S/PV.8570 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Rwanda and Uruguay to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations; Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; and Ms. Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2019/538, which contains the text of a letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I now give the floor to Mr. Lacroix. Mr. Lacroix: I thank members of the Security Council for providing me this opportunity to discuss ways to strengthen, sharpen and re-energize our approach to the triangular dialogue and cooperation among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) and the Secretariat. We have come a long way since 2001, when the Security Council, in the wake of the Brahimi report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2000/809), called for improving the relationship among the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat “to foster a spirit of partnership, cooperation, confidence and mutual trust” (S/PRST/2011/17). Strong triangular cooperation is crucial to enhancing peacekeeping operations. It is particularly relevant today, as the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative is aimed at fostering collective solutions to deal with the challenges that peacekeepers face. The common work of the Security Council, the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, along with other stakeholders, will be key to ensuring continued progress. That applies to many areas of peacekeeping. Improving the safety and security of our peacekeepers is one of them. As we are continuously working to implement the action plan on the security of United Nations peacekeepers, such strong cooperation enables us to better identify gaps and define solutions to the challenges our peacekeepers face on the ground. Those benefits apply as well to our efforts on performance, for which the mobilization of Council members has been significant. As we are working as a priority to implement resolution 2436 (2018), adopted last September under the United States presidency, continuous engagement from Council members, as well as TCCs and PCCs, will be crucial to achieve lasting progress. That is, for instance, the case with the comprehensive performance assessment system. As we continue to roll it out and implement it in an increasing number of our missions, we need the feedback, support and engagement of the Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries, so that it can best respond to the needs and be most efficient and useful to all. In many areas critical to performance, such as training, mindset and equipment, a triangular approach can yield strong results. Mechanisms such as the light coordination mechanism and the Triangular Partnership Project are, to some extent, concrete manifestations of the spirit of triangular cooperation. Mandates can also strongly benefit from the perspectives and experiences of troop and police contributors present on the ground in order to make them more focused, adapted and achievable. Those are only a few areas among many where triangular cooperation is essential to the effectiveness of peacekeeping. A number of mechanisms exist today to facilitate consultations among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat. They include the formal and informal consultations of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the Military Staff Committee. Outside of the Council, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is of course an important forum of discussion involving Council members and troop- and police-contributing countries. The A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments, which has been endorsed by every Security Council member, calls on us all to implement existing intergovernmental commitments on triangular cooperation. As Member States decide to take up the role of A4P champions, their diversity and common work will provide further illustration of the relevance of triangular cooperation in each of the thematic areas of A4P. Today’s meeting is therefore timely, not least because the third Chiefs of Defence Conference, which is being held at the United Nations tomorrow, represents a further critical opportunity to realize triangular cooperation, involving TCCs and PCCs at the most senior levels of their uniformed forces to consult with each other and with the Secretariat. (spoke in French) Given the relevance of triangular cooperation to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, as I have just described, I would like to share some thoughts on how we can work together collaboratively to strengthen triangular cooperation. By building on each other’s assets, strengths and contributions, we can work together to ensure that cooperation can realize its full potential. In the first place, the Secretariat remains ready to give its full support to a more institutionalized system of formal and informal exchanges among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, of course in accordance with the mandate of each. Such exchanges can be useful throughout the life cycle of the mission: at the time of mandate renewals, of course, but also at any time that the mission encounters particular challenges or problems or following strategic reviews. Such meetings should encourage frank, open and interactive dialogue among the partners of this triangular dialogue. The dialogue is most effective when it combines both formal and informal encounters. I am referring in that regard to the practice developed by New Zealand during its tenure on the Security Council, where a member of the Council organized informal and interactive consultations with the troop- and police-contributing countries, which proved useful and appreciated. In order to contribute to the success of such meetings, my Department will continue to participate actively in those consultations, to work with all interlocutors and to share its substantive expertise in the preparation and conduct of the consultations. I would also like to encourage Member States to continue strengthening triangular cooperation through the holding of Council meetings on cross-cutting peacekeeping issues, such as this meeting. Such meetings are useful because they help to refine our common approach and understanding of the current challenges and priority actions to be taken, thereby helping to strengthen peacekeeping. I am referring, for example, to the debate held last May by the Indonesian presidency of the Security Council on training and capacity-building (see S/PV.8521), which has deepened our common analysis of this crucial issue for our operations. I am also thinking of the Security Council visits to our missions, which provide significant opportunities for exchanges with our peacekeepers and our troop and police contributors. Such visits also provide an opportunity to review and report on progress in the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and its concrete impact on the ground. I am also referring to the activities of the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and I would like to pay tribute to the work of Côte d’Ivoire, which has been at the head of the Working Group for the past year and a half. Under that country’s leadership, the Working Group organized very useful exchanges on such central issues as the place of women in peacekeeping, the protection of civilians, and the relationship with host States, to name just a few. As a former host State itself, as a troop contributor and as member of the Security Council, Côte d’Ivoire brings a unique perspective to the Security Council. More generally, I would like to emphasize the pivotal role of Council members that are also troop and police contributors. There are many here, including the country you represent, Mr. President. Those Member States are naturally at the crossroads and at the heart of triangular cooperation. They can therefore play a vital role in its organization through such meetings or visits. (spoke in English) I also encourage representatives to consider expanding triangular cooperation on occasion, as required, to ensure successful mandate implementation. The А4Р Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations includes commitments to “enhance collaboration and planning between the United Nations and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and arrangements”, as well as “to consider options for further direct engagement between host Governments and the Security Council”. In many contexts, peacekeeping missions are likely to benefit from more consistent and closer engagement between the Security Council and the host Government. And, as the Council is very aware, partnerships with regional and subregional organizations are increasingly key for the efficiency of peacekeeping. For African Union (AU) operations authorized by the Security Council, we are in fact already seeing a form of quadrilateral cooperation — among the Security Council, TCCs, the Secretariat and the African Union, including its Peace and Security Council and its Commission. Security Council meetings on the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations are of particular value by fostering common analysis of situations and joint thinking on initiatives or actions to be undertaken. The open debates organized recently on cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union — for instance, most recently in February 2019 by Equatorial Guinea on the AU Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 initiative (see S/PV.8456) — have been very useful to bring to light how this partnership can help tackle current challenges. Finally, on the Secretariat’s part, we welcome the substantive engagement from troop- and police-contributing countries during our meetings, and the value of more meaningful dialogue between the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries. We commit to continuing our efforts to regularly brief TCCs and PCCs and provide information in a timely manner, related to developments on the ground and critical security incidents, for instance. My Department also stands ready to provide useful information, including on ongoing challenges, conflict analyses and risk assessments, and to discuss mandate options before an operation is authorized or renewed. I look forward to hearing today from our Member State partners about other ways that this cooperation, including on the Secretariat’s side, can be strengthened further. We remain committed to working together with everyone here, both Security Council members and troop- and police-contributing countries, to ensure that mechanisms for triangular cooperation are robust and dynamic. In the spirit of Action for Peacekeeping, we look forward to a strengthened triangular cooperation that will contribute to the renewal of our collective engagement.

I thank Mr. Lacroix for his briefing. I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Gyllensporre. Lieutenant General Gyllensporre: It is a great honour for me to have this opportunity to address the Security Council today and give a Force Commander’s perspective on the interaction among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Let me initially anchor my arguments with some words on the situation on the ground. Mindful of course that the Council recently deliberated on Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (see S/PV.8568), I will be very brief. Our forces are deployed to support the signatory parties in the implementation in northern Mali of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, including supervising the ceasefire agreement. As a secondary priority we are to improve the security situation in the central region, where we have dedicated efforts to protect civilians against a mélange of threats that manifest themselves in frequent and brutal attacks against women and children. That challenging situation is perpetuated by threats against our personnel. Indeed, we are targeted and exposed to frequent direct and complex attacks on our bases, as well as improvised explosive device attacks against our logistical convoys. Sadly, the lives of too many peacekeepers have been lost in this effort. Indeed, it is a very complex and challenging situation that goes beyond my earlier experiences in Afghanistan, for instance, and far from what is envisaged in traditional peacekeeping. Yet here we are, and we have to find different and new ways to operate and deliver on the mandate. The force must be more agile and more unpredictable, react faster, be more mobile and use the rules of engagement to their fullest extent. Steps have been taken in that direction. Over the last reporting period the operational tempo was increased by more than 100 per cent. More important, we are changing the mindset of the peacekeepers to become more proactive, flexible and robust. Against that backdrop of demanding peacekeeping, it is reasonable to assume that all actors affiliated with United Nations efforts will be challenged and that cooperation arrangements will become increasingly important. In my opinion, that calls for strengthened cooperation and consultation mechanisms between the field and Headquarters. I understand that sentiment is also reflected in the Secretary- General’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative and the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In reference to triangular cooperation, let me elaborate on the TCCs. It is important for the mission that the Secretariat and Member States continue to support TCCs from the very beginning, including predeployment and subsequent in-mission training, with equipment and associated training efforts. That is of particular relevance for TCCs going to high-risk missions like in Mali. It is key to have clearly defined goals and standards for our traditional troop- and police-contributing countries on what the expectations of the United Nations are, and increased support for training during predeployment in addition to in-mission training requirements. Those requirements must be adapted to reflect the changes in security situations on the ground and also the changes in operational profiles. As the Council knows, there are some TCCs that pay a higher price in casualties than others. Those nations must be prioritized for training, equipment and support measures of other kinds. Force protection is also about giving the commanders freedom of action to the extent possible by, for example, minimizing the number of caveats and giving them unfettered ability to deploy and employ all forces within the mission to advance the mandate, without any — or at least minimal — national constraints. Let me now shed some light on what we do in the Mission and within the force in that regard. As Force Commander, I have close interaction and dialogue with the TCCs through their senior national representatives in order to provide information, get their opinions and create and guide confidence among the troop- contributing nations. For me, it is an important forum to exchange views and convey my priorities. Secondly, I value arrangements and dialogue with the representatives of nations when they visit us in Mali or when they have an opportunity to engage with the Chiefs of Defence, as they will when they participate at this week’s conference here in New York. It provides an opportunity to reach out and maintain dialogue and for us and the capitals to provide and receive candid feedback. Thirdly, I report to the Secretariat on the deficiencies and challenges for TCCs. I also illustrate the good examples, great leadership and robustness that some TCCs demonstrate, so as to ensure that the Secretariat has the best possible picture of what we experience on the ground. Allow me to offer some final recommendations. To me, strategy is a balanced and carefully considered mix of ends, ways and means. The mandate provided by the Security Council defines the ends and objectives for us. The way we operate is codified and issued in a military concept provided by the Secretariat. The resources and means are, of course, provided by the TCCs. Those are the units that will complete the mission at the end of the day. Clearly, close cooperation within the triangle is key in order to set the conditions for an effective implementation of our mandate, in particular in demanding missions with security challenges. As a Force Commander, I can contribute to ensuring — and rely on the fact — that the triangle has as good an understanding as possible of the situation within the Mission and that the TCCs get candid and relevant information directly to their capitals. I welcome the continued possibilities for further dialogue and encourage capitals to plan field visits in order to further understand what their units face in the environment in which they operate. In order for us to meet the high expectations that exist, TCCs must deliver on their mandate, rules of engagement, the body of United Nations policies and manuals, as well as the statements of unit requirements, memorandums of understanding and so on. That is our planning assumption when we receive units on the ground. The United Nations should continue to increase and revise its mechanisms for evaluating units and ensuring accountability. Let me conclude by expressing my gratitude to the Member States that have participated or are currently participating in MINUSMA with troops or staff officers. It is honour and privilege to serve at the helm of the military force of MINUSMA.

