S/PV.9085 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2022/482, which contains the text of a letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/2022/490, which contains the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); and S/2022/510, which contains the text of a letter dated 23 June 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. DiCarlo, Mr. Skoog and Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the invitation to brief the Security Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). Diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission to restore the Plan resumed in November 2021. But despite their determination to resolve political and technical differences, the participants and the United States have yet to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). Achieving the landmark JCPOA took determined diplomacy; restoring it will require additional effort and patience. Together with the Secretary-General, I therefore urge the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to quickly mobilize in that same spirit and commitment to resume their cooperation under the JCPOA. In that regard, we welcome the step taken by the United States in February 2022 to reinstate waivers on nuclear non-proliferation projects. We again appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with Iran. We also call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. While the International Atomic Energy Agency has not been able to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran, it estimates a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than 15 times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. That includes amounts of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent, which is extremely worrisome. Moreover, on 8 and 20 June, the Agency reported that Iran had started to install additional advanced centrifuges at the fuel enrichment plant at Natanz and had begun to feed uranium into advanced centrifuges at the fuel enrichment plant at Fordow. The Agency has also once again reported that its verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. In his most recent report, the Agency’s Director General informed the Security Council that the decision of Iran to remove cameras at various locations and to place them and the data collected from them under Agency seals could have detrimental implications. The Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s nuclear activities and to confirm their peaceful nature are key to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA. The Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) support our common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security. In that regard, the bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with Iran remain key and should be encouraged and built upon. We also continue to encourage Member States and the private sector to engage in trade with Iran using available trade instruments to address ongoing challenges. In addition to the issues with regard to the implementation of its JCPOA commitments, it is also important for Iran to address the concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). I now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s thirteenth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2022/490). First, on nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the past six months. The Council, however, received five notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan. Secondly, with regard to the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information to the Secretary-General and the Security Council concerning ballistic missile launches and the presentation of a new Iranian medium-range ballistic missile between November 2021 and February 2022. We also received information from those same States about two space-launch vehicle tests and two static-engine tests conducted by Iran between December 2021 and March of this year. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches and other activities are inconsistent with the resolution. Thirdly, we reported on our analysis and examination of information received from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates related to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). That paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, as set out in Council document S/2015/546. That document includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) with a range of 300 kilometres or more. During the reporting period, we conducted a follow- up visit to Riyadh, as well as to Abu Dhabi, upon the invitation of their respective authorities. We examined the debris of nine ballistic missiles, six cruise missiles and several UAVs used in various attacks by the Houthis against the territories of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since 2020 and which were alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). We observed that the debris of the nine ballistic missiles and six cruise missiles had similar design characteristics and parts consistent with those of missiles examined previously and assessed to be of Iranian origin. We also assessed those missiles or parts thereof to be of Iranian origin. However, we have not been able to determine when the ballistic missiles or parts thereof may have been transferred from Iran, in particular whether such transfers occurred after 16 January 2016, the date on which the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) came into force. Finally, on the assets freeze provisions, we did not receive any information alleging actions inconsistent with those provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). The JCPOA was a triumph for non-proliferation and multilateralism. After several years of uncertainty, the Plan is now at a critical juncture. We hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will continue to build on the momentum of the past few days of talks, facilitated by the European Union, to resolve the remaining issues. Will we realize the promise of multilateralism and diplomacy by reaching a compromise on the remaining issues? Or will we simply let the painstaking efforts of many years slip between our fingers? The Secretary- General is convinced there is only one path to lasting peace and security for all Member States, and that is one based on dialogue and cooperation. We hope that diplomacy will prevail. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Her Excellency Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason, for her leadership throughout her tenure, as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Skoog. Mr. Skoog: It is again an honour to have an opportunity to address the Security Council in this meeting on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo and their team in the Secretariat for their dedication and perseverance in their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231(2015), in particular the report on that subject (S/2022/490) for today’s discussion. I would also like to express our gratitude to Her Excellency Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason in her role as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and for her work to keep members informed of the current state of play. Since the previous report (S/2021/995) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in December, all JCPOA participants and the United States have continued their intense negotiations in Vienna to restore the JCPOA. Those negotiations started more than a year ago, in April 2021. They have been challenging, not only in terms of defining the steps needed to restore the JCPOA but also in overcoming the trust deficit following the decision of the previous United States Administration to withdraw from the JCPOA in 2018 and to reimpose sanctions, as well as subsequent Iranian nuclear steps inconsistent with JCPOA commitments. By March, we had produced a text containing difficult, hard-won compromises, with only a very few issues remaining open. The text describes in detail the necessary steps for the United States to return to the JCPOA and the resumption of the full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. The negotiations were paused on 11 March due to external factors and to allow Iran and the United States to address final outstanding bilateral issues. To that end, the EU’s efforts to broker an agreement and restore the JCPOA continued. During the pause, the EU High Representative, as JCPOA Coordinator and facilitator between Iran and the United States, continued to be in regular contact with all JCPOA participants and the United States. On 25 June, the EU High Representative visited Tehran at the invitation of Iran’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amir-Abdollahian, in an attempt to break the recent dynamic of escalation and end the stalemate in the negotiations. Following discussions with relevant counterparts in Tehran, the High Representative announced another effort by the EU to help bridge the remaining gaps between Iran and the United States through proximity talks, before the agreement was to be finalized by all JCPOA participants and the United States. The EU remains committed to restoring the JCPOA. However, it is vital that, after more than one year of negotiations, and in view of Iran’s worrisome nuclear trajectory and the continued and new United States sanctions, we conclude this agreement as soon as possible and proceed with the full implementation of the JCPOA. That is important not only for Europe, Iran and the region but also for the world as a whole, which — now more than ever — needs more security and stability. From the Coordinator’s perspective, after more than one year of intense multilateral negotiations, we believe we have a good deal on the table to restore the JCPOA. This is not a bilateral deal between Iran and the United States. Very tough political choices had to be made by all JCPOA participants and the United States to reach the current delicate balance in the text. The deal is now almost finalized. The space for further significant changes has been exhausted. On the EU side, we are concerned that we might not make it over the finishing line. Our message is this: seize this opportunity to conclude the deal based on the text that is on the table. The time to overcome the last outstanding issues, conclude the deal and fully restore the JCPOA is now. As stated time and again, the EU remains committed to the full and effective implementation of the agreement, and we are determined to continue working with the international community for this purpose. We greatly appreciate the efforts of the Council and its partners in supporting the restoration of the JCPOA. At the same time, we remain cognizant of the fact that there is an overwhelming sense of urgency to conclude the talks. That is shared by a great part of the international community, as seen in the recent discussion at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting held in Vienna in June. Iran’s nuclear developments remain a grave source of concern, particularly with regard to its continued accumulation of enriched uranium at 20 per cent and 60 per cent and the installation of more and more advanced centrifuges. Significant work on uranium metal was conducted over the past year and produced knowledge gains that remain of concern. Iran’s nuclear activities are not only inconsistent with the nuclear provisions of the Plan of Action but also raise serious non-proliferation concerns. We also deeply regret Iran’s recent decision to remove IAEA cameras from key nuclear facilities, in response to the resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors. Those cameras are important to ensure the continuity of knowledge on Iran’s nuclear programme for the time when the JCPOA is restored. We reiterate that Iran’s decision to suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol and JCPOA transparency provisions on 23 February 2021 has substantially decreased the IAEA’s access to relevant information on Iran’s nuclear programme; it is important not to take steps, in particular with regard to IAEA monitoring, that could jeopardize the restoration of the JCPOA. We fully recognize that Iran has faced, and continues to face, very serious negative economic consequences following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of previously lifted United States unilateral sanctions, which we deeply regret. The restoration of the JCPOA is the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits and reach its full economic potential, as it will result in a comprehensive sanctions lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran. It is therefore important to show the necessary political will and pragmatism to restore the JCPOA on the basis of the text that is on the table. While acknowledging the strong sense of urgency, it is important to avoid escalatory steps and preserve sufficient space for diplomatic efforts to succeed. Let me also recall the importance of the procurement channel, which continues to be fully functional. As highlighted in the report of the Secretary-General, it remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to Member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We furthermore urge all Members of the Organization to refrain from actions and statements that increase regional and international tensions and thereby escalate a military build-up in the region and beyond. The EU has repeatedly urged Iran to desist from activities that could deepen mistrust and that are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). We remain fully committed to multilateral diplomacy, which has been successful for several decades. It is the only way forward. Let us not forget that the origins of the JCPOA are an exemplary outcome of effective multilateral diplomacy. We have a common interest in making the JCPOA work, in particular in the current international environment. Let us do this together, and let us do it swiftly.

