S/PV.859 Security Council

My delegation followed with the closest attentionthe statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union [857th meeting] regarding the complaint which he submittedtothe Security Councilindocuments S/4314 and S/4315. We listened with equal attention at the same meeting to the UnitedStates representative's reply to the accusations set out, in that complaint, against his Government. 2. An impartial study of these two main statements has led us to the conclusion that the situation is serious, not so much because of the actualincident or incidents which gave rise to it, but mainly because of the mistrust which it has shown to exist between the two parties chiefly concerned, and of the regrettable consequences which it has had or might still, in the near future, produce. 3. The accusation that the UnitedStates Air Force has carried out aggressive acts against the SovietUnionthe matter now before the Council-rests essentially, according to the complaint, on two violations of the Soviet Union's air sp~~e by UnitedStates military aircraft. =~c~~:,t~£rci:!~~1;~:~~~E: i=:~:~:i?:E:Ei~::@=111iZ~ f0 President: sir Claude COREA (Ceylan). Presents: Les representants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Italie, Pologne, Royaume-Unide Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tunisie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgendal 859) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Cliblogramme, en date du 18 mal 1960, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Ministre des affaires etrang~res de 1'Union des Republique15 socialistes sovietiques (S/4314, si4315). Adoption de I'ordre du jour Coblogramme, en date du 18 mai 1960, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Mini!l:tre des affaires etranglHes de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques (S/43i4, S/4315) 1. M. SLIM (Tunisie): C'est avec la plus grande at- tention que nous avons suivi Pexpose fait par le Ministre des affaires etrang~res de PUnion sovietique [857~me seance] au sujetdelaplaintequ'ila introduite devant le Conseil de securite dans les documents S/ 4314 et S/4315. Avec nonmoinsdeserieux,nous avons entendu ~ la m13me seance la replique du representant ~:s~;a::~~~nt~~~~~~~na:u~~~:~~~ portees 2. L'etude impartiale de ces deuxprincipaux exposes nous a amenes ~ la conclusion que la situation est serieuse, non certes en raison de Pincident ou des incidents qui Pont provoquee en eux-m~mes, mais surtout du fait de la mefiance qu'elle revMe entre les deux parties princlpalement en cause, ainsi que des suites regrettables qu'elle a eues ou qu'elle pourrait avoir encore dans le proche avenir. iiat~:~:i~~~~~i:~~~~~~U~~l:~~~:t~~:~t~:n::n~~: 1'Union sovietique, objet de la question soumise actuel- lement au Conseil, repose essentiellement, selon la i~;a;~~~~:~=1::~.t~':fu,.';:: 6. It seems to us that the question could have been closed on lE? May 1960, after President Eisenhower's statement. Unfortunately, events developed otherwise. The hopes placed in the Summit Conference were dashed, and the Security Council is now calledupon to deal with this question and take a clear decision in regard to it. 7. In its request, set forth in the draft resolution [S/4321] which it has placed before the Council, the Soviet delegation asks us to describe the flight of the United States U-2 aircraft over Soviet air space as an aggressive act. Fully aware of our responsibilities within the Council, we shall state our attitude on this subject quite unambiguously. 8. The members of the Council will doubtless recall that Tunisia has been, and continues to be, the victim of many violations of its air space by military air- craft. I have already hadto drawthe Council's attention to them. What makes these violations, which are con- trary to the principles of international law, unques- tionably aggressive acts is the fact that they are carried out by aircraft belonging to an army which is engaged in a war inour immediatevicinity and that they are preceded, accompanied or followedbythebombing of our national soil. It is these circumstances, taken together, that mark these flights clearly as aggressive acts, to which Tunisia has been obliged to draw the Council's attention. 9. If I have mentionedthese violations of my country's air space, it is because they constitute a current problem which cannot but be called to mind in con- nexion with the question brought before the Councilby the Soviet Union. Unlike the violations of Tunisian air space, however, the incident of the United States U-2 aircraft cannot in our viewbe described as involving an aggressive act, since it lacks the essential features characteristic of aggression. 10. It is in fact clear, from the explanatorymemoran- dum submitted by the Sovietdelegation[Sf4315] in sup- port of its complaint as well as from the detailed state- ment made here by Mr. Gromyko that the flight con- cerned was a reconnaissance flight over military and industrial establishments of the Soviet Union. At no time have we been told that the aircraftwas armed, or was followed or accompanied by other armed aircraft. 11. During this debate, all States , andparticularlythe smaller nations, have been urged to take standagainst aggression and not to remain indifferent to this prob- lem. On that point my delegation concurs completely. 12. I represent here a countryfree of all commitments towards either of the two blocs which, unfortunately, 6. Il nous semble que la questionauraitpntrouver sa conclusion le 16 mai 1960, apr~s cette declaration du president Eisenhower. Mais tel ne fut malheureu- sement pas le cas. Les espoirs fondes sur la Confe- rence au sommet ont ete deQus, et le Conseil de securite est appele aUjourd'hui A connaftre de cette question et Ase prononcer clairement l son sujet. 7. Dans sa requ~te, precisee par le projetderesolu- tion qu'eUe a depose devant le Conseil [S/4321], la delegation sovietique nous demande de qualifier d'acte agressif le survol par 1'avion americain U-2 de 1'es- pace aerien sovietique. Pleinement conscients de nos responsabilites au sein du Conseil, nous nous per- mettons de preciseI' sans ambiguil;e notre position Ace sujet. 8. Les membres du Conseil se rappeUent sans doute que la Tunisie a ete et continue d'@tre 1'objet de nom- breuses violations de son espace aerienpar des avions militaires. J'ai eu A attirer l'attention du Conseil A leur propos. Ce qui fait que ces violations, contraires aux principes du droit international, constituent in- discutablement des actes agressifs, c'estqu'eUes sont le fait d'avions qui font partie d'une armee engagee 1ans une guerre dans notre voisinage immediat, et qu'elles sont precedees, accompagnees ou suivies de bombardement de notre sol national. C'est cet en- semble d'elements qui fait de ces violations des actes agressifs caracterises, sur lesquels la Tunisie a ete obligee d'attirer 1'attention du Consell. 9. Si j'ai evoque les violations de l'espace aeriendont mon pays fait l'objet, c'est qu'il y a lA un probl~me actuel auquel on nepeut s 'emp~cher de penser Apropos de la question dont le Conseil a ete saisi par 1'Union sovietique. Mais, contrairement aux violations de l'espace aerien de la Tunisie, l'incident de l'avion am.ericain U-2 ne saurait ~tre qualifie, Anotre avis, d'acte agressif, les elements essentiels qui caracte- risent l'agression lui faisant defaut. 10. En effet, il ressort du memoire explicatifdepose par la delegation sovietique A l'appui de sa plainte [S/4315], de m~me que de l'expose detaille quenous a fait M. Gromyko, que le vol dont 11 s'agit etait un vol de reconnaissance des installations militaires et in- dustrielles de son pays. A aucun m.oment, 11 ne nous a ete dit que cet avion etait arme, ou qu'll precedait d'autres avions armes, ou quIll etait accompagne d'autres avions armes. 11. Au cours de ce debat, i1 a ete fait appel Atous lee Etats - et particuli~rementaux petites nations - pour les inviter as'opposer :ll'agression, Ane pas rester indifferents :l l'egard de ce probl~me. Sur ce point, ma delegation se permet de doiUler son accord total. 