S/PV.90 Security Council

I would like to direct the attention of the representative of the USSR to rule 9, which states: "The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda." Therefore, each meeting requires the adoption of its agenda for that particular meeting. That is what I have sought to bring to the notice of the members of the Council at the initiation of the day's business. It is true, as the representative of the USSR has said, that item 4 does not strictly comply with the terms of the rule in that the four days' Le premier point est l'adoption de l'ordre du jour. Les membres du Conseil ont-ils des questions a poser ou des observations a faire? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Nous avons adopte nOtre ordre du jour lors de notre derniere seance. Nous avons decide que les points 2 et 3 devaient 8tre soumis a l'examen du Conseil. Je ne comprends done pas tres bien pourquoi nous devrions approuver plusieurs fois le meme ordre du jour. Est-ce pour lui donner plus de force? Il est vrai qu'il y a aussi le point 4, qui n'y etait pas inscrit jusqu'ici. Conformement au reglement interieur, il faut que les membres du Conseil soient informes au moins trois jours a l'avance des propositions du President concernant l'ordre du jour. Ce1a n'a pas ete fait. Au cours des trois derniers jours, le President n'a soumis aucune proposition de ce genre aux membres du Conseil. Par consequent, et conformement a nOtre reglement interieur, nous ne pouvons pas inscrire le point 4 a nOtre ordre du jour d'aujourd'hui. Au reste, nous n'aurions probablement pas le temps d'examiner ce point suppIementaire aujourd'hui. Si nous voulons examiner ce quatrieme point, il faut tout au moins l'inscrire a l'ordre du jour d'une seance ulterieure: aUtrement nous violerions nOtre propre reglement interier. Voila ce que j'avais a dire a ce sujet. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je me permets d'attirer l'attention du representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques sur l'article 9 du reglement, qui est ainsi con~u: "Le premier point de l'ordre du jour provisoire de chaque seance du Conseil de securite est l'adoption de 1'0rdre du jour." Il faut done, pour chaque seance, que 1'0rdre du jour partieulier a eette seance soit adopte. C'est ee que fai tenu asignaler a l'attention des membres du Conseil au debut des travaux de cette journee. n est vrai, eomme l'a dit le representant de l'URSS, que le point 4 ne satisfait pa! strietement aux dispositions de l'article, du fait que le Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The task of the present meeting is to continue the discussion of the questions which were included in the agenda at the last meeting. Am I right in this? . . . (continuing in English) and which we included in the agenda of the Council at the last meeting. The PRESIDENT: I would like to indicate to the representative of the USSR that the item which appears as the second item on the agenda was not reached at the las~ meeting and no discussion actually took place upon that particular question. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I did not say that we began a discussion on this question. I said we have to discuss the questions which were included in the agenda at ~he previous meeting of the Security Council. The PRESIDENT: The representative of -the USSR is perfectly correct in that statement, and I regret if I misunderstood him, but the rule definitely indicates that each meeting must confirm its own agenda; and therefore it is incumbent upon me as President to comply with the rule. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I have no objection if you consider it necessary to confirm once again the agenda which we have already adopted. I have no objection. Mr. EL-KHOURY (Syria) : I have no objection to the two items which were adopted at the last meeting being the subject of our discussion for today. I would merely call attention to the order of priority of thesenvo items. Item 2 is the resolution of the General Assembly concerning the reduction and regulation of armaments and item 3 is the resolution of the General Assembly concerning information on armed forces of the United Nations. r consider that the priority would indicate or would imply that the third item should precede the second item on today's agenda, since the General Assembly, in its resolution, states that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments. I consider that the reduction of armaments must be preceded by a general knowledge of the existing armaments in order to ascertain what

I would like to bring to the attention of the representative of Syria that the item listed as having precedence in this matter is submitted to us by the General Assembly with the request that it shall receive prompt consideration, and the item to which the representative of Syria has referred indicates that the Assembly calls upon the Security Council to determine as soon as possible the information which the Member States should be called upon to furnish in order to give effect to this resolution. Therefore, as the representative of Syria will seeJ both can be regarded with urgency, but the item that is listed today as the first item for discussion is the broad question, and it no doubt covers substantially the item that he has referred to. But you will see that one item is referred to as "for prompt attention" and the other is "as soon as possible". Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I shall object to our ·beginning with the third item on the agenda instead of the second. I consider there are no grounds for postponing further discussion of item 2. It is true that L~e item 3 is connected with item 2. It is also true that, in a certain sense, item 3 is a part of the general problem mentioned in item 2. But it is precisely because item 3 is part of the more general question that the Security Council should wve first consideration to the resolution of the General Assembly on the general regulation and reduction of armaments. The PRESIDENT: Do I take it then that the agenda with the exception of item 4, which is deferred until a later meeting, is adopted? If there is no objection to that procedure, it is adopted. 8. General discussion on regulation and reduction of armaments