I thank Mr. Skoog for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Byrne Nason. Ms. Byrne Nason: The thirteenth six-month report (see S/2022/510) of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) was approved by Council members on 23 June. I would like to thank all Council members for their constructive engagement in that process and for the spirit of compromise and flexibility. The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place in the 2231 format of the Security Council, covering the period from 8 December 2021 to 23 June 2022. It includes relevant communications, summarized in my report, as well as key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel. Council members may refer to the report for details, but I wish to mention three points in particular. First, I would like to report that one meeting of the Council in the 2231 format was held during this reporting period, on 23 June 2022, at which representatives of the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/490) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo already referred to some of those points in her briefing. The 2231 format also had a discussion on the ongoing diplomatic efforts to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on ballistic missile and space vehicle launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on issues related to implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Secondly, a total of 13 notes were circulated within the 2231 format during the reporting period. In addition, I sent seven official communications to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 11 communications from Member States and the Coordinator. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in March and May 2021, as well as eight updates. I would like to stress the importance of the IAEA’s role in conducting verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA’s work is essential to provide confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes. The reports of the Director General play a key role in that regard. Thirdly, no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the JCPOA. It remains operational and stands ready to review proposals. I join the Secretary-General in encouraging all participants to the JCPOA, Member States and the private sector to fully support and utilize the channel. The JCPOA is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation, an example of how we can work together to resolve protracted and difficult issues through dialogue and diplomacy. I note that discussions among the parties are ongoing. I join the other briefers here today in hoping that all sides can move to accept the agreement on the table and ensure that the JCPOA can achieve its goals for the benefit of all. It is important that all parties to the agreement uphold it in both spirit and letter, avoid actions that undermine the implementation of commitments, and ensure its full and effective implementation. In turn, we in New York must continue to play our part in demonstrating that resolution 2231 (2015), which endorses the JCPOA, is working as it should. Finally, over the course of my time as Facilitator, I have done my utmost to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in an impartial and transparent manner, working closely with all Council members to meet our shared responsibility to ensure the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which it underpins. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the staff of the Secretariat for their invaluable advice and strong support over this period. It has been a great honour to work with everyone on this important file.

