S/PV.876 Security Council

The Seeurity Council has before it an application from the revolutionary Government of Cuba [S/4378] notifying the Council of the existence of a grave situation with manifest danger to international peace and security, as a - consequence of the repeated threats, harassments, ' intrigues, reprisals and aggressive acts by the United ' States in relation to Cuba, At the 874th meeting the Council heard the statement of Mr. Roa, Cuba's Minister for Foreign Affairs, who adduced numerous facts in substantiation of the crucial arguments contained in the said application, At the same meeting the Council heard the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Lodge, who after categorically denying those charges, gave an assurance to the effect that the United States Government harbours no aggressive intentions in relation to Cuba, We have become accustomed, however, to judging on the basis not of words but of deeds; and we shall endeav~ our to show that the United States Government's declared intentions with regard to Cuba. constitute one thing, and the actions which are being committed in relation to that State another. 7. In our opinion, the information contained in the Cuban Government's letter and in the statement made by Mr. Roa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, gives ample ground for Cuba's application to the Security Council. While we see no need to restate that information, we should like to draw the special attention of the Council's members to certain points which we regard as particularly important. . 8. We deem it indispensable to stress, at the outset, the existence of incontrovertible data testifying to the fact that the United States Government is not merely hostile to the present régime in Cuba but is, at the very least, inspiring—if not actually organizing conspiratorial and diversionist activities. directed against the Cuban Government. In particular, these activities find their expression in thé organization of piratical incursions over Cuba by aircraft that take off from United States territory. 9. As everyone knows, such incursions take place regularly, causing injury or loss of life among Cuba's civilian population and inflicting considerable damage on the country's economy. In the face of irrefutable evidence, the United States Government was forced to admit officially that at least four aircraft which engaged in diversionist acts over Cuban territery had taken off illegally from United States territory on 21 October 1959 and on 18 February, 21 March and 12 May 1960, That admission is contained ina United States Government memorandum of 27 Juze 1960 [S/4888] sent to the so-called Inter-American Peace Committee. 11. The Cuban people were speedily enabled to sat= isfy themselves of the falsity of such statements, 12. The hypocrisy of the United States Government became even more obvious when, after expressing in the memorandum of 27 June 1960 sham regrets over incidents involving flights by American aircraft over Cuba, it went on to say that "the long Florida coastline, the presence in that State of considerable numbers of Cuban political refugees, and the numerous airports in the general area constitute a combination of factors conducive to the undertaking of adventures against Cuba", - Apparently the United States Government is unable to control matters along | its air frontiers where piratical incursions into a small neighbouring State are concerned, andofficially - acknowledges its helplessness in that respect. It follows that the endeavours of the President of the United States, to which he referred in his statement of 26 January, cannot have been very strenuous. Indeed, there arises the question whether any en= deavours of the sort have ever been made, 13. The United States Government has admitted that it was a party to four cases of provocative flights over Cuban territory. In the other cases it is trying to deny its guilt altogether, on the basis of an alleged lack of "substantial evidence". But in the light of the statement I have quoted, and after the well-known U=2 incident, it is obvious to all just how much value’ can be attached to such deniais. 14.. Moreover, do the four cases in which the United States was compelled to admit responsibility not suffice to enable the Cuban Government to qualify United States policy towards Cuba as aggressive? One may ask the United States Government how many incur=— sions of piratical aircraft over Cuba are required in order for it to admit its participation in the violation of its neighbour's sovereignty. 15. These aggressive acts by the United States in relation to the Cuban Republic are directly connected with the campaign of malicious slander and hostile agitation waged in the United States against the Gov= ernment of Fidel Castro. — 16, One may, of course, follow Mr. Lodge and as= sume that a number of members of the United States Congress are irresponsible persons. He is in the best position to know; he was himself a Senator. But it is hard to believe that the United States Gov= ernment cannot call them to order when they start demanding intervention in Cuba; yet precisely such intervention was requested, for example, by Mr. Rivers, member of the House of Representatives for South Carolina. That worthy gentleman, evidently in a state of extreme irritation, demanded that the United States Government should conduct an economic 18. Many a time, in circumstances such as these, has Mr. Lodge told the Security Council of the so= called freedom of speech in the United States. But those are tales for simpletons. Whenever the United States Government deems it necessary, it finds ways and means of influencing the Press; but when the Government finds it convenient to disclaim formal responsibility for the incendiary attitude of the Press, it waxes enthusiastic about freedom of speech. In the present case, where one is in the presence of appeals for war, blockade, intervention and intru= sion, what is involved is not freedom of speech but abuse of freedom of speech, and should be judged as such, 19, Cuban war criminals, the henchmen of bleod= stained dictator Batista, have found refuge in the United States; among them are odious people Hke Rolando Masferrer, who was one of dictator Batista's closest associates, and Major Diaz Lanz, former commander of the air force, who was personally responsible for the murder of scores of people, 20. With the blessing and direct assistance of the United States Government, intense subversive activity against Cuba's legitimate Government is being car= ried on from United States territory by organizations such as the White Rose, the Movement of Revolution= ary Revival, Democratic Cuba and the Cuban National Association, whose memberships consist of enemies of the Cuban revolution. The aim of all these organi< zations—which obviously have nothing In common either with revolution or with democracy, although these words occur in their names—is to overthrow Cuba's revolutionary Government by violence, and to set up in the island a pro~American régime. 21, The White Rose organization~whose headquar= ters incidentally are here in the Bronx, New York— is linked with Batista and with Trujillo; its chief, Rafael Diaz Balart, and his immediate assistant, Salas Humara, held respectively, under Batista, the portfolios of Transport and Health. If is common knowledge that the White Rose in subdivided here into 300 cells which operate on the direct instruce tions of the headquarters in New York, and that it numbers a total of 2,700 members who have been specially trained in subversive activity. The White Rose engages in the large-scale recruiting of diver~ sionists for Cuba, in New York, organizes acts of terrorism against Castro's supporters, and sets up ludicrous govern= ments~in=exile, All this is done under the wing of the United States Government, which asserts that it is the friend of the Cuban people and of the Cuban revolution. publishes slanderous literature . 22. Mr. Lodge will tell us again that the United States is a free country in which everyone is free to do as he pleases. Yet there is one astonishing thing. This freedom is granted to "émigré® organizations which engage in intense subversive activity 23. The second group of facts which I should like to single out is concerned with flagrant United States interference in Cuba's affairs in connexion with the publication in May 1959 of the Agrarian Reform Act and the nationalization of certain foreign concessions. 24. To hear Mr. Lodge, one would think that the United States Government welcomed land reform in Cuba. In fact, however, it is bringing unprecedented pressure to bear on the Cuban Government with a view to forcing this Government to renounce its legitimate right to dispose of Cuba's national wealth.