S/PV.881 Security Council

I draw the Council's attentionto documents8/4354 andS/4385, which contain the communications received from the Government of the Soviet Union on this question.

On 1 July 1960., an American aircraft ofthetypelmownas RB-47 was proceeding on a miosion oyer the international waters of the Barents Sea. Themissioninvolvedflying northward from England over the high seas to a point 200 miles north of the nearest land mass. From there the aircraft flew east into the Barents Sea on a prescribed course which at no time was tobring it closer than fifty miles from Soviet territory. 3. L'avion en question effectuait un vo1d'observation 3. The aircraft in question was onan electromagnetic observation flight. The route was over international waters at all times. The crewoftheaircraft had every reason to enjoy safe and uncontested passage through international air space during this flight. The only weapons the aircraftcarriedweretwo 2o-mm.tail guns. to protect it from attack from the rear. It carried no offensive weapons of any kind. e1ectromagn~ique.n devait rester constamment audessus des eaux internationales. L'equipage de l'avion pouvait Iegitimement vo1er librement et en toute s~ curite h traTers l'espace aerieninternational. L'avion n'6tait arm~ que de deux canons de 20 imiiUmMrei places dans la queue de l'appareil et destines A. le proteger d'une attaque venant de l'arri~re. n ne transportait aucune arme offensive. 4. Comma chacun le sait, l'avion a disparu. Le personnel americain au sol qui suiyait ce vol a pu d~ terminer on. se trouvait exactement cet avion A. 15 h 22 (heure de! Greenwich) malgre le silence dela radio 4. As the world lmows.. this aircraft disappeared. United states personnel whomonitoredthis flight could ~~int the precise location of this plane at 15.22 Greenwich Mean Time even though the aircraft main- J - 5. The' aircraft became the object of widespread search in which the Soviet GoYernment appeared at first to be participating in good faith. Ten days later, however, the Soviet Union proclaimed totheworldthat it had shot downthemissing aircraft. Atthe same time the Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had penetrated SoYiet air space and that it was engaged in a premeditated aggressive mission. The SovietGovernment also accompanied its announcement with new threats of force and violence of a type with which the entire world has, unfortunately, become familiar in recent months. This intentional delay of ten days, as Chairman Khrushchev informed us, had the cynical purpose of "confusingus. These facts are clear and incontrovertible, and the Soviet Union knows that they are. 6. The aircraft was equipped with the most modern and reliable systems for navigation, and the crew had had many years of experience in celestial and other forms of naYigation, including electronic means. The crew would have had no reason to depart from their prescribed course, on which they could perform their duties fully. Indeed, theyhad everyreasontostay away from SoYiet territory and territorial waters. The aircraft was equipped with the most sensitive available radar to tell them-with.the degree of accuracy possible only through electronic means-how near they' were to any land mass. Their instructions required them to rely onthis radarfor navigation. Further, they were instructed that before they got closer than seventy-five miles from SOY.iet territory, and before they started on this portion of the prescribed course, they should make a specialcheckto assurethemselves that the radar was functioningproperly and accurately. These precautions-these elaborateprecautions-were taken because the crew knew, as do so many of us, that the Soviet Union had in the past lured planes towards its frontier. 7. This chart [see chart No. 1] shows the planned course of the RB-47. Nowletme showyou in detail, on another chart which magnifies that particular part [see chart No. 2] what actually happened. 8. The SoYiet Government has stated-indeed, it has boasted-in its memorandum to the Council [8/4385] that the RB-47 entered SoYiet territorial waters on 1 July, twenty-two kilometres (twelve miles) north of Cape SYyatoy Nos, indicated by the red star on the chart, proceeded in the direction ofArchangel andwas shot down by a Soviet fighter over Soviet territorial waters to the east ofSvyatoy Nos at 15.03 GMT. So as to avoid confusion, I would point outthatthere are two places called SyYatoy Nos-one is on the Kola Peninsula, and the other about 200 miles east,beyond Kanin l/ The rep,resentative of the United States of America referred in his statement to two charts which he submitted to the Council and which are reproduced in the annex to the present verbatim record as chart No. 1 and chart No. 2. d~libedmenten erreur. Les faits sont clairs etirr6- futab1es, et l'Union sovi6tique lesait bien. 6. L'appareil etait equipe des instruments de navigation les plus modernes et les plus sQrs, et l'e~page avait, depuis de nombreuses annees, l'experience de toutes les formes de navigation, siderale et autres, et notamment de l'utilisationdes appareils electroniques. L'equipa~ n'aurait eu aucune raison de s'ecarter de son trajet prescrit au cours duquel ilpouv8J.t s'acquitter parfaitement de sa mission. En fait, il avait toutes les raisons de ne pas s'approcher duterritoire et des eaux territoriales sovietiques. L'appareil etait equipe des instruments de radar les plus perfectionnes qui devaient lui indiquer - avec le delf~e d'exactitude .que seuls des appareils electroniquespeUY'ent assurer - a. c:iuelle distance il se trouvait d'tme ter:re quelconque. Les instructions de l'equipage lui imposaient de naviguer au radar. En outre, il avait re9\'ll'ordre de s'assurer par un contrOle special que le radar fonctionnait bien et ayec exactitude avant de s'approcher de moins de 75 milles duterritoire sovietique et avant de s'engager dans cette partie de son trajet. Ces precautions - ces precautions minutieusesavaient ete prises parce que PeqmpagesaYait, co~e taut d'entre nous, que 1'Union sovi61ique avait dans le passe attire des mons versses fronti~res.. 7. Le present schema [voir carte No 1] montre le parcours que devait effectuer l'aYion RB-47. Je yais YOUs montrer maintenant en detail, sur une autre carte [voir carte No 2], oft cette region est representee a. beaucoup plus grande echelle, ce qui s'est passe en reallte. 8. Le Gouvernement sovi6tique a d6clar€l, (ll s'enest meme vante), dans son m6moire au Consell [S/4385], que l'avion RB-47 etait arriv~ au-dessus des eaux territoriales sovi6tiques le 1erjui11et, h 22 kilom~ires .(12 mUles) au nord du cap Sviator Nos, indique par 1'61011e rouge sur la pdsente carte, qu1il avait poUrsuiYi sa route en direction d'Arkhangelsk et avait ete abattu par un anon de chasse sovietlque au-dessus des eaux territoriales sOYietiques 1 Pest de SviatorNos,l 15 h 3 (heure de Greenwich). Pour eviter toute confusion, je voudrais faire remarquer qu'il y a deux Y Au cours de son intervention. le repr~sentantdes Etats-Unis d'Am~ rique se reporte!'1l deux cartes qu"il a pr~sent~es au Conseil et qui sont reproduites h l'annexe du pr~sentcompterenduentant que carte No 1 et carte No 2. 10. The RB-47 did not fall at 15.03 hours either in Soviet territorial waters., as the Soviet Union claims, or into the high seas fifty miles north-east of Svyatoy Nos, wherl3 it actually was at that moment. The aircraft was brought down by the Soviet Union neither at the place nor atthetimewhichtheSoviet Union claims. 11. What actually happened was this, and I hope the Council will listen very carefully. Before the aircraft reached the point more than fifty miles north of Svyatoy Nos at which it was scheduledto make its turn to the north-east, a Soviet fighter pressed infrom the seaward side (there is aredarrowonthe map showing the Soviet fighter) and triedto force the aircraft off its course and into Soviet territory. That is what happened. The Soviet fighter was successfulinforcing our aircraft off its course and in delaying its planned turn to the north-east, but it was not successful in forcing the aircraft intoSoviet air space. Itcausedour aircraft to make a detour. That detour is shown by the green line on the chart. The prescribed course is shown by the black line. Here is what happened. Our aircraft had to go on a little further and then turn up this way. 12. This astonishing and criminal fact is established beyond doubt by the evidence of ourscientific devices, which followed the RB-47 through all the events I have described. 13. It is noteworthy that the aircraft triedto get back on its prescribed north-easterly course and that it succeeded in doing so. In the process of its delayed turn, and while flying away from the Soviet Union, the RB-47 made its closest approach to Soviet territory. 10. A 15 h 3, l'aYion RB-47 n'est tombe ni dans les eaux territoriales sovietiqUes, comme le pretend 1'Union sovietique, ni dans la haute mer a. 50 milles au nord-est de Sviator Nos o~ il se trouvait effectivement a ce moment. L'appareil a eteabattupar l'Union sovietique mais ni a l'endroit ni au moment allegues par 1'Union sovietique. 11. J'esp~re que le Conseil ecoutera tr~s attentivement le recit de ce qui s 'est effectivement passe. Avant que l'appareil ne soit parvenu au point situe a. plus de 50 milles au nord de Sviatoi Nos o~ il devait obliquer en direction du nord-est, un avion de chasse sovietique venu du cOte de la mer (le chasseur sovie- ,tique est indique par une fl~che rouge sur la carte) a !essaye de forcer I'appareil a. d6vier de sontrajet et a. penetrer en territoire sovietique. C'est ce qui s'est passe. Le chasseur sovietique est parvenu a. obliger notre appareil a s'ecarter de sa route et a retarder son virage en direction du nord-est, mais il n'est pas parvenu a le forcer a penetrer dans l'espace aerien sovietique. Il a oblige notre appareilafaire un detour, qui est indique sur la carte par la ligne verte tandis que la route prescrite est indiquee par la ligne noire. Voila ce qui s'est passe. Notre appareil a dii aller un peu plus loin avant de changer sa direction. 12. Cette manreuvre etonnante et criminelle est prouvee indiscutablement par les donnees de nos appareils scientifiques qui ont suivi le RB-47 pendant tous les evenements que je viens de:decrire. 13. 