I thank Lieutenant General Gyllensporre for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ms. Novosseloff.

First of all, allow me to sincerely thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to brief the Security Council today, as it has been the subject of my research in international relations for more than 20 years. The Council has invited me to address the issue of triangular cooperation, which may at first seem technical but is obviously not. Triangular cooperation is at the crossroads of the Security Council’s work when it takes a decision; creates a peacekeeping operation, calls for a number of reforms from the Secretariat, assesses the work of peacekeepers on the ground or when it considers a mission drawdown or closure. At each of those stages, the Security Council must engage in some form of dialogue with the Secretariat and the troop- and police-contributing countries. And that dialogue, I believe, must be strengthened. It should even be a basic principle in an Organization where those who mandate, pay and contribute personnel are not the same. Resolution 1353 (2001), of 13 June 2001, lays the foundation for triangular cooperation by adopting a declaration of principles and proposing a number of options for organizing such cooperation. It also tasked the then recently established Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to work in that area. In resolution 1353 (2001), the Council underlined that its consultations with the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should enhance its ability to make appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities. At the heart of that resolution is the debate on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in terms of adequate capacity and support, adequate human and financial resources, support for the training of various personnel, information development and analysis to assist with regular planning — all of which are at the core of the debate the Council has had over the past year concerning the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. Since the adoption of resolution 1353 (2001), all reference documents calling for the improved effectiveness of peacekeeping operations — from the Capstone Doctrine to the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) (see S/2015/446) to the New Horizon initiative — have mentioned the need to strengthen triangular cooperation. Various initiatives have been taken but none of them has resulted in a regular and systematic process to institutionalize the practice, establish a framework, as called for in the HIPPO report, or begin interactive consultations that would have a real impact on the implementation of mandates. That framework must now be specifically defined so that such interaction becomes a regular practice of the Council and no longer depends on the initiatives of one or the other. I would like to make some concrete proposals to help achieve that objective by striking a balance between the formal and informal dimensions of those meetings, where each actor — the Security Council, the contributors and the Secretariat — can gain the confidence to talk about issues of concern to them. (spoke in English) Triangular consultations should take the form of regular private meetings among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the major contributors. They should involve the primary troop- and police-contributors specific to the mission under consideration, since they are taking the main risks in the field. Ten troop- and police-contributors could be considered a good number to allow for a focused discussion. Some flexibility would of course be required when adjusting the exact number of attendees, but the meetings should not be transformed into yet another forum where no one is willing to talk openly and informally about the real issues. The meetings should be informal in order to facilitate constructive dialogue. No readout of the meetings should therefore be issued. The idea would be that views and concerns expressed by troop- and police-contributing countries would be taken into account by the penholder and would therefore shape the way a mandate is conceived. But that would not encroach upon the decision-making prerogatives of the Council. The consultations should be held before the renewal of the mandate of a mission, before and after a major strategic review has been conducted by the Secretariat and when a major mission-related crisis occurs. They could be held at the start of the process initiated by the penholder to renew a mandate and immediately after the advance copy of the Secretary-General’s report is sent and shared with the main contributors. Sufficient time should be afforded to all stakeholders to come to those meetings with appropriate feedback and input. Those triangular consultations should be held at the expert level and attended by political and military experts, as such discussions are fundamentally political and military. That does not mean that, at times, when stakes are higher, those meetings could not be held at a more senior level in order to enable effective decisions. And, as already suggested by resolution 1353 (2001), such meetings could be strengthened by holding a parallel discussion of a purely military nature within the informal setting of the Military Staff Committee, to which key contributors not serving in the Council could be invited. To summarize, what is needed is to have one type of triangular meeting that is informal in nature but mentioned in the programme of work of the Council, restricted in its format, called for by the penholder and organized in coordination with the presidency of the Council for that month. As the Security Council decides on operations in increasingly challenging and dangerous contexts and pushes major contributors to take more and more risks in a context of financial cuts, it is only legitimate that those contributors demand a greater say in how the Security Council shapes peacekeeping mandates and how the missions are designed. In such a challenging context, the United Nations can no longer postpone triangular discussions and let the gap between the Council and contributing countries widen and tensions increase. The objective of triangular cooperation must be to achieve a shared understanding of the challenges and a shared responsibility to make those operations more efficient, as well as better supported politically, militarily and financially. Each endpoint of the triangle has an important role to play in that common endeavour through engagement that must be early, meaningful and timely. As I wrote in 2015, triangular cooperation is a reform that is free of charge and, instead of costing money, increases the cost efficiency of peacekeeping operations. (spoke in French) Against that backdrop, the idea is not to further burden the agenda of the Security Council and add yet another meeting whereby words would replace taking action. The idea would be to systematize what is currently informal and make such exchanges into an obligatory and useful part of the negotiations concerning a given mandate. To that end, such meetings must also be taken seriously by all so that everyone participates in a constructive spirit, with the relevant information available for them to consider. That will of course require a number of adjustments in terms of the flow of information to and from the contingents on the ground, their capitals and subsequently their Permanent Missions in New York. That may also require the establishment of strategic dialogues among capitals in which issues related to peacekeeping operations must be better addressed. The challenge today is to reverse the trend and to take advantage of the new momentum offered by today’s meeting to implement a mechanism for triangular consultations that is in everyone’s interest for three crucial reasons. First, meaningful triangular cooperation would allow the Security Council to consider matters on the ground from a closer perspective. It is obviously not in the Council’s interest to develop mandates that ultimately would not be implemented on the ground, or that contributors would implement only reluctantly. That would only open the door to all types of non-compliance, restrictions on the use of resources and other forms of inaction that damage the reputation of the Blue Helmets. The Council’s negotiating processes must be better informed by the realities on the ground, and triangular cooperation must be a means to that end. Secondly, such dialogue is also part and parcel of the unity of the Council, which is vital to those operations. The political battles pitched here and there only weaken those operations. Conversely, better mutual understanding increases the sense of sharing the same goals. Lastly, by providing improved information for all concerned, such dialogue must help build a better consensus on how to carry out peacekeeping operations and better identify a realistic and achievable operational framework for them. In brief, we must move beyond words and develop an operational doctrine adapted to the specificity of those operations as well as to their changing environments. In conclusion, while peacekeeping is a partnership, triangular cooperation must be one of its preferred tools. It would be even more robust if the burden of peacekeeping were better shared. It will hardly solve every problem, but it will, I am convinced, help improve a collective and multilateral management of the challenges that those operations entail. I hope that today’s debate will help set in motion the flexible and informal institutionalization of such triangular cooperation.

I thank Ms. Novosseloff for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

On behalf of South Africa, Equatorial Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire — the three African members of the Security Council — I thank the Republic of Peru for convening this debate on strengthening cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs). On their behalf, I also thank Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under- Secretary-General for Peace Operations; Mr. Dennis Gyllensporre, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; and Ms. Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute. (spoke in English) United Nations peacekeeping operations are one of the most recognizable symbols of global solidarity in pursuit of the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. TCCs and PCCs play a vital role in contributing the services of women and men who are dedicated to serving in dangerous environments to provide security to some of the world’s most vulnerable people. Our discussion today allows us to reflect on the coordination, collaboration and cooperation of those responsible for mandating, planning, managing and implementing United Nations peacekeeping operations. Promoting effective triangular cooperation among the Security Council, as the body responsible for mandating peace missions, the Secretariat, as the body responsible for planning and managing those missions, and, importantly, the TCCs and PCCs, as the countries implementing those mandates, remains one of the priorities for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly’s Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and the Security Council have been seized with the issue for several years, as evidenced by numerous decisions and/or recommendations that have been made in pursuit of efficient cooperation. Chief among those are resolution 1353 (2001), reports of the substantive sessions of the C-34, which have dedicated sessions on triangular cooperation, the report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) and, recently, the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. (spoke in French) The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals also call for the development of triangular cooperation policies, whereby it is recognized that global challenges must be addressed through a regional and comprehensive approach, based on the concepts of effective partnership, joint initiatives and collective implementation. However, despite those positive developments, challenges remain that must be met in order to make triangular cooperation best suited and effective. Interest in strengthening triangular cooperation has increased in recent years, given the complex nature of conflicts and the challenges faced by peacekeepers, including unconventional weapons, asymmetrical attacks and the transnationalization and transregional dimension of conflicts. As our briefers mentioned, in particular the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the situation in Mali and the Sahel is symptomatic of the complexity of peacekeeping operations today. That new conflict dynamic increasingly exposes peacekeepers to attacks, thereby forcing them to step up aspects such as command and control, the use of weapons, the acquisition of appropriate equipment, improved capabilities and training, the security of peacekeeping forces and the generation of strategic forces. The nature of the mandates that we adopt is therefore of paramount importance to all actors in peacekeeping. In that regard, it is important that we recognize the importance of consultation with, and the full involvement of, troop-contributing countries and peace coordination committees throughout the duration of peacekeeping operations, including in the development of peacekeeping mission mandates. The meaningful participation of troop-contributing countries will ensure that the views of those serving in the field are essential in decision-making on peacekeeping operations (spoke in English) Subsequent to what I have mentioned, the three African members of the Council propose the following in response to the questions posed in the concept note (S/2019/538, annex). First, resolution 1353 (2001) remains relevant, and all the decisions that were taken therein should be implemented accordingly. Secondly, the measures outlined on enhancing triangular cooperation in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on its 2018 substantive session (see A/72/19) should be considered favourably. Thirdly, triangular cooperation requires working procedures and decision-making processes that are transparent, predictable and inclusive. That will enhance trust among the Secretariat, the Security Council and the TCCs and PCCs in terms of improving mandate implementation and contributing to the more efficient and effective functioning of peacekeeping missions in the achievement of our respective goals. Fourthly, more substantive and regular triangular meetings among the three players are imperative. In that regard, the existing TCC and PCC meetings should be made more meaningful by allowing all three stakeholders an opportunity to contribute to the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. The views of the TCCs and PCCs should therefore be respected and taken into account. Fifthly, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations could also play a monitoring and evaluation role in following up on the commitments made by the Security Council regarding triangular cooperation in its previous resolutions on peacekeeping operations. (spoke in French) We would be remiss if we did not underscore the importance of partnership and political and operational cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Those partnerships can contribute to strengthening triangular cooperation in situations that warrant different levels of coordination. Allow me, on behalf of the three African members of the Council, to therefore underline the need for increased predictability, sustainability and flexibility in the financing of peace support operations led by the African Union and authorized by the Security Council, through the assessed contributions of United Nations Member States, on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, effective triangular cooperation can help Africa achieve some of its most important objectives, as set out in the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020, which aims to make Africa a peaceful and stable continent, free of conflict, and will ensure inclusive growth and sustainable development. In conclusion, the three African members of the Council fully support the Secretary-General’s ongoing efforts to improve the efficacy of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in full harmony with the wider membership.