I thank Ambassador Byrne Nason for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for the Secretariat’s work on the report (S/2022/490) of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and her briefing to the Security Council. I would also like to thank my colleagues Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Byrne Nason for their briefings as well. The United States remains committed to a mutual return to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We have been prepared for months to conclude a deal based on the understandings negotiated in Vienna. Such a deal has been available since March, but we can conclude a deal and implement it only if Iran drops its additional demands that are outside the scope of the JCPOA. In that regard, we would like to thank the European External Action Service and High Representative Borrell Fontelles for going, quite literally, the extra miles in support of concluding an understanding on mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. In the light of those efforts, we were all the more disappointed that, during High Representative Borrell Fontelles’s visit to Tehran on Saturday and the indirect discussions conducted by the European External Action Service in Doha this week, Iran continued to make demands that go well beyond the JCPOA. Iran has yet to demonstrate any real urgency to conclude a deal, end the current nuclear crisis and achieve important sanctions lifting. We remain concerned by the steps Iran has taken recently that undermine the verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of JCPOA commitments, including the removal of JCPOA- related cameras and monitoring equipment. Such steps make a mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA more difficult. The IAEA has our full support in carrying out its critical verification and monitoring responsibilities in Iran for both safeguards and JCPOA purposes. On 8 June, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed profound concern that safeguards issues in Iran remain outstanding due to insufficient cooperation from Iran. The Board called on Iran to act on an urgent basis to fulfil its safeguards obligations. Iran must provide the required cooperation necessary to resolve the IAEA’s concerns without further delay. It is also important that Member States continue to fully implement the relevant measures in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). For instance, restrictions remain in place on transfers to and from Iran of certain ballistic missile- and nuclear-related items and technology, and individuals and entities on the list established pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) remain subject to an assets freeze. We appreciate the Secretariat’s continued reporting on the implementation of those measures. The report’s findings that ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, or their component parts, are of Iranian origin underscores the destabilizing nature of Iran’s continued development and proliferation of missile technology. Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s report finds that unmanned aerial vehicles used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates contained components that the Secretariat had previously assessed to be of Iranian origin. The United States strongly condemns those attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran’s continued proliferation of weapons to its proxies and partners in the region must stop. Iran also continues to carry out activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in defiance of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Launches of space launch vehicles on 30 December 2021 and 8 March 2022 relied on technology virtually identical to, and interchangeable with, those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Iran’s determination to continue to engage in such activities is evident in its announcement on 26 June that it had conducted a launch of its Zuljanah space launch vehicle. Launches using such technology are the exact type of activity that the Security Council clearly called upon Iran not to undertake in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council must be clear and united in condemning that activity. When Iran defies the Security Council repeatedly without consequences, it undermines the fundamental credibility of the Council. In the meantime, the United States remains ready for a mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA, which we are confident would significantly advance international security. The ball is in Iran’s court, and the choice to move back towards the full implementation of the JCPOA rests with Iran.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings, and Ambassador Byrne Nason for the thirteenth report (see S/2022/510) of the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I welcome the presence of the representatives of Iran and Germany. Since its adoption, Mexico has supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which is a successful example of multilateral diplomacy and a key component of the global non-proliferation architecture. The agreement represented a major shift in the approach of the Security Council to addressing Iran’s nuclear programme, which moved away from a sanctions regime and confrontation and opted instead for a collaborative approach. As we look forward to the participants’ full return to the JCPOA, we are concerned about the activities referred to in the respective reports of the Secretary- General (S/2022/490) and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in particular the enrichment of uranium-235 up to 60 per cent, as well as research into more advanced activities, such as metal production and centrifuge modernization, beyond the limits agreed in the JCPOA. Transparency and cooperation are key elements of a properly functioning JCPOA. It is important to remove any doubts about possible actions by Iran that have gone beyond the agreements reached in the JCPOA. To that end, it is necessary to restore access to the IAEA so that it can evaluate and verify the status of Iran’s nuclear programme. At the same time, we urge the United States to lift its unilateral sanctions against Iran, especially those imposed extraterritorially or on third States. If that could be achieved, it would represent significant progress. We understand the position of those who consider it a priority to address the broader security dynamics in the region, including with regard to missiles and the transfer of weapons and components. We believe that it would be better to opt for separate agreements that do not limit the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) or the prospect of a return to the JCPOA. Beyond the reciprocal claims about missile and space technologies, the fact is that the launches and the responses to which they give rise move us further and further away from the atmosphere and the trust that are needed at this time. We welcome the indirect negotiations that are under way in Doha. We appreciate the efforts of Qatar and the European Union to find common ground between the United States and Iran. Mexico believes that the Council should support that dialogue with a view to concluding the negotiations in Vienna. The return to full compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) is in the interests of the entire international community, as it is essential to ensuring the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and promoting stability in the Middle East. We therefore call for differences to be settled in a way that enables a prompt return to compliance with the JCPOA, without preconditions. In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm Mexico’s commitment to achieving and sustaining a nuclear- weapon-free world through compliance with the commitments and obligations of the various legal instruments at our disposal, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In its aim to strengthen and preserve the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime established by the NPT, my country is a consistent defender of the right of all countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But let me be clear — that right carries with it the obligation to comply with the commitments and obligations set forth in the NPT, which include full cooperation with the IAEA.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General Rosemary Di Carlo as well as Mr. Olof Skoog, Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of the European Union, for their briefings. I also welcome the participation of the Ambassador of Iran in this meeting. My country appreciates and commends Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason’s work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue. We also take note of the Secretary-General’s thirteenth report (S/2022/490) on the implementation of that resolution. The adoption of the agreement on 14 July 2015 marked a decisive step in the fight against nuclear non-proliferation and showed the world what the international community is capable of when it is united, committed and determined. Such determination is necessary for overcoming the differences and tensions among the parties in order to restart the negotiations with a view to fully implementing the JCPOA. In that regard, my country welcomes the efforts made by a number of countries in recent months to renew dialogue and revive the agreement, which is both a symbol of and a benchmark for regional and international security. We believe that all initiatives that aim achieve that objective should be encouraged. It is essential that we regain the positive momentum in terms of the implementation of the agreement that existed prior to May 2018. We urge all parties to take proactive efforts in that regard and to restore the agreement, whose establishment, it should be recalled, was the result of a long and arduous process. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a vital role to play as a verification entity. We note Iran’s continued great interest in cooperating with the IAEA, as well as its active engagement in seeking to conclude and extend a bilateral interim agreement. We encourage that initiative and hope that an agreement will be reached to enable the Agency to conduct its verification activities at all nuclear sites. It goes without saying that compliance with confidence-building measures is critical to the implementation of the agreement. It is important to assure all parties and the international community that the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular those set out in annex B thereto, are being complied with. Furthermore, it is urgent that the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran be reconsidered. They have a negative impact on the country’s economy, lead to negative humanitarian consequences and contribute to tensions in the internal political climate, increasing security risks. They are clearly counterproductive and at odds with multilateral efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through political dialogue. I would like to conclude by underscoring how crucial the Plan of Action is for ensuring security and stability, both internationally and in the Middle East. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, my country believes that achieving objectives relative to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important part of building international peace and stability. The Plan of Action is the ideal framework for resolving that issue in an equitable and definitive manner. It is also an excellent reflection of our collective will to give priority to diplomatic and political channels in the settlement of disputes. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. We welcome the Secretary- General’s thirteenth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/490) and thank the Secretariat for its continued professionalism and support. I would also like to thank Ambassador Byrne Nason and His Excellency Mr. Olof Skoog for their briefings. And let me once again thank Ambassador Byrne Nason and her team for her work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It is important that we be clear: Iran’s nuclear programme has never been more advanced than it is today, and Iran’s nuclear escalation is a threat to international peace and security. Iran has continued to improve its enrichment capabilities by developing, installing and using new advanced centrifuges; it has continued its rapid accumulation of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent, and highly enriched uranium up to 60 per cent; and it has continued to curtail International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, the most recent example of which was its decision to switch off 27 monitoring cameras as of 8 June. Iran has also been producing uranium metal, which provides weapons-applicable knowledge. At the current enrichment rate, by the end of this year Iran is likely to have enough enriched material to rapidly produce highly enriched uranium at 90 per cent enrichment for several nuclear devices. Iran also continues to develop ballistic missiles in a way that is inconsistent with annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Iran’s nuclear escalation is undermining international peace and security and the global non-proliferation system, and is in clear violation of resolution 2231 (2015). There has been a deal on the table since March, following a year of intensive negotiations. At that point, there was a viable deal, which would return Iran to compliance with its commitments and the United States to the deal, reversing Iran’s nuclear escalation and lifting United States sanctions related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, Iran is refusing to take that opportunity, while making demands beyond the scope of the JCPOA. Iran should urgently take this deal. There will not be a better one and, if a deal is not struck, then Iran’s nuclear escalation will cause the JCPOA to collapse. In that scenario, it will be incumbent on the Security Council to take decisive steps to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo; Ambassador Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union; and Ambassador Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland, for their briefings. We also welcome the presence of the representatives of Iran and Germany in today’s meeting. As the product of 10 years of work, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a major win for multilateral diplomacy that was endorsed by a number of Security Council resolutions. It is a key pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, a buttress for peace and stability in the Middle East and a model success story for the resolution of regional hotspot issues through dialogue and negotiation. Since last year, positive progress has been made in the negotiations to resume compliance with the JCPOA. Those negotiations are now in their final stages. We welcome the resumption in Doha of indirect talks between the United States and Iran. We also hope that all the parties concerned, driven by a greater sense of urgency, will resolve the remaining outstanding issues without delay in order to remove any obstacles that stand in the way of restoring the agreement’s integrity and ensuring its effective implementation. The future of the Iranian nuclear issue is critical to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, regional stability and international peace and security. China wishes to underscore the following points with a view to keeping the resumed Iranian nuclear talks on the right track and ensuring their early and positive outcome. First, we need to commit to the overarching goal of reaching a political solution. Upholding and effectively implementing the agreement is about maintaining multilateralism and the authority of the Security Council while safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. As Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo rightly mentioned, the JCPOA represents the triumph of non-proliferation and multilateralism. There is no better alternative to the Plan of Action, because engaging in dialogue and consultations is the only right way forward for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. All the parties concerned should move in the same direction, stay the course towards a political and diplomatic solution, work together to encourage and facilitate peace talks, show diplomatic wisdom and political resolve and seek consensus on outstanding issues. China welcomes and supports all efforts conducive to the peaceful resolution of the crisis and appreciates the recent good-offices efforts of the European Union. We hope that the European Union, in its capacity as JCPOA coordinator, will continue to play its unique role and work harder to encourage greater flexibility from the parties. Secondly, we need to follow the correct logic to distinguish right from wrong. The previous United States Administration, while disregarding the objections of the international community, unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and launched a maximum pressure campaign against Iran. That is undoubtedly the root cause of the current Iranian nuclear crisis. As the party responsible for the Iranian nuclear crisis in the first place, the United States should face up to its responsibility, correct that mistake definitively, make a political decision as soon as possible and take concrete measures to respond positively to the reasonable demands of Iran. While repeatedly stating its readiness to seek a return to compliance, the United States is nevertheless escalating the sanctions against Iran and third parties even during the process of resumed talks, which is obviously detrimental to any positive progress in the talks. The United States should live up to its words and lift all relevant unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction measures against Iran so that Iran can fully benefit from the economic dividends of the JCPOA. Thirdly, we need to eliminate interference in the negotiation process. All parties have invested a tremendous amount of energy and effort in the negotiations on the return to compliance. There is only one last mile to go before the negotiations are concluded. In the words of Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, we must not “simply let the painstaking efforts of many years slip between our fingers”. As we approach the final hurdle, it is critical for all parties to reinforce confidence, reject any and all interference and preserve the hard-won results achieved to date in the negotiations. In that context, all parties should be guided by reason, exercise restraint and refrain from taking unconstructive steps that would cause tensions to escalate. China objects to the politicization of the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was apparent in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution on Iran, whose adoption was recently forced through by a number of countries. We support settling outstanding issues through dialogue and cooperation between the Agency and Iran. As a member of the international community, Iran has every right to benefit from the peaceful uses of outer space. We all have different interpretations of the nature of Iran’s missile and space programmes. We hope that the parties concerned will accurately interpret the provisions of Council resolutions on the issue of Iran’s missile launch and avoid undermining the bigger picture of the implementation of the JCPOA. Fourthly, we need to abandon double standards. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays a vital role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all parties must strictly abide by it. The cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia on nuclear submarines marks the first time since the NPT was concluded that a nuclear-weapon State has openly transferred nuclear-weapon materials to a non-nuclear-weapon State. Regardless of how those three countries may choose to name their nuclear- submarine cooperation, they cannot conceal the essence of their nuclear-proliferation behaviour. Its negative impact on the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue cannot be undone, and the risk it poses to regional peace, security and stability is a reality that cannot be changed. The practice of applying double standards to the detriment of the NPT’s objectives and purposes must be done away with if we are to maintain the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In his report (S/2022/490), the Secretary-General recommends that Member States fully support and apply the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges and the procurement channels described in resolution 2231 (2015), among others, in order to engage in trade with Iran so as to assist its response to coronavirus disease-related challenges and enable its people to enjoy tangible economic dividends. China subscribes to that, and we hope that the countries concerned will heed and respond positively to the Secretary-General’s appeal. At the same time, we also hope that the legitimate concerns that Iran has expressed will be taken seriously and properly addressed. As a permanent member of the Security Council and participant in the JCPOA, China has been consistently committed to promoting a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Since the start of this year, China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has engaged repeatedly with the parties concerned on the Iranian nuclear issue and stayed in close communication and coordination with them. China will continue to maintain an impartial and objective position, firmly safeguard the authority and effectiveness of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) and constructively participate in the negotiations on Iran’s return to compliance in order to facilitate the restoration of the agreement to the right track as soon as possible. At the same time, China also considers the legitimate security concerns of the countries of the region to be important. In that regard, Mr. Wang Yi has put forward an initiative aimed at building a multilateral dialogue platform in the Gulf region, supporting all the parties in continuing to build mutual trust through dialogue and consultation and ultimately finding a solution for ensuring lasting peace in the region.