- Yet every sovereign State is entitled to effect land reform. Indeed, a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its ninth session I refer to resolution 826 ([X) of 11 December 1954— reads: "Recommends that Member States, where appropriate, institute land reform measures ..."*The aim of such a reform is, clearly, to improve the condition of the people. 25. Thus the Cuban Government was acting in come= plete conformity with the standards of international law when it exercised its sovereign right freely to dispose of the country's natural resources, 26. In resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952 the General Assembly stated unambiguously that "... the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations". 27. In carrying out an agrarian reform in full conformity with these United Nations resolutions, Fidel Castro's Government is laying the foundation for Cuba's industrialization, for the over~all develop= ment of its economy, and for a radical improvement in the Cuban people's level of living, with achieve= ment of Cuba's full national independence as the final target. Does that not constitute evidence of the patriotic aspirations of Cuba's present Govern= ment? Does it imply any threat to the security of the United States? 28. Opposition by the United States to the Cuban land reform shows that it still does not wish to take account of other peoples' legitimate national inter= ests and imprescriptible rights. Indeed the United States is, in essence, opposing all the Cuban Gove ernment's measures aimed at the over=all develop= ment of the country's economy. With that end in view it is making wide use of the monopoly position held until recently, in Cuba, BY certain United States companies, 29, It is a known fact that nearly the whole of Cuba's oil refining had been in the hands of two United States companies~the Texas Company and the Esso Standard Oil Company, which controlled the supply of petroleum products to the entire coun= d'ordre & 30. By refusing to refine crude oll which was the property of the Cuban State, the American and the British companies not only violated the Mineral Fuel Act operative in Cuba since 1938, but at the same time embarked on the criminal road of boy= cotting the Cuban State and its people. 80. tenant et combustibles -19388, eriminells cubains. 31. ait d'exécuter sérieusement le des dans ait _prises 31. Naturally, the Cuban Government regarded the ljoreign companies' refusal to carry out its orders as an attempt both to undermine the nation's eco= nomic life and to compel the Government to submit io the dictation of the oi] trusts. Nor is it less 1atural that, in these circumstances, the Cuban zovernment should have nationalized the oil com= vanies and taken them under its control, while stating hat appropriate compensation would be paid for the rroperty nationalized. , temps compensation 82, tout son C'est mer national. 12. What else could it have done? Obviously, any yovernment having the country's national interests it heart would, in such circumstances, have behaved na similar way. There is hence no ground whatever or any assertions that Cuba has violated rules of nternational law, 38. The people's sovereign right freely to dispose f its natural resources includes the right to nation~ lize them—a right to which States are increasingly esorting, whether American monopolies like i or ot. In recent years a number of States have effected he nationalization of many undertakings, including weign ones, and of entire branches of their eco= omy—thereby exercising their sovereign rights. uffice it to recall the nationalization of the oil idustry in Mexico, of the Anglo~Iranian Oil Company, 33. ment de fréquemment monopoles années, de ainsi ce suffira trie _Anglo-Iranian { the Suez Canal in 1956, of coal, gas, electricity nd transport in the United Kingdom, of the elec= ‘ical industry in Austria, and so on and so forth. he list is growing all the time. Provisions for the ventuality of nationalization are on the statuteyoks of many States. da Royaume=Uni, lélectricité nalisation liste breux 84, le au ‘la |. In this connexion it is useful to recall the reech made by the United States representative iring the debate in the General Assembly on reso= tion 626 (VII) on the right to exploit freely natural zalth and resources. The United States representa~ ve then spoke as follows: "... every Government has the constitutional right to nationalize and—may I add? to denationalize not only its natural wealth, but also any property and any business within its jurisdiction. My own Government has the power to nationalize property according to its right of eminent domain, and, although we have used that right sparingly, it is firmly established in our constitutional practice ... librement Le as an example of economic aggression by the Cuban Government against the United States? On what basis? It is net nationalization. by Cuba of the oil undertakings on its territory which constitutes aggression, but rather the attempts by the United States to organize the economic blockade of Cuba in order to stifle the country economically and obstruct nationalization. It is precisely steps of that kind which are condemned in international law and, in particular, by the Charter of the Organization of American States to which the United States belongs. For intance article 16 of that Charter, which has already been. quoted here, provides explicitly as follows: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind, "2/ 36, But that is precisely what the United States Government is doing in relation to Cuba, 37, The organization of an economic blockade and other steps aimed at preventing the exercise of a State's sovereign right to make free use of its natural resources are also contrary to General Assembly resolution 626 (VI), which recommends "ail Member States to refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources." 38. Judge for yourselves what should be thought 0of the actions of the United States and of the pressure, the economic pressure, it is exerting on Cuba, and whether that can be reconciled with these directives of the General Assembly. 39. Quite obviously, United States opposition to the nationalization of oil companies in Cuba show that, riding roughshod over the will and the interests of the peoples, the rules of international law and United Nations resolutions and recommendations, the United States wishes to retain an unlimited hold on the economy of Latin American countries, 40, The attempt to strangle Cuba's economy was. plainly and clearly revealed in the United States decision to discontinue the purchase of sugar and other goods from Cuba, On 6 July, the President of the United States announced his decision to reduce by: 700,000 tons the 1960 Cuban sugar quota for export to the United States—which in effect means a discontinuation of further purchases of sugar in Cuba. The President claimed that this action was dictated by a desire to safeguard "the national interest" of the United States. Although he was unable to cite a single instance in which Cuba had not ful= filled its commitments for the supply of sugar, Mr. 2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119 (1952), No, 1609, 41, It is of course plain to all that this is an in=- vented pretext, and that the real reason is an entirely different one. The United States Press openly and effectively disclosed what the United States Govern= ment itself was, for the time being, inclined to conceal, The press presented the President's an=e nouncement under such sensational headlines as, for example: nomic war on Fidel Castro's Cuba", which appeared in The Wall Street Journal—a respectable newspaper, not a tabloid. Business Week, a professional organ for businessmen, said: "The United States shows. Castro its fist." I could cite other examples. This "President Eisenhower declares eco- _ "clarification® by the Press shows the real meaning of the. United States Government's action, That is the real meaning="The United States shows Cuba its fist." For Cuba, all this has serious significance. As is well known, the United States companies themselves forced Cuba into. the development of a one=crop agriculture through the cultivation of sugarcane, which occupies 60 per cent of Cuba's arable land and accounts for 80 per cent of Cuban exports! The United States itself determined the yearly amounts of sugar purchases in Cuba. As a result, the general position was, until recently, that Cuba's economy and foreign trade were completely subordi~ nated to the interests of the United States monopolies. | 42, In these circumstances, the United States deci~ sion to discontinue sugar purchases from Cuba re~- presents an attempt to strangle Cuba's economy; it is none other than a coercive measure of an eco= nomic character, the use of which is condemned, as we know, by the Charter of the Organization of American States, so frequently cited here; and itis fundamentally at variance with the rules of interna~ tional law. Such is the meaning of the policy which Mr. Lodge here has called that of "friendly" rela= tions with Cuba. A fine friendship, if Cuba is forced to turn to the Security Council for help and to seek guarantees of its sovereignty! It is a case of the Russian proverb: "The Lord protect me from such friends, and I will protect myself from my enemies.