S/PV.915 Security Council

I assume, Mr. President, that your remarks refer to me, since it was I who arrived late. I should like to explain to you, and through you to the Council, that an unfortunate mistake occurred; I asked my alternate to be here in my place promptly at 8.30, and some serious misadventure must have prevented him from coming here. In any event, I assume full responsibility for the matter and I would like to offer my apologies to you, and through you to the whole Council; I hope that they will be accepted in view of the explanation which I have given.

I am sure that the members of the Security Council will duly note the statement made by the Argentine representative. Adoption of the agenda Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adopte. Note by the Secretary-General (S/4571 and Add.l) ; Statement dated 6 December 1960 by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist RepnbIics concerning the situation in the Congo (S/4573).

In accordance with the decisions taken earlier by the Security Council, I invite the representatives of Mali, Guinea, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Indonesia, Cameroun, Yugoslavia, India and the United Arab Republic to take seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President Mr. Mamadou Aw (Mali), Mr. Achkar Marof (Guinea), Mr. Mano Cardoso (Congo, Leopoldville), Mr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (ltJdonesia), Mr. Joseph OWOtfO (Cameroun), Mr. Milo PavileviC (Yugoslavia), Mr. Krishna Menon (India) mid Mr. Rafik Asha (United Arab Repttblic), took places at the Secu.rity Council table. S. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm Russian): The Council \vill now hear the interpretation of the statement made by the Argentine representative at the preceding meeting. 6. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As I have just stated, I feel responsible before the Council for this delay, which I hope win be forgiven in view of the situation which gave rise to it. In these circumstances, if the President and members of the Council have no objection, I should personally be quite willing for the consecutive interpretation of my speech to be dispensed with, if that will speed the Council's work. 7. The PRESIDENT (translated from Rttssian): In view of the Argentine representative's remarks, I shall ask the members of the Security Council whether, by way of exception and in order to save time, they agree to change the usual procedure and to waive the consecutive interpretation of the Argentine representative's statement, since that was his own suggestion?

I regret that for once I am unable to agree with the representative of Argentina, who, as we all know, is well versed in the rules of procedure. I would request that, even by way of exception, we do not do violence to the rules of procedure of the Security Council with regard to consecutive interpretation. 9. The PRESIDENT (translated fro'm Russian): Since there is objection, we shall follow our normal procedure and hear the consecutive interpretation of the Argentine representative's speech. The interpretation into English and French of the statement made by Mr. Amadeo (Argentina) at the 914th meeting was given. 10. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): With the consent of the members of the Council I shall call on the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville). 11. Mr. CARDOSO (Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): I thank the President for having given me the opportunity to speak 2 Note du Secretaire general (S/4571 et Add.l); Declaration du Gouvernemen! de l'Union des Republiques 80cialistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, concernant la situation au Congo (S/4573) 4. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Conformement aux decisions deja. prises par le Conseil de securite, j'invite les representants du Mali, de la Guinee, de la Republique du Congo (Leopoldville), de l'Indonesie, du Cameroun, de la Yougoslavie, de l'Inde et de la Republique arabe ume a. prendre place a. la table du Conseil. Sur l'itwita#on du President, M. Mamadou Aw (Mali), M. Achkar Marof (Guinee), M. Mario Cardoso (Congo [Leopoldville]), M. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (lndonesie), M. Joseph Owono (Cameroun), lVI. Miso Pavicevic (Yougoslavie), M. Krishna Menon (lnde) et M. Rafik Asha (Republique arabe unie) prennent place ala. table du Conseil. S. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): I1 va maintenant etre donne lecture de l'interpretation consecutive, en anglais et en franc;ais, de la declaration faite par le representant de l'Argentine a. la dermere seance. 6. M. AMADEO (Argentine) [traduit de l'espagnol]: Comme je viens de le declarer, je me sens, vis-a.-vis du Conseil, responsable de ce retard. Dans ces conditions, et si le President et les membres du Conseil n'y voient pas d'inconvenient, je suis - en ce qui me concerne-- entierement dispose cl. renoncer cl. l'interpretation consecutive de mon intervention si cela ?eut faciliter la tache du Conseil. 7. