S/PV.914 Security Council

The provisional agenda for today's meeting will be found in document SjAgendaj914. It was drawn up in accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its last meeting. Consequently. if there is no objection, I shall consider the agenda adopted. The agenda was adopted. Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary- 4;eneral addressed to the President of the Security . Council (S/4381) Urgent measures in connexion with the latest events in the Congo: Note by the Secretary-General (8/4571); Statement dated 6 December 1960 by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the situation in the Congo (8/4573) 2. Le PRESIDENT (tradttit du russe): Hier, le Conseil de securite a decide de satisfaire aux dernandes presentees par les representants du Mali, de la Guinee, de la Republique du Congo (Leopoldville), de l'Indonesie, du Cameroun et de la Yougoslavie d'intervenir sur la question portee cl l'ordre du jour. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, j'inviterai les representants cl prendre place cl la table du Conseil. Sur l'invitation du President, M. Mamadou Aw (Mali), M. Toure Ismael (Guinee), M. Mario Cardoso

Yesterday, the Security Council decided to grant the requests of the representatives of Mali, Guinea, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Indonesia, Cameroun and Yugoslavia, to be allowed to speak on the item which is on our agenda. Therefore, if there is no objection, I shall invite these representatives to take seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mamado·u Aw (Mali), Mr. Toure Ismael (Guinea), Mr. Mario President: M. V. ZORINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques). P,'esents: Les representants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur. Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Italie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tunisie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgenda/914) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960, adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite (Sj4381): Mesures urgentes a prendre eu egard aux derniers evenements survenus au Congo: Note du Secretaire general (Sj4571); Declaration du Gouvernement de l'Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, concernant la situation au Congo (Sj4573). Adoption de l'ordre du jour 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): L'ordre du jour provisoire de la seance d'aujourd'hui figure au. document SjAgendaj914. Il a ete etabli conformement aux decisions adoptees par le Conseil a sa derniere seance. Cest pourquoi, s'il n'y a pas d'objection, je considererai cet ordre du jour provisoire comme adoptee L'ordre du jour est adopte. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960, adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite (S/4381) Mesures urgentes a prendre eu egard aux derniers evenements survenus au Congo: Note du Secretaire g~neral (8/4571); Declaration du Gouvernement de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, concernant la situation au Congo (8/4573) 6. In connexion with this last document, the Secretary-General wishes to make a brief statement. I call on the Secretary-General. 7. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Thank you, Mr. President. It is only a short piece of information. The note verbale of 7 December from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the Secretary-General, to which you have referred, in its turn refers to Ambassador Dayats report of 2 November [S/4557]. I just want to point out that if, in my report at the last meeting, I did not raise the question referred to in that report regarding the return of Belgium, it was only because we have no confirmed factual information of relevance to the discussion in the Security Council to add to that report.

We now begin the discussion of the item on our agenda. I shall make a statement as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, since I am first on the list of speakers. 9. In the last few days, the situation in the Republic of the Congo has deteriorated sharply. Mobutu's bands, which have usurped power, are abandoning all restraint. The forces backing them are putting through measures which are designed to rob the Congolese people of the independence it so lately won. A few days ago, a dastardly attack was made in the Congo on Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, who was taken captive by force and who is being subjected to inhuman treatment by the armed units under the command of Mobutu's clique. At the same time, these armed bands have also been taking cruel reprisals against other members of the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo and of its parliamentary leaders. 12. The statement by the Soviet' Government also notes the important and valuable lessons which the nations of the world will draw from the current events in the Congo. There is no need for me to quote the relevant passages of this statement, since it has been circulated to all members of the Council, but I should like to stress one point, namely, that after the events in the Congo, no one should trust the promises given by the colonialists from the rostrum of the United Nations. The example of the Congo, more clearly than any other, reveals the bestial nature of colonialism, its hatred of the colonial peoples and its contempt for all the rules of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The lesson of the Congo teaches the peoples of Africa and other continents that there can be no compromise between colonialists, who bring servitude and slavery, and those who fight for independence. That is why the temporary success of the colonialists in the Congo will, in the long run, end in their defeat. 13. The whole course of events in the Congo, especially. the events of the last few days, clearly demonstrates how correct was the position taken by the Soviet Government as soon as the imperialist aggression against the Republic of the Congo began and how well-founded was its serious and consistent criticism of the actions of the Secretary-General and his repre- 3 Apres avoir commit, plus d'un crime contre le peuple congolais, "les colonlalistes entenaent ecarter de force les dirigeants de l'Etat congolais .et les leaders politiques du peuple congolais, et les remplacer par leurs mercenaires clu type Mobutu et Tshombe". [Ibid., par. 2.] 11. Les puissances colonialistes aspirent, par tous les moyens, y compris des moyens manifestement cdminels, a retablir au Congo l'ordre ancien lequel:. encore recemment, leur assurait une domination sans reserve sur la terre congolaise. Au Congo, les membres de l'administration coloniale beIge qui, pris de panique, avaient fui le pays reviennent et s'emparent a nouveau de tous les postes de commande; iIs cherchent maintenant a faire payer au centuple par le peuple congolais le prix de leur recente defaite. SeIon les derniers renseignements re<;us, le nombre des fonctionnaires beIges s'eU~ve maintenant a 3.000; cependant, comme on peut le constater par la dedaration faite aujourd'hui par le Secretaire general, ce dernier, nous ne savons pas pourquoi, n'a pas de renseignements precis sur ce point. 12. La declaration du Gouvernement sovietique met l'accent sur les grandes et precieuses le<;ons que les peuples du monde entier tireront des evenements actuels au Congo. I1 n'est point necessaire maintenant de repeter les passages pertinents de cette declaration, car elle a ete distribuee a tous les membres du Conseit, mais je voudrais seulement souligner un point: les evenements du Congo doivent dissiper toute confiance dans les promesses faites par les colonisateurs du haut de la tribune de I'ONU. L'exemple du Congo revele plus clairement que dans tout autre cas la nature bestiale du colonialisme, sa haine des peuples coloniaux et son mepris en fait des normes du droit international et de la Charte des Nations Unies. La lecon du Congo enseigne aux peuples de l'Afrique et des autres continents qu'entre les colonialistes, agents de la servitude et de l'esclavage, d'une part, et les combattants pour I'independance, d'autre part, iI ne saurait y avoir de compromis. C'est pourquoi le succes ephemere des colonisateurs au Congo se soldera, en fin de compte, par leur defaite. 13. Tout le cours des evenements au Congo, particulierement durant les derniers jours, confirme on ne peut plus nettement la justesse de l'attitude adoptee par le Gouvernement sovietique des le debut de l'agression imperialiste declenchee contre la Republique du Congo; it confirme egalement I'entier bien-fonde de nos critiques, categoriques et consequentes, contre les 14. It should be added that from the first, the United States of America played a leading role in the struggle against the Congolese people, side by side with Belgium. The United States in fact supported the aggressor against the lawful Congolese Government. This the United States did because it has close ties with Belgium and other colonial Powers and because, together with Belgium, it has taken part in the merciless looting of African countries, including the Congo. "What is in effect taking place in the Congo"- I am quoting from the statement by the Soviet Government to which I have already referred-"is a reallocation of influence and of share capital among the major colonial Powers, the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom and France. The despoilment of the Congo's resources is what lies at the bottom of the violence and crimes now being committed by the colonialists and their agents in the Congo. Those primarily responsible for bringing about the Congolese tragedy are the great Belgian, United States, United Kingdom and French monopolies, the gallant knights of the moneybag and the safe-deposit vault. All the rest is window-dressing and stage-setting. "The peoples of Africa, Asia and the entire world see from events in the Congo that, after escaping from one prison, a country may find itself in another, oppressed by the old colonialists acting in league with the new ones." [Ibid., paras. 