* 43, In any other epoch, of course, such economic aggression against a country with an economy de= pendent on foreign monopolies would have seriously affected the country's position and might even have: led to the fall of its Government, That is what the United States monopolists are counting on. But now we are in an entirely different era. The peoples of the socialist countries wiil come to the aid of the Cuban people and will help to ensure the total failure of the economic blockade which the United States of America has declared against Cuba. 44, There are therefore more than sufficient grounds for characterizing United States actions in regard to Cuba as direct intervention in Cuba's domestic affairs and as a clear violation of its national sover~ eignty for aggressive purposes. 45. On 26 January 1960 the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, declared that "the United 46, The point is that the United States is frightened, not only by the possibility of losing its economic and political position. in Cuba, but also by the fact that the Cuban revolution is becoming an example to the other Latin American countries, and that the bold and patriotic policy of Fidel Castro's Government is finding imitators in other regions of Latin America, whose history has, until recent times, been one of ‘high~handed intervention by the United States in the affairs of its peoples, ar. At the 874th meeting, Mr. Lodge said that the United States of Jefferson and Lincoln was well known to him. We too, are familiar with such a country. It has been pointed out more than once that the Soviet people, like many other peoples, deeply revere and respect the great leaders of the United States~Jefferson, Washington and Lincoln, Their democratic views and their respect for other peoples have gained them universal recognition. We know, of course, that there is a great American people talented, industrious and peace-loving. But Mr. Lodge made another assertion. He declared emphatically that he did not know of a United States acting as an aggressor. 48..I must state positively that there is such a United States, which Mr. Lodge does not want to discuss, There are leaders who have long ago dis= carded the democratic and freedom=loving ideals of Jefferson, Lincoln and Washington. After Lincoln, the world became acquainted with the United States of Theodore Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Dulles and McCarthy. There is a vast historical distance between the United States of Jefferson and the United States of McCarthy; and the torch of liberty, lit by the great leaders of bygone America, has long since fallen from the hands of the ruling circles in the United States. 49. In order that evidence shall not be iacking, I will remind you that the aggressive actions of the United States in regard to Cuba constitute only one of the links in the chain of hazardous and peace~ endangering policy which the United States has sc’ long .been forging in various regions of the world. These actions are directly connected with the pro=- vocative policy of the United States in regard to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the it is worth dwelling on certain features of United States policy towards Latin America. 50. At the close of 1823 the United States proclaim= ed the so~called "Monroe Doctrine", which contained the seed of the future policy of unrestrained intervention by the United States in the affairs of the other American States. This policy was reinforced, at the end of the last century, by the "Olney Doctrine®, which quite openly made the Latin American cou tries into vassals of the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt announced that the United States intended to undertake the exercise of an international police power in Latin America, And now another United States President once more proclaims his country's intention to regard Latin America as its own Private domain. 51, What such a policy has meant may be ‘clearly seen from the case of Mexico. Ten years after the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States annexed the Mexican province of Texas; three - year later, it annexed almost half the territory of Mexico. Even after this, however, the United States’ neighbour was not left in peace, As is well known, in 1914 United States forces landed at the Mexican port of Vera Cruz, and two years later the United States sent strong armed forces to Mexico under the command of General Pershing. 52, But United States aggression was not confined - to Mexico. At the close of the nineteenth century, the United States seized Puerto Rico and also made Cuba its colony; although Cuba had been formally declared independent after the Spanish~American War, it was, if the so-called "Platt Amendment" to its Constitution be taken into account, in fact wholly dependent on the United States. 53, At the opening of the twentieth century, the United States, as the result of intrigues and military pressure, forced on Panama the so=called Hay= Bunau-Varilla Treaty, under which Panama was compelled to grant to the United States, in perpetuity, the use, occupation and control of a large part of its territory. Ten years later, United States armed forces landed in Nicaragua; the military occupation continued,. with brief interruption, for more than twenty years, during which time the United States seized additional concessions and naval bases in the country. The United States occupied Haiti in 1915 and remained there until 1934; in 1916 it occupied the Dominican Republic, where it dispersed the parliament, expelled the President and installed a United States Governor as absolute dictator. 54. The United States has still not renounced threats of military intervention against Latin American coun= tries. In this respect you may recall, for example, the United States President's order for the dispatch of marines to the Caribbean area in connexion with by United States monopolies, and as a result they are economically backward and their industrious peoples live in extreme poverty. In consequence of the power exercised by monopolies in Latin America, many Latin American countries have been put in a position of complete dependence upon the markets of the United States and other Western Powers for sale of their raw materials. The United States takes approximately half the exports of Latin American countries and supplies almost half of their imports. One may say: What is wrong with that? It is a good thing; the customer is a -good one. But see what happened to the relations between the "good customer” and Cuba when the "good customer” refused to buy 2 .. commodity which was vitally imiportant to the whole of Cuba and its people. The United States owns almost 80 per.cent of all capital investment in Latin America. There are, however, some interesting facts: for instance, in 1956-1958 the profits from these capital investments amounted to $2,900 million while the general total of new capital investment in this - region stood at $2,122 million. The question arises as to who is financing whom. These figures indicate. that it is not the United States which is financing the economic development of the Latin American coun-: tries, but the Latin American countries thernselveswhich are enriching the United States monopolies, 56. In Chile, for example,.the United States is res= ponsible for over 80 per cent of all foreign invest= ments, while the North American monopolies Anaconda and ‘Kennecott Copper Corporation control 90: per cent of the country's petroleum output. I will not dwell on the world-famed United Fruit Company, which dominates the economies of most States in the Caribbean area; suffice it to reeall that this com= pany directly controls 1,534,000 acres. of land in Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia and other countries, 57. The economic enslavement of the Latin American countries by the United States monopolies re= presents one of the instruments of United States imperialist policy in Latin America, This enslave= ment is still buttressed by United States