S/PV.906 Security Council

Before proceeding with my statement, Mr. President, I should like to thank you for the help you have given us and for this opportunity to state our Government's point of view. 5. I wish at the same time to thank the Secretary- General for the help he also has given the delegations that are not members of the Security Council, thus permitting a useful exchange of views which will, I am sure, prove fruitful. Ever since the beginning of the crisis, we ha-re had an opportunity to confer with the Secretary-General as a member of a group of African delegations and we are thus in a position fully to appreciate his tireless efforts and the sincerity of his intentions. 6. Before going any further· I should like to take up a point made by the Belgian representative, who said that Belgium was being placed in the dock, I would merely say that times have changed and that the situation in the Congo is changing from hour to hour. Now the roles are reversed and the victim, the Congolese people, is in the dock. 7. I shall limit myself to very general considerations, in the hope of making a contribution to the solution of the crisis. 8. When the United Nations decided to provide assistance in the crisis that had been set in motion in the Congo by insatiable colonial greed, we received the decision with hope and satisfaction. The problem at that time was serious but straightforward, gravid with consequences but still clearly defined. We had to recognize that the colonialist aggression was inexcusable and dangerous, and demonstrate the urgency of prompt action in the cause of justice. The problem was to furnish the Central Government of the Congo with assistance in order to secure the early withdrawal of the Belgian troops, to guarantee and safeguard the territorial integrity of the Congo and, of course, to lend the fullest possible aid and assistance to the Congolese authoritief;!. 9. In conformity with the principles of peace and solidarity which we follow in our relations with Africa and with the world in general, and as an expression of our devotion to the United Nations Charter and our confidence in the Organization's ability to settle disputes peacefully and furnish disinterested assistance to nations which so request, my country was the first Sur ]'invitation -du President, M. Gebre-Egzy (Etbiopie) et M. Dosumu-Johnson (Liberia) prennent place a la table du Conseil. 3. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil va maintenant passer a l 'examen de la question a l'ordre du jour. Le premier orateur sur ma liste pour ce soir est le representa.;:l.t du Maroc. 4. M. ·ABOUD (Maroc): Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, permettez-moi, Monsieur le President, de vous remercier de nous avoir facilite la tache et de nous avoir donne !'occasion de faire connaftre le point de vue de notre gouvernement. 5. Je voudrais egalement remercier le Secretair£ general d'avoir aussi facilite la tache des delegations non membres du Conseil de securite, de maniere a permettre un echange de vues utile et qui, j'en suis sur, portera ses fruits dans l'avenir. Depuis le debut de la crise, nous avons eu !'occasion de rencontrer, dans un groupe compose de delegations africaines, le Secretaire general. Nous avons pu apprecier son effort infatigable et la sincerite de ses intentions. 6. Avant d'entrer 6galement dans le vif du sujet, je voudrais tout simplement relever une remarque faite par le representant de la Belgique, concernant la qualite d'accusee de la Belgique. Je voudrais dire au representant de ce pays que les temps ont change et qu'au Gongo les circonstances changent d 'heure en heure. Maintenant, les roles sont renverses et c'est la victime, la population congolaise, qui est au bane de !'accuse. 7. J e me limiterai a des considerations tres generales. Notre intention est d'essayer de contribuer au denouement de la crise. 8. Une note d'espoir et de satisfaction a rayonne dans nos creurs lorsque les Nations Unies ont decide d'apporter leur aide a la crise congolaise declenchee par l'insatiable convoitise coloniale. Le probleme, a ce moment-la, etait grave mais clair, gros de consequences mais bien defini. 11 s 'agissait d' admettre que l'agression colonialiste etait inexcusable et dangereuse, et de montrer l'urgence d'une action immediate en faveur de la justice. Le probleme consistait a preter assistance au Gouvernement central congolais pour obtenir 11 evacuation rapide des troupes belges, garantir et sauvegarder l 'integrite territo- . riale du Congo et, bien entendu, preter aide et assistance, dans la plus large mesure possible, aux autorites congolaises. 9. Conformement a ses principes de paix et de solidarite sur le plan africain et international en general, conformement aussi l son attachement a la Charte des Nations Unies, a sa confiance en cette organisation pour le r~glement pacifique des conflits et !'assistance ~sint6ress6e aux nations qui s'adressent a elle, le Maroc avait repondu le 11. Further, bearing in mind the substantial contribution that is be!ngmade by the Royal Moroccan armed forces, both to the operation under United Nations command and in the form of assistance to the Congolese army, Morocco wishes, in view of current developments in the Congo, to stress the importance it attaches to respect for the sovereignty and prerogatives of the Central Government of the Congo in any United Nations operation. The Central Government is going through difficult times and the situation in the Congo may well go from bad to worse. If the situation is not to deteriorate further, the United Nations must take immediate measures to prevent the withdrawal of the troops placed under its command, All peace-loving nations must act in concert to ensure that the United Nations mission in the Congo achieves its aim while respecting the decisions taken and the sovereignty and prerogatives of the Congolese Government. 12. It is said that the situation in the Congo is confused. Conflicting accounts of events appear in the Press. To illustrate the proportions the confusion has reached, we are even told that we have no choice but to wait and see until the situation becomes clearer. 13. De l'avis de ma delegation, le mot "confusion" est juste. Mais il a ete employe parfois improprement. La situation au sein de l'ONU, a propos de la crise congolaise, est pour nous tres claire, L'injustice appelle le desordre et la confusion, Cepend~ .• il n 'y a aucune equivoque quant aux responsables de la crise congolaise. Le Conseil de securite a reconnu des le debut !'existence d'un gouvernement central. Avec la cooperation et a la demande de ce gouvernement, le Conseil a decide d'oouvrer pour !'evacuation rapide de toutes les troupes belges de !'ensemble du territoire national congolais, aussl bien que pour la sauvegarde de l 'integrite territoriale du Congo. Les responsables de la crise etaient les autorites belges. La mission confiee par le Conseil de securite au Secretaire general etait claire et bien definie. Les intrigues colonialistes ont rendu complique ce probleme qui devait etre simple. La multiplication des obstacles imperialistes dress6s par les agents de l 'Union mini~re du Katanga a reussi a fomenter des troubles dans une nation declaree independante et souveraine. Mais, pour l 'Organisation des Nations Unies, aucune equivoque n'est possible. Si 11evacuation rapide et totale des troupes belges etait l'etardee par les intrigues colonialistes et si l'integrite territoriale du Congo 13. My delegation believes that "confusion" is the right word but it has sometimesbeenusedimproperly. As we see it, the situation in the United Nations with regard to the Congo crisis is very clear. Injustice provokes disorder and confusion. However, there is no uncertainty as to who is responsible for the crisis in the Congo. From the beginning the Security Council recognized the existence of a central Government. With the co-operation and at the request of that Government, the Council decided to take action to bring about the speedy withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the entire national territory of the Congo and to preserve the CO'U.'1try1 s territorial integrity. It was the Belgian authorities who were responsible for the crisis. The mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council was clear and well defined. Colonialist intrigues have complicated a problem which should have been simple. The multiplicity of imperialist difficulties created by agents of the Union mini~re du Katanga has been successful in stirring up strife 1n a nation that has been proclaimed independent and sovereign. But for the United Nations, equivocation is out of the question. If the speedy and total withdrawal of Belgian troops was delayed by colonialist intrigues and the territorial integrity of the Congo could not be promptly ensured, it was simple and logical to return 11. Par ailleurs, et compte tenu de !'importance de la contribution des forces armees royales marocaines, aussi bien dans le cadre de !'action sous le Commandement des Nations Unies que dans celui de !'assistance a l'armee congolaise, et en raison du developpement actuel de la situation au Congo, le Maroc veut dire aux membres de ce conseil tout le prix qu'il attache au respect de la souverainete et des prerogatives du Gouvernement central congolais dans toute action des Nations Unies. Le Gouvernement central traverse des circonstances difficiles. La situation au Congo risque d'aller de mal en pis. Pour ne pas l'aggraver davantage il faut que les Nations Unies prennent immediatement toutes les mesures necessaires pour eviter le retrait des troupes placees sous leur commandement. Il faut que toutes les nations eprises de paix agissent de concert pour que la mission des Nations Unies au Congo atteigne son but, dans le respect des decisions prises et le respect de la souverainete et des prerogatives du Gouvernement congolais. 12. On dit que la situation au Congo est confuse. Les depeches de presse rapportent des nouvelles contradictoires. Pour nous montrer que cette confusion atteint des proportions enormes, on va jusqu'a nous dire qu'on ne peut eviter de rester dans l'expectative et d'etre ainsi confine dans une atmosphere brumeuse. 15. On this point the Moroccan and the Congolese peoples are in full agreement. Morocco itself faces a threat of 11Katanganizat:l.on 11 , the carving up of its national territory. In the southern part of Morocco to which the colonialists give the Roman name Mauritania, there ls a powerful French mining company with shareholders ln other European countries which has for some mysterious reason against all the dictates of common sense received a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Here again, as in the case of Katanga, it is not Mauritania that wants independence. It is the Soci~t~ des mines de fer de Mauritania. In itself the problem in the Congo presents no difficulties. It is an instance of the conflict between freedom and domination and it is made more complicated by imperialist intrigues. 16. The United Nations could well take energetic measures, as in the case of the attack on the Suez Canal launched by outworn imperialism. The Congolese problem was so simple in its three aspects; first, respect for the sovereignty, independence and authority of the Central Government; secondly; the rapid and unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the whole territory of the Congo, and thirdly, the preservation, without bargaining, oftheterritorial integrity of the whole Congolese state. 17. This problem, which was so simple despite its gravity, has been complicatedbyreasonofthe Security Council's failure to take vigorous measures throughout the national territory of the Congo. Instead of involving only three factors, the problem is becoming increasingly complicated with numerous and varied aspects in addition to the three I mentioned a moment ago. 18, In the first place, the situation has deteriorated, in the sense that what was a temporary crisis has become a chronic crisis andtheunderlyingdifficulties are becoming steadily greater. 15. Le pm ~ 0 le marocain et le peuple congolais sont en parfaite communion de pensees a ce sujet. Le Maroc lui-meme est victime aujourd'hui d'une menace de 11katanganisation 11 , de morcellement du territoire national. Dans la zone sud du Maroc que le colonialisme baptise du nom romain de Mauritanie existe une puissante compagnie mini~re fran~aise avec des actionnaires d'autres pays europeens et l'incompr6hensible pr~t financier accord6 contrairement · ll. tout bnn sens par la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le developpement. L~ encore, com.me ~lans le cas du Katanga, ce n'est pas la Mauritanie qui veut l'ind6pendance, mai$ c'est la Soc16t6 des mines de fer de Mauritanie qui veut lrindependance. On volt done que ce probleme congolais ne presente en lui-meme aucune difficulte. C'est un exemple de la lutte entre la liberte et la domination. Il est rendu plus complique par les intrigues imperialistes. 16. L'Organisation des Nations Unies pouvait tres bien prendre des mesures energiques comme dans le cas de l'agression contre le canal de Suez declenchee par un imperialisme demode. Le probleme congolais etait si simple dans sa trilogie, a savoir: premierement, le respect de la souverainete, de l'independance et de l'autorite du Gouvernement central; deuxiemement, !'evacuation rapide et inconditionnelle des troupes d'agression dans l'ensemble du territoire du Congo; troisiemement, lasauvegarde, sans marchandage, de l'integrite territoriale de toute la nation congolaise. 17. Ce probleme si simple malgre sa gravite est devenu complique faute de mesures energiques prises par le Conseil de securite dans tout le territoire national congolais. Au lieu de ee composer de trois elements seulement, il se complique en prenant des aspects multiples et varies, A savoir en plus de la trilogie dont nous venons de parler. 18. Premi~rement, le pourrissement de la situation au Congo, c'est-A.-dire 1'6volution de la crise l caract~re temporaire en une crise chronique, en une ·maladie qui va en s'aggravant. 21. Fourthly, we come to a distressing aspect and one that directly affects the African states with troops under the United Nations Command, This is one of the most painful aspects, and raises a matter of conscience both for our Governments and our soldiers, The de~ terioration in the situation has already led United Nations troops recently to take temporary control of the radio station and certain airfields, As a result of the course of events United Nations troops have been obliged to· turn their weapons against their African brothers of the Congo and even against certain members of the Central Government. This problem of conscience threatens the morale of the African troops who are faced with the growing possibility of fratricidal action which is diametrically opposed to the high ideals that inspired the United Nations and the participating Governments a.t the outset. Morocco does not wish to find its troops in the Congo placedina situation similar to that in which other military contingents in the Congo have found themselves. 22. Fifthly and lastly, the civil war in the town of Bakwanga has faced the United Nations itself with a problem of conscience. In order to protect the innocent who are invariably the victims of civil war, whether in Africa, Europe or elsewhere, the United Nations has introduced further complication, a new problem that is more in the nature of self-contradiction than anything else. The victims were members of the families of certain partisans of secession. The problem faced the United Nations with a dilemma that was the logical outcome of the deterioration of the general situation. Intervention was urgently necessary on humanitarian grounds, but in intervening the United Nations ran the risk of losing sight of the over-all problem by concentrating on minor points whose number could well have increased at a serious and unexpected rate. The over-all problem was and still is the secessionist movements. Further, the United Nations was in di...ager of falling into another inconsistency of which the Central Government might well accuse it. The Central Government might well contend that the United Nations refuses to intervene in the affairs of the Congo while in fact intervening without admitting that it is doing so. 23. These difficulties could only be solved in one way, by eradicating the evil at its source, in other words by taking radical measures to bring about the complete· withdrawal of the Belgian troops and immediate action to preser,re the territorial integrity of the Congolese state, with the consent and co-operation of the Central Government. 24. From whatever angle the Congolese crisis is viewed, only one explanation is possible: the crisis is the result of colonial intrigues. It will last as long as this corroding, pathogenic, Balkanizing parasitism continues. 25. A heavy responsibility rests on the Security Council today. Africa has been called the continent 23. Ces situations difficiles n'avaient qu'un seul rem~de: achever d'extirper le mal dans sa racine, c'est-a-dire prendre des mesures radicales pour· !'evacuation totale des troupes beiges et la sauvegarde sans delai de l'integrite territoriale de la nation congolaise, avec le consentement .et la cooperation du Gouvernement central. 24. De quelque fac;on qu'on envisage la crise congolaise, on est reduit a une seule explication: la crise congolaise est le rermltat des intrigues coloniales; elle durera aussi longtemps que persistera ce parasitisme rongeur, pathogene et balkanisateur. 25. Le Conseil de securite est charge aujourd'hui d'une lourde responsabilite. L'Afrique tout entiere 21. Quatri~mement, un aspect douloureux, l'un des aspects qui touchent directement les Etats africains ayant des troupes sous le Commandement des Nations Unies. Cet aspect est des plus penibles, et pose un cas de conscience a la fois a nos gouvernements et a nos soldats. La deterioration de la situation a deja conduit les troupes de !'Organisation des Nations Unies a se saisir recemment de la station de radio et de certains aerodromes pour un contr6le temporaire. L'evolution des evenements etait telle que les troupes de l'ONU etaient amenees a braquer leurs armes sur leurs freres africains du Congo et m~me sur certains membres du gouvernement central. Ce cas de conscience mine le moral des effectifs militaires africains a cause des possibilites d'action fratricide qui risquent de se multiplier et qui sont a l'antipode de !'ideal tres eleve ayant au debut· inspire !'Organisation des Nations Unies et les gouvernements participants. Le Maroc veut eviter que ses troupes au Congo .ne soient mises dans une situation analogue a celle dans laquelle se sont trouves d'autres contingents militaires au Congo. 22. Cinquiemement enfin, la guerre civile dans la region de Bakwanga a provoque un cas de conscience pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies elle-m~me. Pour proteger des vies innocentes qui sont toujours les victimes des guerres civiles enAfrique, en Europe ou ailleurs, l'ONU allaitsouleverunenouvellecomplication, un nouveau probl~me qui est plus proche de la contradiction avec soi-m~me que detoute autre chose. Les victimes appartenaient aux familles de certains partisans de la secession. Leproblemeetaitundilemme, aboutissement logique du pourrissement de la situation generale. Intervenir etait une action humaine et urgente, mais l'intervention risquait de noyer l 1ensemble du probleme dans des details qui auraient pu se multiplier a un rythme grave et imprevu. L'ensemble en question etait et demeure les mouvements secessionnistes. De plus, l'Organisation des Nations Unies allait au-devant d'une autre contradiction dont le Gouvernement central pouvait bien !'accuser: ce gouvernement pouvait bien dire que l 'ONU s 'interdit d'intervenir ~dans les affaires du Congo tout en y intervenant et sans admettre qu'elle y intervient. 26. It is the Security Council's duty to follow where history leads. The crisis in the Congo must be reviewed without delay. The resolutions adopted by the Council are still in force. There is inmy delegation's opinion no need for further discussion of objectives. The exceedingly urgent question before us is that of taking vigorous measures to ensure the immediate and full implementation of the resolutions adopted. The Suez crisis was brought under control in a few days as a result of the vigorous action taken by our Organization. Why should what was possible in a dispute as grave as the Suez incident be impossible in the no less serious crisis in the Congo? 27. I remember." very clearly and with regret the early days of the Congolese crisis and the efforts made in this Council to reach agreement on a firm resolution with a strong operative part. Nothing came of those efforts. The situation grew rapidly worse and the colonialists lost no time in building up the stocks of weapons intended for the secessionist mo·~ements. The future was gloomy and the Congolese people were driven to despair. As Africa and the colonialist countries do not speak the same ideological language, no meeting of minds was possible. The colonial Powers can only work with puppets, the ambitious or the opportunists. They belong to one world, we to·another. The worst was to happen. A desperate people was facing unsurmountable difficulties. But colonialism is ruthless and knows no compassion. On the contrary it takes pride in doing evil and has the brazen audacity to describe it as good. 28. Apr~s avoir maintenu pendant 80 ans le peuple congolais dans !'ignorance et la servitude, le colonialisme, comme toute chose qui vieillit, s'attache a perpetuer sa domination au moyen de la division, de la corruption et de la mainmise sur les ressources de toutes sortes de lanationcongolaise._Notre pensee et notre programme, a nous Africains, sont justement 11inverse de 1"'ette orientation qui ne peut ~tre qualifiee que de r•erversion de la conscience humaine. Ce que nous voulons pour le Congo, c'est une veritable independance politique et economique sous la conduite d'un gouvernement central patriote, souverain et respecte dans le monde, avec enfin la sauvegarde de l1integrite territoriale obtenue sans delai ni marchandage. Toute defaillance l obtenir ces conditions · indispensables au retablissement de l'ordre sera une perte de temps inexcusable. 28. After keeping the Congolese people in ignorance and servitude for eighty years, colonialism, like all outmoded institutions, is determined to perpetuate its domination by means of division, corruption and a stranglehold on all the resources of the Congolese people. African thinking and the African programme are precisely the reverse of this approach which can only be described as a perversion of the human conscience. What we seek for the Congo is genuine political and economic independence under the leadership of a patriotic, sovereign Central Government which is respected throughout the world, and the preservation of the territorial integrity of tpe Congo without delay or haggling. Any weakness in securingthese conditions essential to the restoration of law and order will involve an inexcusable loss of time. 29. The various factors in the Congo crisis are interrelated. The withdrawal of the Belgian troops, the secessionist or Balkanization movements, internal 29. Les differents facteurs du tableau de la crise congolaise sont. lies les uns aux autres. L1evacuation des troupe'.S beiges, le mouvement de secession ou 26. Le devoir du Conseil de securite est de suivre le sens de l 'histoire. La crise congolaise doit etre reconsideree sans delai. Les resolutions adoptees par le Conseil sont toujours en vigueur. Il est, de l 1avis de notre delegation, superflu de parler a nouveau des buts a atteindre. La question qui se pose d1extr~me urgence consiste plutOt a prendre des mesureEl energiques pour !'application immediate et tota.le de ces resolutions. La crise de Suez a ete contralee en quelques jours, grace a !'action energique de notre organisation. Pourquoi done ce qui etait possible dans un conflit aussi grave que celui de Suez devient-il impossible dans une crise non moins grave au Congo? 27. Je me rappelle fort bien et aregreties premiers jours de la crise congolaise et les tentatives faites au sein du Conseil pour arriver a un accord sur une resolution ferme, avec un dispositif energique. Rien de cela n'a pu voir le jour. La situation s'aggravait rapidement. Les colonialistes augmentaient en toute hate le stock d'armes destine aux movements secessionnistes. L'avenir etait sombre. Le peuple congolais etait accule au desespoir. Comme l'Afrique d'u.n cOte et les pays-colonialistes de l'autre ne parlent pas le meme langage ideologique, aucun accord de pensee n'etait possible. Les puissances coloniales ne savent travailler qu'avec des fantoches, des ambitieux ou <;les opportunistes. Elles appartiennent l un monde; nous appartenons l un autre. Le pire allait se produire. Un peuple desespere etait en proie l des difficultes inextricables. Mais le cceur dur du colonialisme ne connaft pas de sentiments charitables. Bien au contraire, il est fier d'avoir fait un mal qu'avec une audace incomprehensible il qualifie de bien. 30. The other factors are only symptoms of the disease; they are consequences that arose after disorder had been started by the foreign forces of aggression and division. 31. It is for that reason that we believe that the only logical remedy is to eradicate the evil by taking vigorous measures. We must take prompt and radical action. The dividing line between evolutionary and revolutionary methods is becoming indistinct in our time. If we fail to take such action, we shall face a series of dangers as a result of colonialist intrigues: first, a permanent revolution against the chaos created by imperialism masquerading as pseudo-independence; secondly, a continuing revolution against any pre ... meditated attempt to bring the country under foreign trusteeship; thirdly, social upheaval in the form of political or pseudo-ideological conflicts; fourthly-the most serious factor-a chronic state of instability and disorder manifested in a succession of revolts and revolutir.ms. If this should happen, the world will be playing with fire in Africa. 32. It is the characteristic of our times that t'!-e peoples govern their own destinies. Any government or policy in conflict with the aspirations of the people will soon be brought to nought and destroyed. We have seen several examples in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. 33. To sum up, my delegation believes that the future of Africa is linked with that of the United Nations, in which we place our hopes. The eradication of the last 'Vestiges of colonialism is the only answer to the crisis in the Congo. The Advisory Committee on the Congo convened by the Secretary.:.General-andwe are grateful to him for doing so-should be available as often as possible to assist him in following developments in United Nations activities and the situation in the Congo. Lastly, we must not become so preoccupied with details that we forget the over-all problem and we must take vigorous action to ensure that time does not work against us. 34. The Moroccan Government earnestly hopes that the United Nations mission in the Congo will be crowned with success as soon as possible. There is rio alternative to the complete and speedy implementation of the Security Council's decisions as set forth in the resolutions in force. What might be described as a surgical operation is urgentlynecessary. Without it l do not see how we can break the deadlock. 35. We know that the Congo, like all colonies which have become independent, is a rich counfry with a poverty-stricken population. It needs prompt and substantial technical and financial aid. But if we fail to restore its effective independence and sovereignty 31. C'est pourquoi nous pensons que le seul rem~de logique est I 'extirpation du mal par des mesures energiques. Il faut agir vite et d'une mani~re radicale. Entre les methodes evolutionnistes et les methodes revolutionnaires, la ligne de demarcation devient presque impalpable de nos jours. Si nous n'agissons pas, nous courons au-devant des_ dangers qui sont la consequence des intrigues .::olonialistes, a savoir: en premier lieu, une revolution permanente contre le desordre etabli par l 'imperialisme camoufle dans le cadre d'unepseudo-independance; endeuxi~me lieu, une revolution continue contre toute tentative de tutelle premeditee A l 'exterieur; en troisi~me lieu, un dl§chirement social dans le cadre des luttes politiques ou pseudo-ideologiques; en quatri~me lieu - et c'est le facteur leplusgraveun etat chronique d'instabilite et de desordre sous iorme de revoltes OU de revolutions successives. Dans ces circonstances, le monde jouerait avec le feu en Afrique. 32. La caracte!'istique de notre epoque est que les peuples dirigent leurs destinees. Tout gouvernement et toute politique qui s1opposent aux aspirations populaires seront bientOt vains et bienttlt detruits. Nous avons, a cet egard. plusieurs examples en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs. 33. En resume, notre delegation pense que l'avenir de l'Afrique est lie a celui de !'Organisation des Nations Unies, dans lequel nous plagons nos espoirs. L'extirpation des derniers vestiges coloniaux est la seule reponse A la crise congolaise. Le Comite consultatif pour le Congo convoque par le Secretaire general - et nous lui en savons gre - doit ~tre le plus frequemment possible a la disposition du Secretaire general pour suivre !'evolution de l'oouvre des Nations Unies et de la situation· au Congo. Enfin, il ne faut pas noyer l'ensemble clans les details; il faut prendre les mesures les plus energiques pour ne pas ~tre debordes et devances par le temps. 34. Le Gouvernement marocain souhaite arc;lemment que la mission confiee A. l 'ONU au Congo soit couronnee de succ~s dans le plus bref delai. L'application compl~te et rapide des decisions du Conseil de s6cur.ite qui figurent dans les resolutions en vigueur n'a pas d'alternative. Une sorte d'operation chirurgicale s 1impose de toute urgence. Sans cela, nous ne voyons pas comment nous pouvons sortir de l 1impasse. 35. Nous savons bien que le Congo, commetoutes les colonies devenues independantes, est un pays riche avec une population pauvre; il a, bien entendu, besoin d'une aide technique et financi~re subsfantielle et urgente. Mais, sans lui restituer son i:adependance et 36. Morocco is participating in the United Nations military command in the Congo. At the request of the Central Government of the Congo it has placed its services at the disposal of the Congolese National Army. We are confident that the military command of the international Force will successfully accomplish its mission of securing the total and immediate withdrawal of the Belgian troops and preserving the territorial integrity of the Congo. If this does not happen, we shall feel that the United Nations mission has failed in a way that bodes ill for the future. 37. Every man hopes that his family may never need the sel"vices of a doctor. It is our hope that the Congo may cease to need the military assistance of the United Nations.