12. Representant ici un pays libre de tous enga- gements A l'egard des deux blocs qui, malheureu- 13. In all objectivity, the Tunisian delegation is un- able to agree thatthese flights over Soviet air space by United States aircraft constii:ute aggressive acts, andit cannot, therefore, give its approval to the Soviet draft resolution [S/4321]. 14. In our view, this incident could have been settled through the normal channels of bilateral diplomacy. My delegation can only express its sincereregretthat the incident has brought about so dramatic an interrup- tion of the Summit Conference onwhichso many legiti- mate hopes had been pinned. At the beginning of my statement I said that the situation seemed to us to be serious, not because of the incident in itself, but because of the extent of the mistrust which it has shown to exist between the two parties directly in- volved. 15. For if responsible United States officialswere on 1 May, a mere fortnightbeforethe Summit Conference, preparl3d to risk flights over Soviet territory in cir- cumstances which are now a matter of public know- ledge, that mustargue a continuedlackoftrust on their part. Such mistrust maybe regretted; it maybe thought justified or unjustified; unfortunately, however, it exists, and its continuance is a serious matter for mankind as a whole. 16. On the other side, the position is even more serious. The violence of the Soviet Union's reaction against the incident, bringing about the interruptionon 15 May of discussions which had been so laboriously prepared for, is the clear indication of a fear which could conceivably turn to dread. And that is something which must be regarded as evenmore serious, since it is in no way calculated to allay mistrust. 17. An objective analysis of the situation leads us, therefore, to the conclusion that the realproblem con- fronting us is the confidencewhichhas tobe established between the two parties concerned-a genuine con- fidence, truly and unreservedly felt. 18. As the Tunisian delegation has from time totime said in the United Nations, such confidence cannot be based on statements of intention, however generous in their phrasing they may be. Only satisfactory agree- ments, in linewiththe principles ofthe Charter and the relevant General Assembly resolutions, particularly as regards the prevention of surprise attack, the ces- sation of nuclear tests, anddisarmament,bothnuclear and conventional, in all its aspects-only agreements of that kind, I repeat, will make it possible for such confidence to be re-established, not only between the parties directly concerned, but also, and above all, in the hearts of men as a whole. Even agreements such 13. Tr~s objectivement, la delegation tunisienne ne saurait admettre comme constituant des actes agree- sifs les survols de l'espace aerien sovietique par les avions americains et ne saurait, de cefait, donner son approbation au projet de resolution sovietique [si 4321]. 14. Cet incident aurait pu, Anotre avis, ~treregIe par les voies qu'offre norm:\lement la diplomatie bUat6- rale. Ma delegation ne peut que regretter sinc~rement qu'll ait ete la cause de 1'interruptionsi dramatique de la Conference au sommet sur laquelle tant d'espoirs legitimes ont ete fondes. J'ai dit, au debut de mon expose, que la situation nous paraft serieuse, non pas du fait de l'incident en lui-m~me dont nous avons ~ connartre, mals bien du fait de l'ampleur de la me- fiance que cet incident devoile et qui existe entre les deux parties directement interessees. 15. En effet, pour que les responsables americains aient risque, le 1e1' mai, Aune quinzaine de jours de la Conference au sommet, de faire survoler leterritoire sovietique dans les conditions que l'on sait, il faut oroire que la mefiance persiste chez eQ'C. On peut regretter ca sentiment, le juger legitime ou l'estimer infonde, mais, malheureusement, il existe et sa per- sistance est grave pour 1'humanite entiere. 16. La reciproque est encore plus serieuse. La vio- lence de la reaction de 1'Union sovietique contre 1'incident en question, provoquant 1'interruption, le 15 mai dernier, des discussions si laborieusement pre- parees., denote indiscutablement une crainte qui n'in- terdit pas des apprehensions. Et cela, on ne peut s'emp~cher de le considerer encore comme plus grave parce que ce n'est pas denature Acalmer la mefiance. 17. L'analyse objective de la situation nous am~ne donc~ la conclusion que le vrai problllme qui se pose A nous est celui de la necessaire confiance Aetablir entre les deux parties interessees, une confiance 1'6- elle, qu'il ne serait pas impossible de qualifier de sinc~re et sans arrillre-pensee. 1.8. Comme la delegation tunisienne a eu1'occasionde l'exprimer A differentes reprises aux Nations Unies, cette confiance ne saurait s'etablir sur la base de de- clarations d'intention, si genereuses soient-elles. Seuls, des accords satisfaisants, conformes auxprin- cipes de la Charte et aux resolutions pertinentes de l'Asserp.blee generale, notamment en ce qui concerne la prevention d'une attaque par surprise" l'arr~ des essais dJarmes nucleaires, et le desarmement sous tousses aspects, aussibiennucleaires que classiques, seuls de tels accords, dis-je, permettront A cette confiance de reparaftre, non seulement entre les parties directementinteressees, mais aussi etsurtout, 19. The entire world placed greathopes inthe Summit Conference of 15 May which was so unfortunately interrupted. It regarded that Conference as a means of ensuring the relaxation of international tension, of removing the danger of a terrible world war, and of seeking a formula for truly peaceful coexistence be- tween the different nations on the basis of freedom, law and justice. We had hoped that understanding which might have been reached at the SummitConfer- ence would help to facilitate the peaceful solution of certain problems, vital-for us and for thewhole world, which the persistence of the cold war hadmade it im- possible to solve in the spirit ofthe lofty principles of the Charter. That indicates how deeply we were disap- pointed by the failure of the Conference. 20. It is now, therefore, the Security Council's dutyto assume its responsibilities under the Charter, par- ticularly since one of the parties concerned has had recourse to it in the normal way. 21. Representing a country of Mrica which seeks to maintain and restore peace on the basis of law, freedom and justice, the Tunisian delegation does not yet venture to despair. Conscious of ourresponsibili- ties, we appeal for a resumption of the interrupted discussions for negotiation, and for the use ofall other amicable processes recommended in the Charter. 22. Despite everything, candles of hope are still burning which we must try to keep alight. The Soviet Government and the other Powers on the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee are, happily, continuingtheir discussions at Geneva. This is a fact which my dele- gation finds encouraging. Similarly, we were pleasedto hear the United States representative reaffirm here again, on 23 May, that his Governmentwas prepared to enter into any useful negotiations whereby apprehen- sion and distrust could be banishedforever. Thatis an expression of goodwill on which substantial hopes can be based. 23. The duty of the Security Council is, therefore, to promote an amicable settlement, to encouragetrue and honest negotiation, and to work towards that end by every possible means. This, in our view, is the only really useful course whereby peace can be maintained and the future of all mankind assured.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. 25. Mr. BERARD (France) (translated from French): I wish to say only a few words. The representative of Tunisia has seen fit to allude to violations of his country's air space, of which, he maintains, military aircraft have been guilty. If he had French aircraft in mind, it may interestthe Councilto knowthe following: careful inqUiries by our authorities have shown that, in accordance with the categorical instructions received by our pilots, none of our aircraft have crossed the Tunisian frontier. As the Council already knows from the letter which I addressed to it recently [S/4309], the French delegation coulditselfsay a good deal about 19. Le monde entler fondait de-grands espoirs sur la Conference au sommet du 15 mai, si malheureusement interrompue•.Il y voyait le moyen d'assurer la detente internationale, d'eloigner le danger d'une terrible guerre mondiale et de rechercher une formule de coexistence pacifique reelle entre les differentes nations, sur la base de la liberte, du droit et de la justice. Nous avions espere que l'entente qui s'yseraitetablie contribuerait a. faciliter la solution pacifique de certains probl~mes vitaux pour nous et essentiels poer le monde entier, que la continuation de la guerre froide a emp~che de resoudre daus l'esprit des hauts principes de la Charte. C'est dire combiennous avons ete deQus par la rupture de la Conference. 