11 Y a lieu de noter que 1'appareil a essaye de reprendre le parcours prevu en direction du nord-est et qu'il y est parvenu. C'est au moment oil il prenait enfin le virage qui avait eteretardeetqu'il s'eloignait de rUnion sovietlque que l'avion RB-47 s'esttrouvele 14. Let me dwell on these events for a moment. The approach of the Soviet fighter, which took place over international waters, was from the seaward side. It prevented our aircraftfrom makingits prescribedturn to the north-east, which means thatitpreventeda prescribed turn away from theSoviet coastalregion. They apparently did not want it to go away from the Soviet coastal region, and they did not want it to go out towards the open waters of the Barents Sea.If the RB~ 47 had tried to make its prescribedturn on schedule it would have had to turn towards the Sovietfighter. And note this well: if the RB-47 had turned towards the Soviet fighter this turn might have been used as an excuse by the fighter pilot to open fire on the United states airC:i."aft. The aircraft was, therefore, forcedto overshoot its turning point. Shortly afterwards the Soviet fighter broke offfromtheRB-47-perhaps itwas because it was running low on fuel. Then, finally, the RB-47 was able tomakeadelayedturn-still,as I have shown, well outside Soviet air space-tothe north-east and to resume its prescribed course. Through the technical means which we have we were ableto follow these events in detail. 15. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this. The SoYiet fighter was trying toforce-tocompel.;..thepilot of the RB-47 to fly southward over Soviet territory. There it could have been shot down on land. But that attempt failed. 16. Now we wonder why the Soviets have presented so many distortions about this. Perhaps the Sonet air force was reluctant to admit to Chairman Khrushchev that the aircraft ,could not be shot down over Soviet air space-for the very good reason that it was not there-and therefore did not inform him of the facts. Perhaps they did not tell him that they had to go 200 miles from Cape Svyatoy Nos to follow the RB-47. Perhaps Chairman Khrushchev has been lied to. That often happens in dict.,atorships. That is onepossibility. There are others. We can all speculate. 17. I wish to speak about the crew members of the RB-47. They are military personnel in the service of the United States. They were carryingout a legal flight over internationalwaters. International law and custom demand that they must have the right to get into touch with the United States mission in the country in which they are held. This right has not yetbeen honoured by the Soviet Government. Nor has theSoviet Government seen fit to respond to the suggestion of the United States for an on-the-spqt jointsearchfor other missing crew members and the remains of the aircraft. What more flagrant disregard of the standards of international conduct could there be-and what plainer admission of guilt? What reason would they have for 14. Laissez-moi m'arr~ter quelques instants Aces evenements. Le ehasseur sovietique s'estapprochede l'avion RB-47 au-dessus des eaux internationales, en venant de la mer. Il a emp~che notre avion d'obliquer eomme il devait le fairevers lenord-est, c'est-A-dire qu'il l'a emp~che de tourner pour s'eearter de la region coti~re sovietique. Apparemment, onnevoulait pas que notre avion s'eloigne de la region e6ti~re sovietique et on ne voulait pas qu'il se dirige dans la mer de Barents vers la haute mer. Si l'avion RB-4'7 avait essaye d'obliquer au moment preyu, il aurait ete oblige de venir Ala rencontre du chasseur sovietique. Et notez bien ceci; si l'avion RB-47 etait venu! la rencontre du chasseur sovietique, ce mo\!yement aurait pu servir de pretexte au pilote du chasseur sovietique pour ouvrir le feu sur l'avion des Etats-Unis. L'avion a donc ete contraint de depasser le point Oll il devait effectuer son virage. Peu apr~s,le chasseur sovietique s 'est detache de l'avionRB-47 ,peut-~treparce que son Icarburant commenQait 1 s'epuise:l.". A ce moment, 1'avion RB-47 a enfin pu effectuer son virage vers le nord-est, en restant toujours, comme je l'ai montre, bien en dehors de l'espace aerien sovietique, pour reprendre son trajetnormal. Nous avons ete enmesure de suivre ces evenements en detail par les moyens techniques dont nous disposions. 15. Une seule conclusion s'impose. Le chasseur sovietique essayait de forcer, de contraindre lepilote de l'avion RB-47 a voler vers le sud au-dessus du territoire sovietique, ce qui auraitpermis de I'abattre au-dessus des terres. Mais cette tentative a eehoue. 16. Nous nous demandons pOllrquoi les Sovietiques ont telIement deforme les faits. Peut-~trel faviationsovietique a-t-elIe Msite a avouer au preSident Khrouchtchev que Pavion n'avait pu ~tre abattu daus l'espaee aerien sonetique. pour la simple raison qu'il ne s'y ~rouvait pas, et ne l'a-t-eIle donc pas informe des faits. Peut-~ene lui a-t-on pas dit qu'll avait fallu aller A 200 milIes du cap Sviatof Nos pour suivre l'avion RB-47. Peut-·~tre a-t-on menti au president Khrouehtchev. Cela arrive souveiltdans les dictatures. C'est une hypoth~se; i1 y en a d'autres. NOlls pouyons tOllS faire des suppositions. 17. Je voudrais vous parler des membres de l'equipage de l'avion RB-47. Ce sont des militaires au service des Etats-Unis. Ils effectuaient un vollegal au-dessus d'eaux internationales. Le droit et la coutume internationaux exigent qu'ils puissent se mettre en contact avec la missiondes Etats-Unis dans le pays oft ils sont detenus. Ce droit n'a pas jusqu'iei ete respecte par le Gouvernement sovietique. Le Gouvernement sovietique n'a pas non plus juge bon de donner suite Ala suggestion des Etats-Unis tendant ! effectuer sur place des recherches en commun pour trouver les autres membres disparus de l'equipageet, les debris de l'appareil. Pent-on imaginer violation plus flagrante des normes de condUite internationale, 18. Last Friday, 22 July [88oth meeting], I appealed to you here in the Council to releasethese men. I now make another appeal totheSoviet Government. Byyour own admission you are now holding as prisoners First Lieutenant John R. McKoneofTonganoxie, Kansas, and First Lieutenant Freeman B. OlmsteadofElmira, New York, from the crew of the RB-47. This is an illegal act and you have up to now ignored our appeals to release these men and any other survivors who may be in your hands. We ask you once againto release them, and, if there should be any delay in their release, to admit representatives of the International Red ·Cross to reassure their families of their well-being. 19. We also askyoutotellus whatever you know about the menwhoaremissing. Lookinto yourhearts and ask yourselves what earthly point there can be in denying some reassurance to the wives and families of these men. The missing men about whom we askyou for information are: Captain Oscar L. Goforth of Sardis, Oklahoma, First LieutenantDeanB. Phillips ofInwood, Long Island, New York, and CaptainEugeneE. Posa of Santa Monica, California. We desperately want information about the welfare of those men. I also wish to mention here another member of the crew, Captain Willard G. Palm of Oak' Ridge, Tennessee, of whose death we know. I mention his name because he died a hero's death and'his namebelongs onthe roll of honour which I haTe jl..st cited. 20. The Sonet Union has committed a predatory act in international waters. This is serious enough in itself, but the situation has been further aggravated by the subsequent allegations and pronouncements of the Soviet Government. It is thus pertinent to ask what is behind these lawless actions and these reckless stal:ements emanating from the Kremlin and echoedhere in the Council. We knO''' that the SovietUnionhas brutally subjected thousands of square miles of land and millions of people to Sonet domination, but now, and not for the first time, it commits an act of piracy over the high seas. 21. You may besurethatthe Government ofthe United States will resist any Soviet effort to extend Soviet domination over the high seas, and that we will never condone piracy in any form, regardless of the smoke screen behind which this piracy may be carried out. 22. Many people in many countries arebothmystified and concerned by the recent behaviour of the Soviet Union and are asking whether the Soviet leaders are actually seeking a pretext for war. People are asking that. All mankind has reason for concern about the repeated threats of the Soviet rulers to launch rockets anywhere in the world in support of Soviet ambitions. To us this marks a new turn in Soviet public statementa, which I haTe followed closely for many years, and which, although often abusive and intemperate in the past and, inaccordance withstandardSovietpolicy, 19. Nous vous· demandons aussi de nous dire ce que vous savez des hommes portes disparus. RecueiUezvous et demandez-Yous a quoi peut bien servir de refuser de rassurer peut-~tre les epouses et les familles de ces hommes. Les dis1>arus sur lesquels . nous Taus demandons des renseignements Bont: le capitaine Oscar L. Goforth, de Sardis (Oklahoma), le lie-Iltenant Dean B. Phii!lps, d'Inwood, Long Island (New York), et le capitaine Eugene E. Posa, de Santa Monica (Californie). NOUSBouhaitons delafa90nlaplus vive avoir des renseignements sur le sort de ces hommes. Je tiens anssi lmentionnerunautremembre de l'6qulpage, le capitaine Willard G. Palm, d'Oak Ridge (Tennessee), dont nous avons appris lamort.Je cite son nom parce qu'il est mort en h6ros. Son nom dolt figurer dans la liste de ceux quise sont sacrifi6s pour leur pays. 20. L'Union sovietique a commis une attaque brutale dans les eaux internationales, ce qui est deja suff!- samment grave en soi, mais la situation a encore empire il la suite des allegations et des declarations ulterieures du Gouvernement sonetique. 11 y a donc lieu de demander ce qu'il y a derri~re ces actes illegaux et ces declarations temeraires du Kremlin dont le Conseil a entendu l'echo. Nous savons que l'Union sovietique a brutalement soumis il sa domination des milliers de kilom~trescarres de terres etdes millions de personnes; voila, et ce n'est pas la premi~re fois, qu'elle commet un acte de piraterie en haute mer. 21. Vous pouYezetre persuades queleGouvernement des Etats-Unis s'opposera a tout effort du Gouvernement sovietique pour etendre sa domination sur la haute mer et que nous n'accepterons jamais les actes de piraterie sous aucune forme, qu.el que soit le voile de fumee derri~re lequel ils soient cacMs. 