S/PV.886 Security Council

When the Security Council, at the request of the Secretary-General, met and de~- etded, on 14 and 20 July 1960, to go to the assistance of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, tt had three specific objectives in mind: one, to provide the Congolese Government with such military aasistance ag to enable itto re-establish security and order in the Republic: two, to render such technical and economic assistance as might be necessary to tide over an intermediate period, in the hope that a sound and lasting solution of the country's problem might eventually be achieved; and, three, toeffect the speedy withdrawal] of the Belgian troops. 56. Thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General and his able staff, the result so far achieved, while not final, has certainly heen most impressive, Over 10,000 troops of various nations are now in the Congo serving under the flag of the United Nations.'A reasonable measure of security and order has been established. Except in the province of Katanga, Belgian troops have been withdrawn. At the same time, food, fuel, medical services, as well as technical assistance of a very basic nature, have heen rushedto the Congo. This is an achievement of no mean magnitude, This can truly be sald to be the biggest single effort ever undertaken by the United Nations, 7. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to pay jite tribute to the Secretary-General, to his ‘able steff, end to all the Governments ofthose States which heave oo-operated with him in this enterprise, sober optimism on the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General, in his report, makes it clear that "The difficulty which the Council faces inthe case of the Katanga doss not have its root in the Belgian attitude regarding the problem" [S/4417, para. 10}. 89, The Belgian Government has assured the Secretary-General that it "acquiesces in the Security Counell decisions and therefore undoubtedly will instruct its military elements in the Province to act in accordance with the resolutions as implemented by the United Nations Force®* [ibid,}. 60. That is the first saving feature of this problem of Katanga. Secondly, the problem is not, and again I quote the Secretary-General, "one of a wish of the authorities of the province to secede from the Republic of the Congo, The question is a constitutional one with strong undercurrents of individual and collective political aims" [ibid.]}. 61, Quite a few countries in the world have faced or are even now facing similar problems and similar conflicts .between those who favour a strong central government and those who favour strong and important powers for the local government. 62. In the opinion of my delegation, any proposal to solve the present phase of the Congo problem, that is the Katanga phase, must contain three essential elements, 63, First of all, such a solution or such a proposal must make it clear that a United Nations Force in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on 14 and 20 July is entitled to have access to all parts of the Republic of the Congo. 64. Second, such a proposal must also make it unmistakably clear that a United Nationa Force should not, cannot and in fact does not intend to interfere in the domestic political matters of the Republic of the Conga, 65, Third, such a proposal should provide that pending the solution of any constitutional or political problem hetween the province of Katanga and the Central Government of the Republic, the United Nations Force will be responsible for the maintenance of security and order in the province so that Belgian troops can be speedily withdrawn, 66. According to the criterla I have set forth, I find the joint draft resolution sponsored by the delegation of Ceylon and Tunisia [5/4424] to be very impressive. _ if all the authorities involved in or concerned with the Congo problem trust the United Nations and co-operate with the Secretary-General, we all stand to gain, and first of all the people of the Congo stand to gain, If, on the other hand, any important party distrusts the United Nations and obstructe its operations, we all stand to lose, most of all the people of the Congo, 67, This crisis requires full support for the United Nations programme and full co-operation with the 69. First, the Secretary-General's report [8/4417 and Corr.1, Add,i/Rev.1 and Add.2] together with the verbal explanations he gave us this morning (884th meeting] clearly reveal both the seriousness of the situation and the efforts he has made to secure compliance with the Council's resolutions, Once again, the Argentine delegation declares that it has every confi~- dence in the Secretary-General and fully endoreesthe guiding principles he has followed in his whole handling of this problem. 70. Second, the intervention of United Nations forces in the Republic of the Congo was designed solely to re-establish public order and avoid the international complications to which disorder could give rise. It was not designed to interfere in the domestic affairs of the country or to support the central authority against the local authorities or vice versa. AsI stated on 21 July 1960, "this is a problem which concerns purely and simply the inhabitants of the Congo and which they themselves must solve" [878th meeting, para. 130]. Neither the United Nations nor any State has the right to meddle in the problem of Katanga, in so far as domestic jurisdiction is concerned, either to recommend or order integration or to encourage secession, 71, This has been made perfectly clear by the Secretary=General in his instructions of 4 August to Dr. Ralph Bunche [see $/4417, para, 8]. We believe, nevertheless, that the Council shouldexplicitly confirm this principle of non-interference which is in keeping with the obligations imposed by the Charter and with the spirit of the two resolutions we have adopted, 72, Third, we share the view that the character of the United Nations Force in the Congo should not be altered, We therefore consider that the Secretary- General acted wisely and correctly in postponing ita entry into the province of Katanga inthe face of threats of organized military resistance which might have led to hostilities on a large scale. Such operations would have been incompatible with the nature of the United Nations Force and with the purposes for which it had been sent. At the same time, we cannot but condemn the attitude of the local authorities who have defied the Secretary-General's decisions taken in pursuance of the Council's resolutions and have sought—as far as they could—to undermine the prestige and authority of the United Nations, 73. Fourth, two Council resolutions clearly stipulated that Belgian troops must be withdrawn from theterritory of the Congo. These resolutions made no distinctions and-contained no qualifications, They referredto all the troops in the Congo regardless of geographical location, They apply, therefore, to all troops stationed in any of the six Congolese provinces, including na- 75. This observation was valid at a time when these troops were the only ones available for restoring order in the Congo and capable of fulfilling that essentially humanitarian mission, It would no longer be validnow that there are 12,000 men of the United Nations Force in the Congo, instructed by the Council to fulfil this mission, Furthermore, the international dangers inherent tn the continued presence of Belgian troops have increased, It provokes the threat of unilateral intervention by non-African Powers and raises doubts about the efficacy of United Nations action, 76. We therefore feel that it is not only necessary but a matter of extreme urgency that Belgian troops should begin to leave the territory of Katanga at once and should complete their evacuation within a fixed pertod. We also consider that it is part of the obligations of Belgium as a State Member of the United Nations to co-operate actively with the United Nations and to facilitate, as far as possibie, the implementation of the Council's resolutions, 77. In taking this position, we wish to state that we cannot support any proposal which involves condemning the Belgian Government's attitude in this emergency, That would amount to contradicting the statement— which in our view is completely justified—made by the Secretary-General in his report: "The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of Katanga does not have ita root in the Belgian attitude regarding the problem ..." [S/4417, para. 10]. If this isthe case—and we believe that it is—to adopt an attitude of condemnation would be to disregard the evidence we have before us. 78. Fifth, in view of the urgency of the situation, the Council must take immediate action and must indieate to the Secretary-General, as he requests in his report, the practical methods he should use in his future action. 79. I accordingly believe that we must grant the _ Secretary-General broad powers ao that he may secure compHance with the Council's resolutions by proce~ dures he considers appropriate in the-light ofthe cir~ cumstances, No one will be in-a better position than he, since he will be on the spot, to assess those circumstances and to take considered action. In other words, he will be able to determine what lines United Nations action should follow and to discuss with the Congolese authorities all matters related to the entry of the United Nations Force into areas to which it has not yet gained access. 80. I believe that we should confine our directives ‘to this Force to the two I have already mentioned, 81. Sixth, we must make an urgent appeal tothe good gense of all the parties already involved in this conflict and of all those who might become involved in it. We need not stress the gravity of the situation confronting ua, Not only the independence of the Congo and the tranquillity of the whole African continent but the peace of the world depends on the triumph of good sense over hatred, political ambition and recklessness. I hope therefore that the eppeals with which I wish to conclude my statement will not be taken as elther impertinent or pedantic. 82. We appeal to the Central Government of the Congo to have faith in the impartiality with which the United Nations and the Secretary-General are acting for the benefit of the country and with no other interest but that of peace, We cannot conceive that they should he misunderstood or insulted by the principal bene= ficlaries of an action undertaken with such disinterestedness and altruism, 83, We appeal to the Belgian Government to facilitate the achievement of a solution and to implement imme~- diately its repeated declarations that it does not pursue its own interest in the Congo, In these cases, appear~ ances count for almost as much as intentions, and for their sake Belgium should allow no doubt tearise concerning the definitive nature of its withdrawal from the Congo. 84, To the African countries we again state our con~ viction that their moderating influence is a decisive factor for the solution of this serious conflict and that the world trusts in the maturity which they have reached in the exercise of their newly~won independence. 85. Lastly, toe the non-African Powers we would point out that any intervention on their part, outside the framework of the United Nations, would not be interpreted by impartial opinion as the result of a sincere desire for justice but rather as interference prompted by a greed for power, These Powers must also understand that any action ontheir part wouldbe followed by counteraction and that the line between that and a generalized conflict would be dangerously easy te cross, 86. The delegations of Ceylon and Tunisia have submitted a draft resolution [5/4424], which coincides in the main with the views I have just put forward. As in the previous case, it is inspired by adesire to achieve eonstructive solutions which do not prejudice the parties but which reflect the urgent need to end the erisis. The Argentine delegation will therefore vote in favour of it. 87. In so doing, my delegation associates itself with the hope expressed by other delegations that those members of the Council who disagree with the draft on specific points will neverthelesa support it as a 88. For its part, the Argentine delegation will support any action by the Council which tends to confirm our determination to continue to work for peace in Africa and in all parts of the world. 