20. 11 appartient done maintenant au Conseil de securite de prendre ses responsabilites, conformement a. la Charte, d'auhnt plus qu'il est reguli~rement saisi par l'une des deux partie'3. 21. Representant un pays de l'Afrique qui cherche A maintenir la paix et a. la restaurer sur la base du droit, de la liberte et de la justice, la delegation tunisienne n'ose pas encore desesperer. Conscients de nos responsabilites, nous nous permettons de lancer un appel pour la reprise des discussions interrompues, pour la negooiation, ainsi que pour l'utilisationdetous autres moyens amiables recommandes par la Charte. 22. 11 demeure, malgre tout, des lueurs d'espoir qu'il y a lieud'entretenir. Le Gouvernementsovietique ainsi que les puissances qui font partie duComite des 10 puissances sur le desarmement continuentheureusement les discussions a. Gen~ve. C'est a un fait que ma delegation se permet de considerer comme encourageant. De m€!me, nous avons ete heureux d'entendre ici m~me le representant des Etats-Unis reaffirmer a. nOilveau, le 23 mai, que son gouvernement etait dispose a. toutes negociations utiles permettant de bannir a. jamais les apprehensions et la mefiance. 11 y a la. une bonne volonte qui autorise de larges espoirs. 23. Le devoir du Conseil de securite est done d'encourager l'arrangement amiable, la negociation franche, loyale, et d'ceuvrer par tous les moyens dans ce sens. C'est, a. notre avis, la seule voie vraiment utile en vue du maintien de la paix et au benefice de l'avenir de l'humanite enti~re. 24. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le prochain orateut inscrit est le representant de la France, qui desire user de son droit de reponse. 25. M. BERARD (France): Je ne veux dire que deux mots. Le representant de la Tunisie a crubon de faire allusion a. des violations de l'espace aeriende son pays dont, dit-il, se seraient rendus coupables des avions militaires. S'il a voulu faire allusion a. des appareils franQais, il peut interesser le Conseil de savoir que les enqu@tes attentives auxquelles ont pris soin de se livrer nos autorites ont dllmontre que, conformement aux instructions formelles qu'ont reQues nos pilotes, nos avions n'ont en aucun cas franchi la fronti~re tunisienne. Comme le Conseil le ~ait deja. par les termes de la lettre que je lui ai recemment adres~e.

The representative of Tunisia has requested to speakin exercise of his right of reply.

I shall be very brief. I do not consider that the French representative was entitled, in the present case, to a right of reply. 28. I did not mention France. Nor did I mention the representative of France; but, as he ref(:lrred to Tunisia,' saying that according to the conclusive investigations carried out by his Government no French aircraft had crossed the Tunisian frontier, I should merely like to recall the incident of 8 February 1958. This incident led to a debate in the Security Council during which the representative of France admitted that a B-26 bomber had bombed Tunisian territoryj an end was put to the situation throughthe good offices of friendly countries. 29. I do not want to embitter the atmosphere. My present concern is with a problem which is much greater in scope and is much more important for humanity-a problem ranging far beyond the confines of Tunisia and. France, and affecting mankind as a whole.

The representative of France has again asked for the floor. He has already exercised his right of reply, but I would give him the floor.

I think that what I have to say will close the matter. I merely wished to take note of what the Tunisian representative has said and of the fact that his words were not addressed to France. I anllvery glad that that was so. 32. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (translatedfrom Spanish): The Security Council has before it an affairthe repercussions of which cannot be minimized, since they are closely connected with relations between the two greatest Powers. Thp military power and technical resources of the United States andthe Soviet Union are so great that any worsening of relations betweenthem must cause deep anxiety about the danger of a chain of events threatening peace, not by the design of those responsible but because of the mistakes which they might make. We have all witnessed the deplorable happenings leading, inthis month ofMay,tothe present situation, which no one could describe as free from peril. 33. It is infull awareness ofthe gravity of the moment that the delegation of Ecuador is taking part in the debate after a careful study of the memorandum presented by the Soviet Union, the statement ofthe Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and the draft resolution which he has seen fit to submit. 34. The complaint of the Soviet Union is confined to the case of a flight by an aircraft of the United States Air Force over Soviet territory on 1 May 1960-a flight which the Soviet Union considers to be one of a 26. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'allglais): Le representant de la Tunisie a demand~ Aprendre la parole, en vertu de son droit de reponse. 27. M. SLIM: (Tunisie): Je ne dirai qu'un mot, pour denier au representant de la France le droit de reponse qu'il a pris. 28. Je n'ai pas mentionne la France. Je n'ai pas mentionne le representant de la France, mais, puisqu'il a mentionne la Tunisie en disant que, d' apr~s les observations certaines que son gouvernement a faites, aucun des avions franQais n'a franchi la froDti~re tunisienne, je voudrais simplement me borner 1l. rappeler l'incident du 8 fevrier 1958, qui a donne lieu A un debat au Conseil de securite au cours duquel le representant de la France a admis que le bombardier B-26 avait bombarde le territoire tunisien et il a ete mis fin il. cette situation par les bons offices de pays amis. 29. Je ne veux pas envenimer l'atmosph~re.Je veux mIen tenir seulement il. un probl~me beaucoup plus large, beaucoup plus vaste, beaucoup plus important pour 1'humanitli, qui depasse etla Tunisie etla France elles-memes, et qUi est 1'humanite tout enti~re. 30. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la France a de nouveau demande la parole. Il a dejA use de sondroit de reponse, mais je voudrais lui donner la parole. 31. M. BERARD (France): Je crois quecequeje vais dire va clore l'incident. J e voulais simplementprendre acte de ce quIa dit le representant de la Tunisie et de ce que ses paroles ne s'adressaient pas Ala France. Je mIen rejouis. 32. M. CORREA (Equateur) [traduit de l'espagnol]: Le Conseil de securite est saisid'une question qui a de trop profondes repercussions sur les rapports entre les deux plus grandes puissances du monde pour qu'on puisse en sous-estimer l'importance. La puissance militaire, les ressources techniques des Etats-Unis et de l'Union sovietique sont d'une anllpleur telle que la deterioration de leurs relations ne peut que profondement nous preoccuperj un enchafuement de circonstances peut compromettre la paix du monde, non de par l'intention des responsables, mais de par les erreurs qu'ils peuvent commettre. Nous avons tous ete temoins des deplorables evenements qui se sont deroules depuis le debut du mois de mai pour nous mener finalement il. la situation dont nul ne peut dire qu'elle ne soit grosse de perils. 33. C'est en pleine conscience de la gravite de l'heure que la delegation de 1'Equateur prend part il. ce debat, apr~s avoir etudie avec le plus grandsoinle memoire presente par l'Union sovietique, l'expose du Ministre des affaires etrang~res de l'Union sovietique et le projet de resolution qu'il a estime devoir presenter. 