifteenth time by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is also the result of 12 years of intense diplomatic activities based on dialogue and respect for the parties. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is more than a nuclear agreement; it is a confidence-building tool. We share the concerns of our European partners with regard to Iran’s activities in the ballistic field. We call on Iran to refrain from such activities, in particular ballistic-missile launches, which are in contradiction with resolution 2231 (2015). These activities reinforce mistrust and do nothing but contribute to growing tensions in the region. We are concerned about Iran’s activities that contribute to regional instability, including in the area of missile and arms transfers to State and non-State actors in the region, in particular the Houthi in Yemen. We call on Iran to comply with all relevant Council resolutions and engage in a serious dialogue on these concerns, including with other actors in the region. Let me come back to the nuclear agreement. Like the Secretary-General and the members of the Council, Belgium regrets the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It also regrets the reimposition by the United States of unilateral sanctions and the recent lifting of exemptions in the nuclear sector, which prevent not only Iran but also other States Members of the United Nations — parties and non-parties to the JCPOA — from implementing their commitments under resolution 2231 (2015), agreed by all members of the Security Council and supported by a large majority of the international community. Belgium is extremely concerned about Iran’s announcements of non-compliance with some of its commitments. We understand Iran’s difficult economic situation, but like our European partners, we reject a “less-for-less” approach and call on Iran to comply fully with resolution 2231 (2015), including the restrictive measures set forth in annex B of the resolution. Belgium calls on stakeholders to exercise restraint. Dismantling a working nuclear agreement would not put us in a better position to discuss regional issues or provide an immediate solution to the risks it already addresses. We also call on them not to underestimate the devastating and counterproductive effects on the entire existing and future non-proliferation regime. Non-proliferation and conflict resolution require joint negotiated solutions, developed collectively, in full respect of the Charter of the United Nations. There is no credible alternative to this approach, which is the very foundation of the Security Council. There is no credible alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and our duty is to preserve it.

We thank the briefers for their presentations today and for their hard work in carrying out their respective functions. First of all, we would like to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which is a successful outcome of multilateralism, diplomacy and dialogue, and represents a breakthrough in the non-proliferation regime. Similarly, we wish to highlight the commendable monitoring work being done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as its efforts to ensure that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes. In this vein, we welcome the commitment and determination shown by the parties to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA. The Plan of Action has worked, and it has been possible to achieve the primary objectives it established, despite the great challenges the Plan faces, including the withdrawal of the United States, which has generated significant challenges for the Plan’s implementation and brought about economic restrictions that directly affect the Iranian people. We also note with satisfaction that all the reports issued by the IAEA since the entry into force of the JCPOA to date have shown that Iran has complied with its commitments under the Plan and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and is under the most stringent monitoring and verification regime in the world. However, we are concerned about the information provided in the seventh report of the Secretary- General (S/2019/492) and the allegations made by various countries with regard to Iran’s activities that contravene the provisions established in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), in particular the test flights of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the launching of ballistic missiles against other neighbouring countries, and the transfer of Iranian-manufactured arms and unmanned aerial vehicles to various countries in conflict in the Middle East. We are likewise concerned by activities involving the transfer of weapons — unmanned aerial vehicles manufactured by Iran — to various conflict- affected countries in the Middle East. We therefore call on Iran to refrain from taking measures that could undermine the agreement, such as involving itself in hostile activities that destabilize the region and engaging in aggressive rhetoric, which could lead to mistrust among the signatories to the JCPOA and the rest of the international community. It should also refrain from actions that contravene the obligations set out in resolution 2231 (2015). We are concerned at the statements made by Iran’s authorities that it would not commit itself to respecting the limits on its enriched uranium stockpiles and heavy- water reserves and that it would suspend compliance with the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernize and upgrade the Arak heavy-water reactor, if its