S/PV.874 Security Council

This meeting has been convened at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba. The request is contained in document 8/4378. 2. demandé n'y fait relations Conseil, 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba has asked to be invited to participate in the discussion of this item. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Council approves the invitation and I shall invite the Minister to take a seat at the Council table. sentant At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ratil Roa, representative of Cuba, took a place at the Council table. 3. appeler qui Conseil

In connexion with this item I should like to draw the . Council's attention to document S/4388, which contains a letter from the representative of the United States to the President of the Council. d' 4, Before we begin considering this matter I should also like to say that several members of the Council have already placed their names onthe list of speakers 4. je du débat extérieures and will speak after the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs has made his statement. 5. In order to expedite the proceedings I intend to give the floor to the members of the Council who have placed their names on the list of speakers and not to call on representatives wishing to exercise the right of reply until after the list has been exhausted. ‘5. ordonnée, et aux de Be Mr. ROA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): The Tight of any State which is a Member of the United Nations to have recourse to the Security Council 6 rait Nations cannot be questioned. The regional take precedence over the obligations They have come into being under the Charter, but for the States which belong can never signify one recourse less recourse more, It is obvious that ments made under the terms of Charter entail rights which are of than an exclusive character, and that may exercise whichever of those rights 7, Cuba is entirely within its rights the Security Council. Those who invoke Article 52, paragraph 2, of the Charter absurd and non-juridical argument that States members of the Organization States bring before the Security Council submitted to that Organization stubbornly graph 4 of the Article in question, which Article in no way impairs the application and 35", But that is not all. Let us turn of the Charter, which reads, "In the between the obligations of the Members Nations under the present Charter and under any other international agreement, tions under the present Charter shall is nothing here that can be questioned; meaning of the precept is absolutely those who invoke article 20 of the Organization of American States, which "all international disputes that may American States shail be submitted procedures set forth in this Charter, referred to the Security Council of the they too ignore, or pretend to be unaware of the Charter of the Organization of which states categorically that "none of this Charter shall be construed rights and obligations of the Member Charter of the United Nations", / 8. It is evident that any American Member of the United Nations can choose courses, namely recourse to the Security recourse to the Organization of American the event of a situation or dispute~and terms in order not to enter into discussion as to whether every dispute situation, since article 20 of the Organization of American States refers putes whereas the United Nations Charter, refers to a dispute or situation. The rests with the Member State and the exercise it to the fullest extent. Were should be obliged to reach the sad conclusion American States, upon forming a suffered an impairment of their rights, nounced their rights under the United whereas there can be no question was to supplement their rights under Charter with those which they enjoy agency. , 9. This view has been taken and expressed representatives of Latin American intend to go into the matter exhaustively like to quote a few statements made by representatives in the general debate 1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119 (1952), 10. In the course ofthat general debate, at the plenary 10.. cisco de 1954, la meeting held on 28 September 1954, Francisco Gamarra, former President of the Supreme Court ofJustice, . speaking as Chairman of the Uruguayan delegation, said: "In connexion with the case of Guatemala, Ishould | like to draw special attention to, and to support, a point of view which the Secretary-General put for-. ward in his report to the Assembly [A/2663, p. xi], where he says that 'a policy giving full scope te the proper role of regional agencies can and should at the same time fully preserve the right of a Member nation to a hearing under the Charter’, "My country combines membership in the United Nations with membership in the Organization of _ American States, in the belief that the principles of the regional system and the safeguards which it . offers cannot be invoked in order to prevent States from having direct and immediate access to the jurisdiction of the United Nations or to deprive them, no matter how temporarily, of the protection of the agencies of the world community. The legal protection afforded by both systems should be com~ bined, never substituted for one another."2/. tant 11, Mr, José Vicente Trujillo, the representative of Ecuador, made the following statement: "The precedent established by the Security Council in the case of Guatemala is extremely dangerous inasmuch as it implies distorted interpretations of the Charter and in a way closes its doors to an American State applying to the Security Council for assistance when it feels that its case shouldbe heard by that body, We are members and staunch sup~ porters of the Organization of American States, but we.cannot by any means agree that it has exclusive jurisdiction in a dispute such as the one I have just mentioned, My Government took a firm and fundamental position on. this question and informed the Security Council accordingly in an official communication [S/3255]. We hope that there will be no more such negative decisions by the Council, lest the prestige of the Organization suffer and one of the fundamental objects of the Charter— protection against attack—become illusory or come too late," 3/ 12. The position which I have set forth and which I am supporting with these quotations is clear and categorical. The boundaries are precise. Theproblem. is simply one of applying certain precepts and it leaves no room for subtle questions of juridical interpretation. 12. de nettement application dinterprétation 13. 13. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba--and I proclaim it with pride—has given clear proof of its | proclame sion, Meetings, 481st meeting, paras. 15 and 16, ¥ Ibid,, 485th meeting, para. 58. fidelity to Americanism and has clear sense of its duties and responsibilities, the activities of the Organization It has no wish to weaken the regional has the right to have recourse to the when there is justification for doing 14, This is precisely the case here. ing the right of self-defence in the on Cuba, the Revolutionary Government recourse to the Security Council to tion created by the Government of which, in an attempt to limit Cuba's determination within the harsh framework war, goes beyond the boundaries continent and is endangering international security. To be more clear and precise, ment of the United States is trying aims and justify its policy of harassment, and aggression by deliberately distorting ter, policy and objectives of the representing it now as a Soviet appendage, pawn of "international communism" continent, whichever suits its purposes. 15. This fraudulent involvement tical, diplomatic and military United States Government is applying of Soviet Socialist Republics has to isolate and destroy the Cuban done in Guatemala in 1954 and on The winning of another "glorious victory" purpose of all its actions, sophistries, manoeuvres ever since its spoiled lackey, millionaire ex-sergeant named Fulgencio swept from power by the invincible people, who, without asking permission the United States Government for exercise of their sovereignty and themselves in the true free world, exactly that of the imperialist powers. example" which cannot be pardoned purpose of preventing it from being Cuba is being accused of becoming and constituting a "danger" to United States and the hemisphere. dangerous which has turned barracks and tanks into tractors? 16, Neither the Cuban people nor Government is frightened by this Although it is fraught with malicious by now too discredited to deceive There has been no legitimate revolutionary formation or genuine progressive America in the past forty years Jabelled communist. Look at the Mexican the Bolivian Revolution, the Guatemalan the Cuban Revolution. Look at regeneration and the popular parties continent. Indeed, have not the great nationalist revolutions of Asia and Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno and Sekou and are they not still being called munism, pro-communists or Communists? 18. The first of January 1959 opened the door to a new epoch in the history of Cuba, The fall of the tyranny of Batista and the victory of the popular insurrection after an epic struggle organized and directed by Dr, Fidel Castro markthe endofthe colony which survived in the Republic and the beginning, in modern form, of the revolution conceived and longed for by José Martf. Thus the process of fundamental change which is taking place in Cuba today has genuinely Cuban roots and a genuinely Cuban significance for the future. For four centuries Cuba suffered under the yoke of Spanish domination, rebelling against it as the Cubans acquired a national consciousness and will, For half a century the pseudo-republic born of United States intervention and the Platt Amendment endured. It had its national anthem, its flag and its constitution; but its natural resources, its economic . and financial activities and, consequently, its politics were dominated, except in a few fleeting instances, by - foreign interests whose only concern was to take out of Cuba as much profit as they could, The popular insurrection against the tyranny of Machado, interfered with and rendered ineffectual by a coalition of those foreign interests, the armed forces and the reactionary elements in the country, at least had the virtue of showing the Cuban people that political selfdetermination without economic self-~determination is a costly fiction. ses sauf réts maximum populaire neutralisée des pays, ment tique fiction 19, Batista mouvement de assemblée tution cubain, 19, The era following the frustration ofthe insurrec- ‘ion, a process of which Fulgencio Batista was both agent and beneficiary, culminated, thanks to popular resistance and the imminent outbreak of the Second World War, in the formation of a Constituent Assembly which gave expression in the document known as the Constitution of 1940 to the fundamental aspirations of ‘he Cuban people, but those aspirations were for the most part to remain unfulfilled. The colonial structure — ff the C.van economy transformed the. democratic régime into a constellation of ineffective rights that lid not enable the country to retain the great landioldings, undertake agrarian reform, stimulate ecoiomic development, diversify markets, raise levels xf employment and speak with its own voice in interational bodies, Submission, bribery, speculation and ypportunistic anti-communism went hand in hand, applauded by the venal Press and the Department of State. A mere facade concealing an Augean stable, Suba was, nevertheless, a model of that "representa- ‘ive democracy" which the international monopolies rrudgingly tolerate. Its formula for government isthe illiance of despotism, the barracks and the trusts; La forma droits d'entreprendre développement d'élever au soumission, communisme l'apprebation d'Etat. n'en représentative"TM poles une trusts; humaine sa and to convert that formula into a noisome and bloody reality Batista returned with his cohorts of mercenaties, thieves and hangmen. 