At the outset, we would like to thank Peru for convening this important debate. We also thank all the briefers for the most valuable insights they provided today. At a time when peacekeeping operations face constant and evolving challenges, as States Members of the United Nations we feel even more compelled to fulfil the objectives set out in the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In that regard, it is imperative that we recognize the essential roles that the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) play in entrusting, planning, managing and executing peacekeeping operations. That is why we need to strengthen that triangular relationship to promote collaboration, cooperation and mutual trust. Triangular cooperation has been the focus of various debates and discussions, and they continue to identify the lack of timely information and effective dialogue among the three parties, which, in turn, has led to a sizeable challenge. In that regard, we understand that a balance must be struck between formal and informal consultations with efficient formats and effective and timely interactions. Similarly, such consultations are necessary in situations of transition from a peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding operation and in cases of a reduction or withdrawal of a mission. It should be stressed that it is important that the triangular dialogues be conducted in a participatory, timely and inclusive manner, while paying greater attention to the concerns expressed by the TCCs and PCCs and bearing in mind their knowledge of the existing realities on the ground, which can contribute to making effective decisions on peacekeeping operations, especially before the renewal, adjustment or reconfiguration of troops in a mission by the Security Council. That is why we understand that the suggestions made by troop-contributing countries are key in the design of peace missions. With regard to the preparation of meetings, we underscore the importance that TCCs and PCCs receive updated and regular information from the Secretariat on the situation in each peacekeeping operation. Similarly, rapid responses from the Secretariat to their requests for information are crucial. The open debates that are convened by the Security Council are another way of exchanging information on peacekeeping issues, in which the participation of TCCs and PCCs should be highlighted. The joint work of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and troop- contributing countries is an additional mechanism that allows for close dialogue on peacekeeping issues. We should encourage the further strengthening of mission-specific meetings more actively to create an exchange of ideas and information that will contribute to boosting the efficiency of such dialogues. We believe that the meetings of the Working Group should be held on a more regular basis to follow the issues and processes of peace missions and therefore foster the most effective communication among the three pillars. In conclusion, we once again wish to reiterate our commitment to peacekeeping and our conviction that we must all shoulder responsibility for it. It is only through our determination and joint efforts that we will be able to successfully achieve lasting and sustainable peace.

First of all, I thank you, Mr. President, for putting this topic on the agenda. At least from what we have heard so far, this is a matter on which the Security Council really is united — again, it is a very important issue. Let me start by thanking Mr. Lacroix for his briefing and the work he is doing. Very early on in his presentation, he made a proposal that was basically taken up by all of the speakers afterwards. It is a question of more regular meetings among the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) and Members States. I also thank Ms. Alexandra Novosseloff, who I believe made the most formal proposal in terms of institutionalizing it. Mr. Lacroix seemed more open to it being an informal process, which was echoed by Ambassador Adom on behalf of the three African members of the Council, as well as by Ambassador Singer Weisinger. I think we really have to look at how can we intensify this. Personally, I would lean more towards the proposal that Mr. Lacroix made, therefore in a more informal way. As Ambassador Singer Weisinger said, it has to be meaningful and substantive, so this meeting should not just be allocated a regular slot on the agenda, but rather as and when missions or thematic topics require them. Nevertheless, we should have more of these meetings. I think that everybody who has spoken so far sees the benefit in this. The second point I wanted to make, on the subject of TCCs/PCCs, is that we could perhaps invite the head of a police component to the next meeting, as they are a very important element of our cooperation, as well as our missions on the ground. Thirdly, something that was mentioned by almost everybody is cooperation with regional and subregional actors. We have seen this here when we have seen representatives from the African Union or the European Union (EU); we have missions like African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur where it is, in fact, a joint mission, or in Mali we have the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and then we have the EU Training Mission. Therefore, I think we should really look more into having these kinds of meetings where we work together with all actors on the ground. We are very much in favour of that. I would like to thank Lieutenant General Gyllensporre for coming all the way from Mali to brief us and give us a very practical view on one of the most important and critical missions there. I think that, for those of us who attended the trips to Mali and Burkina Faso, we saw how important it was for us to go there, too, to actually meet with the mission, the Government and United Nations representatives on the ground. I think that Mr. Lacroix, in his intervention, said that visits to missions are very important — I can speak only for myself, but since my visit with the Security Council I am far better able to understand the situation on the ground. I also support what Lieutenant General Gyllensporre said with regard to expectations of peacekeepers and that they are more agile, mobile, proactive, flexible and robust. This is provided for in the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and what is expected but, at the same time, we have to be aware that, in Mali in particular, peacekeepers are paying a very high price. Some Council members may have attended the meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission this morning, attended by the Minister of Economy, Planning and Cooperation. Chad has sent approximately 2,500 soldiers to Mali, and they have paid the highest price: 60 of the 200 soldiers who have died in Mali were Chadian. Of course, formally, the TCCs are asked to do everything, such as providing equipment and overseeing all the logistics, but this is an illusion. We have to do more as Member States and beyond in order to support those countries that are actually serving in the missions and therefore I think we have to do more, as Lieutenant General Gyllensporre said, in terms of predeployment and mission training. Germany, for instance, is supplying Chad with security vests and helmets, but I think we have to do it more systematically so that, when these countries go out and represent the United Nations, we are doing everything we can to ensure their troops do not lose their lives. My last point concerns trilateral cooperation, which is something I think we can even go beyond. Moreover, going back to MINUSMA, I think we can achieve a lot when we work together and when we have the best peacekeepers, but we will not solve the problem on the ground if the peace agreement is not actually being implemented, or if good governance and respect for human rights, inter alia, are absent in the country in question. We must therefore further expand our global view if we are to achieve success in our missions. However, this is not the subject on the agenda today. I thank you again Sir, for convening this meeting today on what is, from our perspective, a very important matter where there is a lot to be achieved.

At the outset, I am most grateful to you, Mr. President, for organizing this debate on such an essential element of the effectiveness and success of peacekeeping operations: a goal we all share under the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Ms. Novosseloff for their particularly valuable contributions. I would like to begin by echoing previous speakers in recalling the vital importance that France attaches to triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries. This cooperation, in the form of regular consultations, is necessary at all stages of the life cycle of a peacekeeping operation, including as it is drawn up, drawn down, implemented and renewed. Because they are present on the ground, often have extensive experience and practice in peacekeeping operations and are aware of the difficulties Blue Helmets face, as the MINUSMA Force Commander has just reminded us, as well as having broad expertise, troop- and police-contributing countries have a lot to contribute in terms of the planning, decision-making and effective deployment of operations. The information and lessons that they retain from theatres of operations are very useful in drawing up but also adjusting peacekeeping mandates and ensuring that the mandates are adapted to the realities on the ground. Nonetheless, in the face of increasing complexity of conflict dynamics, sustained dialogue among the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat is essential for the effective management of missions. Missions must be made to measure, effective, credible and able to adapt to environments that are constantly changing. Triangular cooperation is therefore in the interests of us all and puts into practice the values ​of multilateralism that bring us here today and govern our actions at the international level. Secondly, I wish to stress that we already have many tools at our disposal to ensure the smooth functioning of triangular cooperation, as Mr. Lacroix has just reminded us. We have a number of meeting formats within the Council that allow us to interact with troop- contributing countries and the Secretariat. The next meeting of troop-contributing countries will be held here in a few days. We also have the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which provides an opportunity for all peacekeeping stakeholders to speak, as well as meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries that are organized by the Secretariat. From France’s point of view, I think that it is less a matter of establishing new meeting formats than of working to revitalize and improve the effectiveness of those we have today. It is therefore important that everyone be present and actively participate in those coordination forums, which are essential to improving the development and implementation of peacekeeping mandates. Finally, I would like to recall that France is fully committed to triangular cooperation and strives to be exemplary with regard to the mandates for which it is the penholder, in particular the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali but also the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. We seek to systematically consult troop- contributing countries throughout the year, not only at the time of the mandate renewal. We organize field evaluation visits prior to every mandate renewal. We also consult the host State, and we work to prioritize mandates, where possible. In that way, we try to create a positive dynamic. In addition to our consultation activities, we are also fully committed to the training and capacity- building of troop-contributing countries, in particular French-speaking countries. In that way, the training is another key element of triangular cooperation. For example, France supports six peacekeeping training centres in Africa, three in Latin America and one in Asia, which contribute to building the capacity of future contingents deployed in peacekeeping operations. We are also strengthening the skills of those contingents in specialized areas, such as mine clearance, health, judicial police, logistics and civil protection, thanks to our network of national schools that work at the regional level and our network of 320 experts working as closely as possible with the defence and security forces of many countries. Through those various actions, France is committed to training more than 30,000 African soldiers next year to enable them to serve in peacekeeping operations in particular. That is a considerable effort with direct operational significance. Finally, because cooperation is based above all on sharing, we are also involved in the informal coordination mechanism  — the light coordination mechanism — which enables the Secretariat to be fully informed of the various training activities carried out by States for the benefit of troop-contributing countries. I would like to conclude by underlining once again the importance of the active engagement of each stakeholder in the existing triangular cooperation mechanisms in order to fully achieve the positive impact expected for the success of peacekeeping operations, to which we are committed through the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting. I also thank all the briefers: Mr. Lacroix, Lieutenant General Gyllensporre and Ms. Novosseloff. I would like to address the topic of today’s meeting, which is strengthening triangular cooperation, by highlighting three basic aspects. In fact, some speakers who preceded me focused on the same aspects that I will mention now but I would like to deal with them from a different perspective. They are procedural issues, the subsidiary bodies and best practices. On procedural issues, resolution 1353 (2001) regulated the mechanism governing the meetings of the Security Council with troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) as we know them today. Presidential note S/2017/507, issued in 2017, presented some requests and advice to promote the Council’s ability to adopt effective resolutions, including making the Secretary-General’s reports available to the countries concerned for enough time before discussing them in the meetings. Consequently, engaging the stakeholders, be they contributing or host countries, as much as possible is a practical request. As stated in note 507, cooperation must not be limited to the meetings held before the conclusion of a peacekeeping operation’s mandate but must also include all those held after the issuance of the Secretary-General’s reports. Taking note 507 as a guideline is a great step towards holding honest and interactive discussions. The Council can also go back to what many States said regarding today’s topic during the two debates held by the Council under Kuwait’s presidency, in February 2018 (see S/PV.8175) and last month (see S/PV.8552), on developing triangular cooperation to ensure synergy between TCC experiences and the peacekeeping reforms at the United Nations. On the subsidiary bodies, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations is one of the most inclusive subsidiary bodies. Its meetings are held with the participation of TCCs and on an equal footing with Council members. That makes the Working Group one of the Council’s most inclusive tools for working with TCCs. The cooperation of the Working Group with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, known as C-34, provides the Council with the opportunity to take into account the concerns of TCCs and PCCs as well as all the remaining members of the United Nations, since the Special Committee is the sole body mandated to tackle all peacekeeping issues. In that regard, we thank the United Kingdom and Pakistan for their non-paper of 2017, which is still valuable and of relevance to our debate today in terms of benefiting from formal and informal meetings as well as enjoying flexibility in calling for meetings while preparing for them. On best practices, we believe that the engagement of stakeholders must not be limited to the formal meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. It would be better if it included all our practices encompassing informal consultations of penholders with TCCs as well as with the host countries. That is a good and commendable practice that we hope to encompass all peacekeeping operations, including in cases where the course of a mandate is altered following official meetings in order to give stakeholders the opportunity to express their opinion on new developments. Holding those meetings early and regularly, as far as possible, stresses that the responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security does not mean monopolizing the decision-making process. Instead, it means taking into account the advice and concerns of those most affected by its resolutions, especially since they sacrifice the most to maintain peace. The Council must also consult with the host countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed for the sake of their present and future. We refer in that regard to the transitional stages in Haiti and Darfur, since they provide a good opportunity to adopt best practices. In addition, we would also like to commend the contributing countries Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, China and Egypt for holding the first meeting of its kind on triangular cooperation last March. We also commend the Cairo Roadmap, which developed the concept of triangular cooperation into four-party consultations by adding a fourth side representing the host countries. The presidential statement S/PRST/2019/4 recognizes that the mandate of a peacekeeping operation is defined according to the need of the country concerned. Moreover, previous practices and initiatives are an important foundation on which to build and pave the way for more future development.