34. La plainte de l'Union sovietiqueporteuniquement sur l'affaire du vol qu'un avion militaire des Etats- Unis a effectue le ler mai 1960 au-dessus du territoire sovietique. Pour l'Union sovietique, ce survol 36. How should this problembe viewedbythe Council, the United Nations organ whichbearsprimaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security? In our opinion, the present international situation requires that we look to the future and, if that future is to be one ofpeace,refrain from any step which might aggravate eXisting tensions; we must seek a means of reconciling the two greatest Powers. 37. I venture to indicate. in this respect, one positive element in this debate, an element whichshouldnot be obscured QY the vehemence inevitably, at times, characterizing the discussion. I refer. onthe one hand, to Mr. Gromyko's appeal for relations between States to be effectively governed and controlled by international law. This appeal, which shows a positive intention in that respect on the part ofa very powerful State, cannot but help to reduce tension and diminish apprehensions. On the other hand, I refer to Mr. Lodge's restatement of the traditionally peaceful policy of the United States, and to his reaffirmation that his Government will take positive steps towards the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust. 38. Having analysed the Bubstance of thesetwo statements. I feel it is not too muchto say that the Council is in a position to end this debate on a note of confidence. 39. We understand the anger which flights of foreign aircraft over its territory inspire in the SovietUnion. Such flights would cause equal anger in any country, no matter where they came from. But although the anger is comprehensible, it should not be dramatized to the point of blinding one to the most obvious facts of the international situation: war. since it would destroy everybody and leave novictors, mustbeprevented, and the harder the problems, the greater the need for negotiation. 40. It would be desirable-and this is what we fervently hope-that the debate in the Security Council should have served to air the question of the flights sufficiently to make it cleartothe SovietUnion that the United States does not intend to continue them, so that we can all concentrate onthe constructivetask of laying the foundations of international security, which is essential to peaceful coexistence. Inview ofthetechnical revolution which, as Mr. Gromyko has said. has abolished traditional ideas of time and space and fundamentally altered militarystrategy, public opinion. would rightly reg~d it as unjustifiable for one of the two greatest Powers to use an incident between them 36. Comment le Conseil de securite, organe des Nations Unies qui a la responsabilite principale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, doit-il aborder le probl~me?Anotre sens, sil'on songe ll. l'aven"!.!', ll. un avenir de paix, s 'entend, la conjoncture internationale exige que nous nous gardions de tout ce qui pourrait aggraver la tension actuelle et que nous recherchions la voie de la conciliation entre les deux plus grandes puissances du monde. 37. Qu'il me soit permis ll. ce propos de relever un aspect positif de notre debat, que ne doitpas masquer le caract~re inevitablement violent, par moments, de nos discussions. Je veux parler, d'une part, de Pappel que nous a adresse M. Gromyko demandant que le droit international regisse et domine les rapports entre EtatSj cet appel, qui temoigne des intentions positives de Pune des plus grandes puissances, ne peut manquer de contribuer ll. apaiser les tensions et ll. attenuer les craintes. Je veux parler, d'autre part, de laconfirmation de la traditionnelle politique de paix des Etats- Unis d'Amerique, que nous a donnee M. Lodge, et du. fait qu'il nous a repete que son gouvernementprendra des mesures concr~tespour etablir un climat de confiance mutuelle. 38. Je me risquerai ll. dire, apr~s avoir analyse le contenu profond de ces deux declarations, que le Conseil est en mesure de terminer son debat sur une note de confianee. 39. Nous comprenons certes que 1'Union sovHitique s'irrite de voir son territoire survoIe par des avions etrangers. Semblable entreprise, quels qu'ensoientles auteurs, susciterait partout la m~me irritation. Mais, s'il est vrai que cette irritation est comprehensible, on n'est pas fonde ilPexagerer au point de perdre de vue les verites les plus evidentes de la situation internationale: une guerre detruirait le monde entier, ne laissant ni vainqueurs ni vaincus - aussi importet-il de la prevenir; en outre, lanegociation est d'autant plus necessaire que les probl~mes sont plus aigus. 40. n faut esperer - et c'est ll. quoi nous nous effor- QOns de parvenir - que le debatduConseildesecurite aura sern ll. eclaircir suffisamment la question des vols et ll. persuader l'Union sovietique que les Etats- Unis n'ont pas l'intentionde les poursuivre; nous pour..' rons ainsi consacrer tous nos efforts ll. une reuvre constructive consistant ll. jeter les bases de lasecurite internationale, condition indispensable de la coexistence pacifique. Devant la revolution· technique, qui, comme nous l'a ditM. Gromyko, a fait disparaftre leJ!! notions traditionnelles de temps et d'espace et a bouleverse la strategie. militaire, l'opinion publique ne saurait admettre que l'une des deux plus grandes 42. When, after many years of grievous cold war, relations between the great Powers underwent an improvement, a f!;le,ling of releaf entered into international life, and' e~eryone welcomed the direct contacts between Heads of Government. 43. However, those of us who have been observing events from the standpoint of the international community in general have noted two great dangers. One is that the handling of problems by the great Powers alone might result in the interests of other countries being forgotten. The other is that direct contacts between Heads of Government, operating as they do somewhat. out,side the established international structure, mightbe too greatly affectedby chance happenings in the relationships between the great Powers, and might therefore be exposed to the effects ofthe vacillations and brittleness of those relationships. 44. Perhaps another positive aspect of recent evems is the undeniable lesson that the interests ofthe great Powers, as well as those of the others, would in the long run be better protected if relations and negotiations between them were clearly inserted within the framework of some international law-and the highest international law is the Charter of the United Nations; and if negotiations between them on questions of universal interest took place under a systemwhichwould give them stability at critical moments (which will always occur), and in the presence of representatives of the other members of the international community, whose interests are at stake and whose positive contribution should not be underestimated. 45. I may be told that my remarks and hopes are politically unrealistic. I admit that they are, ifwe take a short-term view. But I am sure that, in the long run, the force of what we might call international democracy, of which the only existing expression is the United Nations, will expand and make itself felt in the political thinking of every Power. 46. After this digression, I will now turn to the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. We thinkthat this draft should be rejected, for two basic reasons. In the first place, it proposes the condemnation solely of a particular series of a,cts,failuretorecognize that the accused party has likewise referredto certain acts on the part of the Soviet Union, and that for the investigation of these the Council would have to examine the world situation, possibly as it has developed since as long ago as the Second World War. It would be unconf~rent aux grandes puissances une responsabilite speciale pour ce qui est de la paix et de la guerre, ce n'est pas ll. elles seules cependant que cette responsabilite incombe. Le sort de tous les peuples du monde depend de la solution qui sera apportee aux graves probl~mes que posent la guerre et la paix, et c'est pourquoi tous les autres Etats ont le droilt de partager cette responsabilite. 