22. Nombreux sont ceux auxquels dans bien des pays le comportement recent de 1'Union sovietique semble incomprehensible, qui s'en inqui~tent et qui se demandent si les dirigeants sovietiques cherchent enfait un pretexte pour declencher une guerre. On se le demande. L'humanite tout enti~re a des raisons de s'inquieter des menaces reiter6es, faitesparlesdirigeants sovietiques, de lancer des fusees en n'importe quel point du monde pour appuyer les ambitions sovietiques. Pour nous, cette attitude representeunnouveau tournant dans les declarations publiques de 1'Union 23. It ie not unnatural that we should find reason for concern about those who speak sweetly of peaceful coexistence and then, in the same breath, threaten to unleash a war which would certainly destroy most of human civilization, including the Soviet Union, a war which Mr. KhrushcheT himself admitted in Bucharest on 21 June 1960 would be "incomparably more appalling" than the wars of the past. 24. We have reason for cODcernaboutthosewhomake loud proclamations concerning the importance of disarmament and who simultaneously threaten to use the most terrible armaments in a reckless and tragic manner. The world is well aware thattheSoviet Union possesses rockets. So do we possess rockets. But the Soviet Union threatens to use them in order to bend peaceful nations to its will. We do not. Nuclear war is too serious a matter tobe made the subject of blustering threats orpropaganda. Ifthe SoTietGovernmenthas any genuine interest in the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions it will heedthe resolution -adopted by this Council on 27 May 1960 [S/ 4328], and will desist from irresponsible threats of force and violence. 25. I have now presented to you first the facts about the destruction of the American aircraft over international waters. I then spoke briefly about the international significance of it, making it clear that a repetition of similar predatory acts cannotfail to have the most serious consequences. Now I come to the question of what action the Council should take. 26. Our argument in this case is sostrong, as you can see, and the Soviet Union is so clearly in the wrong, that the United States Government had grounds for introducing a complaint of our own at the time the aircraft disappeared-before the Soviet Union introduced the item we are consideringtoday. Infactwe seriously considered doing just this. There is no doubt in our minds that the members of the Security Councilwould not only have sustained us by a large majority, but would willingly have voted a condemnationoftheSoviet Union which we would havebeenfully justifiedin seeking. But we thoughtitover and onreflection we decided to forego this because we thought it more in accord with the spirit of the United Nations Charter,particularly of Article 33, which calls on all of us first of all to seek solutions to dangerous issues through inquiry or other peaceful means, to appeal to the SoTiet Government to join with us in an objective examination of the facts of this case. You all heard Mr. Kuznetsov on Friday last [88Oth meeting] brush aside this offer. 27. In-these circumstances the UnitedStateswouldbe fully justified in asking the Security Council to condemn this outrageous attack and call upon the SoTiet Union to make prompt payment of indemnities for the bri~vement de la signification de cet acte sur le plan international. en precisant que la repetition de te11es attaques brutales ne peut avoir que des consequences d'une extr~me gravite. J'en viens maintenant a la question des mesures Aprendre par le Conseil. 26. Dans cette affaire, notre argumentation est, comme vous levoyez, tellementforte. etl'Unionsovietique est si manifestementdans sontort que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis aurait ete fonde a presenter une plainte au moment de la disparition de 1'aTion. avant m~me que l'Union sovietique n'e1lt demande 1'inscription de la question Anotre ordre du jour. En fait. nous avions serieusement envisage d'agir ainsi. Nous ne doutons pas que les membres du Conseil non seulement nous auraient appuyes aunelargemajorite, mais encore auraient sans hesiter vote une eondamnation de 1'Union sovietique que nous aurions ete pleinement justifies ~ demander. Toutefois, apr~s mtlre reflexion. nous avons decide de renoneer ~ cette initiative; il nous a semble en effet plus conforme A l'esprit de la Chute - et en partieulier al'esprit de l'Article 33, qui nous fait l'obligationde reehercher la solution des differends graves, avant tout, par voie d' enqu~te oupard'autres moyens paeifiques - de faire .appel au Gouvernement sovietique pour qu'il proeMe, de concert avec nous, Aunexamenobjectifdes faits en cause. Vous avez entendu vendredi dernier [880~me s~anee] M. Kouznetsov rejeter cette ofire. 27. Dans ces conditions, les Etats-Unis seraientpleinement justifi~s Ademander au Conseil de sticurite de eondamner eatt€: attaque revoltante etd'inviter 1'Union soTietique A verser ;.aDj" dtilai des indemnit~spour 28. We do not ask the Security Council to take our word for what happened even though we knowthat it is true. But we do ask the Council to help ascertain the facts. We therefore are introducing aresolutionwhich provides for an investigation of this matter or an adjudication of it by the International Court of Justice. 29. I should like now to read the text of the draIt resolution [S/4409] which I herewith introduce. "The Security Council, "Having considered the item submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 13 July 1960, "Having heard the statements ofrepresentatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "]'Toting the eJQstence of differences between the two Governments as to the facts of the incident of 1 July 1960, in which a United States Air Force aircraft was brought down by Soviet military forces, and as to questions of legal liability arisingfrom the incident, "Recalling its resolutio~of 27 May 1960 (S/4328), in which the Council stated its conviction that eyery effort shouldbe madeto restore and strengtheninte...- national good will and confidence basedonthe established principles of international law, recommended to the Governments concerned to seek solutions of existing international problems by negotiation or other peaceful means as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, and appealed to all Member Governments to refrain from the use or threat of force in their international relations, to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and to refrain from any action which might increase tensions, "Recommends to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to undertake to resolve their differences arising out of the plane incident of1July 1960 either @) through investigation ofthe facts by a commission composed of members designated in equalnumbers, by the United States (If America, by the Union of Soviet Socialist RepubE ·IS and by a Government or authority acceptable to both parties, charged with inquiring into the incident by inspecting the site, examining such remains of the plane as may be located, and interrogating survivors and other witnesses; or (b) through referral of the matter to the InternationaCCourt of Justice for impartial adjudication." 30. The Soviet Union has already made the extraordinary admissionin advance ofthese meetings, which 2'8. Nous ne demandons pas au Conseil de securite de nous croire sur parole, bien quenous sacbions que telle est la verite, mais nous lui demandons son aide pour tirer les faits au clair. Nous luipresentons donc un projet de resolution qui recommande une enqu~te sur cette affaire ou bien une decision de la Cour internationale de Justice. 29. Je Youdrais maintenant donner lecture du projet de resolution [S/44091 que je soumets a l'examen du Conseil: "Le Conseil de securite, "Ayant examine la question soumise le 13 juillet 1960 par l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, "Ayant entendu les declarations des reprel:lentants des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, "Constatant l'existence de desaccords entre les deux gouvernements quant aux circonstances de l'incident du ler juillet 1960, au cours duquel un avion de l'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis aete abattu par des forces militaires sovietiques, et quant aux questions de responsabilite juridique decoulant de l'incident, "Rappelant sa resolution du 27 mai 1960 (S/4328) dans laquelle le Conseils'estdeclareconvaincudela necessite de ne negliger aucun effort pour restaurer et renforcer la bonne volonte et la confiance internationales fondees sur les principes etablis du droit ~nternational, a recommande aux gomrernements interesses de cbercher des solutions auxprobl~mes internationaux existants par voie de negociation ou par d'autres moyens pacifiques conformement a la Charte des Nations Unies, et a fait appel atous les gouvernements Membres pour qu'ils s 'abstiennentde recourir a. l'emploi ou a la menace de la force dans leurs relations internationales, qu'ils respectent mutuellement leur souverainete, leur integrite territoriale et leur independance politique, et qu'ils s'abstiennent de tout acte qui pourrait accrortre les tensions, "Recommande aux Gouvernements de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques et des Etats- UDls d'Amerique de s'attacher l resoudre leursdesaccords decoulant de 1'incident du 1er juillet 1960' soit: ~ au moyend'une enquetesurles circonstances de 1'incident par une commissioncomposeedemembres designes en nombre egal par les Etats...Unis d'Amerique, par 1'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietlques et par un gouvernement ou une autorite acceptable aux deux parties, qui serait chargee: d'enqueter sur l'incident en inspectant les lieux, en examinant les restes de l'avion qui peuvent ~tre, retrouves et en interrogeant les survivants et les autres temoins; soit~) par le renvoi dela question l la Cour internationale de Justice en vue d'une decision impartiale." 30. L'Union soyletique a deja reconnu - ce qui est assez extraordinaire - avant m@me que n'aient lieu 31. Evidently, the head of the Soviet Government thinks nothing of insulting the integrity of the representatives sitting on this Council and the integrity of the Governments for which all ofyou gentlemen speak. He seems positively to want to be defeated here. Just what lies behind this strange manoeuvre is hard to fathom. 32. The United States is not only willing-we are anxious-that the Security Council consider the Soviet charges. We want it to consider our charges as well. We are certain that an honest andthoroughconsideration of the facts canleadtobut one conclusion-that the Soviet Government has taken a lawless action andtries to camouflage it with reckless talk. 33. In conclusion, our purpose here is not to defend ourselves. We have done nothing which requires defence. We want the Council to deal with this criminal and reckless act ofpi.racy committedbythe Soviet Union so that our men,n.owinillegaldetention, may be freed, and 'so that the whole world may breathe more easily again. .

