S/PV.877 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Security Council [873rd meeting], I shall now invite the representatives of Belgium and of the Republic of the Congo to participate in the Council's deliberations. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pierre Wigny, representative of Belgium, took a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Thomas Kanza, representative of the Republic of the Congo, took a place at the Council table. 2, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In accordance with the Security Council resolution of 14 July [S/4387), the Secretary-Generalhafl submitted to the Council bis first report [S/4389 and Add.1-3] on the implementation of that resolution.

In introducing the report to which you, Mr. President, have just referred, I can be very brief. 4. One week bas passed since the Security Council adopted its resolution regarding military assistance to the Republic of the Congo and a withdrawal of Belgian troops [S/4387]. 6. I want to . use this opportunity to pay a sincere tribute to all those countries, who-sometimes with considerable sacrifice-have hastened to give their assistance to the United Nations. It is a most en• couraging experience and marks a major step forward in international co-operation. Short of such a response, from African countries and non•African countries alike, no efforts of the United Nations would have been of any avail. Now we are in a position to look with hope, if not yet with absolute confidence, at the future. We have got off to a most promising start, but we have in no way passed the corner. 7. As regards the military operation, we have brought the Force up to a strength which, for the moment, should serve as a satisfactory basis for our continued effort to assist the Government of the Republic. I do in no way exclude a major expansion of the Force, but such an expansion would have to take into account a series of considerations which should be studied in the breathing spell which we may have at the present before approaching Member Governments with new requests. 8. In this situation, after having concentrated on getting sufficient manpower, we now devote ouratten• tion to all the essential and supporting services which are needed in the field of equipment, signais, supplies, health and administration. We are happy to have with us at present General Alexander, who came to New York today after discussions with the representatives of the Congo Government and with our representatives, bringing fresh evaluations of the needs of the Force. 9. I need not point out to the Members of the Council the difficulties which confront th ose who are responsi• ble for the moulding of the Force into a proper unit and for its deploym.ent and use. The enterprise is far ~~lger and far more complicated than the United Nations Emergency Force, many more nations being involved, a multilingual basis to be used, military units with very different traditions to co-operate, and a vast area to be covered. However, 1 have full confidence in our me·n on the spot and I am sure that they wm be able ta count on continued and full co-operation from the Congo authorities, obviously a necessary condition for the success of this effort which bas been started at the request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. 11. You know about the main line which we pursue in the field of administration and you know what starts I have made. However, in the past week, during which I had hoyed to make progress regarding administration, I have for obvious reasons instead had to put all the resources of the Secretariat :into the establishment of the United Nations Force in the Congo. To the extent the military operation can be considered as in hand, we will again concentrate on the administrative problem. 12. In the field of food, considerable quantities have been put at our disposa! in response to appeals addressed to various Governments. They have been and are being air-lifted to the Leopoldville area, which is the region of particular concern in this report. 13. As regards fuel, one of the main concerns is to get the supply running normally again. We are doing what we can to achieve this aim. In this context I wish to mention that tonight or tomorrow General Wheel.er, well-known from the Suez Canal clearance, will go toLeopoldville to organize the necessarywork in order to prevent the silting of the Congo River. 14. In the field of health, I am in personal contact with Dr. Candau, Director-General of the World Health Organization, whom I have asked, in collaboration with the International Red Cross, to do his utmost in order to stage a crash operation serving to for8"' stall developing dangers. The necessary spraying in the L~opoldville area has not taken place for weeks. There is a great question-mark as regards the water control. There has been an exodus of doctors and nurses which bas stripped the city ofnecessarymedical services. I need not point out what this may come to mean unless quick measures are taken. Although I know that the World Health Organization will do anything in its power to help, I would appreciate it if the Council, as a result. of the debate or in its resolution, would give his work the desirable backing, addressing itself, in fact, to all of those specialized agencies which will have a task to fulfil in support of the United Nations action. 15. Let me now turn to the question of withdrawal. In the first instance I refer to my report and its addendum 1 of yesterday. You find in the report an indication that in due time there will have to be established, by agreement with the Govern.ment of the Congo, an area of operation for the United Nations Force, as well as certain other conditions for its contribution to the maintenance of satisfactory conditions in the country. On this point, I would like to stress that, in one important respect, there cannot, 16. I may mention here that, in reply to a communication to me from Mr. Tshombé, President of the Provincial Government of Katanga, I have made it clear that actions of the United Nations through the Secretary-General, in respects covered by the resolution, must, in view of the legal circumstances which he has to take into account, be considered by him as actions referring to the Republic of the Congo as an entity. 17. I should recall that I said bath in my initial statement [873rd meeting] and in my first report that the United Nations Force cannot be a party to any interna! conflict nor can the United Nations Force intervene in a domestic conflict. 18. Although the Security Council did not, as it has done in previous cases, authorize or request the Secretary•General to take specific steps for the implementation of withdrawal-apart, of course, from the establishment of the Force-my representatives in the Congo have taken the initiatives they have found indicated for the co-ordination of the implementation of the Security Council decision on the Force with the implementation of its decision on with• drawal. Although I do not consider it necessary, a clarüication of my mandate on this point may be found useful by the Council. Such a clarüication, ü made, might aim at establishing the substance of my mandate on this point and the aim of the Council as regards the implementation of the call for a with• drawal. 19. Through the decision of the Security Council of last Wednesday, the United Nations has emba:rked on its biggest single effort under United Nations colours, organized and directed by the United Nations itself. I already had reason to pay a tribute to Member Governments for what they have done to render the task of the Organization possible. May I say here and now that I will have-as a spokesman for the Security t:;ouncil and on behalf of the United Nations-ta ask for much, much more from Member nations, in the military field as well as in the civilian field. There should not be any hesitation, because we are at a turn of the road where our attitude will be of decisive significance, I believe, not only for the future of this Organization, but also for the future of Africa. And Africa may well, in present circumstances, mean the world. I know these are very strong words, but I hope that this Council and the Members of this Organiza• tion know that I do not use strong words unless they are supported by strong convictions. 21. Secondly, I should like to thank the Secretary- General, the President and the Security CouncU for baving authorized the Congolese delegation to place before the world the standpoint of the Republic of the Congo. 22. I believe that the Congolese in general have ve1:y pleasant memories of their eighty years of relations with Belgium. I also think that we, the second generation of Congolese, are even closer to the Belgians than our elders were. The situation in which we find ourselves today is therefore, for us, rather a painful one. I do not think it often happens that a country, hardly two weeks after gaining its independence, bas to come before the Security Councll almost in the role of accuser: in fact, contrary to what we might have hoped, the former colonial Power, which normally should have become a friendly country, has been the first to break, on three occasions, the treaty which we signed on 29 June 1960, on the eve of Congolese independence.!/ 23. I would like to emphasize the painful nature of this matter. However, instructed by my Government to state the standpoint of the Republic of the Congo, I have to describe to you the situatian as we have known and experienced it, and the situation as we had hoped it might be; and finally I have to state the suggestions which we venture to make to the Security Council in the hope that their acceptance will enable the Republic of the Congo to find peace and calm in which it can prosper and in which we can hope to restore excellent relations with our Belgian friends. 24. My speech will take some time, but I think the Council will bear with me. 25. You will have learnt that our Prime Minister intends to corne to New York himself. I have just spoken to our Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gizenga, by telephone, and as a result I should like to correct certain remarks wt· .:h have been made on this subject. The Prime Minister was coming to New York to deal mainly with questions of technical assistance, and we told him that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was passing through Leopoldville next Monday. The Prime Minister informed us of his desire to postpone his arrival in New York and to wait until he had met the Secretary-General at Leopoldville. 26. I will now, as a first point, deal with the situation prior to 30 June. 27. Socially, the Congo may be regarded as one of the most fortunate of countries. It is certainly one of the richest lands of Africa. No one can deny that the Congo is a country where one would like to live. Unfortunately, the Congo has become a battle-field, a country of panic and, for us, a rather unhappy coun• try. !/ Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation between Belgiuin and the Republic of the Cong?