I thank today’s briefers for their informative briefings. The United States recognizes the contribution that contingents make in increasingly insecure environments around the globe. We welcome the opportunity to work together, through existing working groups, to make peacekeeping as effective as possible. The United States views peacekeeping reforms through the lens of our five peacekeeping principles. Peacekeeping missions must support political solutions; have the cooperation of the host country; possess realistic and achievable mandates; have an exit strategy; and adjust to progress and failure. The United States has worked tirelessly over the past two years to promote a culture of performance within United Nations peacekeeping. That will improve the ability of peacekeepers to carry out their mandates effectively. The unanimous adoption of resolution 2436 (2018) made it clear that United Nations peacekeeping performance and accountability are a Security Council priority. To that end, we support the recommendations outlined by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446). The Panel recognized that enhanced triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) is essential to strengthening performance. The United States consults extensively with host countries, peacekeeping mission personnel, troop- and police-contributing countries, the United Nations Secretariat and fellow Security Council members to gain valuable information about the realities on the ground for each peacekeeping mission. We conduct those consultations regularly in New York, Washington, D.C., and capitals prior to the creation or renewal of mandates. We will continue to do so. That informal dialogue is an important mechanism to discuss progress achieved, fluid dynamics on the ground and areas for improvement with existing peacekeeping mandates. It is important to keep the discussions focused on the purpose and specific requirements of the missions, including the protection of civilians, the safety and security of United Nations personnel and improved performance and accountability. It is equally important to avoid overly formalizing triangular consultations, as has been noted by many of our colleagues here today. Adding layers of unnecessary bureaucracy would ultimately weaken the mandating process. The United States notes that triangular cooperation is already discussed in the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. The Working Group has reiterated its commitment to hold consultations between itself and troop- and police-contributing countries at different stages of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We would encourage more TCC Member States to make greater use of those forums by both attending and participating in the discussions. Triangular cooperation is also discussed in the Security Council Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, which reviews working methods for the Security Council to, among other things, enhance interaction and consultation between the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries. In addition to efforts to enhance triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs and PCCs, we must also remember there are other forums where all Member States have an opportunity to engage with the Secretariat and to provide guidance on issues that impact United Nations peacekeeping, in particular in the General Assembly Fifth Committee and in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. We are deeply concerned that recent negotiations in the Fifth Committee on cross-cutting peacekeeping policy issues were ultimately unsuccessful in reaching a resolution owing to the parochial national interests of a few Member States. That was a critical missed opportunity for all Member States, including TCCs and PCCs, to make recommendations on peacekeeping policy. In the continued spirit of Security Council efficiency and effectiveness, we strongly encourage future discussions on this topic to remain in existing Security Council working groups. Those forums are the best vehicles for discussions, especially on mandates.

At the outset, I would like to welcome the presence of the Chiefs of Defence who are representing Member States. We all look forward to tomorrow’s discussion and the outcomes of the Chiefs of Defence Conference. The Security Council counts on their knowledge and experience. Let me also thank all the briefers for their very informative and valuable contributions. The importance and wide scope of triangular cooperation is well recognized and acknowledged. In my statement today I would like to highlight three aspects that my country considers important in this matter: first, the need for open and frank discussion among all relevant stakeholders; secondly, the formats in which the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) and the Security Council can exchange their views, and last, but not least, the potential role that the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations can play in this process. Let me start with the widely expressed desire for in depth consultations among TCCs and PCCs, the Secretariat and the Security Council. That idea cannot be questioned. There is, however, one particularly important element that is indispensable to make the conversation effective, namely, unhindered information-sharing. An honest exchange of views and meaningful discussion are possible only when all partners sit at the table with the same understanding of the subject. Consequently, up-to-date, relevant information from the mission should be well established. As an elected member of the Council, I would also like to bring up the need for penholders to give Council members extended time to work on draft resolutions. In return, such time flexibility would also allow all capitals to consolidate their inputs. We are of the opinion that, while the informal Security Council TCCs/PCCs meetings are already well- established and utilized, the pre-meetings organized by penholders also serve the purpose of sharing concerns and perspectives. It is yet another format that allows all stakeholders to actively engage in a genuine and frank exchange of views ahead of the mandate renewals. It would be worth considering extending such discussions as preparatory meetings to all mandate renewals of peacekeeping missions. Lastly, the third point I would like to make today is on the role of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. There is potential in considering the Group’s incorporation in triangular cooperation. We see the value of the Working Group in its ability to adjust its discussions to the current needs. Each aspect of a mission could be discussed separately and thoroughly, as required. Findings, recommendations or proposals could then be utilized in further deliberations of the Council. In conclusion, I would like to underline the importance and value of triangular cooperation for the work of the Security Council and for the missions in the field. As an elected member and incoming TCC, we attach great importance to constant dialogue among the Council, and in particular penholders, TCCs/ PCCs and the Secretariat. Expressing each other’s needs, expectations and even demands in an open and frank format is the only way to achieve effective mandate implementation.

I thank you, Mr. President, for bringing this important issue, which is always near and dear to our Indonesian heart, to the attention of the Security Council. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, Force Commander Gyllensporre and Ms. Novosseloff for their comprehensive briefings. I would especially like to thank Lieutenant General Gyllensporre for taking care of our peacekeepers in Mali, including Indonesian peacekeepers, and for having us there. I think we learned a lot from our discussion with him at the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The importance of triangular cooperation has long been underlined in many major guiding documents related to peacekeeping. The Brahimi report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2000/809), the report (A/72/19) of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), the New Horizon Initiative report, the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) and the Action for Peacekeeping Declaration all speak volumes about the need to strengthen triangular cooperation. What has been lacking, however, are efforts to institutionalize triangular cooperation. We have heard many important recommendations today. But the question is: how can we make sure that triangular cooperation works? Let me highlight several points that we consider important. First, implementing existing intergovernmental commitments on triangular cooperation is crucial. The report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, for instance, identified, among other things, the necessity of strengthening peacekeeping mandate configuration processes and United Nations capabilities through effective triangular cooperation. The C-34 report also reiterated that triangular consultations based on informal and inclusive thematic debates among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries were essential. All the recommendations from those meetings and reports must be considered and follow-up actions must be determined. For our part, last March we held a triangular formula meeting on training, capacity-building, safety and security, and the performance of United Nations peacekeeping. I stress the word performance. The meeting was useful in bringing together all stakeholders to discuss ways and means to improve and strengthen training, capacity-building, safety and security, and the performance of United Nations peacekeeping, which in turn contributed to the issuance of presidential statement S/PRST/2019/4 under Indonesia’s presidency in May. The second point concerns considering options for further direct engagement between host Governments and the Security Council. That would include cooperation in the pursuit of Security Council mandates, including facilitating access and the implementation of peacekeeping mandates. The quadrilateral formula, which includes host States in the discussion, can be one of the options. Based on the quadrilateral consultations with the host nations, the Security Council, troop- contributing countries (TCCs), police-contributing countries (PCCs) and the Secretariat could discuss the larger picture of political strategy and priorities. Such consultations would be useful in revalidating and rearticulating the long-term vision of the mission’s political objectives and solution. We concur with what Mr. Lacroix mentioned in his statement, namely, that “mandates can also strongly benefit from the perspectives and experiences of troop and police contributors present on the ground”. Our troops on the ground need to be clear on the mandate, and the experts on the Council should make sure that the mandate is simple, clear and executable on the ground. I think that is the message that the Force Commander was trying to deliver, and I think that is also the message that many Force Commanders who have come into the Security Council Chamber have delivered. I will not name those Force Commanders, but that is the message. The questions then centre on how we will do it and when we will do it. I deliberately used the word “experts” for those who are discussing the draft resolution. I think that is extremely important. They should strive for clarity instead of drafting lots of pages of text. I had that experience when we were in Mali. I spoke with many of our peacekeepers there, and I asked them a simple question: Did they understand what they were supposed to be doing based on resolution 2100 (2013)? Council members know what the answer was. I would like to stress once again that better coordination, coherence and cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission during discussions of peacekeeping mandate and transition are also crucial to improving engagement between host Governments and the Security Council. My third and last point relates to pursuing innovative approaches, including through triangular partnership projects. Cooperation does not have to stop at that political level; it should be expanded to the technical level. That is why innovative projects, such as triangular partnerships, should identify the partnerships necessary to address the capacity gap in implementing peacekeeping mandates. That is also important during the configuration of a mission’s force, structures, size and posture so that it is matched with appropriate human, material and financial resources. In that respect, Indonesia will host the Triangular Partnership Project in 2020, focusing on addressing the gap between the mandates and the capacities of TCCs and PCCs. I note the remarks made by my colleague from Germany on the various recommendations, as well as the remarks made by Ms. Novosseloff and Mr. Lacroix. I support not only the holding of meetings, whether formal or informal, but also the substance, dynamics, outcome and concrete action of those meetings. I would love to have more meetings with the TCCs, PCCs and the other stakeholders, but what is important is to stop the debate and to continue with something that is concrete. In conclusion, we hope that this debate also offers an opportunity to revive and operationalize triangular cooperation in the context of implementing the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. As a footnote, I would like to underline the following. I note the message from the Force Commander on the need for the Force Commander and the troops on the ground to be agile and to have the ability to respond appropriately, particularly in missions that have a serious security threat. I wish to underline once again that our objective for the future is to make peacekeeping operations efficient, effective, agile, responsive and, lastly, safe. I think that is the important part that we tend to forget. The key words here are coordination and good management. At the end of the day, we should never forget that our Blue Helmets are on the front lines, risking their lives for the cause of peace.