Before calling for discussion upon the first item of the agenda, I feel that it is possibly expected that I bring to the notice of the Council certain phases of this matter which might be helpful in the approach that we make to a discussion of it. I should like to make some general observations on the subject matter of todlay's meeting and to submit for consideration by this Security Council certain suggestions regarding the way in which the subject might be handled. The subject of disarmament has come before the Security Council under three headings. In the first place, we have a resolution transmitted from the General Assembly on the principles governing the general' regulation and reduction of armaments, and in connexion with that resolution we already have before us proposals by Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Dois-je considerer que l'ordre du jour est adopte, a l'exception du point 4, qui est reporte a une seance ulterieure? Si aucune objection n'est formuIee, il en est ainsi decide. 8. Discussion gem!rale sur la reglementation et la reduction des armements Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant d'ouvrir la discussion sur le premier point de l'ordre du jour, je pense qu'on attend peut-etre _de moi que je rappelle au Conseil certains aspects de la question, ce qui nous permettra peut-etre d'aborder plus facilement la discussion. J'aimerais faire quelques observations generales sur l'objet de la seance d'aujourd'hui et soumettre a l'examen du Conseil de securite certaines suggestions sur la maniere dont la question pourrait etre traitee. La question du desarmement se presente au Conseil de securite sous trois rubriques. Nous avons d'abord une resolution transIllise par I'AssembIee generale sur les principes relJ;issant la reglementation et la reduction generales des armements et, en relation avec cette resolution, nous sommes deja saisis de propositions 80umises The :f1.rst of the items on today's agenda is the General Assembly resolution of 14 December (document S/231). If the terms of that resolution are examined closely, it will be found that it really covers all three matters to which I have referred, and in addition draws attention to a fourth matter, namely, the implementation of Article 43. If we look closely at the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December, it will be found that it contains the following precise recommendations to the Security Council: (a) That the Security Council give prompt consideration to formUlating practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed; (b) That the Security Council expedite consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council, and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that it expedite the consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of atomic energy control; (c) That the Security Council give prompt consideration to the elaboration of proposals to provide for practical and effective safeguards, both in connexion with atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions; c) Que le Conseil de securite etudie sans retard l'elaboration de propositions tendant a foumir des garanties pratiques et efficaces, tant en ce qui concerne l'energie atomique que la reglementation et la reduction generales des armements, afin de proteger les Etats respectueux des decisions de la Commission contre les risques de violations et de subterfuge; d) Que le Conseil de securite hate autarit It would appear that if this Council were prepared simply to express its approval of the General Assembly resolution-and in this connexion I would recall that each of our Governments has, through its membership in the General Assembly, already joined in the unanimous approval of the resolution-and if it were prepared to agree to take action on the five precise recommendations which the General Assembly has made, it would in fact· be doing exactly what the Members of the United Nations wish done immediately in respect of disarmament. It would then only remain for the Security Council to set up the machinery and to devise the methods by which it could carry out these recommendations; fortunately, much of t.h.at machinery already exists and the methods are already part of the familiar practices of the United Nations. All members of this Council will surely agree, and it is implicit in the terms of the General Assembly resolution, that we cannot consider any of the·various phases of disarmament separately. Our first task as a Council, and it is an urgent task, is to apply ourselves to all those phases of the problem of diliarmament which art' now before the Security Council, and, without at this stage attempting to say which will prove in the long run to be the mor.e important, to consider the whole problem, without losing sight of the great objective which all proposals are intended to serve. We are now at the threshold of a period of practical and intensive work which we all hope will be of lasting benefit to mankind. That is a matter in which co-operation between nations, and particularly between all the great Powers, is desirable. We have come to the point where all Members of the United Nations, by their unanimous acceptance of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December, have, without a single exception, pledged themselves to give that cooperation and dedicated themselves to that task. This is not a moment for taking sides, or for attempting to force through our own favourite ideas. at the expense of those of other Members of the United Nations. It is not a time for trying to find the final solution to every problem, or to insist that we must accept a given conclusion. It is a time for starting work; As a Security Council, which is taking up this most important This is neither the time nor the place to. attempt to resolve all the difficulties that surround this subject. This is the moment for the Security Council to demonstrate to the world that it is prepared and able to go on with the task of formulating plans for disarmament in a workman-like manner and in that spirit of unanimity which inspired the General Assembly resolution of 14 December. I, therefore, submit