89, Mr, LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): For the thirdtime the Security Council is faced withthe necessity to take action—and I hope that it will be prompt, decisive action—in defence of the young Republic of the Congo, From the reports of the Secretary-General, as well as from the information supplied by the Congolese Government, the following picture of the present situation in the Conzo—or, fo be more precise, in the province of Katanga—can be drawn, The Belgian Government, acting under the pressure of the second resolution [8/4405] of the Security Council, adopted on 22 July 1960, began te withdraw its troops from certain arzas of the Republic of the Congo and startedte concentrate them in the prevince of Katanga, The occupation of that province ‘ place after the oppesition of the Congolese army . ‘civilian populetion had been broken down by force, In che course of their invasion of the territory of Katanga the Belgian troops caused heavy losses among the soldiers of the Congolese Army and the civilian population of the province. The occupation of Katanga gave military support to the small group of pro-Belgian elements in Katanga and enabled the Governmert of Belgium to organize a movement for the secession of the province from the Goyernment of the Congo. 90. In order to keep its troops in Katanga for an indefinite period of time the Belgian Government has unilaterally construed an entirely baseless interpretation of the Security Council resolutions which, in no ambiguous terms, demanded that the Belgian troops be withdrawn from the territory of the Conge. According to that interpretation, the Belgian Government maintaine that it does not have to withdraw its troops as long as they are not replaced by the troops of the United Nations Force. This is especially convenient in Katanga, where the group of local politicians, headed by Mr. Tshombé and dependent on Belgian military power alone, is being used to oppose the entry of the United Nations Force into the province. This set-up provides the Belgians with a very comfortable arrangement, Officially they can elaim that they do not oppose the execution of the Security Council's resolutions, while at the same time, taking advantage of the unilateral interpretation of these decisions, they delegate the work of direct and open opposition to the United Nations decisions and actions to this small group of renegade local politicians. 91. The whole operation is, therefore, a simple one. Mr. Tshombé tells the United Nations troops that they cannot enter Katanga, and the Belgians tell them that since United Nations forces cannot come to the province the Belgian troops cannot withdraw. But this is a vicious circle which, as the Secretary~General sald today [884th meeting], must be broken. There is nothing in either of the Security Council's resolutions which would make the withdrawal of Belgian troops #2, If approved, this interpretation would mean noth-= ng less than the acceptance of Belgian troops in the Jongo as part of the United Nations Force, enjoying he same status as the rest of that Force, But that ‘g not how things stand, For Belgian troops are in the Songo as invaders, rightly accused by the Government if the Congo of committing an act of aggression. That accusation, together with the supporting evidence, was zontained in two cables (S/4382] sent, on 12 and 13 July 1960, by President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to the Secretary-General, These two cables yave the impulse to, and the basis for, the Security Council's action on 14 July, 13. We note, however, that teday the Secretary= 3eneral in his statement to the Council gave an inter= yretation of the Security Counci! resolutions of 14 and 22 July different from the Belgian interpretation, He zalled for: "the speediest possible withdrawal of Belgian troops in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, as the presence of those troops now is the main cause of continued danger, a withdrawal that must be complete and unconditional" [884th meeting, para, 19]. We support that statement as well as the Secretary~ General's interpretation that the withdrawal of the Belgian troops irom the Congo, including Katanga and Belgian military bases inthe Congo, shouldbe executed regardless of the United Nations. Force's entry into those regions. 94. The Belgian troops, by their occupation of Katan= ga, are prolonging the aggression against the Republic of the Congo, of which that province is an integral part. They have no right to be there, and their own explanation that they went to Katanga on the request of the local authorities proves only how weak and legal is the position of the Belgian Government in that matter. For it is an accepted principle of inter= national law, of which Brussels must be aware, that a local authority which does not possess any international status cannot dispose of the sovereign rights of the Central Government in any case, much less by inviting a foreign Power to occupy its territory. 95. Here, again, we havea vicious circle, The Beigian troops stay in Katanga, supposedly because Mr. Tshombé wants them to be there, and, in return, they want Mr, Tshombé to stay in power in Katanga, Without their support, he would not be the local chief, just as the Belgians, without Mr. Tshombé, could not have the argument that they are keeping a military hold on the riches of Katanga at his request, 96. There is evidence that the riches of Katanga—its uranium, copper, cobalt, diamonds and many other rare minerals—are of interest not only to the Belgian Government but to other Western countries as well. Evidently, the foreign monopolies do not want the natural resources of Katanga to be used for the benefit of the Republic of the Congo, and we note the reflecand the experiences of the last fortnight have proved that this was necessary, More than two weeks have passed since the Security Council approved the resolution [5/4405] in which, for the second time, it requested that the Government of Belgium speedily withdraw its troops from the Congo. The resolution pave the Secretary-Genera! authorization to take all necessary action to this effect, But, since then, nothing has changed, and the province of Katanga is still occupled by the Belgian army. 98, In these circumstances, and for the reasons just explained, it would be impossible to accept the contention, in the report of the Secretary-General, that: "The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude ... " [S/4417, para, 10], The contrary is proved by the fact that the Belgian troops are occupying the territory of the Congo in defiance of the two Security Council resolutions, and I submit that the Council should draw the proper conclusions from that fact. 99, I wish to dwell briefly onthe request of the Prime Minister of the Congo contained in his cable of 7 August addressed to the President of the Security Councit [8/4421]. It concerns the establishment of a group of observers composed of the representatives of African and Asian countries, whose task would be, as we understand it, to assist in ensuring the prompt and full implementation of the Security Council's decisions on the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the upholding of the territorial integrity of the Congo. I believe that we, the members of the Council, should give our thoughtful attention to this proposal, Asthe Secretary- General correctly indicated in his intervention this afternoon (885th meeting] the proposal dees not imply in any sense. a question of lack of confidence in the execution of future operations on behali of the United Nations tn the Congo. Quite on the contrary, it might provide help to all those who are responsible for the execution of the Security Council decisions regarding the Republic of the Congo, from the Secretary-General down to the last member of the United Nations Force, 100, That this responsibility is heavy, and that those who carry if are meeting with opposition and obstacles which cannot be overcome as speedily as they should, we have seen in the last few days, The recent state~ mente emanating from the Belgian Government, together with the position taken taday by the Belgian Foreign Minister in this chamber [885th meeting], give ample grounds for the fears, shared by many, that any decision that the Council may taketonight for the immediate withdrawal of the Belgiantroops andfor the upholding of the territorial integrity of the Congo again will not be carried out by the Belgians, Thus far, they have not felt obligated by the decisions of the Council when dealing with the Secretary—General and his representatives, It may be that they would find it advisable to change their attitude when facing a group of representatives of Member States most di~ 102, Of course, there is one basic issue in this problem. Were the Belgian troops to be withdrawn from Katanga, the whole question of local opposition would undoubtedly change, if not disappear entirely. 103, As to the second reason for not sending United Nations troops to Katanga on 6 August 1960, as was planned, I can only say the following. We agree that the United Nationa Force in Katanga should not interfere in the internal differences between the Government of the Republic of the Congo and local or provincial authorities in 30 far as these differences have the true nature of an internal conflict. This, bowever, is not the case in the province of Katanga, in which authority resta completely with the Belgian troops, after the crushing of the opposition of the Congolese Army. In these circumstances, to refrain from sending United Nations troops into the province of Katanga would indicate indirect support of Betgian intervention and a direct acquaintance with the occupation of that Province, as well as with the Belelan-ineplred opposition to the Government of the Congo, In turn, such a support would constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo and would serve the Belgian and other colonial interests in that country, 104, This is a very sericus problem. If the Belgian troops will not withdraw from Katanga and if the Government of the Republic of the Congo is prevented, by the act of commission of these troops, or by the act of omission onthe part of the United Nations forces, from exercising its sovereign authority over the whole territory of the Congo, then this would constitute a dangerous gituation which could lead to the dlsmember= ment of the country, Such a scheme might be in existence at present in some quarters in which the operation of the Congolese Government in the whole of the Congo would be made impossible in orderto bring about the collapse of the Government or to create conditions for the occupation of the Congo by an outside authority and for an unlimited duration, which could be used to accommodate foreign interests. If any part of such a scheme were successful, it would nat. only be disastrous to the young Republic of the Congo, but it would have a deplorable effect on this Organization as well. lution, 106, In conclusion, I wish to summarize the position of Poland on the present position in the Congo, First, the Belgian troops must withdraw immediately from the whole territory of the Republic of the Congo, including the province of Katanga and the military bases still maintained by the Belgians in the Congo. The refusal up to the present of the Belgian Government to do this has already consti.ated an open viola= tion of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July. Second, the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo has to be upheld and defended, and all efforts aimed at the disintegration of that country should be decisively and promptly resisted. Third, the Security Council should authorize all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of these two objectives of the United “ations: action, which has been organized and executed a. the request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, 107, Mr. ORTONA (Italy): We have been convened again to consider the second report by the Secretary— General [8/4417 and Corr.1, Add.1/Rev.1 and Add.2] on the United Nations operation in the Congo. 108. My delegation would lke first of all once again to comm end the Secretary~General for the way in which he has discharged his task, in the midst of the most complex circumstances, and for the interpretation given by him to his mandate, The report of the Secretary-General, inthe opinion of my delegation, embodies the spirit of strict neutrality and impartiality and the right appraisal of the limits imposed by the circumstances, in which the United Nations operation wes undertaken and carried out, Ittellsthe story of a great international effort which we must all help to make successful if we want it to go down in history as contribution to peace and co-operation among nations, In this frame of mind, allow me to tender a tribute also to Mr. Bunche, who once again has shown that he knows how to be a great public servant in a worthy cause. 