42. Lorsque, apr~s de nombreuses annees d'une penible guerre froide, les relations entre les grandes puissances ont semble devoi:.. :;'ameliorer, une sensation de soulagement a domina le climat international et les contacts directs entre les chefs d'Etat ont ete universellement applaudis. 43. Neanmoins, pour nous qui observions les evenements du point de vue de la communaute internationale dans son ensemble, deux graves dangers se sont clairement dessines: tout d'abord, si les grandes puissances r~glent les probl~mes entre elles, les inter~ts des autres seront oubliesj deuxi~mement,ces contacts personnels, qui s'organisent quelque peu en marge des institutions internationales etablies, sont trop sensibles aux incidents qui peuvent survenir dans les relations entre les deux grandes puissances pour ne pas subir les consequences des fluctuations etde la fragilite de ces relations. 44. Un autre aspect positif des evenements recents est de nous avoir appris que les interets des grandes puissances, comme d'ailleurs les interets des autres nations, seront mi6UX proteges a la longue si leurs rapports sont incontestablement regis par une 10i internationale - et la loi internationale supr~meest la Charte des Nations Unies -, si leurs negociations sur les probl~mes d'inter~t universel s'effectuent dans le cadre d'une structure qui leur assure la stabilite m~me dans les moments critiques - car il y aura toujours des moments critiques ~ , et si leurs contacts ont toujours lieu en presence de representants d'autres membres de la communaute internationale, dont les inter~ts sont egalement en jeu et dont la contribution positive ne saurait ~tre sous-estimee. 45. On dira peut-etre que mes raisonnements etmes espoirs manquent de realisme politique. A br~ve echeance, c'est exact, je le reconnais. Mais je suis certain que ce que j 'appellerais volontiers la democratie intel'nationale, dont l'Organisation des Nations Unies est laseuleexpressionvivante,finirall.la longue par se frayer un chemin et s'imposer dans les conceptions politiques de toutes les puissances. 46. Je passerai maintenant, apr~s cettebr~vedigres­ sion, au projet de resolution presente par l'Union sovietique. Pour deux raisons fondamentales, onpeut ll. notre avis trouver ~ y redire: 11 propose tout d'abord de condamner une eerie de faits pris isolement, ignorant que la partie accusee a impute a l'Union sovietique certains actes qui obligeraient le Conseil, s'il fallait les tirer au clair, a examiner la situation internationale en remontant peut-~tre aussi loin que la deuxi~me guerre mondiale. n serait injuste de pro-. 48,. For all these reasons we hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will not press his draft resolution to a vote butwill, instead, associate himself with the rest of the Councilinaconciliatory statement which will open new roads towards collective security.

At this stage of our debate, the Council having heard the views of all the other members, I should like, in my capacity as the representative of CEYLON, to express its views on the issue before us as brie!1y as I can. 50. The issue, as stated by the representative of the Soviet Union. is important; and yet it is simple, and I would bring it up by quoting the words of the representative of the Soviet Union: "the question ofaggressive acts by the Air Force of the United States of America against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace". The principalfact onwhichthis issue is based is the flight of a United States U-2 aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union on 1 May of this year. This fact is not disputed. Neither is it now disputed that the flight of the aircraft was a deliberate act for reconnaissance purposes-in other words, for obtaining important information concerning the Soviet Union. It has also been alleged-and neither has this been denied-that such flights have taken place on previous occasions. These happenings are not in dispute. They constitute, in our opinion, an important issue which involves, first, a juridical question and, second, a question which is of far greater importance, namely, international relations, particularly the relationship between two of the most powerful countries of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. 51. As a Member of the United Nations which accepts the principles of its Charter, Ceylonconsiders thatthe territorial integrity of each State, large or small, and the sanctity of its sovereign rights are inviolable and are guaranteed not only by the Charter, but also by the universal acceptance of these principles. The observance of these basic and fundamental rights is absolutely necessary for the preservation of peace among all nations. A peaceful and orderly society is possible only under the rule of law and the fullest compliance with international treaty obligations. Therefore, we hold that, at the present time, it is a rule of international law that the air space over the territory of any country belongs to that country and cannot be violatedwithout a breachof international law• I thinkthat this importantfact mustbefully recognized. m~mes l'independance des autres pays. Nous considerons donc comme inacceptable toute affirmation du contraire. qu'elle soit directe ou indirecte. 48. Pour toutes les raisons que je viens d'exposer, nous esperons que le representant de 1'Unionsovietique n'insistera pas pour Clue son projet soit mis aux voix et s 'emploiera au contraire ~ cooperer avec les autres membres du Conseil de securite pour adopteruntexte conciliant qui ouvre des voies nouveHes ~ la securite collective. 49. ~e PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Ace stade de nos debats, et le Conseil ayantentendules opinions de tous les autres membres, je voudrais enqualite de representant de CEYLAN exprimer aussi bri~vement que je le puis son point de vue sur la question dont nous sommes saisis. 50. La question, telle que Pa definie le representant de PUnion sovietique, est importante; elle est cependant simple et je voudrais la presenter en citant les termes employes par le representant de 1'Union sovietique: il s'agit de "la question des actes agressifs commis par les forces aeriennes des Etats-Unis d'Amerique contre l'Union sovietique et de la menace que ces actes constituent pour lapaix universellen. Le fait essentiel que nous trouvons ~ son origine est le survol du territoire de 1'Union sovietique, le ler mai de l'annee en cours, par un avion U-2 des Etats-Unis. Ce fait n'est pas conteste. On necontestepas non plus que ce survol etait un acte commis de propos delibere, ~ des fins de reconnaissance - end'autrestermes, en vue de recueillir des renseignements importants concernant l'Union sovietique. On a egalement affirme - et cela n'a pas nonplus ete nie - que ce vol a ete precede d'autres vols analogues. Ces actes sont endehors de toute controverse. Hs constituent ~ notre avis un probl~me important qui comporte tout d'abord un aspect juridique et, ensuite, un aspect d'importance beaucoup plus grande, ~ savoir les relations internationales, et notamment les rapports entre deux des plus puissants pays du monde, les Etats-Unis et l'Union sovietique. 51. En sa qualite de Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies acceptant les principes de la Charte, Ceylan estime que l'integrite territoriale deto~ltEtat, grand ou petit, et le caract~re sacre de ses droits souverains sont -inviolables et sont garantis non pas seulement par la Charte, mais aussi par Pacceptation universelle de ces principes. Le respect de ces droits essentiels et fondamentaux est absolument necessaire ' au maintien de la paix parmi toutes les nations. l'existence d'une societe pacifique et ordonnee n'est possible que dans le respect du droit et que si chacun s'acquitte de facgon scrupuleuse des obligations decoulant des traites internationaux. Nous estimons par consequent que c'est ~ l'heure actuelle un principe du droit international que 1'espace aerien situe au-dessus du territoire d'un pays, quel qu'il soit, lui appartient, 52. This organization negotiated an international agreement which was signed in Chicago in 1944. The signatories whichwere sovereignStates,bigand small, accepted in that agreement the principle of the sovereign right of each State to the air space over its territory. Among the big States which subscribed to this principle was the United States. I believe the Soviet Union did not sign that international agreement, but I am sure that the SovietGovernmentfully accepts and subscribes to that principle,because its complaint to the Security Council today is made under the same principle. 