I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Head of Delegation of the European Union for their briefings. Together with its British and German partners, France remains committed to enabling a return to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) as quickly as possible. We support the efforts of the JCPOA Coordinator in that regard. It is more urgent than ever to conclude the agreement while it is still possible, because the window of opportunity is closing and because Iran has ramped up its violations of the nuclear provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). As a result of Iran’s violations of the JCPOA for more than three years, including in the course of the discussions in Vienna on its most problematic activities, its nuclear programme is now further advanced than it has ever been. Tehran has accelerated its development of those activities without any credible justification that they are for civilian use, including its accelerated accumulation of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Last year Iran began uranium metal activities. That is not only prohibited by the JCPOA but also highly troubling from a nuclear-proliferation perspective, because the knowledge and know-how that it enables Iran to acquire can be useful for nuclear-weapon production. In the past few days Iran has begun installing new, advanced, higher-performance centrifuge cascades. The more knowledge gains that Iran accumulates, with irreversible consequences, the more difficult it will be to return to the JCPOA, which was designed according to different technical parameters that corresponded to the level of Iran’s knowledge in 2015. We call on Iran to stop that spiral, which could prevent the agreement from being concluded at all. At the same time, Iran’s lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is becoming ever more serious and worrying. The Agency is making it clear that it will very soon be unable to restore the continuity of its knowledge of Iran’s nuclear programme, and that is irreversible. It is deeply concerning that Iran’s decisions are blocking the IAEA from fully exercising the mandate given to it by the Security Council through resolution 2231 (2015). That is indeed a matter for the Council’s consideration. The situation is equally worrisome with regard to Iran’s other activities falling within the scope of resolution 2231 (2015). Iran continues to pursue its ballistic-missile activities in a major way. We reiterate our full support for the Secretary-General’s efforts to investigate possible transfers of that technology in the region. Those activities put Iran in a position to threaten international security, and the Council has all the more reason to closely monitor them because they are occurring in a context where the IAEA, owing to Iran’s activities, is no longer able to assure the international community that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The solution requires respect for international law, dialogue and de-escalation. We continue to hope that Iran will engage in such a process. However, we are becoming increasingly concerned because Iran has not managed to seize the opportunity presented to it during Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles’s visit to Tehran and the indirect talks with the United States that ended yesterday in Doha. What we see is that Iran has not only failed to take advantage of the offer on the table but has brought in new issues outside the scope of the JCPOA with its maximalist and unrealistic demands. We continue to believe that an effective return to full implementation of the JCPOA has the potential to contribute positively to regional prosperity and security, and we will spare no effort to achieve that. But we will not succeed if Iran continues to reject that path. The agreement we negotiated in Vienna continues to provide non-proliferation benefits to the international community. It is also in Iran’s interest, as it offers significant sanctions relief that can benefit both its economy and people. But the window of opportunity is closing. We call on Iran to stop its nuclear escalation, restore its full cooperation with the Agency and seize the current opportunity to lift all the United States sanctions against it in contravention of the JCPOA. France reaffirms its commitment to concluding the agreement as soon as possible, while there is still time.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, the Head of Delegation of the European Union and Ambassador Byrne Nason for their updates. Let me start by reaffirming Norway’s continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). We appreciate all actions aimed at reviving the Plan through substantive talks, including proximity talks facilitated by the European Union. An effective and fully implemented JCPOA strengthens global nuclear non-proliferation and is important for regional and international stability and security. It is the best available opportunity to help build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Norway commends the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain the possibility of a credible continuation of its verification and monitoring activities in Iran. We deeply regret Iran’s recent decision to remove the Agency’s equipment. We note that the Director General is gravely concerned about the consequences of that action, including for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Transparency measures are a vital component of the JCPOA. We call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the agreement, including the Additional Protocol. It is clear from the reports submitted by the Director General of the IAEA to the Security Council that Iran continues to advance its nuclear programme. We are deeply concerned about Iran’s deliberate steps to reduce its nuclear-related commitments. Its non-observance of limitations set by the JCPOA, continued work on enrichment capacity, stockpiling of highly enriched uranium and irreversible enrichment research and development are very worrying. Some of those pursuits have no credible civilian purpose. We urge Iran to return to full compliance with the JCPOA and to resume full cooperation with the IAEA without delay. On the issue of provisions related to ballistic missiles, we should recall that in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Council called on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic- missile technology. Norway shares the concerns that have been raised about the matter and encourages Iran to address them. The situation surrounding the JCPOA continues to be tense and unpredictable. Norway remains a steadfast supporter of multilateralism and constructive diplomatic dialogue to decrease tensions and increase trust and cooperation. We repeat our call on all stakeholders to show restraint and to avoid actions that might contribute to escalation. Norway shares the ambition of an efficient return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, restoring and delivering the benefits of the agreement for all. We urge that the necessary decisions be made to put the Plan back on track.