• "The Belgian troops at present in the Congo shall not be used on Congolese national territory unless the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or the Congolese M!nister for National Defence, explicitly so requests. 11 29. We signed this Treaty, including this paragraph, with the annotation at its head of the adverb 11provisionally11, since the Congolese Governm.ent intended to take over the Belgian military bases established in the Congo.. Since we trusted Belgium, we considered that there was no need to hurry and that we should have plenty of time later on in which to go into the details of the agreements to be signed about these bases. 30. Unfortunately, barely four days after theCongo's achievement of independence, the Belgian Government ordered Belgian troops to go into action on our territory. I shall not mention certain details. Later, if it is felt to be necessary, I shall be prepared to give any details for which I am asked. 31. The first time that Belgian troops went into action on Congolese territory was, it is stated, or rather according to Belgium, at the request of the provincial government of Katanga. At a meeting at Leopoldville, when the Government Council met in the presence of two Belgian Ministers, Mr. de Schryver and Mr. van der MeersQh, and of the Belgian Ambassador to the Congo, the BelgianMinistersdeclared that circumstances beyond Belgium 's control had forced it to order its troops to intervene. The Congolese Government simply quoted article 6, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Cooperation signed on 29 June 1960. You see that, if the Belgian Government had made a simple telephone call or sent a short cable to ou.r Prime Minister, who happens also to be our Minister of National Defence, everything could have passed off legally and, we may add, in friendship and understanding. Yet the Belgian Government went ahead on their own and ordered Belgian troops to go into action on our national terri• tory. For us, Katanga, Kasaï and the Lower Congo remain parts of our national territory. 32. The second time that Belgian troops went into action was at the port of Matadi, which they occupied. Again, we trusted Belgium, but we wondered why the 33. The third occasion was ·a1so very unfortunate. It happened one morning, just the day after there had been a very understanding and friendly conference between the Congolese Government, the two ~elgi~n Ministers, Mr. de Schryver and Mr. van der Meersch, and the Belgian Am.bassador to tiie Congo. At 7 o 'clock on that next morning we learnt that Leopoldville airfield had been occupied by Belgian troops. You can see that this was the third time that a telephone call or a short cable to the Congolese Prime Minister, who is also our Minister of Defence, would have been enough to inform the Congolese Government, and everything would have been arranged in a very friendly way. 34. As you see, the Congo behaved like a good cbild and trusted Belgium. But it had to remind Belgit'lll three times of article 6, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of :'!"riendship, Assistance and Co-operation signed on 29 June 19ê0. 35. It was at this juncture that, using our right as a sovereign State for the first time, we sent to the Security Council an urgent request for military assistance [S/4382). We already purposed asking the United Nations for general · technical assistance, for the Congo lacks trained staff; ail the military, tec:!->nical, legal and other staff are Belgians. As soon as we could use ou!' sovereign right, we meant to ask the United Nations for general technical assistance; we were not yet thinking of military assistance. But on 12 July 1960 we placed before the Sécurity Council an urgent request for military aid. 36. When he heard of our action and learnt of our cable and of the Security Council 's decision, Ambassador van den Bosch wrote us a letter dated 14 July. Before reading the part of this letter which is of interest to us, I should like to read the text of the Sacurity Council's decision. [S/4387); I askyour indulgence, but this wil1 make it possible to compare it with the Belgian Am.bassador's remarks. TheSecu• rity Council 1s resolution reads: "The Security Council, "C onsidering the report of the Secretary-General on a request fur United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo, "Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the Presi• dent and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (S/ 4382), 111. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo; 113. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. 11 37. That is the text which was adopted by the Security Council and whic!i was sent tous on 14 July. On the same day we received the following letter written by the Belgian Ambassador and addressed, sincl, our Prime Minister was away, to our Deputy Prime Minister: "At a meeting held on the e-vening of 13 July, the Congolese Government expressed its wish that Belgium should withdraw the troops at Ndjili airfield, Leopoldville, before 5 a.m. 14 July. 11At the same meeting, Mr. Kanza, Minister for United Nations Affairs, a.lso announced tbat tbe Congo had · addressed a complaint to the Security Council about the presence of Belgian troops on füe Republic' s terri tory, "The Security Council has taken the following decisions on tbe subject: (1) Belgian troops shall be withdrawn, and (2) United Nations troops shall be sent. 11 38. And the following are the comments of Belgium: "The Permanent Representative of Belgium stated that Belgian troops would stay until the United Nations troops had the situation well in hand. Although this statement was not approved by Tunisia and the Soviet Union, it was expressly approved by the other members of the Council, including the United States." 39. The latter goes on to list six points which, unfortunately, we regard as evidence of Belgian ill will: 11The Belgian Government therefore asks me to inform you: "(1) That Belgium is ready to implementthe decisions of the United Nations, and 11(2) That Belgium accordingly undertakes towithdraw its intervention troops when and where public order has been effectively restored by United Nations troops, n 40. On this second point, I must tell you that on Saturday there were already at least 1,200 troops of the United Nations Force on Congoleseterritory. Belgium should at least have evacuated troops in proportion-in other words, the 500 or 600 Belgian troops who were then at Leopoldville; that, I think, would have improved matters, Unfortunately, atLeopoldville 41. I must interpolate here: when Belgium talks of security, the security is more that of Belgian nationals than that of all the territory's citizens. Those of you who know Leopoldville are aware that the Belgian troops patrolling the city ensured the safety of Europeans, and particularly of Belgians, rather than of the Congolese. n(4) The Belgian Government asks the Congolese Government to co-operate in the re-establishment of security. n 42. I think it is difficult and even painful for a sovereign Government to receive this request from a foreign, even if friendly, Government-for we consider that the first duty of our Government is to restore security in the country, and that in order to do so we do not need advice from outside. ff(5) The Belgian Government draws the attention of the Congolese Government to the grave responsibility that it would incur if it acted against the decision of the highest international authority. 11 43. Now Relgium is reminding us of the responsibilities we would assume if we did not respect the SecurityCouncil's decisions, when the example should come from above, from Belgium itself. Today is 20 July, and Belgian troops are still in the territory, despite the Security Council 's resolution. n(6) The Congolese Government should, in particular, avoid any steps constituting unnecessary provocation and dangerous incitement. n 44. Here I would again remind you that, since the Belgian aggression, the Congolese Government has ordered all its troops to return to camp; there has, to our knowledge, been no provocation by Congolese forces. On the contrary, if the Congolese Government had let Congolese troops go into action, I think the worst would have happened. If the Belgian Government speaks of unnecessary provocation or dangerous incitement, we leave it to you to judge from which side the unnecessary provocation and dangerous incitement are coming. 45. In its decision of 15 July, the Congolese House of Representatives adopted resolutions to the following effect: 11(1) Evacuation, within twelve hours, of ail troops of thé Belgian army stationed anywhere on the territory of the Republic of the Congo, and their automatie replacement by United Nations troops; 11(2) Imm.ediate departure of the former officers of the 'force publique', who were at the bottom of the incidents; "(3) The so-called treaties between the Congo and Belgium to take affect only if the Belgian troops invading the country are withdrawn. 11 48. I should like to keep the discussion on a high plane, and shall not enter into details. The Congolese Government is ready to ack:nowledge that there have certainly been abuses. But it takes credit for maintaining calm in the country in the face of mounting provocation and harassment. If the Congolese Government had wished to reply to all and every provocation, I think-as I have just said-that the worst would have happened. 49. You may ask, perhaps, how many casualties there have been. The answer will depend on the speaker. If it is the Belgian representative who replies, I think the number will be that of Belgian casualties. If it is we who reply, as representatives of the Congo Government, we shall say that we regard as a casualty anyone who bas been thè victim of an incident or other occurrence taking place on Congolese territory. I have no figures to give. A parliamentary com:.. mission of i:aquiry bas been set up which has been instructed to ascertain figures, dates, places and hours in respect of the acts committed. I am prepared to communicate all its findings to the Council at a later stage. 50. To continue my statement-the Congolese Government and people have become somewhat mistrustful of Belgium. As I said at the outset, we who k:now the Belgians well from having lived in Belgium, for many years, who k:now that the Belgians have been and still are ready to stand by us in the most difficult as well as the calmest times, who are aware of the Belgians' generous spirit and k:now everything they have done in the social, educational and economic fields, find ourselves today regretfully obliged to tell the world that, because of the acts committed by Belgium, it is for the moment difficult to imagine any sincere co-operation between Belgium and the Congo until satisfaction has been given on four points. The Congolese C'...overnment has instructed me to state to the Council these four points, which in our opinion represent four suggestions amounting almost to decisions ü the world wishes that Belgium should be able to win its way once more to the heart of the Congolese-a heart which at the moment is closed to Belgian friendship, but which is ready to open to understanding with Belgium on these lines. 