Ishallasktospeak again later in replytothe UnitedStates representative, but at this time I should like to make two brief observations. 35. First, I wish to state that everything the United States representative has said to show that the United states military RB-47 bomber did not invade the air space of the Soviet Union is crude fiction from beginning to end, inventedto deceive the people of the Ull;ited States and world public opinion. Everyone knows that it is not enough to pronounce the high-flown words "evidence of ••• scientific devices". There is behind them no factual data whatever. The maps, however beautifully drawn, are pure frauds. 36. May I ask Mr. Lodge whether he really thinks that his theatrical methods, to which United States representatives have been resorting with increasing frequency in recent Security Council meetings, can convince anybody? He should have realized long ago that the Security Council is not a stage for that kind of performance, whichis designedtoproduce a very cheap effect. 37. A United States military RB-47 bomber, while carrying out an espionage and diversionary mission, violated the national frontier of the Soviet Union and invaded its air space, thereby committing an act of aggression against our country. The organizers ofthis act must bear the responsibility for their actions. 38. The United States representative is seeking hypocritically to exploit the feelings of the wives, mothers and close relatives of the members of the RB-47 crew. Thatinitselfis completelyunprecedented. cynicism. We fully understand the feelings ofthewives and mothers of the RB-47 crew. In this connexion, I should like to say to Mr. Lodge that responsibility for n~tes qui si~gent au Conseil de securite". 31. De toute evidence, le chef du Gouvernement sovi6tique ne se fait pas scrupule d'insulter 1'integrit6 des repr6sentants _QUi si~gent au Consen et l'integrite des gouvernements dont vous ~tes tous, Messieurs, les porte-parole. On dirait vraiment qu'il souhaite ici une defaite. Quant aux motifs exacts de cette etrangemanreuvre, nest difficile deles p(metrer. 32. Non seulement les Etats-Unis acceptent que le ConseU examine les accusations soYietiques, mais ils le desirent vivement. Et nous voulons qu'il examine aussi nos accusatiOns. Nous sommes convaincus qu'un examen honn~te et approfondi des faits nepeut aboutir qu'a une seule conclusion, a savoir que le GouverneD..i.ent sovietique a accompli un acte'illegal et essaie de le camoufler par des propos inconsid6res. 33. Pour conclure, je dirai que nous ne cherchons pas ici a nous defendre. Nous n'avans rien fait qui nous oblige a nous defendre. NoUlS voulons que le ConseU se prononce sur cet acte criminel et insense de piraterie commis par l'Union sovietique, de sorte que nos hommes, actuellement detenus illegalement, soient rel~ches et que le monde puisse a nouveau respirer plus librement. 34. M. KOUZNETSOV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit durusse]: Je demanderai la parole plus tard pour repondre au representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique; pour l'instant, jemebornerai a deux observations. 35. J'aimerais declarer d'abord que tout ce qu'a dit le representant des Etats-Unis pour faire croire que le bombardier militaire americain RB-47 n'a pas penetre dans l'espace aerien de l'Union sovietique n'est que pure invention fabriquee de toutes pi~ces pour tromper le peuple des Etats-Unis et l'opinion :J;D.ondiale. Tous savent qu'il ne suffit pas de parler avec emphase de "donnees [d'] ••• appareils scientifiques". Ces paroles ne reposent sur aucun fait, et les cartes, si joliment presentees soient-elles, sont un faux. 36. On pourrait demander au representant des Etats- Unis s 'u croit vraiment que ces effets tM~trauxauxquels la delegation des Etats-Unis au Conseil a de plus en plus souvent recours ces derniers temps convainquent qui que ce soit. n est grand temps qu'u ne consid~replus le Conseil de securite comme des treteaux montes pour des representations aU'~ effets faciles. 37. -Le bombardier americain arme RB-47, qui accomplissait une missiond'espionnage etde diversion, a viola la fronti~re de 1'Union sovietique etpenetre dims son espace aerien, commettant ainsi un acte agressif contre notre pays. Les organisateurs de cet acte doivent en assumer la responsabilite. 38. Le representant des Etats-Unis cherche hypocritement a. jouer avec les sentiments des femmes, m~res et proches parents des membres de l'equipage du RB-47. Son attitude est d'un cynisme sans precedent. Nous comprenons parfaitement les sentiments des femmes et des m~res des membres de l'equipage. J'aimerais a cet egard dire aM. Lodge que la respon- I irJ 39. It is well known that this is notthe first occasion on which the Pentagon and those sanctioning its activities have senselessly played with the lives of subordinates in the pursuit of their aggressiYepolicy. It is high time for an end to be put to this. 40. My second comment is as follows. The Soviet Union is categorically opposed to the holding of any investigation whatever, and to the establishment ofany commission. The Security Council has been furnished with exhaustive data, attesting clearly and definitelyto the aggressive character of the flight of the United States RB-47 bomber which was brought down in the Soviet Union's air space. The proposal for the establishment of a commission to conduct some sort of investigation can have only one object: to confuse an entirely clear issue, to deceive publicopinionandthus to allow the organizers of the provocative flight to escape responsibility. The essential thing, therefore, is not to establish a commission but to condemn the aggressor and call him to order. 41. Of course, I completelysweep aside, as malicious and brazen slander against the Soviet Union and its people, the statements which have just been made concerning the policy of the Soviet Union. It is not difficult to see that the supporters of a stronger cold war policy, of which the United states representative has here appeared as advocate, are attemptingto shift responsibility from the guilty to the innocent, to deceive public opinion. But nobody, by fraudulent methods and intrigues, willmanageto concealfrom the people the truth about the peaceable foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 42. The Soviet Government has consistently advocated, and still advocates, the lessening of tensions in international relations, the preservation and strengthening of universal peace, and the development in every conceivable way of relations and contacts, on a basis of equality, between all peoples. 43. Mr. Lodge's statement unfortunately does not indicate that the United States Government alsowishes to follow this course. On the contrary, that Government obviously intends to continueits peace-endangering policy of aggression in regard to the Soviet Union~ 44. Sir J>ierson DIXON (United Kingdom): Inbringing this matter before the Council today, the Government of the Soviet Union has charged the Government of the United States with a "flagrant violation ofthe frontiers of the Soviet Union". They speak of a provocative act, endangering peace. The specific pretext for these charges is an alleged infringement of Soviet air space over the Barents Sea on 1 July by an aircraft of the United States Air Force. The aircraft in questiontook off from Brize Norton, England. 39. On sait que ce n'est pas la premi~refois que le Pentagone et ceux qui en approuvent les agissements jouent stupidement avec la vie de leurs subordonnes au nom de leur politique agressive. n est grand temps dry mettre fin. 40. Je passe a ma deuxi~me observation. L'Union sovietique se prononce categoriquement contre toute enqu~te et contre la creationde toute commission. Des donnees extr~mementcompletes, qui etablissentclairement la nature agressive du vol du bombardier americain RB-47 abattu dans l'espace aeriende 1'Union sovietique, ont ete fournies an Conseil de securite. La proposition tendant a creer une commissiond'enqu~te ne peut avoir qu'un but: embrouiller une affaire parfaitement claire, tromper l'opinion pnblique et permettre ~i aux instigateurs du vol provocateur d'echapper a leurs responsabilites. C'est pourquoi il importe non pas de creer une commission, mais de condamner l'agresseur et de le rappeler a l'ordre. 41. Bien entendu, j'ecarte categoriquement comme une calomnie haineuse etimpudenteaI'egardde1'Union sonetique et de son peuple les paroles qui ont ete prononcees ici a propos de la politique sovietique. n n'est pas difficile de voir que les partisans de la recrudescence de laguerre froide, dont le representant des Etats-Unis s'est fait ici l'ayocat, cherchent a rejeter leur faute sur autrui et a tromper l'opinion mondiale. Mais personne ne,reussirapar des procedes frauduleux et des machinations a dissimuler aux peupIes la verite sur le caracterepacifiqUe de la. poUtique etrangere de l'UIiion sovietique. 42. Le Gouvernement sovietique atoujours preconise et preconise de nouvean une detente dans les relations entre Etats, le maintien et le renforcement de la oaix universelle,le developpement maximum des rapports et des contacts entre tous les peuples, sur un pied d'egalite. 43. ·La declaration de M. Lodge nepermetmaTheureusement pas de penser que le Gouvernementdes Etats- Unis soit dispose i\ s'engager dans cette voie. An contraire, il semble que ce gouvernement aittoujours l'intention de mener a l'egard de l'Unionsovietiquesa politique agressive et dangereuse pour la paix. 44. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais]: En portant cette affaire devant le ConseiI de securite, le Gouvernement de 1'Union sovietique a accuse le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'une "nolation flagrante des frontieres de 1'Union sovietique", d'un acte de provocation qui menace la paix. En 1'oecurrence, le pretexte de ces accusations est une violation de l'espace aerien soYietique par un appareil de l'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis, qui aurait.eu lieu le 1er juillet au-dessus de la mer de Barents. L'appareil en question avait decolle de Brize Norton, en Angleterre. 46. Her Majesty's Government in the UnitedKingdom has reliable evidence to show that the aircra.,.ft never went within thirty miles-I repeat, never within thirty miles-of the Soviet coast. We were able to determine the position of this aircraft and our information fully tallies with the United States estimate just explained to the Council by Mr. Lodge. 47. Here I wish to stress our confidencein President Eisenhower's undertaking on the matter ofoverflights, the effectiveness of which the representative of the Soviet Union called in doubt onFridaylast. The fact of the matter is that the entire flight of tillS RB-47 aircraft was, and was_planned to be, in international air space. There is nothing illegal about that. 48. One naturally asks oneself the question: why has the Soviet Government called the Security Councilinto session on this incident? I must say that I can see no cause here for a Soviet complaint, much less for the creation of an international incident. 49. Members of the Council will have noticedthatthe representative of the Soviet Union on Friday spoke of the United Kingdom Government as maintaining "a policy of directparticipationin aggressive acts against the Soviet Union". That is what he said. He spoke also of orders given to the Soviet armed forces "to take appropriate action ••• withrockets"-"withrockets"- against, as I understand him, the airfields from which aircraft such as the RB-47 take off. This, surely, is extraordinary language, and against it I must voice an emphatic protest. I simply cannot understand how the representative of the Soviet Union can reconcile such threatening language with the professed desire of his Government, reiterated most recently in the explanatory memorandum supporting the request for discussion of the present item, to do everything possible to avoid involving the world in the calamities of a new war [S/4385]. 