53. It is, however, a fact that there have been violations of this principle for various purpo/3es, particularly for the purpose of espionage. Fromtime to time, such acts of espionage havebeendetected and exposed. But avoidance of international treaty obligations and laws, even if it is done secretly, must be regarded as reprehensible. Espionage has, as has already been pointed out, existed for centuries and will continue as long as human frailties continue and as long as States suspect each other, fear each other and seekto dominate each other. But espionage is carriedout in secret, in darkness, shunning publicity as if it were ashamed of its own ugliness. We suppose it is considered necessary in the civilized society of today, although the act itself is demoraliZing and degrading. We cannot eradicate it easily from society, not perhaps until human nature changes radically and brings abouttrust and confidence, goodwill and understanding. The fact, however, that espionage exists in diverseforms onthe earth below and in the air above and now, also, it is suspected, in the rarer atmosphere of outer space, is no justification for the repudiation of the principle of sovereign right of a State to the integrity of the air space above its territory. th~se selon laquelle est universellement reconnu le principe affirmant que la souverainete d'un Etat s'~tend A l'espace aerien situe au-dessus de son territoire et qu'un autre Etat ne peutypenetrer sans son agrement et son autorisation. Crest la un droit qui rev~t une importance particuli~repour les petits Etats, et Ceylan, petit Etat qui donne une attention toute speciale aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la Charte ainsi qu'au droit international et ala pratique internationale, voudrait soulignertr~snettement1'importance qu'il revet. Depuis les debuts del'aviationet etant donne la rapidite avec laquelle elle s'est developpee, ce droit a ete reconnu et respecte et, afin d'en faciliter l'observation, une organisation speciale a ete creae sous les auspices des Nations Unies. Elle porte le nom d'Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale. 52. Cette organisation a negocie un accord international qui a ete signe a Chicago en 1944. Les Etats souverains signataires, wands et petits, ont accepte par cet accord leprincipe de la souverainete de chaque Etat sur l'espace aerien au-dessus de son territoire. Au nombre des grands Etats qui ont accepte ce principe se trouvaient les Etats-Unis. J e crois que 1'Union sovietique ne figure pas au nombre des signataires de cet accord international, mais je suis certain que le Gouvernement sovietique reconnait ce principe et l'accepte sans reserve, car crest precisement sur lui que se fonde la plainte dont elle saisit aUjourd'hui le Conseil de securite. 53. Cependant, c'est un fait qu'il yaeudes violations de ce principe a des fins diverses, et notamment aux fins d'espionnage. De temps a autre, de tels actes d'espionnage ont ete decouverts etdemasques. Mats la non-observation des obligations et r~gles internationales decoulant ~estraites, memesi elle reste secr~te~ doit ~tre consideree comme reprehensible. L'espionnage, on l'a deja fait remarquer, existe depuis des si~cles et continuera d'exister aussi longtemps que les faiblesses humaines; il durera tant que les Etats se suspecteront, se craindront et chercheront l!. se dominer les uns les autres. Mais l'espionnage se pratique en secret, dans l'ombre, en evitant la publicite comme s'il avait honte desaproprelaideur. Nous supposons qu'on le consid~re comme necessaire dans la societe civilisee d'aujourd'hui, bien que le procede lui-meme soit demoTalisant et degradant. n n'est pas facile de l'extirper de la societe et il sera peut-etre impossible dry parvenir tant que la nature humaine n'aura pas subi un changement profond, creant un climat de confiance et d'amitie, de bonnevolonteet de comprehension. Cependant, le fait que l'espionnage existe sous des formes diverses sur la terre et dans les airs et, maintenant aussi, pense-t-on, dans l'at- 55. Now, I would like to dealwiththe second aspect of the question under discussion. This refers to the relationship of the two Powers concerned. The legal implication' of the United States plane over Soviet territory has been dealt with already. Without minimiZing its importance. I would now like to examine the far more important aspect of its impact on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This, we consider. is of vital importance, not only to these two countries, but also tothe whole world. 56. In the nuclear age, when both these countries are armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, which in a moment can bring about death and destruction to both sides. to the whole human race, to small countries as well as big countries, it is vital that goodwill and understanding and a capacity to live and let live should be established between them. 57. I have referred on many other occasions to the improvement in the relationship between these two great countries, which began recently and appeared to have considerably improved in the fall of last year. With all the ideological and other differences between these two countries, with all the suspicion that exists and with fear of the domination of the one over the other, it is foolish to expect completely harmonious relations all at once. But the whole world hailed with delight and relief a sign of better relations between them. What has been referred to as the Camp David spirit signified this improvement. We are sorry that the efforts made to follow up this improvement by holding a Summit Conference towards the end of last year did not materialize. I hope that the theory that such an attempt was prevented is not true. It is, however. a pity it did not take place at that time. for we feel that if it hadthe course ofhistory might have been changed for the better and that the people of the world might perhaps have seenthe dawn of anew era of goodwill which might at last have fulfilled the universal yearning of all peoples for peace. But alas, this did not happen, and we were disappointed during the early part of this year that the new spiritwhich was born of 55. Je voudrais maintenant traiter du second aspect de la question en discussion. n s'agit des rapports entre les deux puissances interessees. J'ai dejhparle des aspects juridiques du survol du territoire sovietique par 1'avion des Etats-Unis. Sans vouloir en reduire 1'importance, jevoudrais maintenant examiner la question de beaucoup plus importante de ses repercussions sur les rapports existant entre les Etats- Unis et l'Union sovietique. Elle est, estimons-nous, essentielle, non pas seulement pour ces deux pays, mais aussi pour le monde entier. 56. A l'!lge nucleaire, alors que ces deux pays sont armes jusqu'aux dents et pourvus d'engins nucleaires qui pe'.lvent en un moment semer des deux cates la mort et la destruction pour la race humaine tout enti~re, pour les petits pays comme pour les grands, il est essentiel que r~gnent entre eux la bonne volonte, la comprehension et la tolerance envue de laisser tout le monde vivre. 57. J'ai parle en beaucoup d'autres occasions de l'amelioration des rapports entre ces deux grands pays, amelioration qui avait commence h semanifester recemment, qui semblait avoir fait des progrlls considerables pendant l'automne de l'annee ecoulee. Etant donne toutes les divergences ideologiques et autres qui se manifestent entre ces deux pays, etant donne leur mMiance et la crainte qu'ils ont chacun d'~tredomine par l'autre, il cst vain d'esperer voirs'instaurerd'un seul coup des relations parfaitement harmonieuses. Mais le monde entier a salue avec joie et soulagement le moment 011 il a discerne entre eux les signes de relations meilleures. Cette amelioration correspondait i\ ce que 1'on a appele 1'esprit de Camp DaYid. Nous regrettons que les efforts deployes en vue de consolider cette amelioration en tenant une come-' rence au sommet vers la fin de l'annee ecoulee n'aient pas abouti. J'espllre que la tMse selon laquelle on s'est oppose h cette tentative est inexacte. 