51. The first point is that an end should be put to the aggressive action of Belgian troops in the Congo. 10 52. Over a week ago [873rd meeting], when we were discussing the second point-the evacuation ofBelgian troops-we were somewhat trusting and were simply asking that the Belgian troops be evacuated from the military bases in the Congo, those of Kamina and Kitona. But our tiust has since given way to an unfortunate distrust, and therefore our second point is that these Belgian troops must be evacuated from our national territory as quickly as possible. 53. The first two points go, so far as we are concerned, a considerable way towards solving the conflict between two friendly countries which are still ready to co-operate in the future. Youwillhave learnt that e .isting impatience is such that our Head of State, Mr. Joseph Kasavubu, and our Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, have gone so far as to issue an ultimatum-the first of its kind-to the Secretary-General 's representative at Leopoldville. The ultimatum appears in the last paragraph of the letter which they wrote from Stanleyville on 17 July lasttoMr. Bunche, the United Nations Under-Secretary, who is atpresent at Leopoldville. 54. The Congolese Government would wish this ultimatum to be considered in its context, because tb.e Congolese Government-which ls responsible ior Congolese and other nationals on its territory, is under social pressure and for the moment bas the duty of trying to restore the country's economic lifegives the Congolese people the impression that it is doing nothing, while actually great efforts are being made and Ministers have been working, for days and nights, to find a solution. 55. We have already met more than six times with Ambassador van den Bosch at Leopoldville in an effort to discover a solution, but each time we have been disappointed to see that ail the solutions in prospect have been virtually reversed the following day. 56. When we met with Ambassador van den Bosch on Friday evening, he gave us to understand that, as Ambassador, be was concerned. only with political matters and that military questions fell within the province of General Gheysen. commander of the Belgian metropolitan forces. Relying on Belgium and Wishing to find a basis for agreement, we asked the Ambassador to meet us again with General Gneysen present. We waited until 2 o'clock in the morning, but the Ambassador came back alone, as General Gheysen had not wished to come. We thus found ourselves in a 57. I now retum to the Iast paragraph of the letter from our Head of State and our Prime Minister to Mr. Bunche. That para.,araph, which has produced conflicting reactions, testifies to a certain mistrust, but, as I have already said, that mistrust must be considered in context. You must picture the young Congolese Government facing heavy responsibilities, and compelled, a fortnight after the achievement of independence, to request military aid in order to defend its territory. According to detailed information from our Government, that paragraph indicates that the Congolese people have at the moment a somewhat tempered confidence in the United Nations, yet it does betoken a certain amount of confidence because, Belgium being a Member of the United Nations and the Congo haVing been partly admitted to membership, we hope that we shall succeed in finding in the United Nations a basis for agreement between Belgium. and the Congo. The paragraph reads as follows: "If the United Nations seems unable to carry out, between now and 19 July 1960 at 12 midnight, the task which we have asked it to accom.plish-the evacuation of Belgian troops from the national territory, and the retaking of the positions occupied by the Belgian metropolitan forces-we shall regretfully be compelled to request the Soviet Union to intervene, but"-this is what follows-"we hope that you will be able to avoid such a contingency •11 58. I believe that, in conformity with our foreign policy, the Congo is not on the point of withdrawing its confidence from the United Nations and asking for the assistance of any particular country. The Congo continues to rely upon the United Nations. A short while ago, our Vice-President of the Council ofMinisters told us by telephone that the entire Congo was impatiently awaiting the resolations which the Security Council will adopt tonight. I believe that the question whether a country as rich apd beautiful as the Republic of the Congo can live in peace and not become a battleground depends upon the action of the Security Council. 59. The third point is concemed with the situation prevailing in our sixth province, Katanga. The Congolese Government, which does not idly divulge certain information at its disposa!, is aware of the behindthe-scenes manoeuvres designed to bring about the secession of Katanga. Our beloved compatriots of Katanga have struggled side by side with their brothers to win independence, and the national Government was constituted following consultations with the peopie of Katanga, and particularly and specifically with Premier Tshombé, who, incidentaily, would normally have held the portfolio of economic affairs in the national Government had he not refused it and entrusted it to Mr. Yava of the Canakat party. Hence 12 60. I think I am expressing my Government's opinion and conviction in saying that our Head of State, who has undertaken to safeguard th~ territorial integrity of our nation, and our national Government are ready to defend its integrity and request you not to permit any degree of recognition for an independent Katanga, because the Security Council barely a weekago recommended that the General Assembly admit the Republic of the Congo [S/4377] as a single entity to membership in the United Nations, this organization of independent States. 61. The fourth point concerna general technical assistance. It is painful for us to note the continued existence of a certain amount of panic deliberately created by our Belgian friends. Thus when on 14 July my esteemed colleague Mr. Mandis, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, transmitted to Amba01sador van den Bosch the letter breaking off, for the moment, diplomatie relations between Belgium and the Congoin that letter the Congolese Government asked the Belgian Embassy to close its doors for a short period and to wait until Belgian troops had evacuated Congolese territory before negotiating new agreements or the basis of a general understanding with the Congolese Government-we had no intention whatever of asking all Belgians to leave the Congo. On the contrary-all Congolese are convinced that the Congo needs, not only Belgian technicians, but foreign technicians of all nationalities. 62. It is a fact that the Belgians have acc~mplished in the Congo more than have other countries, that the Belgians have invested more than others in the Congo, and that they have only begun their work there. It would be a regrettable capitulation for them to abandon what they have begun instead of finishing it. It is therefore our intention to guarantee the safety of the person and property of every Belgian who wishes to remain in the Congo. Moreover, since we have had United Nations troops with us, all banks and commerical and industrial enterprises, first at Leopoldville and then, gradually, in all Congolese towns, have been guarded by United Nations forces, in order to enable the economic life of the Congo to be carried on, work to be pursued, and economic and social cooperation between Belgians and Congolese to continue uninterrupted. 63. Unfortunately, as I just said, panic prevailsfrom the Belgian side, and most of the Belgians feel that only Belgian troops can ensure their safety. This view, obviously, the Congolese Government counters with a rather "petty" argument: do th~ Belgiansliving in the United States, Canada or Russia need Belgian troops to guarantee their safety, or do they have confidence in the Governments of the countries in which they reside? 64. Unless Belgium still has no confidence in our Government, unless ~elgium still considers us to be 65. I should like to conclude by expressing my thanks to the Security Council. I ·would thank it for the resolutions which it adopted last week. I also thank it for the resolution it will submit to the General Assembly recommending our admission to this community of nations. I would likewise thank it, in advance, for the resolutions which it will adopt this evening. 66. It is further my desire to impress upon you that the Congolese people-! would even say the whole world-expec:t the Security Council to solve the problem of the Congo. We shall be very happy to be able to announce to our Government tomorrow that the Security Council has taken decisions which will enable the Congolese people to recover calm and confi• dence after the withdrawal of Belgian troops, and which will permit the Government and people of the Congo to renew their bonds of friendship and cooperation with Belgium. 67. I thank you in advance for all these resolutions. May I also ask, before concluding, for the right to take the floor again shortly, if it be necessary, in order briefly to reply and perhaps to supplement my statement because, with the limited time at my disposai, I have been unable to go into details. I have simply filled in the main lines of my 11exposé ", and if the Security Council needed further details I should be prepared to supply them.