demands are not met by the other parties to the JCPOA. We deplore this situation and hope that Iran will maintain the commitment that it has shown so far and continue to abide by the agreement and the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) fully and effectively. Furthermore, we echo the call of the Secretary-General on States that use and fully support the procurement channel, as this is the key mechanism for building confidence and transparency. Finally, we call for a continuation of the cooperation that has been shown by the parties to the agreement so far. In that respect, we highlight the laudable role played by the European States in the implementation of measures that promote economic activity, so as to ensure compliance with the commitments in the agreement, including the lifting of the sanctions, with a view to delivering economic benefits to the Iranian people. The failure of the JCPOA would have negative effects in terms of non-proliferation and international security, and we must therefore endeavour to ensure its preservation, because this is a shared responsibility on the part of the States that are signatories to the agreement and the other States Members of the United Nations.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Kuwait. I should like at the outset to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, for her comprehensive briefing on the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492). I also thank the representative of Belgium, as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and the representative of the European Union, on behalf of the Joint Commission, for their briefings. As we hold this meeting under the item “Non-proliferation”, the State of Kuwait stresses once again our steadfast and principled position vis-à-vis all issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, namely, we condemn the use of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, which is a grave violation of international law. The establishment of world peace, security and stability will not be possible as long as such weapons exist. Based on these principles and constants, we welcomed the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), despite our knowledge that the agreement did not meet all of the concerns of countries of the region that continue to suffer from escalating tensions, insecurity and instability. However, we preferred to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) based on our belief in multilateralism and full commitment to all United Nations resolutions and efforts to achieve security and stability in the Middle East. The Middle East region continues to suffer from instability and insecurity and is today experiencing great tension that threatens international navigation routes and the provision of fuel supply. with respect to recent developments in the Gulf, we welcome the unified position that the Council expressed to the media two days ago, condemning the attacks on oil tankers as a violation to international law and a dangerous threat to international peace and security. We have read the current report of the Secretary- General and welcome its content on the continued implementation by Iran of its commitments with regards to its nuclear programme, as certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its fifteenth report. It is important that Iran continue to implement all of its commitments under the JCPOA, including by adhering to the limits on enriched uranium; to comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA; and to ratify the additional protocol, which would guarantee its continued status as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), the report of the Secretary-General is not restricted to aspects pertaining to nuclear matters but follows up on the implementation of controls on ballistic missile technology activities and the transfer of conventional weapons. We are concerned about information contained in the report on the specifications and origin of the ballistic missiles that targeted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as the weapons seized in international waters. Despite the fact that the Secretariat has not been able to pinpoint the date of the transfer of the missiles and weapons mentioned in the report, this is an extremely serious issue that threatens international and regional peace and security. We condemn the repeated targeting of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the launching of ballistic missiles, which undermines its security and threatens the lives of its civilians. The most recent attack targeted Abha international airport. We express our full solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and our support for all measures necessary to protect its security and stability. We also recall the relevant decisions of the League of Arab States requesting Iran to end any activities that undermine the security and interests of the countries of the region, while taking steps to build trust with its neighbours and establish relations based on good- neighbourliness, cooperation, mutual respect and non-interference in their internal affairs. In conclusion, the State of Kuwait emphasizes the importance of the Security Council continuing to shoulder its responsibilities to follow up on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in a comprehensive manner that ensures that Iran and other States comply with their obligations vis-à-vis not only nuclear non-proliferation, but also other areas mentioned in the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Iran.