5 and 6.] 15. The Soviet Government warned that the United States and its NATO allies would stop at nothing to achieve their goal-the overthrow of the national Government of the Republic of the Congo which from the very first days of its f'.xistence was an object of hatred on the part of the colonial Powers, and first and foremost among them, the United States. The reason for this hatred is that the Government of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues set out to strengthen the national independence of their country and to restrict the power of the foreign monopolies which had previously been the undisputed masters of the Congo and which are still endeavouring not to let so dainty a morsel escape from their predatory jaws. 16. Incontrovertible evidence is now available that the United States and its NATO allies were the rea! organizers of the whole Congolese tragedy. Even now, the principal organizing centre of all the subversive activities against the Republic of the Congo is the United States Embassy at Leopoldville, which finances these activities and directs them in the interests of the colonialists. The United States Ambassador is constantly on the move from one place in the Congo to another, including Katanga. 17. L'1 fact, the United States is pushing aside its partner, Belgium, which in the eyes of the colonialists, has shown itself incapable of safeguarding their interests fully in the Congo, and of directing the struggle against the national forces of the Congolese people. Furthermore, the Belgian colonialists are now largely discredited in the eyes of the Congolese people. "L'exemple du Congo montre aux peuples d'Afrique, d'Asie et du monde entier que, s'etant evade d'une prison, on risque fort de tomber dans une autre, de retourner. sous le joug des anciens colonialistes agissant de concert avec les nouveaux colonialistes." [Ibid., par. 5 et 6.] 15. Le Gouvernement sovietique avait fait prevoir que les Etats-Unis et leurs allies de l'OTAN ne s'arreteraient devant rien pour atteindre leurs objectifs, c'esta-dire le renversement du gouvernement national de la Republique da Congo, objet, des sa naissance, de la haine des puissances coloniales et, avant tout, des Etats-Unis eux-memes. Cette haine vient du fait que le gouvernement de M. Lumumba et de ses compagnons de lutte a mis le cap vers l'independance de son pays, la restriction des monopoles etrangers qui jusqu'alors avaient sans reserve regne en maitres au Cong@ et qui maintenant se refusent cl laisser un morceau aussi friand que le Congo echapper 11 leurs pattes avides. 16. A l'heure actuelle, it existe des preuves irre£utables que les Etats-Unis et leurs allies de l'OTAN sont les veritables organisateurs de toute la tragedie du Congo. Aujourd'hui, le centre organisateur principal de toutes les activites subversives dirigees contre 'a Republique du Congo est l'ambassade des Etats-Unis 11 Leopoldville qui finance ces activites et les dirige dans l'int~ret des colonisateurs. L'ambassadeur de!'> Etats- Unis circule continuellement entre differentes villes du Congo, y compris le Katanga. 17. En fait, les Etats-Unis ecartent leur partenairela Belgique - qui, aux yeux des colonisateurs, s'est montree incapable d'assurer pleinement leurs interets au Congo et de prendre en main la direction de la lutte contre les forces nationales du peuple congolais. De plus, les colonisateurs beIges se sont deja largement discredites aux yeux du peuple congolais. 19. The illegality of the present anti-democratic military regime in the Congo is so manifest that it has been officially acknowledged in the second report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative [S/ 4557] and indirectly confirmed by the Secretary- General in the report he made to the Council yesterday. Nevertheless, despite, and I would say, in disregard of this fact, the command of the "United Nations forces" in the Congo in essence entered into an alliance with the leaders of the military dictatorship in that country and has now actually surrendered to them the Head of the legal Congolese Government. 20. Naturally, the present terrorist regime in the Congo enjoys the unlimited support of the United States and its allies. It is they who organized the shameful comedy which was staged in connexion with the representation of the Republic of the Congo in the United Nations. It is they who imposed on the General Assembly the decision approving Mr. Kasa-Vubu's unilateral delegation, thus giving direct support to the man, thanks to whom a military dictatorship has been established in the Republic of the Congo and all the cQuntry's laws have been trampled underfoot. It should also be noted that the United States and Belgium did everything they could to prevent the proposed journey to the Congo of the Conciliation Commission of African-Asian countries, the purpose of which was to help to bring about a peaceful solution of the Congolese problem. 21. During the discussion of the question of the representation of the Republic of the Congo in the United Nations, a "',umber of delegations gave the warning that any decision by the General Assembly which was directed against the interests of the Congolese people was bound to have an adverse effect on the situation there and would only assist those who were obeying the.orders of the colonial Powers and hindering a peaceful solution of the Congolese problem. Now everyone can see that these warnings were justified: the situation in the Congo has sharply deteriorated, the chances of a peaceful solution have been greatly reduced, and this is the direct result of the actions of leaders whose representatives have no right to· speak on behalf of the Republic of the Congo and of its people. 22. A fact which deserves special emphasis is that, having sensed that such actions will not only go unpunished but are even being encouraged, Mr. Kasa- Vubu and his immediate assistants are increasingly determined to exacerbate relations with African countries which were and continue to be sincerely anxious to help the Congolese people in its struggle against the colonialists. 24. The crux of the matter, howevE'1", is that, in trying to provoke a conflict between the Republic of the Congo and the African sister States, the Mobutu bands are steadily extending the scope of the conflict which has arisen in the Congo, involving a growing number of African States, and thus increasing the present serious threat to peace in Africa and consequently to world peace. 25. Such a state of affairs can only play into the hands of the colonialists, for it is their main hope. An increase in international tension makes it easier for them to pursue their aggressive policy, their policy of the arms race, their policy of setting up bases in foreign territory and concluding military alliances. These are all links in the same chain-the long chain of the crimes they commit in pursuit of their imperialistic aims. 26. Finally,. the latest events in the Republic of the Congo and, above all, the attempt to take physical reprisals against the leaders of the Congolese people have fully borne out the correctness of the position taken by the Soviet Union as regards the activities of the Secretary-General and his staff in the Congo. In essence, these activities have consisted in encouraging Mobutu's bands, and those who are backing them, to carry out acts designed to destroy the political independence and territorial integrity of the young republic. It goes without saying that if the Secretary- General were guided in his activities by the well-known resolutions of the Security Council and of the fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, an end would have been put long ago to criminal aggression against the Congolese people, such irresponsible agents provocatettrs as Mobutu and Tshombe would long ago have been taken out of circulation, and all the conditions necessary for normal development would have been created in the Congo. That is precisely what was and still is expected of the Secretary-General by all peace-loving peoples, and, first and foremost, by those African States which are truly concerned with eliminating in the heart of Africa a focus of dangerous tensions which has resulted from the efforts of the colonialists. 