I must say that the statement just rlelivered was quite surprising and something I did not expect. Some of the Congolese representative's remarks were certainly moving, but I failed to grasp the main line of bis argument. He began by referring to the excellent recollection the Congolese people have of the eighty years we spent in the country, years devoted to developing the Congo and bringing it to the level of a civilized nation. He repeatedly refers to us as friends. He reminds us that be took part in the political and economic Round-Table Conferences. He therefore knew that in our desire to see justice done we had unilaterally decided to grant the Congo its independence, without restriction or delay. And then, we are told, four days after the proclamation of independence, Belgium, which had voluntarily given up ail its sovereign rights and retained nothing for itself, met the new situation with unprovoked acts of aggression. 69. The essence of the complaint against us is surely not that we are aggressors but that we are madmen caught up in a collective fit of insanity! I really wonder, after hearing this statement, whatlogical reason, what hum.an explanation lies behind this assessment of our position. 71. I shall, with your permission, tell you the story of what happened; it is an interesting story. We in Belgium have reached a dramatic moment in our national history, and we feel that it is also a dramatic moment in the history of the world. Rarely have a people done what we have done. After having done for the Congo all that the representative of the Congo has just now related, we decided to grant it independence in eighteen months. 72. I should like to supplement the assertions and testimony which have just been given to us with another testimony, that of Mr. Lumumba himself, tile President of the Council in the Congo. It was he who signed, on 29 June, the eve of the proclamation of independence, a treaty of friendship the preamble of which reads as follows: 11Considering that it is in their comm.on interest to maintain between them bonds of friendship and solidarity, in respect for the sovereignty of each of the independen.t States, the High Contracting Parties ••• 11 (the articles of the treaty follow). 73. What statement did Mr. Lumumba make the following day? After a verbal attack which I must consider regrettable and which was in sharp contrast with the official statements that had been exchanged by the two Heads of State, our Sovereign and Mr. Kasavubu, Mr. Lumumba, who fears lest he might be misunderstood, resumed his speech and before all the foreign delegations said: 11At this time when the Congo accedes to independence, the Government wishes to pay a solemn tribute to the King of the Belgians and to the noble people he represents for what they have accomplished here in three quartera of a century. For I do not wish my thoughts to be incorrectly interpreted. The magnificent achievements which are today the pride of the independent Congo and its Government are due to the Belgians. Belgium recognized the Congo's independence, its complete and total independence, without delay and without restriction. We hope that this realistic policy, which today does honour to Belgium throughout the entire world, will result in lasting and fruitful co-operation between the two peoples, independent, sovereign and equal but bound by ties of friendship." These were his words, and it was in the same terms that we ourselves spoke. 74. We now come to what the representative of the Congo has called cases of "force majeure". I could, in this statement which I plan to keep brief, give way to emotion. There were mothers assaulted in front of their children, young girls violated and people mutilated. We have here all the elements of a heartrending tale. 75. I should like to tell the representative of the Congo of the stream of cables that reaehes my desk morning and night. I shall read you some of these cables, in their intentionally abbreviated style and their profoundly moving terseness: "We are informed 140 Belgians including women and children in distress and encircled plantations Buzière, Lemagny, at Maduka, directorVanesungel. Consider action to be taken in consultation with Bunche. 11 "SOS Bunia. Transmitter informs us of message received this morning Salmon indicating bad situation Bunia. Lake Albert women and children besieged by armed troops, Radio amateur no longer able to transmit. British authorities considering how to help. Inform Bunche urgently." "Cable transmitted by private channel. Situation Stanleyville developing very rapidly. Arbitrary arrests. No authority. Essential that adequate United Nations force be sent on emergency basis to Stanleyville; otherwise grave disaster foreseen within 24 hours. 11 76. Can we believe that this was simply a wave of panic that spread after 4 July and that these are mere tales? With the same impartiality, I shall read to you the initial conclusions, written in unadorned administrative style, of the commission of inquiry which we have just set up under the chairmanship of a judge from the Court of Cassation. I havenothad the opportunity to select the passages, The file is not complete. These are simply documents which I put before you: "Mme. B., wife of a serviceman at Thysville, had a miscarriage on 30 June 1960. On 11 July 1960, Congolese soldiers raided Camp Hardy. She was holding her thirteen-month-old daughter in her arms. She was struck in the back with rifle-butts. She managed to reach the wife of another serviceman and a third woman, seven months pregnant, also arrived. On the following day the three women, one of whom had been raped, the other pregnant and the third barely able to stand after a miscarriage, were dragged from their beds at gunpoint. The pregnant woman sacrificed herself and was raped. "Mme. C. was arrested by a dozen soldiers of the 'force publique' at her home at Seke-Banza on 9 July 1960 and taken to Senda. She was kicked all over her body. She was pulled by the hair and dragged along the ground. Towards 11 p.m., four soldiers, one of them an African non-commissioned officer, compelled her and another woman to work for two hours in the savannah at gunpoint. They were beaten. She was raped three times by three different soldiers. "On 5 July 1960 at Kiskutu, Mme. B. was with her mother and her four children. African soldiers broke in. Four soldiers raped her. "At Thysville, Mme. J. saw the wife of an officer raped nine times in the presence of her seven chil• dren. Of the fifty women in Camp Hardy, forty• three or forty-four were raped. "Mme. K. left Leopoldville on 7 July. At about 11 p.m. she met a caravan coming from lnkisi to Thysville. Four women were in the convoy. They had been raped by fifteen to seventeen different Africans. They were in a pitiful state. She also saw jeeps loaded with African soldiers who were shoot• ing at random into the crowd. 11 77. narré déclare sérieusement l'extrême-onction. 78. Le enfermés. leur lisés des avec le barbe 77. A priest from Camp Hardy at Thysville, after describing the events since 4 July 1960, said that on 6 July three Belgian soldiers had been badly injured, to the point where one of them had to receive extreme unction. 78. On 11 July, officers and non-commissioned offi• cers were locked up. He learned that they had been stripped naked, that they had been spat upon, that they had been beaten and ridiculed and that African soldiers had 11checked" the men's sexual organs to see whether they had had relations with African women. Civilians were thrown into the same cell. The soldiers tried to burn off the beard of a missionary priest. 79. Le suite et apprit violées. 79. The witness was released together with the civilians upon the intervention of Mr. Ganshof van der Meersch and Mr. Diomi, a Congolese. It was then that the witness Iearned from the wives that they had been raped. 80. Mme. o. told hiil;l: "I did not give in, I resisted, but ••. "-I apologize, gentlemen, but we constitute he.l.'e a commission of inquiry, and if you wish to know why these friends of the Africans who wish to remain friends of the Africans have changed, then I must read further- 11they pulled out my pubic hair and stuffed it in my mouth for me to swallow. I was raped by several soldiers • • • Then they brutally pushed a rough object into my vagina and afterw;irds wrenched it out." 80. Mme je mais si veultmt lisez on avale; mis objet rugueux dans 81. bébé de quelques menaçant de Elle 81. Mme. P. told how she had been holding a baby of of few months in ber arms; the soldiers struck it and threatened to kill it if she did not submit to them. She was raped some twenty times. 82. Mme. Q., a few days after a confinement, still had stitches on her abdomen and was still lacerated; she was raped by several soldiers. 82. Mme portait déchirée; 83. Que voulez-vous, 83. What do you wish, gentlemen? Am I to continue? 84. It is true that we had faith in the Congolese Government and it is no doubt true that they also had faith in us. But as for me, it will take me some time to forget the 30th of June we spent among you, when the women we 1 ,ft behind, with our children in their arms acclaimed the two leaders as they passed: you:r President and our King. 84. nement congolais, faisait oublier alors sur les roi. 85. Now, Mr. Kanza, do you think that if we had prepared some plot or aggression we would have been 85. Mais, avions 87. We received appeals for calm; we were asked to rems.in where we were or to withdraw our troops. We were told: 11Withdraw your troops withln two hours. • And when all these things were happening, we were told: nyou need not wo1•ry; everything will be quiet iu two hours." 88, I turn to the Secretary-General: would be now venture to give us this guarantee for Stanleyville and for all the towns which surround it, for the Lower Congo, for the major part of the country? 89. These, then, are the unhappy events which have divided us. I thank you, Mr. Kanza, for having spoken of all we have done, and I thank you for speaking of what we are able to do, But it would have been better, I feel, it would have been more honourable, if you had recognized also, and before all else, that horrible things happened, horrible thlngs which resulted quite naturally in the departure of all the Belgians who had trustingly remained among you. Because we belong to a civilized and Christian nation, we believe that the suffering endured by men can perhaps be borne; but dishonour to our women obliges us to turn our backs and leave. We have seen these women; they fill our hospitals. They do not want to tell their storles and you can understand why, Acknowledge then, Mr. Kanza, that this is the true explanation of the events. 90. I shall not read to you the speech I have prepared. I am simply replying to your statement, and you may then explaln to this Council how and why this friendship for which you have praised us bas given way to an instinct of self•defence. What does this mean: instinct of self•defence? Now that you know the causes, you will also understand our actions. 91. You make ready :reference to the treaty of friendship, and in particular to article 6, paragraph · 2 of the treaty, which states that military bases were installed in the Congo with your agreement, pending further negotiations. We had faith in each other, and that is why the troops were still there. You cannot deny the legitimacy of their presence, which was provided for in your treaty. You do not contest this; what you reproach us for is that these soldiers left their barracks, that they intervened, that they entered certain towns. 1 ask you: Do you believe that they could only do this under article 6, paragraph 2, only at the request of your Minister for National Defence? I do not have to invoke solemn legal agreements to justi.fy my statement that we had the right to intervene when it was a question of protecting our corn• patriots, our women, against euch excesses. We had the most imperative duty to do so. If we had not, everyone sitting here would have considered us men 92. You menti.oued Elisabethville. I heard the appeals which came one after the other. Members of the public force had mutinied, besieged the few faithful ones who had remained with their officersina "last stand", surrounded the arsenal and taken it by assault. Then these mutinous soldiers, in total disorder, started out with their arma towards the town, When we arrived, Mr. Kanza, it was too late, Five Europeans had already met their death, Among the victims was the Italian consul. 