50. Frankly, I find itverypuzzling. Itdoes, of course, happen both with individuals andwithGovernments that they first embark on an allegation whichlater appears to be untenable, and then are driven to great lengths by the logic of their own original fallacious position. I may add that of course we do not admit the allegation of the representative of the Soviet Union that we have no contl"ol over thebases we have made available to the United States in the United Kingdom or over the use made of them. 47. Je tiens ici a affirmer notre confiance dans l'engagement pris par le president Eisenhower en ce qui concerne le survol des territoires etrangers, engagement dont le representant de I 'Union sovietique a, vendredi dernier, mis la valeur endoute. Laverite est que le vol de l'avion RB-47 a ete, et devait ~tre, effectue en totalite dans l'espace aerieninternational.ll n'y a rien d'illegal a cela. 48. Une question vient tout naturellement a l'esprit: pourquoi le Gouvernement sovietique a-t-il demande la convocation du Conseil de securite pour examiner cet incident? Je dois dire que je ne vois aucune raison a une plainte sovietique, moins encore iUacreationd'un incident international. 49. Les membres du Conseil auront remarque que le representant de I 'Union sovietique a dit vendredi du Gonvernement du Royaume-Uni qu'il est "directement complice des actes agressifs diriges contre l'Union sovietique". Ce sont ses propres termes. II a aussi parle de l'ordre donne aux forces armees sovietiques "de prendre ••• les mesures appropriees, y compris l'emploi de fusees" - je rep~te "y compris l'emploi de fusees" - contre, si j'ai bien compris, les bases aeriennes d'ml decollent des avions comme le RB-47. C'est la, assurement, un langage extraordinaire, contre lequel je suis oblige de protester de la fa90n la plus energique. II mtest impossible de comprendre comment le representant de I'Union sovietique peut concilier un langage aussi mena9ant avec le desir que professe son gouvernement de faire tout ce qui est en son ponvoir pour eviter d'entrainer le monde dans les calamites dtune nouvelle guerre, desir que ce gouvernement a reaffirme tout recemment dans le memoire explicatif [S/4385] destine a appuyer sa demande de convocation du Conseil. 50. En toute franchise, cette attitude me sembletres deconcertante. II peut arriver, bien entendu, a des individus comme a des gouvernements de se lancer dans des allegations qui se rev~lent ensuite insoutenables et de se laisser alors emporter tr~s loin par la logique d'une position viciee des I 'origine. J'ajouterai que, naturellement, nous rejetons l'allegationdu representant de I 'Union sovietique selon laquelle nous ntaurions aucun controle sur les bases du Royaume- Uni que nous avons mises a la disposition des Etats- Unis, ni sur l'utilisation qui en estfaite. 10 "In these circumstances, it appears that the allegations contained in the Ministry's Note under reference were based on false premises andthatthe Government of the USSR has no groundfor protesting about events which took place on July 1. On th.e contrary, the Government of the USSR bears a heavy responsibility for the action of the Soviet pilot who shot down the United states aircraft in international air space." I continue the quotation from the Note: "Her Majesty's Government view with the utmost seriousness this unprovoked attack,whichillustrates the danger implicit in the present instructions tothe Soviet armed forces. Her Majesty's Government cannot agree that theuse ofUnitedKingdomterritory by the United States Air Force for legitimate operatiom in international air space can in any way be regarded as aggressive action, and accordingly cannot accept the allegations containedinthe Ministry's Note." 52. I take this opportunity to express the sympathyof my delegation with the wives and relatives of the gallant airmen who were the victims of this unprovoked attack while doing their duty over internationalwaters. 53. From what I have said it will be apparent that it is the view of Her Majesty's Governmentthatthe facts of this case do not supportthe Soviet charges and that, therefore, allegations of"aggression" and of "provocation" fall to the ground. Neither the charges made against Her Majesty's Government, nor the charges made against the United States of America, can be sustained. The question naturally arises again of why the Soviet Union has chosen to act as it has; why it has brought these charges before the Security Council. 54. A rather sinister phrase was used by the Soviet representative on Friday, when he describedthe flight of the RB-47 as preparation for war. I cannot really believe that Mr. Kuznetsov does not understand the distinction between preparations for war and precautions taken to reduce the risk of surprise attack. I can assure him once again thatthe Britishpeople have no desire Whatsoever for war. They have experienced war and have, as a result, all the greater desi.re for peace. 55. No country undertakes with pleasure the vast expenditure entailed by modern armaments. Speaki..ngfor 52. Je saisis cette occasion d'exprimer lasympathie de ma delegation aitx femmes et aux parents des courageux aviateurs qui ont ete les victimes de cette attaque sans provocation alors qu'ils accomplissaient leur deYoir en effectuant un vol au-dessus des eaux internationales. 53. n ressort de ce que j'ai dit que, de Pavis du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste, les faits en cause ne justifient pas les accusations sovietiques et que, par consequent, les allegations d'''agression'' et de "provocation" s'effondrent. Les accusations formulees contre le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sont tout aussi insoutenables que celles qui ont ete portees contre les Etats-Unis d'Amerique. La question se pose naturellement la encore de savoir pourquoi1'UnionsoYietique a agi comme alle 1'80 fait et pourquoi elle a porte ces accusations devant le Conseil de securite. 54. Le repdsentant de 1'Union sovietique a employe vendredi une expressionpassablementsinistre quandil a qualifie le vol du RB-47 de preparation a la guerre. J e ne parviens vraiment pas ~ croire que M. Kouznetsov ne fasse pas la distinction entre des preparatifs de guerre et des precautions visant ~ rEiduire le risque d'une attaque par surprise. Je peux lui donner a. nouveau l'assurance que le peuple britannique n'a pas le moindre desir de faire la guerre. n a 1'experience de la guerre et son desir de paix n'en est que plus grand. 55. Aucun pays n'engage avec plaisir les enormes depenses qu'exigent les armements modernes. En ce 56. However, strongly as we desire progress ondisarmament, the first responsibilityofgovernmentisthe security ofthe nation, and a threattothis security must be judged inthe light ofthe attitude and actions of those countries which appear to threaten it. 57. For their greater security, the countries forming the Atlantic alliance have banded themselves together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is purely defensive in character. I need hardly remind members of this Council that the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty concluded on 4 April 1949, inthe preamble to that Treaty reaffirmed their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments. I may also recall that the 'l'reaty, while recognizing theprimaryresponsibility of the Security Council for the mai.nten;mce of international peace and security, invoked the right ef individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter. The North Atlantic Treaty is thus fully consistent with the Charter. 58. I can assure members of this Council that it is the intention of the United Kingdom tofulfil its obligation as a member of NATO. We are certainly not to be separated from our allies by threa.ts or unduly disturbed by propaganda designed to disrupt these defensive arrangements taken for collective security. 59. The Soviet attitude over the flightoftheRB-47 on 1 July is all the more puzzlinginthat they themselves engage extensively in reconnaissance activities. Wein the United Kingdom have for a long time known that Russian reconnaissance aircraft carry out intelligence-gathering flights. There is, of course, one difference between these operations and the onewhich led to the recent Barents Sea incident. It is this. We and our Western allies are not in the habit of shooting down military aircraft carrying out operations in international·air space. 60. Similarly, we in the United Kingdom are frequently subjected to the annoyance of seeing Soviet trawlers, which we know are fitted withelectronic and technical equipment required to intercept radiotransmission in the United Kingdom in close proximity to our own territorial waters, or in close proximity to areas where naval exercises or Western military research activity is carried out. We do not, however, proceed to sink the trawlers. The same thing applies to the numerous unidentifiedsubmarines recentlyfound lurking in the neighbourhood of United Kingdom naval exercises and, indeed, in suspicious circumstances which suggest that they are carrying out electronic 12 initiative~ sovietiques. 56. Si ardent, cependant,que soitnotre desir d'obtenir des resultats en matiere de desarmement, le premier devoir d'un gouvernement est d'assurer lasecuritede la nation, et les dangers qui menacent cette securite doivent ~tre juges en fonction de 1'attitude etdes actes des pays d'oll semblent venir ces dangers. 57. Pour renforcer leur securite, les pays de l'alliance atlantique se sont unis auseindel'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN), dont le caractere est purement defensif. Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler aux membres duConseilqueles Etatsparties au Traite de l'Atlantique nord, conclu le 4 avril1949, ont, dans le preambule de ce traite, reaffirme leur foi dans les buts et les principes de laCharte des Nations Unies et leur desir de vine en paix avec tous les peuples et tollS les gouvernements. Enoutre, le Traite, tout en reconnaissant la responsabilite principale du Conseil de la paix et de la securite internationales, invoque le droit de legitime defense, individuelle ou collective, reconnu par l'Article 51 de la Charte. Le Traite de l'Atlantique nord est donc parfaitement compatible avec la Charte. 58. Je puis assurer les membres du Conseil que le "Royaume-Uni a 1'intention de remplir les obligations qui lui incombent en tantquemembredel'OTAN. Nous . ne nons laisserons certainement pas separer de nos allies par des menaces, nitroublerparunepropagande destinee i\ disloquer des arrangements defensifs pris en vue d'assurer la securite collective. 59. L'attitude sovi~tiqueau sujet du vol duRB-47 est d'autant plus surprenante que 1'Union sovietique se livre elle-m~me i\ des activites de reconnaissance tres importantes. NOllS savons depuis longtemps, au Royaume-Uni, que des avions de reconnaissance russes effectuent des vols destines i\ recueillir des renseignements. n y a, naturellement, une difference entre ces operations et celle qui a provoque le recent incident de la mer de Barents, et c'est celle-ci: noS allies occidentaux et nOllS-m~mesn'avons pas l'habitude d'abattre des appareils militaires qui executent des operations dauB l'espace aerien international. 