I give the floor to the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

The representative of Morocco saw fit to refer to a country, Mauritania, which will shortly become independent at the freely expressed wish of its people, That reference was entirely extraneous to our debate; I simply wish to stress this fact and to add that my delegation denies the validity, both in form and in substance, of the statements made by the representative of Morocco.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I should like to draw the attention of the Council members to a joint draft resolution on the subject under discussion, which has just been submitted by the representatives of Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4523].

In addressing the Council again I wish, first of all, to point out that the developments in the Congo during the last few days, and particularly the repeated attempts to overthrow the legal Government of the Republic of the Congo, have once again dramatically demonstrated the necessity of such urgent steps by the Security Council as would help to stop the present course of events, whose direct consequences are threatening the world, All that has taken place at this table this week also proves that we were right in insisting on the urgent convening ~f the Security Council. 42. It is precisely because we are confronted by a very grave situation that I wish to emphasize the extraordinary importance of this meeting of the Security Council. Its conclusions and decisions will determine in the greatest measure whether the situation will continue to become more and more complicated and 36. Le Maroc participe au commandement des tr011pes des Nations Unies au Congo. A lademandedu Gouvernement central congolais, il a mis ses services a la disposition de l 'arm6e nationale congolaise. ~ous• sommes confiants que le commandement militaire des forces internationales m~nera a bien sa t!che consistant dans l' evacuation totale et immediate des troupes belges et dans la sauvegarde de l 'integrite territoriale du Congo. Sans cela, nous considererons que la mission de ! 'Organisation des Nations Unies a abouti a un echec nefaste pour l'avenir. 37. Ce qu'un hcmme souhaite pour sa famille, c'est de ne jamais avoir besoin des services d'un medecin. Ce que nous souhaitons au Congo, c'est de ne plus avoir besoin de !'assistance militaire des Nations Unies. 38. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je donne la parole au representant de la France, qui desire exercer son droit de reponse. 39. M. MILLET (France): Le representant du Maroc a cru bon de faire allusion tun pays, la Mauritanie, qui sera sous peu independant par la libre volonte de son peuple. Cette allusion est totalement etrang~re a notre debat; je veux simplement le souligner et ajouter que, dans la forme comme sur le fond, ma delegation s 'inscrit en faux contre les affirmations du representant du Maroc. 40. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole a l'orateur suivant, je me permets d'attirer !'attention des membres du CollSeil sur un projet de resolution relatif a la question qui nous occupe; le texte vient d'en ~tre depose par les representants de Ceylan et de la Tunisie [S/4523], 41. M. VIDIC (Yougoslavie) [traduit de l'anglais]: En prenant a nouveau la parole, je voudrais, tout d'abord faire observer que !'evolution de la situation au Congo au cours de ces derniers jours, et en particulier les tentaUves repetees de renverser le gouvernement legal de la Republique th Congo ont, une fois de plus, fait ressortir de fa9on dramatique la necessite, pour le Conseil de securiUi, de prendre d'urgence des mesures aidant a enrayer unr-i succession d1evenements qui constituent aujourd'hui pour le monde une menace directe. Les debats qui se sont deroules cette semaine autour de cette table prouvent egalement combien · nous avions raison de demander avec insistance la reunion d'urgence du Conseil. 42. C'est precisement parce que nous ·nous trouvons devant une situation tr~s grave que je tiens i\ souligner !'importance extraordinaire que revm cette reunion du Conseil de securite. Selon les decisions et conclusions auxquelles aboutira le Conseil, la situation continuera de se compliquer et de devenir plus 44. We have considered very carefully the remarks of the Secretary-General [896th and 904th meetings] on our statement of 9 September. Without casting doubts on the good intentions of the Secretary-General and other United Nations representatives in the Congo, my delegation feels in duty bound to state that the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of the Congo has become a brake slowing down any adequate action aimed at implementing strictly the resolutions of the Security Council. This fact has been used to continue the outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo in most diverse forms. Aside from the malevolent procrastinations in the withdrawal of foreign troops, which is completely harmful to the normalization of conditions in the country, most positive attempts to break up the Republic of the Congo and to organize a conspiracy against the legal Government have continued up to this moment. The departure from the course already adopted was, in the first instance, caused by the action of Belgium using the natural difficulties of the new state and its Government to forestall the realization of independence in order to retain certain colonial possessions by various means which I described in my earlier statement. In short, the non-intervention of the United Nations was used to continue the intervention I described, while relying on the misuse of the principle of the right of selfdetermination, about which I am going to speak now. 45. Thus the recently achieved independence and territorial integrity of the Congo was brought into the greatest ~~gei:. As I have said, an attempt has been made to find support in the flagrant misuse of the principle of the right of self-determination. This principle is now invoked by the very group which is encouraged by those who had for decades made it impossible for the Congolese people to realize its right of selfdetermination, self-government and independence. 46. There is no need to dwell on the fact that my delegation firmly maintains the principle of the right of self-determination. It is known well enough to what -extent and in what manner the represeiilatives of Yugoslavia, within the framework of the United Nations and otherwise, have defended that right on all occasions. In a situation such as that now prevailing in the Congo, however, this principle can be applied only 1f the complete independence of the country as a whole is duly respected. Only the full independence of the 44. Nous avons examine avec beaucoup d'attention les remarques que le Secretaire general a faites [896~me et 904~me seances] au sujet de notre declaration du 9 septembre. Sans vouloir mettre en doute les intentions du Secretaire general et des autres representants de 1 'ONU au Congo, ma delegation se voit dans I 'obligation de declarer que le principe de la non-intervention de l 1ONU dans les affaires interieures du Congo est devenu un freinquiralentit toute action tendant efficacement a la stricte miseenapplication des resolutions du Conseil de securite. On en a profite pour poursuivre une intervention exterieure dans les affaires internes de la Republique du Congo, sous les formes les plus diverses. Independamm.ent des retards voulus clans le retrait des troupes etrang~res, qui contrarient au plus haut point la reprise de la vie normale dans le pays, certains ont continue jusqu'a ce jour de s'employer par tousles. moyens a semer la dissension et a organiser un complot contre le gouvernement legal. Si la ligne de conduite adoptee A l'origine n'a pas ete suivie, c'est tout d'abord a cause des actes de la Belgique, qui a profite des difficultes naturelles que traversaient le nouvel Etat et son gouvernement legitime pour entraver !'accession a l'independance effective, afin de conserver certaines possessions coloniales, par divers moyens que j'ai decrits dans ma precedente declaration au Conseil. Bref, le principe de la nonintervention de l 'ONU a ete utilise pour poursuivre !'intervention que j'ai decrite, en s1appuyant sur l'emploi abusif du principe du droit A l'autodetermination, dont je vais parler maintenant. 45. C'est ainsi que les plus graves dangers en sont venus a peser sur l 'independance i\ laquelle venait d'acceder le Congo et sur son integrite territoriale. Comm.e je l'ai dit, on a essaye de s'appuyer sur un abus flag-rant du principe d'autodetermination. Ce principe, nous l'entendons aujourd1hui invoquer par ce groupe m3me qu'encouragent ceux qui, depuis des dizaines d'annees, empechaient le peuple congolais de realiser ses droits A l'autodetermination, Al'autonomie et a l 1independance. 46. Je n'ai pas besoin de souligner quemadelegation defend fermement le principedudroita.11autodetermination. On ne saitquetropdequellemaniere et jusqu'a quel point les representants de la Yougoslavie, au sein de l'ONU ou en dehorsd'elle,sesonten toute occasion faits les defenseurs de ce droit. Or, dans une situation comm.e celle qui existe aujourd'hui au Congo, ce principe ne peut s'appliquer que si l'independance compl~te du pays dans son enl'>emble est respectee com.me i1 se dolt. Seuls l 'independance complete 4 7. That is why we must not allow the Government of the Republic of the Congo-the legal Government of a country which has been recommended by the Security Council for membership of the United Nations-to be put in an equal position with puppet groups and illegal armed formations in the service of foreign interests. Even less should we allow ourselves to permit this Government to be put into an unfavourable position in relation to the latter. The United Nations Force in the Congo should help the Government of the Republic to exercise its authority over the whole of the territory of the country. The relevant resolution of the Security Council stipulates that. It corresponds to the interests of relaxation of tension and the re-establishment of law and order in the Congo. It alone opens up a clear perspective of finding a way out of the prevailing dangerous situation. If only because of the outside help and support for the groups waging the fight against the legal Government, half-way measures are not possible without their being directly detrimental to the Republic of the Congo and to the prestige of the United Nations. 48. As we have seen, the correctness of the United Nations in the Congo up to this moment and certain interpretations of non-intervention by the Organization in internal affairs have already been amply misused by the Belgians, who have no similar scruples, and the protests addressed by the Secretary-General to the Belgian Government bear ample witness to this. We have previously stated the pertinent facts. 49. In order to avoid further complications and a radical deterioration of the situation in the Congo, the Security Council and the Command of the United Nations Force should not at this juncture, in our opinion, hesitate before measures such as the request that all armed groups which are not based on the constitution and laws of the Republic of the Congo be disarmed, with a corresponding guarantee that there would be no reprisals. The United Nations Force in the Congo should take an active part in bringing this measure into effect. It is a measure which would bring peace to the Congo in the speediest and most efficient manner. It would eliminate the most dangerous forms of foreign interference and make possible a change to peaceful and normal political development. If some secessionist and conspiratorial groups were not to respond to it that fact would clearly prove that they opposed action by the United Nations to bring about the normalization of conditions in the Congo. menace l'independance de la Republique du Congo dans son ensemble et dans ses divers elements constitutifs, aussi bien que le peuple congolais en general. 47. C'est pourquoi nous ne saurions permettre que le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo - gouvernement legal d'un pays dont le Conseil de securite a recommande !'admission a !'Organisation des Nations Unies - soit mis sur le m~me p,ed que des groupes fantoches et des formations arn:, §es illegales au service d'intedts etrangers. Nous devons moins encore permettre que ce gouvernement soit mis dans une situation defavorable par rapport il. ces groupes. La Force des Nations Unies au Congo dolt aider le Gouvernement de la R6publique it exercer son autorite sur l 'ensemble du territoire. C 'est lil ce que prevoit la resolution pertinente du Conseil de securite. Et i1 y a la le moyen de reduire la tension et de retablir l'ordre public au Congo. C'est sur cette base seulement que l'on peut clairement discerner la possibilite de mettre un ter~e aux dangers de la situation actuelle. Ne serait-ce qu'en raison de l'aide apportee de l'exterieur aux groupes qui m~nent le combat contra le gouvernement 16gitime, lea demi-mesures ne sont pas possibles: elles ne feraient que nulre directement it la R6publique du Congo et au prestige de l'ONU. 48. Comma nous l'avons vu, !'attitude correcte adoptee par !'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo jusqu'A. present et certaines interpretations de la non-intervention de l 'ONU dans les affaires interieures ont deja perm.is de nombreux abus de la part des Beiges, qui ne s 'encombrent pas de scrupules en la mati~re, comme les protestations adressees par le Secretaire general au Gouvernement beige le montrent abondamment. Nous avons precedemment rappele les faits a cet egard. 49. Si I 'on veut eviter de nouvelles complications et une aggravation radicale de la situation au Congo, i1 faut, salon nous, que le Conseil de securite et le Commandementde la Force des Nations Unies, dans la conjoncture actuelle, n'hesitent pas A prendre toutes mesures .voulues et, par example, A demander le desarmement de tous les groupes armes qui existent hors du cadre de la Constitution et des lois de la Republique du Congo, tout en obtenant en contrepartie de la garantie qu 'il ne sera pas exerce de repdsailles. La Force des Nations Unies au Congo doit elle-m~me prendre une part active a l' applica- Uon de cette mesure, qui ramrmerlllt la paix au Congo de la mani~re la plus rapide etla plus efficace, tout en 6liminant let\\ formes l~s plus dangereuses d'intervention etrang~re et en facilitant la transition vers une vie politique pacifique et normale. Si certains groupes de conspirateurs et de partisans de la secession ne repondent pas a cet appel, ils it is sufficiently ·demonstrated by all the previous discussions in the Security Council, by the reports of the Secretary-General and by other documents that the position of the United Nations Force in the Congo, under conditions of a deepening crisis provoked by outside interference and intervention, is very delicate, and that the tasks of the Force are extremely difficult and serious. 51. Precisely because of this and in order to carry out the real task of the United Nations in the Congo, a task which we support, it ts necessary to correct certain short-comings and mistakes in its activities, for these short-comings and mistakes can have unpredictable .-repercussions on the future of the Republic of the Congo, on relations in that part of the world and on peace in general, not to speak about the prestige of our Organization. There is still time, although not much of it, to correct all this. 52. With reference to this, I would like to point out that the actions of the Government of Belgium and of those lending in one way or the other their support to Belgium are the main cause of the creation of a serious danger and the introduction of the cold war into that area. It will be difficult to avoid this unless the United Nations undertakes the necessary steps and measures; otherwise the outlook will be black indeed. 53. I feel compelled to reiterate that now we must deal with the necessity of effectively stopping all outside interference an~ of bringing the relations and cooperation between the Command of the Unit,;,d Nations Force and the Government of the Republic of the Congo into harmony with the principles contained in the resolutions of the Security Council on this question. Precisely because of this it is so necessary to point out to the Command of the United Nations Force and to those who bear the responsibility for its activities their essential task and the effective methods for r...,rrying it. out. In doing so the only criterion which is valid, which should be used to judge the United Nations activities in the Congo and which is at the same time not controversial but contained in previous resolutions of the Security Council ta United Nations assistance to the Government of the Congo and co-operation with it in the defence of the independence, territorial in-. tegrity and sovereignty of the Republic. 54. I intend to reiterate here, answering at the same time the Secretary-General's remarks, why my delegation attaches so much weight to the Security 'Council resolution of 14 July 1960 [S/4387]. This resolution, in the opinion of my delegation, is of basic importance in order to evaluate all the activities of the United Nations in the Congo simply because it was on the basts of the legal authority of this resolution that the United Nations Force in the Congo was created. It was on this basis that the Member States of the United A la Belgique que sont dues en majeure partie !'existence de ce grave danger et !'introduction de la guerre froide dans cette region. 11 sera difficile d'y parer A moins que l 'ONU ne prenne lea mesures necessaires; sinon, lea perspectives seront des plus sombres. 53. Je tiens A repeter qu'il est maintenant de notre devoir de faire en sorta qu 'il soit effectivement mis terme A toute ingerence etrang~re et que lea relations et la collaboration entre le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies et le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo soient bien conformes auxprincipes enonces dans lea resolutions du Conseil de securite. C'est precisement pour cette raison qu'il s'impose h tel point de bien faire comprendre au Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies et A ceuxqui sont responsables de son action ce que sont leur tllche essentialle et les moyens efficaces de l'accomplir. Pour ce faire, le seul critl!re valable d'apr~s lequel on puisse juger l 'action de l'ONU au Congo et qui en m@me temps ne pr@te pas A controverse - puisqu 'il figure dans lea resolutions precedentes du Conseil de securite - est l'assistance des Nations Unies au Gouvernement du Congo et la cooperation avec ce gouvernement pour defendre l'independance, l'integrite territoriale et la souverainete de la Republique. 54. Je tiens A redire ici, en repondant par la m~me occasion aux remarques du Secretaire general, pourquoi ma delegation attache tant d'importance h la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 14 juillet 1960 [S/4387). Cette resolution, de l'avis de ma delegation, est d'une importance fondamentale pour juger toutes lea activites des Nations Unies au Congo, car c'est sur la base juridique constituee par cette resolution qu'a ete creee la Force des Nations Unies au Congo. C 'est sur cette base que lea Etats Membres 55. I wish to repeat something which I pointed out in my statement of 9 September. If we do not begin to act to implement fully the resolutions of the Security Council, the Government of the Republic of the Congo, finding itself the object of new attacks encouraged and organized from the outside, would naturally have to turn to its friends for help and friendly nations would be compelled to take this help into more serious consideration, with all that this would inevitably involve. But before this happens, everything should be done to avoid it, since the negative consequences of such a development are obvious. 56. It is in the interests of the peoples of the Congo, of Africa and of the world that the cold war should not be extended to that area which, as a whole, needs peace so that the countries which are acquiring their independence now may begin the great creative work awaiting them. So much the greater is the responsibiUty of the United Nations for the strict implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council because the United Nations has the power and the duty to save the Congo and that part of the world in general from the dangerous consequences of the cold war. This is at the same time in accordance with its general task of relieving the cold war in the whole of the world in favour of an era of active and peaceful co-operation among peoples. 57. Allow me in conclusion to say a few words in connexion with creating a United Nations fund for the Congo. Of course my Government stands for a voluntary United Nations fund for the Republic of the Congo. This is necessary for rei)sons given bytheSecretary- General and mentioned by many other speakers. Financial aid should be given through the Government of the Republic of the Congo or, if you wish, in co-operation with that Government. For reasons already mentioned, we support this idea. 58, Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Mr. President, I thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to deliver a very brief message from H.M. Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia. The message is: "Because the grave situation in the Republic of the Congo is deteriorating from day to day rather than improving, and inasmuch as it has become difficult to implement the series of Security Council resolutions, the United Nations should not limit itself only to the maintenance of peace-and security in the Republic of the Congo; it should also seek a solution 55. Je voudrais repeter ici ce que j'ai dejl souligne dans ma declaration du 9 septembre. Si nous ne commengons pas i\ agir pour mettre pleinement en application les resolutions du Conseil de securite, le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo, se trouvaut l'objet de nouvelles attaques encouragees et organisees de l'exterieur, devra toutnaturellement se tourner vers ses amis pour qu'ils l'aident, et les nations amies se verront dans !'obligation de prendre plus serieusement en consideration cette demande d'assistance, avec tout ce qu'elle comporterait inevitablement. Il ne faut done rien negliger pour prevenir une telle situation, grosse de consequences nt'.ifastes evidentes. 56. L'int6rt\t de la population du Congo, de l'Afrique et du monde veut que la guerre froide n'aille pas s'6tendre A. cette region qui, dans son ensemble, a besoin de paix afin que les pays qui accMent aujourd'hui i\ l'independance puissent s'attaquer A. la grande oouvre crliatrice qui les attend. La responsabilite qui incombe A. l'ONU d'appliquer strictement les resolutions du Conseil de securite est d'autant plus grande qu'elle peut, comme c'est son devoir, epargner au Congo et A. cette partie du monde en general les consequences dangereuses de la guerre froide. Cette ligne de conduite est en mt\me temps conforme au but d'ensemble de l'ONU, quiestde faire reculer la guerre froide dans le monde entier afin Q.1.!.'une rire de cooperation active et pacifique s'ouvre pour les peuples. 57. Qu'il me soit permis, en conclusion, de dire quelques mots A. propos de la creation d'un fonds des Nations Unies pour le Congo. Il va sans dire que mon gouvernement est favorable A. la creation d'un fonds des Nations Unies alimente par , des contributions benevoles et destine A. la Republiqne du Congo. Les raisons qu'a exposees le Secretaire general et qu'ont reprises nombre d'autres orateurs en montrent bien la necessitli. L'aidefinanci~redevra ~tre accordlie par l'intermediaire du Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo ou, si l 1on veut, en cooperation avec ce gouvernement. Pour les raisons d6jA. mentionnees, nous appuyons cette idlie. 58. M. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) [traduit de l'anglais]: Monsieur le President, je vous suis tr~s reconnaissant de me donner cette possibilitli de lire. un tr~s bref message de s. M. Han6 Selassie Ier, empereur d'Ethiopie. Ce message est ainsi con911: "La situation inquilitante qui rrigne dans la R6publique du Congo s'aggrave de jour en jour au lieu de s'am6liorer et il est devenu difficile d'appliquer les diff6rentes resolutions du Conseil de s6curitli; en cons6quence, 110rganisation des NationsUniesne devrait pas se horner A. assurer le maintien de la paix et de la s6curit6 dans la R6publique du Congo; 59. Such an approach to the problem, we believe, will solve the central problem of the Republic of the Congo, that is, it will enable that country to maintain its unity and thereby defeat any encroachment upon its integrity.