I wish to thank Peru for taking the initiative to convene today’s debate. I also thank the three briefers for their briefings. Peacekeeping operations are an effective tool for the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs), and the Secretariat are three important components involved in peacekeeping operations. Strengthening triangular cooperation among them is crucial to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. In 2018, the Secretary-General proposed the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, while 151 Member States endorsed the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, making commitments to strengthening consultations between peacekeeping stakeholders on mandates and their implementation and giving new impetus to advancing triangular cooperation. China wishes to make the following comments on strengthening triangular cooperation in peacekeeping operations. First, improving the mandates given by the Security Council is a precondition. The mandates of peacekeeping operations should adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles guiding peacekeeping operations, while remaining closely aligned with the fundamental goal of a political solution. The formulation of mandates must be tailored to conditions on the ground and correspond to the needs and actual situations of the countries concerned. The mandates of peacekeeping operations should be clear and specific to facilitate political solutions. The priorities and focus of each phase need to be updated continuously according to the dynamics and needs. Secondly, improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is crucial. The Secretariat should optimize the logistical support mechanism to ensure more efficient support and adequate peacekeeping resources. Attention should be paid to strengthening training in order to effectively help the TCCs and PCCs improve their ability to implement their mandates and respond to complex situations. More attention should be paid to the safety and security of peacekeepers. The Secretariat and the missions should adopt integrated measures, develop safety and security rules, improve early warning and response capabilities, enhance information collection and sharing, improve security equipment and protection measures, and strengthen medical rescue and life-saving capabilities. Thirdly, building stronger partnerships serves as a buttress. The Security Council meetings with TCCs and PCCs should be better utilized to promote more comprehensive and in-depth discussions. The role of the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should be better leveraged to serve as a channel of communication among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the TCCs and PCCs so as to forge synergy and resolve practical problems. The penholders of the Security Council should strengthen communication with the TCCs and PCCs in the process of drafting relevant draft resolutions on peacekeeping operations, to learn the actual needs and tailor the mandates authorized by the Council’s resolutions, with greater attention paid to improving actual results. China is a permanent member of the Security Council, as well as a major TCC and a major financial contributor to peacekeeping operations. China is a firm supporter of and an important participant in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Currently, we are comprehensively implementing the multiple pledges made by Chinese President Xi Jinping to further support United Nations peacekeeping operations. We have already established a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops and two peacekeeping standby police units. At present, more than 2,500 Chinese keep peacekeepers are implementing mandates in eight mission areas. China attaches great importance to and is ready to actively participate in triangular cooperation in peacekeeping operations. We support the Security Council in strengthening communication with the TCCs and PCCs and the Secretariat, and in working together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. China would like to leverage the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund and its own advantages in the area of training and strengthened coordination with the Secretariat to focus on building the capacity of developing TCCs. Through concrete actions, China will continue to make its own contributions to enhance the capacity of United Nations peacekeeping operations and honour its commitments towards peace.

I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to today’s briefers and to the Peruvian presidency. It is indeed essential that the interaction between the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries proceed in the direction of improved mutual understanding on the basis of the provisions of the note of the President contained in document S/2017/507. Today I would like to focus on a series of concrete measures that would achieve that objective, first, by making better use of existing mechanisms and, secondly, by advancing our thinking on other approaches. First, with regard to making better use of existing mechanisms, I would like to begin with the issue of meetings between the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Security Council. Since we became members of the Council, my delegation has endeavoured to take full advantage of those meetings as opportunities for sustained and substantial exchanges among the Council, the Secretariat, the host State, the missions concerned and contributors. Let us be frank  — a dysfunctional format cannot be publicly deplored in the General Assembly unless we make the effort to bring such interactions to life. I would also like to encourage the penholders in the Council to take into account the considerations expressed by contributors when drafting resolutions for mandate renewals. Furthermore, all meetings of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations are held in open format. We therefore encourage all troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as mission host States, to participate. Small and medium-sized contributors should also make their voices heard. As a member of the Council, we have everything to gain from such exchanges as they highlight operational difficulties and elements on the ground that countries believe the Council must take into account. Lastly, we welcome the fact that interpretation is provided at the majority of the meetings held by those two forums, thereby addressing multilingualism and accessibility concerns. Secondly, with respect to other approaches, while making good use of existing forums is a useful first step, we can certainly make a greater effort. We believe that it is important to hear from financial contributors, regardless of their rank. As a Member State, we provide human resources for peacekeeping but we all also invest financial resources to ensure that peacekeeping functions well. From that perspective therefore, we have a financial interest in its success. I would like to quote from a recent report of the Boutros-Ghali Peacekeeping Observatory. “The participation of financial contributors in meetings concerning mission implementation would, first and foremost, enable the format of the mandate to be adapted to the financial resources available and overcome operational difficulties that hinder its design and conduct.” That would indeed be a useful step in our efforts to align mandates and resources. Some mandates are implemented in increasingly challenging security environments, thereby requiring greater efficiency, performance and operational responsibility. We therefore see some merit in spurring an enhanced dialogue on increasingly technical and military issues in order to allow for horizontal dialogue among the experts of the respective contributors. Consideration should be given to the role that the Military Staff Committee should play in a triangular structure. Lastly, Belgium supports the proposal in the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions to ensure that information is available to stakeholders further in advance of planned Council meetings. We hope that that proposal can be adopted quickly.

We thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s meeting on the important subject of strengthening triangular cooperation among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat on issues related to peacekeeping activities. We thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Force Commander Lieutenant General Gyllensporre of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Ms. Novosseloff, independent consultant from the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute, for their briefings and views. It is indeed difficult to overstate the importance of triangular cooperation. It plays a significant and defining role in the practical effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping as it brings together the key players involved in setting tasks, planning, managing and carrying out United Nations peacekeeping operations. The key platform of the United Nations system for implementing such cooperation is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). It is unique in its representativeness. It is within the Special Committee that members of the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries develop common approaches to the parameters of peacekeeping activities and engage in interactive dialogue with the Secretariat on current issues. A sine qua non for reaching the necessary level of trust among all interested parties is ensuring transparency and observing in practice the consensus agreements reached in intergovernmental formats. For example, it is the recommendations and decisions adopted by the C-34 that should guide the Secretariat and missions on the ground in discharging their executive functions. That covers the textbooks, concepts, guidelines and other documents developed by the Secretariat. With those objectives, it is also important to observe the division of labour within the United Nations system among the structures that define the functional modalities of peacekeeping operations to ensure that we do not impede the Special Committee in its mandate of considering common issues in the area of peacekeeping. To that end, the Security Council, as the organ endowed by the Charter of the United Nations with responsibility for preventing threats to international peace and security certainly plays the primary role in designing the mandates for United Nations peacekeeping operations in each specific country. We advocate putting into practice the proposals for promoting triangular cooperation outlined in the reports of the C-34. We believe that peacekeeping mandates and the conceptual know-how of the Secretariat should correlate with the opinions of troop-contributing countries (TCCs), police-contributing countries (PCCs) and host countries. That, in turn, will allow us to have an accurate interpretation of the objectives set to avoid the possible overburdening of mandates and, in so doing, increase the effectiveness of their implementation. In that context, we note the opportunity to increase the effectiveness of triangular cooperation by involving the host countries, which bear the main responsibility for protecting civilians, guaranteeing the political process, removing reasons for crisis and engaging in post- conflict reconstruction. As practice has shown, in countries where there is active cooperation based on mutual respect between missions and the State, there is a precondition for the effective achievement of objectives. TCCs and PCCs also play a defining role in guaranteeing effective United Nations peacekeeping operations as it is the Blue Helmets they send who are called on to fulfil the objectives set by the Security Council. Their opinion and the timely information they can provide from the area of operations are indeed very important. The experience garnered also enhances the institutional memory of the United Nations system and provides lessons for the future. We therefore reiterate the value of the meetings held among the Security Council, TCCs and PCCs before the mandate of a peacekeeping mission is extended. We also note that the potential of the Military Staff Committee remains underestimated. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter, the Committee shall be called upon to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements. We believe that it would be logical to consider more closely ways of utilizing the analytical capacities and practical assistance that the Military Staff Committee can provide. A useful element is the practice of conducting country visits to United Nations missions, following up with a report with recommendations for the Security Council and inviting military representatives of the elected members of the Council to take part in the meetings of the Military Staff Committee. We also believe it important that the authority of the Military Staff Committee be reconfirmed and that the Secretariat provide it with all the necessary assistance in its activities involving the maintenance of international peace and security.