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Etant donne la declaration faite par le representant de l'Argentine, je demande aux membres du Conseil de securite si, cl. titre exceptionnel et afin de gagner du temps, ils accepteraient de modifier notre procedure habituelle et de renoncer cl. l'interpretation consecutive du discours fait par le representant de l'Argentine, puisqu'il le propose lui-meme. 8. M. MILLET (France): Je regrette pour une fois de n'etre pas d'acCDrd avec le representant de l'Argentine dont le savoir est bien connu en ce qui. concerne les regles de procedure. Mais je demande que, meme a titre exceptio17.nel, il ne soit pas fait entorse au reglement du Conseil de securite concernant les interpretations consecutives. 9. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Puisqu'une objection a ete soulevee, nous suivrons donc la procedure habituelle et entendrons l'interpretation du discours du representant de l'Argentine. II est donne lecture de l'interpretation, en anglais et en fran(ais, de la. declaration faite par M. Amadeo (A1"gentine) ala 914eme seance. 10. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): avec l'assentiment des membres du Conseil, je donne la parole au representant du Congo (Leopoldville). 11. M. CARDOSO (Republique du Congo [Leopoldville]) : Monsieur le President, je vous remercie de me donner id l'occasion de parler du pays qui est d'abord 13. In its report, the United Nations presents facts relating to the Congo. It has not established all these facts itself. It is relying on certain sources, some of which it considers authoritative, some suspect. However, one fact is clear: the arrest of M):'. Patrice Lumumba, the former Prime Minister, who 'was dismissed in proper and due form by the man whose position as head of state of the Republic of the Congo has not been questioned. On this point, I regard no one as authorized to interpret Congolese laws. Colonel Mobutu has described the circumstances in which the arrest took place. ONUC relies on this description of the facts. Thus, it acknowledges the Colonel's complete moral authority to relate the £lcts exactly. That is an important point. 14. Therefore, it is true, at the report states, that "a patrol of 40 ANC from Port Francqui had followed Mr. Lumumba and had effected the arrest at Bulongo, about five miles north-west of Mweka", and that these men had stated that "if arrangements could not be made to take over Mr: Lumumba by 2 p.m. that afternoon, they intended to shoot him." The report goes on to say that "The Chief of Staff said that he had issued orders that Mr. Lumumba was not to be killed under any circumstances." [Ibid., para. 10]. 14. Il est done vrai, selon le rapport, qu' "une patrouille de'40 soldats de l'armee nationale congolaise de Port-Francqui avait suivi M. Lumumba et avait procede a l'arrestation a Bulongo, a 8 kilometres environ au nord-ouest de Mweka" et que ces hommes avaient declare que, "si l'on ne pouvait faire en sorte que M. Lumumba fUt pris en charge le jour meme, a 14 heures au plus tard, ils allaient le fusiller". On lit encore que "le chef d'etat-major a declare qu'il avait donne l'ordre de ne tuer M. Lumumba en aucune circonstance". [Ibid., par. 10.] 15. Tel est le veritable visage de la revolution pacifique du colonel Mobutu, un visage humain, conciIiant, et - apres tout - fondamentalement congolais. Le colonel a empeche ses troupes de fusilIer M. Lumumba. Qui d'entre nous ici, hommes pacifiques, ne souligl1erait ce fait? 15. That is the true picture of Colonel Mobutu's peaceful revolution, a humane and conciliatory revolution, and-above all--one which is fundamentally Congolese. The Colonel prevented his troops from shooting Mr. Lumumba. Is there anyone here, in this body of peace-loving men, who would not stress this fact? 16. Many similar facts exist. On 12 September, Mr. Lumumba was arrested at Camp Leopold and was then released. On 24 September, on the orders of Colonel Mobutu, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Antoine Gizenga, who had been arrested some time before, were set free. These measures were taken in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, the released men never showed a conciliatory attitude. We know all these men, who are just names or numbers to the Soviet 16. Il existe de nombreu~ faits semblables: le 12 septembre, M. Lumumba etait arrete au camp Leopold, puis reliiche; le 24 septembre, sur ordre du colonel Mobutu, M. Maurice Mpolo et M. Antoine Gizenga, arretes quelque temps auparavant, sont relaches. Tout cela en vue d'aboutir a une solution pacifique. Malheureusement, cesbommes reliiches ne se sont jamais montres conciliants. Tous ces hommes qui, pour le Gouvernement sovietique, ne sont que des noms ou des numeros, nous les connaissons, pour avoir lutte avec eux contre le colonialisme; nous avions meme place notre espoir en eux. Malheureusement, ils ont ete mal conseilles par certains pays africains, au point de fausser le veritable sens de la revolution congolaise. Nous sommes les premiers a regretter les injures et les humiliations qui leur sont infligees, car, avant d'etre les G~)Vernment, for we fought with them against colonialIsm; we even placed our hope in them. Unfortunately, they were so badly advised by certain African countries that they were distorting the real meaning of the Congolese revolution. We are among the first to regret the insults and humiliations they have suffered, for, before being the friends of foreigners, they are our 17. Mr. Lumumba has been examined by two physicians whom the Congolese authorities sent, without awaiting instructions from anybody-African-Asians, capitalists or communists. He is well. 18. I have no intention of trying the LUll1ull1ba case here. The trial will take place in the Congo itself, in proper form, according to Congolese laws, for of course it is an exclusively domestic matter falling within the province of Congolese sovereignty. The Congolese people have not yet forgotten Mr. Lumumba's arbitrary arrests, the genocide of the Baluba in Kasai, and the abuse of public power. In the name of objectivity, we must also deplore the maltreatment which Mr. Songola and other members of Parliament are undergoing at Stanleyville, where they are being illegally detained by rebd forces. 