political intervention in the affairs of the Latin American coyntries, by the organization of conspiracies, and - by direct aggressive acts such as that perpetrated | in 1954 in respect of Guatemala, 58, This is the kind of order instituted by the United States in Latin America. On behalf of this exploita~ tion and enslavement, the United States supports dictators like Batista, Trujillo, Somoza and similar men. However, times have changed, Times are not such that the imperialist Powers may consider them= selves masters in Latin America, Asia or Africa, may unlawfully plunder and divide the world at will, and may dictate their wishes to enslaved peoples. Against this type of order the peoples of the colonies and dependencies are now révolting; they are fighting for freedom from colonialist oppression, and in 59, It will not help the United States, either, io “vag once more across the scene the scarecrow of “international communism", Heart=rending cries about the communist threat may confuse a small number of political innocents; but they cannot de= ceive the peoples, including those of Latin America, whose own experience has well acquainted them with the real character of United States policy, and who have undergone oppression by the reactionary dic= tators that the United States has set up. One can but wonder at the senseless persistence with which the United States Government resorts—and is beginning to resort ever more frequently=to the same stunt on almost every occasion when events escape its — control, 60. It may be remembered that the United States Government attributed to Communist machinations the revolution which freed the Egyptian people from the hated Farouk régime; the July revolution in Iraq which ended the rotten régime of Faisal and Nuri Al~Said; the rise of the national freedom movement in Africa; and the anti-United States demonstrations by the Japanese people in connexion with the Kishi Government's conclusion of the new military treaty with the United States.. 61. Now, holding the "communist danger" over the heads of the Latin American countries, Mr. Eisen= hower, President of the United States, has declared that the United States will not permit the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, Let us try to determine what the United States President means by Soviet intervention. ' 62. The policy of the Soviet Union, in respect of Cuba as well as of other countries, is clear and unequivocal. That policy is based on the general principles to which the Soviet Union steadfasily adheres in international affairs. Foliowing these principles, we oppose all aggression, imperialism and monopolies and, in any form, the enslavement of peoples. We say, as we have always said, that our sympathies are with the peoples who are fighting jor their freedom, with those who have risen up to zombat the colonialists and foreign exploiters, 13. In order that there may be no doubt on this int, I venture to quote the following statement made iy the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the ‘que loviet Union, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, on ; January 1960: "The Soviet Union has no other aim than to safeguard peace and to ensure all possible peaceful co-operation with all the peoples of the earth... We look with great understanding and sympathy on the efforts of. the Latin American peoples ic raise the economic and cultural ievels of their countries. Between the Soviet Union and the Latin 64, In accordance with this general policy, the Soviet Union recognized the revolutionary Govern= ment of the Republic of Cuba and, considering that Government's desire to pursue a genuinely national policy, proceeded to a substantial expansion of mu= tually beneficial trade and economic relations with Cuba, This naturally led to the establishment of diplomatic relations, 65. An economic agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union, based on the principle of mutual benefit and equality of the parties, was concluded as a result of the visit of Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Cuba in February of this year, Under the agreement, the Soviet Union undertook to buy 425,000 tons of Cuban sugar from the 1960 crop, in addition to the quantity already purchased, and 1,000,000 tons of sugar yearly for the four following’ years, 66. The Soviet Union also agreed to provide the Republic of Cuba with financial and technical as» sistance in the construction of factories and mills, Yo that end the Soviet Union stated its readiness to grant Cuba a credit of $100 million over a period of iwelve years, 67. During the visit of the Cuban economic mission to the Soviet Union in June 1960 the two parties jointly examined the possibilities of an expansion in Soviet-Cuban trade in 1960-1961 and of assistance by the USSR in the construction of a number of in« dustrial enterprises and power plants in Cuba, At the request of the Cuban Government, an agreement was then also concluded concerning the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Cuba. The agreement is being scrupulously carried out by the trade organizations of the USSR and that is espe= clally important for Cuba at a time like the present, when it has been subjected to economic aggression and when, in particular, the oil monopolies of the United States are trying te obstruct the delivery of petroleum, a product which is vital to any country. 68. It. might be added that at the same time an understanding was reached with regard to the con= clusion of a cultural exchange agreement. between Cuba and the USSR. 69, Furthermore, as is widely known, the Soviet Government later agreed to make an additional pur= chase of 700,000 tons of Cuban sugar, that is, an amount equivalent to the whole of the quota reduction which the President of the United States announced on 6 July 1960, How can such relations be charac~ terized as interference? Or as intervention? 70. Thus we are confronted with an odd situation: the fact that the United States oil companies, ESSO and. Texas, charge exorbitant prices for shipments to Cuba, that terrorists, saboteurs and pirate air= craft are being. dispatched to that country, all this, according to the logic of Mr. Lodge and the President of the United States, constitutes a manifestation of security of the United States. Is this not a strange form of logic? '71. 71. In that comexion orie wonders if it is not with the blessing of United States leaders that the Press in the United States has begun an intensive campaign to propagate the fable that the USSR is seeking to use Cuban territory for the establishment of a mili~ tary base, That fabrication is so patently absurd that it is hardly necessary to refute it. Suffice it to say that the modern weapons which the Soviet armed forces have at their disposal can, if necessary, be used from the territory of the USSR itself and the - USSR has no need for military bases elther in Cuba or in any other part of the world. 72, While we are on the subject of military bases, however, we cannot overlook the fact that the United States itself still maintains a naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, which it uses as a cudgel to brandish over the heads of the Cuban people and as a stronghold from which to carry out plots and diversionary activities against them. Furthermore, it is well known that at the time when the United States seized terrie tory at Guantanamo for the establishment of a naval base, Cuba was virtually a United States colony. Taking advantage of that situation, the United States secured the right to exercise full control over the area, The so~called treaty concerning the Guantanamo - base, which was concluded in perpetuity, and which imposes oppressive. conditions on Cuba, is a brazen example of arbitrary conduct with regard to a small country. 73, The USSR. supports the Cuban people in their struggle for independence. It has declared its sym= pathy for the objectives of that struggle and its. friendship for the Republic of Cuba. It has taken that position because the United States, relying on its might. and its wealth, is trying to interfere in Cuba's domestic affairs and impose its will on that country. Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the . Council, of Ministers of the USSR, stated recently and I take the liberty of quoting him once more—"If. the United States imperialists commit any acts of aggression against the Cuban people who.are defend= ing their national independence, we shail support the Cuban people," ‘me 74, The people of the USSR will not remain indifferent if armed intervention is undertaken against Cuba; let no one in the ruling circles of the United States have any illusions on that score. The USSR, relying on its own might, will give the necessary aid to Cuba at the latter's request. Nor will the USSR be alone in so doing, There can be no doubt that Cuba, in its selfless struggle for its freedom and independence, will receive the necessary heip from other peaceful States as well, I should make it clear in that connexion that we are not threatening the United States with our rockets, as Mr. Ledge seeks to demonstrate, and we do not intend to make any such threats. We say, "Hands off Cuba; let it work out its own destiny; do not threaten it with your 76. The United States' aggressive acts towards Cuba have given rise to a situation constituting a threat to international peace and security. It is precisely for this reason that the Security Council, on which, as we know, the United Nations Charter confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, should take steps to halt this aggression and maintain peace, 77. We should resolutely thwart any attempts to prevent the Security Council from carrying out this responsibility expressly conferred upon it by the Charter, Yet that is precisely the course into which we are being impelled by those who propose that Cuba's complaint should be transferred from. the Security Council to the Organization of American States, That proposal means that the question of aggressive acts by the United States would be trans~ ferred to a body in which the United States has a predominating influence and could quietly deal with Cuba as it pleased. 78, In justification of the proposal to transfer Cuba's complaint to the Organization of American States reference is made to Article 52, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter and to article 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Let us have a look at the provisions of those instruments. 79, Article 52, paragraph 2, provides that Members of the United Nations entering into regional arrange= ments shali make an effort to achieve pacific set= tlement of local disputes through such regional ar= rangements or regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. Article 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides that international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in the Charter of that Organization before being referred to the Security Council. 80. In the letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Security Council [8/4878], however, it was stated that Cuba's appeal to the Security Council was oc= easioned by the grave situation which existed as a’ consequence of the repeated threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals and aggressive acts of the United States against. Cuba and that that situation was giving rise to a threat to international peace, The discussion of the question in the Council has not only confirmed . that original statement but has also disclosed new facts demonstrating that we are indeed confronted with a situation the continuation of which constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. 81, How is it possible in the face of ail these facts to assert that this situation which endangers worid companied by a variety of aggressive and other hostile acts directed against that country? Such assertions can: be made only by those who, for one reason or another, are seeking to paralyze the Security Council and prevent it from taking prompt and effective measures to put a stop tothe aggressive acts of the United States and to preserve world peace. 82. It is hardly necessary to point out that a threat to peace in any part of the world is far from being a private, local affair concerning only countries in the immediate vicinity. Today peace is indivisible, The fires of war kindled by aggressors in any part of the world threaten all peéples equally. That is why the Security Council, when a threat to peace arises, should act and act without delay, In accord= ance with the Charter, to put an end to the danger. 83, This obligation. is imposed on it by Article 24 of the Charter, in which it Is stated that "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, Its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility"and f emphasize the word ‘primary ‘for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out ite duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on thelr behalf~on behalf of the Mem= bers of the Organization, Application of this provision would certainly not mean that the Latin American States. would be excluded from participation in the adeption of a decision with regard to the question under consideration, In a case like this the Security Council, as stated in the Charter, acts on behalf of all its Members, which means that it acts on behalf - inter alia of the American States, some of which are directly represented on the Council. 84, It should be noted, in particular, thet the United Nations Charter includes special provisions stress~« ing the fact that even if a situation threatening international peace has its origin in a local dispute, the Security Council can in no way be deprived of the rights vested in it by the Charter; it cannot decline to consider such a situation on the pretext that.the question has not previously been examined by a regional agency and it cannot refuse to take steps to put an end to such a danger. 85. Article 52 expressly states that the obligation of Members of the Organization to make efforts to achieve a settlement of local disputes within the framework or regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council in no way impairs the application of Article 34 and 35 of the Charter, which, as we know, refer to action by the Council in con nexion with disputes or situations the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 86, Yet those who are in favour of referring the question before us to the Organization of American substitute for the Security Council. 8%. What is more, Article 102 of the Charter of the Organization of American States itself states that "None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations’ of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations", Furthermore, it is specifically provided in Article 103 of the United Nations Charter that "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the ‘Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter=_ national agreement, their obligations under the pres= ent Charter" (that is, the Charter of the United | Nations) "shall prevail"=I repeat, "shall prevail". Cuba has acted in accordance with this understanding and interpretation of the Charter, the only possible interpretation, the only one tuaranteeing the rights of Members of the United s.ations, Cuba chose the Security Council to examine its complaint and it has the right to do so, a right secured by the Charter, secured by international law. 88 Article 34, paragraph 1, unequivocally provides that: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 84, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly." On the strength of that provision of the Charter alone, the Cuban Government is fully entitled to apply to the Security Council for help and to expect such help from the Council, So far as the Security Council is concerned, the Charter imposes on it the obligation to take the appropriate steps to deal with a situation which threatens peaca, 89. Thus, from the legal standpoint, the proposal to. refer the complaint to the Organization of American States is contrary to the United Nations Charter. From the political standpoint, whether or not the sponsors .so intend, the effective purpose of the proposal is to prevent the Security Council from taking the requisite effective measures to protect the national independence and political and territorial integrity of Cuba, a purpose that suits the convenience of the United States, which by its actions against Cuba has created a ‘Situation \ threatening universal peace, 90. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to emphasize once more that the Security Council has an obligation to discharge the function imposed ‘upon it by the United Nations Charter and to take a decision which will preclude the possibility of con= ‘tinued aggression by the United States against Cuba, facilitate the normalization of the situation in the Caribbean area and the maintenance of international peace and security as a whole. 91, Let me say a few words concerning the draft resolution submitted for the Council's consideration by the delegations of Argentina and Ecuador [S/4392]. 92. First of all, let us consider the statement by the Argentine representative that the resolution is a resolution, on the other hand, is an assessment of the situation existing between the United States and ‘Cuba, an assessment of the situation from the stand= point of the Charter; that situation is reflected in the draft resolution. 