0, The rickety structure collapsed, together with ts old and new servants, at the beginning of 1959 and, or the first time in its history, the people and Govern- 20. nouvelles 1959 le ensemble nent joined in the exercise of power without strings 1 constraints of any kind. Cuba became truly free, independent and sovereign. To described in an already historic in accordance with its historical character, its mission in America, and the requirements of the time, political, economic, social and build for itself a democratic classic formula of Lincoln is effective and dynamic reality. the people who rule and the Government, prets their desires and needs, tionary conscience of the people Laie te os 21. Cuba possessed a predominantly nomic structure, feudal in character to foreign interests, with the inevitable concentration of landed property, wages, social enslavement, undeveloped dependence on a single market, currency in consumer goods, administrative tion, poverty, disease, unemployment, bossism and political chicanery. this disastrous state of affairs, powers inherent in national sovereignty, transforming the country's economic ture for the benefit of the lower in the hands of the people the destiny, welfare, progress and Revolution reveals its character, tives. Cuba is not frightened by maliciously attached to it. It is more. Revolutionary Cuba is actual satellite of any country. charge against it are deliberately also for the first time, a small ing its historical orbit with movement, Hence, the motto underlying policy: "Friends of all, slaves of aspire to live together freely the peoples and nations of the ASPB ae ERE Sd Tepe equality, mutual respect and reciprocal spective of their social systems. 22, The increasing flood of calumnies, and attacks to which our revolutionary been subjected in the United States era of liberation dawned in Cuba drastic reduction of the sugar quota the international crime of economic accusations made and the punitive have remained the same, They ranged nation of the sugar quotaeconomic landing of marines—military eighteen months the people of jected to a policy of intimidation, which has found expression in, the elimination of the sugar quota. 23. Since certain United States included extracts and articles periodicals and passages from is pertinent to stress that the and threatening language to which ‘munisteTM, Smathers, du 30 _jamais crimes elarait, favorable la Guatemala était a4, The process of conditioning United States public opinion with the obvious aim of justifying any type of attack against Cuba was again reflected in the Con~ gressional Record when this official organ printed in its issue of 4 June 1959 a speech made by Commander Preston J, Moore of the American Legion, who stated with singular irresponsibility during the graduation ceremony of the Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington that communism was capturing a major base ninety miles from the coast of the United States. 24. publique faire stest lorsque numéro Washington, aux Investigation, de faisant communisme importante 25. un d'attaques américaine, une & monde qui, songes des 25. I can place at the disposal of members of the Security Council a large collection containing hundreds of similar attacks published inthe United States Press. Although they cannot all be considered as official opinions, they do repeatedly represent the views of leading United States politicians and members of the Government who significantly use the same lies to misrepresent the character and objectives ofthe Cuban. Revolution. 26. Another fact which is unacceptable tothe Government and the people of Cuba, to whom it rightly appears as a manifest interference in the domestic affairs of a Sovereign State, has been the series of hearings held by the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the United 26. vyernement titre, ‘relevant J'entends Sous-Comité Etats-Unis, notoires, personnages réclamés ex-généraux Ugalde ments States Senate. The procession of witnesses included such notorious traitors as Pedro Luis Dfaz Lanz and Sinister figures from the deposed tyranny sought by the Cuban courts for genocide, such as ex-Generals Tabernilla, senior and junior, and ex-Colonel Ugalde Carrillo, former head of the Military Intelligence Service and of Military Operations in the Sierra Maestra, where he committed innumerable crimes. This gang of criminals used the Capitol in Washington as a counter-revolutionary platform and thus served the anti-Cuban interests which placed them there. sierra brables. Capitole réyolutionnaire, qui a coldly calculated plan. Cn 18 September 1959, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, naval chief in the Caribbean, publicly affirmed that Soviet submarines had surfaced in Cuban territorial waters and made pronouncements . that called for violation of the principle of nonintervention, The Pentagon had begun to show its claws. Various statements on similar Hnes by Allen Dulles revealed the role assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. Allegations of "communist infil= tration" and "International communist influence" in the Cuban Government followed each other in waves. On 26 January 1960, the President of the United States, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 2 carefully studied statement of "reasonable bases for a workable and satisfactory relationship between our two sovereign countries" expressed his "confidence in the ability of the Cuban people to recognize and defeat the intrigues of international communism which are aimed at destroying democratic institutions in Cuba and the traditional and rautually beneficial friendship between the Cuban and American peoples", In his reply broad= cast on 27 January, the President of Cuba, Dr. Osvaldo Dortieds, réjected "with the utmost energy the insinuation that could be considered implicit" in those words. - The Machiavellian machinery which ledto the "glorious victory" so dear to the late John Foster Dulles had come into play. But Cuba is not Guatemala and history will not repeat itself without catastrophic consequences for the United States, 28. In his letter of 8 April 1960 written in reply to the statement in defence of the Cuban Revolution submitted to him by Chilean students, the President of the United States, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, took it upon himself directly and openly to judge the Cuban revolutionary movement and the Government which our people won for itself at the cost of 20,000 lives lost in the overthrow of tyranny. According to President Eisenhower, the present leaders of Cuba, from the Government down, have betrayed the ideals of the Revolution, A statement of that kind is not one to be expected from a friend of the Cuba people or from the Head of a Government which on various occasions before and since has repeated that it desires cordial relations between Cuba and the United States. And the profound doubts of my Government are strengthened by the fact that after these protestations of friendship the United States has proceeded im- Placably to commit economic aggression against the people of Cuba by arbitrarily reducing the sugar quota. 29. The unusual statement to which I have just referred, amplified and multiplied on numerous occasions by subordinate spokesmen and United States politicians and commentators, the openly acrimonious terms in which it is conceived andthe aim of widening the breach in relations between Cuba and the United States by the position of strength adoptedby the United States Government have helped to increase the apprehension of the Cuban people, which is gravely concerned about what may be considered a carefuliy prepared strategy designed to unleash armed aggression against Cuba at the appropriate time. stupéfiants ‘INd&e bases ‘ T'agression oubliant gére & 31. Among the many facts that confirm what I have said I shall cite the following: Several hundred war criminals, fugitives from Cuban justice and a group of traitors to the Revolution have found open protection in the United States, These individuals, who are for the most part concentrated in the State of Florida, have been given every facility and encouragement, They have thus been able to carry out numerous flights over Cuba, using aircraft of different types, from which they have dropped explosives and live phosphorus and, in some cases, have fired on the civilian population. 31. viens Unis eriminels la révolution, cipalement couragements de divers incendiaire population 32. Among the attacks on Cuba by aircraft flying from United States bases the following may be mentioned: 32. & ’ gas (a) On 25 July 1959 a light aircraft in which the adventurer Rafael del Pino, wanted by the Cuban legal authorities, had just landed, was seized, It had flown from Florida in the United States. In the following months, numerous light aircraft from the United States violated Cuban air space in order to rescue fugitive war criminals and to leave arms for groups of outlaws. en ltaventurier cubaine. avyions de fugitifs placés (b) On 11 October 1959 the Nidgara sugar mill was attacked by an aircraft which dropped two jellied petroleum bombs on it.. attaquée napalm, de de eonsidérables. (c) On 18 October 1959 the Punta Alegre mill on the nerth coast of Camagtiey Province was attacked and one of the bombs dropped caused considerable damage. un Piorini sion blessés, (d) On Wednesday 21 October 1959, af 6 p.m., a twin-engined aircraft piloted by Pedro. Luis Diaz Lanz and Frank Fiorini flew over Havana, The casualties from this attack were two dead andover forty wounded, Although the United States authorities said they were unable to discover the base from which this plane was operating, Cuban reporters of the magazine Bohemia photographed the attacking dircraft—a B-25 bearing the registration number N-9876-C—shortly afterwards in a hangar at the airport at Pompano Beach, Florida. And in spite of the fact that it already had the evidence it had requested, the United States alleged that the aircraft had not flown from United States territory and the measures taken by the United States Government were so ineffective and compliant that Diaz Lanz was allowed to remain at large on only $5,000 bail. soient base nalistes phié N-9876-C, Pompano ricain demandées, provenaient mesures rées simple 34, “Although on 1 November 1959 the United States Secretary of State announced the adoption of special measures to avoid further attacks on Cuba by aircraft flying from airports in Florida, the effectiveness of these measures has not been apparent since, beginning on 12 January 1960, a war was launched against the principal Cuban industry in the middle of the sugar harvest, On that day, the cane fields of the Hershey mill on the north coast of Havana province were burnt. Among the many incendiary bombs dropped some did not explode and were recovered intact. They were bombs of United States origin bearing the words "Bristol Marines". On 18 January, the cane fields of the Corazén de Jesfis and Santa Teresa mills in Las Villas were attacked, On 28 January an aircraft, whose registration number CN~325 was identified by local inhabitants as it was flying very low, attacked the cane fields of the Adelaida mill in Camagiiey. That same day the fields belonging to the Punta Alegre mills in Camagiiey and the Manatf and Delicias mills in Oriente province were attacked, In all, more than 15,000 tons of sugar cane were burnt. On 6 February, the cane fields of the Céspedes, Violeta, Florida and Estrella mills in Camagiiey were attacked, 35, On18 February 1960 atragic incident conclusively confirmed, for anyone who might still have any doubt, the origin ‘and the protagonists of the aerial attacks on Cuba, At 9 a.m., alight aircraft whose pilot was trying to dive~bomb the Espaiia sugar mill in Matanzas province, exploded in the air over the mill, The villagers, who had rushed to take cover whenthey saw one of the crew leaning out of the window with a package in his hand, were witnesses of the bloody ending of the adventure. Both members of the crew were killed by the explosion, but one of them had kept his papers and could be identified aS Robert Ellis ‘Frost, a United States pilot who had taken off from Tamiami airport in Florida that morning in his Comanche 250. 86. Three days later, four 166-pound bombs were dropped on Cojfmar, a small fishing village near Havana, where. Dr. Fidel Castro, the Prime Minister, lives. The aircraft which attacked Cojfmer and was photographed by reporters of the magazine Bohemia at the international airport at West Palm Beach, Florida, was atwo-engined B~25, with the identification mark 7-R on the tail, The number 170, indicating the squadron to which it had belonged in the Second World War, was painted on the nose, The attacking pilot was a United States citizen, Bob Spinning, who was paid $3,000 for the mission. 37. In spite of all the evidence and facts uncovered by Cuban reporters, the United States authorities, although reinforced, according to official reports, by additional staff, did little. On 23 February a number 38. On 7 March the cane fields of the San Crist6bal sugar mill, in Pinar del Rfo, were set on fire and on 18 March the Espafia sugar mill was again attacked. 