Upon me has devolved the responsibility of expressing on behalf of the Government and people of Liberia profound gratitude for the privilege of being heard on this very important and most provocative issue. In availing itself of this opportunity, the Liberian delegation would implore members of the Security Council to believe that it is moved solely by a genuine desire to put an end to this protracted debate which, if conti.nued in its present atmosphere, will render untold daLiage to the people of the Congo and dim the hopes of Africans now on the threshold of independence. 61. We shall, therefore, appealtoallshadesofopinion that have been advanced on this issue and to all parties involved for whole-hearted co-operation, tolerance and understanding as the sine qua non to a satisfactory solution of the Congo situation. 62. It will be a travesty of the principles of the purest justice if members of the Council permit themselves to be swayed by verbal pyrotechnics while the fate of millions, who have faith in the United Nati.one as their ladder to the good life, oscillates in an aura of confusion and inaction. 63. May I be permitted the boldness to say that this is not the time for words; it is not the time to find out who is wrong or who is right. If mistakes have been made through omission or commission, the best interest of the Congolese in particular and the Africans in general dictates that they be imputed to all and generously assumed by all. 64. The view of my GDvernment that the United Nations is the foundation of peace is so well known that I should hesitate to intervene in this debate; but my Government has directed me, in a telegram received a few minutes before the last meeting adjourned, to make the position of the Liberian Government unmistakably clear for the records and for emphasis. Our position is as follows. First, the Liberian Gov~ ernment implicitly believes in the United Nations and its instruments. Second, the Liberian Government supports the Secretary-General and the United Nations on the Congo. Third, the Liberian Government is in favour of the Central Government of the Congo. Fourth, the Liberian Government believes that the United Nations should take steps to restore order in the Congo with the co-operation of all Members of the United Nations. Fifth, the Liberian Government will, as always, contribute its quota to any fund established i\ son integrite. 60. M. DOSUMu-JOHNSON (LiMria) [traduit de l 'anglais]: C'est i\ moi qu'incombe la responsabilite de dire combien le gouvernement et le peuple liberiens sont heureux de pouvoir faire connailre leurs idees sur cette question aussi importante que delicate. En saisissant cette occasion, lad616gationliMriennetient A assurer les membres du Conseil de securite que son seul desir est de mettre fin a ce debat trop prolonge qui, s'il se poursuit dans le climat actual, fera un tort irreparable au peuple du Congo et decevra profondement les espoirs des Africains qui sont aujourd'hui au seuil de l 'independance. 61. Nous adresserons done un appal auxporte-parole de toutes les nuances d'opinions qui ont ete exprimees ici et a. toutes les parties interessees pour leur demander de faire preuve de l' esprit de cooperation, de tolerance et de comprehension sinc~res qui est la condition sine qua non d'une solution satisfaisante du probll!lme congolais. 62. Les principes memes de la simple justice seront bafoues si les membres du Conseil se laissent influencer par des artifices de rhetorique au moment oil 1~ destin de millions d'hommes, qui voient dans l 'Organisation des Nations Unies leur espoir d'acceder i\ une vie heureuse, se joue dans une atmosph~re de confusion et d'inaction. 63. Permettez-moi de dire que l'heure n'est pas aux paroles; ce n'est pas le moment de chercher qui a tort ou qui a raison. Si des erreurs ont ate faites, par action ou par omission, l 'inter~t bien con9u des Congolais en particulier et des Africains en general veut qu'elles soient imputees i\ tous et que tous en prennent genereuseme~t la respo~abilite , 64. Le monde entier sachant que mon gouvernement voit dans !'Organisation des Nations Unies le fondement m0me de la pa.ix, je devrais hesiter A intervenir dans cette discussion; mais j'ai reQU~ quelques minutes avant la lev6e de la derni~re s6ance, un t~- legramme dans lequel mon gouvernement me chargeait de bien preciser sa position pour emp~cher que ne subsiste la moindre ambigull;e. Notre position est la suivante: tout d'abord, le Gouvernement liberiencroit implicitement en I 'Organisation des Nations Unies et en ses instruments. Deuxil)mement, il appuie le Secretaire general et !'action de l'ONU au Congo. Troisi~mement, il est en faveur du Gouvernement central du Congo. Quatri~mement, il estime que las Nations Unies devraient prendre des mesures pour retablir l'ordre au Congo avec la cooperation de tous lea Membres de l'ONU. Cinquillmement, il apporter~ com.me ioujours, sa quote-part A tout fonds que le suing their task, the task of assisting the Secretary- General in the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations. This must be done, we pray, not in diffused solitariness but rather in condensed solidarity. 67. Finally, my delegation is at a loss to see how the United Nations as a body, in the exercise of a function which it has been called upon by a central government to undertake, could be charged under the non-interference principle of the Charter of the United Nations. Let us, therefore, leave behind us all ambiguities and move forward to the mark of the high calling which ts unity, territorial integrity and a central government in the Congo. 68. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It is not my intention at this late hour to go over again in detail the questions which we have been discussing during the last few days: I will confine myself to a few remarks concerning the statements of certain delegations and the situation as it stands now before we take our decisions. 69. The first thing to be noted in assessing the situation as it stands at this point in our deliberations ls the fact that many representatives of African countries have been permitted to take places at the Council table, but that no representative of the Government of the country forming the subject cf our discussion has been admitted. This fact, of course, reflects no credit on those representatives in the Council who decided by their votes to deprive the representative of the Republic of the Congo of the right to participate in the discussion of this question of vital concern to the Congolese people, whose voice, unfortunately, we have not heard in the Council. 70. At the same time Belgiumwaspermittedtotake a place at the Council table-Belgium, the country which is the aggressor against the Republic of the Congoand was given the opportunity at the Council's meetings of explaining its position and even of making accusations against certain States. I think that the abnormality of this situation is quite obvious. It ls a consequence of the political attitude adopted by a number of great Powers, first and foremost the United State11, the United Kingdom and France, which prevented the admission of the representative of the Congolese people to the deliberations on the question of the situation in the Congo but did nothing to stop a statement being made by the representative of Belgium, who explained his Government's position to the Council. I am drawing particular attention to thl!=! because I believe we are 69. Ce qui res99:rt tout d'abord lorsqu'on examine la situation telle qu'elle se pr6sente au stade actuel de notre discussion, c'est que l'on a admis A la table du Conseil de securite de nombreux repdsentants d'Etats africains, mais non le gouvernement du pays dont nous examinons le cas. Cela ne fait certes pas honneur l ceux des membres du Conseil de securit6 qui, par leur vote, ont decide d'emp~cher le repr6sentant de _la Republique du Congo de partici.per l la discussion d'une question qui touche au cmur m@me des inter~ts du peuple congolais, lequel n'a malheureusement pas pu se faire entendre au Conseil. 70. En m@me temps, on a invite A la table du Conseil de securite la Belgique, pays qui est Pagresseur de la Republique du Congo et qui a eu la possibilit6 d'exposer sa position aux s6ances du Conseil, et m~me d'accuser certain& Etats. Je pense que le caract~re anormal de cette situation est parfaitement evident. Et cela est dd l la position politique d'un certain nombre de grandee puissances, et d'abord des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France, qui se sont opposes l\ ce que le repr&- sentant du peuple congolais participe l\ la discussion de la question de la situation au Congo, mais n'ont pas emp@cM !'intervention du representant de la Belgique, qui a expliqu6 ici les vues de son gouvernement. J'appelle tout sp6cialement !'attention lAdessus car nous souhaitons~ je pense, que le monde 72. The Government of Belgium and its representative attempted to speak here of acts of violence committed by Congolese soldiers against Belgian nationals, claiming that this alone was what necessitated the Intervention of the Belgian troops in Congolese affairs after Independence had been officially granted. 7 3. Of course, the Belgian Government and the Belgian representative had nothing to say here about the acts of violence and the atrocities perpetrated by Belgian authorltles and Belgian troops on the soil of the Belgian Congo, the deeds which had caused the Congolese people to revolt against Belgian domination. But the fact that the Belgian representative was authorized to speak here as he did, while the representative ofthe Congolese people, which has been the victim of colonial domination and aggression, was not given a hearing, reflects no credit on those Governments which prevented the Congolese people from making its voice heard in the Council. 7 4. We have also heard here statements by the representatives of several Member states which are members of the Security Council, and by the representatives of many African countries, who were invited to sit at the Council table. 75. It was plain for all to see that, while many Western representatives who spoke in the Council tried to keep silent about all kinds of gross violations of the Security Council's decisions and to steer clear of awkward questions, almost all the representatives of the African states who spoke here referred quite openly to impediments, distortions and serious errors in the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions, citing a number of facts and making a number of serious charges against various officials of the United Nations and against certain Governments that had prevented the proper Implementation of the Council's decisions. The African representatives, in their speeches, referred to three types of distortion and error. 76. First, there was reference to the considerable delay-amounting In fact to sabotage-in the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Congolese territory, and to the continuation of what is actually military assistance by Belgium to the separatist elements inside the Congo and, in particular, to tte puppet administration of Katanga. In this connexion I must point out that these serious transgressions took place despite the Security 15 73. Bien entendu, le Gouvernement belge et le representant de la Belgique ne pouvaient pas nous parler des violences et des atrocites perpetrees par les troupes et les autorites beiges sur le territoire du Congo beige, et dont le resultat a ete precisement la r~olte du peuple congolais contre la domination belge. Mais le fait que le representant de la Belgique a eu le droit d'en parler ici, alors que le representant du peuple congolais, qui est la victime de la domination coloniale et de l'agression, n'a pu se faire entendre, n'est pas i'l. l 'honneur des gouvernements qui ont empeche que I 'on donne la parole au peuple congolais. 74. Nous avons entendu egalement ici les interventions de plu.sieurs representants d'Etats membres du Conseil de securite ainsi que de representants de nombreux Etats africains qui ont ete invites A la table du Conseil. 75. Ce qui etait frappant, c'est que, si de nombreux repr6sentants de pays occidentaux qui ont parle au Conseil ont cherche l passer sous silence diverses violations flagrantes des decisions prises par le Conseil de securite et ont tente d'arrondir les angles, presque tous les representants d'Etats africains que nous avons entendus ici ont parle ouvertement des obstacles l I 'execution des dsolutions du Conseil de securite et des deformations et erreurs graves commises dans leur application; ils ont cite de nombreux faits et formula de graves accusations i'l. l'adresse d'un certain nombre d1agents officials de I 'Organisation des Nations Unies et de divers Etats qui ont em~cM la bonne e:io1cution des decisions prises par le Conseil de securite. Dans leurs d6claratlons, les repr6sentants des Etats .africains ont cite trois categories de deformations et d1erreurs. 76. En premier lieu, on a parle du trlls long retard, en realit6 du sabotage du retrait des troupes belges du territoire congolais et de l'aide militaire que la Belgique continue en fait i'l. dormer aux el~ments separatistes A l'interieur du Congo, notamment aux dirigeants fantoches du Katanga. Je dois souligner A ce propos que ces violations graves se sont produites en depit de la decision du Conseil de s6curit6 77. Secondly, reference was made to the violation of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo and to the undermining of the ~uthority of the Central Government of the Congo, developments which likewise complicated the situation and made it more difficult to carry out the Security Council's decisions. 78. Thirdly, many of the African delegations which addressed the Council referred to the sovereign right of any Government to receive whatever assistance it deems necessary in order to preserve the independence of its country and to consolidate its territorial integrity. 79. All these statements in the Council confirm, in my view, the appraisal of the situation which we made in our previous statements and which ls the basis for the conclusions put forward in our draft resolution [S/4519]. 80. As for the draft resolution just circulated, I assume we ·shall have another opportunity of reverting to it when we come to consider the resolutions.