May I start, Mr. President, by welcoming your choice of topic for today’s debate. I think that, from the conversation we have had around the table and the contributions made, this is one that has provoked considerable interest. It is a really good choice. In the same spirit, I would also like to thank our briefers for coming to us today and setting out their views. The United Kingdom greatly values triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat, represented by Jean-Pierre Lacroix — who is also of course also a key player there —and the troop- and police-contributing countries, which are so vital for all of us in in terms of achieving any mandate. As the Ambassador of Kuwait kindly reminded us, we set out these issues in a joint non-paper with our friends and colleagues from Pakistan last year, which we think is still highly relevant to these conversations. At that time, there was broad agreement that the purpose of triangular cooperation was to enable those troop- and police-contributing countries to provide reliable and relevant information on the realities of implementing and delivering peacekeeping mission mandates to decision makers here in New York. Like many of its counterparts on the Security Council, the United Kingdom is of course a troop- contributing country (TCC) itself. We therefore very much recognize the importance in value of views from the ground, which we happily pass on from our own troops. And, as a Security Council member without personnel presence in every mission, we know that we need to seek the perspectives of other troop- and police-contributing countries as we consider issues on the Council’s agenda, and we do so. As an example, in advance of the renewal of the mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) this year, we met each of the Permanent Representatives of the troop-contributing countries throughout the process and at every level in the Mission. We hosted a meeting with other Security Council members, and that helped directly inform our approach towards resolution 2472 (2019) and, I believe, the Council’s decision-making, particularly on how to deliver the commitment that we have made repeatedly concerning the transition from AMISOM to Somalia- led security. That is just one example, in which it was not necessary for us to create any new process. We were able to do that within the existing parameters, and I believe that we should consider that, as well. We must also recognize, as troop-contributing countries, that we may draw a particular view or perspective from our own contingents’ activities, but no single contributor has a monopoly on the truth of what is happening on the ground. As a Council, we need to make sure that we consider the views of the Special Representatives and Special Envoys of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and all other relevant analyses to make sure that we have a complete and integrated picture. As I said earlier, I think that there has been a really interesting conversation about the best way of holding these discussions. We have carried out these relatively informal consultations one on one and subsequently with other members of the Council. During the United Kingdom presidency in August 2018, I also chaired a TCC meeting (S/PV.8326). I would say that it was not the most dynamic discussion that I have ever participated in. I therefore believe that it is really important that we consider how we can make those meetings more informative and interactive. We are very ready for that conversation, and I take note of proposals made by Alexandra Novosseloff. But we do not want it just to add to our already busy agenda. If we are going to come out with a new idea for how to do something, we need to take something else away or amend the existing method. Otherwise, we will be simply creating more and more meetings. I also agree with all of those who have talked about the value of missions and visits. The Secretary-General has urged Member States to make a greater commitment to peacekeeping through the Action for Peace initiative (A4P), and 151 Member States have endorsed that declaration, which specifically calls on us to implement existing intergovernmental commitments on triangular cooperation, namely, to strengthen consultations among peacekeeping stakeholders on mandate implementation, strengthen United Nations and African Union cooperation, and expand the triangular partnership project, which builds long-term capacity for TCCs and supports capacity-building. When Alexandra Novosseloff talked to us earlier about triangular cooperation, she also talked about it in terms of avoiding tension. In that spirit, let me note that the other shared commitments under A4P include improvements to performance and conduct through the use of performance data to inform deployment decisions and agreement to hold personnel in leadership to account for proper conduct, including in particular on sexual exploitation and abuse. For the United Kingdom, it is therefore disappointing that some troop-contributing countries have decided to obstruct improvements that would have helped deliver better performance. The adoption of the Fifth Committee’s draft resolution on cross-cutting peacekeeping policy would have asked the Secretary- General to take further steps to improve peacekeeping performance and tackle sexual exploitation and abuse. It was also deeply concerning that the same Member States frustrated the usual consensus on the independent Board of Auditors report (A/73/5 (Vol. II)), which addresses actions within the Secretary-General’s own remit, by forcing a vote and resoundingly rejecting recommendations on improving performance. Such recommendations would have not only helped to protect civilians in conflict; they would have gone hand in hand in improving the safety and security of our peacekeepers. Let me conclude by saying that, in seeking to improve United Nations peacekeeping, the Secretary- General has sought commitment and consensus. It is now down to us to demonstrate our commitment to implementing the reforms that we so often talk about and on which we found consensus just last year.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Peru. We too thank our briefers  — Mr. Lacroix, Force Commander Gyllensporre and Ms. Novosseloff— for their in-depth analyses of the subject matter that brings us together today, and we are glad to see the constructive tone that the current discussion in this meeting has taken. We also thank the troop-contributing countries whose representatives are here among us this afternoon. Peacekeeping, in particular peacekeeping operations, is a tool that is constantly evolving and adapting to address the increasingly complex and multidimensional environments in which conflicts take place. That has required deploying them with more precise objectives, coherent strategies and innovative responses. In that light, we decided to convene this debate and provide a space for reflection to discuss an issue that, in our opinion, has yet to reach its full potential, namely, strengthening and better coordinating dialogue and cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries. In recent years, various reports and analyses by the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies, such the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, independent high-level groups and other bodies, have provided us with lucid evaluations and valuable proposals to that end. It is now our responsibility to translate the theoretical into concrete actions. Among the important ideas and concepts put forward this afternoon, we believe that there are meaningful possibilities that can be provided within the context of formal consultations to increase the effectiveness of peace operations and the robustness of their respective mandates, provided that we are able to make effective use of them. In that regard, we agree that there is an urgent need to provide them with greater interaction, which involves ensuring that those who chair them  — preferably Permanent Representatives in close coordination with penholders — foster a more direct and genuine exchange of ideas and experiences. Ensuring the participation of other relevant actors, such as Force Commanders, when mandates are up for renewal, as well as a balanced participation between political and military experts, would also be advisable. Aiming for a more fluid exchange also entails ensuring the adequate prior preparation of the parties, especially the contributing countries, and convening meetings with due advance notice and defined purposes, within the framework of an established calendar and with all relevant documentation circulated in a timely manner, including conceptual notes and performance measures of the peace operation concerned. We also believe that we must complement those formal meetings with other informal meetings to provide flexibility for coordination among the parties, especially when the Council’s heavy agenda does not permit formal triangular dialogue meetings to be held as often as is necessary. We welcome the efforts made in that regard by the penholders in convening informal meetings to gather reliable and relevant information that the contributing countries are able to provide and to engage in in-depth discussions on the texts of the resolutions. We also underscore the central role of the Secretariat in those meetings through deep analyses of the situations and capacities required for each mission, but we stress the need for such informal meetings to take place at the various stages of peace operations, and not only for the renewal of mandates. In particular, they ought to be held in a periodic, systematic manner that does not depend on the goodwill or willingness of a given penholder or on isolated initiatives of non-permanent members. That last point leads us to the main point of our statement, which is concerns the need to make concrete progress towards the institutionalization of triangular cooperation so as to give more structure to our exchanges. We believe that this is feasible on the basis of the broad coincidences raised by many of the approaches that we have heard today, which add to our understanding a substantial basis for agreeing on a best- practices document as soon as possible. We believe that the Working Groups on Peacekeeping Operations and on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, ably chaired by Côte d’Ivoire and Kuwait, respectively, could prepare such a document, if they saw fit, together with members and non-members of the Council that have long-standing participation and experience in peace operations. Peru, in its dual role as an elected member of the Council and a troop-contributing country since 1958, will resolutely support all efforts to institutionalize triangular cooperation. We hope that this debate and the summary document that we will prepare at the end of our presidency will give greater visibility and renewed ideas to an issue that is of interest to all, insofar as it contributes to the credibility and efficiency of peace operations and, by extension, to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia.

I would like to begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council, and particularly on organizing this highly topical debate on working relations and cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs). I would also like to thank Mr. Jean Pierre Lacroix and the two other briefers. Triangular cooperation was, of course, partially institutionalized with the establishment of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2001. As mentioned earlier by our colleague from Kuwait, there have been a number of additional resolutions and presidential statements adopted to promote understanding among those three elements. The report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) recommended that the Security Council institutionalize a framework to bring in troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat early in the process. There is no doubt that a collective commitment to peacekeeping, based on a shared understanding of the objectives and mandates, remains critical to successful peacekeeping missions. Today, missions are deployed in an increasingly complex operating environment and with significantly increased security risks. That underlines the importance of a collective commitment and the need for a continuous and meaningful dialogue among those who create, coordinate, implement and finance peace operations. That also emphasizes the importance of the further institutionalization of coordination to ensure policy and operational coherence across all United Nations systems. It is indeed absolutely essential that the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat now work to streamline and coordinate their activities in the increasingly complex environment of peacekeeping. In that context, I would like to make a number of suggestions to encourage the spirit of partnership and interdependence and to animate stronger cooperation and confidence-building among those three elements: the Security Council, the TCCs and the Secretariat. First, we need to see greater involvement on the part of troop- and police-contributing countries in the mandating process. In its presidential statement of December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/26), the Security Council itself recognized that consultations among the three stakeholders were not working effectively. The Council recognized that, in principle, the experience and expertise of the troop-contributing countries could greatly assist in the planning of operations. That would especially be the case where political processes are weak or non-existent and the environment is dangerous and difficult. The Council also recognized that a sense of ownership over the mandate and the planning processes among troop-contributing countries offered a direct link to performance. However, it is still the Secretariat and the resolution penholders — and not those who will be involved on the ground —that present analyses of the political, security and humanitarian situations for a mission. Informal meetings may take place, but there is plenty of room for further input from troop-contributing countries. Indeed, if triangular cooperation is to be strengthened, that is imperative. Secondly, the lack of participation in the process of mandate preparation or renewal certainly affects performance, and negatively so. It damages the trust among the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. Peacekeepers need to know that authorized mandates have been set up as a result of full consultation and candid discussions, as well as further consultations on the challenges to be faced. It might be added that this would also help to improve the perception of financers, which often seem to believe that countries are not doing enough to ensure efficiency. Such painful exclusion has created a sense of that life is compromised for money, which, unfortunately, is now prevailing in the situation of peacekeeping operations. I would also recall that United Nations peacekeeping operations would not be possible without the participation of troop-contributing countries. It is only common sense to guarantee their full involvement in planning and organizing, which would provide equality and fair treatment. Thirdly, I would suggest that there is still plenty of room for the further development of links within triangular cooperation. For example, the Security Council is not effectively represented at the field level of missions. Earlier, Ambassador Heusgen mentioned the importance of field visits, where one feels the heat and sees the challenges to and opportunities for peacekeeping. But the Security Council still takes decisions on the basis of reports, which are sometimes based on perception rather than reality. For successful mandate operations, it is necessary that the Security Council institutionalize regular consultations with the stakeholders. That must cover not just the mandates of operation, but also include areas such as the safety and security of peacekeepers, strategic force generation and gender, conduct and discipline. Proper consultations and institutionalization of this kind would also allow the resolution of disputes over mandate capabilities or national caveats. Equally, such discussions should not be confined to formal talks in New York. There should be field-level informal discussions that could address shortfalls in information flows and institutional arrangements. In this context, penholders should make it a priority to consult with TCCs in good faith and not overlook the significance of institutional arrangements. As our colleague from the United Kingdom mentioned earlier regarding the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), we have held thorough consultations with troop-contributing countries and I believe that has created ample opportunity for us to understand each other, as well as for the United Kingdom to take into consideration some of the challenges AMISOM has faced in the field. It would also be sensible to strengthen the contribution of other mechanisms for effective mandate delivery. It is very clear, as the Security Council has recognized, that successful peacekeeping operations will increasingly require strong collaboration and dynamic consultation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union. Continuous engagement and consultation with relevant actors — particularly the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which significantly influence the standard and deployment of capabilities in the field — is indeed imperative. In conclusion, the deployment of peacekeeping missions in the context of escalating levels of violence and increasing asymmetrical threats has resulted in growing numbers of Blue Helmets paying the ultimate sacrifice. This should forcefully underline the necessity of putting an end to unnecessary competition for roles in peace operation decision-making. It is very clear that the Security Council, TCCs and the Secretariat, as well as other major stakeholders, must work closely together to strengthen the system of United Nations peace operations. The Security Council and the Secretariat must listen properly to the experiences of the troop- and police-contributing countries. Regular, high-level meetings of all three elements, with conclusions being taken into account in any mission planning, must be a requirement. This is the first and most obvious step towards achieving the more effective and safer delivery of United Nations peacekeeping missions and mandates. It needs to happen urgently.