39, On 21 March an aircraft, manned by two United States citizens, H. Rundquist and W. J. Shergalis, was’ captured on Cuban soil while it was trying to fly several fugitives from revolutionary justice out of Cuba. It had taken off from Fort Lauderdale in Florida. 40. On 5 April units of the Cuban armed forces opened fire on a light aircraft flying over the sugar plantations between Perico and Coliseo in Matanzas, On 13 April two more light aircraft flew over Cojimar and the Via Monumental, in the suburbs of Havana, Or 26 April a ght aircraft flew over Bejucal in Havana. On 12 May a Piper aircraft with United States registration number N/4356/P was brought down on the Santa Fé—Mariel road west of Havana. Its pliot, an American adventurer, was killed when the aircraft _crashed, ‘41, These numerous and repeated violations of Cuban air space, undertaken from bases in the United States with the participation of United States citizens andthe support of the United States authorities, have cost the Cuban economy over 350,000 tons of sugar cane, in addition to a number of deaths and many persons wounded and burnt, 42, While these aerial attacks were taking place and even after a group of invaders flownfromthe Dominican Republic had been captured in Trinidad, in Las Villas province, the United States Government maintained a strict embargo on arms for Cuba, on the pretext of alleged "tension in the Caribbean". What was more, United States diplomats brought improper and unjustified pressure to bear on other Governments to prevent Cuba from acquiring the means to defend its air space and soil. 43. In a diplomatic note delivered to Mr. Philip W. Bonsal, the United States Ambassador in Cuba, on 13 November 1959, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba made the following protest: "The United States Government has the right to refuse a licence for the export of arms and other weapons of war to whomsoever it pleases. But it cannot bring influence tobear on other Governments, under the pretext of co-operating in the maintenance ‘of peace in the Caribbean area, in order to prevent a friendly Government from obtaining the aircraft it needs for purely defensive purposes to replace unserviceable equipment. The representations made by the United States Government to the United Kingdom Government to prevent this exchange unfortunately coincided with the aerial attacks on Cuba and continued despite the fact that ithas been pointed out to your Excellency that they constituted an 44, As concrete evidence that this climate of tension and aggression is fostered directly from the United States, I would draw attention to the following facts: The United States Press has reported that the International Rescue Committee, whose ostensible purpose is to furnish assistance toe political extles, will set aside $1 million to enable traitors to the Cuban revolution who seek asylum in the United States to remain in United States territory. The Cuban people, whose compatriots have lost their lives in the aerial attacks organized by these hired conspirators whose motives and purposes are an open secret, helieve that this sum is really intended to finance by devious means the plan for the invasion of Cuba. This action is the more grave when we remember that while thousands of young Cubans were being murdered in broad daylight in the streets of Cuban towns and its villages were being devastated by bombs manufactured in the United States, freely supplied to the tyrannical Batista Government, the Rescue Committee made no move to assist the thousands of Cuban patriots who sought temporary refuge in the United States inorder to save their lives. 45. The Wall Street Journal, a newspaper which does not conceal the interests which it represents, has recently published the most detailed and well informed account of the objectives underlying the State Department's policy towards Cuba. In the course of the account official sources are repeatedly cited, In its issue of 11 July 1960, The Wall Street Journal states that "in any case, U.S, diplomats are plowing right ahead with their anti-Castro planning". It goes on 1 to say: "According to officials in on the strategy conferences, the State Department has now tentatively decided to bring the Cuban crisis formally before a meeting of the O.A.S. First off, the United States will urge that the Castro régime be brandeda threat to hemisphere security ... If the O.A.S. agrees to that ... the State Department will put forward specific proposals for isolating the Castro ré- gime, Precise details are secret, and subject to change...". 46, And the mouthpiece of Wall Street adds: "United States diplomets are equally certain that really rough measures, suchas military intervention in Cuba, aren't the answer now either, though few rule out the possibility completely" and, continuing, it insists, accepting a false premise that has been usedto foster hostility and fear with respect to Cuba; "And if the Russians should move to establish military bases in the island Republic, top Administration officials contend, the United States is ready to explore the prospects of organizing a joint Latin American expeditionary force to 'intervene'." 47, Commenting on the possibility that the aggressive measures and economic boycott now in operation United States and the West against a Communist government in Guatemala in a successful revolution in 1954", 48, The propaganda campaign initiated by Senator Smathers in April 1959, which identifies. the revolutionary Government of Cuba with the Guatemalan Government of Colonel Arbenz, has thus become 3n> alibi which is being used fifteen months later by the promoters of armed aggression against the Cuban people, 49, The predictions of an armed attack on Cuba are not confined to the increasingly bold speculations of the planners of the aggression that is in progress, In support of the views of the columnist, foseph Alsop, who a short while ago asserted that armed intervention in Cuba was already necessa.,, an invasion plan has recently been made public. Inthe latest issue of the National Review, dated 16 July 1960, Anthony Harrigan, after describing the Cuban revolution in terms suspiciously similar to the stories most in vogue in official circles, proposes a plan to "save Cuba", According to this unofficial strategist of the - Pentagon, the agents who should be utilized inthe first instance are the Cuban counter-revolutionaries themselves—already given the protection of the Rescue - Committee in the United States and enjoying every possible facility to transmit a daily radio programme calling for subversion in Cuba. ; 50. The National Review states: "The task of U.S, authorities is essentially military. While the State Department is unwillingto take firm action against Castro, the armed forces display no such hesitancy. The Navy is well aware of the menace a Communist Cuba offers to the security of the Caribbean and the South Atlantic. The Army and the Air Force fear ... missile bases may be installed on Cuban soil. They know that the United States cannot tolerate a Communist Cuba." 51. We come now to the connexion between the plan and the State Department's present policy: "A ... diplomatic and economic break with the present government should precede the launching of military operations against Castro by Free Cuba forces. Congress should invoke the Monroe Doctrine and declare that a European Power is com. ‘tting indirect aggression against the United States and other American nations by its creation of a satellite ‘régime in Cuba. That should be followed by a stop order against the shipment of all-supplies to Cuba ‘from this country, including the spare parts for engines and mechanical equipment that are essential in a country where virtually all machinery is of American manufacture. The United States should refuse to permit shipment into this hemisphere of war supplies destined for the Castro government, "In considering the actual military operations necessary to drive Castro and the Reds from power in Cuba, it is necessary to realize the overriding importance of striking a single lightning blow. To start a prolonged civil war in Cuba, in which the country was torn to pieces by rival groups, would hardly be in the American interest, And in the light of the psychology of the United States public, support for such a struggle wouldhe slim. Americans quickly tired of the war in Korea. In all likelihood, they would not accept a Korea-type war in Cuba, © aae "A simultaneous strike against Castro-controlled Cuba would have to be timed with an uprising of anti-Castro forces, The planning for this, so as to assure a co-ordinated attack, would be a joint task for the ... Cuban groups, plus the CIA and military intelligence groups. The .., military strike would have to be air-borne, The size of Cuba necessitates air drops of resistance groups or the landing of freedom fighters by aircraft. The fatlure of Castro's air force to shoot down light planes used to set fire to cane fields indicates air defense of the island is now and wouldbe negligible, especially as the number of planes available would be inadequate to halt any mass flight of planes over Cuba. "Such a mass flight is what would be necessary. Since the United States might not wishtouse. its own military planes, manned by its own air personnel, on missions against Castro, it would be necessary for the free Cubans to obtain a tremendous fleet of privately~owned light planes, This is not at all farfetched, for most Latin air operations in revolu= tionary situations inyalve precisely this type of aircraft. Moreover, these small planes can land on highways and could deliver liberation fighters tothe outskirts of major traffic and communications _centers, "Because the flights would be one-way, the distance these planes could cover would he twice as great as under normal flying conditions. But, of course, there are some areas of Cuba which would be beyond their reach. U.S, military aircraft, operating under secret orders and with CIA officers in charge, could carry out air-drops over Santiago de Cuba and other distant points. "Indeed, once a liberation movement has the Castro forces on the run and has gained control of the principal centers in Cuba, a provisional government of Cuba could call on the United States for open assistance in the pacification of the country. This need not involve the commitment to Cuba of large 52. While the people of Cuba, underthe calm and firm leadership of the revolutionary Government, haye been laying the foundations of their economic independence and defying the resulting anger, threats and pressure of the international monopolies, the latter's agents and protectors do not relax their malevolent efforts to misrepresent the character and aims of the revolution. Their fundamental purpose has been, and is, tocreate the false impression that under the decisive influence of "international communism" Cuba has become one of the areas in dispute inthe coldwar. Again and again Cuba has reaffirmed its independent international policy, its adherence to the principles of the Charter - of the United Nations and its determination to live in freedom and at peace with all nations. 