I thank you, Mr0 President, for giving me the opportunity to submit on behalf of Ceylon and Tunisia the jointly sponsored draft resolution contained in document S/4523. The draft resolution ls really self-explanatory, but I would crave your indulgence and that of my colleagues while I present a few considerations in its support. We are aware of the fact that there are two other draft resolutions before the Council, one submittedbythe United states of America [S/4516] and the other submittedby the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/4519]. As I had occasion to observe in the course of my statement this morning, the two draft resolutions are definitely opposed to each other in material particulars, and while the one which I have the honour to submit contains many features in common with the draft resolution submitted by the United states ·of America, it also has many other features which, I would submit, should make it more attractive from the point of view of the whole situation in the Congo. 82. There is an important point which 1 should like to bring to the attention of the Council at the very · beginning, and that is that all the draft resolutions before us refer to the resolutions adopted by the Council on three previous occasions, 14 July, 22 July and 9 August, making it clear that the basic considerations required in dealing with the situation in the Congo are the same today as they were when the matter was considered on those previous occasions. The draft resolution which I have the honour to submit reaffirms those resolutions. In other words, we do not think it necessary to suggest any new principles or new methods in our approach to this problem, and we feel that what is necessary, if anything at all, is to see that the resolutions adopted in the past continue in force, that 77. En deuxi~me lieu, on a parl~ de la violation du principe de non-ing6rence dans les affaires interieures du Congo et du travail de sape entrepris contre le Gouvernement central du Congo, ce qui a egalement complique la situation et rendu plu., difficile !'application des decisions du Conseil de securite. 78. En troisi~me lieu, de nom.breux Etats africains qui sont intervenus lei ont invoque les droits souverains qu'a tout gouvernement de recevoir toute assistance .qu'il juge indispensable pour le maintien de l 'independance de son pays et le renforcement de son integrite territoriale. 79. Toutes ces interventions que nous avons entendues confirment, l mon sens, le jugement que · nous avons emis sur la situation au cours de declarations precedentes et sur lequel reposent lee conclusions que nous avons proposees dans notre projet de resolution [S/ 4519]. 80. Quant au projet de resolution qui vient de nous ~tre distribue, je pense que nous aurons encore !'occasion d'y revenir lorsque nous passerons .A. la discussion des projets de resolution eux-m~mes. 81. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de l'anglais]: Monsieur le President, je vous remercie de me donner !'occasion de presenter, au Jiom des delegations ceylanaise et tunisienne, le projet de resolution commun contenu dans le document S/ 4523. ·En fait, ce projet de r6solution est parfaitement clair; toutefois, je sollicite votre indulgence et celle de mes coll~gues pour donner quelques precisions. Nous n'ignorons pas que le Conseil de securite est saisi de deux autres projets de r6solution, dont l 'un a ete presente par lee Etats-Unis d'Amerique [S/4516] et l'autre par !'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques [S/ 4519]. Comme j1ai dejA. eu !'occasion de le faire observer ue matin, ces deux projets sont diametralement opposes sur des points importants; or, _celui que j1ai l'honneur de pr6senter se rapproche, A. bien des egards, du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, mais il contient ·aussi d'autres elements qui devraient le rendre plus ·acceptable si l'on consid~re !'ensemble de la question du Congo. 82 •. Je voudrais d~s maintenant appeler !'attention des membres du Conseil sur un point tr~s impor- , tant: tous les projets de r6solution dont nous sommes saisis rappellent les dsolutions adopt6es par le Conseil au cours de trois s6ances ant6rieures, les · 14 juillet, 22 juillet et 9 aodt; il est pdcis6 que les principes directeurs l suivre l propos du Congo n 'ont pas chang6 depuis ces dates. Le projet de r6solution ceylano-tunisien reaffirme ces rtisolutions. En d'autres termes, nous ne croyons pas n6cessaire de suggerer de nouveaux principes ou de nouvelles mmodes pour aborder ce probl~me, et nous estimons qu 'il importe avant tout de veiller l ce que les resolutions demeurent valables et l ce que des mesures plus fermes soient prises en vertu de 84. In addition to the reference to those resolutions, one new idea is presented in this draft resolution. It is an important one and is to be found in operative paragraph 2, which reads: "Calls upon all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo. n 85. We wish to supplement the resolutions which the Secretary-General is to implement by callinguponthe Congolese themselves to take action within the Republic of the Congo.· 86. That is done becaµse the clear opinion has been expressed around this table that the dissensions and conflicts of a ·political or constitutional character and the fierce rivalries which exist owing to differences among personalities have created a situation which has added to the general confusion and the instability of the Government. It is, therefore, of fundamental importance to the improvement of the Congo situation that this should be rectified, and its rectification can be brought about only by the active engagement of the Congolese people in trying to settle these internal conflicts and thus bring about the unity in the country which, we believe, will lead to the integrity of the Republic of the Congo. 87. Here I should like to make one observation in reference to something which is not in the draft resolution on which I am speaking. In the course of my remarks this morning I drew attention to what I felt was an urgent requirement in the Congo situation, and that was the constitution of a group of people-a committee or commission, call it what you will-whose object would be to assist the Congolese people in doing what we now call upon them to do by virtue of this draft resolution, because we believe that it is not altogether right that this should be left only to the Congolese people themselves. We believe that the burden of this difficult task should be shared by people from other parts of the world who are interested in the people of the Congo and who are willing to help the people of the Congo to carry out this task. 88. That being the case, we should have inserted in .88. Nous aurions done pu faire figurer dansceprojet this draft resolution a provision to enable the estabde resolution une disposition visant la constitution lishment of such a committee or comm~ssion. If you d'un comite ou d'une commission de cette nature. Si do not find any reference to such a committee after notre texte ne mentionne aucu.n organe de· ce genre • we have declared our full belief in the necessity for alors que nous croyons fermement A sa necessit6, such a C( mmittee a.fterwehavedeclaredourfull belief c'est parce que le moment nous parai't malheureuserin the necessity for such a committee, it is entirely ment mal choisi pour le constituer. n faudrait, pour because we felt that the time, unfortunately, did not ce faire, avoir l' appui de tous les mem.bres du Conseil. appear to be opportune for an attempt to constitute Comme il ne semble pas, tout au mains A l'heure such a committee. We would undoubtedly require the actuelle, que ceux dont l'appui serait manifestement full support of the membership of this Council. Inasnecessaire soient disposes h accueillir favorablement much as it appears that, at the present time at any cette proposition, les auteurs du projet, qui ont tous rate, there is not forthcoming the support for that deux fait connaitre leur opinion h ce sujet dans leurs 84. Outre ce renvoi aux resolutions anterieures, nous avons introduit une idee nouvelle dans notre projet de resolution. Cette idee importante figure dans le paragraphe 2 du dispositif, qui est congu comme suit: , "Invite taus les Congolais A l 'interieur de la Republique du Congo A rechercher une solution .rapide, par des moyens pacifiques, a taus leurs conflits internes, en vue de l 'unite et de l 'integrite du Congo." 85. Nous desirons ainsi completer les resolutions que le Secretaire general doit mettre .en application en invitant les Congolais eux-memes a prendre les mesures necessaires dans la Republique du Congo. 86. Nous avons fait figurer ce paragraphe dans le projet de resolution parce que !'opinion a ete clairement exprimee autour de cette table que les dissensions et conflits de caract~re politique ou constitutionnel ainsi que les violentes rivalites dues aux querelles de personnalites ont cree· une situation qui a aggrave la confusion generale et l 'instabilite du gouvernement. Il est done abolument indispensable d'3 remedier a cet etat de choses si l'on veut que la situation s'ameliore au Congo, et le seul moyen d'y parvenir c'est que le peuple congolais entreprenne activement de regler ces conflits interieurs et de retablir !'unite dans le pays, ce qui, A notre avis, permettra d'assurer l'integrite de la Republique du Congo. 87. Je voudrais ici evoquer un point qui n'est pas mentionne dans le projet de resolution quejepresente au Conseil. Ce matin, j'ai appelel'attentionduConseil sur ce qui me paraissait une necessite imperieuse dans I'affaire du Congo, A savoir la ·constitution d'un groupe, qu' on pourrait aussi appeler comite ou commission, dont le rOle seraitd'aiderlepeuplecongolais ~ prendre les mesures que nous suggerons dans ce · projet de resolution: nous estimons, en effet, qu'il ne serait pas juste de laisser ce soin au seul peuple congolais. A notre avis, ce lourd fardeau devrait etre porte egalement par des peuples d'autres regions qui s'interessent au Congo et sont desireux d'aider le peuple congolais. 90. I should like next to refer to operative paragraph 3 and draw your attention to the fact that we still believe· that the United Nations Force should continue to act to restore and maintain law and order, which is essential in the condition of the Congo at the present time, and we link it with its importance for the maintenance of international peace and security. 91. In operative paragraph 5 you will note that we repeat certain decisions which had been arrived at by this Council in the past in both sub-paragraphs (!!) and (2). I should especially like to draw the attention .of the Council to a sentence, in sub-paragraph (!), which is a new one: " ••• and decides that no assistance for military purposes be sent to the Congo except as part of the United Nations action". I shall comment only on this new sentence because, as I said before, · the rest of the paragraph is not new: it is taken from previous resolutions of this Council. It has been asked why it is necessary to include this provision that this Council should decide that no assistance for military purposes be sent to the Congo except as part of the United Nations action. This is a very important provision and is purposely included here in order to make it absolutely. certain, as certain as we can make it, that no country which is a Member of the United Nations would be entitled to send military assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations itself. 92. In this connexion I should like to ask the Council to refer to the resolution of 14July [S/4387)-the first resolution that was passed. In paragraph 2 of that resolution we read: "Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as Neanmoins, je n'insisterai pas sur cette question et je voudrais simplement faire une suggestion, c'est=::a~ dire exprimer l'espoir sinc~re, conformement aux opinions que nous avons entendu formuler ici, que le Secretaire general etudiera cette question avec le Comite consultatif pour le Congo et verra si l'on peut faire quelque chose pour satisfaire le vif desir qui anime un si grand nombre d1entre nous. 90. Je voudrais ensuite appeler l'attentionduConseil sur le paragraphe 3 du dispositif et souligner que nous estimons toujours que la Force des Nations Unies doit continuer A agir pour retablir et maintenir l'ordre public - ce qui est indispensable etant donne la situation qui r~gne au Congo A 11heure actuelle - et que nous apprecions toute I 'importance que cette action presente pour le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. 91. Vous remarquerez qu'au ·paragraphe 5 nous reprenons, dans l'alinea .!! et dans l'alineaQ, certaines des dec~sions anterieures du Conseil. J'appellerai tout parliculi~rement !'attention du Conseil i,ur un membre de phrase., A l'alinea .!! du paragraphe 5, qui est nouveau: " ... et decide qu I aucune assistance A des fins militaires ne soit envoyee au Congo si ce n'est dans le cadre de l'action des Nations Unies". Je me bornerai A faire une remarque sur ce nouveau membre de phrase, car, com.me je l'ai dejA dit, le reste de ce paragraphe n'est pas nouveau puisqu'il est tire de resolutions precedentes du Conseil. On a demande pourquoi il etait necessaire d'inclure ici une disposition precisant que le Conseil decidait qu'au01me assistance 1 des fins militaires ne devait !tre envoyee au Congo si ce n'est dans le cadre de l'action des Nations Unies. C'est ll une disposition extr!m~ ment importante que nous avons fait figurer ici 1 dessein pour !tre absolument s1lrs, aussi s1lrs que nous pouvons l'@tre, qu1en dehors de !'Organisation des Nations Unies elle-m~e. aucun pays., Membre de l'ONU, n'aura le droit d'envoyer une assistance mill• taire au Congo. 92. A cet egard, je prierai le Conseil de se reporter au texte de la resolution du 14 juillet [S/ 4387). la premi~re resolution qu'il a adoptee. Au paragraphe 2 de ce texte, nous lisons ce qui suit: "D6cide d1autoriser le Secretaire general A prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo., les mesures necessaires en vue de fournir A ce gouvernement I 'assistance 93. There we define very clearly the responsibility of the United Nations Force in the Congo and bow long that responsib1Uty is to continue. Therefore, the whole responsibil1ty for the discharge of these functions is placed on the United Nations Force. That is the fl"st important point in this connexion. 94. There is, therefore, no room for the provision of military assistance independent of the assistance provided by the Un~ted Nations, first because that is the provision made in this resolution which has beeri quoted with approval so often around this table-and that alone is sufficient justification for my contention. But apart from that there is this obviously clear, further reason that if we permit the sending of military assistance in an unlimited way outside the United Nations, we shall very soon create such a situation within the Congo that there will be more chaos proba~ bly than law and order maintained, because it would be impossible to have any kind of co-ordination of activity in regard to the iulfillment of this duty which bas been cast on the United Nations, namely, "to provide the Government with such military assistance ••• until ••• the national security forces may be able" to take over that task. 95. Furthermore it has been pointed out that even after the Security Council resolutions were passed and the Belgian forces had withdrawn, or as many as were able to withdraw had gone, there was evidence of the supply of material of a kind which is used in military operations. That· certainly has to be stopped and it has been the request of many of those who took part in this discussion today, particularly of those invited members who brought to our notice the fact that there is a great influx not only of military personnel but also of mil1tary material. That must be stopped if the United Nations is to do its work and carry out the responsibility that has been given to it. I brought up the case -;f Belgium because of the close connexion which Belg±,,;m htis had in this matter. But what would apply in th~ case of Belgium would also apply with equal force to any other country which might want to send military supplies. 96. It might be argued, of course, that we would be stopping military assistance to the legitimate Government of the Congo-to the Central Government of the Congo-and that would not be right; we should not interfere with the sovereign right of the Government of the Congo to receive any m111tary material or support in military personnel from any friendly country outside which is willing to give such support. That would appear to be a sound argument, but it is a s~- cious one because there is nothing here which will stop the supply of any military help to the Congo by, any country which wants to make such help available if it is done in the proper way and through the correct channel. And the correct channel, as ls stated here, 19 93. Ce paragraphe definit tr~s clairement la responsabilite de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo et la duree pendant laquelle elle doit continuer 1 assumer cette responsabilite. Ainsi done, l' enti~re responsabilite d'exercer ces fonctions repose sur la Force des Nations Unies. C'est 1A le premier point important 1 cet egard. 94. L'envoi d'une assistance militaire independante de l'aide fournie par les Nations Unies se trouve done exclu, tout d'abord parce qu'il s'agit 11 d'une disposition qui figure dans une r6solution qui a ete si souvent ciiee ici d'une mani~re approbative au cours de nos debats - et que cela seul suffit 1 justifier ma th~se. Mais, outre cette raison, il en existe une autre, qui est parfaitement claire: si nous autorisons, sans aucune restriction, l'envoi d'une assistance militaire en dehors de !'Organisation des Natioru; Unies, nous verrons bient~ se creer au Congo une situation qui sera probablement plus proche du chaos que du maintien de l'ordre public, carilserait impossible d'etablir une coordination quelconque des activites en ce qui concerne l'accomplissement de la ta.- che qui a ete confiee aux Nations Unies, 1 savoir "fournir [au] gouvernement !'assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et ce jusqu'au moment oil les forces nationales de securite •.• seront 1 m3me" dese charger de cette Uche. 95. De plus, certains ont fait observer que, m~me ·apr~s !'adoption des resolutions du Conseil de s6curite et apr~ le retrait des troupes belges - de toutes les troupes, tout au mains, qui ont eu la possibilite de se retirer - on avait pu constater que du materiel du type utilise pour les operations militaires etait fourni au Congo. Il faut que cela cesse et c'est j11stement ce qu'ont demande bonnombredesrepresentants qui ont participe 1 nos debats aujourd'hui, notamment ceux que nous avons invites 1 sieger ici et qui ont appele notre attention sur le fait qu'il ·y a un,grand afflux non seulement de personnel militaire mais aussi de mat6riel militaire. Il faut que cela cesse si nous voulons que I 'Organisation des Nations Unies puisse s'acquitter de sa t!che et assumer la responsabilite qui lui a ete confiee. J'ai mentionne ·la· Belgique, A cause du r0le particulier qu'elle a joue dans cette affaire. Mais ce qui vaut dans le cas de la Belgique -vaut aussi, de la m~e mani~re, pour tout autre pays qui souhaiterait fournir une assistance militaire. 