27. However, the Secretary-General did not deem it necessary. to lend an ear to the just demands of the peace-loving countries of Africa and Asia and to the voice of those who called for rapid and energetic measures in implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Under the mask of non-interference, the Secretary-General and his representatives in the Congo in fact directly interfered in that country's internal affairs, but sided with those elements which are intriguing in the Congo and planning to revive the colonial regime, although it is now definitely a thing of the past. When they should have given effective aid in order to enable the legitimate GOvernment of the Republic to discharge its functions throughout the entire territory of the country, the 6 28. The Soviet delegation has had occasion several times to produce evidence concerning the true part played by the Secretary-General and his representatives in the Congo and by the command of the "United Nations forces" acting in that country under their orders. 29. However, the publication of the report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo [Sj4571], containing letters from the Secretary- General to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and the statement made by Mr. Hammarskjold at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council impel us to make a few additional comments. 30. First of all, we are struck by the fact that, in the official report of the Secretary-General's Special Represmtative, Mr. Lumumba is not once referred to as the Prime Minister of that country. Yet we know that the Parliament not only did not relieve him of that office, but on the contrary several times confirmed him in it. By omitting the title of Prime Minister for Mr. Lumumba the Secretary-General and his representatives in the Congo are apparently seeking to make the arbitrary arrest of the head of the legitimate Congolese Government seem less brazen and scandalous t!-l~n it was. But who will be deceived by such naive devices? 31. As one reads the detailed account of the criminal attack on Mr. Patrice Lumumba, one cannot avoid the impression that the command of the "United Nations forces" in fact facilitated the attack. It refused Mr. Lumumba's request for transportation and protection at a time when the circumstances of his personal life were such that even political enemies should have taken them into account. 32. In the Special Representative's report it is stated: "After the death of his newborn daqghter, Mr. Lumumba on two occasions, on or about November 20, asked for special United Nations air transport for himself and his family to take the remains to Stanleyville for burial. This request had necessarily to be declined as the limited- United Nations aircraft are available only for the transport and provisioning of United Nations troops and personnel." [Sj4571} para. 4.] 33. Is that not a shameful thing for the representatives of the United Nations in the Congo to have done? The Prime Minister of the legitimate Government, who officially asks the United Nations for help, cannot obtain an aircraft for the transportation of his family after his daughter's death on the pretext that 7 29. Cependant, la publication du rapport du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo [Sj4571], avec les lettres du Secretaire general a M. Kasa-Vubu qui y sont jointes, de meme que la declaration faite hier par M. Hammarskjold devant -le Conseil de securite, nous oblige a exprimer un certain nombre d'observations complementaires sur cette question. 30. Et tout d'abord, on ne saurait passer sous silence le fait que, dans le rapport officiel du representant special du Secretaire general, M. Lumumba ne porte jamais son titre veritable de Premier Ministre du Gouvernement congolais. Or, on sait que le Parlement non seulement n'a pas destitue M. Lumumba, mais qu'en fait, il a confirme a plusieurs reprises ses pleins pouvoirs en tant que premier ministre. Le Secretaire general et ses representants au Congo en omettant pour M. Lumumba le titre de premier ministre veulent evidemment attenuer l'impression produite par l'arrestation arbitraire du chef legitime du gouvernement congolais, en rendre, pour ainsi dire, moinscriant le caractere ehonte. Pourtant, qui ce naif subterfuge peut-il tromper? 31. En lisant la description detaillee des circonstances dans lesquelles fut execuh~e l'attaque des bandits contre M. Patrice Lumumba, on ne peut echapper a 1'impression que le commandement des "forces de l'ONU" a, en fait,rendu possible cette attaque. Il a refuse a M. Lumumba les moyens de transport et de protection dans des circonstances de sa vie privee qui, semble-t-il, auraient du etre prises en consideration, meme s'il s'agissait d'un ennemi politique. 32. Dans le rapport du representant special du Secretairegeneral, on peut lire ce qui suit: "Apres le deces de sa fille, qui venait de naitre, M. Lumumba, a deu:x: reprises, le 20novembre ou aux environs de cette date, a demande que les Nations Unies mettent un avion a sa disposition et a celle de sa famille pour emmener le corps de la petite fiUe a Stanleyville, Oll elle serait enterree. Necessairement, cette demande s'est heurtee a une fin de non-recevoir, etant donne que les avions en nombre limite dont disposent les Nations Unies ne peuvent servir qu'au transport et a l'approvisionnement des troupes et du personnel des Nations Unies." [Sj4571, par. 4.] 33. N'est-ee pas la un tableau a la honte des representants des Nations Unies au Congo? Le premier ministre d'un gouvernement legitime s'adressant aux Nations Unies pour leur demander une aide pour son gouvernement ne peut obtenir l'avion qui pourrait transporter sa familIe, a la suite de la mort de sa fille, sous 3S. Mobutu's bands made use of this very situation to lure Mr. Lumumba into a trap and to do him violence, and they did so with the tacit approval of the command of the "United Nations forces", to say the least. 36. In the letter appended to the report of his Special Representative in the Congo [5/4571, amJe.t· Il], the Secretary-General raises the question of having representatives of the International Red Cross examine Mr. Lumumba's conditions of detention and of applying due process of law in organizing Mr. Lumumba's trial. 37. I am at a loss for words to describe this step by Mr. Hammarskjold as it deserves. It is surely clear to all that anyone speaking of due process of law in the Congo should first of all-unless he is a pious hypocrite-call for the elimination of the bands of hired assassins acting in the territory of the Congo under Mobutu's leadership:'they are the ones who should be judged in the interests of peace and made to feel the full weight of the law. Instead, the Secretary-General, readily reconciling himself to the illegal actions of these brigands, asks them to maintain' some semblance of decency in dispatching their dirty business. 38. In view of the present situation in the Congo, how can there beany talk of trying the Prime Minister of the legitimate Government, and who could possibly be the judges? The Secretary-General and his representatives in the Congo would like to wash their hands of this shameful af(air; but they cannot evade responsibility for the unlawful arrest of Prime Minister Lumumba and other leaders of the Republic of the Congo. 39. The report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo actually contains documentary proof of the "United Nations command's" responsibility as regards the violent attack on Mr. Lumumba. This report states outright: "As Mr. Lumumba had left on his own responsibility, orders were issued to United Nations troops to refrain from any interference in regard to Mr. Lumumba's movements or those of his official pursuers." [Ibid., para. 6] Who were his pursuers? Mobutu's brigands again. Does the Secretary-General regard Mobutu's bands as the "official pursuers" of the Prime Minister of the lawful Government? 40. It must be clear to everyone that at a time when Mobutu's brigands were endeavouring to locate Prime Minister Lumumba in order to seize and arrest him, when all the units of Mobutu's so-called army were ordered to begin a new series of arrests of Kasa-Vubu's and Mobutu's outstanding political opponents, such a 38. Dans les circonstances actuelles au Congo, peuton parler d'un jugement sur la personne du premier ministre d'un gouvernement legitime, et qui pourraient etre les juges en l'occurrence? Le Secretaire general et ses representants au Congo cherchent a se laver les mains de cette honteuse affaire. Cependant, its ne sauraient se decharger de la responsabilite encourue par eux dans l'arrestation illegale du premier ministre Lumumba et des autres dirigeants du peuple congolais. 39. Le rapport du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo contient, en substance, des preuves documentaires de la culpabilite du commandement des "forces de l'OND" dans les actes arbitraires infliges a M. Lumumba. Dans ce rapport, il est fait remarquer sans equivoque que, "M. Lumumba etant parti sous sa propre responsabilite, les troupes des Nations Unies avaient rec;u l'ordre de s'abstenir de toute intervention concernant les mouvements de M. Lummnba ou ceux des autorites qui le poursuivaient". [Ibid., [i'J,r.6.] Mais qui donc le poursuivait? Les bandes memes de Mobutu. Considerez-vous les bandes de Mobutu comme des autorites lancees a la poursuite du premier ministre d'un gouvernement legitime? 