53. In successive diplomatic notes, the Government of the United States has tried to suggest that Cuba's international policy is contrary to the ideas of the so-called free world and at the same time has, as we have seen, encouraged, in the words of President Eisenhower himself, counter~revolutionary activities, making vain appeals to the people of Cuba, who are daily more closely identified with their nationslist, ‘anti-feudal and democratic revolution, which is, to an a 54, In the face of the verbal, economic sinaaizuonitic aggression and the growing pressure of United States interests affected by the economic and social reforms undertaken by the revolutionary Government, the threat. of armed aggression is becoming increasingly.evident to the Cuban people, As this: dramatic situation ap-~- proached a climax, reflected even in the UnitedStates extent that is true of few others, imbued with deep human significance. a Press, there came the statements made on 9 July by the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev. After referring to the demand of the Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, for an even tougher economic policy towards Cuba after the drastic reduction of its sugar quota, the Soviet Premier, in the course of an extempore speech and by way ofexample, accordingto the report in The New York Times said: "It should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an unattainable distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire, should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare te start intervention against Cuba, And the Pentagon would be well ad= vised not to forget that, as shown by the latest tests, 5. On Sunday, -10 July, the Prime Minister of Cuba, \r. Fidel Castro, spoke from his sick-bedtothe people n.a televised broadcast to inform them of the probems facing Cuba as a result of United States ecoiomic aggression, His words, which I shall now quote, re a clear and precise expression of the Cuban point f view: "At a time when our country is really face to face with the might of the greatest economic empire in the world, with the most powerful oligarchy, which has once again struck out against the peoples of America ... the Soviet Union has come forward absolutely spontaneously—I must stress that point, for we did not count on Soviet rockets to defend us, we counted on the justice of our cause, we counted on our dignity, we counted on the heroism of our people, on their will to resist ... ".,. In response to the statements of the Premier of the Soviet Union, the United States Government has not made the statement the situation calls for. The only logical reply would have been an explicit declaration to the world that the United States has no aggressive plans against Cuba, The United States had the duty to tell the world—a world to which both it and the Soviet Union belong—that it harbours no aggressive intentions against Cuba; to give the world its assurance that it does not propose to attack Cuba ...". i6. To date, the only known reaction of the United tates Government to the Cuban Prime Minister's nvitation—to which it is obliged to reply as a member if the Security Council, the body responsible for the naintenance of international peace and security—has teen to dust off, with a defiant air, the Monroe Joctrine, a doctrine continually invoked buf never ipplied to defend the territorial integrity, sovereignty ind independence of the Latin American peoples, as ve know from the Spanish attack on Tampico in 1829, he Anglo-French invasion of the Plate in 1825, the French blockade of Argentina in 1838, the Anglo- Franco-Spanish intervention in Mexico in 1862, the mposition of Emperor Maximilian on Mexico in 1863, he Spanish bombardment of Chile and Peru in 1866 ind the Anglo-Italo-German bombardment and blockide of Venezuela in 1902. i7, The starting point for the recrudescence of the inti-Cuban campaign in the United States was the yromulgation of the Agrarian Reform Act of 17 May 1959. Nobody has ventured to challenge the justice or | uistorical necessity of that Act. I need only remind . rou that the rural population of Cuba~over 3 million yeople—was almost totally unemployed for nine months of the year, since sugar-cane production requires yarely three months' work, and that less than a fifth ofthe farmland was under cultivation. An insignificant minority, less than 2 per cent of the total population, 58. When the land reform was put into effect, difficulties began to arise with foreign owners, most of them absentees, represented by corporations. As the Cuban Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro, pointed out: "it is not our fault that a large portion of Cuban land was in the hands of foreigners. The reform is just, its implementation is the basis for the nation's economic independence, and nothing can hold it back." Diplomatic pressure and propaganda for just, immediate and adequate compensation also began at that time. 59. The Agrarian Reform Act recognizes the right of estate owners to receive compensation both for their land and for any improvements they have made on it, But Cuba does not have, indeed no country has, the necessary amount of cash funds for immediate payment, Moreover, the defeated dictatorship left the Cuban Treasury, the state credit institutions and the country's foreign reserves in a ruinous state and saddled Cuba with a deficit of $1,000 million in its balance of payments with the United States. The agrarian reform is being financed by payment in bonds redeemable in twenty years and bearing interest at the rate of 4.5 per cent per annum, Cuba has more than once drawn attention to the fact that the land reform ordered in Japan by General Douglas MacArthur during the United States occupation provided for payment in thirty~year bonds at-a 3.5 per cent rate of interest... 60. In the attempts that have beer made to lower the prestige of the Cuban agrarian reform, there has been much talk of the way in which the National Institute of Agrarian Reform has carried out the initial occu~ pation and subsequent expropriation of landholdings. The Agrarian Reform Act has constitutional status in Cuba and the Supreme Court, in accordance with the legislation in force, has upheld the legality of the National Institute's acts in the intervention and initial occupation of estates subject to the application of the Act. 61. Act No. 588 of 7 October 1959 establishes the legal procedure for the compulsory expropriation of properties covered by the Agrarian Reform Act. The ordinary civil courts have jurisdiction in the expropriation proceedings and the owners can appear before these courts in defence of their rights; they may also designate experts to assess on their behalf the value of the property, improvements, buildings and growing orops, The owners may also appeal to a higher court, the Chamber of Constitutional Guarantees of the Supreme Court. 62. Once expropriation has been authorized, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform orders the National Bank through the Tribunal of Accounts to pay the compensation, 63, As of 11 July 1960 the situation expropriations under the Agrarian Reform follows: si ES RCT ‘ Area in Number “caballerfas* Estates expropriated ...0. 772 5,199.03 Estates acquired by purchase from their owners. ..... 61 24,894.86 Estates in the process of expropriation. ...cceee 3,746 90,215.23 Estates appraised..... .. 5,882 209,708.00 64. In addition, the necessary legal been taken to occupy 80,000 "caballerfas" the large sugar estates on which co-operatives being organized which will provide permanent ment for over 100,000 rural workers; the land in each co-operative will be cane cultivation and the remaining 30 crops. The total area affected by the Agrarian Reform Act is 400,000 "caballerfa" is equivalent to 33 1/2 65. One of the aspects of the agrarian bitterly attacked by the foreign interests the valuation of the land. The Act value of an estate is the value its owner tax purposes, and all the properties and included in the estate are assessed on of the most widely publicized cases United Fruit Company, the owner largest sugar mills which were surrounded estates totalling 8,175 "caballerfas". Company's land, 40 per cent of which was valued at $6,118,407, but the company compensation of $30 million. The question to be considered and decided by the courts, noted, however, that during the first intervention in Cuba and in the early Republic, the lands in question were ridiculously low prices, Three thousand almost 100,000 acres, were bought another estate of 1,000 "caballerfas" the United Fruit Company for the incredible $100, This is how the people of Cuba of their basic resources by foreign investors refuse to return their natural heritage, exchange for adequate compensation. 66. It is a source of annoyance to the Cuban revolution that their forecasts failure of the agrarian reform, interms are being disproved by the facts. Production fallen off either in the co-operatives ings to which a total of over 15,000. have been given individual title to trary, ours is the first agrarian output has substantially increased year. 67. The National Institute of Agrarian only working to increase production through educational and economic assistance been ee 68,. The resuits already obtained from the agrarian ' reform guarantee an increase in sugar-growing capa- _city as well as a considerable diversification of agriculture. The facts demonstrate the unfounded . character of the false rumours spread by the United States Government in its initial search for pretexts to reduce the Cuban sugar quota when it asserted that Cuba would be unable to meet its commitments te the United States market because of its agrarian policy and its policy of trade expansion, The Cuban Govern-. ment's reply was to offer an additional milliontons of sugar the following year, with the guarantee that if it failed to meet the commitment it would renounce its historic quota, which it had obtained at the cost of tremendous sacrifice, The response to this was a heightening of the economic aggression and Cuba was prevented from shipping over 840,000 tons of sugar to the United States during the remainder of the current year, Cuba will, if it is found necessary to do so in the | national interest, defend itself by enacting emergency legislation to offset the loss. 69. The immediate economic objective of this reprisal taken by the United States Congress at the suggestion and under the pressure of the State Department and the White House is to neutralize the achievements of the Revolutionary Government at the natidnal and international levels—the achievements of the agrarian reform, the co-operatives, the diversification of agri~ culture, the new sugar policy, the economic contribution of the working class to industrialization, the comprehensive reform of education, andthe establishment of mutually beneficial relations with all the nations of the world which have extended a hand of friendship to us while our neighbours to the north prepared aggression against us. But at the same time this action, because of its unilateral character andits coercive intent, constitutes political intervention and economic aggression, which are expressly condemred in articles 15 snd 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American 7 United Nations. he adoption of this action is tantamount to "forcing the sovereign will" of the Cuban tiea, a regional organization of the | State by obliging it, for the purpose of obtaining. "special advantages" for United States interests affected under the Agrarian Reform Act, to abdicate the full exercise of its sovereignty and hence to renounce its independent policy of economic development, the fair distribution of wealth and the diversification of markets. 70. This means, in short, that a great Power has violated its contractual commitments to the detriment of the sovereignty, well-being and progress ofa small country, thus endangering hemispheric peace and security and increasing international tension. At one stage in this confused process, before the United States had decided on aggression against Cuba, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, according to an article by James Reston published in The New York Times on 1 July 1960, carried a copy of articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American reference to Cuba that the United States Government would fulfil its inter-American agreements and in particular that it would never adopt measures that might affect the Cuban economy adversely. In this . case, as in so many others involving relations between the two countries, the words of the United States Government are at variance with its deeds. 71. The United States Government misses no oppor=- tunity to point out the extraordinary contribution its investors have made to Cuban economic advancement, and it especially emphasizes the "privileges" which Cuba has enjoyed in the United States sugar market, but it constantly and deliberately fails to mention the other side of the picture—the benefits and advantages the United States has derived, A full analysis of this question would take too long to present, and I will sherefore deal only with the essential points. 72. In its diplomatic note of 13 November 1959, the Revolutionary Government recognized the contribution which United States interests have made to Cuba's material development, but it also drew attention tothe . heavy contribution those interests had made to the distortion of Cuba's economic structure, which was in its essential features typical of that of a colonial dependency. It is not by chance that the monocuitiva~ tion of sugar and excessive dependence on the United States market have been the central feature of the Cuban economy, This is the result of contractual commitments entered into with the United States since the establishment of the Republic. The legal conditions deriving from the Convention of Commercial Reciprocity concluded between the two Governments in 1902 set rigid limits to the development of the Cuban economy and the country's foreign trade. One of the worst results of this pattern of relations, which was attacked by the distinguished patriot Manuel Sanguily when it was under discussion inthe Senate, was Cuba's conversion by American investment in the 1920's into one huge sugar mill serving the United States import market and a rich market for the sale of United States manufactured goods and agricultural products, This was the classical modus vivendi of metropolitan country and colony. The colony supplied the metropolitan country with a semi-processed agricultural commodity at a low price and with the money it re~ ceived bought back high~priced manufactured goods and even foodstuffs from the metropolitan country. This disadvantageous economic and trade relationship was supplemented, as if it was not enough, by a political guarantee clause, the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right—a right obtained through coercion and threats—te intervene in the "colony" if things did not go as the United States interests wished. 