96. On peut n<:>us retorquer, naturellement, que nous emp~cherions le gouvernement legitime du Congo - le Gouvernement central du Congo - d'obtenir une assistance militaire et que cela ne serait pas juste; nous ne devrions pas eml)!cher le Gouvernement du Congo d'exercer son droit souverain de recevoir toute assistance militaire, sous forme de materiel ou de personnel, que tout pays ami est pr~t A lui fournir de l'exterieur. A premi~re vue, cet ·argument para.ft judicieux, mais il est specieux, car rien n'emp~che le Congo de recevoir une assistance militaire d'un pays qui desire lui accorder cette aide s'il la lui fournit de la mani~re qui convient et par la voie appropriee. Or la voie 97. Finally, I should like to make a general point. After all, in this connexion, particularly in a matter dealing with the Congo, we have to turn for advice and guidance and for assistance to those countries which are in the same continent as the Congo and which are its nearest neighbours, because they arethecountries which understand the conditions that prevail in the Congo L,ore than some of us do and also because they are the countries which urgently rallied to the call of the United Nations and sent their forces and other assistance to help the Congo in the difficult situation in which it found itself. Those countries must, therefore, be able to tell us whether any action we propose to take with regard to the Congo is in the interests of the Congo and of its people, or in any way likely to cause harm. 98. As I listened to the statements made at this table -particularly by those representatives from countries of Africa-I clearly felt that the lines on which the United Nations and the Security Council were basing their action were sound lines and lines which were calculated to cause no harm or damage to the interests of the country. It is true that certain instances were brought to our notice where more vigorous implementation might have been helpful and where certain mistakes might have heen avoided, but the call was for vigorous implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, and therefore I think that we are on safe ground when in this draft resolution we ask for the same vigorous implementation. Furthermore, lam aware.that we have the support of the representatives of African countries for this draft resolution which has been submitted joir.tly by Tunisia and Ceylon, and in that confidence I can safely submit it for the acceptance of this Council, 99, The representative of the Soviet Union a little 99. n y a quelques instants, le representant de while ago referred with approval to the sentiments l'U?iion sovietique a rappele, en les approuvant, expressed by the same representatives to whom I have les opinions exprimees par ces mtmes represennow referred with regard to the actions taken and the tants dont je viens de parler, l propos des mesures situation generally in the Congo. Here we have a case prises au Congo et de la situation generale dans where the draft resolution is generally not unacceptce pays. Nous nous trouvons done devant un projet able, and that is a potent argument because, as I said de resolution qui n'est pas, en general, inacceptable, before, there are many others here from these counet c'est la un argument de poids, car, comme je l'ai tries who are in a better position to know what is the dejl dit, il y a ici beaucoup d'autres representants best course to adopt and what is the most reasonable de ces pays qui sont mieux a meme de savoir quelle action to take in dealing with the situation in the Congo. est la meilleure ligne de conduite a adopter et quelles 97. Enfin, je voudrais presenter un argument de caract~re general. Apr~s tout, dans cette affaire, notamment lorsqu'il s'agit d'une question concernant le Congo, c'est aux pays qui appartiennent au m~me continent que le Congo et qui sont ses plus proches voisins que nous devons demander de nous conseiller, de nous guider et de nous aider parce que ces pays comprennent mieux que certains d'entre nous la situation qui existe au Congo et aussi parce que ce sont les pays qui ont repondu sur-le-champ a l'appel de l 'ONU et -ll,li ont envoye leurs troupes et une assistance sous d'autres formes pour aider le Congo dans la situation difficile ou il s'est trouve. Ces pays doivent done pouvoir nous dire st telle ou telle mesure que nous preconisons en ce qui concerne le Cc-ngo est conforme aux interets du pays et de son peuple ·.t risque, d'une fa9on ou d'une autre, de leur etre prejudiciable. 98. En ecoutant les declarations faites ici - notamment par les representants des pays d'Afrique - j 1ai eu nettement le sentiment que les principes sur, lesquels !'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Conseil de securite fondent leur action sont des principes judicieux et des principes qui ont ete elabores de fa9on a ne porter aucun prejudice et a ne faire aucun tort aux interets de ce pays. Sans doute nous a-t-on cite certains cas OU il etlt ete hon d'obtenir une application plus vigoureuse des decisions prises et dans lesquels on aurait pu eviter de . commettre certaines erreurs, mais ce que l'on demandait, c'etait justement !'application energique des resolutions du Conseil de securite et j'estime done que nous sommes a l' abri de toute critique lorsque dans notre projet de resolution nous demandons nous aussi la mise en application vigoureuse de ces resolutions. En outre, je sais que les representants des pays africains appuient ce projet de resolution qui a ete presente en commun par la Tunisia et Ceylan et, dans ces conditions,jen'eprouve aucUJ'.i.e apprehension l soumettre ce texte l l 'approbation du Conseil. 101. Of course, the most important new feature in the draft resolution is the proposal from the Secretary- General's fourth report [S/4482, para. 6] which we have incorporated. Basing ourselves on that, we have made an appeal to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a UnitedNationsfundforthe Congo. And there is a very important provision here that should not be lost sight of, We recommend that the contributions to this fund should be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government of the Congo. Those are two very important qualifications or safeguards. We can be quite certain that, as in other cases, the Secretary- General will see to it that the United Nations control will be effectively used with regard to the expenditure of this money. But there is a new feature that has been incorporated which should give confidence to those interested in the Congo, and it is that we lay down that, in addition to United Nations control, there should be consultation with the Central Government of the Congo with regard to the utilization of this fund. 102. All this taken together should create a situation where the hope of all of us that a new era should begin in the Congo would be realized, and where the objective of the United Nations would be successfully carried out so that we would see, instead of debates on the Congo, the economy and the political life of that country proceeding smoothly and flourishing. '.1.03, Mr, SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): The representative of Ceylon has just explained tothe Council the structure of the draft resolution which we - prepared jointly, and the reasons which led us to take that step. I thinktheremaybesomevalue in my adding to this explanation of our initiative. 104. For · three days-since last week, in fact-the debate concerning the present situation in the Congo has been going on. We have discussed. procedural questions and then proceeded to the substantive problem. As the debate bas continued-profitably, in my opinion, both for the Council and for the Congo, Africa and the whole world-situations of increasing difficulty have been arising. Difficulties have supervened within the Congo. other difficulties, of an increasingly international character, have also appeared. These difficulties are serious for international peace and security. I repeat that the difficulties of a domestic nature are not within our competence but are for the Congolese people to deal with, and I would venture never to de- 101. Bien entendu, l'element nouveau le plus important du projet de resolution est la proposition qui figure dans le quatri~me rapport du Secretaire gt,r.~ral [S/4482, par. 6] et que nous avons reprise dans ce texte. Nous fondant surcetteproposition,nous faisons appel aux gouvernements de tous les Etats Membres pour qu'ils versent d'urgence des contributions volontaires a un fonds des Nations Unies pour le Congo. Et nous avons ajoute la une disposition extr~mement importante qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue: nous recommandons que les contributions versees a ce fonds soient utilisees sous le contr8le de l 'Organisation des Nations Unies et en consultation avec le Gouvernement central congolais. Ce sont la. deux conditions ou garanties d'une extr~me importance. Certes, nous pouvons ~tre stlrs que le Secretaire general, comme en d'autres cas, veillera a. ce que le contr6le de !'Organisation s'exerce efficacement sur l'utilisation des sommesenquestion. Mais il y a un nouvel element que nous avons fait figurer dans ce texte et qui devrait inspirer confiance a. tous ceux qui s'interessent au Congo, c'est la disposition stipulant que, outre le contrOle de l 'Organisation des Nations Unies, il doit y avoir des consultations avec le Gouvernement central du Congo en ce qui concerne ! 'utilisation de ce fonds. 102. Tous ces facteurs consideres ensemble devraient creer une situation telle que notre espoir a taus de voir une ~re nouvelle s'instaurer au Congo sera realise et que les buts des Nations Unies seront atteints, de sorte· qu'au lieu de debattre du Congo, nous pourrons voir la vie economique et politique de ce pays suivre son cours harmonieusement et s'epanouir. 103. M. SLIM (Tunisie): Le representant de Ceylan vient d'exposer au Co.116eil l'economie du projet de resolution que nous avons ddige en commun ainsi que les raisons qui ont motive notre initiative. n me semble utile d'apporter aussi ma contribution l cette explication de notre initiative. 104. Depuis trois jours - depuis la semaine derni~re., m3me - le debat s'est prolonge autour de la situation actuelle au Congo. Nous avons discute de questions de procMure et nous avons ensuite. aborde le probl~me de fond. · Pendant que ce debat se prolongeait - utilement, A. mon avis, aussi bien pour le Conseil que pour le Congo, pour l'Afrique et pour le monde entier - les situations devenaient de plus en plus difficiles. Des difficultes apparaissent A. l'interie~r du Congo. D'autres difficultes, A.caract~re de plus en plus international, apparaissent egalement. Ces difficultes sont graves pour la paix et la securite internationales. Je rep~te que les difficultes de caract~re interne ne sont pas de notre ressort, mais 105. I see no point, at this late stage of our discussion, in returning to principles which already, In my first statement, I have emphasized as those that, in our view, should Inform our final decision. It seeins to me that participation in our discussions by states not members of the Security Council has considerably helped to identify the conclusions at which our Council ought to arrive. Following on these discussions, I think it might be valuable to summarize, briefly, the essential points which in our opinion should figure in any useful conclusion to our debates, account being taken of the circumstances and of the grave dangers to international peace and security and to stability in the Republic of the Congo. 106. Our decision should be based on a certain numi:ler of considerations, which I might sum up as follows: first, it is absolutely necessary that the action undertaken by the Security Council since 14 July 1960 at the request of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo should continue, on the basis of the Council's decisions, until the goal stated in the resolution of 14 July is reached; secondly, this action should continue to ensure the integrity, unity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo, considered as one and indivisible. To that end, the efficient functioning of administrative machinery and the economic and financial situation-a transitory situation, we hope -call for the establishment of a special United Nations fund for the Congo, financed by voluntary contributions and placed under United Nations control in consultation with the Central Government of the Congo. 107. Entirely without prejudice, of course, to assistance of a civil nature which might be supplied bilaterally, such financial assistance might more effectively ensure economic and financial independence, the _only guarantee of true political independence. On the other hand, that political independence cannot be ensured until the Republic of the Congo has received a guarantee that Member states wlll abstain from any action calculated to endanger its territorial integrity and that same political independence. 108. Unfortunately it is becoming increasingly clear that the Belgian authorities are continuing or have continued to furnish weapons, personnel and military supplies which have aggravated and encouraged secession, discord and division. Our conviction is growing that this encouragement and these supplies are undermining international peace and security. During the debate at the last meeting, my delegation was reproached cn the ground that it persisted In att:eibuting to the Belgian Government or the Belgian authorities responsibUity for everything happening in the Congo. On 7 July 1960 I took occasion, when presenting the candidature of the Republic of the Congo to the United 105. Je ne crois pas utile, en cette phase tardive de nos discussions, de revenir sur les principes que j'ai d6jl soulign6s dans ma premi~re intervention comma etant ceux qui, ll. notre avis, doivent dieter notre decision finale. A mon sens, la participation it nos discussions d'Etate non membres du Consetl a contribu6 largement ll. l!agager les conclusions qui s 'imposent ll. notre organisme. Il me semble utile de faire, l la suite de ces discussions, un petit resume de ce qui, it notre avis, doit essentiellement figurer dans une conclusion utile de nos debate, compte tenu des circonstances et des dangers graves qui menacent la pabc et la securite internationales comma de ceux qui menacent la stabilite dans la Republique du Congo. 106. Notre decision doit se fonder sur un certain nombre de points, que je peux resumer ainsi: en premier lieu, il y a necessite absolue que l'action engagee par le Conseil de securite depuis le 14 juillet 1960 sur la demande du Gouvernement central de la Republique du Congo se continue sur la base des decisions du Conseil, jusqu'll. leur finalite normale telle qu'elle est prevue par la resolution du 14 juillet; en deuxi~me lieu, cette action doit continuer A assurer l'integrit6, 11unite et l'independance politique de la R6publique du Congo, consid6ree comme une et indivisible. A cette fin, le bon fonctionnement des rouages administratifs, aussi bien que la situation economique et financi~re - passag~re, nous l 'esperons - commandant la creation d'un fonds special des Nations Unies pow;- le Congo, alimente par des contributions volontaires, et place sous le contr~le de l 'ONU, en consultation avec le Gouvernement central du Congo. 107. Sans prejuger, certes, !'assistance A. caract~re civil qui peut survenir bilateralement, ma d616gation estime que, plac6e sous les auspices neutres de 11ONU, une telle assistance financi~re pourra assurer plus effeotivement l 1ind6pendance economique et financi~re, seule garantie de la v6ritable ind6pendance politique. Mais l'ind6pendance politique ne aaurait ~e assuree, d'autre part, tant que l'on n1aura pas garanti A. la R6publique du Congo que les Etats Membres s'abstiennent de toute action de nature A mettre en danger l'int6grite territoriale et cette ind6pendance politique. 108. Or nous nous apercevons malheureusement de plus en plus que les autorites belges continuant - ou ont continue - de fournir des armes, du personnel et des fournitures militaires> qui ont aggrave et encourage la secession, le d6saccord et la division. Nous avons de plus en plus la conviction que cet encouragement et ces fournitures sapent la paix et la securite internationales. Au cours de la discussion A. la derni~re seance, U. a lite reproche A. la delegation tunisienne de continuer ll. imputer au Gouvernement belge ou aux autorites beiges la responsabilite de tout ce qui arrive au Congo. J'ai eu l'occasion, le 7 juillet 1960, en presentant la candidature de la 109. The experience of these last two months has made it clearer than ever that Belgium bears a heavy responsibility. Let us hope that everything likely to cause unrest, discord and division will soon disappear from the Congo. These supplies of weapons and ammunition have endangered stability and security in the Congo: but that was not the only menace. During our previous debates, we authorized the Secretary- General-and he has done everything possible to that end-to arrange for all the Belgian troops to be withdrawn. But other states might likewise be tempted to provide similar assistance for military purposes. In that way we might find ourselves becoming more and more deeply involved in an extremely grave and, for the Congo, Africa and the whole world, an eminently dangerous situation which would bring us closer to the disaster that we are trying to avert. It is therefore, in our view, absolutely necessary to prohibit such assistance for military purposes, except as part of the United Nations action. Now that the international danger is becoming ever clearer, such a prohibition must be incorporated in our decision. 110. In our previous discussions I had occasion to pay tribute to the action engaged in by both American and Soviet aircraft, in response to the United Nations' appeal, with a view to supplying all possible humanitarian assistance to the Republic and people of the Congo. I expressed the hope that Africa would never hear the sound of American and Soviet aircraft except as part of this humanitarian, andpurelyhumanitarian, mission; and that hope I still maintain. 111. In this connexion I would recall the joint texts issued by the Conference of Independent African states, which also seem to draw a distinction between assistance in the administrative, economic and cultural fields and assistance rendered by the United Nations. The joint texts put out by the independent African states on 30 August do not state that multilateral assistance furnishec;l by the United Nations through civilian channels prevents bilateral assistance; but this referred solely to civil assistance. I do not think that the participants in that conference intended that the same latitude should be allowed in the case of assistance which was clearly military. 112. Such are the fundamental principles underlying the initiative taken by the representative of Ceylon 109. L'experience de ces deux derniers mois nous prouve de plus en plus que la responsabilite beige est lourde. Esperons que disparaftra bient0t du Congo tout ce qui a ete de nature A causer le trouble, la discorde et la division. Cea fournitures d'armes etde munitions ont 6t6 dangereuses pour la stabilit6 et la securite au Congo; mais cela n'etait pas le seul danger. Au cours de nos precedents debats, nous avons autorise le Secretaire general ll. obtenir que toutes les troupes beiges se retirent et il a fait le possible A cet effet. Mais d'autres Etats peuvent ~tre tent6s, eux aussi, de fournir une assistance ll. des fins militaires. Nous pourrions ainsi nous trouver de plus en plus engages dans une situation extremement grave et eminemment dangereuse pour le Congo aussi bien que pour l'Afrique et pour lemonde entier, et qui nous mettrait plus pr_,s du precipice alors que nous voudrions nous en eloigner. 11 est done absolument necessaire, ll. notre avis, d1interdire une telle assistance A. des fins militaires, ll. moins que ce ne soit dans le cadre de l' action entreprise par l'ONU. Maintenant que le danger international apparaft ainsi de plus en plus nettement, il est necessaire qu 1une telle interdiction soit formulae dans notre decision. 110. J'ai eu l'occasion,lorsdesprecedentsdebats,de saluer l'action qui a ete entreprise aussi bien par lea avions americains que par les avions sovietiques, repondant ll. l'appel des Nations Unies, pour assurer toute assistance humanitaire l la Republique et au peuple congolais. J'ai eu !'occasion de souhaiter que la terre d'Afrique ne connaisse le vrombissement des avions americains et sovietiques qu'A !'occasion de cette ceuvre humanitaire, et uniquement humanitaire. Je me permets encore d•esperer. 111. Je rappellerai A ce propos que la declaration commune des Etats independants d' Afrique semble, elle aussi, distinguer entre !'assistance civile, administrative, economique ou autre, et celle fournie par les Nations Unies. La declaration commune des Etats independants d' Afrique du 30 aotlt ne dit nullement que !'assistance multilaterale fournie par les Nations Unies dans le cadre civil interdit une assistance bilaterale; mais il s'agit uniquement d'assistance A caract~re civil. J e ne pense pas que la meme latitude existait, dans !'intention des participants l cette conference, en mati~re d'assistance nettement militaire. 112. Tels sont les principes essentiels qui ont guide !'initiative du representant de Ceylan et de