At the outset, let me thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her presentation of the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2022/490) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We also thank Ambassador Olof Skoog of the European Union and Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason for their remarks. Ghana believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) represents the best opportunity and pragmatic path for addressing the Iranian nuclear issue. It is for that reason that we have followed and supported all the diplomatic efforts that are being undertaken in Vienna to resolve all outstanding issues required to reactivate the commitments of the parties under the Plan of Action and regarding the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We believe that the JCPOA lays out a pragmatic balance between Iran’s ability to use nuclear energy for peaceful development purposes and the imperatives of non-proliferation and even regional security. Ghana therefore advocates for ensuring that the efforts to reactivate the Plan of Action are not stalled by preconditions or a maximalist approach. That implies that the unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran should be lifted and that it should assume its commitments. We welcome the continuing efforts of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to maintain the Agency’s monitoring and verification activities of Iran’s nuclear programme. We also emphasize the need for Iran to abide by its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement, as well as other nuclear-related commitments, including the Additional Protocol. In that regard, we urge for ensuring that the Agency has unimpeded access in conducting its verification and monitoring activities. In conclusion, we reiterate our support for a diplomatic solution for the reactivation of the JCPOA, and we call for all outstanding issues to be resolved expeditiously. We urge the parties to work constructively towards a full return to the terms of the deal. Today the question of non-proliferation is much more critical to international peace and security, and all parties must work constructively to ensure the safeguards.

I too would like to thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo for her presentation of the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2022/490) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also express my appreciation to Ambassador Byrne Nason and her team for their efforts in finalizing the consensus report of the Facilitator (S/2022/510), and I thank Ambassador Olof Skoog, Head of Delegation of the European Union, for his briefing. India supports the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We have always maintained that all JCPOA-related issues should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and diplomacy. We hope that the diplomatic efforts under the JCPOA will reach a satisfactory solution. We value the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General to implement the Agency’s verification and monitoring mandate. India also attaches importance to the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We take note of the Agency’s recent reports, which were also considered at the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting. We urge Iran to cooperate constructively with the IAEA towards addressing all safeguards issues and enabling it to perform its verification and monitoring activities.

I would like to thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo, as well as Ambassadors Skoog and Byrne Nason, for their briefings. I also welcome the participation of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany in today’s meeting. It was our expectation and hope that today’s meeting would be held within the context of a restored Iran nuclear agreement. While recognizing the recent efforts aimed at resuming talks to revive the 2015 Iran deal, my delegation joins the Secretary-General’s call for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to demonstrate the flexibility required to reach a compromise on the last remaining issues and to return to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). We also urge all participants in the negotiations to continue engaging in a spirit of purpose to bring the agreement back to full operationalization and in a way that upholds the principles of disarmament, strengthens regional security and addresses other issues of mutual concern among the parties. Kenya reaffirms that global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute the core guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We see the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) as critical multilateral achievements and mechanisms in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Despite the recent setbacks, we therefore anticipate an outcome that will further enhance non-proliferation efforts and cooperation on disarmament issues. It should, first, provide a clear and practical road map aimed at returning to full compliance with and implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) and rebuilding trust among the relevant parties. Secondly, it should ensure that all the parties adhere to their commitments under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, including the lifting of additional sanctions and all retaliatory measures, which violate the principles and procedures laid out in the JCPOA. Thirdly, it should safeguard the equipment and important verification and monitoring work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ensure that its work continues unhampered on the ground. We encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement its safeguards agreement and voluntary transparency and implementation measures with the IAEA, as agreed in the Plan. That includes Iran taking ownership of the Plan and strengthening its commitments to the JCPOA provisions. My delegation reaffirms its appreciation of the critical role that the IAEA plays in global nuclear safety and in supporting member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the areas of science, technology and attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals, including tackling climate and environmental challenges. My own country can attest to that. In that regard, and as we look forward to the upcoming 2022 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we also note that among other things, the political and diplomatic efforts that went into the establishment of the JCPOA were geared to ensuring the economic and technological development of Iran in the area of peaceful nuclear activities. We therefore urge that the Council’s engagement with the non-proliferation agenda go hand in hand with encouraging efforts to strengthen the peaceful application of nuclear technology in industrial development projects for tangible benefits to the Iranian people and holistic political and economic stability in the subregion. We also note the significant role of the Joint Commission in ensuring that political and technical differences are addressed, including guaranteeing that the principles of integrity, transparency and confidence-building are upheld in matters pertaining to resolution 2231 (2015), including the continuation of trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran and relevant transfers within the JCPOA framework. In conclusion, I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, and your team on a successful conclusion to your June presidency.

We thank the briefers for their comprehensive briefings and for their commendable work in supporting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The United Arab Emirates reiterates its unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and its support to all constructive efforts aimed at realizing non-proliferation objectives in our region and globally. We welcome the verification and monitoring undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and we value the Agency’s contributions to regional and international peace and security. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. The continued expansion of enrichment activities in Iranian facilities, including uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent levels, and the accelerated development and deployment of advanced centrifuges are also very worrying. We are also concerned about Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of necessary transparency measures, including the recent removal of IAEA surveillance cameras. We hope that Iran will enhance its engagement and cooperation with the Agency to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. We reaffirm that the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes requires full adherence to safeguards obligations, compliance with the relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions and full cooperation with the IAEA. We call on Iran to take steps to build confidence in its nuclear activities and to return to full compliance with the verification measures and limits established by the JCPOA, including the implementation of the Additional Protocol. We thank the Secretariat for its visit to the United Arab Emirates and note the findings in the Secretary- General’s report (S/2022/490) regarding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used by the Houthi terrorist group in terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Those abhorrent terrorist attacks have been widely condemned, including by the Council. We reiterate our call for de-escalation and for taking steps to build confidence and ease regional tension. More generally, it remains critical that we unite our efforts to counter the increasing availability of advanced technology and weapons to non-State actors, which represents a growing threat to international peace and security and destabilizes our region. In conclusion, the United Arab Emirates will continue to support diplomacy and dialogue to find common pathways towards achieving a peaceful and prosperous future for our region. We hope that the talks can continue and be built on.

Ireland welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General (S/2022/490), the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2022/510) and the Joint Commission (see S/2022/482) and has taken note of their findings. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings today. Ireland remains strongly committed to preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Despite the progress made in the Vienna talks, we are concerned about the fact that a full restoration of the JCPOA, including a return by the United States and a return to compliance by Iran, has not yet taken place. That is despite the fact that extensive negotiations have taken place since spring 2021, with a viable deal now on the table. We urge all sides to move without further delay to agree on it and move forward with its implementation. We fully support the work of European Union High Representative Borrell Fontelles to facilitate efforts to that end. We welcome the start of talks in Doha this week and urge all parties to work urgently towards concluding an agreement. It is important that all sides return to full compliance with their commitments under the JCPOA. We are deeply concerned about Iran’s actions regarding its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, in particular its accumulation of considerable stocks of 20 per cent and 60 per cent enriched uranium, its experiments in uranium metal production, its development and increasing use of new and advanced centrifuges and the associated irreversible knowledge gains. Those activities have increased as Iran has suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA. Ireland shares the grave concern expressed by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a number of reports regarding those actions, particularly about the consequences of the decision to remove IAEA cameras and other equipment from various sites around Iran. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Council has asked the IAEA Director General to report at any time if he has reasonable grounds to believe that there is an issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of JCPOA commitments. It is therefore important for the Council to pay attention when the Director General expresses such concerns. I would stress that it is only through the IAEA’s verification and monitoring, including under the JCPOA, that the international community can have confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is essential that Iran cooperate fully and without prevarication with the IAEA in all aspects of its safeguards obligations and commitments, including the provisional application of the Additional Protocol. We share the concerns expressed by others regarding Iran’s ongoing ballistic-missile and space launch activity. We urge Iran to reconsider actions that undermine trust, which is essential to the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We note that during the reporting period the United States reinstated waivers on civilian nuclear projects, which will facilitate the implementation of those activities. At the same time, we call on the United States to meet its commitments on the lifting of sanctions, refrain from imposing new sanctions and take all necessary steps to facilitate the full implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). It is important that the Iranian people see tangible benefits from the full implementation of the JCPOA. Finally, the JCPOA is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and an example of how we can work together to resolve protracted and difficult issues through dialogue and diplomacy. It is essential that all of us work to restore and rebuild confidence in the agreement and ensure that it can achieve its goals for the benefit of all.