40. Etant donne que les bandes de Mobutu voulaient a tout prix connaitre le iieu de residence du premier ministre Lumumba afin de se saisir de sa personne et de l'arreter; que, dans ce but, l'ordre avait ete donne a toutes les unites de la pretendue armee de Mobutu de proceder a une nouvelle serie d'arrestations des 1 Documents officiels de l'Assemblee generale, qll-ill:Jibne session, Cinquieme Commission, 796eme seance. 41. How are we to evaluate the appeal Mr. Hammarskjold made in his statement yesterday that we should adjust ourselves to the existing circumstancesin other words, that we should accept the fact that an irresponsible clique has virtually seized power in the country, that all democratic principles are being trampled underfoot, that legally established State institutions have been dissolved and that leading members of the Parliament and the Government are under arrest and being subjected to torture? 42. To accept all this would mean to betray completely the interests of the Congolese people, and wholly to destroy the principles of the United Nations Charter, to which the Secretary-General claims to be dedicated. The one thing clear is that the Secretary-General himself plans to do nothing to remedy the situation which has arisen in the Congo. It is not fortuitous that in his statement yesterday he proposed no specific measures to that end. 43. It would appear that the colonialists have achieved their aims in the Congo at the present stage: that country no longer has a national Government, and the Belgians and their allies are again occupying it and doing as they please. It is no wonder that Mr. Hammarskjold should also wash his hands of the criminal attack on the Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Patrice Lumumba. The Secretary-General's position has become consummately clear. 44. He is apparently aware of this himself, for he has now proceeded to distort generally known facts. Thus, when he spoke yesterday in the Security Council, the Secretary-General, to our considerable surprise, gave an altogether new formulation of the purposes for which some States sent military units to the Congo. According to him, the aim of the United Nations military operation in the Congo was merely, "to protect life and property within the Congo, in danger after the breakdown of the national security system, so as to eliminate the reasons given for the Belgian military intervention"-thus, according to him, the reason for the Belgian military intervention was the br~kdown of the national security system-"and"-he continued- "thereby to reduce what internationally had to be regarded as a serious threat to peace and security." 44. Le sentant probablement.lui-meme, il va jUS$l.u'~ de£ormer ostensiblement des falts_connus de tous. Amsl, prenant la parole hier devant le Conseil de secu~te, le Secretaire general, a notre grande stupefaction, a enonce sous une forme entierement differente les objectifs en vue desquels furent envoyes .au, Cr;m~ des contingents de certains pays. Selon IUI, lobJectlf des operations militaires de l'ONp a:u C01!gO etait, co~me it l'a dit: "de protegeI' les vies humames et les b~ens au Congo, menaces apres l'effondrement du systeme national de securite de fa~on a faire disparaitre les raisons invoquees a' l'appui de l'intervention miIitaire beIge" - comme vous le voyez, la raison qui. a provoque l'intervention militaire belge reside dans 1'ecroulement du systeme national de securite; il a dit ensuite: "et a roouire par la ce qu'il fallait considerer, du p,oint de vue international, comme une grave menace a la paix et a la securite." 45. Cette definition ampoulee des objectifs qui, soidisant doivent etre assures avec l'aide de l'ONU s'eloig'ne considerablel1}e!-1~ de ce qui, en. reaIite: co:x~­ titue la teneur des deCISions du ConseI1 de secunte. Conformement a ces decisions, l'objectif principal des operations de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, a~ ConlTQ etait de fournir une aide au gouvernement legitime!:>de ce pays clans sa lutte contre l'agresseur beIge, d'assurer l'independance politique et l'intt~grite territoriale de ce pays. 46. C'est precisement de cela qu'il s',agi~sait dans. ~e telegramme contenant la demande d aSSIstance mllItaire adresse au Secretaire general le 12 juillet par les dirigeants de la Republique du Congo [5/4382] et mentionne dans la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 14 juillet [5/4387]. Ce telegramme, qui,soit dit en passant, etait signe de M. Kasa-Vubu et de 45. This flowery description of the aims which presumably were to be achieved with the aid of the United Nations is very different from what is actually to be found in the relevant resolution of the Security Council. Under these resolutions, the main purpose of the United Nations operation in the Congo was to provide military ~ss~stance to the legitimate Government of that country ~11 Its struggle against Belgian aggression and to secure Its political independence and territorial integrity. 46. That is precisely what was asked for in the telegram, containing a request for military assistance from the leading statesmen of the, Republic of the ~ongo dated 12 July [5/4382], which was mentioned In the Security Council's resolution of 14 July [5/ 4387], addressed to the Secretary-General. This telegram (incidentally, it was signed by both Kasa- 48. Now openly taking the line of justifying Bclgiun aggression, the Secretary-General alleges that it was provoked by the disturbances in the Congo. Howcver, nowadays the Belgians themselves no longer use this story they hastily invented to explain their aggressive actions in the Congo. And yet, here is Mr. Hammarskjold repeating these ancient fables. For a long time now no one has qucstiollt'd that the true cause of the Belgian aggression in the Congo was not concern for the lives and weH-being' of a few thousand Belgians, but rather the wish to enable the Belgian monopolies to retain control over the former colony and to go on exploiting its natural wealth and its rich human resources. 49. The reason for the Secretary-General's current attempt to give a distorted interpretation of the purposes of the United Nations operation in the Congo and of the causes of the entire Congo crisis, is that not one of the specific purposes of that operation has been fully achieved: Belgian aggressionagainst the Republic of the Congo continues, although in a somewhat different form than in its first stage. the political independence of the Congo has not been secured, and its territorial integrity has not been preserved. In this sense, regardless of the Secretary-General's denials, his operations in the Congo under the flag of the United Nations have in fact resulted in a complete failure. SO. Mr. Hammarskjold has made an entirely unjustifiable attempt to identify his activity and that of his staff with the activity of the United Nations as a whole. The Soviet deiegation has repeatedly declared, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that, regrettably, Mr. Hammarskjold has not been carrying out the will of the United Nations. but only of a group of countries which have considerable influence. The criticism directed against him both by the socialist countries and by many countries of Asia and Africa has been prompted by a desire to strengthen the authority of the United Nations, which has been seriously impaired by the activities of its Secretary- General and his staff. 51. Yesterday, 1'11'. Hammarskjold tried to refute this obvious fact, although he had no valid arguments at his disposal. At the same time, he did his best to shift the blame for the failure of his operations to the political leaders and the people of the Congo. He asserted that it was not he, the Secretary-General, but they-the leaders and people of the Congo--who had failed, because, as he put it, of their failure to take advantage of the unparalleled assistance offered to them by the United Nations. 52. I am compelled to note once again that Mr. Hammarskjold echoes the colonialists and acts hand in glove with them. The grave and unmerited accusation he has brought against the people and leaders of the Congo is exactly what the colonial Powers have been saying about nearly all the peoples of their colonies. Much ink prot<~ger la vie et la sl'Curite de quelques millie!" de Bclges, mais la volonte d'assurer aux monopoles beIges le controle de l'ancienne colonie, de conserver la possibilite d'exploiter les richesses natureIlcs du Congo et de tirer profit de ses immenses reserves humaines. 