As regards the draft resolutions submitted up to today, the views of the Soviet delegation have been fully expressed, and it is unnecessary to reiterate them now. 114. With regard to the draft resolution just submitted by the delegations of Ceylon and Tunisia, I must say that, in its present form, it cannot serve as a basis for a positive decision on the Congo question. We appreciate the efforts made by the delegations which co-sponsored this draft resolution, and we understand their good intentions. Unfortunately, however, thetext of the draft does not point in the right direction for a decision ori this acute problem: and the Soviet delegation cannot, therefore, support this draft resolution in the form in which it has been submitted. 115. Guided by a wish to try to find a basis for an agreed decision, the Soviet delegation proposes certain amendments to this draft resolution. 116. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, after the words "continue to assist" should be added the words "the Central Government of", so that the phrase would read: "continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo". This amendment is indispensable because, unfortunately, the assistance which has so far been provided has not always gone to the Central Government of the Congo, and we do not want to accept a situation in which the assistance furnished by the United Nations reaches the hands of the separatists, the persons opposing the territorial integrity and independence of the Congo. 117. In the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution, referring to action by the Secretary- General, the words "to continue to give vigorous· implementation to them" should be replaced by the words "to implement them strictly", and the following words should be added at the end of the paragraph: "permitting no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo 11• 118. Here we are basing ourselves on the fact that unfortunately-as was pointed out in the Security Council discussions-the Secretary-General, the United Nations Command and individual members of the Secretary-General's establishment in the Congo have made serious mistakes in this matter, and that many representatives, especially those of African states, who have spoken here, have referred to the necessity of correcting such mistakes. 113. M. ZORINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovi6tiques) [traduit du russe]: La d616gation de l 'Union sovietique a deji\ pleinement expose ses vues sur les projets de resolution qui ont ete deposes jusqu'i\ ce jour; il est done inutile d'y revenir maintenant. 114. En ce qui concerne le projet de resolution qui vient d'~tre presente par Ceylan et la Tunisie, je dois dire que, &ous sa forme actuelle, il ne peut servir de base ll. un r~glement positif de la question du Congo. Nous savons gre i\ ces delegations des efforts qu 'elles out deployes pour mettre au point ce projet et nous comprenons les bonnes intentions qui les out animes. Malheureusement, ce texte n I oriente pas dans le sens qui convient le r~glement de cette question brtllante, et c'est pourquoi la delegation de l'Union sovietique ne peut l'appuyer de son vote sous sa forme actuelle. 115. Animee du desir de rechercher une base d'entente pour une decision, la delegation sovietique propose d'apporter i\ ce projet les amendements suivants: 116. Au quatri~me considerant, apr~s les mots "pr~ter assistance au" inserer les mots "Gouvernement central du". Cet amendement nous semble indispensable du fait que !'assistance fournie jusqu'A. present n 'est malheureusement pas toujours allee au Gouvernement central, et nous ne voulons pas admettre une situation oil l'aide donnee par l'ONU tombe aux mains des separatistes, de ceux qui luttent contre l 1integrite territoriale et l 'independance du Congo. 117. Au paragraphe 1 du dispositif, nous proposons de remplacer les mots "continuer h les mettre vigoureusement en application R, qui concernent le Secretaire general, par les mots "les mettre strici;ement en application", et d'ajouter i\ la fin de ce paragraphe le membre de phrase "en n'admettant aucune intervention dans les affaires interieures de la Republique du Congo". 118. Nous partons du fait que, comme on l'a relevll dans les debats du Conseil de securite, le Secr6taire general, le Command~ment de la Force des Nations Unies et diverses personnes envoylles au Congo par les services du Secr~taire g6n~ral ont malheureu-- sement laissll commettre des erreurs graves pr6cisllment dans ce sens, et un grand nombre de ceux qui out pris la parole lei, en par.lculier des representants d'Etats africains, ont soulign6 la n6cessit6 de rectifier ces erreurs. 120. In the third operative paragraph, where the United Nations Force is mentioned, we propose the deletion of the words "continue to". Why? Because what has so far been done bythe United Nations Force need not be continued, since the Force has been permitting erroneous actions, owing to erroneous orders issued by the Command. We do however consider that the Force should "act to restore and maintain law and order". 121. We therefore propose the deletion of the words "continue to"; and the conclusion, after the words 11law and order", of the sentence as follows: "with a view to assisting the Central Government of the Congo to exercise its authority and ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo". This also is in keeping with the previous resolutions of the Council, but it is necessary to specify it, because to say merely that the United Nations Force should "act to restore and maintain law and order" would be tantamount to admitting the possibility of instituting a type of order in the Congo which would be inconsistent with the interests of the Congolese Government and of the United Nations as a whole. 122. U!'.!ortunately, experience in this connexion teaches us that we must be very careful in this matter; otherwise we risk turning the United Nations Force into a tool of a policy having nothing in common with the interests of the United Nations or of the peace and security of the peoples. 123. In the fourth operative paragraph, the word "consultation" should be replaced by the word "cooperation"-because, unfortunately, consultation so far has very often taken the form of merely giving information to the Government on the intentions of or on the action already being taken_ by the United Nations Command and the representative of the Secretary-General. To avoid this, we consider it indispensable to use the words "in co-operation with" (the Central Government of the Congo). 124. In sub-paragraph (!) of operative paragraph 5, after the words "and also to refrain from any action", the words "including military assistance" should be added, and the whole of the concluding phrase, from and including the words "and decides that", should be deleted. To retain these latter words in sub-paragraph (!) would amount to violating a basic principle of the United Nations-the sovereign right of any country to receive any type of assistance for the purpose of maintaining its independence and defending and strengthening its territorial integrity. 125. The re1presentative of Ceylon and, later, the 126. Le repdsentant de Ceylan et ensqite le repr6- representatiV18 of Tunisia themselves stated that we i:1entant de la Tunisie ont dit eux-m&mes que nous have no right to deprive the Government of military n'avons pas le droit de priv_er le gouvernement d'une 120. Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif, oft il est question de la Force des Nations Unies, nous proposons de supprimer seulement les mots "continuer A". Pourquoi? Paree qu'il ne faut pas continuer ce qu'a fait jusqu'l present la Force des Nations Unies, parce qu'elle a laisse commettre des erreurs du fait des ordres fautifs donnes par le Commandement. Mais nous estimons qu'elle doit "agir pour retablir et maintenir l'ordre public". 121. Nous proposons done de supprimer les mots "continuer l" et de remplacer les mots "selon ce qu' exige le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales" par les suivants: "afin d'aider le Gouvernement central congolais ~ exercer ses pouvoirs et l assurer l 'integrite territoriale et l 1independance politique du Congo". Cela aussi est conforme aux resolutions precedentes du Conseil, mais il est indispensable de le dire, parce que, si l'on disait simplement que la Force des Nations Unies dolt "agir pour retablir et maintenir l'ordre public", cela equivaudrait A permettre l'instauration au Congo d 'un ordre qui ne correspondrait ni aux inter~ts du gouvernement ni aux inter@ts des Nations Unies dans leur ensemble. 122. Malheureusement, I 'experience nous a appris qu'il faut ~tre prudent l cet egard; sinon nous risquons de faire de la Force des Nations Unies !'instrument d'une politique qui n'aurait rien de commun ni avec les inter@ts de I 'Organisation des Nations Unies, ni ayec ceux de la paix et de la securite des peuples. 123. Au paragraphe 4 du dispositif, nous proposons de remplacer le mot "consultation" par le mot "coop6ration"; en effet, jusqu'l pr~sent, au lieu de consulter le gouvernement, on s'est malheureusement souvent contente de !'informer de ce qu'avaient !'intention de faire ou de ce que faisaient dejl le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies et le representant du Secretaire general. Pour eviter cela, nous estimons indispensable d'introduire le mot "cooperation" (avec le Gouvernf3ll).ent central du Congo). 124. A l'alinea _g du paragraphe 6, nous proposons, apr~s les mots "et aussi de s'abstenir de toute action", d1ajouter les mots "et notamment de toute assistance militaire" et de supprimer le m.embre de phrase "et decide qu1aucune assistance A des fins militaires ne soit envoyee au Congo si ce n'est dans le cadre de !'action des Nations Unies". Maintenir ces mots l 11 alinea a serait en realite enfrehidre un principe essentiel de-l'Organisation des Nations Unies, celui du droit souverain qu'a tout Etat de recevoir n'importe quelle assistance pour maintenir son independance, pour renforcer et defendre son integrite territoriale. 126. We consider that it is notpossibletotake such a course, and we believe that the wordingofour amendment-"refrain from any action, including military assistance, which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo"-refiects the principal task, which is to withhold military assistance from elements working for the dismemberment of the Congo and for the loss of its political independence, to stop completely any military assistance from Belgium to the separatist groups which, in a111ance with the Belgian Government, are attempting to destroy Congolese national unity. It that was the purpose of the sponsors of this draft resolution, our amendment is completely in line with it. 127. In our opinion, sub-paragraph ~) of operative paragraph 5 requires no amendment. 128. These are the amendments which we consider indispensable, although even with them this draft resolution would still not be fully in keeping with our objectives, given the situation in the Congo and our experience with regard to the implementation of the Council's previous resolutions.

If no representative wishes to speak at this time I think that we are bound to have a recess of ten minutes or so in order that the amendments proposed by the representative of the USSR may be circulated.

It is certainly the normal procedure that we should have before us the text of the· amendments submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union, but I have been able to note down his proposals on this subject, and in an effort to bring our views closer togetherwhich we have been trying to do ever since we started this debate-I would say that in our view, in the matter of the Congo, all this action should be taken in agreement with the Central Government of the Congo. That question seems to us to present no difficulty. In our opinion, and in that of the Security Council, it is certainly the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, which is concerned; and although we did not think it necessary to repeat the words "Central Government of the Congo" or "Central Government of the Republic of the Congo" everywhere, it goes without saying that that is what we mean: nothing else can be meant. 131. With regard to some of the additions suggested with a view to assisting the Republic of the Congo, it seems to me that that has already been covered by previous resolutions of the Security Council, in particular by the resolution of 14 July 1960. 132. There are of course other amendments that seem to us based on principles which for the time being we 126. Nous ne pensons pas qu'il soit possible de s'engager dans cette voie et nous considerons que l 'amendement que nous proposons maintenant, A. savoir le membre de phrase "s'abstenir de toute action et notamment de toute assistance militaire qui pourrait saper l 'integrite territoriale et· l 'independance politique de la Republique du Congo", repond au probl~me essentiel, qui est d'emp~cher toute assistance militaire aux elements qui cherchent ! demembrer le Congo et A lui faire perdre son independance nationale, d' arr~ter entillrement l' aide militaire que fournit la Belgique aux elements separatistes qui, de concert avec le Gouvernement belge, s'emploient A. detruire l'unite nationale du Congo. Si tel etait le but des auteurs du projet de resolution, notre amendement y repond enti~rement. 127. A notre sens,l'alinea}!duparagraphe5n'appelle aucun amendement. 128. Tels sont les amendements que nous jugeons necessaire d'apporter; toutefois, m~me si ces amendements etaient adoptes, le projet de resolution ne repondrait pas enti~rement aux objectifs que nous devons atteindre eu egard A la situation au Congo et A. !'experience acquise quant ! !'application des resolutions adoptees par le Conseil de securite. 129. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si personne ne desire prendre la parole pour !'instant, j 'estime que nous devrions suspendre la seance pendant une dizaine de minutes pour qu'on puisse distribuer le texte des amendements proposes par le representant de l'URSS. 130. M. SLIM (Tunisia): Il est normal, Monsieur le President, que nous soyons saisis du texte des amendements proposes par le representant de l 'Union sovietique, mais j'ai pu noter directement les propositions qui ont ete faites par lui A ce sujet et, dans un effort tendant ! rapprocher les points de vue - ce que nous n'avons jamais cesse de faire depuis que nous avons entame ce debat - il nous semble que, s'agissant de la situation congolaise, toute action doit se faire en accord avec le Gouvernement central du Congo. C'est l!, nous semble-t-il, une question qui n'offre aucune difficulte. Il s'agit bien, dans notre esprit et dans !'esprit du Conseil de securite, du Gouvernement central de la Republique du Congo, et, bien que nous n'ay9ns pas estime necessaire de re- ~ter partout cette qualification: Gouvernement central du Congo ou Gouvernement central de la Republique du Congo, il est bien entendu qu'il s 1agit de cela et qu'il ne peut pas s'agir d'autre chose. 131. A propos de certaines des additions jugees necessaires dans un esprit d'assistance A la Republique du Congo, il me semble que cela est dej! couvert par les resolutions anterieures du Conseil de securite, notamment par la resolution du 14. juillet 1960. 132. Il y a bien entendu d'autres amendements qui nous semblent inspires de principes que, pour le 133. Can the Council allow itself to become like that asaembly which went on discussing the sex of angels while the town was captured? Would it not be wiser to rest content with the possibly imperfect text which we have submitted after careful reflection, after careful discussion and after careful consultation, and of which, despite its imperfections, we do, in our hearts and minds, believe that it fully meets the needs of the situation? When I say "fully", this word must of course be understood not in its absolute, but in its human sense. 134. I think that, while natt11'ally awaiting the authentic text of these amendments, the delegation of Ceylon and my own dele•gation prefer, quite definitely, to adhere to the text which we have proposed. Inspired above all by a concern for effectiveness and speed, we maintain this position and venture to make a most sincere and heartfelt appeal to the effect that in the interests of the Congolese people, of the Congo, of Africa, of our Organization itself, of world peace and security, and in the hope of a relaxation of international tension immediately before a very important General Assembly session, we should be allowed to let our draft resolution stand as it is and be accepted by the Security Council, by a large majority, if not indeed, as I hope, unanimously. La seance est suspendue a Oh 20; elle est reprise a Oh 30. The meeting was suspended at 12.20 a.m. and resumed at 12.30 a.m.