for the Council's consideration that, in taking up the debate on the General Assembly resolution; we should recognize that this resolution contains the five precise recommendations to which I have referred, and we should first consider whether, as a Council, we will adopt those recommendations and act upon them. If we do adopt them, I suggest that we should then concentrate on the initiation of measures for carrying them out. The proposals made by the USSR and the United States of America should then be considered. In the opinion of our delegation, neither of these proposals excludes the other. To illustrate what is in the mind of the Australian delegation, I would suggest that the immediate outcome of our deliberations might be an agreement to take concurlent decisions to the following effect: (a) To establish along the lines proposed by the representative of the USSR a commission to proceed immediately to the elaboration of practical measures to implement the General Assembly's decision on the general regulation of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of international control to assure the reduction of armaments and armed forces; (b) To accept the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission as a basis for the immediate initiation of the second stage of the Commission's work and, as the General Assembly resolution requires, to facilitate the Commission's work and to expedite the preparation of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of atomic energy control; travaux~ et, comme le demande la resolution de l'Assemblee generale, faciliter les travaux de cette Commission et hater l'elaboration d'un projet de convention ou de conventions en vue de la creation d'un systeme international de controle de l'energie atomique; c) Renvoyer immediatement au Comite d'etat-major I'execution rapide des dispositions de I'Article 43, et, en meme temps, de la resolution de l'AssembIee genbale concernant les renseignements sur les forces armees. Si des memrtS de ce genre pouvaient @tre promptement adopt~es, nous aurions erltam~, parallelement et concurremment, une serie d'ac- (c) To refer immediately to the Military Staff Committee the rapid implementation of Article 43 and, at the same time, of the General Assembly resolution regarding information on armed forces. H prompt measures af this kind could be taken, we would have initiated on parallel lines a useful series of concurrent activities, all of I, therefore, suggest to the Council: (a) That it should now take up the first item of the agenda, namely, the item relating to document S/231, and agree to adopt the recommendations made by the Ceneral Assembly to the Security Council; (b) That it should then decide upon measures to carry out those recommendations. If we can do that, we should probably find, when we come to the other items of today's agenda, that there was very little remaining to be said and that we had, in fact, reached agreement to pursue, in a practical way, the tasks laid upon us both by the Charter of the United Nations and by the will of its Members.

Item 2 of the agenda is now before the Council for discussion. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): As I have already pointed out in my statement at the meeting of the Security Council on 31 December 1946, the Government of the USSR, when it submitted its proposals on 27 December, intended to expedite the preparation by the Council of practical measures to secure the fulfilment of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The necessity of determining such practical measures is evident. The adoption of the above-mentioned resolution by the Assembly is an event of great historical sigllificance. However, at the present time the task is to enforce the resolution of the General Assembly without further delay. With this very purpose, that is, the swift adoption of practical measures to implement the decision of the General Assembly, the Government of the USSR submitted to the Security Council its proposal on the establishment of a commission which would immediately . proceed to work out such measures, and would submit them to the Council for consideration, within a maximum time limit of three months. At the meeting of the Security Council on 31 December, the representatives of some States expressed their wish that the USSR proposals be discussed at the next meeting. I did not object to this, since I thought that the Security Council would discuss the substance of these proposals at its next meeting. Today we are discussing their substance. As it already became known at the last meeting of the Council, the representative of the United States took a position towards logi~ either you agree to the United States proposals on control of atomic energy, and therefore agree to the proposals on working out practical measures for the general reduction of armaments and armed forces, or, if everything does not go smoothly with the United States proposals on control of atomic energy, then we refuse in general to occupy ourselves with the working out of measures for the general reduction of armaments and armed forces. That is the conclusion that follows from the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States. That is the sense of this draft resolution. The attempts to make the working out of concrete measures for the realization of the General Assembly dedsion on a specific question dependent on the progress and results of the consideration of another, to the detriment of the general application of the General Assembly decision on "Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments" cannot be justified by references to the necessity of giving priority to any specific question. Actually, the task of the Security Council is to proceed without delay to work out the practical measures on all the questions on which the General Assembly has taken the decision. Thus, the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States is not in conformity with the resolution of the General Assembly, and for that reason I cannot subscribe to it. During the discussion of the questions arising from the decision of the General Assembly, we should be guided by the common interest of the United Nations in the cause of strengthening peace and international security. We should proceed from the necessity of a more prompt realization of the decision of the Assembly. The delay in considerr.tion of the concrete questions concerning general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces on the basis of sundry plausible excuses cannot promote the successful beginn;j'g of the rt., .ization of this important decision which would play an historical role in establishing a stable peace and friendly relations among nations. I wish to express the hope that the Security Council will adopt the proposals submitted for its consideration by the Government of the USSR on 27 December 1940, and proceed without delay to work out the necessary measures for the application of the resolution of the General Assembly. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the resolution of the General Assembly, after indicating the general scope of the problem in paragraphs 1 and 2, proceeds immediately to emphasize the importance of expediting the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in fulfilling the directive which the General Assembly gave it nearly a year ago. In the opinion of the United States delegation, it is vital to the success of our joint aim and aspiration, which is to construct an international system for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, that we proceed to take first things first. The United States feels that effective international control of atomic energy is the key to the whole problem and must com~ first. I find it dh.lficult to believe that regulation of armaments generally can be effectively achieved without general agreement on the fundamental problems relating to the control of atomic energy. It is our view that substantial progress in the crucial field of international atomic energy control is a prerequisite to success in the general field of the regulation of armaments. It s~ems obvious that the problems we face in attempting to deal with the various aspects of arms regulation, whether we are dealing specifically with the atomic bomb or other weapons of mass destruction, or with conventional weapons, are very simple. We are not concerned with unilateral disannament. We are only concerned with col" lective regulation of armaments and armed forces. We know from experience that it is not safe to rely upon a system of regulation which is not collectively enforced. The creation of a system of effective regulation is fundamentally a problem of devising effective international controls and safeguards which will protect comply" ing States against the hazards of violations and evasions. We cannot expect any nation to accept any system for the regulation of armaments and armed forces unless it is satisfied that the international. controls and safeguards provided will be truly effective. No system of th.is nature which leaves law-abiding States weak and helpless in the face of aggression can ever contribute to world peace and security. We therefore feel that the Council should devote all its efforts to securing substantial progress in the field of atomic energy before it considers other phases of the regulation of armaments, such as the elimination of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and also to the regulation of conventional weapons and equipment of armed forces. The Security Council has recently received from the Atomic Energy Commission its first preliminary report setting forth the basic principles which it feels are ~s.':~ntial to the effective international control of atomic energy. This report will appear on the provisional agenda of an early meeting of this Council. In our view, the consideration of this report, with its recommendations and findings, should be the first action of the Security Council in response to the General Assembly resolution. Paragraph 4 of the General Assembly resolution recommends: "That the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council..." The purpose of the resolution which was introduced by the United States delegation on 31 December of last year is to carry out this recommendation of the General Assembly and give first priority to consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report. I hope the Council will agree, as a result of its present discussion of the General Assembly's resolution, that it should take up consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report at an early date, before attempting to engage in any of the other phases of disarmament referred to in the General Assembly's resolution. The Atomic Energy Commission has worked for months to produce this first report. It appears to us not only natural but proper that the Security Council should decide to deal with these findings and recommendations for atomic energy control before attempting to deal with related matters which are of subsidiary importance. Secretary Byrnes' speech includes numerous other passages which reiterate the understanding of the United States 6at first priority is to be given to the control of atomic energy. I do not recall that any member of the General Assembly took issue with the statements which Secretary Byrnes made in this respect. Furthermore, paragraph 8 of the General Assembly resolution specifically states: "Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on 24 January 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission." I venture to hope that what appears to me to be the common sense of this position will likewise appeal to other members of the Council, and, I hope, to the world in general. The United Nations have spent nearly a year formulating the general principles which would make possible effective international control of atomic energy. Mter great effort, ten of the twelve nations represented on the Atomic Energy Commission have been able to reach agreement on certain fundamental principles which they believe would form the basis for an effective system of internationalcontroI. Representatives of two countries on the Atomic Energy Commis~ sion, however, found themselves un~ble to agree to these principles. One of these countries is a M. James F. Byrnes, Secretaire d'Etat des Etats~Unis, dans le discours qu'il