11 est cependant deplorable que la conference n'ait pas eu lieu h ce moment-Ill., car nous pensons qu'en ce cas, le cours de 1'histoire aurait pu ~tre change dans un sens favorable, et que les peuples du monde auraient peut-~tre vu l'aube d'une llre nouvelle debonne volonte 58. It was bad in itself to be detected in the act of violating the territorial integrity of another State, but it was made worse by the unhappy blunder of seeking not only to justify such violation but also to indicate that such violations would continue. With all humility, recogniZing that we are one of the very small Powers in a world of giants, we have to say in all sincerity that we strongly deprecate the action which led to the flight of the U-2 aircr!aft, especially on the eve of the Summit Conferenc\}. Vie unequivocally disapprove of this and other such flights. The detection of the flight must necessarily impair relations between these two countries, must lead to increasedinternational tension and constitute a greatdanger toworldpeace. We therefore greatly regret that it happened. This incident, apart from destroyingtemporarilythe hope engendered by the new-born spirit of goodwill of only a few montho ago, has already contributed to the break-up of the Summit Conference which had been promoted so assiduouE"y by persons interestedinthe establishment of peace, and on which so much depended. 59. It will do no good at this time and at this meeting to engage in the interesting enterprise of discovering the cause ofthe failure of the Conference. There may be several causes, but it is certain that one of these was the flight incident. The unfortunate incident has happened, and with it have been swept aside the Summit Conference alld-more important even than that, inour opinion-the goodwill that had been generated. To rekindle that goodwill is our most important task, fOl' we recognize that the ultimate destruction of the world can be avoided only on the basis of understanding, harmony and goodwill among the big Powers, and particularly the two most powerful among them. We are not alone in this view; it has been universally voiced in every part of thG world. It can be taken as a universal appeal which should be heeded by the great Powers. It is made because it is important to all people, great and small, to secure peace. The smallest of us has a right to it, and a right to ask those in whose hands lies the issue of peace or war to decide for peace. 60. But peace Call1lot be wonbymere words or threats or by the show of force. Peace canbe won only by acts which will remove suspicion and fear. These acts will lead to total disarmament, and then we shall lead the way to peace among men. In support of this approach for seeking once again to create better understanding, I would like to quote briefly from a statement made by the leaders of two under-developed countries. I refer to the important communique issued by two great world leaders-Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. They said, on 20 May: 62. It is a solution we must now find. We must not be discouraged by failure. It has been said that failures are the pillars of success, and inthepresent case that saying is quite applicable. If we are to build anew the spirit of goodwill, we must do nothing to exacerbate feelings and impair goodwill. It is inthis light that my Government views the Soviet draft resolution. Ifthere had been no new development of a conciliatory nature following the U-2 flight incident, andifthe case rested with the interpretation drawn fromthe statementmade by Secretary of State Herter. we might have felt compelled to condemn the flight as anunwarranted invasion of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. But, in our view, the statement madeby President Eisenhower that, after the flight incident and a few days before the Summit Conference was to take place, he had stopped all such flights over the Soviet Union, and that such flights would not be resumed, should be accepted as satisfactory. Surely the ordinary implication ofthis is a recognition that a mistake hadbeenmade and it would not be repeated. It is, in our interpretation, more than that; it is an expression of regret ofwhich a great man should not be ashamed, but should be proud. Surely, after such a statementfrom the head of one of the great States of the world, some attempt should have been made to continue the Summit Conference. In our opinion, the statement made any formal condemnation quite unnecessary, because it indicates the acceptance of international law and of treaty obligations. We are satisfied that the principle of law, to which we attach very great importance, has by this statement been vindicated, and we are satisfied that the United States will implement it in goodfaith-just as we would believe in the good faith of any other sovereign State-its promise not to resume such flights. progr~s et, en fait, m~nerait A un desastre mondial dont il est difficile de mesurer les terribles consequences." 61. On aura remarque que dans ce communique conjoint, les deux hommes d'Etat soulignent la responsabilite des grandes puissances concarnant la paix et la guerre. n n'y est pas question de l'incident de l'avion U-2. Leur recommandation capitale. c'est d'empecher que ne s'aggrave la situation internationale. C'est ce A. quoi nous devons nous employer maintenant - je tiens moi aussi A insister sur ce point - et nous pouvons y parvenir en mettant tout en reuvre pour ameliorer les relations internationales. 62. C'est une solution que nous devonstrouvermaintenant, sans nous laisser decourager par un echec. On a dit que les echecs sont les piliers de la reussite et cela peut fort bien ~tre vrai dans le cas present. Si nous vouloDs ressusciter l'esprit de bonne volonte, nous ne devons rienfaire quipuisse exacerber les sentiments ni ebranler les bonnes intentions. C'est sous ce jour que mon gouvexnement consid~re le projet de resolution sovietique. Si, depuis l'incident de l'avion U-2, il ne s'etait produitaucunfaitnouveauen mati~re de conciliation et si 1'interpretation de cette affaire etait restee celle qu'en adonnee dans sadeclaration le Secretaire d'Etat, M. Herter, nous aurions peut-~tre juga de notre devoir de condamner ce survol comme une violation injustifiee de 1'integrite territoriale de l'Union sovietique. Mais, A. notre avis, ilfautaccepter comme satisfaisant1'engagementqu'apris le president Eisenhower, apr~s l'incident du survol et quelques jours avant ladate fixee pour laConference au sommet, de mettre fin A tous vols de ce genre au-dessus de 1'Union sovietique et de n.e pas autoriser qu'ils soient repris. Assurement, cette declaration equivaut A reconnartre qu'une erreur a ete commise etqu'ellene sera pas repetee. A notre sens, elle estplus que cela; elle constitue une expression de regret dont un grand homme, loin d'avoir honte, doit ~tre fier. Apr~s une telle declaration, emanant du chefd'undesplusgrands Etats du monde, il aurait certainement fallu essayer de poursuivre la Conference au sommet. Anotre avis, cette declaration rend tout ~ fait inutile une condamnation formelle parce qu'elleimplique l'acceptationdu droit international et des obligations decoulant des traites. Nous sommes convaincus qu'elle reconnart le principe de droit auquel nous attachons tant d'impOrtance et nous sommes egalement convaincus de la bonne foi des Etats-Unis - comme de celle de tout autre Etat souverain-- lorsqu'ils promettent de ne pas reprendre ces vols. . 