109. Various opinions have been uttered in the last few days about the wisdom and the efficiency of the operation, I think that the situation demands, on the one side, a thorough examination in general of the matter confronting us and, onthe other, the consideration of the specific aspects concerning the province of Katanga. It would be indeed erroneous and inadequate to pronounce our views on such aspects without framing them within the whole perspective of events. 110. From a general point of view my delegation wishes to restate that what has been done in such short time constitutes an encouraging result and basis on which to build a successful future for the 111. In the first stage of the operation, we were concerned with two main factors: on the one hand, the impending collapse of the basic public services In the Congo and, on the other, the danger of any undue outside intervention which could jeopardize whatever hopes of orderly progress in that country might have been in sight. The twe problems, so to speak, were related because, obviously, only the re-establishment of a normally-functioning State and the achievement of order under a Government having authority with the people could guarantee the Congo's Independence and autonomy, and form the prerequisite for a free and prosperous national development, 112, The United Nations mission was conceived, and operates, as a mission of peace, an emergency operation intended to allow the Belgian troops to withdraw and to pave the way for a return to normality. But it was also quite clear from the beginning that to restore order and to guarantee it would not be enough; technical assistance and wide economic efforts would be necessary in order to enable the Congo not only to get on its feet but also to attain its political, sectal and economic alms as a modern State, 113. No one could or should have expected a final solution overnight, In fact, with the exception of the particular situation in Katanga, the achievements of the United Nations in the Congo can be considered an amazing fulfilment of the blueprint for action outlined in the Security Council's two resolutions, Actually we have heard today encouraging data and information which bear witness on one side to the speed and effielency with which the United Nations Force has been built up in Congo, and on the other, to that very fact which has been at the centre of the concern of the Council: the withdrawal of Belgian troops, tobe geared however to the arrival of the United Nations troops a0 that law and order and the protection of the Européans in the country may be ensured, The number of Belgian troops which have been withdrawn is, I think, an eloquent confirmation of those intentions that Mr, Wigny, the distinguished Belgian Foreign Minister, had expressed so formally and solemnly inthis chamber on the 22nd of July 1960 [879th meeting), when he stated to us his Government's readiness to comply in full with the Security Council's resolutions: the facal point of hia commitment being that Belgium would withdraw its troops as soon as the United Nations Force could assume the responsibility of ensuring law and order. In conjunction with this important and fundamental aspect of the situation, let me add that the United Nations action has made possible the arrival in the Congo of supplies of every kind so as to allow the resumption of civil life and activities andthe checking of famine and epidemics, A worthy achievement in a worthy cause, 114, Let me now direct myself to the problem of Katanga, I think that the Secretar'y-General should also be commended for the manner in which he has faced 115, It was therefore necessary for Mr. Hammar= skjold to cancel his plans to send the United Nations Force into Katanga and to revert to the advice and instructions of this Council. I do think again that this was the most correct and only advisable procedure. And that any hint~as has heen suggested inthe Press— of “capitulation vis-a-vis the colonizers", or of un= warranted weakness, is to be viewed as a most objectionable speculation, with clear propaganda purposes, Because, let us face it, those who utter these words of sanctimonious indignation literally would have raised hell if any occurrence with loss of lives and bloodshed had ensued from the entry of the United Nations troops, especially within the local African population. 116, There is in fact a point to which the Secretary~ General, with unusual insight and clarity, calls our attention. That is, the character of the Force and, as a matter of fact, of the whole operation. I do not think that anyone could have the slightest doubt sbout the propriety of the interpretation given by the Secretary- General in this respect, The Force is not entitled to take military initiative and is only entitled to act in self-defence, The Secretary-General had stated that in unmistakeable terms in his first report, [$/4389 and Add.i-6] which constitutes the political and legal basis for the interpretation of the resolution of the Council of 22 July [8/4405],-and everyone around this table had, I am convinced, that particular point in mind when we adopted that resolution unanimously. Now, that particular character of the Force andofthe whole operation stems directly from the fundamental evalua~ tien which the Council in its wisdom has made of the implications of the Congo situation, It corresponds to the instituttonal frame in which, with respect to the Charter, we have since the beginning approached the Congo problem. It ensues, in my opinion, that such character must not be changed now since there is no change in our fundamental evaluation of the problem. What we must do is to devise a way which, in addition to the use of the Force, and leaving to the United Nations Force the same character, would help in at~ taining the objective, which is the rapid and complete implementation of the decision we took in our previous resolutions, 117, It is now on this basis that we have to view the next steps to be taken, First of all, let us consider the technical aspects of the situation—the previous resolutions of the Council, as statedalsoby the Secrestill perform a precious and extremely important task for the economic welfare of the Province, are not a0 overcome by panic as to flee the country, 118, This is a set of circumstances which must be kept in mind, even with more attention and preoccupation than for the rest of the country. We all know that the Katanga province can continue in a prosperous life only if the wheels of production and mining are kept going, and if any breakdown of activity is avoided. And we also know, without embracing any theory of white supremacy or of so-called "imperialistic" per= petuation, that the Europeans still are, and still can be in the future, an invaluable agset to that country, Any attempt to deprive the Congo of the co-operation of as many as 20,000 civilians in Katanga would be a clear indication that certain Governments have no respect whatsoever for the welfare of that country and that they are bent on pursuing their own imperialistic alms at the cost of the distress, sorrow, poverty and desolation of the population that they pretend to protect. 119, We must therefore try in this Council to set forth ways and means, so that the United Nations troops may be allowed to enter the Katanga province, making possible in turn the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. That is where the picture becomes tinted by an element of the situation in the Congo which did not exist clearly in the first stage as a major difficulty: the emergence, that is to say, of a movement, headed by the Premier of the provincial government of Katanga, almed at creating a political bedy in opposition to the Government in Leopoldville, 120. It is obvious that at the very foundation of the Katanga provincial authorities' resistance to the en= trance into that region of the blue-helmeted troops is the fear that United Nations intervention in that part of the Congo might imply an interference in the con< stitutional evolution sought by the Katanga authorities, This is a complex problem, of course, of a domestic 122, But, to revert to our specific duties today, let me say that what is at stake is the full accomplishment of the mission undertaken by the United Nations on the basis of the two resolutions adopted by the Security Council after a request by the Government of the Congo. In order to dothis the Council has to dispel any fear or suspicion that the United Nations operatlon in Katanga would be a means of prejudicing future constitutional arrangements, We must in fact emphasize that the United Nations Force is not meant to intervene in any way in the internal constitutional preblems of the Congo and that its presence in the province of Katanga would not be considered as affect= ing the status of the authorities there vis-a-vis the Government of Leopoldville. That is, I think, our chief duty, so as to make possible that very withdrawal of the Belgian troops whichis called ior in connexion with the entry of the United Nations Force. 123. But there is another aspect ofthe problem which I cannot refrain from mentioning at this stage. Firat and foremost, it ia the duty of all Members to abide by the two resolutions already adopted by the Council, that ig to say, that all Members have to support them and not try to set up anoutside, and often competitive, action, Iam referring to the statements by the Soviet Government of 31 July 'S/4416] and 6 August (S/4418], circulated at its request as documents of the Security Council, which seem to offer anappraisal ofthe Congo situation that everyone, Iam sure, would find hardly in line with the overwhelming will of this Council. Further, we regret to detect in such statements an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to influence with its own political direction the legal action of the United Nations. 124, May I say that I shudder at the thought that the pursuit of propaganda aims can go to such extremes of distortion as to suggest. that the so-called aggressore of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are trying to bring "hunger" to the Congo so as fo achieve their imperialistic aims, I shudder because it 125, In conclusion, what we have to doisto persevere along the lines already set forth and so far successfully implemented, 126. The United Nations cannot and will not impose its views on the Congo. The constitutional evolution of the Congo concerns only the Congolese people. We cannot, however, be blind to the fact that statements and opinions by responsible Congolese persons are of some relevance in easing or worsening the situation, May we therefore join in a friendly appeal to all concerned to keep their heads cool and realize that every false step can have incalculable consequences not only for the world and for Africa but in the first place for the Congolese people, 127. The Belgian Government has agreed tothe withdrawal of the remaining Belgian troops from Katanga, and this fact is certainly a heartening feature of the situation, 128, Ours is a mission of peace, We are not pursuing old-style policies; the attempt is now made to create anew order and to achieve a newform of inte.national co-operation, The situation in the Congo is serious but it can surely improve and eventually be normalized, if only no one intervenes outside the United Nations and if the Government and the people of the Congo realize that the United Nations is their only hope, their best friend and the surest guarantee of their territorial integrity and independence, The theory of "going it alone", notwithstanding the activities displayed by the United Nations Force andthe obligations of the Charter, which we have heard unfortunately echoed too often in the last few days from various quarters, is extremely dangerous and can entail fatal blows to this Organization, And we all know that a fatal blow to the United Nations is a fatal blow to the peace of the world. 129, Our ultimate alm must be to bring about, through the mission that the United Nations has undertaken in the Congo and only through it, the necessary condi-~ tions for the orderly, peaceful and prosperous development of this newly born State in harmony and fruitful co-operation with the community of nations, so ag to ensure to the Congolese people the bright future to which they are entitled as an independent and sovereign State, to put an end to their tribulations so that they may also join fully and actively in the task of shaping for Africa the bountiful destiny that it deserves, a destiny from which the world as a whole may derive new vigour and stability.