At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Byrne Nason for her briefing, her report (S/2022/510) and her tireless work as Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The work of the Facilitator is a central element in the process of monitoring the implementation of the resolution, alongside the Secretary-General’s reporting mechanism. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Olof Skoog for their briefings. Brazil welcomes the reports both of the Facilitator and the Secretary-General (S/2022/490) and takes note of their findings. Brazil reiterates its belief that the Iranian nuclear issue can be resolved only by peaceful and diplomatic means, in accordance with international law. In the context of renewed tensions and risks in the Middle East, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) provides a suitable framework for dialogue among the parties concerned. Brazil is counting on the collective commitment of the JCPOA’s original participants to immediately resume full compliance with their respective obligations under the agreement and resolution 2231 (2015). We are hopeful that dialogue and mutual understanding will prevail and that all the parties involved will demonstrate the flexibility and the constructive approach necessary to achieve that goal. Pending the conclusion of ongoing negotiations, we call on all the parties to refrain from any further actions that may jeopardize a possible and necessary agreement on the issue. Brazil defends the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the internationally recognized authority responsible for monitoring and verifying compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that regard, we regret that the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities of nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA have been seriously affected since 23 February 2021. Brazil welcomes the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to preserve the Agency’s ability to fulfil its independent and technical role in the implementation of safeguards in Iran. We hope that it will be able to monitor full compliance with the JCPOA.

We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Head of the Delegation of the European Union Ambassador Skoog and the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Ireland Ambassador Byrne Nason for their briefings. We note Ireland’s efforts in ensuring the successful coordination of the resolution 2231 (2015) format and the Irish team’s high level of professionalism, confirmed by the adoption by consensus of the six-month report of the Facilitator (see S/2022/510). However, we should point out that unlike the report, today’s briefing by the Facilitator was not agreed by consensus, in line with the resolution 2231 (2015) format. We have questions on some of its points. Regrettably, that has somewhat affected the overall positive impression of Ireland’s work as Facilitator. We hope that in future the facilitators of the resolution 2231 (2015) format will return to the practice of having their statements adopted by consensus by all Council members. In the past, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was endorsed thanks to professional diplomacy, which among other things envisages a willingness to take into account the interests of others and demonstrate reasonable flexibility in order to reach a compromise. It marked a key achievement in modern multilateral diplomacy. The importance of the deal for the region and the world as a whole can hardly be overestimated. It signified that despite fundamental differences in positions, the sides were still able to reach an agreement. Regrettably, that crucial balance was disrupted in 2018 following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal and subsequent multiple steps that not only shattered the JCPOA but also prevented the other parties to it from properly fulfilling it. Those steps include above all the illegitimate unilateral sanctions, both direct and indirect, imposed by the United States. I would like to underscore that the policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which the United States continues to embrace to this day, is the root cause of all the issues currently plaguing the JCPOA. All of Iran’s subsequent steps have been a reaction to the United States’ destructive position rather than Tehran’s arbitrary deviation from its obligations. It is therefore completely logical to assume that any steps taken by the United States to resume full compliance with the relevant JCPOA obligations could encourage Iran to move forward with some of the obligations that were previously put on hold. We regret that the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/490) fails to clearly articulate that cause-and-effect nexus, and not for the first time. Furthermore, the report gives equal weight to calls for the United States to lift restrictions to take a decision on exemptions. When the revival of the JCPOA is in question, what is important is not exemptions but the full, consistent and verifiable lifting of the illegitimate discriminatory measures that the United States imposed on Iran in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). We welcome the fact that the Secretary-General’s report confirms the role of the JCPOA as the most effective tool for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and regional security, and we fully agree that the path to lasting peace and security is through diplomacy. The report states that during the Vienna talks, the United States and the current parties to the JCPOA, including Iran, demonstrated their collective commitment to resolving all political and technical differences. We trust that that trend will continue. We support the Secretary- General’s call to all sides to remain flexible in the interests of reaching a compromise. At the same time, we should point out that the report fails to mention the important role of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, whose decisions are designed not only to ensure the implementation of negotiated measures but to monitor that implementation. We also need clarification of the Secretary-General’s assertion that a lack of progress in relaunching the JCPOA will undermine confidence in ability in the Plan’s ability to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. I would like to recall that the key role in this context is played by Iran’s implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA has ensured notable transparency vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear activity. The Russian Federation, like a number of other countries, voted against the Board of Governors resolution that was initiated by a group of Western States in early June. We believe that that initiative is highly inopportune, blatantly politicized and at variance with the efforts being made on the negotiations track to restore the JCPOA. The issues addressed are retrospective in nature and pose no proliferation-related risks. Let us recall that, since 2015, Iran has been the State that has been most frequently verified among IAEA parties. We continue to be very much troubled by the illegitimate practice of the Secretariat in carrying out certain investigations under resolution 2231 (2015). We categorically object to that kind of activity by the Secretariat. Its mandate in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) is exclusively administrative and technical in nature, as set out in the note dated 16 January 2016 from the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2016/44. The authority to send any requests to Member States to provide information or to react to such requests, not to mention any inspections on the ground, is not vested in the Secretariat. The 2231 cell is not a sanctions committee; it does not have the relevant expertise. We do not believe that a report of the Secretary-General should contain any conclusions based on conjectures of Secretariat staff or information from unidentified or uncorroborated sources. We have repeatedly noted that Iran has been scrupulously complying with the missile-related provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). The Council has not received any compelling evidence to the contrary. We deplore the fact that a number of States continue to make unjustified allegations vis-à-vis Tehran’s nuclear programme, using the same logic that we have repeatedly repudiated. To conclude, I wish to stress that there is still no alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Our duty is to safeguard and revive it. The Russian Federation wholeheartedly supports negotiations to resume implementation of the JCPOA through the initially agreed-upon frameworks. From the very beginning, we said that the path back to the JCPOA would not be easy. It is always much easier to destroy something than it is to rebuild it. But we are heartened by the fact that work on a recovery package is already at an advanced stage. We see no insurmountable issues in the way of reviving the JCPOA, but now we are at an exceedingly important, delicate and crucial stage. Attempts to step up pressure on Iran and through an unwarranted fuelling of tensions around the JCPOA could fully invalidate prospects for reviving the deal. We would urge the parties to demonstrate strategic restraint, adopt a pragmatic posture and focus on compromise. We are confident that in this case solutions acceptable to all will be found.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Albania. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her valuable insights. I would also like to thank Ambassador Skoog for the updated information he provided in his capacity as the Representative of the Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We also thank Ambassador Byrne Nason for her work as facilitator for resolution 2231 (2015) and commend her stewardship and efforts in supporting the implementation of the resolution. Albania has a profound belief in multilateral diplomacy and solutions. For multilateralism to succeed, we need to engage in good faith, have and show trust, and seek realistic and lasting solutions. That is the essence of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would like to make the following brief points. First, we regret the fact that recent days’ talks in Doha were inconclusive. Since March, what looks like a possible, good and fair agreement has been waiting for Iran’s approval. We see it as an excellent opportunity for Iran to embrace a solution that would benefit regional and world security as well as peace and stability and that would best serve the interests of the Iranian people themselves. The sooner they respond to this opportunity, the better. Requests that go outside the perimeter of the core issue of the agreement do not contribute to the process. Secondly, we are deeply worried about the second test launch of a domestic satellite vehicle on 26 June. We are extremely worried about the findings contained in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/490), which clearly address the inconsistent activities undertaken by Iran that are in clear violation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Thirdly, we welcome the visit of the Secretariat to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in response to invitations from their respective authorities. The materials examined show that Iran has conducted the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle systems and capabilities to non-State actors. We urge Iran to stop transferring and delivering those technologies to regional non-State actors and to fully comply with paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Furthermore, we expect the Secretariat to report to the Security Council on its further findings in due course. Fourthly, Albania welcomes the adoption with overwhelming support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution early this month upholding the IAEA’s core mission of safeguarding nuclear material to prevent nuclear proliferation. We deeply regret the recent decision of the Iranian authorities to shut down the IAEA cameras and the Online Enrichment Monitor. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA and not undermine its work. Providing technically credible information in response to the IAEA’s questions is the only way to remove those safeguards issues from the Board’s agenda and to show commitment to the JCPOA. We call on Iran to fully comply with the resolution and its annexes and all other obligations. I began my remarks by mentioning good faith and trust. Escalatory steps and provocations go against that spirit. They will not help Iran; they will not help negotiators; they will not contribute to the process. We hope that the frank engagement of the international community, especially the tireless efforts of the European Union, will encourage the Iranian authorities to seize the momentum, stop the threats and provocations and work with full transparency with those who have put on the table a comprehensive, meaningful, forward-looking and far-reaching agreement. I conclude by reiterating our firm belief that the JCPOA, a landmark success of diplomacy, remains the only tool that can reassure the international community in a verifiable way that Iran’s nuclear programme is and remains solely dedicated to peaceful purposes. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The representative of Ireland has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I am surprised by the comments from my Russian colleagues on my earlier statement as Facilitator. My statement was circulated yesterday as a courtesy for the information of all Council members, as I explained at the format meeting on resolution 2231 (2015) last week. The statement reflects my views on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) over the past six months. This is not a negotiated text, nor has it ever been. The 2231 format is expressly not a sanctions body and has its own particular established modalities. The established practice is that the Facilitator’s statement has not been negotiated but is circulated as a courtesy, and we have worked to maintain an inclusive overall approach. I think that practice best suits the role and the responsibilities of the Facilitator.