19. Messrs. Songolo, Othita and Fele, and other members of Parliament who come from Stanleyville and were elected by the people, have publicly dissociated themselves from Lumumba. They were entirely within their rights. They returned to Stanleyville to report to the people who had elected them. Most regrettably Gizenga, who had just been set free by Mobutu, had preceded them. He imprisoned them all, for no other reason than that they had disavowed their former leader. For more than two months, long before the recent events at Leopoldville, these members of Parliament have been in prison, maltreated and beaten half to death. It is said that Songolo has lost an eye and that Fele's left leg is paralysed. If it were objective and impartial, the Council would also be distressed by the lot of these unfortunate men. Humanitarian feelings do not exist only in one direction, one must not weep only for those with whom one agrees. The Congolese delegation is astonished that the Soviet Union, with its deep concern about safeguarding human lives, did not think of convening the Security Council to protect these men. 20. For these reasons, I formally request the Security Council to ask the Secretary-General to submit a report on the maltreatment of the unfortunate members of Parliament from Stanleyville. The Congo does not end at Leopoldville. A decision should not be taken on the basis of the situation in a single city or in a single area. The Congo is one and indivisible; secession and separation in any form must be combated. 21. Western capitalism has provoked, and still supports the secession of Katanga. Communism or, more accurately, eastern State capitalism is fomenting the secession of Oriental province. The Congolese people are firmly resolved to fight any attempt at secession, from whatever quarter it may come, to safeguard the unity and independence of the Congo. '''le shall shoulder the responsibility for our own affairs. '''le hope that our African and Asian brothers will also assume responsibility for the defence of their common ideals. To these brothers I say: you cannot oppose one form of secession in order to guarantee another. If you did so, it could well be said, unfortunately, that the Congo tolled the knell of the principles of Bandung. 22. It is not the Congolese who are divided; it is the world that is divided. Therefore, let the Congo be left 20. C'est pourquoi je demande formellement au Conseil de securite de prier le Secretaire general de lui soumettre un rapport sur les mauvais traitements subis par les infortunes par1ementaires de Stanleyville. Le Congo ne s'arrete pas aLeopoldville. Il ne faut prendre aucune decision qui soit fondee seulement sur la situation d'une ville ou d'une region. Le Congo est un et indivisible. Et c'est contre toute secession, tout separatisme, que nous devons maintenant lutter. 21. Le capitalisme occidental a provoque et soutient toujours la secession du Katanga. Le communismeou, pour mieux dire, le capitalisme etatique de I'Estfomente la secession de la Province-Orientale. Nuus, Congolais, sommes fermement resolus acombattre toute secession, d'ou qu'elle vienne, pour sauvegarder notre unite et notre independance. Nous assumerons nos responsabilites en ce qui nous concerne; nous esperons que nos freres africano-asiatiques assumeront aussi les leurs pour la de£el1se de leurs ideaux communs. Chers freres, vous ne pouvez pas combattre une secession pour en cautionner une autre. S'il en etait ainsi, on pourrait desormais dire, helas! que le Congo a sonne le glas de Bandoung. 22. Ce ne sont pas les. Congolais qui sont divises; c'est le monde qui est divise. Laissez donc le Congo 28. In conclusion, my delegation refers to President I~a~a-Vubu's letter to the Secretary-General, recog- 11lzmg the human rights mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter: "You may rest assured, Sir, that our country has not acceded to the Charter of the United Nations in vain; we are aware of the obligations it imposes and have undertaken to abide by them in their entirety. The whole organization of the country, which we are working steadily to restore to order, is moreover 23. L'Union sovietique propose de desarmer 1'armee nationale congolaise. Au mois de juillet, nous avons vu le gouvernement provincial du Katanga, sous 1'instigation des capitalistes, desarmer pres de 2.000 soldats congolais. Aujourd'hui, 1'Union sovietique demande de desarmer les forces congolaises. Decidement, tous 1es imperialistes se ressemblent par leurs methodes, comme par leur cynisme. 