I have listened with close attention to the statements made in the Council today by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of the Congo and of Belgium, by members of 131. In his af *: -sent this morning [884th meeting] the Secretary-General described the gravity of the immediate —?‘uation in the Congo andthe various forms of risks which now imperil the success of the United Nations operation. This is clearly «4 difficult and po= tentlally dangerous situation which faces the Council, 132, We should not, however, forget the wide degree of success which the United Nations operation has achieved in putting into eifect the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 July [8/4387] and 22 July [8/4405], This is a great achievement and the United Kingdom Government congratulates Mr, Hammar=- skjold and his staff on the high degree of drive, imagi= nation and organization they have shown in putting inte effect the decisions of the Security Council. 133. We recognize also the important service to the cause of peace made by those countries which have so promptly responded to the Secretary-General's request for contingents to the United Nations Force, For its part the United Kingdom has been glad to contribute by supplying food, transport and logistic support, and remains ready to do its best to meet any further. demands which the Secretary-General may make, 134. However, the United Nations forces have so far been unable to extend their operation into the Katanga province and to assume responsibility for law and order there. This is the obstacle which has led to all the difficulties which now threaten the United Nations operation, 135. What is the real nature of this obstacle which the United Nations forces have encountered? It is, I think, extremely important that we should all beclear on the answer to this question because on that answer must depend our decision asto what the Council should do next. The right answer, I believe, emerges from the Secretary-General's second report. 136, First, it is not because the Belgian Government or the Belgian authorities have sought to prevent the deployment of United Nations forces in the Katanga, The Secretary-General states quite clearly in his report: "The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude regarding the problem, as stated to me..." (8/4417, para, 10]. 137. Members of the Council haye heard the Foreign Minister of Belgium [885th meeting] declare that the Belgian Government was ready and indeed anxious to withdraw ite troops from Katanga the minute the security of Belgian nationals there was ensured Inone way or another, Mr. Wigny statedthat ifthe Secretary=- General declared that he would ensure this without any hiatus, the Belgian troops would withdraw. The Minister added that Belgian troops and officers, in= cluding any in the service of the "Force publique", would not participate in any resistance fo the entry of United Nations forces. 139. I do not, therefore, consider that it can be maintained, as has been argued, that the basic difficulty in the situation lies in the Belgian attitude, and in my view the members of the Council would be deluding themselves if they thought that the problem could be resolved by continuing to concentrate exelusively on this point. 140. There can be no doubt that the separation of Katanga from the rest of the Congo would indeed be a most unfortunate development. It is clear that the province should remain an integral part of the State of the Congo and that its resources must playa vital part in the country as a whole, It would be a tragedy if the wiity of the Congo were not preserved. 141, The internal political dispute which is the real origin of the trouble has arisen because the authorities in Katanga believe that the Congolese constitution should, in the best interests of the Congo as a whole, provide for a high degree of previncial autonomy, 142, The Central Government of the Congo does not share this view. So far the authorities in Katanga have believed that the deployment of United Nations forces in Katanga would jeopardize their possibilities to work for a constitutional settlement other than a strictly unitary one, They fear that the United Nations forces would be used to impose 4 constitutional settlement unacceptable to the majority of the people inthe Katanga, and they have therefore refusedto allowthe United Nations Force to enter the province. 143, In this situation the presence of the Belgian troops in Katanga is a contributing factor, but not the basic one, Thus the basic difficulty, as we see it, is a dispute not between Africans and Belgians but between Africans and Africans. ‘ 144. Her Majesty's Government believes that the attltude of Katanga authorities towards the United Nations Force ig a mistaken one, which we trust they will immediately reverse. The United Nations Force cannot and, as the Secretary=-General has made plain, will not, interfere in what is essentially an internal constitutional dispute, 145, Nor can its troops be used for any purpose other than to ensure the maintenance of law and order. To employ the United Nations Force in any way which mnight give the impression that the United Nations was taking sides in this constitutional dispute would be not only contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter but also in contradiction to the understanding on which the troops were made available by the various sending Governments and on which several other Governments, including Her Majesty's Government, have provided support for the United Nations. 146, I should like, if I may fora moment, to consider the nature of this problem whichis facingthe Congolese spread over a vast area and comprises awide variety of race, language and tradition. This problem of creating a union out of divergent elements is no new one, and history has shown that itis not one which can easily be solved, In the case of my own country a long historical process was necessary before the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland emerged in its present form, 147. Icould point to many other examples, and indeed there are other new countries in Africa where long and detatled negotiation has been necessary before a satisfactory solution of this problem was found, It would indeed be surprising ifthis tremendous problem of working out a constitution best suited to the needs of the people had not given rise to deep and sincerely held differences of opinion. 148, However, the problem is one which only the Congolese people themselves can resolve. 149, It may be that the United Nations, or perhaps individual Member Governments, may in some way be able to assist in bringing together those in the Congo whe held opposing views on this problem, But in the present circumstances the task of the United Nations Force must be restricted to the maintenance of law and order, and it must preserve a strictly neutral attitude toward the constitutional matters in dispute. This applies not only to the United Nations as a whole but to individual Member Governments. While clearly they should use all the influence they may possess with elther party to induce them to come together and settle their differences, individual Member Governments, equally clearly, must refrain from anything in the nature of direct intervention in the dispute, even though they may be invited by one of the parties so to intervene. Intervention of this sort by any Member of the United Nations would only be calculated gravely to complicate matters and turn what is essentially an internal dispute into something very much wider. If the United Nations is to be able to exert its full influence and contribute as it should to a solution of the difficulties, it is essential that individual Member Governments should refrain from any action which might render the United Nations' collective effort more difficult, 150, The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union alleged this afternoon [885th meeting] that the Belgian Government, supported by its partners in NATO, is actively pursuing a policy of severing the province of Katanga from the Congo and attempting to dismember and strangle the young Republic, in the interests of so-called "foreign. monopolists". 151, That is, I think—and [ hope Mr. Kuznetsoy will agree—a fair summary of his argument, though the 153. If I may turn for a moment to the draft resolution presented by the representatives of Ceylon and Tunisia [8/4424], IT should like to say that once again the Security Council is indebted to Sir Claude Corea and Mr, Mong! Slim for preparing a draft resolution which goes far to meet the requirements of the situa~ tion with which we are confronted. I am sure that they will not infer that my delegation has failed to appreclate the thoughtfulness and value of their work if I dwell for a moment on what seems to me to be the major defect of this draft resolution. This is that it concentrates unduly, In our view, on one aspect of the very complicated situation now existing in the Congo and particularly in Katanga. 154. I have already stated the view of my delegation that the continued presence of Belgian troops in that province is in no sense the heart of the problem, Yet, the draft resolution appears to carry the implication that if only the Belgian troops are withdrawn every= thing will at once be solved. I do not believe that the real situation is as simple as that, and I must state the opinion of my delegation that from this point of view there is a certain lack of balance in the text hefore us. 155. As we have been told by the sponsors, the pur=- pose of this draft resolution is to provide the Secretary-General with fresh authority from the Council to preceed with the operation of the United Nations Force in fulfilment of the Security Council's two pre= vious resolutions on dealing with the Congo, I should like to explain my understanding of this draft resolution, Operative paragraph 2 reads: "Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions". 156. We have heard the Foreign Minister of Belgium state that the Government of Belgium is ready to withdraw its troops immediately the United Nations is prepared to assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. This seems to me a clear and un= exceptionable statement. It does not, I think, conflict with the attitude of the United States as expressed by Mr, Lodge earlier in the day when he said: "The time has come for Belgian withdrawal at the earliest moment, under arrangements to be worked security to the people". 158. This is also the view of the United Kingdom Government, which likewise considers that Belgian for: § should be withdrawn as soon as practicable, would clearly be a travesty of the purposes of the United Nations if any over-precipitate withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga as a result of action initiated by this Council were to result in the breakdown of law or to lead to the evacuation of the large numbers of Belgian inhabitants who are so essential to the economic life ofthe Congo, Members ofthe Council will, I know, be mindful of their heavy responsibility of the United Natiens to avoid any steps which might lead to such lamentable consequences, 159. The draft resolution provides for the immediate withdrawal of the Belgian forces "under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General". I must admit that this language is a little obscure to my ear, and I think it would be of value to the Council if the Secretary-General could at some stage indicate how he would interpret it, 160. As has so often happened inthe past, the Security Council, if it adopts this draft resolution, willbe laying a heavy responsibility on the Secretary~General, My Government has entire confidence in the Secretary~ General's judgement in discharging this responsibility and it expects that all those concerned, including the authorities in Katanga, will extend to hiro the active eo~operation which he has the right to expect, 161. Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution reads: "Reaffirms that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise". I take it that this paragraph is intended as a response to the proposal made by the Secretary-General in his statement this morning that the Security Council should formulate: ‘principles for the United Nations presence, which, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Caarter, would safeguard democratic rights and protect the spokesmen of all different political views within the large entity of the Congo so as to make it possible for them to make their voice heard in democratic forms” [884th meeting, Jara, 27]. 1 take it that if the Council adopts this paragraph of the draft resolution it will be its intention that the United Nations Force should operate on the basis of the principles described in this passage in the Secre-= tary-General's statement. 162. As the Secretary-General indicated in his statement, the Jouncil must be aware that beyond even the gravity of the situation in the Congo, there is the shadow of a greater danger. One aspect of this is the 164, No one here, I think, will deny that the United Nations has jin recent years proved an essential instrument for the containment of disputes which would otherwise have become serious dangers to peace. The United Nations has, I believe, served particularly well the cause of all the emerging peoples and countries in Africa and Asia, and rightly so. Ido not believe that there ia any Member ofthe United Nations who in their interest would wish to diminish the prestige and authority of the United Nations or can afford to do so, 165. With these grave issues at stake, any Government must surely recoil from taking any action with regard to the situation in the Congo independently of the United Nations operations there. For this reason, my Government earnestly appeals to all concerned to lend theiy fullest and most sincere support to the Secretary-General and to the United Nations Force in their vital task of easing a situation of potential international conflict and of contributing to the well-being and happiness of the young Republic of the Congo.