The amendmentspresentedby the representative of the Soviet Union have now been circulated [S/4524]. Are there any comments from the members? 135. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Les amendements presentes par le representant de l 'Union sovietique viennent d'0tre distribues [S/4524]. Quelqu1un desire-t-il presenter des observations?

I shall not prolong our debate at this stage of the discussion. I take the iloor now because I want to make a few observations in connexion with what was said by the representative of Tunisia, one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution tabled before us. It is true that we all feel that in view of the coming session of the General Assembly, to which so many of the people and Governments pin their hopes for the improvement of the international situation, we should not do anything that would signify that the members of this Council are opposed to the spirit of conciliation, compromise and negotiation aimed at a fair and adaptable solution. 136. M. LEWANDOWSKI (Pologne) [traduit de l'anglais]: Je n1ai pas !'intention de prolonger nosdebats. J e ne prends la parole que parce que je desire faire quelques observations au sujet des remarques du representant de la Tunisie, qui est l'un des auteurs du projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis. Il est vrai que nous estimons tous qu'en raison de la prochaine session de 11 Assemblee generale, en laquelle tant de peuples et de gouvernements ont place leur espoir d'une amelioration de la situation interna- ·tionale, nous ne devrions rien faire qui puisse signifier que les membres du Conseil sont oppos6s -! I 'esprit de conciliation, de compromis et de negociation qui permettent de parvenir ~ une solution acceptable. 137. It is true that both sponsors of the draft resolution said that there are things that could be improved in the resolution as it has been proposed. I am certain that they had in mind, when saying that, everything that was said around this table, especially by the representatives of the African states. Neither they nor a great many members of the Council had any hesitancy in stating their full support for the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. 137. Il est vrai que les deux auteurs du projet de resolution ont reconnu qu'il serait possible d'en ameliorer le texte. Je suis st1r qu'en disant cela, ils songeaient ~ tout ce qui a ete dit ici, notamment par les representants des Etats africains. Ni ces representants, ni un grand nombre de membres du Conseil n'ont eu la moindre hesitation ~ soutenir pleinement le Gouvernement central de la Republique du Congo. 133. Est-ce que le Conseil peut se permettre de ressembler ~ cette assemblee qui discutait du sexe des anges pendant que la ville etaitprise?Ne serait-il pas plus sage de se contenter du te:i.ie meme imparfait que nous avons presente apr~s mQre reflexion, apr~s milre discussion, apr~s milres consultations et qu'en notre fune et conscience nous estimons, malgre ses imperfections, repondre pleinement aux necessites actuelles de la situation? Lorsque je dis 11pleinement", il faut bien entendu prendre ce mot non dans son sens absolu, mais dans son sens humain. 134. Je crois que, tout en attendant naturellement le texte definitif de ces amendements, la delegation de Ceylan et la mienne pref~rent tr~s serieusement s'en tenir au te:i.ie qu'elles ont propose. Guides surtout par le souci de l 1efficacite et de la rapidite, nous maintenons cette position et nous nous permettons de lancer un appel tr~s sinc~re et tr~s vibrant, pour que, dans l'int6rat du peuple congolais, dans l'int6rat du Congo, de l'Afrique, dans l'int6rat de notre organisation elle-mame comme dans celui de la paix et de la s6curit6 dans le monde, dans l'espoir enfin d 'une d6tente internationale ll la veille du jour oll nous affrontons une tr~s importante session de l 'Assembl6e ~n6rale, on nous permette de laisser notre projet sous sa forme actuelle et pour que le Conseil de s6curit6 l 'adopte ll une majorit6 tr~s forte, ou mame, je me permets de l'esp6rer, ll l'unanimit6. 139, I made this brief intervention only because I was moved by what the representative of Tunisia said in connexion with the situation as it now exists in the Congo, to which we should all spare no effort in assisting toward a speedy and just solution.

If there are no Gther speakers, we will proceed to the vote.

Since the President is about to put the draft resolutions to the vote, I submit that, under rule 32 of the rules of procedure, there are two draft resolutions-those standing in the names of the United states [S/4516) and the Soviet Union [S/4519]-which were submitted prior to the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia. May I ask the President to be good enough to inquire of the Council whether it would be prepared to waive this rule and to grant priority in the voting to the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia,

The representative of Ceylon has asked for priority for the draft resolution which he has introduced together with the representative of Tunisia. My delegation has carefully examined the text of that draft resolution and, in our opinion, it contains the necessary elements to ensure the continuation and expansion, if necessary, of effective United Nations action in the Congo. Its objectives and provisions parallel those of our own draft resolution. In fact, there is little substantive difference between thetwotexts. Wetherefore have no objection to the request for·priority made by the representative of Ceylon. I wish merely to say 139, Si j'ai fait cette br~ve declaration, c'est uniquement en raison des paroles que le representant de la Tunisie a prononcees au sujet de la situation actuelle au Congo, situation qui merite que nous n 'epargnions aucun effort pour aboutir h une prompte et equitable solution. 140. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si personne ne demande la parole, nous allons passer au vote. 141. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de l'anglais]: Puisque le President va mettre les projets de resolution aux voix, je voudrais faire remarquer que, conformement A !'article 32 du rllglement interieur, nous devons · examiner deux projets de resolution - celui des Etats-Unis [S/4516] et celui de l'Union sovietique [S/4519] - qui ont ete presentes avant le projet de resolution de Ceylan et de la T-Jnisie. Puisje prier le President de demander aux membres du Conseil s'ils sont disposes A renoncer A !'application de cet article et A donner la priorite au vote sur le projet de resolution presente par Ceylan et par la Tunisia? 142. M. WADSWORTH (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Le representant de Ceylan ~ demande la priorite pour le projet de resolution qu'il a presente conjointement avec le representant de la Tunisia. Ma delegation a attentivement etudie le texte de ce projet de resolution et estime qu 'il contient les elements. voulus pour assurer le maintien et, s'il y a lieu, le daveloppementd'une action efficace des Nations Unies au Congo. Ses dispositions et ses objectifs rejoignent ceux de notre propre projet de resolution. En fait, i1 n 'y a gu~re de difference entre les deux tructes q~t au fond. Nous n 'avons done aucune objection A la demande de priorit€l faite par le repre-

Our delegation has already commented both on the United states draft resolution and on the draft resolution now submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon. The United States representative has just said quite plainly that he sees no essential difference between his draft resolution and that submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon. 144, Taking this into account and bearinginmindthat the Tunisian representative has not consented even to the discussion of the question of making, to his draft resolution, amendments the point of which I have explained and which are very important for the correct trend of the resolution, the Soviet delegation sees no reason for withdrawing its own draft resolution, and will insist on this draft being put to the vote in the order in which it was submitted.

My delegation apologizes to the delegation of the Soviet Union and begs that country's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs to allow me to dispel a misunderstanding. The comments I made did not mean that I refused to discuss the draft amendments submitted by the USSR delegation. What I said, and what I believe, is that the discussion of those amendments might carry us very far and delay a decision which the Council ought to take as rapidly as possible. The members of the Council can certainly discuss these amendments, if they consider it necessary. I have simply ventured to make an appeal that our draft resolution should be allowed to take its chance and be submitted to the members of the Council without the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation, not, in the case of some of those amendments, because of their substance or their form. As I have explained, when we speak of the Congo, we mean the Central Government of that country. But my delegation's proposal stemmed primarily from its concern at the difficulties liable to arise from discussion of those amendments, difficulties that might ·carry us very far and possibly bring us back to the point at which we found ourselves last night or this morning. We should then be in danger of having to start the whole debate all over again. 146. I simply made an appeal. It reflects our common concern to secure, bothforthe Congo and for the international situation, foundations which are more solid, if not permanently stable. I maintain this appeal, and I ask the Council to give priority to .our draft resolution. In this I am acting from deep conviction,

I think that it now falls upon me to summarize the situation. 148. We have a request for priority by the representative of Ceylon, supported by the representative of Tunisia. The representative of the United states 143. M. ZORINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]: Nous avons deja expos6 nous vues sur le projet de r6solution des Etats-Unis d'Amerique comme sur celui que viennent de deposer les delegations de Ceylan et de la Tunisie. Le representant des Etats-Unis vient de dire assez clairement qu'il ne voit pas de difference fondamentale entre le projet de resolution de sa delegation et celui des delegations de la Tunisie et de Ceylan. 144. Cela 6tant, et comme le repr6sentant de la Tunisie n'a meme pas accepte de discuter la possibilite d'apporter a son projet de resolution n1importe lequel des amendements que j1ai presentes et qui sont tr~s importants pour rectifier l'orienta.tion de la resolution, la delegation sovietique ne voit aucune raison de retirer son projet de resolution etinsistera pour qu'il soit mis aux voix dans l'ordre dans lequel il a ete presente. 145. M. SLIM (Tunisie): Ma delegation s'excuse aupr~s de la delegation de I 'Union sovietique et prie instamment le Vice-Ministre des affaires etrang~res de ce pays de me permettre de dissiper un malentendu. Les observations que j 'ai faites ne constituent pas un refus de discuter les projets d'amendements presentes par la delegation de !'Union sovietique. Ce que j'ai dit, et ce dont je suis convaincu, c'est que la discussion de ces amendements risquerait de nous entrafuer fort loin et de retarder une decision qu'il appartient au Conseil de prendre au plus vite. Les membres du Conseil peuvent certainement discuter ces amendements s'ils l'estiment necessaire. Je me suis simplement permis de lancer un appel pour qu'on permette que notre projet de resolution puisse courir ses chances et soit soumis a l 1assentiment des membres du Conseil sans les amendements proposes par la delegation de l 1Union sovietique, non pas, pour certains de ces derniers, en raison de leur substance ou de leur forme. Comme je l'ai explique, lorsque l'on parle du Congo, il s1agit du Gouvernement central de ce pays. Mais la proposition de ma d~legation est nee surtout de la preoccupation des difficultes que peuvent causer les discussions portant sur ces amendements, difficultes qui risquent·de nous entrafuer fort loin et peut-etre de nous ramener A la situation devant laquelle nous nous trouvions bier soir ou ce matin, Nous risquerions alors de reprendre !'ensemble des debats. 146. C'est un simple appel que j'aiadresse.Ilrepond au souci, que nous avons tous, d'assurer, pour le Congo et pour la situation internationale, une base un peu plus stable, si ce n I est une base definitivement stable. J e maintiens cet appel et je demande au Conseil d1accepter que notre projet de resolution ait la priorite. C'est tr~s sinc~rement que je fais cet appel. 147. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois devoir maintenant resumer la situation. 148. Le representant de Ceylan, appuyeparlerepresentant de la Tunisie, demande la priorite pour la mise aux voix du projet de resolution commun de ces

I would request that each amendment be put to the vote separately.

We shall proceed to vote separately on each of the amendments introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union to the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of Ceylon and Tunisia, 152, The Council will vote first on the amendment in paragraph 1 of document S/4524. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ceylon, Poland, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: China, Ecuador, France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United states of America. Abstaining: Argentina. The amendment was rejected by 6 votes to 4, with 1 abstention.

The Council will now proceed to vote on the amendment in paragraph 2.

In explanation of my vote on the draft resolution which has just been regrettably vetoed and on the amendments proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to say that I voted against these amendments because the representative of the Soviet Union tried to justify them in g1eneral on the basis of the opinions which he expressedatlengthyesterday [903rd meeting] and has just now expressed again about the conduct of the United Nations Force in the Congo hitherto. Since my delegation profoundly disagrees with these opinions, it was not possible for me to support any of the amendments which reflected them. 166. Moreover, as I made clear when I spoke yesterday, I reject entirely the allegation that those who supported the joint proposal of the representatives of Tunisia and Ceylon are inspired by neo-colonialism, whatever that may be, or by any desire to offend against the principle of a free and independent Congo. In the view of my delegation, the joint draft resolution which was so regrettably vetoed a few minutes ago l/omctal Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Arr- ~. agenda item 85, document A/4495. 161. A l'heure actuelle, il est clair que les puissances coloniales et les Etats-Unis font tout pour utiliser l'appareil de l'ONU a. des fins qui n'ont rien de comm.un avec les t!ches d6finies dans la Charle des Nations Unies. 162. Voll!\ pourquof nous nous sommes 6lev6s energiquement contre la position de ces puissances concernant le r~glement de la question du Congo et contre la pression qu'elles ont exercee et qu'elles exercent toujours sur les Etats africains afin d'obtenir que cette question soit reglee dans le sens qui leur convient. 163. Le Conseil desecuriten'apuprendremaintenant de nouvelles decisions. Toutefois les anciennes decisions du Conseil demeurent; elles doivent ~e executees et le Secretaire general tout comme le Comman.dement de la Force des Nations Unies doivent observer strictement les decisions qui ont 6te adopt6es. Elles n 'ont pas et6 rapportees, elles restelit en vigueur et nous lutterons pour qu'elles soient appliqu6es pleinement. 164. Tenant compte des resultats de la discussion et du vote d'aujourd'hui, je veux declarer que le Gouvernement de I 'Union sovietique a presen\.e une proposition en vue d'inscrire il. l'ordre du jour de la quinzi~me session ordinaire de l'Assemblee generale des Nations Unies, en tant que question presentant un caract~re d'importance et d'urgence, la question de la menace a. 1 'ind6pendance politique et ! l 'integrite territoriale de la Republique du Congo. Une declaration il. cet effet accompagnee d'un m~ moire explicatif a ete remise. au Secretail!'e general ll. 165. Sir Patrick DEAN (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais]: Pour expliquer mon vote sur le projet de resolution qui Vient malheureusement de faire l'objet d'un veto ainsi que sur les am.endements proposes par le representant de l 'Union sovietique, je voudrais dire que j'ai vote contre ces am.endements parce que le representant de l 'Union sovietique a tente de les justifier d'une fac;on generale en se fondant sur les opinions qu'il a longuement exposees hier [903~me seance] et qu'il vient d'exprimer a. nouveau touchant la conduite de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo jusqu'l ce jour. Ma delegation etant en complet desaccord avec ces opinions, je n'ai pu voter pour aucun des amendements qui les traduisaient • . 166. D'autre part, com.me je l'ai precise dans mon intervention d'hier, je rejette categoriquement !'allegation selon laquelle les delegations qui ont appuye la proposition presentee conjointement par les representants de ia · Tunisie et de Ceylan seraient inspirees par le neo-colonialisme - quoi que puisse signifier ce terme - ou par un desir quelconque d'attenter au principe de la liberte et de l'indepen- .!/Documents officiels de l'Assemblee generale, quinzieme session, ~. point 85 de l'ordre du jour, document A/4495. 167. The speeches of certain members of the Council and of some non-members who addressed us have contained severe criticisms of the Belgian Government. These criticisms have been rebutted, to my mind, convincingly, in the admirably lucid and restrained intervention by the representative of Belgium. 168. I would only add one remark. To attribute the origin of the troubles in the Congo to the intervention of Belgian forces appears to me to be an inversion of historical truth. The causes of these troubles should, in the view of my delegation, be sought elsewhere. 169. Mr. WADSWORTH (United states of America): When a few moments ago I indicated no objection to giving priority to the draft resolution submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon, I did so in the expectation that the United states draft resolution would not be voted on ·in the happy eventthat the draft resolution of Ceylon and Tunisia were adopted. However, now that it has not been adopted, I still feel that it would only further lengthen our procedures if I were to press for a vote on the United states draft resolution. I would therefore indicate now formally that I do not intend and do not wish to press for the vote. 170. At the same time I think that it is incumbent upon me to say the following. The Soviet Union has just shown the lengths to which it will go in opposition to effective United Nations assistance for the Republic of the Congo. This negative policy has been emphasized continually in Soviet action outside the United Nations and in attacks on all aspects of the United Nations programme. Now it has taken the form of :v~toing a resolution whi.;;lt would have provided financial aid to the Congo and would have gone far to:- ward preventing-had persons lived up to it-any unilateral intervention in Congolese affairs. And we should certainly have expected that all members of the Council would heed the call. I must also note that this is a resolution which the very substantial majority of the African delegations felt able to support. 170. Je crois d'autre part devoir d6clarer ce qui suit. L'Union sovietique vient de montrer jusqu•on elle etait _pr~te a aller dans son opposition a une assistance efficace des Nations Unies ~ la Republique du Congo. Cette politique negative n'a cesse de se manifester dans !'action menee par l'Unionsovietique en dehors de !'Organisation des Nations Unies et dans ses attaques contre tous les aspects du programme de l'ONU. Elle rev~t maintenant la forme d'un veto contre une resolution qui aurait fourni au Congo une aide financi~re et qui aurait puissamment contribue - si elle avait ete respectee - a emp~cher toute intervention unilaterale dans les affaires congolaises. Et il est certai,n que nous esperions que tous les membres du Conseil auraient tenu compte de l'appel qui leur etait adresse. J e dois egalement relever : qu'il s'agissait d'un projet de r6solution auquel la tr~s grande majorite des delegations africaines etaient favorables. 171. Yesterday I said that the United Nations action in the Congo was at the crossroads. That remains my view. The United Nations action must succeed. The alternative if it fails would be grave indeed. The United states, like eight other members of this Council, was prepared to make the decisions which would encourage and expand United Nations assistancetothe Congo. The Soviet Union was not. 171. J'ai dit hier que, dans son action au Congo, , l 'Organisation des Nations Unies 6tait ! la crois6e des chemins. Je suis toujours de cet avis. Il faut : que !'action de l'ONU soit couronn6e de succ~s. Si ._ elle 6chouait la situation serait extr~mement grave. Les Etats-Unis, de mtme que huit autresmembresciu Conseil, etaient dispos~s a prendre les decisions qui auraient stimule et developpe 1 'aide apportee au Congo par les Nations Unies. L'Union sovietique ne l'etait pas. 172. As I said the other day, the Soviet Union does 172. Comme je l'ai dit l'autre jour, !'Union not want the United Nations to succeed in the Congo sovietique ne veut pas que !'Organisation des Nations 17 3. Inasmuch as the Cowicil has been wiable to fulfil its responsibilities owing to this veto, I propose the following resolution which I urge the Cowicil to adopt promptly: •The Security Cowicil, "Having considered the item on its agenda as contained in document S7 Agenda/906, "Taking into accowit that the lack of wianimity of its permanent members at the 906th meeting of the Security Cowicil has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, •Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly as provided in General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, in order to make appropriate recommendations."