73. The 1902 Convention of Commercial Recriprocity hinged upon preferential tariffs and fiscal benefits under which the duties on a large number of United States products were as much as 60 per cent lower in some cases than those on products of other countries, and a number of Cuban products, including sugar, could enter the United States market at duties lower amount of Cuban sugar which could be sold on the United States consumer market and the remaining conditions—such as the preferential tariff—were specified on a contractual basis in the Convention, 74, The situation changed entirely with the introduction of the quota system, which governed the amount of sugar which Cuba could sell on the United States market. From that time forward, the tariff - preference for Cuban sugar written into the 1934 Commercial Agreement, which replaced the 1902 Convention of Reciprocity, was relegated to the background and the quota became a decisive factor. The United States Congress assumed the power of fixing the Cuban sugar quota unilaterally and periodically, and thus the. essential counter-balance to all the preferential concessions which the United States continued to enjoy in virtue of contractual obligations was eliminated, From that time on trade relations between Cuba and the United States were governed by the principle, heads I win, tails you lose. While the Cuban sugar economy remained at the mercy of unilateral decisions of the United States Congress, Cuba was still contractually bound to continue to grant all the con~ cessions given. Morally, the situation was even worse. When it set up the quota system, the United States disregarded the volume of Cuban sugar exports during the previous period in which the Convention of Reciprocity had been in force, Cuba supplied 48.1 per cent of the sugar consumed between 1902 and 1929. In 1930, Congress placed such a prohibitive tariff on sugar that Cuban exports dropped to 28 per cent, The United States also forgot the fact that Cuba had lost millions of dollars by selling it its entire sugar crop at prices below the world market price during the First World ‘War. Subsequently, it also overlooked the millions of dollars Cuba had sacrified during the Second Worid War. 75.- But the sad story does not end there. When he fixed the Cuban quota in 1934, the Secretary of Agriculture, who was authorized by the lawto determine it on. the basis of a representative period of nine years (1925-1933), chose the three worst years for Cuba (1931-1933) .During those years Cuba's exports dropped to a very low level as a result of the very high tariff in force. In consequence of that blatantly unfair act, Cuba's participation in the United States market, which had been 48.1 per cent during the years 1902 and 1929, was reduced to 28.6 per cent, Furthermore, the consolidation of tariffs under the 1934 Trade Agree= ment prevented Cuba, whose basic. commodity was at the mercy of unilateral decisions, from raising its tariffs to promote other branches of production without first initiating negotiations with the United States. The Cuban economy became more colonial in structure and Cuba became increasingly dependent on the United States market, _ 77. The United States Congress has periodically suspended or modified the quota system, Every time it has done so, Cuba has suffered, except for the year 1948, when the system was revised to give Cuba the temporary right to export more sugar in view of the special circumstances fullowing the Second World War, However, for the first time in that Act, the Congress, On instructions from the State Department, inserted a punitive clause under which the Secretary of Agriculture was empoweredto prevent any country-~ let us say Cuba-—from taking advantage of increases in the consumption of sugar on the United States market if, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the country in question denied fair and equal treatment to United States nationals or to United States trade, shipping or industry. That was the first attemptto use the Sugar Act as a weapon of foreign policy in Cuban- American relations. The vigorous protests of the Cuban Government and the generally unfavourable reaction to clause 202-E in Latin America forcedthe Congress to revoke the clause in 1949, tis relevant to note that article 16 of the Charter ofthe Organization of Ameri-~ can States—proposed by Cuba and adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States—condemns this type of punitive action when it prohibits any State from using or encouraging "the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind", 78, Finally, to conclude these clarifications and explanatory remarks, I should liketc reveal the secret of the "annual gift" of $150 million which Cuba re~ ceives by reason of the fact that the price of sugar on the United States market is usually higher than the world price. This lie has been repeated so often by . United States newspapermen and officials that many naive persons may take it to be the truth. This "gift", which Cuba receives because of the difference in price, is simply a consequence of the policy of protecting domestic producers and all countries with quotas stand to benefit by it. The people of Cuba have been paying for this supposed privilege with progressive reductions 80. The 1948 tactic of utilizing the Sugar Act as an instrument of coercion and reprisal has just been repeated, except that this time the crime was com=- pleted and the intention was carried into effect. President Eisenhower, using the discretionary powers granted him by the Congress, has cut this year's Cuban quota by 840,000 tons, There is no need to refute the pretext given for this action; it is a flimsy one and it is false. The important thing is that it reveals the true motive. But even more important, of course, is the state of mind of the people it is intended to subjugate by starvation: that people proclaims through me, before the conscience of the world, that it prefers honour without quota to quota without honour. 81. The vicious slash in the Cuban sugar quota had been preceded by other acts of economic aggression emanating directly from the Government of the United States. Suffice it to mention the cancellation of credit to Cuban banks, the payment in advance demanded by industrial firms which did business with Cuba, the freezing of Cuban bank accounts and the repeated seizure of commercial aircraft, Moreover, at about: the same time that the decision was taken to violate articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Esso, Standard Oil, Texaco and Shell oil companies started to prepare a new type of economic aggression with consequences far more serious than the cut in the sugar quota. With the backing of the State Department, these companies organized a plot to deprive Cuba of fuel and paralyse its vital economic machinery. While these machina~ tions were going on behind the scenes, the National Bank of Cuba was negotiating with the oil companies a stage-by-stage programme to which they had agreed in principle to facilitate compensatory payment for their imports. 82. Although the main financial obstacle had been © eliminated, oil imports continued to decline and sev-— eral tankers coming from Venezuela were rerouted as they neared Cuba. Fuel stocks declined at an alarming rate and the Revolutionary Government, exercising its authority and powers, stood upto the oil companies and gave them the alternative of refining the crude oi! acquired by the Cuban State within a specified period or facing the consequences, In view of the arrogant refusal of the oil monopoly, the Revolutionary Government had to choose one of two courses: it could either yield to the oil companies' demands and abdicate the 83. The United States Government was goaded by this failure into declaring economic war against the Revolutionary Government, promoting collective armed action against Cuba within the Organization of American States, attempting unsuccessfully to arrange for Latin American co-operation, threatening intervention to protect its interests, resurrecting the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument of hegemony and adopting such a belligerent attitude. that it provoked the Soviet Union's staggering warning. At this point, we must put the following questions: Who is interfering in the internal affairs of Latin America? The major Power threatening to unleash its military power against a small, unarmed country or the other great Power coming forward to prevent it from so doing? Who is robbing a small country of its sugar quota.and who is offering to compensate for that loss? Does the inter- American system tolerate and sanctify this kind of intra-continental aggression or does it repudiate and condemn it? Are we, in the interests of hemispheric unity, democratic principles and continental security, ’ which have now become worthless scraps of paper, to allow ourselves meekly to be led away, like a docile beast, to the slaughterhouse? What is the inter- American system? Is it intended to protect the rights of smal! countries to act in their self-interest or is it a straitjacket in which we remain confined while our misfortunes, hopes and desires aretraded upon for the benefit of outsiders? In the last analysis, who is adhering more closely to the rules of the inter-American system: the continental Power violating them in its fury of Goliath against David or the extracontinental Power seeking to save David from perishing under Goliath's blows? 84. Immediately following the enactment of the law intended to restrict Cuba's right to self-determination and to block its economic development, President Eisenhower announced with great fanfare anemergency economic plan of co-operation in—as he said—"the economic development of Latin America". He emphasized inter alia the need for substantial investment of public funds. 85. Confession makes further proof unnecessary. Besides, it is ironical that this belated move should vindicate the proposal made by Premier Fidel Castro in Buenos Aires last year at the meeting of representa- 86. Even the United States Press has pointed out the inappropriateness of the moment chosen to announce this "new Marshall Plan", which vainly seeksto coun- ‘teract the impact of Premier Fidel Castro's ideas on Latin American public opinion by. crude political ‘alchemy. As a number of United States commentators © have warned, with more foresight than certain presidential advisers, the peoples of Latin America will look upon this improvised and hastily concocted plan— and they have done so—with profound reservations, and it will be very difficult to convince them that it is not once again intended to buy their support with dollars in a crisis when it is recalled that they were scorned and treated with. contempt at a time when unconditicnal solidarity and strategic raw materials were not so urgently needed, 87, Spokesmen for the Department of State have frequently asserted, with the object of deceiving world public opinion, that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba does not show any willingness to negotiate its differences with the United States Government through the diplomatic channel, The facts show that the reverse is true. What the Revolutionary Government has not accepted is the claim that Cuba's national and infernational policy can be dictated from Washington, as in the past, 88, In corroboration of what I have just said If should like to read out certain passages from the statement made by Osvaldo Dortic6és, President of the Republic of Cuba, on 27 January 1960 in reply to statements made by President Eisenhower: "The differences of opinion which may exist between the two Governments, being subject to diplomatic negotiation, can in fact be settled by means of such negotiation. The Government of Cuba is entirely willing to discuss all those differences without reservation and to the fullest extent and expressly states that in its view there are no obstacles of any kind which should prevent the carrying out of such negotiations by means of one or another of the methods and instruments traditionally appropriate to that end. The Government of Cuba wishes to maintain and expand its diplomatic and economic relations with the Government and people of the United States on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocal benefits for both countries and considers that on this basis the traditional friendship between the peoples of Cuba and the United States will prove indestructible." 