98. An assessment of the situation is given. The ' Security Council, the draft resolution states, is deeply concerned by the situation existing between Cuba and the United States of America. The nature of this situation has been made clear by the state= ment of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba and the statement of Mr. Lodge. If we are concerned with the nature of the situation, we are assessing the situation and we are not dealing with a procedural matter relating to our work, 94, The draft resolution goes on to propose that the consideration of the question should be adjourned pending the receipt of a report from the Organization of American States, 95. What isthe reason for such a proposal? Itis bases on the fact that the situation is under consi~ deration by the. Organization of American States. It would mean that the Security Council, without ex= amining the question itself and not wishing to take any action, would refer the question to the Organization of American States, Is that a procedural matter? No, it is not a procedural matter but a refusal by the Security Council to fulfil its obligation, The Soviet delegation cannot support such a resolution. 96. We are told that this matter must be referred to the Organization of American States, that we must wait for a report from the Organization of American States. The question is, why? What answer has been given to the question of why we should wait for this? The representative of the United Kingdom has given the reply that it is not for the Security Council to deal with the Cuban question. Mr. Lodge said that the Security Council was not the appropriate organ to deal with it—the same thing in other words. So this question must be referred to the Organization of American States because it is not for the Security Council to deal with it; that is, the Security Council. is not competent to deal with it. Is this what the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States mean? They do not say so in so many words, but when such a proposal is put forward and put to the vote, that is what it means. Whether the sponsors of the resolution wish it or not, that is what the re solution means. 97. My next point is, why the Organization of American States? One of the reasons we are given is that the Organization of American States has al= ready begun to consider the question. What evidence is there that it has already begun to consider this question? It is a matter’ of common knowledge that Cuba has raised the question of agressive actions by the United States in the Security Council and has not brought up the matter in the Organization of 98, It is true that the Organization of American States is considering something, The New York Times sheds some light on what it is considering. For once I will pay a tribute to The New York Times and quote what it says in an editorial. This was written before the Security Council meeting, before we had begun to consider this question. On Sunday, 17 July 1960, the paper wrote: "Tomorrow in the United Nations Security Council, the United States will move to refer a Cuban complaint of United States ‘economic aggression' to the twenty-one nation Organization of American States. The Cuban complaint is largely based on the fact that the United States two weeks ago drastically cut Cuba's sugar quota to the United States. ... Peru, with strong United States encour= agement, last Thursday requested an Organization of American States' Foreign Ministers meeting to consider"—to consider what?—"the defense of the regional system and American democratic principles in the face of the threats which might affect them." 99, The New York Times continues: ‘In a bid for Latin American support in the Or= ganization of American States, the United States will submit new economic development programs to an inter-~American -meeting in Bogot& in Sep~ tember=-thus moving to meet one of the Latins’ long~standing grievances." 100. I am not the one who is linking the raising of this matter in the Organization of American States with the promise of assistance for the so-called "economic development" of the American States. The link has been established by the actions of the United States Government. The New York Times continues: ; "But New York Times correspondents report that Latin American public opinion does not appear ready for strong collective action against Cuba. There is still much backing for Dr. Castro's social and economic reforms, and a suspicion of the extent to which "big business’ interests (such as the expropriated oil companies and sugar planters) are behind United States policy towards Cuba." < 101. One can readily subscribe to this assessment of the position and of the attitude of public opinion in the Latin American countries to the policy of the United States towards Cuba, 102, Why do I say this? I say it because in fact the Organization of American States did decide to ‘consider a question, but not the question raised by Cuba, Not that question, but another one. Why then does the resolution propose, on the ground that the situation is already being considered in the Organi= zation of American States, that the Security Council should refrain from acting and shouid refer the matter to the Organization of American States? Is 103. If we are to believe what The New York Times tells us (and in the present case I have no reason to disbelieve it since these are widely known facis), -the United States is drawing a direct connexion be= tween the referral of its disputes to the Organization of American States and the provision of economic help to the Latin American countries. In other words, it is telling them: "If you will suppert us against Cuba in the Organization of American States, you can count on our help~we promise you." True, it remains to be seen how these promises will be im= plemented, but at any rate, the existence of such a policy is crystal clear, But what is the role of the Security Council in this? How can we support a policy of this kind? 104, The Soviet delegation strongly objects to doing so. We therefore consider that the Security Council would be taking the right course if it began by con= . demning the aggressive actions which the United States has undertaken against Cuba; at all events, jt should not renounce its right to consider this question or evade its duty to take active, effective measures to protect the independence of a small country against pressure by a great Power. If the Security Council takes a decision, the least if can do is to refrain from evading its responsibility; it has no right to transfer this question to the Organi~ zation of American States in these circumstances. 105. The Soviet delegation wishes to put forward some amendments [S/4394] to the draft resolution submitted by Argentina and Ecuador [S/4392]. 106. The amendments are to delete from the draft resolution two paragraphs, the one reading: "Noting that this situation is under consideration by the Organization of American States;* and the other reading "Decides to adjourn the consideration of this question pending the receipt of a report from the Organization of American States". 107. We further propose that in the penultimate paragraph beginning with the words: "Invites the members of the Organization of American States to lend their assistance ...*, the words "Organization of American States" should be replaced by "United Nations", 108, The Soviet delegation would be prepared to accept this draft resolution if it were thus amended. Why? Because in that case, if the paragraphs I have mentioned regarding the transfer of the question to the Organization of American States were deleted, he Security Council would at least be taking a step, 1owever inadequate, towards discharging its obliga~ ions and responsibilities and would be acting in the nterests of a small Staté which has appealed to the Security Council for assistance. .09. I formally submit these amendments fo the lraft resolution of Argentina and Ecuader. 112. But I will repeat one thing I said yesterday about Chairman Khrushchev's threat to use rockets against us, and that is this: Neither we nor the other members of the Organization of American States are.. frightened by these threats, nor will we be deterred . from our treaty obligations to prevent the establish= ment of a régime dominated by international com-= munism. All we say, very simply, is this: Do not touch us; do not touch those with whom we are tied; do not seek to extend communist imperialism. That is very simple and ought to be easily understood by everybody. 