24. Nous tenons ici a souligner que l'unique issue de 1'operation des Nations Unies au Congo est de permettre aux forces nationales de faire valablement la releve des troupes de 1'ONU. Pour notre part, nous ne laisserons jamais personne venir desarmer les forces regulieres de notre armee. Nous considererons toute tentative de ce genre comme une agression contre la Republique par les troupes de 1'OND. Prenez done vos responsabilites, Messieurs. Vous etes avertis. 25. En matiere de desarmement, du reste, il y a lieu de se demander a qui ce devoir incombe au premier chef. Si l'ONU en a le pouvoir, qu'elle aiIle d'abord desarmer les grandes puissances et la menace de la guerre n'existera plus. Voyons, Messieurs, ne rejetez pas sur les petits les responsabilites des grands. 26. Nous, Congolais, sommes convaincus que les Nations Unies peuvent rendre les services qu'on est en droit d'en attendre. Nous n'avons jamais manque l'occasion de critiquer 1'ONUC, parfois amerement, chaque fois que, dans ses oscillations politiques, elle touchait a nos affaires interieures; nous n'avons pas non plus manque de reconnaitre qu'elle avait obtenu certains resultats positifs. Nous voulons bien profiter de l'assistance technique, meme elargie, des Nations Unies au Congo. I1 ne faut toutefois pas que cette assistance soit imposee. Elle est acceptee, et meme souhaitec dans la plupart des cas, mais on ne peut reprocher aux Congolais de vouloir se reserver le droit au dernier mot. 27. En ce sens, on peut demander, et meme supplier, que 1es republiques sceurs de l'Afrique cessent de se meler des affaires interieures du Congo. Ce sont certaines d'entre eUes qui ont cree le cuIte de la personnalite et qui retardent ainsi le denouement de la crise congolaise. La seule fac;on d'en finir au Congo est d'eliminer la guerre froide qui est une guerre de pretentions a peine camouflees; et c'est notre population qui en souffre. Personne ne peut pretendre etre plus Congolais que les Congolais eux-memes. Tenons-nousen a ce principe et la paix sera sauvegardee. 28. Nous terminons en nous referant a la lettre du president Kasa-Vubu au Secretaire general, lettre reconnaissant les droits de 1'homme tels qu'ils SOl1t mentionnes dans le preambule de la Charte: "Vous pouvez etre certain, Monsieur le Secretaire general, que notre pays n'a pas adhere en vain a la Charte des Nations Unies; nous en connaissons les obligations et nous nous sommes engages a les respecter integ "ement. Toute l'organisation du pays, que nous travaillons d'arrache-pied a remettre en 32. What is now required, in the opinion of my delegation, is·a sustained and patient effort by all concerned to help and support those in the Congo who are working to establish conditions of law and order throughout the country, and to strengthen its unity in a form best suited to the conditions. 33. President Kasa-Vubu, the acknowledged head of state, has called for an early round-table conference of the political and provincial leaders of the country. We believe that such a conference would provide the best opportunity for uniting the energies of all men of goodwill in the Congo to bring about the developments I have just described. 34. In this general task, the United Nations effort in the Congo has an important role. This is basically to help the Congolese authorities in the establishment and maintenance of' conditions of law and order, and to supplement the capacities of the Congolese security forces to do so. 35. In the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation, the resolutions dealing with the Congo adopted by th~ Security Council on 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 [S/4387, S/4405 and S/4426], provided the Secretary- General with a satisfactory mandate to carry out this responsibility. 36. The Council heard yesterday a remarkable account from the Secretary-General [913th meeting], in clear and objective terms, of the way in which he has interpreted his mandate and of some of the complications and difficulties which he and his staff in the Congo have encountered in carrying it out. Speaking for the United Kingdom, I should like to say that, while there are one or two things in the Secretary-Genel'al's statement with which my delegation does not entirely agree, I fully 31. La tache n'est pas aisee. Le Congo est un vaste pays Oll les communications sont difficiles. Les populations qui I'habitent ont des traditions differentes, toutes profondement enracinees. Certaines de ces populations n'ont que peu d'experience des problemes d'administration et de gouvernement. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que, dans de nombreuses regions, la situation demeure instable et peu satisfaisante. Cet etat de choses doit etre pour nous tous une source de serieuses preoccupations. 32. Ce qui est necessaire maintenant, c'est, de l'avis de ma delegation, un effort soutenu et patient de la part de tous les interesses afin d'aider et d'appuyer ceux qui reuvrent au Congo pour etablir l'ordre et la legalite dans l'ensemble du pays et renforcer son unite selon les modalites les plus appropriees. 