a prononce devant l'Assemblee generale le 1S decembre, a clairement exprime ce sentiment. Je voudrais citeI' seulement le passage suivant de ce discours: ". . . Toutefois, en abordant les problemes que pose le desarmement, il faut commencer par le commencement. La premiere tache que nous devons entreprendre c'est d'etablir le contrOIe de I'energie atomique, afin que celleci ne soit utilisee que pour assurer une vie heureuse al'humanite et non pour I'entrainer dans une guerre mortelle. n y a d'autres armes de destruction massive, mais si nous ne pouvons pas reIever le defi quand il s'agit de la bombe atomique, l'arme la plus epouvantable qu'on ait jamais inventee, nous ne pOUITons jamais non plus le relever quand il s'agira des autres armes.n Le discours du Secretaire d'Etat Byrnes contient de nnmbreux autres passages ou il confirme que les Etats-Unis se rendent compte que le controle de l'energie atomique doit etre etudie d'urgence et avant tout autre probleme. Aucun membre de I'AssembIee generale, que je sache, n'a mis en question les declarations que le Secretaire d'Etat Byrnes a faites a cet egard. En outre, l'AssemblCe generale declare expressement au paragraphe 8 de sa resolution: "Aucune des dispositions contenues dans la presente resolution ne modifiera la resolution de l'AssembIee generale, adoptee le 24 janvier 1946, instituant la Commission de l'energie atomique, ou n'en lir1itera la portee." Je me pe.rmets d'esperer que ce qui, dans cette position, m'apparait comme le bon sens meme, suscitera egalement I'interet des autres membres du Conseil ainsi que, je le souhaite, de l'opinion publique mondiale en general. II a fallu aux Nations Unies presque un an pour parvenir a :i:'nrmuler les principes generaux qui rendraient possible le controle international 'fficace de l'energie atomique. Apres de grands etforts, dix pays sur les douze representes au sein de la Commission de l'energie atomique ont ete en mesure de se mettre d'accord sur certains principes fondamentaux qui, croient-ils, formeront la base d'un systeme efficace de controle international. Cependant, les·representantiJ de deux pays membres de la Commission de l'energie atomique n'ont pas cru pouvoir approuver I must reiterate that I cannot believe that any progress can be made in any of the less important fields of general reduction of armaments until the major issues involved in atomic energy control have been resolved. I have a feeling of optimism as to the outcome of the Security Council's consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report, and I am confident that if this matter is dealt with in the same spirit which animated the discussion and final vote on the General Assembly's disalmament resolution a month or so ago, we shall be able to reach conclusions of real importance which will hold great hope for the future of the world. Again I urge and request my colleagues at this table to take first things first. Upon conclusion of the Security Council's consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report, there will remain ample time to consider what further steps the Council could appropriately take in response to the General Assembly resolution. I must point out what I think should be obvious. The United States has always been a leader in the field of peaceful settlement of disputes and of the reduction and regulation of armaments. The United States has never interposed delay in disarmament for its own sake. The United States does not wish to take any action which will delay the universal disarmament and universal collective control we all desire. We cannot, however, be accused of desiring to delay disarmament in order that we may remain armed, simply because we do not agree that the whole problem should be discussed at one time. . If agreement is reached on the control of atomic energy and an adequate system of safeguards and controls is set up and enforced, the other phases of disarmament will, I venture to say, become a minor problem. The fact that the problem of reaching an agreement on control of atomic energyis a difficult one, that it has seemed to be hopeless at moments, is no reason why we should evade the issue now. If it is the most important problem existing before the civilized world today, it should be clung to and worked at until we reach an agreed solution. The United States will.do its full pan: in promoting and carrying out a universally accepted and agreed-upon scheme for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. We only ask you, and I beg you again, to consider .seriously the United States position regarding the priorities in this question. In this respect, one point appears to me to be certain at the outset: the General Assembly, upon whose resolution our work on disarmament is based, requests us to give prompt consideration to the problem of disarmament and that, thereby it meant the whole problem including atomic disarmament. Moreover, it appears to me to be equally certain that the General hsembly clearly showed its intention of not allowing the study of atomic disarmament to be delayed by that of general disarmament. The first risk we must avoid is that the stud}- of atomic disarmament might be swamped in the general and much longer study of disarmament and thus suffer delay. There are many reasons why we should press on as rapidly as possible with the work regarding control of atomic energy without waiting for a general study of disarmament. The problem of atomic energy is of a very special nature. By reason ot its strictly defined scientific character, it raises very special problems, because control of atomic weapons is inseparable from that of atomic production for peaceful purposes, and also because we are dealing with an entirely new industry which, apart from the elementary research stage, in reality exists ill one country only. Finally, the particularly destructive effects of the atomic weapon, the enormous danger it constitutes for humanity, and the inhuman character of its use~ justify its being outlawed, and make the study of atomic disarmament itself very necessary; no delay ought to be occasioned by the fact that we may engage in other studies on general disarmament. I would further recall in this connexion