I now give the floor to the representative of Rwanda.

At the outset, we wish to join other speakers in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Security Council presidency this month. We also thank you for convening this important debate. We agree with most speakers that triangular cooperation remains key to the success of peacekeeping operations. Anything short of that will bring failure, as we will have failed to cooperate on an important task. We also wish to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and Ms. Alexandra Novosseloff for their very useful briefings. First of all, allow me to recall that the Security Council adopted resolution 1353 (2001), which set out a statement of principles underlining that consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should enhance the ability of the Security Council to take appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling mandates and responsibilities. This means that peacekeeping is a partnership. All partners must make efforts towards better coherence and efficiency. Without that cooperation among those three pillars of peacekeeping, we are all bound to fail. From what we see, there are those who establish a mandate and those who implement it. This kind of approach to peacekeeping operations is damaging their effectiveness. It is hurting the authority and credibility of the principal organ dealing with peace and security, which is the Council, and it is hindering the tools it creates to mitigate some of the most complex crises in the world. In that regard, all partners need to be on the same page on issues affecting peacekeeping operations. As most speakers have mentioned, sustained, meaningful consultations with troop-contributing countries at all levels and stages of planning and decision-making processes are critical to the success of any United Nations peacekeeping operation. This means that the Security Council cannot work on these issues in isolation from the implementers of its resolutions and mandates. What we are seeing is that United Nations responses to conflicts have become very complicated due to the political and social dynamics surrounding conflicts across the world. The bottom line for the accomplishment of a successful peacekeeping intervention requires a high level of cooperation, coordination and coherence. In a situation where cooperation, coordination and coherence are weak, strategic outcomes become much harder to accomplish. This means that triangular partnership allows a common understanding of the situation, which informs the development of peacekeeping mandates. Once again, resolution 1353 (2001), among other documents regarding triangular cooperation, stresses the need for the Secretariat to be given sufficient human and financial resources to fulfil its peacekeeping tasks. It is unfortunate that, recently, financial resources have been diminishing to the detriment of peacekeepers and at the expense of contributing countries. This reaffirms the need for structured cooperation that will address existing gaps between mandated tasks and resources with a view to having mandates that are achievable. Strengthening triangular cooperation is to the benefit of the Council, the Secretariat and troop- contributing countries. Accordingly, I would like to make the following points. There should be regular meaningful consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- contributing countries. Meetings should be informal in the sense that they promote a frank, transparent and constructive dialogue. Such meetings should be held in a format that allows the discussion of both operational and political matters and in a manner that will facilitate informed political decisions based on the reality on the ground. This kind of regular and informal meetings should be convened with a spirit and sense of common concern among all peacekeeping stakeholders. In the end, that should enable them to arrive at a common foresight on how to best implement specific tasks as they are presented in a specific peacekeeping mandate.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

I thank you, Mr. President, for inviting Bangladesh to address the Council on strengthening triangular cooperation for peacekeeping operations. Triangular partnership is critical to effective United Nations peacekeeping; there is no question about that. Yet, building partnerships across divergent views of the three key stakeholders — the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) and the Secretariat — has always been a challenge and remains so even today. I hope that today’s discussion will play an important role in informing and guiding our upcoming work. I thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix and the other briefers. Despite a clear division of responsibilities among the three parties of the triangle, there are significant interlinkages and interplay among their work. Therefore, meaningful cooperation and consultations among those three parties are crucial to crafting clearly defined, realistic and achievable mandates. Furthermore, such consultations can also help to narrow gaps between mandates and realities during the implementation phase, ease tensions on unresolved issues in other bodies, such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and the Fifth Committee and bring in fresh ideas from the field in defining the contours of future policies, particularly during the drawdown and exit phase of a mission. In our efforts to set triangular dialogue in a better and more robust framework, in the past we held discussions both on procedural and substantive matters. In that regard, we must commend the work of delegations in the 2018 C-34 negotiations for coming up with a consensus-based section on triangular cooperation with specific recommendations. In keeping with those discussions, let me take this opportunity to share some concrete thoughts. First, the objective of strengthening triangular cooperation should be primarily about overcoming the so-called Christmas-tree mandate dilemma. More flexibility and receptiveness to the inputs coming from TCCs and PCCs and the ground while setting the mandates are key in that regard. The performance appraisal system and apportionment of responsibilities must also be uniform and informed by realism, practicality and achievability. Essentially, the idea should be to allow ownership among the TCCs and PCCs by creating spaces for their voices in critical decisions, including the composition of peacekeeping operations, force adjustments, resource requirements and so on. Secondly, very often in the United Nations bodies dealing with peacekeeping operations, such as the C-34, the Fifth Committee, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the Contingent-Owned Equipment Working Group, the views of the Council, the TCCs, the PCCs and the Secretariat become very divergent. In addition, those United Nations bodies have their own ways of operating, which are not necessarily in sync with each other. Triangular dialogue can certainly play an important role in eliminating those barriers and creating platforms for more meaningful and regular, perhaps institutionalized, interactions among various intergovernmental processes on important issues, such as safety and security, performance, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, among others. Thirdly, we must take concrete steps to further systemize triangular dialogue with an appropriate mix of formal and informal meetings. We see great value in holding regular informal meetings at the expert level with adequate opportunities for participation by field-level actors through videoconferences or other means. That will encourage dynamic, field-focused, two-way discussions. Such meetings should encourage bottom-up thinking and, as such, be adequately flexible, constructive and open in nature to inform decision-makers of the views and concerns expressed by actors and contributors in the field. It is also important to maintain an adequate balance between the military and the civilian voices. Those informal meetings can be used to lay the ground for higher-level meetings in a formal setting, with an effective decision-making agenda and political commitment. Fourthly, the existing mechanisms, such as the C-34 and the Security Council Working Group, need to be utilized for more in-depth discussions of common concerns over various policy issues. In addition, other existing practices for formal and informal meetings need to be further strengthened and streamlined through innovative ways. The Security Council Working Group can play a catalytic role in further institutionalizing triangular cooperation by regular and systematic engagement with TCCs, PCCs and the Secretariat. They can aim to push the discussions beyond the traditional pro forma and formulaic domain to a more open and interactive one and to keep the Security Council informed of the outcomes of such discussions. In turn, the Security Council can reflect the outcomes of such discussions in mandate setting and renewals. Fifthly and lastly, to guide the discussions towards convergence in a systematic way over a period, it is essential that the discussions in a meeting adequately inform the meetings to follow. The Secretariat can keep track of the discussions in a matrix format, particularly for meetings on thematic issues and mission-specific matters. In addition, advance planning and a tentative yearly calendar for triangular consultation with a flexible agenda can help to prepare Member States to contribute to such meetings appropriately.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Allow me, too, to begin by thanking Peru for organizing today’s debate. Let me also thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix and the other briefers for their insightful briefings this afternoon. My country has been a consistent troop/ police-contributor (TCC/PCC) to United Nations peacekeeping for almost six decades. More than 200,000 of our bravest have served in 46 missions around the world in some of the most high-risk environments. One hundred and fifty-six of them have made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of international peace and security. The dedication and professionalism of our peacekeepers are widely acknowledged. They are well trained, well equipped and prepared to act in all circumstances, in accordance with their mandate. We have also been proud to contribute to United Nations peacekeeping in the realm of ideas and norm- building. During Pakistan’s presidency of the Security Council in 2013, the landmark resolution 2086 (2013) was adopted (see S/PV.6903). For the first time, the resolution recognized the multidimensional nature of modern peacekeeping and its evolving role in facing the complex challenges that come with it. We believe that TCCs are the eyes and ears of the United Nations on the ground. Their inputs are therefore invaluable for the Secretariat as well as the Security Council. Pakistan has therefore been a strong proponent of proactive and robust triangular cooperation. In that vein, in 2018, along with the United Kingdom, Pakistan presented a non-paper to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) to aid discussions and find ways to improve triangular cooperation. We were pleased to see that initiative referred to in the concept note (S/2019/538, annex) for today’s debate. As a result of our efforts, an entire chapter was dedicated to triangular cooperation in the 2018 C-34 report (A/72/19). Let me now make five specific points to further improve triangular cooperation. First, Pakistan considers effective communication and consultation among the three main stakeholders  — the Security Council, the Secretariat and the TCCs  — critical for effective and result- oriented peacekeeping, which is a point that has also been made by many of the speakers this afternoon. There is therefore a real need to institutionalize triangular cooperation as a framework to engage troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat early in the process. Secondly, with operating environments becoming ever more volatile and with a chorus of demands for doing more with less, that three-way communication has assumed even greater importance. Thirdly, we do not need to add another layer of formal mechanisms to improve things. All we need to do is to better utilize the existing avenues and a balanced mix of formal and informal dialogue. Both, of course, have their own merit. Fourthly, formal meetings need to be revitalized to maximize their benefits through the provision of relevant information to TCCs and PCCs in a timely manner in order to ensure substantive and meaningful dialogue well ahead of mandate renewals. Fifthly, the elected members of the Council continue to play a critical bridge-building role in facilitating discussions on triangular cooperation. That aspect of triangular cooperation also needs to be further strengthened. Pakistan, along with Morocco, established an informal group of troop- and police-contributing countries in 2017. It includes almost all top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Our group co-hosted a meeting on triangular cooperation with the participation of leading TCCs, senior representatives of the Secretariat and members of the Security Council. We believe that the platform can be used to further our common objective of effective communication and better peacekeeping. Finally, allow me to say that the Security Council and the Secretariat can continue to count on Pakistan as a key partner not only in the field but in all dimensions of peacekeeping, including norm-building and policy formulation. However, without real and effective triangular cooperation, we cannot expect to successfully deal with the multiple challenges that we face today.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