89. In accordance with this policy, which has consistently guided Cuba's diplomatic relations with the United States, on 22 February 1960, in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, I delivered to the United States Chargé d'affaires at Havana a note the substantive part of which read as follows: "The Revolutionary Government of Cuba, in accordance with its expressed proposal to renew through "The Revolutionary Government of Cuba wishesto make it clear, however, that the renewal and sub= sequent development of the said negotiations must necessarily he subject to no measure being adopted, by the Government or the Congress of your country, of a unilateral character which might prejudge the results of the aforementioned negotiations or cause harm to the Cuban economy and people. "It seems obvious to add that the adherence of your Government to this point of view would not only contribute to the improvement of relations. between our respective countries but also reaffirm the spirit of fraternal friendship which has bound and does bind our peoples. It would moreover permit hoth Governments to examine, in a serene atmosphere and with the broadest scope, the questions which have affected the traditional relations between Cuba andthe United States of America," 90, What was the reaction ofthe United States Government to this concrete proposal by the Cuban Government, which was both dignified and friendly? It was the following: "The Government of the United States cannot accept the conditions for the negotiations stated in Your Excellency's note to the effect that no measure of a — unilateral character shall be adopted on the part of the Government of the United States affecting the Cuban economy and its people, whether bythe legis~ lative or executive branch, As set forth in President Eisenhower's statement of January 26, the Govern~ ment of the United States must remain free, in the exercise of its own sovereignty, to take whatever steps it deems necessary, fully consistent with its international obligations, in the defense of the legiti~ mate rights and interests of its people." 91. The unilateral measures had already been decided upon at that time, It had been resolved to strangle the Cuban revolution economically, to put economic ag~ gression into effect, by drastically. reducing the sugar quota, a step which constituted a flagrant violation of the tacit agreement undertaken with the Cuban sugar producers, who had made large investments in order to guarantee that the United States market would, as at all times, be adequately supplied. 92. If a great Power refuses to negotiate and at the | same time commits economic aggression against another smaller nation which has no thermonuclear | bombs, or guided missiles, can it complain about the diplomatic difficulties which it has itself provoked? In its diplomatic relations the Government of Cuba, the friend of all Governments and all peoples which reciorocate its friendship, asks only genuine respect for its sovereignty and reciprocal treatment on a basis of quality and mutual benefit. The Government of the United States, as the text of the note which I have yuoted reveals, writes off the international obligations ‘0 which it has subscribed and seeks to negotiate its lifferences with Cuba from a position of strength, vhich is intolerable and inadmissible to the dignity of amy Government that respects itself and the people whom. it represents. determination to resist, in solidarity with the people, any who would dare disembark on our shores in the -guise of conquerors. To subjugate or defeat us will not be an easy task, The destiny of my country today is the destiny of all the under-developed peoples of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Cuba is not alone. 94. Through me the Revolutionary Government of _ Cuba requests the United Nations Security Council to take action appropriate to the nature of the question before it, 95. Mr.LODGE (United States of America): The United States has engaged in no threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals or aggressive acts against the Government of Cuba. 96, The Foreign Minister of Cuba: has told us that Dr, Castro would like an assurance from the United States that the United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba, Unnecessary though it most certainly seems to me, let me here and now give him this assurance, heaped up and overflowing: the United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba. 97. The United States has consistently exercised restraint in the face of what seems to be a deliberate and concerted effort on the part of the present Government of Cuba to create a grievance withthe United States. We can read no other meaning intothe recourse of the Cuban Government tothe Security Council today. Such recourse is not in harmony with its treaty obligations under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States signed at Bogot4 on 30 April 1948. Under these treaties the American Republics contractedto resolve their international differences with any other American State first of all through the Organization of American States. The United States believes that the proper forum for the discussion of any controversies between the Government of Cuba and the Governments ofother American Republics is the Organization of American States. 98. The causes of international tensions inthe Caribbean area have been under consideration by the Inter- American Peace Committee since the meeting of the. American Foreign Ministers in Santiago, Chile, in August of last year, which was called to deal with that problem, Allegations of the kind which the Foreign Minister of Cuba has produced before this body, if they had any validity, could have been considered and dealt with there. At no time has the Cuban Government made any effort to contribute to that Committee's work, despite repeated invitations to all the Governments of the Organization of American Statesto do so. 99. On 27 June 1960 the United States Government, after Cuban refusal to engage in direct negotiations, submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee a memorandum entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba against the United States which have served to increase tensions in the Caribbean area" and informed the Committee that it would con~ 101, In these circumstances, the United States be~ lieves that the Security Council should take no action on the Cuban complaint, at least until, as contemplated by the provisions of the inter-American treaties to which I have just referred, such discussions have taken place in the Organization of American States, A solution of these differences should be found by pacific means among the American States in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of American States, In the meantime the Council should be alert to outside attempts—notably from the Soviet Union-—~to aggravate tensions, 102. Let me say that it is not a question of which is greater or which is less—the Organization of American States or the United Nations. The point is that it makes sense—and the Charter so indicates—to go to the regional organization first and to the United Nations as a place of last resort. There is no question, of course, of replacing the United Nations. 103. Relations between the United States and Cuba have traditionally been extremely close and friendly as befits neighbours whose fundamental national interests are similar and who are separated byless than a hundred miles of water. 104. The United States helped Cuba to achieve its independence in 1898, and our ‘peoples have a history of a half-century of cordial relations. We have maintained unusually close economic relations, The United States has been the traditional supplier of 70to 80 per cent of Cuba's imports and has taken 60 to 70 per cent of Cuba's exports—a share which is higher than with other countries of Latin America generally. We also have maintained a mutually preferential tariff with special low import duty rates. Cuba has consistently received a higher price for sugar not only above the world market price but above that of any other supplier. We were allies in two world wars. 105. It is no secret either that many long-time friends of Cuba in the United States and friends of Cuba elsewhere in this hemisphere were heartened by the ideals expressed by the present leader of Cuba when he assumed control of the Cuban Government. 107. In those circumstances the United States tried to show its understanding and sympathy for Dr.Castro's stated aim of honest and efficient government, for the perfection of democratic processes and for economic development leading to higher living standards and to - full employment, On 11 June and 12 October 1959 we expressed to the Cuban Government our full support for soundly conceived programmes for rural development. We particularly applauded Dr. Castro's stated desire to do something for land reform, so badly needed and so long delayed. 108. Even the shock of the many executions in the first months following the establishment of the Revolutionary Government and the sharp attacks on the United States Government by high Cuban officials failed to diminish the warm and friendly feeling with which Dr. Castro was greeted on all sides when he came to the United States, to New York among other places, in April 1959, There was a general reluctance _to believe that Cuba, a country for which the people of the United States have long had a special affection, could be embarked upon an unfriendly course. 109. On 20 January of this year President Eisenhower. issued a major restatement’ of American policy towards Cuba, reaffirming the adherence of the United States Government to a policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, including Cuba, and explicitly recognizing the right ofthe Cuban Government and people, in the exercise of their national sovereignty—and I am quoting—"to undertake those social, economic and political reforms which, with due regard for their obligations under international law, they may think desirable" and expressing sympathy with the aspirations of the Cuban people. 110. That was the official voice of the United States. Under our Constitution there is only one person who speaks for the United States in the field of foreign affairs, and that is the President of the United States. So far as the position of the UnitedStates in the world is concerned, he is the Government of the United States. The Government of the United States is not seventy-five members of Congress; it is notthe American Legion; it is not The Wall Street Journal; it is not the Attorneys General at their convention. E is not Joseph Alsop, it is not James Reston, and it is not Senatcr Smathers. It is Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, who speaks through his agents—one of whom I am here. Incidentally, there are 535 members of Congress, so that means that out of that number only seventy-five expressed themselves as not liking Dr. Castro's administration, That is not such a bad vote. 111. The truth of the matter is that we have free speech in America. We have unrestricted free speech, in our Press, in our Congress, anywhere. You can — hire a hall and say anything you want, and that means, : of course, that some things are going are not going to be liked in Cuba, to be liked in New York, but by f is }- H iS fs imagination can free speech be called 112. The United States has just been Foreign Minister of Cuba of harbouring providing facilities for counter-revolutionaries, of frequent violations of Cuban air been accused of economic aggression refusal of two private American oil fine Soviet oil and because of the President's to reduce the Cuban sugar quota. Let at the facts. 113. First, the provisions for the extradition sons from the United States are well Those provisions are set forth ta Cuban Extradition Treaty and in United and have been discussed in detail by of State with Cuban Embassy officers. extradition requests in United States more,without even notifying the United ment. To the best knowledge of the extradition has never been requested ment of Cuba for any of those persons defined by the Government of Cuba from the Batista régime. 