113. Mr. Sovolev's speech was unusually abusive, harsh and intemperate, He used such words as "hos~ tile’, "conspiratorial", "pirates", "terrorism", and "hypocrisy"=words that, of course, are unparlia= mentaryand I think it is a pity to use these violent words when we had a session here yesterday which was marked by moderation and by a spirit of con= ciliation. I might say that these harsh words, if they were used by anybody else at this table, would cause -me concern, but, in great frankness, I do not admit the right of the Soviet Union to lecture the Security Council on any question at all concerning respect for the rights of small nations. There is no country on earth that has a worse record than the Soviet Union concerning small countries. It shows its contempt for small countries every year in the General Assembly when it seeks to make them second~ class citizens by dividing up the General Assembly between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sacred name of parity. . 114. Mr. Sobolev has gone back to 1846 in the cata= logue that he has made of thing that he does not like about the United States. I will not go back so far, although I cannot help recalling that in 1846 the Russians were engaged in oppressing the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Turkmen and various peoples of Central Asia, and that they are still there. He refers to our being in Mexico in 1846. Well, we have not been in Mexico for a hundred years. So there is that difference. But I will not go into that. However, I thing it is appropriate, when he poses as the de= fender of small countries; to remind the Council that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have ali been absorbed by the Soviet Union within the memory of quite young people— it did not happen very far back— and that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and East Germany have been made into satellites. a disgraceful thing which has not happened to any= body else in this S Organization. 115. I could go on to the Soviet contempt for the United Nations whenever the United Nations does not happen to coincide with what the Soviet Union conceives to be its interests, notably as regards Hungary, as regards Korea, as regards the seiting up of the United Nations Emergency Force which is doing such a wonderful job in the Gaza Strip and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and which is contributing to the peace of the world, in the benefits of which the Soviet Union shares, but to which the Soviet Union does not contribute one ten=cent piece. It. cannot find the money to help that worth-while, constructive activity. 116. There is no doubt at all that the dictator Batista, bad as he was, was a very small fish indeed when one considers the blood=baths which were or= ganized by the late Marshal Stalin, whose comopera~ tion in 1941 with Adolf Hitler in the Ribbentrop= Molotov Pact of unfragrant memory the world has not forgotten, and which showed a cynicism at that time which obviously persists to this day. 117, We removed our troops from Latin America, from everywhere, many years ago, We removed our troops from Lebanon in 1958 as soon as we were asked to do so. The Soviet troops do not leave, They infest Eastern Europe today. They continue to op» press the Oriental races in the Soviet Union. 118,. Mr. Sobolev, the Government that you represent does not come into court with clean hands. It is shedding crocodile tears about Cuba. Mr. Sobolev quoted a Russian proverb; so I will simply close by quoting something out of the Holy Bible: "And why belioldest thou the mote that is in ‘thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam thatis inthine own eye?"

I should Hke to speak for a few minutes so that the Council is not left with the impression that Mr. Lodge has answered my statement. He has, of course, given no answer, since -it would be difficult to reply to the arguments which have been put forward and expounded here by the representative of Cuba. That is why there has been no answer. 120. But Mr. Lodge always has in reserve what I might describe as a standard selection of replies to the Soviet representative which can be used on any occassion. We have had this standard selection again today. I see no reason for making any rejoinder. However, Mr. Lodge did introduce 2 new note in his statementhe mentioned Czarist imperialism and spoke of the Uzbek and Tajik peoples. Since Mr. Lodge has recently visited that region he was proba~ bly able to see for himself how the Uzbek people are faring under the Soviet régime. .au 122, Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): I should like to avail myself of the right of reply in connexion with the statement made a short while ago by the United States representative, Mr. Lodge, who spoke against the employment of abusive language in the Security Council. However, it was regrettable that in his statement he gave us a very good example of the use of such language, I do not intend to enter into the details of his statement, which had nothing to do with the subject under discussion, However, I feel obliged to enter a strong protest against, and to take strong exception to, his insinuations regarding the country I represent here, - 123. Mr, AMADEO (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): At the close of this debate, we should like to express our profound gratitude to all delegations which have given their support to the draft resolu= tion prepared and submitted jointly by the delegations of Ecuador and Argentina, 124, We are glad that there has been a true understanding of our efforts to find a formula which, while taking account of the fact that proceedings are under way in a regional agency,. does not bar the parties concerned from access to the United Nations and provides an opportunity for a search for peaceful solutions on the basis of negotiation. We can only feel gratified on this score. 125. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution find it impossible to accept the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union representative. These would, in fact, remove from our text the mention of a valuable means of solving our present difficulties, namely, | the action of the Organization of American States. We cannot in any way allow this action to be nullified by factors contrary to the interests of the continent and of each of the States composing it. 126, Finally, we share the hope expressed here by various representatives that the Organization of American States, responding to the exhortation made to its members in operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution, will put forth all the efforts required to render a fresh meeting of the Security Council unnecessary. We voice this hope as the final conclu= sion of our attempts at conciliation. 127. ‘The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I take it that the Council is now ready to proceed to the vote. We shall vote first on the Soviet Union amendments appearing in document S/4394. A vote was taken by show of hands, Abstaining: Tunisia, The amendments were rejected by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention. 128, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall vote now upon the draft resolution submitted by Argentina and Ecuador in document S/4392. A vote was taken by show of hands. Infavour: Argentina, Ceylon, China, Ecuador, France, Italy, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abstaining: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-= publics. © The draft resolution was adopted hy 9 vates to none, with 2 abstentions. 129, Mr. ROA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): The Revolutionary Government of Cuba had recourse to the Security Council in order to submit for its consideration the situation created. by the Govern~ ment of the United States with manifest danger to international peace and security, and to request the adoption of such measures as were deemed appro~ priate. 130. It was thus exercising an optional right granted to it by the Charter of the United Nations, without disparaging or damaging the regional organization té which it belongs, and was prepared in advance to accept. the decision taken by the majority of the Council. 131. The draft resolution just approved,.as indeed any other draft resolution which the Council might have adopted, is or would have been something in which the Cuban delegation had no participation whatever. We have not negotiated, ner were we in= terested in negotiating, any type of resolution; but, faced with the possible alternatives, my Government would have preferred a Council resolution condemn= ing the harassments, reprisals and agressive acts indulged in by the United States Government against the Government and people of. Cuba. At the very least, the situation should have remained exclusively one for consideration by the Council. 