49. La tentative faite maintenant par le Secretaire general d'interpreter d'ltt1e maniere deformee le but de l'operation des Nations Unies au Congo ainsi que les causes de l'ensemble de la crise au Congo est liee au fait qu'auclIn des objectifs de ladite operation n'a ete enticrement attcint: l'agTCssion beIge contre la Republique du Congo se poursuit, quoique sous une forme quelque peu differente de ceIle qu'elle revctait lors de la premiere ctape, l'il1dependance politique du Congo n'est pas assuree et son integrite territoriale n'a pas ete maintenue. Dans ce sens, 'lueIles que soient les denegations du Secretaire general, son action, sous le drapeau de I'ONU au Congo, s'est veritablement soldee par un echec total. SO. M. Hammarskjold. d'nne manicre tout a fait injustifiee, essaie de faire coincider ses activites et celles de ses subordonnes avec les activites de l'Organisation des Nations Unies tout enticre. Or, la delegation sovietique a maintes fois releve, ct au Conseil de securite et it l'Assemblee generale. que M. Hammarskjold n'execute malheureusement pas la volonte de toute l'Organisation, mais seulement celle d'un groupe de pays. disposant d'une grosse influence. Les critiques dirigces contre lui, aussi bien par les pays socialistes que par de nombrcux pays d'Asie et d'Afrique, ont pour but de reiever I'autorite de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies qui se trouve serieusement ebranlee par les agissements du Secretaire general et de ses subordollnes. 51. M. Hammarskjold a essaye, hier, sans aucune raison d'ailleurs, de nier cette evidente verite. En meme temps, il a tente de rejeter sur les dirigeants politiqut:s et sur le peuple du Congo la responsabilite de I'echec de son action, affirmant que c'etaient eux et non le Secretaire general qui avaient subi un eche:: au cours de tous les evenements survenus au Congo. car ils n'ont pas su tirer profit, a-t-il declare, de l'aide importante pretee par l'OND. 52. Il faut constater cette fois encore que M. I-Iall1- marskjold parle et agit de concert avec les colonisateurs. L'accusation grave et injustitiee qu'il a portee contre le peuple et les dirigeants congolais se con~ond exactement avec ce que disent les puissances colontales de presqup. tous les peuplcs coloniaux. Que d'encre a 54. It must be emphasized again and again that the command of the "United Nations forces" and the Secretary-General personally are fully responsible for the fact that power in the Congo has been seized by a group of irresponsible persons in violation of all the laws ef the young Republic-laws the observance of which Mr. Hammarskjold claims to be so anxioL to ensure. The unrestrained rule of these armed bands has now resulted in the complete breakdown of the country's political and economic life. 55. No one will be deceived by Mr. Hammarskjold's assurances that until the une.xpected military cou.p in the Congo-unexpected,' it would seem, only by the Se~retary-General himself-matters in the Congo were be1l1g set right. This is an odd lapse of memory on the part of the Secretary-General. Even before the military regime took over 'in the Congo he was repeatedI)' warned, both in the Security Council and elsewhere, that he and the command of the "United Nations forces" were working not to improve but to worsen the situation in the Congo. They denied this. But e;xperience has shown that these warnings were both timely and well-founded. Back in August of this year the command of the "United Nations forces", with the Se~retary-General's blessing, took such provocative actIon as denying representatives of the legitimate Government access to the broadcasting stations. 53. M. Hammarskjold, cherchant a se blanchir devant l'opinion publique, nous dit qu'il n'etait pas du mandat de I'ONU, ni, par consequent, du sien, de creer le gouvernement central de la Republique du Congo et d'etablir une constitution pour ce pays. Certes, personne n'a assigne un tel objectif, ni au Secretaire general, ni au commandement des "forces armees des Nations Unies" envoyees au Congo. Par contre, une autre tache concrete leur a ete confiee: aider le gouvernement legitime et reeIlement e.xistant du Congo a garantir l'independance politique et l'integrite territoriale du pays et, avant tout, I'assister dans sa lutte contre I'agression beige. Rien de plus, rien de moins! Malheureusement, I'e.xecution de cette tache qui nous avait ete directement proposee a ete sabotee par le commandement des "forces des Nations Unies" et le Secretaire general en personne et cela par tous les moyens. Its ont ete contraints, au debut, de tenir compte quelque temps, en paroles, de I'existence clu gouvernement legitime du Congo, mais en fait ils I'ont empeche, par tous les moyens, de retablir la paix et l'ordre public. En realite, ils ont aide les Beiges et leurs allies de 1'01'AN a mener des activites subversives contre le gouvernement legitime et le Parlement qui I'avait cree, jusqu'au moment ou leur a ete possible de paralyser et de desorganiser l'activite de l'un comme de l'autre. 54. It est indispensable de souligner encore et toujams que le commandement des "forces des Nations Unies" et le Secretaire general en personne sont entierement responsables de ce que le pouvoir au Congo a ete accapare par un groupe d'individus irresponsables qui meconnaissent toutes les lois de la jeune republique, lois que M. Hammarskjold, en paroles du mains, se preoccupe de faire observer. Les activites sans frein de ces bandes armees ont eu pour effet un effondrement complet de la vie politique et economique du pays. 55. Mais personne ne se laisse prendre aux assurances de M, Hammarskjold selon lesqueIles, avant le coup d'Etat militaire au Congo, du reste inattendu - inattendu sans doute seulement pour le Secretaire generaltout allait pour le mieux dans ce pays. M. I-Iammarskjold a la memoire etrangement courte! Avant meme le coup d'Etat, il avait ete preventl, au Conseil de securite en particulier, que lui et le commandement des "forces de rONU" menaient une politique qui conduirait non ;\. I'amelioration. mais ;\. I'aggravation de la situation au Congo. A cela ils ont oppose un dementi, mais les evcnements ont montre que ces avertissements etaient tout i\ fait opportuns et entierement justifies. Encore en aO£lt dernier, le commanclement des "forces des Nations Unies", avec la benediction du Secretaire general, avait deja: entrepris des mesures de provocation, a I'egard des representants legitimes du 56. Yesterday Mr. Hammarskjold asked with feigned surprise how it happened that Mobutu had well-armed, fully equipped units at his disposal, with all their needs provided for. Indeed, how could this have happened if, according to Mr. Hammarskjold himself, the United Nations disarmed the Congolese National Army, while the country's treasury is so empty that he has repeatedly asked for immediate financial aid to the Congo? How could it have happened that before the very eyes of the command of the "United Nations forces" mysterious forces set up a whole army of hired assassins, whose actions resulted in making the Congo crisis acute in the extreme? What are these mysterious forces which were able to hoodwink both the command of the "United Nations forces" and the Secretary-General personally? We shall help the Secretary-General to reply to all these questions, seeing that he himself does not appear to have the courage to give the Council an honest account of his activities. 57. Mobutu's armed bands were organized by the colonial Powers, first and foremost among them Belgium and the United States, which supplied them with arms and all necessary equipment. This was openly reported in the United States Press where Mr. Hammarskjold can find the necessary details to help him understand the matter. They were able to do it because neither the command of the "United Nations forces" nor the Secretary-General himself made any attempt to intervene, but on the contrary, by repeatedly tripping up the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo, created a situation favourable to the diversionist tactics of the colonial Powers. They thus contributed to a situation in which Mobutu's bands have abandoned all restraint and are now attempting physically to destroy the national leaders of the Congo. 58. In these circumstances to lay the blame for the Congolese tragedy on the Congolese people and its leaders indicates a total loss of objectivity and political responsibility. The real guilt for this tragedy of the Congolese people devolves on the colonial Powers and their agents in the Congo, who were acting with the tacit approval of the Secretary-General, his representatives and the command of the "United Nations forces" in the Congo, all of whom had distorted the clear meaning of the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1%0 [Sj4387, Sj4405 and Sj 4426]. The colonial Powers and they alone precipitated the events that inflicted great SUffering on the Congolese people and made it impossible to have faith that any collective measures can be carried out effectively in the framework of the United Nations. 