114, Second, a number of Cuban nationals required by the United States Immigration ralization Service to leave Florida from any area within 150 miles of the This was a voluntary and co-operative United States Government to help in the Caribbean area, and it never acknowledgement from the Cuban Government, 115. Third, the United States has precautions in accordance with its the 1928 Havana Convention on the of States in the Event of Civil Strife domestic laws dealing with the traffic and implements of war which might tionary activities. 116, Fourth, the United States has vigorous and elaborate system of controls by the United States Government in prevent unauthorized flights in the Caribbean has deplored the very few which have spite of our restrictive actions. On Cuban authorities have refused to United States authorities to prevent one case about which Cuba complained duals involved, one of whom was named Shergalis and the other Hector Garcfa indictment in United States courts the flights as agents of the Cuban Government 117. In the most celebrated case, the Lanz in 1959, for whom extradition lack of evidence, the Cuban Government claim that he bombed Havana. I quote the This claim is contradicted by Cuba's ports and also by the results of carried out by United States authorities the plane returned to our territory. showed that the bomb-bay in the 118, Fifth, among the charges of economic aggression have been all sorts of fanciful charges. President Dorticé6s, for example, described the withdrawal of United States technical assistance as a "sign of aggression", in a speech in Montevideo in June. On 11 July Dr. Castro referred to the drop in American tourism to Cuba in a context of economic aggression. But surely it is not surprising if Americans do not want to go to a place where they are not wanted and where their country is subjectedto a ceaseless stream of abuse, Even the preferential ‘sugar quota and the premium price which Cuba has traditionally enjoyed were described by Guevara in March as meaning "glavery" for the Cuban people, 119, Sixth, no economic aggression of any sort was involved in the refusal of the American owned oil companies to refine Soviet oil. Those two companies have operated in Cuba for fifty years as law-abiding companies and have made a contribution to the growth of the Cuban economy, Since the revolution, the Cuban Government has allowed those companies to be paid only a small percentage of their cost of importing erude oil from Venezuela to refine in Cuba, At the time of their seizure, the Cuban Government. owed them $50 million for oil they continued voluntarily to provide. The law under which Cuba purported to require the companies to refine Soviet oil had never previously been considered to mean that it also required the companies to refine ary oil other than that ‘from Cuban sotl. The United States believes that the Cuban action in seizing these companies without compensation was arbitrary and illegal. It is further evidence and confirmation of a pattern of relentless efforts to destroy Cuba's traditional investment and trade relations with the free world. To our knowledge, not a single American property-owner in Cuba had been reimbursed for the property taken away—frequently without receipt—from him. 120. Seventh, the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota was no act of economic aggression, but a justifiable - measure of self-protection of the United States to ensure. its needed supply of sugar in the face of acts on the part of the Cuban Government which made this supply extremely insecure. The United States was under no obligation under the sugar agreement to purchase raw sugar from Cuba, nor was Cuba obliged to sell. Normally, about one-third of our total sugar supply comes from Cuba. The Government of Cuba is now following a course which raises serious questions as to whether the United States can in the long run continue to rely upon that country for such large quantities of sugar. The arrangement might have continued to be mutually beneficial to both the Ameri~ 121. There is no escape from the intent of recent Cuban actions, and the United States regretfully—and very regretfully—has had to protect its own long-range sugar supply accordingly. 122. The Foreign Minister of Cuba this afternoon has also referred to the Soviet threat of rocket attacks ‘against the United States. So that there may be no mistake at all, let me say that the principles of the . ‘Monroe Doctrine—which is another way of saying the prevention of the extension of alien domination of the. American continent—are fully alive and will be vigorously defended by the United States. The principles. of that Doctrine are now emhodied intreaty obligations among the American States, notably in the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, which provide means for common action to prevent the establishment of a régime dominated by international communism inthe Western Hemisphere, 123, We are notfrightened by Chairman Khrushchev's threat of rockets, and we will live upto these treaties just as we live up to our obligations in the United Nations. 124, Now I come to the conclusion of my remarks— and this is a very special question indeed, Let me say this, that whenthe Foreign Minister of Cubatalks about the United States as a "North American aggressor" and as a “butcher"—I believe that was the word he used this afternoon—and charges us with a number of other offences, I for one am willing to believe that at the moment when he utters these words he actually believes in them. But in the greatest candour I assure him that the United States of America he is talking about does not exist. The United States of America which does exist is the United States of America which helped Cuba to get its independence. It is the United States of America which sprang from the words of Patrick Henry, "Give me liberty or give me death", a rallying-cry which inspired the great Bolfvar and the noble José Martf, It is the United States of America of Thomas Jefferson, who wrote in our Declaration of ‘Independence that "all men are created equal" andthat they are entitled to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"—happiness as each individual conceives it, and not as somebody tells him that he must have it. It is the United States of America of Abraham Lincoln and.the freeing of the slaves, whichtoday inspires our steady progress in the field of civil rights. It is the United States of America of the victory over yellow fever in Panama; of President Franklin D, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor; of President Eisenhower's hopes for economic collaboration; the United States of America by which no one has ever been enslaved. It is the United States of America which is human, of course, and therefore imperfect, but which is always eager to correct its errors. Above all it is the United States of America which wants to be friends with Cuba and which some day, somehow, will be friends again. 126. First of all, I wish to make it clear that the question now before the Council is, for the Argentine delegation, an extremely difficult one. This is a dispute between two countries of our continent with which Argentina maintains close ties of friendship. His a disagreement between two nations whose history and geography, as well as many other factors, emphasize their deep-seated community of interests, This dispute is therefore unnatural, and we hope that it will prove to be no more than a passing cloud on the American horizon. 127. We are convinced that, intheir coramon interest, relations between the two great ethnic and cultural groups inhabitingthe American continent must he based on mutual understanding and confidencemthis not only on grounds of theory and sentiment, but also for practical and realistic reasons. The United States and the countries of Latin America possess characteristics which greatly distinguish them one fromthe other in many essential aspects of their respective national personalities. But the factors which unite them— - especially at this point in history~—are more important. than those dividing them, Unquestionably they are at different stages of economic development, they have different psychological approaches, andthere are con~ siderable sociological differences between them, But both have established their social order andtheir code of moral values in accordance with the Christian concept of life. Both believe that the individual is more important than the State, Both have adhered, in their public life, to the republican and representative sys« tem of government. 128. Above all, however, all the countries of the Western Hemisphere have aligned themselves on the same side wher it is aquestionof resisting ideological systems that run counter to our most deeply rooted spiritual convictions. There is a great gulf, in the world today, between communism and political sys— tems based on respect for individual liberty. If is our’ earnest hope, which we have expressed here on many occasions, that the struggle between the two concepts will not result in recourse fo arms. But that hope cannot blind us to the fact that the conflict exists and that, for the nations of this hemisphere, it is almost impossible to remain neutral. We have no desire to impose our own systems on others, But we are en~ titled to take any measures which may be necessary to prevent the imposition upon us, from outside, of systems that conflict with our cherished way of life. 129, For all these reasons, harmony between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon areas of our continent is, today more than ever, 2 vital need. That harmony, needless to say, must in our view be based on absolute equality and mutual respect. We do not believe that today there is any responsible body of opinicn in the United States or in Latin America which thinks in . my own country became involved in difficulties on that . Score on more thanone occasion, But we are convinced that on both sides of the Rfc Grande there is a new awareness, which combines a recognition of the vital need for a "rapprochement" in present circumstances with the appreciation that there can be no friendly relations unless they are based on mutual independence and respect for the fundamental rights of ail the members of our community, 130. This conviction of the need for a strengthening of the ties between Latin America and the United States, on abasis of equality and mutual respect, guides not only the international policy of my country but alsa, we are sure, that of the vast majority, if not all, of the Latin American republics. Itistruethat on both sides there are minority groups which have nostalgic memories of systems of subjection, and others which, on the contrary, are interested In bringing about the destruction of the spiritual and political ties between the two areas, But such groups are of Httle importance compared with the great majority which sees in an agreement based on equality the beginning of a new era of material and moral growth, to the common benefit of the entire continent. 131, The dispute between Cuba and the United States is a serious obstacle to this reorganization of inter~ American relations. It consequently not only affects the two parties concerned but also harms all the other countries of the continent. That is why, when this question was brought before the Security Council, the two Latin American countries represented here— Ecuador and Argentina—felt they had a special re~ sponsibility for finding a generally acceptable solution, 132. In a case dealt with by the Council a few weeks ago, the representatives of the two Latin American | countries, together with those of the African—Asian nations, sought and obtained approval of atext inviting ‘the parties to seek a solution of the difficulties by observing law and having recourse to peaceful proce~ dures,. How much more, then, are our delegations justified in acting with the same object of conciliation in view when the case is one of countries whose disagreement constitutes for us not merely a source of sorrow but also, and equally, a danger. 133. Accordingly, the delegations of Ecuador and Argentina have decided to submit to the Council the joint draft resolution which f have the honour to introduce [8/4392]. Let me now say a few words about the nature and purpose of the text that is before the Council for its consideration. 