60. De m@me, nollS avons souvent, au Royaume-Uni, le deplaisird'observerdes chalutiers sovietiques, dont noussavons qu'ils sont equipes du materiel electronique et technique necessaire pour intercepter les 6missions radio-6lectriques faites surleterritoire du Royaume-Uni, i\ proximite immediate de nos eaux territoriales ou bien encore desecteurs oilontlieu des manoouvres navales ou des recherches militaires faites par les puissances occidentales. Malgre cela, nollS ne coulons pas les chalutiers. On peut faire la m~me remarque i\ propos des nombreux sous-marins non identifies qui ont ete recemm,ent trouves rOdant non loin des eaux oU se deroulaient des manmuvres 61. If I mention these activities, it is only to show that this Council really wonld have to be in virtually permanent session if the United Kingdom Government were to make an issue out of, and seek to create an international incident over, every separate occasion. on which we were overlooked, or overheard, by the Soviet Union. . 62. In exercising resttaint about Soviet intelligencE:: acthities, the United Kingdom Government is greatly influenced by the conviction that nothing but harm can come of attempts to makeinternationalincidents out of what are, strictly speaking, legitimate activities in international waters and air space. 63. We also recognize that activities of this kind unfortunately do reflect facts of life inthepresent int~r­ national climate. In present conditions,where aircra..6 and missiles canoperate atgreat ranges, Governments are obliged, as a matter of self-defence, and in the absence of internationally agreed measures, to guard against surp:t;.se attack, to keep themselves informed of the capabilities and dispositions of foreignmilitary forces. For this purpose reconnaissance by aircraft and by ships in international airspace and waters iff' commonly employed. 64. However much one may deplore the lackofinternational confidence which renders such activities necessary, there is nothing legally wrong in using international air space andinternationalwaters to gain necessary information of this sort. We in the 'United Kingdom reglU'd these activities not as the cause of tension but rather as a symptom of the tension which undoubtedly exists. 65. I mow that this Council is well aware of the continuing efforts made by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to do everything within its power to contribute to a lessening of tension. If this is to be achieTed, all concerned must co-operate to minimize incidents which inevitably arise from time to time in the prel3ent unsettled state of the world. It is for this reason that we are so puzzledbythe apparent disposition of the Soviet Union to dopreciselythei opposite, to distort and magnify the incidentwhichthe Councilis at present considering. We frankly cannotunderstandwhy they should wil3h to create an international crisis out of this incident. . 66. The Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, was moved to write a personal letter to Mr. Khrushchev on 19 July to express to him his anxieties about the way in which the world situation was developing and aboutthe apparent new trend in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Mr. Macnullan reminded Mr. Khrushchev that he had consistently welcomed andgivenmuchweightto assurances of the Soviet Government's desire for peaceful coexistence and "detente" in international 13 61. Si je mentionne ces activltes, c'est seulement pour montrer que le Conseilsiegeraitpratiquement en permanence si le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni decidait de porter la question devant le Conseil ou de chercher i\ creer un incident international chaquefois que 1'Union sovietique surveille ses activites ou ecoute ses communications. 62. Si le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni fait preuve de retenue ausujet des activites de renseignement sovletiques, c'est en grande partie parce qu'il est convaincu qulil ne peut etre que nuisible de chercher i\ creer des incidents internationauxi\propos.de ce qui, i\ strictement parler, constitue une activite legitime dans les eaux internationales et l'espace aerieninternational. 63.. Nous reconnaissons aussi que des activites de cet ordre refl~tentmalheureusement une situation de fait due au cllinat international actuel. Dans les circonstances presentes, 00 les avions et les fusees ont un rayon d'action tres etendu, les gouvernements, en l'absence d'un accord international, sontobliges,pour assurer leur legitime defense et se premunir contre une attaque par surprise, de se tenir au courant des possibilites d'action et des dispositions des forces arIDees etrang~res. A cette fin, on fait couramment appel i\ la reconnaissance aerienne et navale dans 1'espace aerien international et dans les eaux internationales. 64. Si deplorable que soit le manque de confiance internationale qui rend ces activites necessaires, il n'en reste pas moins q1:.?il n'y a rien d'illegal ~ utiliser l'espace aerien international et les eaux internationales en 'VUe d'obtenir des renseignements de cette nature. Le Royaume-Uni consid~re ces activites non pas comme la cause .de la tension internationale, mais bien plutat comme le sympt8me d'une tension d!lnt 1'existence est indiscutable. 65. Le Conseil n'ignore pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste dans le Royaume-Uni ne cesse de faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour contribuer i\ diminuer la tension internationale. Pour que ces efforts soient couronnes de succ~s, ilfaUt quetodes les parties interessees coop~rent pour rMuire au minimum la portee des incidents qui, dans l'instabilite actuelle du monde, se produisent inevitablement de temps i\ autre. C'est pourquoi nons trouvons si deconcertant que l'Union sovietique semble disposee 1 faire exactement 1'inverse en denaturant et en grassissant l'incident dont le Conseil est saisi. Nons ne p'"'uyons franchement comprendre pourquoi elle ch.~.i."che 1 creer une crise internationale i\ propos de cet incident. 66. Le Premier Ministre, M. Macmi1lan, a ete amene i\ adresser le 19 juillet une -lettre personnelle 1 M. Khrouchtchev pour lui faire part de son inquietude i\ propos de llevolution des evenements dans lemonde et de la nouvelle tendance qui semble se manifester dans la politique etrang~re sovietique. M. MacMillan. rappelait dans cett;e lettre qulil avait toujours favorablement accueilli les assurances donnees par le Gouvernement sovietique de son desir de coexistence Mr. Macmillanwent on to say: wI simply do not understand what your purpose is today.- 67. This must surely be the questionwhichbaffiesthe members of this Council as a whole and, indeed, Governments and peoples throughout the world. The action of the Soviet Government in preventing the summit meeting froni taking place, in breaking off disarmament talks at a moment when real progress was in prospect there, in taking up positions in this Council which are better calculated to raise the temperature than to help to cool it down-all these things are disturbing as well as puzzling. 68. These actions, and the language adopted by the representative of the Soviet Union, do not, as 1 have already said, accord well with the expressed peaceful aims of the Soviet Union. They do not accord with the Sonet Government's own statements about the desirability of letting the dust settle. Nor are they responsive to the terms of the Council's resolution of 27 May 1960 [S/4328], which, as Mr. Kuznetsov himself has reminded us, called uponmembers to refrainfrom any action which might increase tensions. 69. In our view" therefore, the allegations madebythe Soviet Goyernment in connexion with the flight of the RB-47 on 1 July, and the language in which these allegations and the Soviet draft resolution are couched [S/4406] would have been unfortunate even were they based-I repeat, eTen were they based-on an accurate rendering of the. facts of the case. As it is, it seems clear that the Soviet charge must ba rejected by the Security Council, which must regL'et that the Soviet Government has taken a step calculated to heighten rather than to reduce the fears and'amdeties all too preTalent in the world today. 70. There is a Tery sharp contrastbetweentheterms of this SOYiet draft resolution and the proposals made by the United states, now incorporated in the United states draft resolution [S/4409] which Mr. Lodge has just put before us. In these, there are no recriminations, no allegations, no proyocations. Instead, the Goyernment of the United states proposes that they and the Government of the SOYiet Union should agree peacefully to resolve these differences arising out of the aircraft incident of 1 July on the basis of an impartial investigation into the facts. 71. GiYen the SOYiet action in destroyingthis aircraft on a legitimate missionoyerinternationalwaters,with the loss of men entailed, this does seemto me a most moderate and reasonable offerandonewhichIstrongly urge the representative of the SOYiet Union to accept. M. Macmlllan poursuivait: "Je ne comprends "Teritablement pas quel but est aUjourd'hui le v8tre.- 67. Cette question deroute certainement aussi tons les membres du Conseil ainsi que les gouvernements et les peuples du monde entier.. Le Gouvernement sovietique empAche la r6union de la conference "an sommet", rompt le8 pourparlers sur le desarmement au moment meme oill'on ponvait en esperer un progr~s reel, adopte au Conseil de securite una attitude plus propre Aechauffer les esprits qu'Ues apaiser - tout cela est Ala fois inquietant et deconcertant. 68. Ces actes, ainsi que le langage employe par le representant de l'Union soTi6tique,sont,commejel'ai dejA dit, difficiles Aconcilier avec les buts pacifiques que l'Union sOYietlque pretend mer. ne ne sont pas en harmonie avec les declarations du Gonvernement sovietique lui-m8me sur l'avantage qu'll y a Alaisser s'apaiser les esprits. ne ne sont pas non plus conformes aux termes de la resolution duConsellen date du 27 mai 1960 [S/4328] qui, comme M. Kouznetsov lui-m@me l'a releTe, fait appe.l A tons les gouveronements Membres pour qu'ilS s'abstiennent de tout acte ~ pourrait accroftre les tensions. 69. A notre avis, par consequent, les allegations du GoUTernement sovi6tique Apropos du vol du RB-47~ ainsi que les termes employes dans ces allegations et dans le projet de resolution sovietique [S/44061, auraient ete regrettables mAme si ces allegations avaient ete fondees - je re~te. mAme si elles avaient ete fondees - sur un compte renduexactdesfaits.Tel n'etant pas le cas, il semble evident que le Conseil de securite doit rejeter les accusations sovietiques et exprimer son regret que le Gouyernement sOYietique ,ait agi en vuc d'accroftre et non pas de diminuer les craintes et l'anxiete qui ne sont que trop repandues dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. . 70.' n y a un contraste tr~s marque entre les term.as de ce projetde resolutionsOYl6tf.que etles propositions des EtatB-Unis qui figurent maintenant dans le projet de resolutio~ [S/4409] dont M. Lodge vient de nous, donner lecture. Ce projet de resolution ne contient ni recriminations, ni allegations, ni provocations. Au contraire. il tend 1 ce queleGouvernementdes Etats- Unis et le Gi:lUYernement de l'UnionsOYletiquesemettent d'accord pour resoudre de fagon pacifique le differend souleTe par l'incident du ler juilletaumoyen d'une enqu8te impartiale sur lea circollf\tances de cat incident. 71. Si l'on consid~reque l'Union sOYletique a d6truit cet appareil alors qu'll accomplissait une mission legitime au-dessus des eaux internationales, atapr~ "Toque ainsi la perte de 'Ties humaines, cette offre me semble des plus moderees et des plus raisonnables et j'engage Tivementle representant de 1'Unionsmetique Al'accepter. j