33. Le president Kasa-Vubu, chef reconnu de l'Etat, a demande que l'on reunisse sans tarder une conference de la "table ronde" a. laquelle participeraient les dirigeants politiques et provinciaux du pays. Une telle conference offrirait selon nous a. tous les hommes de bonne volonte du Congo la meilleure occasion de mettre leurs energies en commun pour tenter d'atteindre le resultat que je viens d'indiquer. 34. Dans cette tache d'ensemble, I'effort de l'ONUC a un role important cl jouer. Ce role consiste essentiellement a. fournir une aide aux autorites congolaises pour l'etablissement et le maintien de I'ordre et de la legalite et cl completer les forces de securite congolaises en vue d'atteindre ce but. 35. De I'avis de la delegation du Royaume-Uni, les resolutions adoptees au sujet du Congo par le Conseil de securite, les 14 et 22 juillet et le 9 aout 1960 [S/4387, S/4405 et S/4426], ont donne au Secretaire general un mandat qui lui pennet de s'acquitter de cette mission. 36. Le Secretaire general a fait hier devant le Conseil [913eme seance] un remarquable expose dans lequel il a precise, en termes clairs et objectifs, la fa<;on dont il a interprete son mandat et indique certaines des complications et difficultes auxquelles lui-meme et son personnel au Congo se sont heurtes dans l'execution de ce mandat. Au nom du Royaume-Uni, je tiens a. declarer que, bien qu'iJ. y ait dans cet expose un ou deux points sur lesquels ma delegation n'est pas entierement d'ac- 38. What is necessary is an accommodation of the differences of personal ambition, tribal hostility and provincial separatism which beset the people of the Congo today. In times past, and in circumstances such as those now obtaining in the Congo, these differences would very likely have been resolved for good or ill by the sword. It is precisely the incalculable suffering which this process would inflict upon the peoples of the Congo which we in the United Nations are striving to prevent. 39. But the task of resolving by peaceful means the gra"l(e and I:omplex political problems which confront the Congo is one of the greatest difficulties. I should like, if I may, to cite an example with which my Government was to some extent concerned. In the final years immediately preceding the establishment of the independent Federation of Nigeria, prolonged and complicated negotiations and consultations took place involving the leaders and people of the different regions of the country so as to form the constitution best suited to the people of Nigeria as a whole. Different and strongly held views were advanced. It was only as a result of much compromise and the exercise of patience and understanding by all concerned that the present Federal Constitution of Nigeria was evolved. It seems to me that the constitutional problems facing the Congo today are in some way similar. Yet the people of the Congo and their President are required to face them in infinitely more difficult circumstances, and without the benefit of gradually acquired experience. 40. Clearly, the process of finding the right solution will be long and complicated. All those who wish the Congolese people well can best contribute in whatever way is open to them by displaying understanding of all the difficulties involved, sympathy for the individual leaders who are truly endeavouring to solve them, and steady and patient support for those forces which are working to establish conditions of law and order throughout the country, and to maintain its political and territorial integrity. 41. I referred a moment ago to the account which the Secretary-General gave us of some of the difficulties which he and his staff have encountered in carrying out their task in the Congo. He also told us of the criticisms from various quarters which he had received, and that he drew some comfort from the fact that these criticisms were frequently in direct conflict with each other. It would indeed be surprising if, in view of the 42. I should like to take this occasion of expressing once again my Govenmlent's recognition of the singlemindedness and dedication to the ideals of the United Nations with which the Secretary-General has discharged the great burden of responsibility which we in this Council have put on him with regard to the Congo. I should like similarly to put on record our recognition of the work and self-sacrifice of all those members of the United Nations staff in the Congo who have been striving, often in conditions of great hardship, to assist the Secretary-General in his task. 43. As I have indicated, the United Kingdom Government does not believe that any further resolution is required from the Security Council in connexion with the mandate of the Secretary-General. Vve are, however, disturbed at certain aspects of the developments in the Congo. In particular, we are concerned that there should be proper observance throughoutand I stress that word, throughout-the Congo by all those wielding power of any kind, of the recognized processes of law and order, and of proper respect for the rights and dignity of the individual. That is why the United Kingdom delegation joined with the delegations of Argentina, Italy and the United States of America in sponsoring the draft resolution [S/4578] which was so eloquently presented to the Council by the representative of Argentina at the last meeting. We have been concerned at the reports and evidence that Mr. Lumumba was ill treated at the time of his arrest, and we think it correct that the Secretary-General should have addressed a message to President Kasa- Vubu with regard to the proper treatment of Mr. Lumumba. We are relieved to hear that, according to recent reports, the conditions of his detention are reasonable and humane. 