I eall on the Secretary-General, who wishes to reply to the question put to him by the United Kingdom representative,

The repreaenta~ tive of the United Kingdom asked me how I would interpret the phrase “speedy modalities determined by the Secretary~General". It may he natural if [hesitate a little bit to venture an interpretation at this stage of the debate, 168. For me, necessarily, the malin interpretative document will be my own statement this morning [884th meeting], to which I regardthis draft resolution asa reply, But I think perhaps that, in that light, T can risk an attempt to explain how I look at the position, 169, T readthe phrase "speedy medalities" asa recog= nition of the need for me—and I repeat "for me"—so to implement the request for immediate withdrawal ad= dressed to the Government cf Belgium as to provide for an orderly development within the limits of the possible, as determined also by factors over which others than we are the masters and, of course, with due regard to the overriding needs of the situation, 170, Thus J read the phrase quoted by the representative of the United Kingdom as entitling me, inter alia, to have regard to the concern expressed by this very Council that there should be effective and continued maintenance of law and order, This will not slow down the withdrawal provided that, as the Security Council has a right to expect, the Belgian Government and Mr, Tshombé—and those whe may support him—give their full and immediate co-operation. There are also other related considerations which must influence me in determining the modalities. May it suffice to remind the Council of what Isaidthis morning regarding 171, The PRESIDENT ftransiatedfrom French): Does any representative wish to speak again at this stage - of the proceedings? It is my understanding that the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to speak a little later. If no one wishes to speak now, I shall do so myself as the representative of FRANCE, 172. The Secretary-General presented his second report to the Council and commented upon it at the beginning of our present discussion. He provided us with a clear account of the measures which he and his colleagues have taken and he summarized the results already achieved, The results are on the whole satis= factory and I should like to call attention te one point in this connexion, The Secretary-General tells us that "all the Belgian troops have withdrawn from all regions in Congolese territory where there are now United Nations troops" [8/4417, para. 4]. Coming from the Secretary-General himself that statement cannot be questioned, Belgium has therefore fully complied with the Council's request and has withdrawn its troops wherever order and security have been guaranteed by the arrival of United Nations units, It is only proper that we should recognize that fact and express our appreciacion. 173, The Secretary-General goes on to describe the difficulties he is experiencing in carrying out his task and the problem which he has still to solve-—the problem of Katanga. I shall return to that point later. But before I leave the report I should like to call attention to this sentence from the section dealing with Katanga: "Thus the United Nations is faced with no problem of Belgian opposition." [Ibid.] Belgium is therefore fully exonerated; it formally stated that it would abide by the Council's decisions and its actions show that it has done so. 174, These two statements are enough to demolish the charges which have again been levelled against Belgium in the Council and to show that they are unfounded, I do not propose to comment at any length on the attacks made by the Government of the Soviet Union in the notes it has had distributed to the Council and in the statements of the Soviet representative. I do not believe that the Seviet Union can pose before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) States ag the champion of freedom and the emancipator of nations, Its record would have to be different ifit was going to play that role. My own country, which will have led thirteen African nations to independence this year, has nothing to learn from anyone in this respect. 175, As for the Beigian troops, an attempt is being made to make them the scapegoat for all the Congo's difficulties, Their immediate withdrawal is repre= sented as the panacea which will solve allthe Congo's difficulties, The disturbances and acts of violence and brutality that have been committed are, we are told, the result of the presence of Belgian troops. The fact 176, In his most recent statement [885th meeting] the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has again conclusively shown that Belgian units were brought in during the disturbances and outbreaks of violence solely in order to ensure the safety of Belgian nationals. The Belgian Government's actions have fully demonstrated the truth of that statement, Mr. Wigny has told us how many troops hadbeen withdrawn and repatriated. He also told us how many troops are stilt in the country and how eloquent those figures are and how utterly af variance with the rumours spread by ill-intentioned persons! He also gave us a formal assurance that the troops in Katanga would be withdrawn, like the others, when the United Nations was in a position to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order and security in the province. 177, I wish now to comment more specifically on the problem of Katanga. My Government recognized the Republic of the Congo with the territories under its jurisdiction on the date of its independence, It was that Republic, comprising the same territory, whose admission to the Wnited Nations was recommended by the Council on 7 July 1960. My Government has refrained from responding to any approaches concerning a division of the country. It believes that the unity of the State is essential to its prosperity and must be safeguarded in one form or another. It is convinced that the sooner the Congolese administration is restored and the Government at Leopoldville proves its effectiveness, the more easily will this objective be attained, i78, In his report, the Secretary-General analysedthe difficulties raised by the Katanga problem in a way that deserves the most careful attention, He says: "The problem for those resisting the United Nations Ferce in Katanga may be stated in these terms: Will United Nations particination in control of security in Katanga submit the prcevince to immediate control and authority of the Central Government against its wishes? They consider this seriously to jeopardize their possibility to work for other constitutional solutions than a strictly unitarian one, e.g. some kind of federal structure providing for a higher degree of provincial self-government than now foregeen. The spokesmen for this attitude reject the unitarian formula as incompatible with the interests of the whole Congo people and as imposed from outside.” [S/4417, para. 10.]_— - para, 6]. 180. We are well aware of the difficulties whichhave arisen between the Central Government and the pro=} vinclal authorities, While we must bear these difficulties in mind, they are not in any way within the Council's competence, They are constitutional, political and administrative in character. They are internal affairs with which we are not concerned, except to declare that the United Nations is completely and entirely impartial in the matter. That is in fact the Secretary-General's view in the matter; he said: *This is an internal political problem to which the United Nations as an Organization obviously cannot be a party." [Ibid. para, 10.) 181. My delegation fully supports these views. It further considers that once a State has hadthe honour to be selected by the United Nations to co-operate in the implementation of a Security Council resolution, ita forces can no longer undertake an action other than that decided upon by the international Organization, In such circumstances, there can be no question of any threat of individual action. The Security Council has given the Secretary-General a mandate. No one, and least of all those who have been asked to provide military assistance, has the right to challenge its deeision and recommendations, 182. A further consideration must also be taken into account in regard to the Katanga problem. We must not forget that United Nations forces were gent to the Congo to restore order, to put an end to acts of bru~ tality and the mutiny of the "force publique" and to stop the disintegration of the Central Government. The situation is quite different in the province of Katanga. There order and security have been successfully maintained by the local authorities. There have been no riots or violence of the kind that has occurred elsewhere, in the province of Leopoldville in particular. This may account for the suspicion the Katanga authorities may have entertained on learning that United Nations troops were about to enter their province that an attempt was being made to ensure that constitutional issues which are still to be discussed would be settled on the lines desired by some members of the Leopoldville Government, 183. My delegation welcomes the position taken in thia matter by the Secretary-General in his report, We hope that every reassurance will be given to the Katanga authorities that the relief of Belgian troops in the province by United Nations contingents will in 84, In concluding this brief review, I should like to xpreas to all the Congolese people my delegation's arnest wish that they will be able to solve their amporary differences in the interest of the peace and rosperity of their country. 85, I turn now to the text of the draft resolution ubmitted by the representatives of Ceylon and Tunisia 3/4424), 86, Mr. Wipny told usthat his Government was ready > withdraw its troops from Katanga as soon ag they ould be relieved by United Nations units andthe latter ere able to assume responsibility for order and acurity. The time that this will take does not depend n the Belgian Government but onthe speed with which 1¢ United Nations forces act and the speed and effiiency with which the Secretary-General has so far ated and on which we are unanimous in congratulating im guarantee that the time taken willbe no more than 1 strictly necessary. 87. The draft submitted dees not, we believe, take yto account the facts as set out by the Secretaryfeneral in his report and does not take cognizance of 1@ measures taken by the Belgian Government to give ffect to the Council's resolutions. Despite the proof iven by the Belgian Government of its respect for re Charter, the draft resolution submitted to the ‘ouncil, coming after the resolutions of 14 [8/4387] ad 22 July [8/4405] may reasonably give the impresion that it is directed against Belgium alone. preuves 88. Moreover, it seems to my delegation that the asurance requested by the Belgian Government canot in fairnesa be refused, Justice and honour do not low Belgium to abandon the protection of its nationals 8 long as that protection is not guaranteed, in Katanga s elsewhere in the Congo, by United Nations forces, fhich of our Governments would have acted difrently if it had been placed in the same position? or these reasons my delegation cannot approve operaye paragraph 2 of the draft resolution submitted by 1¢ delerationa of Ceylon and Tunisia. 39, I shall perhaps be told that the answer required y Belgium need not be mentioned in the text and that is self-evident. My delegation did not oppose the revious resolutions which were, it was explained, rafted in moderate and understanding terms. But we mund that once the resolutions were adopted the strict- 3t legal interpretation was placed upon them. 90. My delegation will be guided by these consideraons in the vote on the draft resolution, I need not ay that our vote in no sense.constitutes a disavowal f the action thus far taken by the Secretary-General nd the services under him. My delegation continues ma ne que doit » believe that the initial results of United Nations ction have been most encouraging and that the Oranization's efforts must be maintained, If it proves ecessary for the Council to meet again, my delega- France intended. I say this because Iknow that France has recognized the Republic of the Congo as an inde=- pendent, sovereign State; but I felt that I should elucidate the point as the word "tutelle" may give rise to misunderstanding, I hope that the representative of France will not mind my doing so.

Speaking as representative of FRANCE, I should like te thank my friend, the representative of Tunisia, for giving me an opportunity to make my meaning clear. His remarks show how much we are influencedby our surroundings after spending so much time here, and the Trusteeship Council has undoubtedly momentarily left its mark on the Security Council, although it did not colour my thinking. 193, I would merely point out the difference between “prendre sous sa tutelle"—to take under its wing which is the expression I used, and "prendre en tu=- telleTM, 1 did not say "en tutelle*, which would have meant that I did not recognize the Congo as an inde=- pendent State, As the representative of Tunisia has very rightly pointed out, we all recognize the Congo as an independent State, I hope that this brief clarification has made my meaning clear and provided my friend, the Tunisian representative, with the explana~ tion he wished to have, If I may make one further comment, I would add that the distinction cannot, as the footnotes in some novels say, be renderedin English, 194. Mr, BOMBOKO (Republic of the Congo) (trans~ lated from French}: After listening to the various speakers who have addressed the Council today, I have come to the conclusion that it is no easy matter to write history. Some events can be described accurately whereas it is very difficult to give a reliable aecount of others, perhaps because the facts tendto be forgotten, My delegation and I do not propose to deal only with the facts, We shall try to raise the debate to the level of principles. 195. I wish first to try to clear up the confusion which seems to arise when the problem of Katanga is discussed, Some speakers have very properly pointed out, as I did myself, that the problem of Katanga is not a domestic issue, I stressed that point in my first statement [885th meeting]. 196. It has been said that Katanga wants autonomy and is anxious to escape fromthe control of the central authority, The "Loi fondamentale’® with which we were provided by Belgium gives us a federal structure. Unless the word "federal" has a variety of meanings, I think there is a vast difference between a confederation of States and a federation. The United States is a federal State and yet no one can say that there is no political unity in the United States. In a confederation of States, there is no unity in the political sense, 198, We must not obscure the issue, Ifwe are to solve the problem, we must speak the same language and use the same words, Then we shall understand one another and the problem will be simple fo solve. 