93. Would you care to tell me what the Belgian troops did when they arrived there to restore order? I must say that I admire the self-control of our paratroopers, who are, after all, a rugged group. They had been i:old: "Do not shoot, look out and be discreet." One might well wonder how these men, stirred up by danger and anger, could prevent themselves from committing some excess. Weil, order was restored and the paratroopers withdrawn without one shot being fired, without one person being wounded and without any incident whatsoever. 94. You made no mention of Luluabourg. I am surprised that you did not recall that when Mr. van der Meersch, whose name you mentioned, was at Kamina on that day, on his way to Leopoldville to meet Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba, he remained there, in the centre of Africa, for seven hours before finding a plane with which he could reach Leopoldvllle. And that is how he personally, with deep distress, heard such calls for help as: "We-men, women and children-have taken refuge in the Immoikasai building. They are outside, a disorderly mob with their rifles; now they are bringing up heavy machine-guns; they are placing mortars in position. 11 And it was only at the very end of the day, as you know, that help arrived and it was possible to free these unfortunate people. 95. But I am not telling you anything you do not know, Mr. Kanza. Mr. Lumumba, your Prime Minister, passing through Luluabou:rg and observing the position, signed an agr~,l='t:,y;:~t with our Consul•General, noting the gravity c,i. fus disturbances, and asked that Belgian troops should be kept in Kasai for at least two months. 96. I know that Mr. Lumumba left for Elisabethville in a Belgian aircraft. He was not able to land at Elisabethville, in this Katanga of which you have just spoken, where we were taking him. On landing at Luluabourg on his return, and faced with an unchanged situation, without any forces at hand, he said: "Well, no, I rescind the order, the men must go home." Ji you had been in our place, I ask you in ail honeBty, would you have taken the responsibility for saying, a!ter all our suffering, that Mr. Lumumba's promise, given one day in writing and superseded the following day by a simple statement, was adequate? WouJ.d you have felt that it would bave entitled you to say, "Very well, it is agreed, we shall leave all those people there to their fate, to the magnanimity and, above all, the effective protection of the Congolese Govern-- ment11? 19 99. I must say that I had prepared a statement of a legal nature, but Mr. Kanza has said some interesting things; and I believe he has done so in good faith, as he was not on the spot and has been told them. He knows us well; we also know him well, but it was none the less necessary to fill in the gaps in his recollection of events and to begin by restating the basic facts a little more completely and accurately. 100. Do not, I beg of you, invoke article 6, paragraph 2, of the treaty of friendship. Wllerever we have intervened, it has been in order to save women and children; and if, as you know, more than 20,000 of them have now gone back to Belgium, it is not bevotre contrôle cause we had conspired against the Republic of the Congo. 101. I would ask you to note that we have done everything to limit the scope of these justifiable and necessary interventions as much as possible. !t is somewhat easy to forget the orders given to our commanders, the delay and strictly local scope of their execution, and above all our constant appeals to the United Nations for assistance. The United Nations is now taking an important decision, namely, to intervene in the Congo in view of the appalling and undeniable vacuum existing in the country. Up till now, the United Nations has held that it could not intervene in a country's interna! affairs, and we certalnly did not wish to provide any pretext on which such a charge could be brought against us. But whenever the Secretary-General, with bis generosity, his legal knowledge and his hum.an understanding, has felt that it was possible to provide United Nations assistance to prevent this frightful calamity, we have supported him from beginning to end. When, at the outset a proposa! was made to send 200 international officers to bring up to their previous strength the cadres of the "force publique•-cadres which, as you know, were previously Belgian and were to remain under the treaty of friendship, Belgian cadres under your authority and control-Belgium im.mediately con- __ 102. And now, what is our position? It is totally different from your assessment of it. We have confidence in the United Nations. I understand that you too have confidence in the United Nations; but your Government must be having second thoughts about relying on the United Nations for the text which you have quoted, and I recall, indicates that it has not made up its mind. It said that if the United Nations was unable to give an assurance within twenty-four hours that the mission requested would be sent, the Congo would be regretfully obliged to request the intervention of the Soviet Union. I really do not know when to believe you. I am prepared to believe you today; but then do not say that it is Belgium which has no respect for or confidence in the United Nations. You, members of the Congolese Government, should endeavour to practise respect for law, as we have been doing for centuries in our country. We are a small, peaceful nation. We have always defended our independence. We have always protected ourselves against foreign domination and, if we had reason to enter Africa-we have said so from the outset-it was to prepare the people placed under our care for independence. 103. Everything that I have said, everything that has been said, has not of course convinced the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union never is convinced. Now, it is the Soviet Union which is most vigorously accusing us of aggression. We might have thought that, even if it did not know the true facts, it could at least have had regard for the suffering endured and recognized that 1-.._,dependence had been granted without delay. Not only the Belgium. Government, but the whole population of Belgium., learnt with relief and gratitude that the odious charges had beèn dismissed through the rejection [873rd meeting] of the Soviet amendment [S/4386]. 104. But, without making any easy assumptions, and confining myself strictly to the actual facts, I would like to make the following points. 105. Why, when Mr. Lumumba appealed to the Soviet Union, did the latter reply at once, before making inquiries and seeing precisely what was happening, that the noble Congolese people-and I agree with those words-"must defend itself against an unwarranted aggression by little Belgium and ••• "-for good measure-"all the Western camp"? 104, Mais, tantes gistre 105. Pourquoi, appels de suite, avant de ce d'accord contre et de tout 106. I should like to make our presentpositionclear. 106, We sent troops; they intervened to the extent necasenvoyé sary to fulfil our sacred duty to protect the lives and en 107, In this respect, I would like to express my special gratitude to the Secretary-General for the manner in which he has carried out his task; from the legal, political and technical angles alike he has done it superbly; he deserves the highest praise and Belgium feels deeply grateful to him. As in the past, we continue to have complete confidence in him. 108. However, there is one suggestion I would like to make to him: it is that he should speed up the arriva! of troops and also put and end, if possible, to this madness and stop the incitement to murder which is contimùng over the Congolese radio. I am not saying that 1t has the support of the entire Congolese people. But the Congolese people, who do not know the situation, are being incited to acts of violence which may become widespread and break out at any moment. In Brussels we are living in a state of anguish. What a relief it was to hear the calming voice of Mr. Ralph Bunche at last on this microphone-a voice bringing peace and therefore solace to our compatriote who had remained there. Continue to follow this course, Mr. Secretary•General; make the voice of peace heard. You are the general of peace. Prevent the agitators, wherever they come from, from continuing their evil works. You know that the incitement to violence, direct or indirect, does not emanate solely from Congolese territory; make this shocking provocation cease. 109, Just now I was telling you of these incidents, these outrages. We have set up a commission of inquiry in Belgium and appointed one of our most eminent judges as chairman. I have asked our Ambassador to request the United Nations also to carry out an inquiry in order to establish that the faots as given by ui, are correct. We are not asking that our word shOlùd be taken. for it; however, we do ask you to believe that if so many of us left, it was not with• out cnuae and it was not in consequence of a conspi ... racy on our part. 112. For my part, I believe that some of the incidents which have ocourred are terrible to recall; and I said in the Belgian Senate: "A nation acquires maturity through tribulation; the future is not built solely on memories of the past. 11 That assumes a return to wisdom, common sense, decency and all the obligations of a civilized statesman on the part of a Head of Government who, it must be said, is somewhat inconsistant, changing his mind and position from one day to the next, as likewise the wording of his telegrams, without anyone knowing what the Congolese Government and people finally think. Ihope this assumption will prove to be correct for the sake of the Congolese people and our own sake. 113, As to the Security Council, my final words may perhaps not be quite as precise as the Council would like. I am well aware that I have not adopted the demeanour or mode of address which, I imagine, are usual around this table, It is the first time that I have been privileged to take a seat here; but it was the preceding speech which impelled me to act as I have done and to put aside legal argumentation and concentrate on stark facts. I hope that his factor will be given due recognition. It has already been recog-- nized, but I must repeat, that I am the representative of a small nation, I recall that at the last session of the General Assembly I said that the small nations represented a majority of votes and had a great role to play in the promotion of moderation and peace. In order to win this peace, they must have the opportunity and the courage at certain times to recognize who have been the sufferers and to speak up for what is right. If this hope were disappointed, after our sufferings and after all we have endeavoured to do and have done with so much generosity, as you were reminded just now by one who is allegedly my adversary but who· in the end finds himself collaborating with me in this respect, where do you think that the small nations who are devoted to peace would find another forum in which they could obtain recognition of their legitlmate rlghts and see justice afflrmed?