I would like first of all to thank Peru for convening this important debate on the issue of tripartite cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) in peacekeeping operations, as well as for inviting Egypt to participate as one of the largest contributors to military and police contingents in United Nations peacekeeping operations. This meeting is especially timely in the light of the important debates taking place at the United Nations on the reform and enhancement of the peacekeeping system. I also express my thanks and appreciation for the important briefings we heard earlier in the meeting and to those speakers who preceded me. We are aware that peacekeeping reform initiatives tend to focus on strengthening regular capacities and operational aspects of peacekeeping despite the fact that many of these initiatives originate from Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277), the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), the report of High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) and finally the current Secretary-General’s Action for Peace (A4P) initiative, all of which comprehensively addressed the various political and operational dimensions of peacekeeping. The prevailing focus on the technical and operational elements of peacekeeping effectiveness and performance has shifted to carrying out consultations between the Security Council, TCCs and PCCs in recent years, mainly on the operational and technical requirements for contingents and staff in performing certain tasks, although the increasing complexity of the operational environment of peacekeeping operations on the ground highlights the importance of a comprehensive review of the entire mission in order to ensure better design and implementation of peacekeeping mandates for better results. There is a need for a clear political strategy that supports the implementation of the mandate within a comprehensive vision for sustained peace. Those present may agree with me that the availability of a political framework constitutes a key indicator for measuring the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and determining their suitability for action in specific contexts, which necessarily differ from one case to another. We believe that it is important for the scope and nature of the dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the TCCs/PCCs to be developed. Although extensive consultations are ongoing in that regard, we as TCCs continue to see the absence of a strategic dimension in those dialogues that would make TCCs real partners in efforts to ensure that peacekeeping operations meet their strategic objectives. The current format of the consultations, in accordance with resolution 1353 (2001), does not rise to the desired level of triangular cooperation. There is therefore a need to rethink this old and still existing format. Based on its continued commitment to enhancing the effectiveness of the peacekeeping system, and being aware of the enormous challenges facing peacekeeping, Egypt, as a major TCC, was at the forefront of the countries supporting the Secretary-General’s A4P initiative and the joint commitments. In the context of its readiness to assume the presidency of the African Union, Egypt took the lead in placing African TCCs and peacekeeping host countries at the centre of the efforts to implement A4P initiative. In November 2018, Cairo hosted the first high-level regional conference, which provided a unique platform for the key actors of the peacekeeping system to discuss ways to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations from a global perspective that addresses the strategic, political and operational dimensions across a given operation. The regional conference resulted in the Cairo Roadmap for Enhancing the Performance of Peacekeeping Operations from Mandate to Exit. The Cairo Roadmap defines the concept of performance to reflect the broad range of responsibilities and obligations underpinned by the A4P initiative and the joint commitments. It focuses in particular on the priority of conducting field analyses based on a comprehensive consultative process among the Mission’s leadership, host countries, TCCs/PCCs and active regional organizations, with the conclusions and recommendations arising from this analysis to serve as an important source of information for the Security Council when reviewing, restructuring and withdrawing missions. Hence, the Cairo Roadmap develops the concept of tripartite consultations into one of quadrilateral consultations including host countries, TCCs/ PCCs, the Security Council and the Secretariat. The Roadmap also sets operational and technical capacities on a par with the policy priorities and the essential contribution of peacekeeping operations to building and sustaining peace. I would also like to point out that the Cairo Roadmap has benefited from extensive consultations over the past several months to reflect the experience, expertise, wisdom and aspirations of a wide range of key actors and stakeholders, including TCCs and host countries, most of which are African countries that contributed to the formulation and development of this initiative and expressed strong support for its content, which represents African leadership and ownership. I therefore call on the Security Council, which has the inherent competence to maintain international peace and security, to give serious consideration to the practical solutions put forward by the Cairo Roadmap to the challenges undermining the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including the strengthening of mechanisms for consultation among the Council, the Secretariat, TCCs and host countries. The Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali noted the great challenges and serious and complex operational difficulties facing his forces in Mali. I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to the Force Commander and to his forces, while pointing out that the most serious tasks in Mali are undertaken by Egyptian forces, as Egypt is one of the main contributions to that major United Nations operation in a sisterly African country. In conclusion, I would like to thank you once again, Mr President, for convening this important meeting at a very important time and during a challenging period for peacekeeping operations, which requires us all to work together and demonstrate the genuine will and support necessary to make United Nations peacekeeping operations more suited to the purpose established for them in order to achieve the desired objectives.

I now give the floor to the representative of Uruguay.

Allow me at the outset to express our gratitude to the presidency of Peru for having organized this debate on triangular cooperation in the context of peacekeeping operations, as well as for having invited Uruguay to participate in it. We wish you and your delegation every success, Mr. President, in leading the Council during this month of July. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix; the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre; and the Senior Fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute, Ms. Alexandra Novosseloff, for their briefings. We have also taken careful note of the statements delivered by members of the Council and those troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) that have spoken before us. I wish to reaffirm Uruguay’s commitment to the United Nations peacekeeping system and peacekeeping operations. Our country has already deployed more than 50,000 troops to more than 20 operations around the world in our long history as a troop- and police-contributing country. As of today, Uruguay’s contribution of troops places our country as the main contributor from the Americas and very close to being among the top 20 in the world. That effort, which has been sustained for decades, has afforded our country a very rich experience in this field. Cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries — known as triangular cooperation — is not a new concept. On the contrary, it has been a regular element of the deliberations of the United Nations since at least 1990, almost 30 years ago. It is not my intention to reiterate concepts that have already been mentioned by delegations that have spoken before me, but I do wish to at least emphasize that there are a number of precedents on this topic — documents and initiatives emanating from the Security Council itself and from the General Assembly. Among those precedents, I should like to mention the Brahimi report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (S/2000/809) of 2000; the Capstone Doctrine report of 2001; the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) of 2015; the New Horizon initiative of 2009; and the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative of 2018. At the Security Council level, we note the creation of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2001, the adoption of resolution 1353 (2001) in the same year, presidential statement S/PRST/2015/26 of 31 December 2015 and the update to note 507 on the Council’s working methods (S/2017/507, annex). At the General Assembly level, since 2010 the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has dedicated a section of its reports to triangular cooperation. Moreover, those broad efforts, based on theoretical discussions, have been accompanied by the creation of various mechanisms to bring triangular cooperation into practice. However, in spite of all those precedents, there remains a shared perception among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries that the current consultations fall short of expectations and are yet to reach their full potential. As we said earlier, although the topic of triangular cooperation has regularly formed part of our debates for several years, we wish to underscore the greater importance today more than ever of improving those mechanisms, given the particular challenges faced by peacekeeping missions today. We have reached the point at which peacekeeping operations are working in increasingly complex and changing operational environments and facing threats of all kinds. Peacekeepers require a high level of preparation and training for the various mandated tasks and in the use of more sophisticated equipment and new technologies. Greater efficiency and effectiveness are also being demanded of peacekeeping operations while the budgets allocated to finance those operations are being reduced year after year and the Organization faces serious problems in making timely reimbursements to troop- and police-contributing countries. In Uruguay’s view, addressing these challenges in the current context requires strong triangular cooperation among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries. In that regard, we believe that first-hand information and experience, as well as the perspectives of countries whose personnel are deployed in conflict zones, are of great use to the Security Council in its process to better understand the situation and consider the opportunities and threats arising on the ground. Furthermore, we should not underestimate the importance of having a broad base of support for the mandates approved by the Security Council, particularly taking into account the characteristics of the new tasks that have been incorporated into those mandates, which are more complex and involve more robust rules of engagement, such as in the case of the protection of civilians. Allow me to very briefly share some ideas that my country believes could contribute to improving the quality of triangular cooperation. During our participation as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2016 and 2017, we had the opportunity to develop an initiative proposed by New Zealand that consisted of convening, on the part of the penholder, an informal meeting among troop- and police- contributing countries, members of the Council and the Secretariat well in advance of the renewal of a mandate. That informal format, with the combined presence of diplomatic delegates and military and police advisers, has been proven to foster a more fluid exchange among stakeholders and is a suitable complement to the formal meetings with TCCs/PCCs organized by the Security Council. We believe that this practice, which we understand continues to be used, albeit sporadically, should be more systematized in the work of the Security Council, for example through an update to note 507 working methods, which contains a section dedicated to this topic. The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations is also a viable platform for strengthening triangular cooperation through discussions on specific issues, such as the protection of civilians, the security of peacekeeping personnel, the use of technology or environmental management in peacekeeping operations, among others. The Secretariat, particularly through its Department of Peace Operations, also has a key role to play in convening meetings with members of the Security Council and TCCs/PCCs as and when needed, for example in the context of strategic reviews of missions or when there are abrupt changes in an operational environment. Finally, within the scope of the General Assembly, the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations constitutes a useful body that brings together the three actors of triangular cooperation and from which recommendations and political directives can be issued on the topic. In short, and with this I will conclude my speech, the strengthening of triangular cooperation should be in the interest of the three parties given that they will benefit from enhanced dialogue, which in turn will have a positive impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.