199. There have been references to the fact that law and order prevail in Katanga. But, unless my recollection is at fault, we were told that the Belgian forces intervened solely because of the needto protect human lives and property in view of the disturbances of law and order. If law and order prevailed in Katanga, there was no justification for Beigian intervention in the province, But as Belgium has intervened in Katanga it is to be presumed that law and order did not prevail, if a measure of order has subsequently been restored, it is because the United Nations came and tried to ensure order. It cannot be argued that the intervention of the Belgian troops was justified unless there was a reason for their intervention. 200. It has been said that the most important thing is to ensure the safety of Europeans working in Katan~ ya. 1 do not believe that there is any problem, because United Nations troops are not going to Katanga to wage war on the Europeans but to ensure conditions in which the safety of Europeans working in Katanga and throughout the Congo can be guaranteed. I do not see why the entry of the United Nations troops into Katanga should be opposed on the alleged ground of the safety of the European population, What is more, I must say that in some cases the Europeans in the Congo were Induced to flee in panic when there was no reason for Joing so. In some places in the Congo Europeans were iold—~—and I am thinking in particular of Coquilhatville— where I saw Congolese weeping as they tried to per~ suade the Ewropeans to stay and remain at their posts— that they should leave with the last Belgian soldiers Jecause there was no guarantee that the United Nations ‘roops would be abie to maintain order. Not only was ganic spread but in some places an attempt has also jeen made to create what have been called constitudonal problems, 101. Thus at Coquilhatyille, in the province of the iquator, attempts have been made tocreate a problem vy trying to make the Africans of the province believe hat they should secede because the Central Govern= nent is incapable of maintaining law and order. As rou know, there is a division of powers and there was 202. There is a secret treaty between Belgium andthe "autonomous Republic of the Equater". The text I am about to read to you is that sent by the government of the province to the Central Government at Leopoldville. It reade: ®Belgium recognizes the legal existence of the autonomous Republic of the Equator. This recognition shall be without prejudice to Belgium's right subsequently to recognize a Congolese Federation of which the autonomous Republic of the Equator would form part. *Belgium undertakes to ensure that the budget of the autonomous Republic of the Equator is balanced. The arrangements for such financial support shall be the subject ofa special agreementtobe negotiated between the two contracting parties. *The autonomous Republic of the Equator and Belgium shall grant each other most favoured nation treatment and shall guarantee the safety and property of the other's nationala. "The Belgian Government will consider the possi~ bility of making available tothe autonomous Republic of the Equator fifty scholarships a year to permit nationals of the autonomous Republic to receive higher education in Belgium. "Belgium shall guarantee the external security of the autonomous Republic of the Equator. It shall have the right to keep a police force, the size of which shall be determined later, intheterritory. The force shall be under the command of an officer enjoying the confidence of both Governments. For its part, the autonomous Republic of the Equator shall guarantee the safety of individual Belgians andagreeto the presence of Belgian military advisers with the national command of the national army of the Repub= lic of the Equator. *Done at Coquilhatville, 16 July 1960." This document has not been signed because the provincial government at Coquilhatville would not accept it. There is no point in attempting to laugh the document out of court because those who provided it can if necessary come to give evidence to the Council. 203, I must comment on the extremely irresponsible way in which efforts are being made to divert the Council's attention by saying that there ig a consti~- tutional problem in the Congo and that that problem ig preventing the full implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions. The problem is an artificial one and, as 1 showed this morning, if there is any problem, there are parliamentary procedures through which the citizens of Katanga, and of Equator and Eastern provinces can endeavour to make known their point of view in our Parliament. 204. If the Congolese are against this "provincial autonomy", it is not because they fear autonomy as such. We are afraid of the balkanization of the Congo, gince there is now talk not of a federal State but of a confederation of States. As the President of the 206. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia [8/4424], I should like to say that Ibelieve that it offers the only means of reassuring people. We Congolese do not want to live permanently in a climate of mutual distrust and panic, We want peace so that we can begin to build up our country and consolidate the independence we gained barely 2 month ago. 207. That will only be possible if the uncertainties that still persist are removed, The presence of Bel= gian troops in the Congo was the subject of a special article in the General Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Co-operation which we concluded on the eve of our independence. In the Treaty of Friendship it was stipulated that the troops could net be used except on the express request of the Congolese Minister of National Defence. The argument that Belgian troops went into Katanga because Mr. Tshombé asked them to do so is without legal weight because Mr. Tshombé has no competence in international matters, Under the Treaty, Mr. Tshombé had no authority to ask for Belgian troops. Only the Minister of National Defence : the Central Government of the Congo was empowered 0 do 80, 208, To justify the intervention, it has even been said that I personally called in the Belgian troops. I shail net attempt to dispose of that allegation; it is not necessary. I want only to show you that the decision to use the troaps was taken without the participation of the Congolese Government although the latter's consent was expressly required. I believe that if that mistake had not been made the disastrous situation we all deplore would not have occurred. 209. My conclusion is a very simple one. On behalf of the Congolese people, on behalf of all Africa, in the interests of international peace, I ask the Council to accept the position taken by the Secretary~General as the only one that will permit us tobreak the deadlock. 210, I understand the concern of certain delegations. But in this situation we must not consider our direct interests alone. We must be more far-sighted, for the Congolese tragedy hag international implications and may lead to a greater disaster than that we are now facing. I believe that we musi set aside personal feelings and bitterness and work together to find a solution that will enable us to break the deadlock ag Boon a8 possible. 211. So far as the Congolese people are concerned, the sine qua non of collaboration with the Belgian 212. I wanted to make these comments in order to make clear the interpretation which my delegation places upon the draft resolution. 213. Before I conclude, I would point out that the draft resolution, at least as it stands, makes no reference to bases. But we believe and hope that when the resolution is interpret d, the question of bases will be taken into account. In his second report the Secretary-General refers to the matter. I believe that in view of the possibilities which are open to the Secre= tary=-General under the mandate that he has been given to settle the Katanga problem, he will be able to find ways and means of settling the question of the bases at the same time. 214, The PRESIDENT (translatedfrom French): I give the floor to the representative of Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

I have asked for the floor in order to clarify the position of the Soviet Union on certain points raised in the second statement of the Secretary-General [885th meeting]. 216. The first point is that ofthe disarming of Congelese army units by United Nations troops. Inthat connexion I should like to say that when reference was made in the Soviet delegation's statement to actual cases of the disarming of Congolese army units by United Nations troops it was on thebasis of communi~ cations received from official Government representa— tives of the Republic of the Congo. I am speaking in particular of a cable [5/4414] from Leopoldville dated 26 July 1960 and signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, nthat cable it was stated that "United Nations troops are disarming our soldiers"—that is, Congolese soldiers—"and allowing Belgian forces to keep their arms which is incompre= hensible". This fact is also mentioned in the letter (8/4414) dated 31 duly 1960 from the Prime Minister of the Republic ofthe Congo addressedtothe President of the Security Council. 217. The next point concerns intervention in domestic affairs. I should like to clarify the Soviet Union's position on this question also. The Soviet Union stands for non«intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. It is prepared to support in every way and to participate in measures to prevent intervention by one State in the affairs of another andtotake steps to bring such intervention to an end as quickly as possible when it occurs. 218. What is happening in the Congo? Particularly since the second statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo, the Belgian Government has been flagrantly intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo, in violation of the Security Council's resolutions and of the United Nations Charter. It is flouting the will of the legitimate Government and 119. Yet efforts are being made here to represent ich action, aimed at restoring the lawful rights of the jovernment, aS intervention in the domestic affairs x the Congo. 120. Those who are responsible for the tense situa~ ion in the Congo are now cryingthat anything intended o put a stop to their subversive activities will consti-= ute intervention in the domestic affairs of Katanga. Chat, however, is the attitude of the aggressor, an tttitude which the Security Council certain! cannot thare, Inaction and procrastination in this matter will ay into the hends of those who are flagrantly inter= ‘ening in the domestic affairs of the Congo and wish ter, feront o jegitimatize their aggression, 21. The Soviet Union cannot be a party to actions uch as these, which run counfer to the interests of he Congolese people and are aimed at securing ap= roval of intervention in the domestic affairs of the /Ongo. 22, I next wish to comment on the question, whe is urning Africans against Africans, It is hardly necesary to recall here that it has always been a favourite actic of the colonialists to sow dissension among eoples and to turn one sector ofthe population against nother. méthode territoire population nant 23. In the colonies and ¢opendent countries their rinciple is "Divide and rule". The Belgian authorities re now trying to apply that time-honoured method— o sever Katanga from the rest of the territory of the fongo, to turn one part of the population against nother. But they are forgetting one thing: the times ave changed completely and that trick will no longer fork. République. 24, The Security Council is in duty bound resolutely o put an end to these activities, which imperil the eople of the Congo and for that purpose it is essential hat the Belgian forces should be withdrawn immeiately from the entire territory of the Congo and that he dismemberment of that young Republic shouid be alted. 25, The Soviet Government has consistently opposed he fomenting of enmity and hatred between peoples f different States or between different sectors of the opulation of any one State. The Soviet Union has learly demonstrated that peoples of different naionalities, peoples whose sking are of different olours, peoples who have different customs, can live peuples population 4 peace and harmony ina single State when nationality uestions are settled in the interests of the peoples oncerned, 26. With regard to the question whether the United lations troops should take the initiative in resorting > arms, the Soviet delegation has not proposed and ces not now propose that the forces sentto the terriwry of the Congo in accordance with the decision of 228. In conclusion I should like to stress once more that the situation in the Republic of the Congo is still tense and that the danger threatening that newly inde~ pendent State not only has not been eliminated but is assuming an ever more sinister character. Nomatter how delicata the language used, be it the finest Oxford English, it is impossible toconceal that fact. The main source of that danger ts the presence of Belgian treops in the territory of the Congo, All the memhers of the Security Council now seem to be agreed on that point. Consequently, it continues to be the Security Council's primary task to take the necessary measures to ensure the immediate expulsion of the occupying forces from the Congo. 229. The Soviet Government's position on this question has been clearly set forth in its statements of 31 July {S/4416] and 6 August 1960 [8/4418]. It be- Hieves in the necessity of taking stern and effective measures forthe speedy implementation of the Security Council's resolutions. 230. The Soviet Government has also expressed its views concerning the specific character of those measures. We have communicated to the Council our Government's suggestions in that regard. In that connexion I should like to stress that the Soviet Union is prepared to make its ccatribution and unite its efforta to these of other States Members ofthe United Nations to bring an immediate end to aggression in the Congo. 231. At the same time the Soviet Government is concerned at the dangerous situation which has developed in the Republic of the Congo and cannct ignore the appeal it received from the Government of the Congo for help on a bilateral basis. I should like to recall the statement made by the Soviet Government in that connexion on 31 July, which was at the same time an answer to the Congo Government's appeal, I quote: "In the event of the aggression against the Congo continuing, and in view of its dangerous consequences for the cause of universal peace, the Soviet Government will not hesitate to take resolute measures to rebuff the aggressors who, as has now become per= fectly clear, are in fact acting with the encourayement of all the colonialist towers of NATO." [8/4418.] 