I aall upon the representative of the Congo, who bas asked to speak in order to reply to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affaire of Belgium. "The Council of Ministers met today, 20 July 1960, to consider the country's political situation. It took note of aggressive acts which Belgian troops have committed in various parts of the Republic of the Congo, and which are still continuing today. While the Council of Ministers was in session, the Prime Minister received two telephone messages. One was from the head of the provincial government at Coquilhatville, who reported that Belgian forces had already killed two Congolese policemen and a soldier at Coquilhatville. They had also killed three Congolese soldiers at Boende, bringing the number of victims up to six •••• " It is 20 July today and those incidents took place on 20 July. ". • • The whole of Coquilhatville is in the throes of general panic. No public service is operating. The people are gripped by appalling anxiety and fear. The head of the provincial government at C oquilhatville, referring to the telegram which he sent yesterday to the Chief of State and to the head of the central Government, repeated his demand for the immediate dispatch of United Nations troops to Coquilhatville with a view to securingthe evacuation of the Belgian forces and facilitating the restoration of law and order. He reported that unless the central Government took urgent steps to that end, the worst might happen." "The second message was from the head of the provincial government at Luluabourg who reported a similar situation and likewise pressed for the dispatch of United Nations forces to Kasaï." "The Council of Ministers also examined the situation in Katanga, where General Lundula has been captured by Belgian troops. 11 116. I am somewhat surprised to note a certain degree of nervous irritation on the part of the Belgian representative. The impression of all of us in the Congo is that this irritation is almost universal. We perhaps need the help of the United Nations forces in restoring calm and peace among the Belgian population and in the Congo so that a better understanding may prevail. 11 7. Mr. Wigny has reminded us of a speech which our Prime Minister made on 30 June. He conveniently 119. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has referred to the Luluabourg incident. I do not think that it was thanks to the Belgian soldiers that the 1,200 Belgians at Luluabourg were saved. The Congo has 25,000 troops, and, however well trained the 500 or 600 Belgians may be, I believe that the Congolese are still the masters of the tropical forests. Is there any need to point out that warships were already off Matadi on 6 July even though it takes at least fifteen days to sail from Antwerp to Matadi? Those warships were perhaps showing the flag or taking a cruise, but our distrust is such that we cannot interpret their presence at Matadi as a peaceful gesture. Mr. Wigny bas referred to other events which I do not propose to take up. May I, however, quietly remind the Belgian representative that Belgium did not grant us our independence but that the Congo won it. That is a different matter. 120. I apologize for speaking about myself but, as I am addressing you here, I think of my father who was in prison less than a year ago. Mr. Kasavubu, who is now Chief of State and Mr. Lumumba, our present Prime Minister, were also in prison. Of the thirtythree ministers, secretaries of state and ministers of state in the Congolese Government, at least ten have been in prison. I believe that if those gentlemen could speak here, they would say that they had been subjected to far greater atrocities than those ofwhich some Belgians have been the victims. 121. Mr. Wigny has also stated that the Belgian forces have come in order to protect Belgian nationale. He adroits that the Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation bas been violated. Our country has not had much experience in international affaire but we hope that the Congolese Government, having regard to the example set by Belgium. of the unscrupulous infringement of a treaty it has signed, will look for models elsewhere, in places where treaties, once signed, are respected. :J.24. Mr. Wigny has reminded us that he represents a small nation. That is true. The Congo has appealed to small nations because it is convinced that a small nation such as Belgium should be opposed by sympathetic small nations. Thus, when I conveyed to you the last paragraph of the letter from our Chief of State and our Prime Minister, I informed you that the Congolese Government was resolved to place its trust in the United Nations and, through it, in its small sister nations in Africa thanks to which we shall succeed in re-establishing peace and tranquillity in our national territory. 125. I believe that the present situation is very serious. We cannot confine ourselves to discussion of the past because, whereas for Belgium the Congo is part of the past~ for us it belongs to the present and to the future. The task confronting us is to build a new country, virtually to rebuild our country, this time not on foreign foundations but by forging something new, something of our own making. Thus I shall merely recapitulate the specüic points which the Congolese Government has requested me to place before the Cormeil in the interests of ensuring the safety of lives and property and the return of peace and tranquillity to our national territory. 126. The Congolese Government is demanding that the aggressive action of Belgian forces in the Congo _êhould be brought to an end. I would again draw atten- 127. All we ask at present is that Belgium should show greater understanding in order to safeguard its own interests and facilitate better co-operation in the future. The evacuation of Belgian forces from our national territory as quickly as possible-! do not go so far as to say immediately-constitutes a solution, indeed the only solution to the problem. 128. Today is 20 July and I am addressing you calmly. But I believe that my calm is in contrast to the indignation and impatience of my colleagues and my fellow countrymen at home. The current presence of armed Belgian soldiers who come and go in our national territory as if it were still a colony is not only an irritant to the people but a completely senseless form of provocation. If Belgium believes it to be its duty to keep these soldiers in our national territory, I can only hope that the worst will not happen. I hope that, because of the arriva! of United Nations forces, the nervous irritation of the Belgians will not spread to the Congolese. 129. The issue before us now is not one of communism. The Congolese Government is a national, I would say a nationalist, Government. The Congolese Government is uttering threats ! Our Prime Minister and our President are exasperated; the confidence which they had placed in their erstwhile masters has been betrayed; although they had suffered greatly from colonialism-I hesitate to use this word which has become so current-and have been subjected to all its brutalities, yet they still trusted the Belgians up to the very ev~ of independence. But four days later they were forced to admit that, now the country was independent, the same trust did not prevail as when it had been a colony. 130. In making this brief reply to the somewhat sentimental speech just made by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, I do not propose toquote specific incidents affecting the Congolese, although the fact remains that the Congolese have suffered more than the Belgians. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affaire can show telegrams and letters. Though they cannot write, my fellow countrymen in the villages occupied by the Belgian forces would have a lot to say. With sadness in my heart, I can recall acta of brutality committed on Belgian soil, in Europe, in a civilized country, to quote the Belgian Minister for f oreign Affaire. I believe that, say what they may, 131. It is out of place at this stage to revert to a sentimental approach and to consideration of the merits of a form of paternalism. Belgium is now dealing with an independent and sovereign State. The task before us is to give practical effect, in calm, tranquillity and dignity, to the independence that we have won. We must earn the confidence of foreign nations and we must demonstrate to the whole world that in spite of our inadequacies, in spite of the fact that the Belgians have deliberately imposed certain hardships upon us and that some doors have been deliberately closed tous, in spite of all our deficiencies, the Congo now has a national Government and is taking its place in the concert. of nations. The Congo is ready to guarantee the safety of lives and property, provided that the Congolese Government is given an opportunity of achieving its goal. 132. The Congolese Government and the entirepopulatiôn of the Congolese territory, including both Congolese and foreigners settled in the Congo, expect the Security Council to take forma! decisions on the evacuation of the Belgian forces as rapidly as possible, because the Congolese Government is now cap-, able of shouldering its responsibilities. We believe that the Congolese Government, with the help of the United Nations forces, will gradually achieve its goal. 133, I shall conclude my brief statement by quoting a Congolese proverb, which is also an African proverb: He who spits in the air and stays where he is will get it back in his face. but if he moves the spit will land on the ground. There is another proverb: No matter what soap you use on a gourd that has held red pepper, the smell of the pepper will always remain. 134. Belgium should now abandon the attempt to regain the confidence of the Congolese by force. Such an attempt is futile because it would force the Congo to oppose force by force. Belgium must regain the confi.dence of the Congolese by a better understanding, by a broad-minded approach and, especially, by admitting that the Congolese Government and people are sufficiently mature to manage their own affairs. My two proverbs need no comment; I leave the Council to reflect on them. 136. oppose aux appelle dire qu'il samment prétendre 136. First, the representative of the Congo sets what he calls Belgian atrocities against the outrages I described. I would point out that it is not sufficient to affirm something; it has to be proved. It is not enough to say that the people are not sufficiently educated to send cables in order to claim that these things actually occur. 137. hatville et trois une internationale. autres. reille Cela soumettre 137. The representative of the Congo tells us that there are appeals for help from Coquilhatville and Luluabourg and that three members of the "force publique" were killed and three elsewhere-1 forget the figures. Weil, that is an assertion. For my part I propose an international inquiry. We will see what wrongs have been done on both sides. I realize that in a situation like this the reaction was not gentle. That is always the cal;le everywhere. But I am ready to submit to an international inquiry. 138. du ~ous Belgique quelques Monsieur notre C'est gouvernement trouver 138. That is the proposa! I make to the representative of the Congo. I want to be absolutely fair. I would add that all the African students in Belgium have been, on the whole, respected. There have been a few regrettable incidents, and I regret them because in our country we disapprove of acts of this kind. They were perhaps the acts of people whose feelings were running high. The Government condemns these acts. I could wish that the representative of the Congo had taken the same attitude with regard to what has happened in the Congo. à 139. a que nous se mesure était 139. Here is the second point. The representative of the Congo referred to warships. He forgot to say that we have a permanent base. One of the bases is at the mouth of the river. We have taken no steps in that respect. What could the flotilla there do? Itwas based there. 140. Besides, the representative of the Congo gives me the best possible argument. He spoke of aggression and then be gave figures. In Leopoldville we have 1,400 men. I believe that the United Nations will have to send twice as many men toreplace us. Facing these 1,400 men there is a population of 350,000~ Our army command is peaceful, but it is not stupid. If it had wanted to attack a population of 350,000, it would not have sent a mere 1,400 men. Its only purpose was, as I have said, to defend our nationals. It had no wish to interfere in the domestic affaira of the Congo. There was no intention of attack. It hoped that it would not have to defend itself against the Africans. I say this, because Mr. Kanza said that we did not value all human lives alike. But we do not consider ourselves legally obliged to interfere in the affairs of the Congo. We are defending our nationals. 140. le d'agression. ce pense nous une est avait il - tissants. rieures ne que M. Kanza dans croyons Congo. Nous défendons 141. I should like to make the point absolutely clear. 141. As soon as security is re-established, we are ready prêts to withdraw the troops that have intervened. I have sécurité said this before and I repeat it now. The position is l'ai clear. We have already begun to get out of Leopold- à Léopoldville. Nous ville, We have stopped everything. We shall be only mandons too happy to get out of the other places as soon as the nous United Nations tells us that security and tranquillity la (1) The purpose of Belgian military intervention in the Congo is purely humanitarian. (2) The intervention had been strictly proportionate to the objective sought, namely the protection of the lives of Belgian nationale. (3) It is limited in its scope by its objective. It is limited in time since it is conceived as a temporary action. (4) In intervening, Belgium is not pursuing any political design or seeking to interfere in any way in the domestic politics of the Congo. (5) So far as we are concerned the independence of the Congo is a:n accompllshed fact. Why would we have granted it only to take it back indirectly a fortnight later? The independence of the Congo is an accomplished fact. (6) Belgium is gratified that, under the direction of the Secretary-Genel'al, the United Nations has undertaken military action to restore order and security in the Congo, (7) The Belgian authorities will co-operate in the military action undertaken by the United Nations. (8) Belgium will withdraw its intervening troops as soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations effectively ensures the maintenance of order and the safety of persans. This principle has already begun to be carried out, particularly in Leopoldville, and we hope that the situation will soon be the same elsewhere.