the point which was made a short while ago that we have now been working on atomic disarmament for more than six months. We have :eached a very advanced stage in this study under more or less encouraging conditions and it would be disappointing and unfortunate if this research were held up in any way. I wish to remind you that this point of view was maintained by the French delegation before the General Assembly and that r myself spoke It is possible, and for my part I hope so, it is perhaps probable thatour work on atomic energy will be concluded first, possibly because it was started first and has already made progress. I sincerely hope that this will be so for the reasons I have just given. for the atomic weapon is a special menace to humanity and its regulation is more necessary than that of any other weapon. Nevertheless, the study of the other aspects of general disarmament will without doubt be extremely long and e".tremely complex and will require much work, and I regard it as unfortunate to lose any time in initiating this study. I am actually not clear as to the difficulty we may encounter. We have before us two matters which can perfectly well be studied simultaneously; it would seem very easy to co-ordinate and synchronize the study of these two subjects. On the subject of atomic energy, we have to consider a first report submitted by the Atomic Energy Committee. It seems certain that the Security Council will be able to reach early agreement on a large portion of this report. Even if certain portions require longer discussion, we could in any case speedily set the Atomic Energy Commission to work again by approving the first portion of the report before us. For example, insofar as conventions on the control of atomic production in its various stages are concerned, it seems to me that almost unanimous agreement was reached in the course of the study by the working groups of the Atomic Energy Commission. As the working groups were composed of the actual members of the Security Council, we might easily reach agreement on these points; the Atomic Energy Commission could therefore be speedily given terms of reference enabling it to resume its work for the implementation of at least a part of its report. As to general disarmament, the object of the proposal submitted to us by the delegation of the USSR is primarily to create a committee with instructions to submit proposals to us. This is not a very original plan of work but it is necessary. We always work through committees. It is the best procedure; and I do not see why we cannot establish this committee promptly and put it· to work too; this would not delay our work in other fields. I would like to add a few comments on the other questions of procedure which may arise. In this connexion I am perhaps overstepping our agenda a little, but I would like to explain the draft resolution, which I shall ask the Secretariat to distribute shortly, and avoid having to speak again on these questions. As regards general disarmament, the question arises whether the Security Council will have to define the general principles of the action required of the committee to be set up. This would obviously lead to longer and more difficult discussion. It wmlld certainly be desirable if we could, when establishing the committee, give it precise terms of reference; but I would point out that the General Assembly's resolution of 14 December is already a sound basis for work and states the purposes very precisely. Moreover, the committee on disarmament to be set up by us will be a working body of the Security Council. Since it will consist of representatives of the same States as those members of the Security Council we might, as a first step in its work, ask it to define the general principles guiding its operations. These principles might be submitted promptly to the Security Council; this method would thus obviate a loss of time. We must also determine how this committee is to be constituted. I think it must include all the members of the Security Council and representatives of the Military Staff Committee. The committee itself would later be free to admit whatever technical experts it may deem advisable. Another point is the time limit of the terms of reference granted to the committee by the USSR resolution. This period of one, two or three months at the most seems to me very short. It would, I believe, be quite impossible to ask the committee to adhere to it, if it is meant to achieve a.'1ything on the g-eneral problem of disarmament within this period. Finally, I would like to raise a point on which I think we ought to reach a decision as soon as possible. As I have already said, I think representatives of the Military Staff Committee should be included in the committee to be set up. The Military Staff Committee is a permanent body of the United Nations, established by the Charter, one of whose normal functions is to study the disarmament question. It seems to me that we could ask the committee to deal with this point specially. I also think that we can go further now and ask the Military Staff Committee to consider two other points, which you, Mr. President, have already raised in connexion with the resolution submitted by the Australian delegation. I think. we should ask the Military Staff Committee to speed up the work with which it was entrusted a year ago and to complete it within a period which we might fix at three months, as provided for in the USSR resolution regarding the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. We might also ask this Committee to submit proposals to us concerning the implementation of the last but one sub-paragraph of paragraph 7 of the General Assembly's resolution: the recommendation for the progressive and balanced withdrawal of armed forces stationed in exenemy territories, as well as the resolution on information to be furnished on this subject. It seems to me normal that the Military Staff Committee should be requested to make a study of the information which the various States concerned may be called upon to furnish. These are the few observations I felt bound to make. They appearin a draft resolution drawn up by my delegation which will be distributed to you now. .