233. finales Mr. WIGNY (Belgium) (translated from French): 1ould now like to make some final observations on alf of my delegation. de 234, de fois in the first place, I have the following comments ,ake on Mr, Bomboko's statement: the last time he ce [879th meeting], Mr. Kanza used unverified re= is from news agencies; today, Mr. Bomboko pro= 2d documents which arenot signed. Ifee] compelled ioint out to him that that is not the proper way to le a case. des d'hui, signées. controverser 235. général me Belges note congolais, protestations, Mr. Bomboko also referred to the General Treaty ‘riendsnip, Assistance and Co-operation, and I am i he did. Mr, Bomboko emphasizes that the Belgians his friends and will always be his friends. I have id that statement and we bear the Congolese people malice. But we should have more faith in those estations if the Leopoldville radio were less dent. de Lastly, Mr. Bomboko raised constitutional ques= s. The distinction between confederation and ration depends on your school of thought. I do not rw his argument there. I note merely that he said 236, constitutionnels. et pas ces démocratiquement, que que trop these questions should be settled peaceably, ocratically. How right he is! Does he not think that first step, now that order has beenrestored through efforts of the United Nations, would be not to let liament remain on vacation too long and to place country once again under parliamentary control? soumettre What I am going to say now has to do with weing responsibility for this unhappy state of af- 3. The representative of the Soviet Union has said 227. MTination ments, a Je m'étonne soviétique crois par pour : and again that we were the aggressor. I do not offence at that accusation, coming as it does from , Lam merely surprised that his memory of history o short for I seem to remember that the charge rejected by this very Council and therefore, at t out of respect for the Council, it should not be ‘ated, Argentina, Ceylon and other countries, have been enough to say that we had a legitimate right to ‘vene to save our nationals. I have always said: yly the right, but the duty. 238. bien d@intervenir toujours le The representative of Tunisia sympathized with feelings that prompted our action but was not ‘inced that our position was legally justifiable. I 10t absolutely sure, Mr. Slim, that you would have m the same detachment if your own countrymen been involved. But, let us consider the question 239, mnent par Slim, de détachement, dique, ment sécurité d'intervenir affaires approuvée vide. monde; ressortissants. mesure; avec 1 a legal point of view and let me ask what you, wr wisdom, think of the following line of argument. did the Security Council and the Secretary- *ral decide to intervene in the affairs of the Congo h are internal affairs? Because, in the phrase oved by this Council, there was a vacuum in the co. You intervened to save world peace; we went e Congo to save our nationals, Everyone does the of which he is capable: but either you are right we are right or we-are both wrong. The argument xed by the United Nations that there was a yacuum town, 240. In assessing responsibility, direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious, there is one argument, Mr. Slim, which you put forward very strongly, very politely and with many qualifications, Besides, you said that this argument was based on Press reports which you believed pending further information, a reservation that reflects your experience of affairs, Well, let me give you more information, It is not true that there were no troops in Katanga and the existing vacuum compelled us to step in, and that after coming in we organized forces which are now opposing the Leopoldville Government. On 30 June 1960, there were 4,000 troops in Katanga, a large number of whom mutinied. The military police remained loyal and disciplined. The Belgian officers didnomorethan reform some of the oldunits. They didnot arm any new troops. These are the facts which you seemed to be seeking and I submit them to your impartial judgement. 241. Now I come to the implementation of the Council's earlier resolutions. 242, ‘The representative of Poland has reproached us with concentrating troops in Katanga and I believe the representative of the Soviet Union has done us the honour of stating that this concentration was a threat to world peace. I would remind you of the figure: 1,700 troops. Would that the Council hadalwaysto deal With threats to the peace provoked by the presence of 1,760 men! It is against those menwho are leaving in any case—that the Soviet representative is proposing to muster a combat force. I seem to remember that, in other circumstances, certain countries intervened in other countries when there was no need for them to protect their nationals from danger, and yet the Security Council und later the General Assembly were not allowed even to send in an investigating committee, to say nothing of sending troops. We sent troops, our troops, solely to save the lives of our nationals and; in reply to the representative of Ceylon's question, I shall repeat the figures: five provinces out of six have been evacuated and 3,800 out of 7,750 men have been or will be repatriated in the near future. That is the exact measure of our respect for the de=- cisions and resolutions of the Security Council. 243, Lastly, I should like to discuss the new draft resolution [8/4424]. I have no right to take the initiative. I have no right to vote. But ag a party concerned in this matter, you will no doubt permit me to express my opinion. 244. In the first place, was struckbyons thing which has been elcquently underlined by a number of mem-= C'est projet eonformément accepter sécurité l'exécution 45, My delegation agreed with the United States epresentative who, in this spirit, felt bound for the iird time to remind al] States of this elementary rule. ‘or I believe in the United Nations and I respect the ecurity Council. But what would become ofthis organ 245. Etats-Unis fois, élémentaire. respecte organe guise, sont * every State was free to take the Council's place as : pleased in the tasks constitutionally entrusted to 1e Council and assumed by it in practice? quement 46. My second comment on the draft resolution has 246, résolution directement "a du Secrétaire possibles + do with paragraph 2. This is of direct concern to i@ Belgian Government and calls upon it "to withdraw amediately its troops from the province of Katanga ader speedy modalities determined by the Secretaryeneral and to assist in every possible way the impleentation of the Council's regolutions"TM. Conseil", 247, tel nion comprendre qui sion pas conduite ltintention commencant: en temporaire rentrer devoir sacrée tT, I°do not wish to hide my feelings. This text, as stands, will be atrongly resented by Belgian public xinion and I shall find it very difficult to make my yuntrymen understand the true spirit which inspired . Too many of them are under the impression—and ill remain under the impression—that they have not xen understood and respected as they should have 2en in view of their earlier behaviour. It is not that e do not intend to withdraw very rapidly, As I said hen I began, our troops were in Africa through no ish of our own to carry out atemporary mission and 2 want nothing better than to get our soldiers home : quickly as possible, Butthere was aduty to be done: id that was the sacred trust of guaranteeing the ety of our nationals. 248, que mais voudrions la hiatus. sentant égard, que, par suppose, Nationd organisation comme répéterai, fiance Secrétaire pour ‘8. I refer to our nationals not because I want to ake any distinction or to discriminate but because ¥ competence does not extend beyond that point. We tould Hke to receive an assurance that in Katanga, t elaewhere, there will be no hiatus in the maintemee of security, and law and order. The Secretarysneral, at the request of the United Kingdom repremtative, has given us fuller information on this point. am grateful to him for doing so. It is my understandg& that, in conforinity with the views expressed by a ‘eat many members and, | imagine, withthe views of | Members of the United Nations, the Organization's st duty is to ensure the safety of individuals as 311 as peace among nations. For my part, I assure u, and this I repeat, that I shall endeavour to resure thoge who are apprehensive andiam convinced at the Secretary-General will take effective action engure that security is maintained without a break. interruption, 249, un a Belgique, ment 9, I should however like to be quite clear on this int. The Secretary~Generel stated that he would rry out his mission with the co-operation of Bel~- um, the Congolese Govyérnment and Mz. Tahombé's vernment. As far as Balgium is concerned, I accept to de, 250. One expression used struck me greatly. twas said that there was a “vicious circle® which had to be broken. I agree. But let us be sure that no blood is shed in the process. H—which is not the case~blood was shed through our fault it would still be possible te have recourse to the Security Council, but if blood was shed as a result of a mistake by the United Nations every nation would be involved andthere would be no possible recourse. 251. That is why you must be even more deeply con=- cerned with the question of security than I. For I, if I may put it this way, am a court of first instance, responsible for preserving public safety. Ideal with an emergency. You, the members of the Council, are the court of final appeal, beyond which there is nothing; you are the only judges of your acts; you are account able to yourselves alone for the decisions you take. For that reason I am certain that you will give the problem the most diligent consideration. 252. That is all I intendedtosay. have a word to add concerning the constitutional problem mentioned by Mr. Bomboko a moment ago. In Katanga there is the Katanga fovernment. I donot know whether the govern= ment is federal, confederal or provincial. I simply note that there is a political dispute between Elisabeth= ville and Leopoldville, We do not depend on unsigned documents for our knowledge of the dispute, it is proved by developments and the positions taken by the parties. Since 30 June 1960 i have been a bystander. Before 36 June the matter was one of Belgium's responsibilities; today it is the concern of the Congolese, We believe that, as most members ofthe Council have said, all Members of the United Nations and the Organization itself must respect this principle of nonintervention, 253. The Organization~—and with this point I shall conclude—hag a great mission to carry out. It is not, ap the representative of the Soviet Uniontriedto make us beHeve, a matter of driving the Belgians out. The Belgians are going away, having called you in. Their only desire is to leave. I would even say that it is not simply a matter of maintaining, restoring or increas~ ing the safety of individuals. The Security Council, as an organ of the United Nations, ts faced with a much bigger task. Because of untoward circumstances and also certain mistakes, the Congolese Government has been unable to maintain the political, economic and social organization of the Republic. Whether it is placed "en tutelleTM or assisted—either formula canbe uged~it needs assistance from all to help in restoring not only the aafety of individuals, but also political, legal, economic and social order, This is the great work of assistance that the United Nations has under~ aggressive act. If the Security Counci! has refrained from using that term in any of its resolutions it is because the sponsors of the resolutions adopted by the Council rightly wished to avoid exacerbating the feelings of the Belgians further at a time when they were already deeply stirred. 255. I realize that those feelings persist and that a Security Counell decision, finding or resolution intended solely to ensure the restoration of the territorial integrity and full and complete sovereignty of a State which has been recognized as sovereign seems still to be regarded as a blow to the deepest feelings of the Belgians. The deepest feelings of the Belgian people are a matter ofconcerntcus; we are solicitous about the feciings of the Belgians wherever they may be, in the Congo or elsewhere. But it is possible also to sympathize with the feelings of a people which after eighty years under the rule of another people is given its full and complete independence and then sees its legitimate feelings and aspirations to independence and freedom trampled underfoot, after the difficult situation it has faced. 256. I would also remind you that the primary purpose of the Security Council resolutions has not been ta ensure the safety of individuals, of Belgian or any other nationality. The Securify Council met at the express request of the Government of the Congo, which asked the United Nations for assistance, in the situation with which it was faced, in orderto ensurethe maintenance of order and safety and to put an end to what it regarded as an attack on, and violation of, its sovereignty and independence. I did not want to stress this point again, but nevertheless we must not reverse the roles and make the safeguarding of individuals, which is incidental to our main purpose, the main purpose, while our real purpose would then become the corollary of the action decided upon by the Security Council. 257, Of course, we are concerned with legality. We are anxious to confirm the decisions taken by the Security Council and the United Nations. I think we all agree on this point. 258. But I would remind you, since there has been some hesitancy and in view of some of the interpre- ‘ations which we have heard, that at certain periods of ustory strong and powerful nations have thought them= selves justified in rushing to the assistance of fellow- 70untrymen, alleged to be an oppressed minority. We mow what that theory led to when It was applied in 259. I should also like, lest we fail in our purpose, to remind you of another historical example which, although different in some respects, is very similar. There was-—I apologize for mentioning this—a soverelgn and independent African country against which a European country committed aggression. This African country~Ethiopia-~could not defend itself, During the debates in the League of Nations some Members of the League, including the United Kingdom, at one point called for the application of sanctions. That was in 1936. It proved impossible to apply sanctions. I was a student at that time and remember the words spoken by the representative of a emall country in Latin America, a part of the world which is strongly at= tached to the fundamental principles of freedom, merality and human rights. It may be that the repre= sentative did not himself believe what he was saying, but I remember that he said: ‘Gentlemen, if you do not decide on sanctions, you may one day become another country's Ethiopia". Sanctions, I repeat, were not applied. It was not long before one European country after another suffered the same fate as Ethiopia. 260. We have refrained, and shall continue te do so, from uging the word “aggression” or even the term "appressive acts" in resolutions, since we are most anxious not to exacerbate the feelings of the Belgian people or to give offence te anyone. But we hope it will be understood how important it is that the United Nations resolutions should be implemented quickly, immediately, in order to avoid a catastrophe. We hope also that it will be understood that there are times when it is necessary to stifle one's feelings—andI am sure that statesmen are capable of doing so—in the interests of something more important: the strengthening of peace and the maintenance of international security.