44. At this point I should like to add that I entirely agree with the explanation given by the representative of Argentina about Mr. Lumumba's status. He cannot, in the view of my delegation, claim any special right by virtue of the office of Prime Minister which he once held. But as my Argentine colleague said, he has the right, like all persons throughout the Congo to be treated as a human being and a citizen. 45. But whatever has been the treatment of Mr. Lu'" mumba, we must recognize that there have unfortunately been many other-far more serious and, in many cases, tragic-examples of total disregard for the normal rules in past months. Probably the most horrifying was that indiscriminate and uncontrolled massacre at the end of August, in the Bakwanga region, of men, women and children of the Baluba tribe. This massacre was referred to in the Secretary-GeneraI's report to the Security Council of 9 September. [896th meeting, para. 100.] It was carried out by troops of the Armee nationale congolaise, then under the direction of Mr. Lumumba, who were transported to the area in Soviet aircraft made directly available to him by the Soviet Government. Then there has been the arrest and continued detention of Mr. Songolo, a member of Parliament and formerly a minister in Mr. Lumumba's 43. Comme je I'ai deja indique, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne croit pas necessaire que le Conseil de securite adopte une nouvelle resolution concernant le mandat du Secretaire general. Cependant, certains aspects des evenements survenus au Congo ne laissent pas de nous inquieter. En particulier, nous desirerions vivement que tous ceux qui, dans l'ensemble du territoire du Congo - et je dis bien dans I'ensemble du territoire-, detiennent un pouvoir quelconque observent strictement les formes reconnues de la legalite et de I'ordre et respectent comme il convient les droits et la dignite de I'individu. C'est pourquoi la delegation du Royaume-Uni s'est jointe a celles de I'Argentine, des Etats-Unis et de I'Italie pour appuyer le projet de resolution [S/4578], qui a ete presente de fa~on si eloquente au Conseil, a sa derniere seance, par le representant de l'Argentine. Les informations et temoignages seIon lesquels M. Lumumba aurait ete maltraite lors de son arrestation nous ont cause quelque inquietude et nous pensons que le Secretaire general etait tout a fait fonde a adresser au president Kasa-Vubu un message demandant que M. Lumumba soit traite de fa~on' convenable. Nous sommes heureux d'apprendre, d'apres des renseignements recents, que les conditions de sa detention sont raisonnables et humaines. 44. J'ajoute id que je partage sans reserve le point de vue du representant de I'Argentine en ce qui concerne le statut de M. Lumumba. De I'avis de ma delegation, M. Lumumba ne saurait revendiquer des droits speciaux en rai'Son des fonctions de premier ministre qu'il a exercees. Neanmoins, comme I'a fait observer mon collegue argentin, il a le droit, au meme titre que quiconque au Congo, d'etre traite comme un etre humain et un citoyen. 45. Quoi qu'il en soit et quel qu'ait ete le traitement reserve a M. Lumumba, il faut reconnahre qu'il y a eu, malheureusement, au cours des mois ecoules, de nombreux autres exemples - beaucoup plus graves et souvent tragiques - de meconnaissance totale des regles normales. Parmi ces exemples, le plus horrible peut-etre est le massacre general d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants de la tribu des Baluba, commis a la fin d'aout dans la region de Bakwanga. Le Secretaire general a mentionne ce massacre dans le rapport qu'il a fait au Conseil de securite, en date du 9 septembre [896eme seance, par. 100]. I1 a ete perpetre par des troupes de l'armee nationale congolaise, alors sous les ordres de M. Lumumba, qui avaient He transportees dansla region par des avions sovietiques mis a la disposition de M. Lumumba par le Gouvernement de I'Union sovietique. Il y a eu egalement l'arrestation et 46. As I said, my Government remains concerned that Mr. Lumumba should be properly treated, but we find it difficult to take at face value the violent protestations on his behalf of those who have made not the slightest gesture of concern at the far graver sufferings which have been inflicted on others. 47. I wish to draw the attention of the Council to what the representative of Argentina has said about the situation in Stanleyville. My delegation wishes to associate itself with his e..x.pression of deep concern about the e..x.cesses committed there against Europeans and Congolese alike, and about the continuing threat to their freedom and their lives. We confidently look to the United Nations authorities to do all in their power to remove this threat and, in accordance with their mandate and in co-operation with the Congolese authorities, restore law and order in that area, as indeed in all areas of the Congo. 