Mr. President, I wish to thank you for having organized this meeting, which deals with an important issue for the whole international community, namely, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which, according to the Secretary-General, is a demonstration of successful multilateralism and a major achievement in dialogue and diplomacy. As the Council is well aware, the JCPOA is founded on two pillars: Iran’s nuclear-related commitments and the commitments of other participants, which should bring about economic benefits to Iran. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is mandated to verify and monitor the implementation of Iran’s nuclear- related commitments, and it is doing so. The IAEA’s 15 consecutive reports have confirmed Iran’s continued full compliance with its commitments. Therefore, the first pillar is completely fulfilled, with the highest possible standards. But what about the second pillar? Has it been realized? This pillar is composed of two complementary commitments: the lifting of sanctions and the promotion of normal economic and trade relations with Iran. This fact has twice been stipulated explicitly in the JCPOA, which states: “The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all United Nations Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy”. Likewise, resolution 2231 (2015) emphasizes that “the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran”. In addition, the resolution, “Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council’s decisions, ... “2. Calls upon all Member States ... to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.” As Security Council sanctions can be annulled only by itself, this organ, through resolution 2231 (2015) and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, terminated all its sanctions against Iran. Regarding multilateral sanctions, under the JCPOA, the European Union (EU) and its member States are committed to adopting “an EU regulation, ... terminating ... all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions”. Likewise, on national sanctions, according to the JCPOA, the United States is committed to “ceasing the application of the statutory nuclear-related sanctions”. In addition, in accordance with the JCPOA, the EU, its member States and the United States will “refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran” and will not “undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA”. Furthermore, according to the JCPOA, the United States will “make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realization of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting”. But what has happened in practice? The United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of its illegal sanctions rendered the JCPOA almost completely ineffective with respect to Iran’s benefits, which is of course a clear violation of the United States commitments under the JCPOA and a breach of its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). The United States also brazenly continues to threaten other States to either violate resolution 2231 (2015) or face punishment. That irresponsible conduct by a permanent member of the Council, unprecedented in the history of this organ, is a frontal attack on resolution 2231 (2015), violates the Charter of the United Nations and international law and further erodes trust and confidence in the Council. As a result, the United States itself is not fulfilling its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015), is not allowing Iran to implement certain parts of the JCPOA and is preventing other States from implementing their obligations under the resolution. Nevertheless, over the course of a year after the United States withdrawal, Iran’s only reaction was to give the remaining JCPOA participants, mainly the E3, at their request, week after week and month after month an opportunity to compensate for the consequences of the United States withdrawal. However, Iran’s goodwill and maximum restraint, as well as the repeated promises by other participants to seek practical solutions, yielded no concrete results. By exercising its policy of strategic patience in order to preserve the JCPOA, Iran has paid a heavy price as a result of the United States economic war and its so-called maximum pressure policy, including its attempts to cut Iran’s oil exports to zero and to disrupt free trade with Iran. In practical terms, the JCPOA has become an agreement that is being respected by only one party. A multilateral agreement cannot be implemented unilaterally. Iran has done a great deal and much more than its fair share to preserve the nuclear deal. Iran alone cannot and will no longer shoulder all the burdens to preserve the JCPOA. Therefore, in order to protect the security and national interests of the people of Iran and to bring a balance to the JCPOA, on 8 May Iran decided to limit, in the first phase of its plan, the implementation of its commitments in two cases, namely, with regard to the level of reserves of enriched uranium and heavy water as identified in the JCPOA. At the same time, I must stress that this decision is in full conformity with paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, according to which, in the case of a reintroduction or reimposition of the sanctions or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, Iran will have the right “to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”. In fact, as stated by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that is a minimum measure that Iran could adopt a year after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed its illegal sanctions. In line with Iran’s decision, if adequate practical measures are not taken by the other JCPOA participants and the international community in general within 60 days, Iran will be forced, in the second phase of its plan, to “suspend compliance with the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernize the Arak heavy water reactor”. As stated in our Supreme National Security Council’s statement, the Islamic Republic of Iran entered into negotiations in good faith, agreed to the conclusion of the JCPOA in good faith, implemented its commitments in good faith and, after the United States withdrawal, provided the remaining JCPOA participants enough time to shoulder their responsibilities with goodwill. The remaining JCPOA participants, particularly the E3, must now either demonstrate their goodwill by taking timely, adequate, serious and practical steps to preserve the JCPOA, which is now in a critical