59. Being well aware of the true nature of the situation, for a long time the Secretary-General deliberately ignored the legitimate requests of many 60. The United States, United Kingdom and French imperialists give the Secretary-General away completely by praising him to the skies. They. are well aware of what his "impartiality", "neutrality" and "disinterestedness" are really worth. They realize full well to what e..xtent the Secretary-General's so-called neutrality and the pretended non-interference of the command of the "United Nations forces" facilitated the task of the colonialists by enabling them to pursue their subversive activities in the Congo under the United Nation!" flag. 61. In the light of the foregoing, the Soviet delegation calls upon the Security Council to take immediate action ..against th~ ~gres~QJs, against the colonialists and their hirelings, who are endeavouring to stifle the national' independence of the Republic of the Congo, an independence which the Congolese people won after decades of stubborn and valiant struggle. The Soviet delegation calls upon the Security Council to take immediate measures to prevent further catastrophic developments in the Congo and to ensure the immediate cessation of the criminal activities of the colonialists, these enemies of the Congolese people, and their helpers. 62. The Soviet delegation submitted yesterday, for the consideration of the Security Council, a draft resolution [SI4579] which in its view contains the minimum measures which must be carried out in the Congo without any delay whatsoever. This draft resolution reads as follows: "The Security Council, "Having examined the situation in the Republic of the Congo in the light of recent developments pointing to a further serious deterioration in that situation, as well as the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo of 5 December 1960 [S14571 and Add.1], "Being profoundly concerned at the fact that Mr. Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, has been unlawfully deprived of freedom and is being subjected to other acts of violence on the part of the armed bands of Mobutu, "Noting that these bands have also been guilty of flagrantly unlawful acts and acts of violence with regard to a number of parliamentary leaders and members of the Government of the' Republic of the Congo, "Considering that continuation of the unlawful activities of the armed bands of Mobutu is leading to increased tension in the country and is impeding "Le Conseil de sccurite, "A:yant exl1tlnine la situation dans la Republique du Congo eu egard aux derniers evenements, d'ou il ressort que cette situation continue de s'aggraver serieusement, ainsi que le rapport du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo, en date du 5 decembre 1960 [S/4571 et Add.1], "Profondement inquiet de constater que M. Patrice Lumumba, premier ministre de la Republique du Congo, est illegalement prive de sa liberte et est soumis a d'autres sevices de la part des' bandes armees de Mobutu, . "Notant que ces bandes se sont aussi rendues coupables d'actes grossierement arbitraires et de violences contre plusieurs personnalites du Parlement et plusieurs membres du Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo, "Considerant que la continuation des actes illegaux des bandes armees de Mobutu provoque un accroissement de la tension dans le pays et fait obstacle au "Calls ·upon the Government of Belgium, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations Security Council and the special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, immediately to withdraw Belgian military, paramilitary and civil perso!1nel from th~ Congo." 63. The Soviet delegation helieves that the adoption of this draft resolution would make it possible, even in the present serious situation when the Congo crisis has reached an acute stage, to alter the course of events in that country in such a way as to reach a peaceful solution of the whole problem. The implementation of the measures mentioned in the draft resolution would, first of all, bring to an end the aggression against the Congolese people; it would help to restore the rule of law in the country, and to prevent any reprisals being taken against prominent fighters for Congolese independence headed by Patrice Lumumba; and it would ensure that the Parliament and the lawful Government of the Republic of the Congo would resume their functions. The implemf:~ntation of the Soviet Government's proposals would help to remove a blot from the fair name of the United Nations, which, because of the subversive activities of the United States, Belgium and their allies, has so far been unable to deal a crushing blow to the intrigues of the colonialists in the Congo. 64. While reserving the right to comment separately on the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States [Sj4578] , the Soviet delegation would like to state unequivocally at this point that it is clearly the purpose of that draft resolution to prevent the Security Council from considering urgent and effective measures designed to bring about a radical improvement in the present situation in the Republic of the Congo, a situation which is a serious threat to the cause of peace. 65. Instead of such a radical solution of these burning questions, the sponsors of the aforementioned resolution in effect want the Security Council to sanction the crimes against peace and democracy committed by Mobutu and to cover them up by hypocritical pious wishes concerning the observance of human rights and the intervention of the Red Cross. That is certainly not 63. La delegation sovietique estime que l'adoption de ce projet de resolution permettrait, meme dans les penibles circonstances actuelles, alors que la crise au Congo a pris une forme tellement aigue, d'y renverser le cours des evenements dans le sens d'une solution pacifique de l'ensemble du probleme. La mise en ceuvre des mesures figurant dans ledit projet mettrait un terme avant tout a1'agression perpetree contre le peuple congolais, aiderait a retablir une legalite elementaire dans le pays, mettrait fin a la repression qui s'exerce contre ceux qui, diriges par Patrice Lumumba, luttent pour l'independance du peuple :~ongolais et garantirait le retablissement de l'activite du Parlement et du Gouvernement legitime du Congo. La realisation des propositions presentees par le Gouvernement sovietique aiderait a effacer la tache honteuse qui ternit le nom de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies, laquelle, du fait des activites subversives des Etats-Unis, de la Belgique et de leurs allies, n'a pas ete a meme, jusqu'a ce jour, de s'opposer resolument aux tentatives des colonisateurs au Congo. 64. Se reservant le droit de presenter separement ses observations sur le projet de resolution elabore par l'Argentine, les Etats-Unis, 1'Italie et le Royaume-Uni [S/4578], la delegation sovietique voudrait des maintenant declarer de maniere parfaitement explicite que ledit projet a pour but evident d'empecher le Conseil de securite d'examiner les mesures concretes et urgentes qui amelioreraient radicalement la situation actuelle an Congo, situation qui presente un immense danger pour la paix du monde. 65. A la place de cette solution radicale que les evenements imposent, les auteurs de ce projet de resolution cherchent, en fait, a obtenir que le Conseil de securite approuve les crimes de Mobutu en camouflant ces crimes contre la paix et la democratie au moyen de souhaits hypocrites sur le respect des droits de l'homme et 1'intervention de la Croix-Rouge. Ce n'est

This meeting of the Security Council was caned to consider the latest events in the Congo, of which the Secretary-General has informed us in document S/4571 and Add.l. 68. I shall now expound the Argentine delegation's views on the question under discussion. In doing so, I am firmly resolved to spare no effort to keep the debate on the high and dignified level suitable to this august body. 69. The particular problem before us today concerns the acts of violence which took place in the Congo during the last few days. The details are so widely known that it is not necessary for me to repeat them. 70. Before taking up the matter, may I briefly recapitulate the legal position. 71. The resolution of the General Assembly of 22 November 1960 [1498 (XV)] had the effect of seating in the Assembly the delegation appointed and led by Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the President of the Republic of the Congo. This clearly implied that it recognized the Government appointed by the head of the state, which is now effectively in power, as the only Government of the Congo. This explicit recognition means that the United Nations cannot accept the credentials of any person or group of persons other than those appointed by the President, as members or representatives of the Congolese Government. 72. Mr. Patrice Lumumba, who held the post of Prime Minister when independence was declared, is not now a member of the Government led by Mr. Kasa- Vubu. The United Nations cannot, therefore, regard him as holding executive authority, nor can we refer to him by his previous title, which he no longer possesses, in the text of our resolution. Certainly Mr. Lumumba is still a deputy, since the Parliament has not been dissolved. But, as far as the United Nations is concerned, he is not the head of the government. 73. I wanted to make this clear, in order to place the events in which Mr. Patrice Lumumba has been one of the protagonists in their true perspective. While Mr. Lumumba is not head of the government, and has no right to that title, he is still entitled to respect and consideration as a man who has until recently held high political office in his country. Civilized usage requires that anyone who has held such office should be treated with particular respect, whatever judgement may be passed on how he discharged that office. Above all, however, Mr. Lumumba is a citizen and a human being, which is a higher position than any public office, and he has a right to be treated as such; in other words, he cannot be denied his fundamental human rights. 