48. I have so far sought to explain to the members of the Council the attitude of my Government towards the present situation in the Congo. Before I llnish, however, I am constrained to the distasteful but necessary duty of commenting on the statement [Sj4573], which the representative of the Soviet Union has caused to be circulated and on the speech which he made at the last meeting of this Council. 49. My first comment must be to reject categorically, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and the United Kingdom, the Soviet accusation that "British authorities in Africa" are working against the leaders of the Congolese State and against the Congolese people. Her - Majesty's Government have at no time sought to interfere in any way in the affairs of the Congo. On the contrary, -they are ready to do everything in their power to assist in ensuring that the Congo is enabled to work out its own problems in true independence and free from outside interference. 50. The statement, which was circulated by the delegation of the Soviet Union and the speech which was made here earlier today resemble each other in content and in style. In the time available I have not been able to compare them carefully or to judge which is the more disgraceful. No matter: both document and speech are to all intents and purposes devoid of truth and replete with slander. I would commend, not only the members of the Council but all Members of the United Nations, to study both speech and document carefully and to appreciate fully their implications. It 52. I have already expressed my view about the part played by the Secretary-General. Among others attacked in the Soviet document is Mr. Ralph Bunche, the honoured and distinguished Under-Secretary at the United Nations Headquarters. Members of this Council all know him and are aware of the tireless dedication with which he has for many years devoted his great abilities to the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations. I think you will all agree that he hardly fits the picture of either an "oppressor" or a "lackey". 53. Looking further afield at the "oppressors" and "lackeys" serving Mr. Hammarskjold and the interests of the colonialists in the Congo, whom do we find? 54. First we find the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Dayal, a distinguished Indian diplomat, and General von Horn, a senior Swedish general, both of whom had served their apprenticeship as "lackeys" with United Natiol1s actions in the Middle East. Then there is Brigadier Rikhye, a senior officer of the Indian Army, the military adviser to Mr. Dayal, who has on occasion acted as his deputy. The Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces must not be forgotten. He is Major-General Kettani, seconded from the Royal Moroccan Army for the purpose. The Chief of Staff of the United Nations Forces is General Iyassa, whom the emperor of Ethiopia has made available to the United Nations for this purpose. The Executive Assistant to Mr. Dayal is Mr. Nwokedi of Nigeria, and the Chief of United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo is a distinguished Swedish economist, Mr. Linner. 55. This is, to my simple mind, a surprising list of "lackeys" and "oppressors"; I have no doubt that it will be noted with interest in New Delhi and in Stockholm, in Lagos, in Rabat and in Addis Ababa. 56. The representative of the Soviet Union has made many other charges. He has used offensive words in describing the character and activities of servants of the United Nations and of Congolese leaders. He has recklessly charged those whom he calls "the NATO Powers" with conspiracy and aggression. For instance, he has attempted to make capital out of the unhappy circumstances in which the United Nations authorities inten~ts des colonialistes au Congo, qui trouvons-nons? 54. Tout d'abord, le representant special du Secretaire general, M. Dayal, eminent diplomate indien, et le general von Horn, general suedois de haut rang, qui tous deux ont fait leur apprentissage de "laquais" au cours des operations des Nations Unies dans le Moyen- Orient. Nous trouvons encore le general Rikhye, officier superieur de l'armee indienne, conseiller militaire aupres de M. Dayal, et a l'occasion son suppleant. 11 ne faut pas oublier non plus le Cori1111andant supreme adjoint des Forces des Nations Unies, le general Kettapi, detache par l'armee royale marocaine. 11 y a egalement le chef d'etat-major de la Force des Nations Unies, le general Iyassu, que l'empereur d'Ethiopie a mis a la disposition de 1'0rganisation, le chef du cabinet de M. Dayal, M. Nwokedi, de Nigeria, et enfin le chef cle l'operation civile au Congo, M. Linner, eminent economiste suecIois. 55. C'est la, pour mon esprit naif, une liste surprenante de "laquais" et d' "oppresseurs". Je ne doute pas qu'elle ne suscite un vif interet a New Delhi, a Stockholm, it Lagos, a Rabat et a Addis-Abeba. 56. Le representant de l'Union sovietique a profere cle nombreuses autres accusations. 11 a employe des termes offensants pour depeintre le caractere et les activites de fonctionnaires des Nations Unies et de dirigeants congolais. Sans peser ses mots, il a accuse de conspiratioll et d'agression les pays qu'il appelle les "puissances de l'OTAN". 