64. If this is so, no good or valid reason now remains to condemn the United States. If the Soviet draft resolution to condemn the United States had come before us before the United States gave its assurance or if the United States had not given suchan assurance, then we would have felt compelled tosafeguardthe sovereignty and territorial integrity of any State. Butnowthat this assurance has been given by the United States, my Government accepts it. 65. There is also a strong psychological reason, which is very important, whywe shouldnotnow seek to condemn the United States. I have earlier referred to the fact that for the preservation of peace, to l:lave humanity from annihilation and toenableunder-developed cO'lmtries to remove poverty and want and bring prosperity and plenty to the under-privilegedpeople of the world, it is absolutely essentialthat good relations should be created and fostered between the two great Powers. It is essential also that we must begin now, not months later. We must not allow an opportunity for anyone accidentally or by design to lightthe spark that will become a conflagration which will destroy the world. We cannot permit of any delay. Itmust be done now. How can we do that if we start by an act of condemnation in the face of the assurance I have referred to? Even if it can be done it is bound to leave a bitter taste in the mouth; it is bound to exacerbate feelings; it will not provide the atmospherefor reconciliation and the restoration of good relations. That is why this is important from the psychological point of view. 66. We would urge the representative of the Soviet Union, in the interests of the early re-establishment of harmony and mutual good relations to considerthis aspect of the question and to consider the assurance given by the United States, which, as far as can be gathered, has been recognized as satisfactory by a very large section of this Council. The assurance asked for in operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft 64. Dans ce cas, il ne subsiste aucune raisonvalable de condamner les Etats-Unis. Si nous avions ete saisis du projet de resolution sovietique it cet effet avant que les Etats-Unis n'aient pris d'engagement quant itl'avenir, ou encore s'ils n'avaientpaspris cet engagement, nous nous serions trouves dans 1'obligation de garantir la souverainete et l'integriteterritoriale de tout Etat quel qu'il soit. Mais maintenant que nous avons reQu des Etats-Unis une garantie, mon gouvernement 1'accepte. 65. n existe aussi une serieuse raison psychologique - et cet argument est tr~s important - pour nous dissuader de condamner maintenant les Etats-Unis. J'ai dejA dit qu'il est absolument essentield'lltabliret de renforcer debonnes relations entre les deux grandes puissances si nous voulons preserver la paix, sauver 1'humanite de la destruction, permettre auxpays sOllsdeveloppes de faire dispara1'tre lapauvrete et lebesoin, enfin assurer la prosperite et l'abondance it tous les peuples du monde qui ne sontpas parmi les privilegies. II est egalement essentiel que nOllS entreprenions cette oouvre immediatement et non pas apr~s des mois d'attente. Nons ne devons donner Apersonnel'occasion de faire jaillir, accidentellement ou volontairement, l'etincelle qui causera une conflagration mondiale. Nous ne pouvons accepter aucun delai. Nous devons agir d~s maintenant. Comment y parvenir si nous commenQons par prononcer une condamnationendepit des assurances que nous avons rel]ues et que j'ai rappelees? M~me si, en principe, nous pouvons agir ainsi, notre decision aura fatalement pour resultat de creer des rancoours et d'exacerber les sentiments: elle e creera pas l'atmosph~re proprice A la reconciliation et au retablissement des bonnes relations. C'est pOllrquoi le facteur psycho10giqueestimportant. 66. Afin de retablir dans unprocheavenir1'harmonie et 1es bonnes relations mutuelles, nous voudrions prier instamment le representant de 1'Unionsovietique de tenir compte de cet aspect de laquestion, ainsi que de 1'engagement pris par les Etats-Unis, engagement qui, pour autant que nOlls puissions le savoir, a ete reconnu comme satisfaisant par de tr~s nombreux membres de ce conseil. L'assurance reclamee dans le 67. Speaking as PRESIDENT. I would point out that there are no other speakers on my list. Does any member wish to take the floor now?

I would hope we could go ahead with the business and proceed to a vote. It is only 5 p.m. 69. The PRESIDENT: I might inform therepresentative of the United States that I have had a request that this discussion be continued tomorrowmorning, as the representative of the Soviet Union would like to speak in reply to the statements made in the debate and he would prefer to do that tomorrow. Having heard all the speakers. up to now, he would wish to consider the statements that have beenmade here andgive his reply tomorrow. 70. Mr. LODGE (United States ofAmerica): Webegan consideration of this matter onMonday afternoon.then we had a meeting on Tuesday afternoon. and now one on Wednesday afternoon. It has been the custom since I have been here to have meetings in the morning and in the afternoon. While Iunderstood, andas a'matter of fact joined with those who did not want to meet this morning and yesterday morning, because I like to accommodate members. Iwouldstillpoint outthattime is going by and that all opinions of every conceivable variety have been expressed on this question. Consequently, I welcome your announcement, Mr. President, that we are to meet tomorrow morning and tomorrow afternoon. I am always in favour of a complete consideration, but I think we have had ~hat; and. if the Security Council does not startdealingwiththis matter and coming to grips with it, I thinkit is going to make a very unfortunate impression on world opinion. After all. it is the proceedings here nowthat are standing in the way of a resumption of negotiations and activity in the field of disarmament and in the field of nuclear test suspension and negotiations on outer space. As I have said, I would be glad to stayhere now and in fact have a meeting tonight to dispose of some of these things. but I realize that that is not your desire, Mr. President. Of course, I naturally defer to you,but I do welcome your statement that we will meet tomorrow morning and tomorrow afternoon.

I myself would like to finish this discussion as soon as possible. There were good reasons ,. as the representative of the United States knows, why we didnot meetthis morningand yesterday morning. On this occasion it is not unreasonable, it appears to me, for the representative of the Soviet Union to askfor a littletimeto consider the statements made here this afternoon before he gives his reply. In 67. Parlant en ma qualitede!?RESIDENT,jevoudrais signaler au Consell qu'll n'y a pas d'autres orateurs inscrits sur ma liste. Quelqu'un desire-t-il prendre la parole? 68. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Je serais heureux que nouspuissionspoursuivre le debat etpasser auvote. nn'est que 5 heures. 69. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais informer le representant des Etats-Unis que j'ai ete prie de remettre a demain matin la suite du debat car le representant de 1'Union sovietique voudrait repondre aux declarations qui ont ete faites ici, mais prefererait ne le faire que demain. Aprl:ls avoir ecoute tous les orateurs, 11 voudrait pouvoir etudier leurs declarations pour donner sa reponse demain. 70. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Nous avons commence l'examen de cette question lundi aprl:ls-midi, nous nous sommes reunis mardi apr~s-midi et maintenant, c'est-ll-dire mercredi aprl:ls-midi. Depuis que je suis ici,l'usage a ete d'avoir des seances le matin et l'apr~s-midi. Bien que, par souci de courtoisie, j'aie compris et m~me appuye la proposition de ceux qui ne voulaientpas que nous nous reunissions ce matin ni hier matin, je voudrais faire remarquer que le temps passe et que toutes les opinions possibles ont maintenant ete exprimees sur la question qui nous occupe. E:u consequence, je me felicite de vous avoir entendu aunoncer, Monsieur le President, que nous nous reunirions demain matin et demain aprl:ls-midi. Je suis toujours partisan d'un examen complet des questions, mais je pense que cet examen aetefaitetque, si le ConseU de securite ne s'attaque pas serieusement au probl~me, 11 en resultera une impression penible sur l'opinion mondiale. Apr~s tout, ce sontnos discussions actuelles qui retardent maintenant la reprise des negociations ou des activites en mati~re de desarmement et de cessation des essais nucIeaires ainsi que des negociations relatives a l'espace extra-atmospherique. 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