75. Unfortunately the ill-treatment which, according ..·····-to-the reports we have received, the head of the Congolese Government has suffered, is not the first or the only outrage against persons in the Congo that we have had to deplore. For several months, ever since 30 June 1960, we in this Council have heard terrifying accounts of acts of physical and moral violence against hundreds of European and Congolese civilians which began a few days after the proclamation of independence. Later we learned, through the Secretary-General's reports of tribal massacres in the province of Kasai. And now, at the same time as the news about Mr. Lumumba, we have received reliable news of the present danger to many Congolese and European citizens in the capital of Oriental province. We strongly condemn the crimes against Congolese public figures and European civilians which have been committed at Stanleyville, and we are deeply concerned about the danger which these people still face. 76. In giving this painful account, I cannot pass over in silence the death of soldiers of the United Nations Force who fell in the fulfilment of their duty. In particular, I wish to pay a heart-felt tribute to the Irish soldiers who were murdered in a treacherous ambush and to the Tunisian soldiers who were killed in the clashes before the Embassy of Ghana. 77. All these incidents, taken together, make up a picture of violence in the light of which, as the Secretary-General rightly said yesterday, we must judge the events we are now considering. Nothing could be further from my mind than to minimize their gravity with the excuse or on the ground that such criminal acts are now only too frequent in the Congo. On the contrary, I think that, precisely because these abuses are so wide-spread, it is particularly necessary to express the censure which they deserve and to take any steps within our power to prevent their repetition. 16 80. For this purpose, the delegations of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Argentina have submitted the draft resolution [S/4578], which I have the honour to lay before the Council. 81. It will readily be seen that the four-Power draft resolution is strictly limited to those aspects of the present situation in the Congo which concern human rights. It expresses our deep concern at the conditions which have led to acts of violence against persons of any nationality. It declares that any violation of human rights in the Congo is inconsistent with the purposes that have guided the United Nations in that country, and that it expects that no measures contrary to recognized rules of law and order will be taken by anyone against any persons held prisoner or under arrest. It expresses the hope that the International Committee of the Red Cross will be allowed to examine detained persons throughout the Congo. Finally, it requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to secure the restoration of law and order throughout the t~rritory of the Congo and to ensure respect for the human dignity of all persons within the country. 82. The four-Power draft resolution recalls the obligation assumed by the United Nations to assist in the restoration of law and order in the Congo, including the safeguarding of civil and human rights for all the inhabitants of the country. Previous -resolutions of the Council, in fact, expressly called for such co-operation and for the restoration of law and order. Yet although we believe that there ;::an be no true rule of law if 'Wimt't--.;~p,~.nk....<!.!l.d,..\..:hats:.X~.L~pinions they may partisane et s'applique a tous les habitants du Congo, hold. '. - - - ....que1s -q:u~ soient leurs tendances ou leur rang social. 84. Our draft resolution set3 forth positions of prin- 84. Notr~projet ·p'reoi:i"ilii-sulet"de"lisauvega:r'dtN;l.e§. ciple with regard to the safeguarding of human rights droits de l'homme des positions de principe qu'il semble...· which hardly need to be defended or explained. We inutile de defendre ou d'expliquer ici. En tant que and the other sponsors felt, however, that merely to coauteurs de ce texte, nous avons cependant estime que reaffirm general principles would turn our initiative nous ne pouvions nous borner a reaffirmer desprincipes into something lyrical and ineffective. On the contrary, generaux qui donneraient a ce projet un caractere we considered it essential to relate this general statelyrique et inefficace. Nous avons juge au contraire, ment of principles to the specific cases with which we indispensable de lier cette declaration generale de prinare concerned so that our efforts might be fruitful and cipes aux cas concrets qui nous interessent, afin que really influence the course of events. nos preoccupations aient un effet pratique en rapport direct avec les evenements. actuels. 85. For that reason we ::equest the Secretary-General 85. C'est pourquoi nous prions le Secretaire general to continue his efforts to ensure respect for the human de poursuivre ses efforts pour garantir a tous les habidignity of all persons within the country. My delegatants du pays le respect de la dignite de la personne tion's understanding-and it trusts that this interhumaine. Ma delegation considere - et elle espere que pretation is shared by the other sponsors-is that this les coauteurs l'entendent ainsi - que cette disposition provision formulates specific recommendations to the adresse au Secretaire general dans le cadre general Secretary-General to ensure respect for human dignity des pouvoirs conferes par des resolutions anterieures within the general framework of the powers already du Conseil des recommandations particulieres destinees granted to him by previous Council resolutions. Our a assurer le respect des personnes. C'est pourquoi notre draft resolution is therefore an affirmation of principles resolution constitue une affirmation de principes que les which, is indispensable in the circumstances, but it is circonstances ont rendue indispensable; mais elle comalso a practical measure aimed at immediately corporte egalement des mesures pratiques tendant a remerecting the abuses which have been committed and any dier immediatement aux abus deja commis et a ceux abuses that might be committed in the future. To sum qui pourraient l'etre a l'avenir. Dans l'ensemble, cette up, it reflected the position which should be taken with resolution indique l'attitude a adopter en presence des regard to the facts which have been condemned when faits reprehensibles que nous connaissons, quand on les these are evaluated dispassionately and disinterestedly. considere sans passion ou preoccupation d'interet. C'est . 'That is all I have to say about the four-Power draft tout ce que j'avais a dire au sujet du texte de notre resolution. projet de resolution. 86. The Soviet Union has also submitted for our 86. L'Union sovietiqtie a, de son cote, soumis a l'exaconsideration a document which, although-as was men du Conseil un document qui, ainsi qu'il ressort clear from the debate concerning the agenda [873rd c1airement du debat sur l'ordre du jour [873eme meeting]-is not the one on which our present disseance], n'est pas celui qui sert de base a notre discussion is based, is nevertheless included in item 2 of cussion, bien qu'il figure au point 2 de cet ordre du this meeting's agenda. On behalf of my delegation jour. Au nom de ma delegation, je desire commenter I wish to comment on both these documents. ces deux textes. 87. V\Tith regard to the first, we wish to express our 87. En ce qui concerne le premier, nous tenons a distate, if not our surprise, at the really extraordinary marquer notre mecontentement - sinon notre surlanguage used in the Soviet statement. We have, unprise - du langage vraiment insolite adopte dans la fortunately, become accustomed to the increasing declaration sovietique. Nous sommes malheureusement violence of the language used in the cold war, particuhabitues, surtout depuis le debut de la quinzieme session lady since the beginning of the fifteenth session of the de l'Assemblee generale, aces outrances verbales qui General Assembly. We have seen many of the rules of font partie de la guerre froide. Nous avons pu cons- 88. We must, on the other hand, give somewhat more attention to the Soviet draft resolution because of the significance of the measures it proposes. As I do not wish to take up too much of the Council's time, I shall merely mention those points of the draft which, in our view, would have the most serious repercussions on the United Nations operation in the Congo and-if we may say so--on international peace. 89. In the first place, the draft resolution calls upon the United Nations to secure the immediate release of Mr. Patrice Lumumba and a group of his supporters and at the same time to take all the necessary steps to ensure the resumption of the activities of the so-called "lawful Government" of the Republic of the Congo. 