184. It has been debated whether a country belonging to the Organization of American States—a regional agency recognized in Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations—is entitled to bring a dispute with another American State before the United Nations, or should first have recourse to the regional machinery. My delegation, so far as it is concerned, does not think that a theoretical and legal analysis ofthis question is indispensable. If we look at the matter from a practical standpoint—and since it is generally recognized that no await the results of its action and ascertain its point of view. 135. That is why the draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and Argentina proposes, in operative para~ graph 1, a decision by the Security Council "to adjourn the consideration of this question pending the receipt of a report from the Organization of American States", It should be noted that it is not proposed te deny the Council's competence in the matter, or even to settle the legal question of which organization should act first, What is suggested is a noting of the concrete cilrcum~ stance that the regional organization is dealing with the question, anda recognition that, for abetter evalua~ tion of the issues, it is useful to have before us the considerations at which the regional organization may arrive, 136. This preliminary measure cannot prevent the Council from making provisions which in procedural law would be described as precautionary, to ensure that the existing situation does not deteriorate before ‘the report of the Organization of American States is transmitted to us, It is in view ofthese temporary but urgent requirements that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 have been drafted, 137, As representatives will note, the resolution's recommendations are of two types, according as to whether they are addressed to members or to nonmembers of the Organization of American States, The members of that Organization are parties to binding agreements and therefore have legal commitments which impose on them reciprocal duties of co~ operation and assistance. This, of course, dees not affect the emotional ties between them, to which I have referred at length in the first part of my present statement, That is why we felt that we could ask the member States of the Organization of American States to co-operate actively and constructively and, as our draft resolution says, to "lendtheir assistance towards the achievement of a peaceful solution of the present situation", This wording, far from being incompatible with operative paragraph 1, under which consideration of the question by the Council is adjourned, comple~ ments it, precisely because it is the co-operation and assistance which we are requesting from the American countries that will make the report of the regional organization useful to us. 138. The position of countries which are not members of the Organization of American States is different. While many of them are undoubtedly linked to. the parties to the dispute by strong emotional ties (I am thinking, for instance, of those countries which were the founders of our nations), they are not bound by legal obligations to co-operate and assist. Accordingly, to 189. This request to abstain from any action which might aggravate tension, although explicitly made only to countries that are not members of the Organization of American States, also, needless to say, applies to that Organization's members. For if we ask these for the greater contribution—assistance towards a solution of the dispute—it is clear that we must also ask them _ to make the lesser contribution, namely to refrain from aggravating the situation. If we do not say this explicitly in the text, it is because we regard it as redundant, 140. Our draft resolution is not addressed to the parties to the dispute, since that would involve a decision of substance incompatible with our proposal that consideration of the question be.adjourned, But it seemed to us advisable to include in the preamble a paragraph recalling the obligation of Members of the United Nations to "settle their international disputes by negotiation and other peaceful means. in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." This wording, which is almost identical with that of Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, reminds the parties of the course that they should follow in order to bring their conduct into line with the international rules by which they are bound, It is our hope that these precepts will be duly . observed, sothat it will be unnecessary for the Security Council to take any further action in this matter. We realize, of course, the gravity of the situation which has arisen between Cuba and the UnitedStates, Yet we do not believe that anything irreparable has so far taken place such as to prevent the finding of a mutually acceptable solution, The parties can still usefully resort to direct negotiation, which in this case is the most appropriate course. It is likewise our hope that abusive language will give way to language of moderation, thus making it more possible for the concrete difficulties to be faced in a spirit of calm. 141, So far as my delegation is concerned, we deem it essential to prevent this distressing conflict from being exploited on behalf of interests foreign to those of the parties in dispute. We have to recognize that opinions in the continent are, on the matter at issue, divided. But the vast majority of our peoples, whatever their standpoint with regard to the. dispute may be, would vehemently oppose any extra~continental attempt to use it as a pretext for interference or propaganda. We are sure that the parties, once aware of such intentions, will do everything necessary to thwart them. 143, All these considerations explain, we believe, the draft resolution now before the Security Council, We hope that it will meet with unanimous approval, which will doubtless contribute to a relaxation of. tension, paving the way to that prompt restoration of friendly relations between two sister. nations of the American continent which we so earnestly desire,

It is a wise custom that when the President of the Coun~ cil has to make a statement on behalf of the country which he represents, he should do so at the end of the debate; and I intend to observe it. However, as cosponsor of the draft resolution which the representa~ tive of Argentina has just explained with his customary clarity, I should like to say the following in my capacity as representative of ECUADOR. ' 145. Ecuador's activity in the Security Council this year has been based on the principle that the present world situation demands continuous efforts in the way of conciliation, so that the international differences which now darken the scene may be prevented from gravely endangering international peace and security. We believe that the Security Council is called upon at this moment in history—more, perhaps, than at any other—to exert a conciliatory influence designed permanently to lessen, and not to aggravate, existing tensions. ; 146. When the Government of Cuba brought before the Council the situation which had arisen between Cuba and the United States of America, we thought it our duty to take a powerful initiative with a view to a reconciliation. Ecuador and its people have brotherly — feelings for the people of Cuba, and at the same time are linked with the United States and Cuba by bonds of close friendship and geographical facts—facts dictating an undeniable community of interests, It is for this reason that we have watched with regret the course taken by the relations between these two countries, and that we offer, with all warmth and sincerity, this contribution of ours towards a reconciliation. 147. It is not only possible, but essential, that this effort in the way cof conciliation, and those efforts which are undoubtedly being made by other Latin 148. A reconciliation between Cuba and the United States is not only necessary, but possible. We are sure that the mental and psychological prerequisites are present on both sides, and I would venture to say that the opening statements which we heard at this meeting contain valuable eiements which justify us in hoping for a good result. In this respect I shall confine myself to pointing to two aspects which are, Perhaps, fundamental. 149, The Cuban revolution constituted a victory for the Cuban people against an oppressive dictatorship, and is still, we believe, inspired primarily by the legitimate desire of that people to establish justice, economically and socially, both within the country itself and internationally. The Cuban Government is, we are sure, fully aware that so laudable a popular movement will attain its objectives most effectively in an atmosphere of peace, without international friction, and that this can come about through a serious effort on the part of the international organizations and by the patient use of bilateral methods such as negotiation, 150, On the other hand, the Cuban Government has shown a legitimate insistence that in regard to Cuba there should be respect for the central principles of international coexistence, such as the principle that negotiation should be based on the legal equality of States and on respect for their sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. We are surethat, with the help of international organizations, there must once more be a realization in Cuba that these principles are not in danger; and that ifall States observe them, as the United Nations Charter prescribes, the situation which the Council is now considering will right itself, 151, With this end in view, Tjoin withthe representative of Argentina in appealing to all members of the Council to support this effort of conciliation whichthe two Latin American delegations are making. 152, The draft resolution we have submitted also reflects, so far as Ecuador is concerned, a policy we have consistently followed with regard to the juris~ diction of the United Nations and the regional organizations, and to the rights and duties of those States which are Members of the world Organization and members of a regional agency. 153. This policy may be summed up in the following three considerations. 154, First: we believe that it is juridically correct, and politically advisable, to try to solve through regional bodies those disputes which canbe dealt with by regional action, This is all the more indicated at the 155, Secondly: as the United Nations Charter makes clear, regional arrangements ‘and agencies in no way detract from the powers of the Security Council as the supreme body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, The Security Council is of course required, legally and politically, to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or agencies, which. means that when there is a case appropriate for regional action the Council should recommend this. course, or at any rate seek areport from the regional body concerned before taking any decisions itself. Acting in this way, the Council, far from relinquishing its competence, is in fact exercising it, In the opinion of my Government, the Security Council would be well advised to adjourn its discussion of the matter now before it, until it has received a report from the = Organization of American States. 156, Thirdly: as a corollary to the foregoing, it is clear that the provisions of the Charter regarding regional arrangements and agencies and the legal obligations assumed by States in establishing regional agencies in no way invalidate the rights ofthese States to appeal to the Security Council if they consider that the defence of their rights and interests so requires, or that a specific situation or dispute, although appro~ priate for regional action, might endanger international peace and security. Any contrary interpretation would place States members of a regional organization in a position of capitis diminutio in the United Nations, which would be both deplorable and legally improper. 157. Such is the statement I have to make as repre= sentative of Ecuador. 158, Before we hear the consecutive interpretation, I should like to suggest that we suspend our work now and meet again at 9 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m. GREECE-GRECE Kauffmann Bookshop, Athénes. GUATEMALA eataled E, bate 14.33, Guatemala HAI Librairie “A la Caravelle”, 131-8, Port-au-Prince. HONDURAS librerfa Panamericana, HONG KONG-HONG-KONG The Swindon Book Kowloon. ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar F,, Austurstraeti 18, INDIA-INDE Orient Leng dras, New Delhi The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario. CEYLON. CEYLAN Lake House Bookshop, Asses, Newspapers of Caylon, P.O. Box 244, Colombe. CHILE-CHELT ; Editarial de! Pacifico, Santiago. Ubreria vers, Casilla 208, Santiage. Oxford Book & Delhi & Calcutta, P. 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