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has requested that the Security Council be urgently convened to examine the question of "New aggressive acts by the Air Force of the United States of America against the Soviet Union, creating athreat to universal peace". 74. A few days ago the Soviet delegation was asking for a meeting of the Security Council to examine alleged aggression by Belgium against the Congo. Afew days later the Soviet delegation was again denouncing allegedly aggressive acts by the United States, this time against the revolutionary Government of Cuba. 75. How many aggressions can there be, one might wonder, and what dark designs doestheWesternworld entertain, at any rate if the Soviet Union is to be believed. The words "aggression", "aggressive" and "aggressor" occurred no less than thirty-eight times 'in the statement of Mr. Kuzrietsov, the Soviet Deputy Minister for ForeignAffairs on22July[88Othmeeting]. Yet did he nothimselfsaythatincessantrepetition of a single word does not make it true? 76. These alleged acts ofaggressionappearto.obsesB the Soviet Union to an extent that is 'surprising in so great a military power~ Is the Soviet Union really so afraid of aggression by theWesternpowers or is it not rather seeking to seize the most varied pretexts to arraign the Western countries-and moreparticularly the United states of America-before world opinion, using the Security Council as a forum. 77. I observe also that in his statementof22 July the Soviet representative did not hesitate to revert to the question of Cuba, although it had no direct bearing on his subject. What is more, he did so in terms which I cannot accept since he asserted that the consideration of Cuba's complaint by the Security Councilhadshown that the United States intended to use every means to strangle the young republic and to bring the people of Cuba to their knees. That is not, I believe, the conclusion reached by the Councilorthe sense of the resolution it adopted. h&;it~ A reTenir, dans son expOB~ du 22 juillet, sur l'affaire de Cuba. n l'a d'ailleurs fait en des termes auxquels je ne puis souscrire puisque, d'apr~s lui, l'examen de la plainte de Cuba par le Conseil aurait revele queles Am~ricainsavaient1'intention d'~touffer par taus les moyens, y compris l'intervention militaire, cette jeune r~publique et de mettre le peuple cubain 1 genoux" Or, ce ne sont pas, me semble-t-il, les conclusions qu'a adoptees le Conseil, nilesens de la resolution qu'll a vot~e. 78. By its accusations and denunciations, in support 78. Par ses accusations, par ses denonciations qui, of which., as we shall see, no acceptable evidence is nous le verrons, ne reposent pas surdespreuvessufproduced., and by the threatswhichaccompanythem, is fisantes, par les menaces dont elIe les accompagne, not the Sonet Union helping to create a state of dis- 1'Union sovi~que ne contribue-t-elle pas 1 creer un trust and tensie,n which is unfavourable to the mainetat de m~fiance et de tension, qui est contraire au tenance of peace" of which the Soviet Government so maintien de la paixdontsongouvernementseproclame vehemently claims to be the champion? The Soviet si hautement le d~fenseur? Le Vice-Ministre sovie- Deputy Foreign Minister has calledthe WesternNATO tique a trait6 de bloc agressif les pays occidentaux countries an aggressive bloc. Since my country is a r6unis au sein de l'OTAN. Puisque mon pays en fait 15 d~ Vice-Mini~tre des affaires etrang~res de 1'Union sovi~que, M.. Kouznetzov,- durant son -expos~ le 22 juillet [880~ seance]. Ne n~ avait-U pas pourtant declar~ lui-m~me que la repetition· inlassable d'uri m~me mot ne suffit pas Aen faire une verite? 76. De ces pretendus actes agressifs, l'Union sovietlque manifeste une veritable hantise, qui c~rrespond bien peu A la grande puissance militaire dont elIese prevaut. Redoute-t-elle 'uaiment Acepointune agression des puissances occidentales., oune cherche-t-elle pas bien plutat lsaisir les pretextes les plus divers pour meitre en accusation devant l'opinion mondiale, et en se servant du Conseil de securite, les pays occidentaux - et plus particuli~rementles Etats-Unis d'Amerique? 77. Je constate aussi que, sans lien direct avec son sUjet, le repr~sentant de l'Union sOYi~que n'a pas 79. Mr. Kuznetsov asserts that the American RB-47 aircraft was shot down in SoYiet territorial waters because it had violated Soviet air space and that the intrusion constituted a clear case of aggression as defined in internatiorial law. 80. I shall deal in the second part of my statement with the question whether or not anyviolation of Soviet air space occurred. But I would point outbefore going further that there is no international definition of aggression and that ~ recent years various committees have made fruitless attempts to draft one. Even if we accepted the Soviet Union draft definition of 3October 19571' as a criterion the flight of theRB-47, if it flew over Soviet territorial waters-which has yet to be prove8-could not be regarded as an act ofaggression and recourse to force. 81. The SoYiet representative hasboastedofthe great patience and moderation shown by his Government in merely shooting downtheRB-47 aircraft andnotbringing the Soviet air force and rockets into action. It would have been an act of unbelieYable fony to have done so. We have too much faith inthe Soviet Government's intelligence, cool judgement and sense of international responsibility to believe that it couldfor a single moment have considered takingsuchcounteraction to deal with an incident of this kind. Its action in shooting down the RB-47 was in itself disproportionate to the graYity of the offence which would have been committed if the aircraft were proved to have violated Soviet air space. I regretthe resultant loss of human lives, for which the Soviet authorities are responsible. My regret is the greater because the widow of Captain Palm, who was killedinthe incident, was French by birth. Although she has become an American citizen by her marriage,we stillfeel for her as a fellow Citizen, especially at this time of trial and tribulation. The French delegation wishes to assure Mrs. Palm and her children of its sincerest sympathy. 82.. The Government of the Union of SoYiet Socialist Republics requested that the Security Council should be urgently convened to examine the question of these wnew aggressive acts by the Air Force of the United States". It has repeated and specificallystatedthatthe question required immediate examination. If that was the case, it is surprising that it waited thirteen days, until 13 July, before bringing the incident which ocfronti~resfranQaises. 79. M. Kouznetsov affirme que l'aYion americain RB-47 a ~e abattu dans les eaux territoriales sonetiques pour avoir viola 1'espace aerien de 1'Union sovietique, et que cetteintrusionconstituaitune agression caracterisee suivant la definition de ce mot en droit international. 80.Je reserve pour la seconde partie de mon expose la question de savoir s'il y a eu ou non violation de l'espace aerien sovietique. Mais qu'il me soit permis de rappeler d~s maintenantqu'iln'existepasdedefinition internationale de l'agression et que, au cours des annees derni~res,diverses commissions ont cherche en vain h l'etablir. M~me en prenant comme element de jugement le projet de definiti~n presente par l'Union soTi6tique le 3 octobre 1957'Y, ilne serait pas possible d'admettre que le Tol du RB-47, si celui-ci avait panetre au-dessus des eaux territoriales sovietiques - ce qui reste h demontrer -·soit un acte d'agression et constitue un recours h la force. 81. Le representant de 1'Union soTietique a vante la grande patience et la grande moderation dont aurait fait montre son gouvernement en secontentantd'abattre l'avion RB-47 etenne mettantpaa en action l'aviation et les fusees sovietiques. n n'eQt plus manque qu'ille 1ft! Nous croyons trop hI'intelligence, au sangfroid dU Gouvernement J;lovietique et h son sens des responsabilit~s internationales pour estimer qu'il ait pu penser un seul instant, en faced'unpareil incident, h recourir h une telle riposte. En faisant abattre le RB-47, il a dejh pris une mesure qui depasse de beaucoup la gravite du delit qu'aurait commis cet avion sril etait prouve qu'il avait Ylolel'espaceaerien soTietique. Je regrette la responsabilite des pertes de Ties humaines qu'ont assumee, a. cet egard, les autorites sovietIques. Je la regrette d'autant plus quela veuve du capitaine Palm, tue dans cet incident, etait franQaise de naissance. Si, par son mariage, elle a acquis la nationalite americaine, elle n'en reste pas moins sentimentalement pour nous une compatriote, surtout h l'heure de l'epreuve et-du chagrin. La delegation franQaise tient h assurer Mme Palm etses enfants de sa sympathie la plus sinc~re. 82. Le Gouvernement de 1'Union des Republiques socialistes sOTietiques a demande que le Conseil de securite se reunisse d'urgence pour examiner la question de ces "nouveaux actes agressifs" commis ,par les forces aeriennes des Etats-Unis. n a repete et specifi6 que cette question exigeait "un examen lmmediat". Si tel etait le cas, comment ne pas sr~onnerqu'il ait attendu 13 jours pour soumettre au y Docum~nt A/C.6fL.399 (mim~ographi~):le textedecedocumentest identique 11. celui du document A/AC.77fL.4: voir Documents officiel.sde l'AssembMe g~nerale, douzi~me session, Supplement No 16, annexe 11. sect. 1. 84. None of these means has been employed by the Soviet Government. Afterten days ofsilence, itbrought these charges against the Government of the United States and without making any attempt at negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, appealed to the Security Council. 85. It is the Council's function to ensure that peace is maintained. It is notproperthat certainof its mem.,. bers shouldusethe highestorgans ofthe United NatioD.!!l for purposes for which they were not intended, in particular to maintain an atmosphere ottension~- 86. In his statement the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs explained thattheRB-47, anAmerican six-engined reconnaissance bomber, violatedthe State frontier, of the USSR in the Barents Sea north of Cape SYyatoy Nos near the Kola'Peninsula on 1 July 1960, tliat 'it refused to comply with the instructions of a Soviet fighter and that it was consequently shot down by the fighter in USSR territorial waters. The United States representative, for his part, has explained the flight plan of the RB-47 in detail and has described the manoeUTl'e employed by the SOYiet fighter, which flew in from the north, that is from the open sea, to force the RB-47 to enter USSR air space, how the RB-47 broke away, and how it disappeared 320 kilometres from the place where the Soviet Government reported that it had come down. 87. In denouncing what he described as this further aggression, this further provocation by the United States of America, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that after the incident no one could be inany doubt concerningthe realpurpose of the solemn assurance given by the President ofthe United States concerning the order he supposedly gave that overflights of Soviet territorybyUnitedStates aircraft should cease. 88. I reject that interpretation. Indeed the assurance given by the ~esident of the United States is one of the facts which particularly leadme to doubtthat there has been a further violation of Soviet frontiers by an American aircraft. The word of the President of the United States is not only that of a Head of State; it is also that of a great soldier whose sense of honour is known to each of us. Can anyone believe that he would have given this undertaking voluntarily unless he was determined to abide by it and also was in a position to ensure that it would be respected? fronti~res sovietiques. La parole du President des Etats-Unis n'est pas seulement celle d'un chefd'Etat, elIe est aussi celle d'un grand soldat dont nOlls connaissoDS tom; le sentiment de l'honneur. Qui pourrait penser qu'11 aurait spontanement pris pareil engage-- ment non seulement s'il n'etait pasfermement decide A sly conformer, mals en outre s'11 ne disposait pas 17 85. Le r~le du Conseil est d'assurer le maintien de la paix. n nefaudrait pas que certains de ses membres utilisent les plus hautes instances des Nations Unies ades fins auxquelles elles ne sontpas destinees, surtout en vue d'entretenir un climat de tension. 