Does any other member of the Council desire to speak at this meeting? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Mr. President, in the conclusion of your own statement you suggested that the Council should now take up the first item of the agenda, namely, the item relating to document S/231 and agree to adopt the r~commendations which the General Assembly has made. As you, yourself, and one or two other representatives have said, the resolution was adopted unanimously by the Assembly and our representatives, as well as the representatives of all our Governments agreed to iti therefore, I suppose we can assume the Council's approval of that resolution. I dcdnee that we are, therefore, now engaged on the next item which you have defined as determining the measures necessary to carry out these recommendations. In that respect, we have more than one proposal before us. I am unable to give any definite opinion at this moment on the various proposals, but with regard to the proposal made some days ago by the representa- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Y a-t-il un autre membre du Conseil qui desire prendre la parole au cours de cette seance? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): A la fin de votre propre declaration, Monsieur le President, vous avez propose au Conseil de passer a l'examen du premier point de l'ordre du jour, a savoir celui qui se rapporte au document S/231, et d'adopter d'abord les recommandations que l'Assemb16e generale a faites au Conseil de securite. Comme vous-mcme et un ou deux representants l'avez fait remarquer, la resolution a ete adoptee a l'unanimite par I'Msemblee. Nos representants, en tant que representants de tous nos Gouvernements, y ont donne leur adhesion, et nollS pouvons done, je pense, presumer que le Conseil l'adoptera egalement. J'en concIus donc que nous discutons maintenant le point suivant qui, a votre avis, doit determiner les mesures a prendre en vue de dormer effet aces recommandations. Nous nous trouvons id devant plusieurs proposition~. Il m'est impossible en ce moment de donner un avis prOCi; sur ees divers~ propositions, mais je voudrais demander au representant de l'URSS quelques n est possible, toutefois, que la mise en application des dispositions de ce paragraphe entrame un certain travail technique. Mais je crois que les decisions generales prises en vertu des dispositions de ce paragraphe devront @tre d'ordre poIitiQue et reIever des Gouvernements. Je ne suis pas absolument certain que le Comite d'etatmajor puisse jouer la un rale tres utile, et certainement pas un role directeur. Cette pr~mi~re opinion mise a part, j'estime que le projet de resolution frim~ais est utile. Pour en revenir a la proposition de l'URSS, je 'Voudrais poser une question au representant de t'URSS et lui demander quelques.precji'lions Apart from that first view, I should say that the draft French resolution is useful. Reverting to the USSR proposal, I would like to ask a question of the representative of the USSR. I should like to ask him whether he L'autre point de la proposition fran~aise qui me laisse queIques doutes, c'est que le Comite d'etat-major devrait, dans un deIai determine, soumettre au Conseil des recommandations tendant adonner eft'et a l'avant-dernier alinea du paragraphe 7 de la resolution de l'AssembIee generale. Le paragraphe id mentionne est, je crois, celuiqui recommande aux Etats Membres de proceder, compte tenu des necessites de l'occupation, au retrait progressif et equilibre de leurs forces stationnees sur les territoires ex-ennemis, et au retrait sans delai de leurs forces stationnees sur les territoires d'autres Etats Membres, sans leur consentement Iibrement et publiquement exprime dans des ~raites ou accords compatibles avec la Charte, et ne contredisant pas des accords internationaux. One more observation, which has already been made by the representative of France, concerning time limits. We are all agreed that we must push on with the work of disarmament as quickly as possible. If putting in the time limit contributes toward that, I welcome it; but there is always a disadvantage in fixing a time limit which raises expectations which are subsequently disappointed. The manner in which the USSR proposal is drafted would rather give the impression that the work of this committee would be expected to be completed within three months. I think that is quite out of the question; it is impossible. The French representative, in his draft resolution, has worked it differently. The committee is requested, within the space of not more than three months, to submit to the Security Council the proposals which it may be in a position to formulate. I think that makes it a little bit clearer that this would be in the nature of an interim report. I shall have no objection to stipulating that interim reports must be made at certain stated intervals, but I should like, when we come to drafting the final proposals, to avoid inserting any time limit which would give the impression that the work is going to be completed within a certain period. We would thereby raise too high, the hopes of the public who are watching our work here and we should inevitably create a certain amount of disillusionment as we pass the successive time limits imposed.