132, The resolution adopted, while maintaining the jurisdiction of the Council, takes it for granted that the situation is under examination by the Organiza= tion of American States and accordingly adjourns consideration of the matter pending the receipt of a report from that body. 1383. The position of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba is, briefly, as follows: (1) It reaffirms its full right te opt for recourse to the Security Council. (2) It confirms in every detail the charges which it has made, Consultation of Foreign Ministers held at Santiago in 1959, It is a memorandum addressed to a colla= teral body of the Organization of American States, and not a formal charge submitted, as it should have been, to the Council of that Organization. (4) The Cuhan Government accepts the terms of the resolution adopted by the majority and, while continuing to assert its rights before the Security Council as it thinks fit will also uphold those rights with the same zeal and firmness in the Organization of American States, 134. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba will, in short, reject no international forum that will en« able it to defend and uphold the sovereignty, terri= torial integrity, independence and self-determination of its people. 185, Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): I should like to give a brief explanation of the votes cast by my delegation on the draft resolution sub=- mitted to the Council and on the amendments pro= posed by the Soviet Union representative, 186, In our opinion, ‘these amendments completely reverse the meaning of the draft resolution. They tend to reaffirm the fact that the Council still has before it the dispute submitted to it by the Cuban Government. As I pointed out during my statement at the 875th meeting, my delegation considers that this matter has been regularly brought before the Council and is still before it. Consequently, these amendments could hardly be opposed by my delega= tion, But I did not vote in favour of them because we feel that the joint draft resolution does not deny that the Council is seized of the matter but, on the contrary, confirms that fact. This draft also contains an element which, given the existing circumstances, is in our view constructive. It also conforms with Article 33 of the Charter by deciding that the Council should simply refrain from examining the question more thoroughly until the Organization of American States has completed its action. 137, These are the reasons which led me to abstain on the Soviet Union's amendments and to vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and Argentina which the Council has just adopted. 138, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): If no other member of the Conuncil wishes to speak, I propose to make the following statement as re= presentative of ECUADOR. 139. It is my policy, in the Council, to avoid pole=- mics, I believe in the effectiveness of sober and ob= 140. As representative of Ecuador I cannot,. how= ever, let pass without protest one of the assertions made by the Soviet Union representative. Mr. Sobolev _ stated—and I have before me a copy of the verhatim record in English which I am reading: "The history of the Latin American countries so far"~and I stress the words "so far"="is a history of open interfer= ence by the United States in the affairs of the peo~ ‘ples of those countries." [S/PV.876, p. 22.] 141, Those were the words used by Mr. Sobolev. In the interests of accuracy, I must formally deny the truth of this assertion. The history of the Latin’ American countries has indeed been a struggle for the principle of non~intervention, but from this struggle we have emerged victorious, The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States is effective in the inter~Ameriecan world, It is effective in theory and in practice; it is effective in fact and in law. From the beginning of the *good neighbour" policy proclaimed by President Roosevelt more than twenty-five years ago, relations between the Governments of the United States of America and the Latin American countries have been charac= terized by mutual respect and by fruitful and reci~ procal co-operation in the political, economic and social fields, 142. There are, of course, problems and sei~backs, That is in the nature of things. We do not live ina perfect world, but in general we try to solve our problems in the manner of good neighbours and good brothers. 143. The principle of non~intervention exists not merely in archives and in official life. It has become the flesh and blood of peoples and forms pari of their most precious spiritual heritage, and of their conscience. The Latin American peoples strove for that principle against any attempt to violate it. I repeat: against any attempt to violate it. We Latin Americans extend the hand of frienship to all peoples of the world, We do so because we believe in a world based on the principles of the United Nations. But if any Power near or far, and especially the latter, seeks to take advantage of our friendly attitude to ~ tell us what to do~whether ostensibly for our own protection or otherwise, and whatever the dispro= portion between the Latin Americans and that Power may be—all it will achieve in the long run will be the animosity and deep antipathy of our peoples. 144, Our efforts for our political, economic and 3ocial independence are and will remain our own. We have achieved our majority, and do not accept my kind of guidance. We do not believe in having . 1appiness imposed or us. The future will justify my vords. .

The President does not interfere, in the domestic affairs of any country; in particular, it does not contemplate inter= ference in the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries. I think I gave due attention to this point in my statement, and a careful perusal will show that it deals adequately with the subject. The meeting rose at 2.20 p,m, of Ghana, GREECE-GRECE Kauffmann Athénes. GUATEMALA <, *aetmel £, 14-33, Guatemala HAITE librairie “A TI1-B, Port-au-Prince. HONDURAS Libreria P: HONG KONG-HONG-KONG The Swindan Kowloon. - ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun F., Austurstraeti (NDIA-INDE Orient Long dras, New Oxford Baok Delhi & Calcutta. Penh. CANADA : The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, CEYLON.-CEYLAN Lake House Bookshop, Assoc, Newspapers P. Varadachary of Ceylon, P.O. Box 244, Colombo. INDONESIA-INDONESIE Editorial del Pacifico, Ahumada 57, Santiago. Djakarta. Librerfa lvens, Casilla 205, Santiago. (RAN CHINA:CHINE "Guity”, 482 The World Book Co., Lid, 99 Chuag IRAQAIRAK King Road, Ist Section, Taipeh, Tai fe's The one Press, Ltd., 211 Honan = ipe_AND.IRLANDE i ~~ Stationery COLOMBIA-COLOMBIE ISRAEL Libreria Buchholz, Bogotd. Libreria Américo, Medellin. Bt in’s and 48 Nachlat Libreria Nacional, Ltda., Barranquille. COSTA RICA ITALY-ITALIE Ubrerta Commissionaria Gino Capponi Azuni 15/A, JAPAN-JAPON Maruzen Company, Imprenta y Libreria Trejos, Apartado 1318, San José. CUBA ; Lo Caso Belga, O'Reilly 455, ta Habane. CZECHOSLOVAKIA-TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Eeskoslovensky Spisovatel, Nérodni Trida Nihonbashi, 9, Praha 1. DENMARK-DANEMARK Finer Munksgaard, Ltd., Nerregade 6, K¢benhavn, K. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.’ REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana, Mercedes 49, Ciudad Trujillo. JORDAN-IORDANIE Joseph {. _ Box 66, Amman. KOREA-COREE Eul-Yoo Publishing Chongno, Seoul, LEBANON-LIBAN Khayat's Cellege 92.94, cve ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Ubreria Cientifica, Guayaquil & Quite. EL SALVADOR-SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cia., Ia. Avenida sur 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE International Press Agency, P.O. Box 120, Addis Ababa. FINLAND.FINLANDE AL inen Kirjah LIBERIA J. Momolu LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. MEXICO-MEXIQUE Editoriaf Hermes, 41, México, 2 Keskust PP MOROCCO-MAROC Helsinki. FRANCE Editians A, Pédone, 13, rve Sovfflot, d'études industrielles, Rabat. NETHERLANDS-PAYS-BAS N.V. Martinus 9, ‘'s-Gravenhage. Paris (Ve). GERMANY-ALLEMAGNE RE; hmidt, Schwenthal 59, Frankfurt/Main. Strasse _ Elwert & Meurer, Hauptstrasse 101, NEW ZEALAND-NOUVELLE-ZELANDE United Nations land, C.P.O. NORWAY-NORVEGE Sohan Grundt gustsgt. 7A, Berlin. Schdneberg. gel 9, Wies- 3 pede W. £. Saarbach, Gertrudenstrasse 30, Kéln (1). der Horn, §; Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.: or Safes Section, United Nations Office, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Litho in U.N. Price: $U,S. 0.35: 2/6 (or equivalent in other