90. This proposal is, of course, in flagrant contradiction of the resolution adopted by the Council on 9 August on the initiative of the delegations of Ceylon and Tunisia, in which the Council reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo w:ould not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. Consequently, if the Soviet draft resolution were to be approved, it would signify a fundamental change in the policy hitherto followed by the United Nations. But even if the resolution of 9 August had not been adopted, the Soviet proposal would be inadmissible because it would be an act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. It would be a real par .'.r!,:,x for the United Nations, whose Members have boE;'"ld fhemselves by the Charter to respect the political independence of all States, to embark on such an operation. The crude intervention represented by the deposing of a Government actually in power-and that is what is here being proposed-and the installing of another which is not in effective control would, if it were carried out by one State to the detriment of another, impose upon the United Nations ~ the obligation to take action as prescribed by the Charter. To whom, then, would it be possible to turn if the act of intervention was committed by the United Nations itself. 91. In the second place, the Soviet draft resolution proposes that the United Nations Forces should proceed to disarm the Congolese National Army which, in the language of the document, is referred to as "the terrorist bands of Mobutu". 92. \Vhile the first proposal must be stigmatized as interventionism, the second must be condemned as aggression, for it contains an additional element the gravity of which does not need to be stressed, namely, 93. Thirdly, the Soviet draft resolution proposes that the interference by Belgium and "other colonial Powers" in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo should be resolutely condemned. 94. With regard to the position of Belgium in the Congo affair, we feel that our delegation has been sufficiently explicit in stating its views. We had no hesitation in voting for the draft resolution requesting Belgium to withdraw all its military forces. from the territory of the Congo, and when there was occasion for doing so, we were unhesitatingly frank in criticizing certain aspects of Belgium's actions. Nevertheless, in the present circumstances we do not feel that Belgium's action after the withdrawal of its troops demands the "resolute condemnation" proposed by the Soviet Union. 95. Even on the basis of Mr. Dayal's report, some of the conclusions of which we do not endorse, we do not feel that the objective facts related in it are such as to make a prima facie case involving the responsibility of the Belgian Government. \Ve are not even convinced that these facts are in themselves incompatible with independence and peace in the Congo. Therefore, in our view, the proposed condemnation is out of order and promoted by considerations which have nothing in common with the facts as set out in the documents before us. 96. As for calling upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw Belgian military, para-military and civil personnel, we should have no objection, if the need should arise, to stating once again that we are opposed to the presence of such personnel. \Ve do not, however, feel that there is convincing evidence of their presence to a degree or extent that would constitute an act of aggression or undl:1e interference. Of course, it goes without saying that if such illegal acts did occur or were to be proved, we should not hesitate to reaffirm our strong support for any measure to eliminate them. 97- \Vith regard to the evacuation of Belgian civilian personnel-by which we understand Belgian officials employed by the Congolese Government-we consider this to be a measure not based on the previous decisions of the Council and not in accordance with the sovereignty of the Congo, which has recruited these civilians. Of course, as we said in the Assembly,2 not everything that is legally permissible is politically advisable, and in the present instance what in a general way seems to be advisable is for technical assistance to be channelled to the Congo as far as possible through the United Nations. 98. In connexion with the present debate, a general question has been raised which goes much further than 2 Ibid.• Plenary Meetings, 913th meeting. 2 Ibid., Seattces plenieres. 913eme seance. 101. The Secretary-General said that mistakes had been made in the United Nations operation. Vie share the view which prompted this frank admission, and we too believe that some of the agents of the United Nations have made mistakes of various kinds. How could it be otherwise? It is one thing, however, to recognize this undoubted fact and quite another to reject the whole operation in the Congo. Above aU, it is quite another thing to throw doubt on the impartiality and good faith with which the Secretary-General and his staff have acted in carrying out this difficult task, a task which, as we should remind ourselves from time to time, they did not assume of their own volition or on their own initiative, but because we entrusted them with it. 102. For this reason I wish, while in the process of defining our positions, to reaffirm, on the express instructions of my Government, our confidence in the Secretary-General and our conviction that the presence of the United Nations in the Congo is today the main guarantee that a minimum of order will be maintained in that part of the world and that it will not become the first spark of a conflagration which, once started, could not be put out. 103. The Secretary-General said yesterday that this Organization in all its frailty represents the sole approach which may reduce the risk of the constant frictions of today. 99. Nous avons longuement traite de ce probleme au sein de l'Assemblee et nous n'avons pas l'intention de rappeler ici les arguments que nous avions deja eu l'occasion de presenter. En nn mot, nous avonssoutenu et nous soutenons que les conditions a exiger d'un gouvernement pour que ses lettres de creance soient reputees valables sont les suivantes: premierement, exercice effectif du pouvoir; deuxiemement, volonte de respecter les engagements internationaux, en l'occurrence, les obligations imposees par la Charte. Tout examen de la legitimite d'un gouvernement du point de vue du droit interne de ce pays nous parait constituer un acte d'ingerence; faire d'un te1 examen une pratique courante transformerait l'Organisation en une entite purement fictive. En poussant la these jusqu'au bout, ce "legitimisme" cher a la Sainte-Alliance ferait de l'Organisation un ensemble de fantomes, une sorte de musee Grevin ou de musee de Madame Tussaud. Il y a en fait bien peu de pays qui, a un certain moment de leur histoire, n'aient pas connu de faille dans leur legalite constitutionneUe; permettre, en consequence, que des puissances etrangeres ou l'Organisation internationale s'erigent en juges de cette legalite equivaudrait a detruire les fondements memes de l'ordre international. 100. Nous ne saurions cacher que le discours prononce, au cours de la derniere seance, par le Secretaire general nous a vivement impressionnes. Nous pensons que toute personne de bonne foi, queUe que puisse etre sa desapprobation de l'c:euvre accomplie par l'ONU au Congo, n'a pu manquer d'etre emue par l'accent de si~lc~rite et la noblesse des paroles du Secretaire general. 101. Ce dernier nOllS a nit que des erreurs ont ete commises lors de l'operation des Nations Unies au Congo. Partant du meme critere qui a inspire cet aveu loyal, nous pensons, nous aussi, que certains agents de l'ONU - comment pourrait-il en etre autrement? - se sont trompes, plus ou moins lourdement. Mais c'est une chose que de reconnaitre ce fait incontestable et c'en est une autre que de condamner en bloc l'operation du Congo; c'est surtout une toute autre chose que de faire planer des doutes sur l'impartialite et la bonne foi du Secretaire general et de ses collaborateurs qui ont entrepris une tache difficile assumee non par plaisir ou spontanement mais bien - il est bon de le rappeler de temps a autre - parce que nous la leur avons confiee. 102. C'est pourquoi, ail moment ou il convient de definir sa position, et avec l'autorisation expresse de mon gouvernement, je renouveUe, en son nom, notre confiance dans le Secretaire general en reaffirmant notre conviction que la presence de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo constitue, a l'heure actuelle, la garantie essentielle du maintien d'l1n minimum d'ordre dans cette region du monde et permet d'eviter que ce pays ne devienne un foyer d'incendie qu'il serait par la suite impossible d'eteindre. 103. Le Secretaire general a declare hier que cette organisation, si frele qu'elle soit, represente la seule voie qui puisse nous offrir une chance de reduire le risque que comportent les frictions constantes du mqnde d'aujourd'hui. It was so decided. The meeting rose at 7 p:m. Printed in Canada Price: $U.S. 0.35; 2/6 stg.; Sw. fr. 1.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) 8576-April 1961-1,725