I wonder if, at this stap;e, the Council would be willing to adopt formally the resolution submitted by the General Assembly and then permit the proposals that have been submitted and others that will be submitted to establish the mechanics by which that resolution may be implemented. I myself will have a resoltuion on behalf of Australia to submit at our next meeting. But I do think that at this stage we might be able to place in order the discussion of this matter by the formal approval of the resolution submitted to us by the Assembly. un~ redaction differente. D'apres lui, la commission devra, dans un delai maximum de trois mois, soumettre au Conseil de securite les nropositions qu'il sera a mcme de formuler. A ~iC"~. avis ce texte fait ressortir plus c1airement qu'it s'agit la d'un rapport provisoire. Je ne m'oppose pas a ce que 1'0n parle de la presentation de rapports provisoires a certaines dates determinees, mais je voudrais, lorsque nous redigerons nos propositions definitives, que 1'0n s'abstint de fixer des delais, susceptibles de faire croire que le travail sera termine a une date precise. Nous susciterions de trop grands espoirs dans le public qui nous observe et nous lui imposerions sfirement des deceptions, a mesure que s'ecouleraient les delais successifs. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je me demande si, au point ou nous en sommes, le Conseil serait dispose a adopter formellement la resolution qui lui a ete presentee par l'Assemblee generale, et a considerer ensuite les propositions qui lui ontete ou qui lui seront presentees afin d'etablir les dispositions necessaires pour donner effet a la r&olution qui nous a ete transmise par l'AssemblCe generale. En ce qui me concerne, je presenterai une resolution au nom de l'Australie a notre prochaine seance. Cependant, au point ou nous en somm~, nous pourrions, a mon avis, regler la discussion de cette question en accep- Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Security Council should, of course, accept the resolution transmitted to it by the General Assembly. It seems to me that we cannot do otherwise. I thought, however, that we had done so at the last meeting of the Council. How could it be otherwise? Apparently, we decided at the last meeting to consider this resolution, but not to accept it. This is not quite clear to me. I think that on this matter, as on the question of the agenda, this is the second time we are taking a decision. If anyone doubted, or still doubts, that at the last meeting of the Council we decided only to include the question in the agenda, but not to accept this resolution, then we can take the second decision which you propose. However, I, thought that we had already decided to accept this resolution.

I think it will be agreed that when an agenda is placed before a meeting-, it still leaves the right to the members to determine whether it will accept, reject or amend, or deal in whatever way it may, with any of the matters which may be submitted on that agenda. This matter was submitted to this Council, but until such time as the Council itself has formally accepted the resolution, it seems to me to leave undone something that requires to be done formally. That was why I felt I had to put the thing quite in order and to ensure proper procedure, and I will submit it to the Council in that way. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I think it goes without saying that since the resolution of the General Assembly was adopted unanimously, all the members of this Council consider themselves bound by the provisions of that resolution. Notwithstanding, I think it may be desirable that we pass a formal resolution in which we declare that the Security Council accepts the recommendations to the Council which are contained in the resolution of the General Assembly. I think there are two reasons for adoptingsuch a formal resolution. One of these is legal. We already faced this problem .when we had the resolution of the General Assembly concerning admission to membership. The view which was then held was to accept that resolution, though the Security Council is not automatically bound to accept recommendations of the General Assembly. Therefore, it will help to remove M. LANGE (Pologne) (tratluit de l'anglais): Je crois, puisque la resolution de l'Assemblee generale a ete adoptee al'unanimite, qu'il va de soi que tous les membres du Conseil se considerf rtt comme lies par les dispositions de cette resolution. Neanmoins, il serait, a mon avis, souhaitable que nous adoptions une resolution formelle declarant que le Conseil de securite accepte les recomrnandations . ,;. sont faites et qui sont contenues da; ,':ution de l'AssembIee generale. Il y a deux raisons, .le . /une est d'ordre juridique, en faveur __doption de cette resolution. La question s'est deja posee lorsque nous avons eu affaire a la resolution de l'AssembIee g-enerale sur l'admission a la qualite de membre. Vous avez alors ete cl'awL d'adopter cette resolution, bien que le Conseil de recurite ne soit pas automatiquement force d'accepter les recommandations de l'AssembIee generaIe.

Do I take it then that it is the wisb of the Council that we formally register the acceptance by the Council of the resolution of the General Assembly on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments? Since there is no objection, it is adopted. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Since it is considered that we did not take such a decision at the last meeting, we should, of course, take this decision at the present meeting. n· PRESIDENT: We will continue today's discussil>&_ at such time as the Council may choose at. a later meeting. The members of the Council consider this an appropriate time to adjourn the discussion, and I now adjourn the Council, which will meet again at 3 p.m. tomorrow aftemoon. La seance est levee a18 h. 10.