The Security Council bas met today at the request of the Soviet Government in order ta hear the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 14 July 1960 [S/4387]. As is known, one of the most important points in that resolution was the request for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo-in other words, for the cessation of armed. intervention against the Congolese people, who bad just attained their national independence. 144. The urgent need to give prompt consideration to this question is dictated by the fact that the Belgian Government, relying on the support of those Powers which are interested in the preservation of the colonial régime in the Congo, is continuing its armed intervention in tbat country's domestic affairs. The Belgian Government is continuing an open combat against the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo, which has firmly stated its determination to ensure its country's genuine independence and ta preserve its territorial integrity. 145. The Security Council, having examined several days aga the situation in the Congo [873rd meeting], 30 146. plusieurs pé principales aux des Congo fortüications préparent temps, opérations 146. Belgian paratroopers have seized a number of Congolese towns and have yirtually occupied Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo. The Belgians have the airfields and the main lines of communication and bridges in their bands. According to the latest reports, Belgian aircraft equipped with rocket weapons are being hastened to the Congo and Belgian troops are feverishly erecting fortifications at Leopoldville, which shows that they are preparîng for a protracted war. At the same time the occupying forces are broadening the scope of their military operations in the Congo. 147. mier fait de 147. According to Prime Minister Lumumba, Belgian paràtroopers fought their way into the town of Coquilhatville on 16 July and seized all the local administrative establishments. 148. qué et version que d'autres avec le stratégique, cette grand viaire 148. On the following day, 17 July, paratroopers landed at Kindu. The Belgian military bases at Kamina and Kitona were converted into centres of subversive activity against the young Republic. In addition, there were reports to the effect that the Belgian Govern ... ment was planning further occupations of vital centres in the country, the major blow to be struck from the air against Bas-Congo, a strategically important area south of Leopoldvi,le. It is perfectly obvious that the purpose of that attack is to seize one of the most important places in the Congo, namely the town of Matadi, which is the chief seaport, arr important rail junction and the terminus of the oil pipeline. 149. 18 le sièrement juillet. du nécessité 149. The Secretary-General's report of 18 July [S/4389 and Add.1-3] in effect confirma that the Government of Belgium is stubbornly and brazenly ignoring the Council's decision of 14 July. In doing so, that Government continues to make use of the favourite excuse of the colonialists-the alleged need to protect the interests of Belgian nationals. 150. général déclaré prendre cas danger draient les à leur moment étouffer 150. As may be seen from the Secretary-General's report [S/4389, para. 44], the Belgian Government has stated that the Belgian authorities will continue to take ffthe necessary security measuresn in the case of grave and imminent danger. But the question whether or not an imminent danger exista is one which the Belgian authorities themselves intend to settle at their own discretion. What this actually means is that the colonialists have no intention of abiding by the Council 's decision, but that they want to continue their armed intervention againstthe Congo until they have attained their basic objective, which is to strangle and dismember the young Republic. 151. tervention tives l'ont cherchent regnes. - proclamation 151. We now know that the expansion of military intervention in the Congo is being accompanied by efforts to dismember the young State. As so often in the past, the colonialists are here trying to apply the principle of ndivide and rulen. They have succeeded in finding a stooge to be used tothat end in the person of one Tshombê who, only a few days after the proclamation of the Republic's independence, came out 153. Not without reason did the delegations of the African States Members of the United Nations, in their statement of 18 July concerning the Congo situation, resolutely condem.n any attempt to undermine the Congo's territorial integrity from without. That position is fully shared and whole-heartedly supr, _1rted by the Soviet Government. 154. The enemies of the Republic of the Congo are combining their political and military attacks upon it with economic aggression, designed to strangle the young Republic by hunger, the provocation of disorder, and sabotage. 155. As the colonialists continue their open military intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo, the situation in that country deteriorates witheverypassing day. The Government of the Republic bas appealed again and again to world opinion, to the United Nations, drawing attention to the mortal danger which threatens the country and asking that urgent measures be taken to put an end to the continuing aggression. First of all it demands the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. Yet the Belgian authorities continue to ignore these demands by the Government of the Republic of the Congo. 156. The Security Council, on which is conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should without delay extend a helping band to the victim of imperialist aggression and take effective steps to enable the Congo to consolidate its independence. 157. We note with satisfaction that many States and peoples have spoken out in opposition to the criminal designs of the colonialists. They have already begun to give aid to the brave Congolese people. 158. Moved by feelings of friendship for the heroic people of the Congo and firmly resolved to do what it can to bring about the triumph of the just cause for which the Republic of the Congo, in upholding its independence, is fighting, the Soviet Government bas decided to fu:rmsh that Republic with food and other assistance and to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations accordingly. Food supplies to the total of 10,000 tons have been allotted. The Soviet Government bas also assigned five airerait for the delivery of goods to the Congo and for other transport services required in connexion with the granting of aid to the Republic. 159. The Soviet delegation fully shares the opinion of President Kasavubu of the Republic of the Congo and Prime Minister Lumumba that the present external aggression against the Republic of the Congo constitutes a threat to international peace. 161. Hence the question of checking aggression against the Congo has enormous significance for the entire world. The United Nations has the obligation to speak out against the crimes of the colonialists and to take active steps to defend the Republic of the Congo. 162. The Soviet delegation cannot pass over the fact that an attempt is being made to frighten world public opinion and, indeed, the Security Council, in connexion with the events in the Congo. People are seeking to create the impression that the lives and property of Europeans there are in danger. In this connexion the Western Press and the statements of many persons in public life clear ly reveal the intention to blame the people of the Congo for the disorders and violence wbich are taking place in that country. 163. This is confirmed by the statement which the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs made today. But no one should be deceived by that deliberate and provoeative attempt by the colonialists to shift responsihility from the gu.ilty to the innocent. Everyone present in this chamber well lmows that the disorders and clashes, the break-down of transport and industry, and the complication of food supplies were all organized by those who for long years have been exploiting the people of the Congo. These quarters seek to strangle the young Republic with the bony hand of hunger, to intimidate it, to bring the Congolese people to their lmees and to re-impose upon them the yoke of colonialism. The Belgian colonialists are playing the prime part in these dark deeds. 164. The example of the Congo shows howtenaciously the advocates of the colonialist system cling to the past and employ any meanm to preserve their rule so that they may continue to plunder the very rich natural resources of the Congo and keep the industrious Congolese people in colonial bondage. They do not want to recognize that the era of the shameful colonialist system is gone for ever. Everything must be done to ensure that that colonialist system shall finally be liquidated within the shortest possible time, The struggle of the peoples against that disgrace of the twentieth century cannot be halted. Nevertheless, there are still some in the West who think that if they make a few concessions here and there they can keep the old system fundamentally intact. That was what the foreign monopolists thought when they posed as being "zealous" for the Congolese people's welfare. The statement made today by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affaira is a case in point. If the interpretation was correct, he said, speaking of the people of the Congo, that they were a people "entrusted to our care". Were they, then, so entrusted by God in order that they might the more easily be exploited? 165. The representative of Belgium is surprisedthat the Congolese delegate here should have dared to speak aloud of the Belgian Government's perfidy, that 166. The people of the Congo thought otherwise. They decided once and for ail to throw off the colonial yoke, to take their fate into their own hands and to build a new life, m;i.Ilg the rich natural resources in which the soli of the Congo abounds. and the fruit of their oym. labour for the benefit of the country with its 13 million inhabitants, and not for the enrichment of a clique of international monopoliste. 167. Tbat alarmed the foreign enslavers. They dropped their hypocritical mask of humanity and began trying to subdue the people by fire and sword. 168. In the light of what is happening in the Congo, the ID$•::ure most urgently needed is the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor forces, that is, the Belgian troops. This demand has universal support. In this connexion we should take into account the statement of 18 July issued by the group of African countrîes repr:esented in the United Nations, which read in part "the wîthdrawal of all Belgian forces is indispensable to the restoration of peace, order and stability" and in which Belgium was subsequently called upon to "wîthdraw its forces from the Congo wîth immediate effect". 169. The Soviet Union on 13 July [873rd meeting] supported the proposal to send temporarily to the Congo a United Nations force established at the request of the Securîty Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union did so on the assumptîon that in the establishment of such a force both the wishes of the Congolese Government, which had requested military assistance, and the desire of the countries of Asia and Africa, tbat the force should comprise units from the independent African and Asian States, would be taken into account. 170. The United Nations Force should remain in the Congo for a strictly limited period, should in no way interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congolese people, and should ensure the territorial inviolability and integrity of the country. 171. It should be noted that in the oral report which the Secretary-General made to the Council on 13 July [873rd meeting] it was particularly indicated that military personnel belonging to the armies of the great Powers would not be sent to the Congo. In this connexion we deem it essential to draw the attention of the Security Council to a press report to the effect that a detachment of the United states Armywhich had previously been stationed in West Germany arrived at Leopoldville airport on 17 July under the pretext of co-operating 1.n the evacuation of refugees and assisting the operations of the United Nations Force in the Republic of the Congo. 172. On instructions from the Government of the USSR, the Soviet delegation registers its objection to the introduction of United States troops into the Republic of the Congo on any pretext, and insists on the 17 4. The Soviet delegation also considers it necessary to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the new manoeuvres by the Belgian authorities aimed at creating the impression that Belgium is complying with the request, made in the Security Council's resolution, that it should withdraw its troops. The transfer of some of these forces from Leopoldville to other parts of the Congo is contemplated. Belgium is trying to represent such transfers as a partial evacuation of its forces. That, of course, should deceive no one. The Belgian forces should be withdrawn from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. 175. The presence of Belgian troops in the Republic of the Congo is an intolerable challenge not only to the Government of that Republic, but to the whole wor Id. It must be frankly stated that the stubbornness of the Belgian Government would have been impossible had that Government not been supportedbypowerful protectors in the shape of its military allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 176. In connexion with the situation wbichhas arisen, the Soviet delegation, on instructions from the Soviet Government, submits the following draft resolution [S/4402] to the Security Council for its consideration: ffThe Security Council, ffHaving heard the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the question of aggression by Belgium against the Republic of the Congo, 1t1. Insists upon the immediate cessation of armed intervention against the Republic of the Congo and the withdrawal from its territory of all troops of the aggressor within a period of.three days; "2. Calls upon the states Members of the United Nations to respect the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo and not to u.-idertake any actions which might violate that integrity. 1 77. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that at this crucial moment the draft resolution which it bas submitted will receive the unanlmous support of the Security Council's members. 178. If aggression continues, then, of course, more active measures will have to be taken, both by the United .Nations and by peace-loving States which are in sympathy with the Congo's cause.