The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Just very quickly on this, we would like to agree with Ireland as Facilitator. Facilitators’ reports have always been agreed by consensus, as it was this time, but, as the Ambassador said, that has never been the case with Facilitators’ statements for these meetings, and we do not see a need to change the established process. We therefore reiterate our appreciation for Ireland’s work as Facilitator on this file.

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I am somewhat surprised at the discussion that has unfolded. It seems to me that if one of us Security Council members were to speak before the Council with the authority to perform certain Council actions, then those statements should, at the very least, not run counter to the understanding of other Council members or raise questions for them. Furthermore, Ireland is not the first State to be carrying out the facilitator role, and, to my memory, its predecessors approached this matter with greater care and attention. So, with respect to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, as we have noted the trend of a new generation of British diplomats to revise the gentlemen’s agreements that exist in the Council, we are not surprised. At the same time, it does not make those revisions pertinent for us. Overall, we positively assess the work of the Irish team, which is something that we have already stated. We regret the fact that at the last juncture there were certain misunderstandings. Had everything been done correctly, perhaps Ms. Byrne Nason would not have had to justify the way her report was prepared. I do hope that things will go more smoothly in future. I thank her again for her delegation’s work.

The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I do not want to extend this any longer. I fully concur with the remarks of my colleague from the United Kingdom, and I want to reassure the Irish delegation that everything was done correctly. Our understanding is that the norm has for many years been that the facilitator’s statements are circulated as a courtesy, which is all that is required. We see no reason to change that process and believe that the Irish delegation has followed all norms and requirements for its role. We thank the delegation of Ireland for its work.

I now give the floor to representative of Germany.