At this hour I speak. only because I feel I must say Justa few words on two points. Reference has been made by several representatives to that part of the Secretary-General's report which contains these words: "The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of the Katanga does not have its roct in the Belgian attitude...* [S/4417, para. 10]. That is part of the report; it is there, there is no doubt. As against that I would like to quote this; "as the presence of those troops now is the main cause of continued danger" [884th meeting, para. 19]. L leave it te the Council to interpret this for itself. 262. I can understand the passage I read first to the effect that the difficulty which the Council faces in the case of Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude. My interpretation may be right or wrong, but the interpretation clearly does not negative the inter~ pretation here that it is the main cause of continued danger. 263. We are not importing our ideas or tryingto make things difficult. We are arguing s case, andin arguing 264. The second point I should like to mention—and I am making it as short as possible—is that I have a certain difficulty in understanding a remark made by the representative of Belgium. In referring to opera= tive paragraph 2 of our draft resolution [5/4424], he said=I cannot remember his exact words, but I hope I am conyeying the sense of his remarks—that he could not get his people in Belgium to accept that paragraph. Operative paragraph 2 reads: "Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secre+ tary-General ..." The Secretary-General has given an explanation of what is understood by him under the term "modalities". i the course of my earlier statement, I ventured to express our viewpoint on this by saying that certain arrangements must necessarily be made and will be made. The representative of Belgium has told us again and again—and I believe him—that the Belgian troops will be withdrawn, that he is waiting to withdraw them, that they are waiting to go back, and that he wants the United Nations troops to be able to take their place in order to maintain law and order. 265. There is no one in this Council who denies that taw and order must be maintained and the security of deople must be ensured. We say that the United Nations ‘roops Can assure the security of the people. This is a contradiction which it is very difficultto understand, and that is the only reason—since I did not wish to let ‘hat go by without referring to it=—that led me to ask for the floor at this time.

The jecretary-General has asked tomake a brief comment, and I now give him the floor,

The representative of Ceylon has drawn attention to two statements of mine, one in the second report and the other in the statement I made this morning [884th meeting]. The first one covers a phrase which has been very much quoted here today—but practically always, I must say, quoted incompletely, "The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of the Katanga does not have iis root in the Belgtan attitude" is only the beginning of the sentence, Two things follow. First of all, it speaks of "the Belgian attitude ... as stated to me". And then there follows an explanation: "as the Belgian Govern~ . ment acquiesces in the Security Council decigions and therefore undoubtedly will"—in the future tense- ‘instruct its military elements in the Prevince to act in accordance with the resolutions as implemented by the United Nations Force" [$/4417, para. 10]. 268, That is to say, what I wanted to bring out was the fact that the Belgian policy line,tobe implemented by action, did not present us with a problem: there was nothing new to expect from that side. - 270. E think that the representative of Ceylon willsee the connexion between the two statements. 271. The PRESIDENT (translated from French}: I now invite members of the Councilto proceed to a vote on the two draft resolutions before us: the draft reso= lution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia [8/4424] and the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [5/4425]. 272. I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4424]. A vote was taken by a show of hands, In favour: Argentina, Ceylon, China, Ecuador, Poland, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abstaining: France, Italy, The draft resolution was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2 absfentions,

The USSR dele~ gation will not press for a vote onits draft resolution.

Four delegations, the delegations of Italy, the United King— dom, the Soviet Union and Poland, wish to explain their votes. The representative of the Conga also wishes to speak. 275, Mr, ORTONA (Italy): I asked for the floor once again in order to explain the position of my delegation with respect to the resolution which has been adopted by the Council. 276. I wish to stress that my delegation is substan-— tially in agreement with the priacipal lines of the provisions contained in this text, andthat we wish sincerely to commend the efforts made by the representatives of Ceylon and Tunisia to bring about a draft which one can certainly feel considerably reflects the composite clements in the picture, and first of ali, the views of the Secretary-General who has the main responsibility for the outcome ofthis important operation of the United Nations in the Congo. 277, There is, however, a point in which the resolution seems to us not to meet a requirement which wa feel is essential in taking into account the present situation in the Congo, and this compelled my delegation to abstain. That is the fact that there is a clear omission of a condition which, as I declared in my statement previously tonight, we still maintain is of paramount impowtance, the circumstance that the withdrawal of the Belgian troops which have been sent to guarantee the safety of human lives should occur only in conjunction with the ability of the United Nations Force to ensure law and order. I have repeatedly informed the Council of the great concern of my Government especially for the welfare of the Italian communities in the Congo, a concern which the mem~ bers of the Council will not failto appreciate and which the question addressed to him by the United Kingdom presentative has made a notable contribution toward @ clarification of this point. We have also noted the servations made by the representative of Ceylon. wertheless, the fact that the wording of the draft solution was not completely clear on this matter d did not spell out a need which, in our mind, was sential induced my delegation to abstain in the ting, grandement pris Toutefois, n'était tionnait amené 9. I wish to restate quite clearly, however, that the ope ofthe resolutionis onetowhichwe can subscribe 279. la appuierons d which will have our support in its general imple=- sntation, 8, Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): My deletion was able to vote in favour of the draft resolun of Ceylon and Tunisia because of the statements, 380. Hanglais]: résolution aéclarations sentant général maintenant Uapplication responsabilité l'erdre e made by one of the sponsors, the representative Ceylon, and because cf the reply given by the cretary=General to my question, which reassured my legation as to the sense in which it is intended to plement the resolution with regard to the reonsibility for effective and continued maintenance law and order in the Katanga province. 1. Mr, KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist publics) (translated from Russian): The USSR deletion wishes to make the following comments in exmation of its vote. 281, listes soviétique tions 282. Ceylan gue ment retrait blique territoriale 2, The resolution adopted on the proposal of the presentatives of Ceylon and Tunisia makes no men= n of the fact that the Government of Belgium is azenly flouting the decision of the Security Council acerning the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the ritory of the Republic of the Congo andthe maintence of the territorial integrity and political indeadence of that country. 3% Nevertheless, the USSR delegation voted in rour of the text because it enables the Security uncil to carry out its most important task, namely ensure that Belgium would immediately and unconionally withdraw all its troops from the entireterri- ‘y of the Republic of the Congo, including the proice of Katanga, 283. voté résoudre de immédiatement troupes du 1, Gur yote was aleo determined by the considera- 284, que fois général ligné Secrétaire hésiter d'obtenir territoire contre n thai the adoption of this resolution, which confirms i broad authority given to the Secretary-General by : Council in the two earlier resolutions, once again iphagizes, and emphasizes unanimously, that the 2retary-General has the obligation to take decisive agures, without hesitating to use any means to that i, to remove the Belgian troops from the territory the Congo and to put an endto acts directed against : territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. Congo. 3. Mr, LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): We vated in favour the draft resolution presented by Ceylon and Tunisia the understanding that its adoption would result in 285. glais]: présenté que trois touchant 1 implementation of the three principles which guide land in considering the situation in the Republic of | Congo, as enumerated in my statement duringthis 287, With regard to paragraph 3, we assume that the entry Into Katanga of the United Nations Force will be carried out immediately and regardless of any obstacles, since such entry, as the text ofthe resolution states, is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution, 288, I should like to make one observation concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution, We consider this paragraph to be superfluous since the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of any country= and in the Congo particulariy—is the principle on which our Charter rests and, from the very beginning of United Nations action in the Congo it was understood, I think, by everybody-—the Secretary-General included —that such intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo would not take place. Therefore, we do not see any reason for the repetition of that principle, which is embodied in any action or any document approved in the United Nations, especially in the Security Council, Tf, however, it is embodied in the text of the resolu= tion, the Polish delegation considers that it should not give rise, in any interpretation of this paragraph, to the belief that the Security Council thereby agrees with any efforts on the part ofthe Belgian Government or of any other Power acting directly or through their agents, in Katanga or anywhere else in the Congo, towards the disintegration of the Congo by any means which could be used for that purpose. 289, Finally, I should like to make afew observations with regard to paragraph 5 as an objéction to the interpretation given during the discussion inthe Coun=- cil before the vote, which interpretation tended to exclude the bilateral relations which the Government of the Congo might find it advisable to develop with any country in the world, The Congo is not a Trust Territory or a dependent territory and the clarification of that matter during the discussion was helpful in that respect, The United Nations Force is there at the request of the Government of the Congo which, at the same time, hasfullrighttodevelop ite relations with any other State according to its desires, 290, These brief comments, I believe, will clarify our position regarding our vote on the resolution. 291, Mr, BOMBOKO (Republic of the Congo) (trans= lated from French): I wish to thank the members of the Security Council for the resolution they have just adopted with a view to the immediate solution of the Katanga problem and the restoration of peace in the Congo, In explaining the position to my Parliament and my Government I shall emphasize three points. 292. First, Belgian troops did not intervene in the province of Katanga in response to a request by 193, Second, Mr, Wigny, the Belgian Foreign Minig= er, seems to be unaware of the provocative activities # Belgian diplomatic agents in the Congo and thereore does not take seriously the text that I read to you, vhich was submitted to the government of the province if the Equator for its signature by Mr. Adrianssens, 2onsul General at Coquilhatville. 194. Finally, we take due note of the fact that Beltium's acceptance of the present resolution means hat Belgium will henceforward actively facilitate the intry of United Nations troops into Katanga and begin he immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its Troops, thus reassuring its nationals, Since United Yations troops will be in Katanga, there will be no rounds for creating a panic among officials and juropeans in the private sector, as the United Naticns Troops will be able to ensure their safety, | 195. On behalf of the people and Government of the songo, IT wish again to thank the members of the security Council and the Secretary-General of the JInited Nations.

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