After the statement which has just been made by the representative of the United states, I must express my amazement at the attitude which the Government of the United states is now taking on this question. 175, The fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly is to open on Tuesday, 20 September. This session, as is known, will be attended by the Heads of Government of many states of the world, including the Heads of Government of many African cowitries. At our instance, the question of the Congo has been proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the session. What is more, the Assembly is also to consider, at this regular session, the question of admitting new Members to the United Nations, among them fourteen new African states. Yet the United states wishes an emergency special session of the General Assembly to be held two days before the fifteenth session. Why? Cannot the question be discussed in two days' time -if you wish to have it discussed, in the General Assembly, by a large number of states? 176, Why do we need an emergency special session? When a week ago we insisted on the convening of the Security Cowicil as a matter of urgency, in view of the difficulties and the serious situation which had developed in the Congo, the United states objected; it procrastinated, because it was preparing a reversal of the position: now that it has done so, it wants its handiwork to be approved by the General Assembly. 177. The manoouvres on this question are quite obvious, they are plain for all the world to see; and the fact that the United states is now proposing the convening of an emergency session is merely proof of their, machinations to the detriment of the African States and of all those who are interested in the young 173. Le Conseil n'ayant pu s'acquitter de ses responsabilites du fait de ce veto, je presente le projet de resolution oi-aprlls, que je demande instamment au Conseil d'adopter sans retard: "Le Conseil de seouritli, "Ayant examine la question inscrite 1 son ordre du jour tel qu'il figure dans le document S/ Agenda/ 906, "Tenant compte du fait que le manque d'wianimite des membres permanents du Conseil de slicuritli A. la 906~me slianoe a emp~cM le Conseil de s 'acquitter de sa responsabilite principale touchant le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, •mcide que l 'Assembl6e g6n~rale sera convoqu~e en session extraordinaire d'urgence conform~- ment aux dispositions de la resolution 377 A (V) de l'Assemblee gfuierale, en date du 3 novembre 1950, afin de faire les recommandations approprilies. 11 174. M. ZORINE (Union des Rlipubllques socialistes sovilitiques) [traduit du russe]: Apr~s la declaration que vient de faire le reprlisentant des Etats-Unis, je dois exprimer mon tr~s vif litonnement devant la position qu'adopte maintenant son gouvernement sur cette question. 175. En effet, la quinzi~me session ordinaire de l'Assembllie genlirale s'ouvrira mardi proohain, le 20 septembre. A oette session assisteront, comme on le sait, les chefs d~ gouvernement d'wi grand nombre d'Etats, notamment de nombreux Etats africains. Nous avons propose d'inscrire la question du Congo A l'ordre du jour de cette session. Qui plus est, l'ordre du jour de cette session comprend !'admission de nouveaux membres, parmi lesquels on compte 14 nouveaux Etats africains. Cependant, voiUl que les Etats-Unis veulent wie session extraordinaire de l 'Assemblee generale deux jours avant cette sessicn ordinaire. Pourquoi? A quelles fins? Ne pourra-t-on pas examiner cette m~me question dans deux jours si vous voulez qu'un grand nombre d'Etats la discutent A. l'Assemblee glinerale? 176. Pourquoi est-il nlicessaire de convoquer une session extraordinaire? Lorsqu'il y a une semaine nous insistions pour convoquer d'urgence le Conseil de slicurite par suite des difficultes et de la situation grave qui s'litaient crelies au Congo, les Etats-Unis s'y sont opposlis et ont retarde la convocation du Conseil de securite parce qu'ils preparaient Wl coup ·d'Etat au Congo, et que leurs prliparatifs sont maintenant acheves. Ils ont retardli la convocation du Conseil. Et, ll pr6sent, ils veulent faire sanctionner leur reuvre par l 'Assemblee glinerale. 177. Les manreuvres dont cette question fait l'objet sont tout h fait evidentes, tout le monde peut les voir et, si les Etats-Unis propoaent maintenant de convoquer une session extraordinaire, c'est lA.seulementla preuve de leurs machinations au detriment des Etats africains, au detriment de tous ceux qui · veulent 180. You can, of course, decide now to convene an emergency special session, but the absurdity of such a decision is obvious to the whole world. You cannot wait two days, yet you waited such a long time! When we proposed to you a session of the Security Council, you put it off from day to day because you wanted to wait and see whether something in the Congo would change, whether you would manage-with Belgian help and the use of the machinery and Command of the United Nations-to overthrow the existing Government and substitute one of your own. You were not in a hurry then, but you are in a hurry now. 181. Je pense que la consideration principale dont s 1est inspire le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis en proposant une session extraordinaire a trait aux prochaines elections: il faut m.ontrer au peuple americain !'attitude ferme des Etats-Unis sur cette question, il faut montrer au peuple americain que les Etats-Unis se soucient de la securite de l'Afrique, de la securite du monde. Mais le peuple americain ne s'y laissera pas prem:ire, et la session extraordinaire que vous voulez convoquer ne fera gullre apparai'tre votre propaganda sous un jour favorable et ne vous donnera pas de satisfaction. Quant a la session ordinaire qui est sur le point de s 1ouvrir, elle examinera dans une atmosphllre plus calme la question du Congo et d'autres questions qui interessentactuellement le monde, et je pense que les representants de tous les Etats qui si~gent l l'Assemblee generale comprendront fort bien !'orientation de votre politique, qui ne vise nuliement a renforcer la paix et A. resoudre les questions coloniales dans le sens qui convient. 181, I think that the main considerations by which the Government of the United states is moved in proposing the emergency special session are connected with the pre-election period: the American people has to be shown how firm the United states is on this question, it has to be shown that the United states is concerned for the security of Africa and of the world. But the American people will not be deceived by that, and the emergency special session which you wish to arrange will add no lustre to your propaganda and will give you no satisfaction. The regular session which is about to begin will discuss the Congo question, and the other questions· of present interest to the world, in a calmer atmosphere, and I think that the representatives of all the states participating in the General Assembly will fully understand the political line you are following, which is t: nu means directed towards strengthening peace 0!' -anding the proper solution for colonial problems. 182. The Soviet delegation will vote again!i!t your proposal-because it sees the absurdity of convening· an emergency special · session two days before the regular session of the General Assembly, ·and the political mistakenness of such a decision, in view of the fact that the regular session will be attended by Heads of Government and the leading statesmen of all countries, who will be able to discuss questions with great attention and thoroughness-assuming that you intend such questions to be debated seriously, and noi: for the purpose of propaganda and demagogv. 182. La delegation sovietique votera contre votre proposition, parce qu'elle volt l'absurdite de conyoquer une session extraordinaire deux jours avant l'ouverture de la session ordinaire de l'Assembl6e generale; elle voit qu 1une telle decision serait une erreur du point de vue politique puisqu.e 1:1. la session ordinaire participeront les chefs de gouvernement, les dirigeants les plus qualifi~s de tous les Etats, qui pourront examiner ces questions avec une plus grande attention et qui seront mieux 1:1. m~me de le faire., si tant est que yous soulevez ces questions pour qu'elles soient discutees serieusement et non 1:1. des fins de propagande et de demagogie. 179. Ces essais d1intimider les Etats africains ne vous apporteront rien de hon et n I auront aucune influence sur un Etat qui fermement et sans rel!che mllne et m~nera une politique visant a la liberation des peuples coloniaux, a l'octroi a oes peuples d'une independance veritable et au maintien et au renforcement de cette independance. En ce qui nous concerne, vous n'arriverez pas a nous intimider ainsi. 180. Vous pouvez certes decider maintenant de convoquer une session extraordinaire, mats l'absurdite d'une telle decision est evidente pour lemondeentier. Vous ne pouyez pas attendre deux jours alors que vous avez attendu si longtemps! Lorsque nous vous proposions de convoquer le Conseil, vous retardiez la reunion de jour en jour parce qu'il yous fallait attendre pour voir si quelque chose n'allait pas se modifier au Congo, si vous n'alliez pas reussir, gdce a !'aide de la Belgique et a !'utilisation de l'appareil de l'ONU et du Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies, a renverser le gouvernement actual du Congo pour le remplacer par un gouvernement qui vous serait devoue. Alors vous n'etiez pas presses et maintenant vous l'etes. 184. My delegation voted against the draft resolution presented by Ceylon and Tunisia. In my appeal before the vote, I made known the principal reasons for our position. Despite the assurances of the authors of the draft resolution and despite the general feeling among representatives of many countries around this table, including representatives of African states, that the legal Government of the Republic of the Congo has to be supported and defended against all efforts to overthrow that Government, that the Government should have full sovereign rights in its actions and policies, and that the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo has to be defended-despite all those beliefs and convictions in the statements of policy, those concepts were not included in the text of the draft resolution, although its authors told us that they had those ideas in the back of their minds. 185. However, the Polish delegation was afraid before the vote, and ts certain after the vote, that because of those deficiencies in the text of the draft resolution, that draft, if approved, would have been used to revise the former decisions of the Security Council. 186. I do not want to goanyfurtherinto this problem. I would merely like to draw the attention of the Council and of the authors of the draft resolution to tha statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in explanation of his vote when he said that he voted for the draft resolution presented by Ceylon and Tunisia in the belief that the cause of the situation in the Congo was not Belgian aggression but could be found elsewhere. I wonder whether the authors of the draft resolution foresaw, in drafting their proposal, that it might be interpreted or used in the manner just expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom. 187. May I now be permitted to turn to the draft resolution submittt,d by the United states delegation. I should like to add to what was said by the representative of the Soviet Union by indicating the following four points. 188, It ts not true, as would appear from the second paragraph of the draft resolution, that the Security Couucil is prevented from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is not true that we have no decision on the question of the Congo. We have three approved resolutions which stand and which have to be implemented. If it was not possible to vote upon a resolution which would make clear the necessity to implement the former resolution, it is certainly not the fault of the delegations which were put in the position of having to vote against the draft resolution of Ceylon and Tunisia. 184. Ma delegation a vote contre le projet de resolution presente par Ceylan et la Tunisia. Dans l'appel que j'avais adresse avant le vote, j1avais expose les principales raisons de notre attitude. En effet, en depit des assurances donnees par les auteurs du projet de resolution, bien que les representants de nombreux pays siegeant i\ cette · table, y compris les representants d'Etats africains, aient en general estime qu 'il fallait soutenir le gouvernement legitime de la r publique du Congo et le defendre contre toutes les tentatives visant i\ le renverser, bien qu'ils aient juge que ce gouvernement devait agir et fixer sa politique dans la plenitude de ses droits souverains et qu'il etait necessaire de defendre l 1integrite territoriale et l 'independance poll..: tique du Congo, ces principes que les representants avaient pourtant exposes avec conviction dans leurs declarations generales n1ont pas ete repris dans le texte du projet de resolution, quoique ses auteurs nous aient dit qu'ils les avaient eus presents i\ !'esprit. 185. Les craintes que ma delegation eprouvait avant le vote se sont maintenant transformees en certitude: comme le texte du projet de resolution presente des lacunes, ma delegation est stlre que, s'il avait ete approuve, on l'aurait utilise pour revenir sur les decisions anterieures du Conseil de securite. 186. Je ne veux pas m'etendre davantage sur cette question. J e voudrais simplement appeler 11 attention des membres du Conseil et des auteurs du projet de resolution sur la declaration que le representant du Royaume-Uni a faite pour ru.'Pliquer son vote: il a dit qu'il avait vote pour le projet de resolution presente par Ceylan et la Tunisia parce qu'i\ son avis la situation au Congo ne s'expliquait pas par une agression de la Belgique mais par d1autres raisons. Je me demande si, en redigeant leur texte, les auteurs du projet de resolution avaient prevu qu'il pourrait ~tre interprete OU utilise comme le representant du Royaume-Uni vient-de le faire. 187. Je voudrais matntenant, avec votre permission, dire quelques mots du projet de resolution presente par la delegation des Etats-Unis. J'aimerais ajouter les quatre points suivants i\ cequ'aditle representant de l'Union sovietique. 188. Contrairement i\ ce qu1on pourrait penser en lisant le deuxi~me considerant duprojetderesolution, il n'est pas vrai que le Conseil ait ete emp~che de s'acquitter de sa responsabilite principale touchant le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. Il n'est pas vrai que nous n'ayons pas pris de decision sur la question du Congo. En fait, nous avons approuve trois resolutions qui demeurent valables et qui doivent ~tre executees. S'il n'a pas ete possible d'adopter une resolution qui aurait precise la necessitli d'appliquer la resolution precedente, ce n'est certainement pas la faute des delegations qu'on a mises dans !'obligation de voter contre le projet de resolution de Ceylan et de la Tunisia. 190. It is true thatthereisanecessityto consider the present and future development of the United Nations operations in the Congo. There is need for considering the financial assistance. An item for the consideration of those things has already been proposed for inscription on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly which will convene on 20 September. 191. To add to the arguments and opinions expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union, I would like to point out that we have been informed that many Heads of state will meet during the regular session, including the Heads of African States who are immediately concerned with the situation in the Republic of the Congo. It would be only just and proper to have their contribution in the further outline of our actions and as regards assistance to the Congo. Furthermore, as we already know, there have been a number of applications for membership from new African states which, as we hope, will be considered and approved during the first day of the regular session of the General Assembly. Would it not be proper and just to permit those new African members to participate in the discussion on the question of the Congo, or is it the intention to exclude those new states from that discussion? 192. For those reasons, my delegation will vote against the United States proposal. 193. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the draft resolution submitted by the United states delegation. 194. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has asked for the floor.

I should like to say that we cannot, in this vote, be guided by resolution 377 A (V) to which the draft resolution refers, since that reso- . lution was adopted in violation of the United Nations Charter which requires unanimity in the Security Council in the matter of convening emergency sessions. 196. We shall therefore regard the adoption of any such resolution as illegal, unless it is approved unanimously by all the permanent members of the Security Council. 197. I deemed it necessary to make this statement before the vote was taken. 198. Tne PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the draft resolution submitted by the United States [S/4525). 198. Le PRESIDENT (traduitdel'anglais): LeConseil va maintenant passer au vote sur le projet de resolution presente par les Etats-Unis [S/4525).