I thank the President for giving us the opportunity to speak under rule 37 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Let me join others in thanking the three briefers  — Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Byrne Nason — for their excellent briefings, but also for their continued and unstinting support for the restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We also welcome the support expressed by the Secretary-General for the JCPOA. We share his assessment that the JCPOA is still the best possible instrument for ensuring the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and that its restoration would therefore contribute immensely to peace and stability in the region and far beyond. We also concur with Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo’s analysis that we are now at a critical juncture. Despite our strong belief that restoring the JCPOA is both urgently required and possible, the prospects unfortunately have become very tenuous at this point. This is all the more regrettable since a viable deal to restore the JCPOA has been on the table since the beginning of March. It is the result of months of intense negotiations and would return Iran to compliance with its JCPOA commitments and the United States to the deal. We have been ready to conclude the Vienna agreement since the beginning of March, and we still are. It is a fair and comprehensive package. Since the time for it to be concluded is rapidly diminishing, we greatly welcome the recent good offices of the European Union High Representative. The proximity talks between the United States and Iran in Doha in recent days would have provided yet another chance for Iran to agree to the deal. Unfortunately, also in Doha, Iran has not seized the occasion, but has insisted once again on demands that go well beyond the scope of the JCPOA. At the same time, and also since our last meeting here six months ago (see S/PV.8930), Iran has continued its nuclear escalation unabatedly and taken even more far-reaching steps that are incompatible with its commitments under the JCPOA. Iran’s worrisome nuclear escalation includes the extensive use of advanced centrifuges for industrial purposes for nuclear enrichment way beyond JCPOA limits. We are equally gravely concerned that Iran has continued to curtail the verification and monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the country. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and restore all JCPOA surveillance and monitoring measures in full. This also extends to the clarification of open safeguard issues. The resolution that was adopted overwhelmingly by the IAEA Board of Governors in June clearly demonstrates that our grave concern is shared by the vast majority of the Governors of the Agency. On Annex B of the resolution 2231 (2015), let me reiterate our well-known position. We continue to consider Iran’s development of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic-missile technology, as inconsistent with paragraph 3 of Annex B to the resolution. There is also a need to ensure better compliance with the prohibition of transfers of so-called Missile Technology Control Regime-listed items to and from Iran, which is covered in Annex B, paragraph 4. The delivery of missile technology or related services or know-how to armed groups by Iran is destabilizing the region and must end immediately. In closing, let me repeat that we are ready to conclude the deal that has been negotiated in Vienna. We urge Iran to seize the diplomatic opportunity to restore the JCPOA while it is still possible.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I would like to begin by thanking Under-Security- General DiCarlo, Ambassador Byrne Nason of Ireland and Ambassador Skoog of the European Union for their briefings. Today, almost seven years after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), Council members once again reaffirm their support for the registration and full implementation of the JCPOA. We believe that the Comprehensive Plan of Action is a hard-won, multilateral diplomatic achievement that remains the best option and has no alternatives. I feel compelled to refresh Council members’ memories about the reasons why we are in the current situation. Unfortunately, certain Council members who have disregarded their own obligations in relation to the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) continue to ignore the underlying causes of the current situation and present a spurious narrative as to why we are in the Chamber today, attributing certain falsehoods and fabrications to my country. The commitments under the deal, which were carefully worded and explained in the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), are explicit and unambiguous. While Iran’s nuclear commitments were connected to the effective lifting of all sanctions and normalization of Iran’s trade and economic relations, the sheer fact is that sanctions are still in place, and Iran is not enjoying the economic dividends as promised by the deal. In accordance with the JCPOA, other parties are committed to ensuring “Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy” (resolution 2231 (2015), para. 33) Specifically, the United States, in addition to its obligation to lift sanctions against Iran, is explicitly committed to “mak[ing] best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realization of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting” (ibid., para. 26). Despite these explicit commitments, Iran has been denied its rights and benefits for the past four years. Let us remind ourselves that, in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015), and in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States withdrew from the agreement on 8 May 2018 and reimposed unilateral sanctions that had previously been lifted, putting unparalleled pressure on other countries to either disregard their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) or face punishment. This is unprecedented in the history of the Security Council. Despite the enormous difficulties that we faced as a result of the sanctions, Iran decided to continue honouring its commitments, which was validated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 15 times, after being promised and assured by the European participants in the JCPOA — France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) — that they would compensate Iran for the losses suffered after the United States withdrew from the Comprehensive Plan of Action. Unfortunately, the E3 disregarded their obligations and promises, leaving Iran with no choice but to utilize its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA to partially suspend its commitments, on 8 May 2019. In that context, Iran has taken certain remedial measures, in accordance with the JCPOA, to re-establish some balance in the reciprocal commitments and benefits under the accord. However, those particular States refer to Iran’s remedial measures, with much fanfare, in a manner that suggests that it was Iran that withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed or reintroduced countless inhumane sanctions with the publicly declared objective of starving an entire nation. While the former United States’ Administration recklessly sacrificed a well-established tenet of international law, withdrew from the deal and reimposed sanctions, the current Administration is following in its predecessor’s footsteps as it continues to adopt its notorious policy of maximum pressure and impose sanctions on Iran. There is no doubt that those policies are intended to create leverage in negotiations. Against that backdrop, I would like to address a few points that clarify our position on the current situation and the ongoing talks. Iran is committed to multilateral diplomacy, whose outcome should assure the effective and verifiable lifting of all unlawful sanctions. Iran has demanded verifiable and objective guarantees from the United States that the JCPOA will not be torpedoed again, that the United States will not violate its obligations again, that sanctions will not be reimposed under other pretexts or designations, as occurred during the previous United States’ Administration, and that JCPOA mechanisms will not be abused. Those are the minimum requirements for determining the deal’s long-term viability. In the course of the Vienna talks, we exercised maximum flexibility and showed good faith in order to reach an agreement that was acceptable to all and even introduced innovative solutions to the remaining issues in the hope of breaking the impasse. However, the United States’ unrealistic and rigid approach has led to the current stalemate. We are continuing our remedial measures because the non-fulfilment of their commitments by other parties continues. The sanctions remain in full force, the maximum-pressure policy is still being pursued and our people’s suffering continues. Nonetheless, as soon as all of the obligations of the other parties are fulfilled in a complete, effective and verifiable manner, Iran will immediately reverse all of its steps. However, the suffering of our people, as a result of the failure of other parties to carry out their commitments, is almost completely irreversible. Our patients, particularly those with rare diseases, have been suffering from inhumane sanctions, including on medicine and medical equipment. How can the death and suffering of those innocent patients be reversed? That injustice cannot be erased from the memory of the Iranian people. With regard to our cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as our peaceful nuclear activities, I would like to stress that all of our peaceful nuclear activities are entirely consistent with our rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the Agency’s safeguards agreement. As a responsible member of the NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to the principle of collaboration with the Agency and has fulfilled all of its obligations under the NPT and its comprehensive safeguards agreement, as the Agency continues its activities in Iran without hindrance. Our peaceful nuclear programme has been under the most robust and intrusive nuclear verification, monitoring and transparency measures ever conducted in a country in the history of non-proliferation. Iran has also provided the Agency with the necessary information concerning the alleged locations on 20 March, in compliance with the joint statement agreed to on 5 March and within the timetable established. Despite our unprecedented, strong and proactive cooperation with the Agency, the Agency’s response was neither appropriate nor productive. We were surprised by the Agency’s most recent report on the issue, because we had gone to great lengths to explain and clarify the remaining questions. We responded to all of the Agency’s questions thoroughly, constructively and cooperatively. We believe that the Agency’s recent claims are based solely on erroneous and fabricated information provided by the Israeli regime, which has done everything it can to kill the JCPOA. Despite Iran’s constructive cooperation with the Agency, the United States and its E3 partners, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, pushed for the adoption of a resolution at the recent IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting, their only motive being to build up their negotiated position in the current talks. We believe that the IAEA’s resolution is politically driven and that it will have negative effects on the ongoing talks, whose consequences will be the responsibility of the resolution’s authors. That childish game must end. As a result, in line with our Parliament’s resolution, we have decided to suspend certain measures that were not covered under the safeguards agreement. However, Iran is willing to continue engaging with the IAEA to address concerns and misunderstandings as long as the issues are technical and non-political. The Agency should respect the principles of independence, impartiality and professionalism in its work. During our intensive consultations in Tehran last week with Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Iran once again emphasized its willingness to provide creative solutions to the remaining issues in the hope of ending the deadlock. We agreed to hold indirect talks with the United States, through the EU, in order to overcome the last hurdles in the talks. We were sincere in the Doha talks, which were serious and positive. As in the past, we will be in touch with the EU Coordinator for the next stage of the talks. Our negotiating team is ready to engage constructively again to conclude and reach a deal. The ball is in the United States’ court, and if it acts realistically and shows its serious intention to implement its obligations, the agreement is not out of reach. Finally, with regard to the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/490), our observations are contained in my letter to the Secretary- General dated 27 June (S/2022/518), covering our views on issues that I did not address in my remarks today. However, we believe that the report should have addressed the root causes of the current situation surrounding the JCPOA and focused on the United States’ violations of resolution 2231 (2015), which includes sanctions-lifting commitments. According to some paragraphs of the report, the Secretariat has continued to engage in unauthorized travel and verification visits, as well as taking measures to examine allegations regarding the implementation of the resolution’s annex B. The note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44) has elaborated on the Secretariat’s mandate on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which is confined to administrative support for the Security Council. Such ultra vires activities by the Secretariat are therefore unacceptable and should be avoided. Similarly, any possible findings or assessments made by the Secretariat are rendered null and void. In that regard, any allegation that may be attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran is hereby rejected. In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the region. First, we categorically reject the baseless accusations and unfounded allegations made about my country in today’s meeting. As a responsible State, Iran is committed to its international obligations and has never engaged in any activity that breaches its obligations, including under resolution 2231 (2015). Our space and missile programmes fall outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes and are not subject to negotiations. Iran’s foreign policy is based on full respect for international law, mutual respect, good neighbourliness, cooperation and dialogue, as well as maintaining regional peace and security, through the active participation of all the States of the region. We are determined to pursue that policy in good faith. Our constructive engagement and efforts with the United Nations to assist and support the truce and its extension in Yemen are based on our firm belief that the countries of the region should work together for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The massive United States’ military build-up and export of sophisticated weaponry, as well as certain European countries’ supply of lethal weapons to countries of the region, have transformed the region into the world’s largest concentration of foreign military installations, making it a ticking time bomb. Another key source of regional insecurity is the Israeli regime’s destabilizing, malicious and terrorist activities in the region, which have always been accompanied by the persistent support of the United States. The Israeli regime has taken every opportunity to threaten and destroy the JCPOA, as well as to undermine Member States’ implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It has carried out covert operations and subversive and disruptive measures against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, as well as the cowardly and abhorrent assassination of innocent Iranian scientists in its efforts to further its sinister objectives in the region. It is regrettable that some Council members continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, as recently reflected and acknowledged in a new report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Instead of making unwarranted comments about our current peaceful nuclear activities, they should adhere to their NPT commitments, particularly those under article VI. Those States are also deafeningly silent about the Israeli regime’s nuclear weapons, as well as its repeated terrorist and disruptive activities against our peaceful nuclear facilities. It is high time that we dispensed with double standards.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. Before adjourning the meeting, as this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of June, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Albania to the members of the Council and the secretariat of the Council for the support they have provided to us. It has indeed been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of every delegation and the representatives of the Secretariat, including the conference services officers, interpreters, verbatim reporters and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of Brazil good luck in the month of July.