condition or, along with the United States, accept full responsibility for any possible consequences. While Iran is determined to vigorously secure its interests against the economic terrorism of the United States and all its mischievous plots and plans, the international community should also resist United States bullying and lawlessness if we want our world to be governed by the rule of law, not the rule of power, and by the force of logic instead of the logic of force. We should not allow the fabrications, disinformation or deception of the United States to set the agenda. One example is its disinformation campaign and the hue and cry about Iran’s missile programme in relation to resolution 2231 (2015). Iran’s missiles are designed to deliver conventional warheads and are not designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Accordingly, they are outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015). To develop a conventional ballistic missile programme is an inherent right under international law and is neither prohibited nor limited by resolution 2231 (2015). Living in such a volatile region as the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not compromise its security or its conventional defence capability, as no other country does. American officials claim that the sanctions are not intended to hurt the people of Iran but, in practice, entirely the opposite is true. The sanctions are basically designed to harm the general public, particularly those who are vulnerable, such as women, children, the elderly and patients. The sanctions harm the poor more than the rich, the ill more than the healthy and infants and children more than adults. In short, those who are most vulnerable suffer the most. For instance, patients who have severe conditions and therefore need scarce and expensive medicines and advanced medical equipment, which in most cases must be imported, suffer the most. Just one example among thousands is the dire need of a 38-year-old Iranian woman for a certain medicine that is not available in Iran. In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, when she was seven years old, her neighbourhood in an Iranian border city was bombed and she was wounded by the chemical agents provided to Saddam Hussein by some Western States. To breathe normally, she needs a certain medicine that now cannot be imported because all possible ways are blocked by the United States despite its claim that such cases are exempt from sanctions but, in practice, they are not. That is the real meaning of not hurting the Iranian people — true hypocrisy. The United States is weaponizing food and medicine against civilians, which is a clear manifestation of the collective punishment of an entire nation, amounting to a crime against humanity and thus entailing international responsibility. Now, let’ us delve into the Americans’ claim of negotiations without preconditions and their demand for us to meet diplomacy with diplomacy. What do they mean by diplomacy and negotiations without preconditions? For them, diplomacy means withdrawal from a deal that was recognized globally as a significant achievement of multilateralism; it means the reimposition of sanctions, in violation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015); it means punishing other States for implementing that resolution; it means the so-called maximum pressure policy; it means imposing sanction after sanction; it means collective punishment of an entire nation; it means waging a true and all- out economic war against an entire nation; it means economic terrorism; it means military adventurism and sending spy drones into Iranian airspace; it means more military build-up in the Persian Gulf; it means designing more plots to divide regional countries and create further tension among them in order to sell more arms to the region. The list goes on and on. We are a nation that, as attested by our history, resists aggression, intimidation and coercion. Conversely, we respond very well to civilized behaviour, respect and honesty. Trust is the main prerequisite and the minimum requirement for entering into a meaningful dialogue. This can be represented only in deeds, not in deceptive and sugar-coated words. As long as illegal sanctions are in place, one cannot be expected to trust the offer of an honest and genuine dialogue. Finally, our observations on Secretary-General’s report (S/2019/492) are contained in a letter that I sent to Your Excellency yesterday, which covers our views on issues that I have not addressed in my remarks today. Last but not the least, today the United States representative repeated again a few of his country’s baseless allegations against Iran. As my country has responded to those allegations, either through our Foreign Ministry or at relevant international forums, I do not want to dignify them with an answer. However, some accusations have been raised for the first time in an open meeting of the Security Council at which we are present. I must also put on record our view on those subjects. With respect to the United States spy drone, as I mentioned in my letter of 20 June to the Secretary- General and the President of the Security Council, our credible, detailed and precise technical information on the path and points of intrusion of the drone leave no doubt that, when targeted, it was flying over Iranian territorial waters. We have maps here that clearly indicate that the drone entered four miles deep into our airspace. On 21 June, the debris of the targeted drone was retrieved from Iran’s territorial waters and displayed to the media. In regard to that incident, Iran acted in self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and in full conformity with international law. Instead of rejecting credible technical information, the United States must accept the responsibility for its wrongful act. With regard to the oil tanker incidents, we have already rejected the baseless United States claim, which is part and parcel of its Iranophobic campaign by which it resorts to deception, fabrications and disinformation. The United States claim in that regard has not even been supported by some of its closest allies. Today, one country of the region distanced itself from the United States claims and officially stated that it could not honestly point the finger at any country because it did not have evidence. Neither fabrication nor blaming others can change the reality. The United States must stop its military adventurism and false-flag operations in the broader Persian Gulf region.