86. Dane 'Son expose, le Vice-Ministre des affaires etrang~res de l'Union sovietique nous a explique que, le 1er juillet 1960, leRB-47,bombardieramericainde reconnaissance 1 six moteurs, avait viole lafronti~re d'Etat de l'Union sOYietiquedanslamerdeBarents, au nord du cap SviatorNos, pr~s de lapeninsule de Kola, avait refuse d'obtemperer aux injonctions d'un avion de chasse soTietique ~t avait enconsequence ete abattu par celui-ci dans les eaux territoriales de l'Union soYietique. De son cOte, le representant des Etats- Unis nous a retrace de mani~re precise le plan de vol du RB-47, nous a raconte la manoouvre a laquelle i1 ,avaitete soumis d~ la partde l'avionde chasse soYiatique venant du nord, c'est~h-dire de la haute mer, pour le forcer a entrerdimsl'espaceaeriende l'Union sovietique, comment il s'etait degage et comment 11 avait disparu 1 320 kilom~tres du lieu indique par le Gouvernement sovietique comme ayant ete celui de sa chute. 87. En denon~ant ce qu'il a appele cette nouvelle agression, cette nouvelle provocation des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, le Vice-Ministre des affaires etrang~res de l'Union sovietique a indique qu'apr~scelapersonne ne pouvait encore douter des buts veritables de l'assurance solenneUe fournie par le Presidentdes Etats- Unis concernant 1'ordre qu'll estcens6 avoir donn6 de . mettre fin au survol du territoire sovletique par des avions americains. 88. Contrair~ment a cetteinterpretation,l'assurance fournie par le President des Etats-Unis est un des faits qui m'am~nentparticum~rement1 douter qu'il y ait eu nouvelIe violation par un avion americain des 90. If the Soviet authorities were soanxioustoestablish a further 'Yiolation of the frontiers of the USSR, why did they shoot down this aircraft over territorial waters where no trace would remain?Whydidthey not wait until the aircraft was oyer land, where ml investigation would have been possible? In his account of the U-2 incident, the Soviet representative told us [857th meeting] that his Government had been anxioUs to have clear proof of the responsibility of the United States aircraft and bad allowed it to penetrate over 1,000 kilometres into Soviet territory, to the heart of Russia, over the town of SverdloYSk, before shooting it down. Why didtheSoviet authorities follow a different course in the case of the RB-47?Evenif their account of the fact is correct, was there any real urgency about shooting the aircraft down? At the speed of 900 Idlemetres an hour mentioned by Mr. Kuznetsov it would take only one and a half minutes to cross territorial -Waters. If I have understood correctly, the Sovietpilot was able to determine accurately the precise instant at which Soviet territory was violated, signal his instructions to the RB-47 and shoot it down, all within a space of less than ninety seconds. Was it possible or necessary to act so quickly? Would the evidence not have been vastly more convincingiftheSovietpilot had Waited a few minutes longer? In this connexion, it 1$ worth noting that according to the Soviet Deputy Minister's statement, the American aircraft apparently made no attemptto getaway and,fly out to sea~ which would have explained, althoughitwould certainly not.. have justified, its pursuer's haste. But Mr. Kuznetsov has categorically stated that the aircraft, despite the instructions of theSovietfighter, continued on its course towards Archangel. Why was it not allowed to commit a flagrant violation of Soviet territory oyer the Kola peninsula or over the mainland? This argument applies even if the aircraft did not fly straight into Sovietterritorialwatersbutcrossedthem obliquely, following the line of the coast. 91. The Soviet 'representative's explanations leayeus 91. Les explications donn6es par le representant de in 'Very considerable doubt. That doubt can only be PUnion sovietique laissent un grand doute dans notre removed by establishing the facts with certainty and 'esprit. Cedoute,onnepourraledissiperqu'en etablisthere is only one way of doingso,to obtain statements sant de mani~re certaine les faits. n n'y a pour cela from the members of the crew held by the Sonet qu'un moyen, c'est de faire parler les membres de Government and to do so in conditions which ensure 1'6quipage detenus par le Gouvernement sovietique, et that they will speak freely andthatthe other party will de le faire dans des conditions qui garantissent qu'ils not be able to challengetheir statements.Why does the's'exprimeront en toute liberte et que leurs declara- Soviet Government refuse to do this and merely give 'tions ne pourrontpas @tre contestees par1'autrepartie. us its version of the statements made by Lieutenants Pourquoi le Gouvernement sonetique s'y refuse-t-il McKone and Olmstead? Why has itmerely informedus et se contente-t-il de nous donner sa version des d6- of their account of their flight instructions instead of clarations des lieutenants McKone etOlmstead? Pourproducing a statement on the incident it$e1£, made by quoi ne nous a"foir rapporte de leurs dires que ce qui the surviving airmen in the presence of United States concernait leurs instructions de yol et non leur recit l ~==~o~~.:.\':"':~=':::::l':: ~~ :w~':"';~= ~":~~~Ati~':~ j lumi~re des cartes dont je disposais. Qu'il me soit permis de dire qu'elles ne m'ont pas paru convaincantes. 90. Si les autorit6s sovietiques attachaient une telle importance! etablir unenoUYelle violation des fronti~res de l'Union sovietique, pourquoi avoir abattucet appareil au-dessus des eaux territoriales oil aucune trace ne pOUTait ~tre conservee? Pourquoin'avoirpas attendu qu'il seft1t engage au-dessus de laterre ferme, ,pil des constatations eussent616possibles?Enrelatant l'incident de l'U-2, le repr6sentant de l'Union sovi6- tique nous avait indique [857~me s6ance] que son gouvernement avait tenu a prouver clairement la responsabilite de l'avion americain, qu'il l'17;"ait 'laisse s'engager aplus d'un millier de Idlom~tr6~ en territoire sovietique, et que c'est seulement lorsqu'il, avait ete au coour de la Russie, au-dessus'de la Ville de Sverdlovsk, qu'ill'avait fait abattre. Pourquoi les autorites sOYletiques en ont-elles use differemment ayec le RB-47? M~me si l'on admettait leur th~e, y avait-il veritablement urgence a abattre cet avion? A la vitesse de 900 Idlom~tres Altheure que nous a indiquee M. Kouznetaov, la traversee des eaux territoriales ne dure que 1 minute 30 secondes. Si je comprends bien, l'aviateur sovietique apudeterminer avec precision l'instant exact de la violation duterritoire, faire des injonctions au RB-47 et l'abattre. Et tout cela a <id necessairement se produire en moins d'une minute et demie? Etait-il possible, etait-il ~e­ cessaire de choisir ce court instant? N'eilt-il pas ete fnfinfment plus probant d'attendre quelques minutes de plus? D'autant que, suivant l'expos6 du Vice-Ministre sovietique, l'appareil americain n'aurait nullement cherch6 A s'esquiver et 1 regagner la haute mer, ce qui aurait pu, je ne dirai certainemep,t pas justifier, 'mais expliquer la hate de son poursuivant. Mais M. Kouznetsov nous a formellement indique que Pappareil, malgr6 les semonces de l'avion de chasse sovi6tlque, poursuiTait sa route vers Arkhangelsk. Pourquoi alors ne pas 1'avoir laisse commettre une 'Violation flagrante du territoire sovietique, soit dans la peninsule de Kola, soitsur la terre ferme? Et ce raisonnement Taut anssi bien si l'avion aTait aborde non pas perpendiculairement, mais diagonalement lea eaux territoriales sovietiques et lea avait en quelque sorte suivies. 92. The account we have heard from the Soviet representative thus leaves many questions unanswered. It does not contain the conclusive evidence which alone could justify the grave chargesbroughtby his Government against the Government of the United States. In reply the Council has heard a categorial repudiation by Mr. Lodge, whose account of events differs radically from that given by the Soviet representative and is an indictment of the Soviet Government. In the face of such conflicting evidence and uncertainty, how could the Security Council condemnthe Government of the United States before the facts have been established beyond a doubt? The first step must be to ascertain the facts and there is only one way of doing so, by conducting an investigation by agreement between the parties and by interrogating the two survivors in completely acceptable conditions. Until the Soviet Government has proved its case to the hilt and has refuted the United States representative's submissions, we shall not be able to recognizethat it was justified in shooting the RB-47 down, or thatit has the right to detain the survivors ofthis disastrous incident for which it has assumed responsibility. Itis incumbent on the Soviet Government to defend itself against the American a.ccusations, just as much as it is for the United States Government to defend itself against the Soviet alleg, tions. For that reason my delegation cannot vote for any draft resolution asking us to condemn the United States authorities without proof. For that reason, also, in its desire to see the whole question cleared up, my delegation welcomes the. United States proposal, which calls specifically for a joint inquiry, and asks that the detained airmen should be released so that they cantestify andthus contribute conclusively to the establishment of the truth. 93. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'espagnol): Le Conseil reprendra 1'examen de cette question demain

The Council will resume consicf,":::'a'tioa of this itemtomorrow at 10.30 a.m. ~ 10 h 30. The meeting rose at 1 p.m. Annex Y CHARTS SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE COURSE OF HIS STATEMENT AT THE PRESENT MEETING CARTES PRESENTLES AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE PAR LE REPRESENTANT DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE AU COURS DE SON INTERVENTION A LA PRESENTE SEANCE Chart No. 1. Planned route of the RB-47 aircraft. Carte No 1. Itineraire prevu pour l'avion RB-47. Carte No 2. Parcours detaille (prevu et effectif) de l'avion RB-47, le 1er juillet 1960. Chart No. 2. Detailed flight path (planned and actual) of the RB-47 aircraft, 1 July 1960. (See maps at end of fascicle) .V This annex was circulated under the symbol S/PV.881/Add.l. La seance est levee a13 heures. Annexe Y (Voir cartes a la fin du fascicule) y La presente annexe a paru sous la cote S/PV.88l/Add.l. AIRCRAFT ...."'. :./'"..:, ••'>:.~... .~s~,". 'V' .' / / ;' CHART No. I iI I II , ~--_.L_ i I I I I I I I I I \ \ I I I ~ .c f{M & ." r ';;\ { E A It S \ 1\' I'e iIiIUL. ~L .20 40 ,20 40 .20 40 CHART No. 2 CARTf: N° 2 IU,VU H f:FFI::CTIF) Df: L'AVION RB·47, Lf: ler JUILLH 1960 \ \ I \ \ I I I \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ A ML, . ";;io' 40 ~s I \ I I \ I I I \ \ .FM. 7! G HM J \ \ N NI- 40 " ".20 '':0' • ':l'o' ·...0 KI,. NI., ·'~b' , .- ., .20 •• •• • •- 1 E .. - A R ••• k B ... \:\ •• \,. \ \ \ 1 \ \ 1 \ AK \ t K PK ION CLOSESt POIKt -.. \ \ i IOr \ 1 ;;.._ '~Io" ARGENTINA-ARGENTINE Editorial Sud"mericana, S.A., Alsin" 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRAlIA-AUSTRALIE Melbourne University Press, 369/71 L"ns- dale Street, Melbourne C.l. AUSTRIA-AUTRICHE Gerald & Co., Graben 31, Wien, 1. B. Wullerstarlf, Markus Sinikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. 8ELGIUM·8ELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S.A., 14·22, rue du Persil, Bruxelles. BOllVIA·BOLlVIE Libreria Selecdones, Casilla 972, La Paz. 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