The United states welcomes the report of the Secretary- General [S/4389 and Add.1-3] and subsequent statements, all of which point to the real progress being made by the United Nations in carrying out the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 13 July [S/4387]. We congratulate the Secretary-General and bis staff, includingMr.Bunche, who have worked tirelessly in bringing about the reassuring presence of the United Nations on the troubled soil of the Congo. 180. M. l'anglais]: le et des des résolution rité ses travaillé troublé Unies. 181. The report of the Secretary-General is a message of hope for all mankind, a message that tells us that calm and quiet and order will come to the Congo soon. The danger has not disappeared, but it bas receded. With the continued efforts of the Secretary- General and others, with more and more United Nations troops on the spot, we can look forward hopefully to the early restoration of public order. 181. l'humanité sage le mais du l'effectif le prochainement 182. Here, Mr. President, are some basic facts. 182. Il 183. Tout d'abord, l'Organisation a agi de façon décisive. personnes L'effort tout des aident à y sont éloignés de sont l'Organisation comptent d'Ethiopie, 770 du Ghana, 1.250 du Tunisie. Cinq transportés 635 des seront bataillons â Léopoldville au transports nisiens rejoints police envoyées africains. l'effectif de 10.000 hommes. 184. dité été centaines de tonnes de sont déjà la sation nécessaire il Unies. 183. First, the United Nations bas moved quickly and effectively and, I might say, decisively. Many nations and countless individuals have contributed to the success of this operation. ln the forefront of the United Nations effort is the quick and ready response of African States whose armed contingents are already in the Congo helping to restore public order there. These men, far from their native countries and climates, are in the Congo on behalf of all of us-the entire United Nations. Three thousand, five hundred United Nations troops are already in the Congo; 460 troops from Ethiopia, 770 from Ghana, 1,250 from Morocco and 1,020 from Tunisia. An additional 500 Ghanaian troops were air-lifted today, as were approximately 635 men of the Swedish battalion in the United Nations Emergency Force. About 700 men from Guinea will be air-lifted starting on Friday. Commitments have been made to air-lift other battalions of African troops to Leopoldville over the next few days. These include an additional 1,250 Moroccans, 1,000 Tunisians and 600 Ghanaians. Soon these men will be joined by other troops and police units from other States, Africari and non- African. We hope that in a fewdaysthe United Nations force will reach a strength close to 10,000 men. 184. The United Nations bas also moved rapidly on the food front. Contributions have been pledged by a number of countries. Hundreds of tons of flour and other foodstuffs have already arrived in the Congo to help alleviate the threatened food shortage. other United Nations Members . are expected to provide needed assistance in other ways. Clearly, this is a collective effort on the part of the United Nations. 11TheUnitedNations is now in a positiontoguarantee that contingents of the United Nations Force, drawn from both European and African countries, will arrive this week in sufficient numbers to ensure order and protect the entire population, European and African. 11 186. In the light of this rapid and impressive international effort, we believe the Government of the Republic of the Congo should feel protected and reassured. Problems remain for this young Government, but surely the desire of the United Nations to assist and its ability to do so effectively has been made abundantly clear. The United Nations will not permit the Congo to founder and we know perfectly well that once fear has been conquered, it is possible to tackle the outstandi.ng problems realistically and effectively. 187. There is a second important fact to mention. It relates to the question of withdrawal of the Belgian forces. We think we can understand the feelings of everyone concerned with this problem. We canunderstand the fears of the Congolese leaders when troops of the former administering Power returned to the Congo. We can understand equally well the anxieties of the people and Government of Belgium and their feeling that they had to send urgent contingents to protect their nationals. The atrocities committed are certainly deplorable. 188. In my statement of 13 July [873rd meetingl I made clear that the United States interpreted the provisions of the Security Council resolution of that date calling upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops as being contingent upon the successful carrying out of the entire resolution by the United Nations. 189. The Belgian representative stated in the Security Council early last Thursday morning [873rd meeting] that Belgian troops would be withdrawn when security had been re-established and properly assured by a responsible authority. On 14 July this declaration was confirmed in a letter presented by the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville to the Government of the Congo. According to this letter, which has been made public, Belgium comm.its itself to the withdrawal of its troops when and where order is sufficiently restored by United Nations troops. 190, Moreover, we note the statement in the Secretary-General's report that 11following the arrivai of 191. It is regrettable to note tonight that the Soviet Union is evidently seek:i.ng to bring the cold war to the heart of Africa. Its demand tonight that the United States withdraw the few American technicians who are at present in Leopoldville with the approval of the United Nations is cltlarly another effort by the Soviet Union to obstruct the United Nations effort to restore order in Leopoldville. All the world lmows, except apparently the Sov-telc Union and others who are like-minded, that the small group of American service personnel in Leopoldville are there in connexion with the specific request of the United Nations to provide transport, communications and food. They will stay there only as long as they are needed to support the United Nations efforts in the Congo. In the sense in which the word is customarily used here in the United Nations, they are not troops at all. 192. When we were invited to send United States troops to the Congo last week, we declined, politely and quickly, and instead turned to the United Nations. Really, I do not think it is worth while taking the Security Council's time with petty things like that. 193. There have been reports that the Soviet Union might intervene in the Congo directly with troops, and before I yield the floor I would just like to say a word about that. The position of the United States Government on this point is unequivocally clear, both for itself and for others. For, as I have said, despite an official request from the Government of the Congo some days ago for United States troops we insisted that all American help should be sent through the United Nations. The United Nations effort, we think, offers the best way of restoring order and making possible the speedy withdrawal by stages, of Belgian forces. Obviously, no troops should be introduced into the Congo other than those requested by the Secretary-General pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 14 July. The United States can, accordingly, be counted on to continue its vigorous support of the United Nations in the Congo. With other United Nations Members we will do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United Nations. Such forces, if they were introduced, not only would be in defiance of the United Nations but would seriously jeopardize any effort to bring stability and order to the Congo. 194. The PRESIDENT. (translated from Spanish): With the Council's consent, I propose to adjourn the meeting at this time in order that we may resum.e consideration of the item at 3 p.m. today. In the inter- 191. It is regrettable to note tonight that the Soviet Union is evidently seeking to bring the cold war the heart of Africa. Its demand tonight that the United States withdraw the few American technicianB who are at present in Leopoldville with the approval the United Nattons is clearly another effort by the Soviet Union to obstruct the United Nations effort restore order in Leopoldville. All the world knows, except apparently the Soviet Union and others who are like-minded, that the email group of American service personnel in Leopoldville are there in connexion with the specific request of the United Nations to provide transport, communications and food. They will stay there only as long as they are needed support tho United Nations efforts in the Congo. tho sense ln which the word is customarily used here in the United Nations, they are not troops at all. 192. When we were fnvited to send United States troops to the Congo last week, we decllned, politely and quickly, and instead turned to the United Nations. Really, I do not thlnk 1t ls worth wh!le taking the Security Cou.ncil 's time wlth petty things like that. 193. There bave been reports that the Soviet Union mlght intervene in the Congo directly with troops, and beforc I yield the floor I would just llke to say word about that. The position of the United States Govcrnmcnt on thls point is unequivocally clear, both for itsclf and for others. For. as I have said, despite an official request from the Government or the Congo some days ago for United States troops we insisted that all Atnerican help should be sent through the United Nations. The United Nations effort, we think, offers the best way of restoring order and making possible the speedy withdrawal by stages, of Belgian f orccs. Obviously, no troops should be introduced into the Congo other than those requcsted by the Secrctary-General pursuant to the Security Councl.Ps resolutlon of 14 July. The United States can, accordingly, be counted on to continue its vigorous support of the United Natiorui in the Congo. With other United Natiorui Membcrs we will do whatever mav be necessary to prcvent the intrusion of any military forces not rcqucsted by the United Nations. Such forces. thcy wcre introduccd. not only would be in deffance of the United Nations but would scrlously jeopa.rdize any effort to brtng stabllity and order to the Congo.

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