11 a essaye cl'exploiter les circonstances malheureuses qui ont empeche les auto- 58. I shall not take up the time of the Council by dealing with all these charges and accusations tonight; other members of the Council may wish to reply to some of them later. The serious thing is that behind the absurdity of these charges there lies the fact that the Soviet Union is maintaining a persistent and unscrupulous attack on the independence and integrity of the United Nations Organization, with the purpose apparently of subverting it to its own ends. Any such purpose, let me assure you, is completely contrary to the interests Ol the large majority of the Organization. 59. There is another and equally sinister explanation of the Soviet accusations. The representative of the Soviet Union claims that, as a result of the action of the United Nations the first objective of the colonialists in the Congo has been achieved. What he really means is that, as a result of the action taken by the United Nations, in accordance with the mandate conerred upon it by the Security Council, the first objective of the Soviet Government has failed. The attempt to intervene actively in the affairs of the Congo and to extend Soviet influence there has been thwarted, and the violence of the accusations levelled at our Organization by the Soviet representative is a measure of the disappointment of his Government at the frustration of its policy. 60. The lesson surely is this, as the representative of Argentina pointed out at the last meeting: "i! those Governments who are concerned with this Organization should be able to continue to serve the Purposes and Principles of the Charter; they must be vigilant in frust~atingall attempts, from whatever quarter, to subvert ]ts authority. 61. One final word. My delegation believes that t1 situation in the Congo today is serious. But we have not given up hope. VVe believe that we owe it to the people of the Congo not to give up hope. We believe ~hat if good will and a determination to work together ]s shown by all of us, the situation wiII improve. The Congolese people wiII be enabled, as is their right, to live in peace and security. They ""ill be given the chance that we, the other nations of the worIc1, have had in our time and which, by admitting them to membership of this Organization, we have offered to them, to live in peace and security with us. They might then come to regard these grim, tumultuous months in the history of their young country as a time which tested not only themselves but the conscience of the worIc1 as a whole. 62. It is to meet that challenge that we, each one of us here, must devote our energies. The tide of events has.. to some extent, placed the destinies of the Congolese people in the care of our Organization. We cannot-we Illust not-let them down. And because this is

With the consent of the Council, I shall call on the representative of Mali. 64. Mr. AVV (Mali) (t1"Q.1Jsla.ted from. Fre'llch): I have asked the 'President to be kind enough to allow me to take part in this meeting of the Security Council so that I may communicate to the Council a telegram from the President of the Republic of Mali and which, I hope, all members of the Council will have already read. This telegram, from President Modibo Keita, reads as follows: "Notify you opinion of Mali which corresponds with that of President Nkrumah that United Nations acceptance Kasa-Vubu delegation implies recognition Congolese Govermnent headed by Patrice Lumumba. Kasa-Vubu having been elected by Congolese Parliament his recognition by United Nations as chief of state entails de facto recognition of said Parliament and legitimacy of its acts. In latest news we have heard rumour of arrest of Lumumba by Mobutu troops. Consequently ask you do everything possible to obtain endorsement of position expressed above and to secure immediate liberation Prime Minister Lumumba covered by immunity Parliament alone can withdraw. United Nations would be betraying its mission if it did not help Lumumba to restore authority Congolese Central Government and to enable Parliament to function. Central Govermnent sole legal authority." 1 65. We repeatedly expressed this view, during our statement, at the 920th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, in the debate on the report of the Credentials Committee, and the President of the Republic of Mali supports it with his full authority; we based it on an argument which we have always considered irrefutable: namely, that we agree on the legality of Mr. Kasa-Vubu's position as President of the Republic of the Congo. We think, however, that the principles upon which we base our recognition of the legality of Mr.. Kasa-Vubu's position as President remain valid for Mr. Lumttmba and the Congolese Parliament. 66. Several delegations have unfortunately taken the position until now that Mr. Kasa-Vubu is the sole legal authority. It would seem that the only thing one must know about the Congo is who is the head of state. We have come to attach such importance to Mr. Kasa- Vubu's representation in the United Nations that some of us even now fail to see any point in trying to find out who in the Congo has the authority to take action and to meet all the responsibilities of the young Republic. 67. "\iVhat is the present situation? There is a head of state, of course; we have all recognized him and no one has challenged him. But everyone here knows that 69. Why should we recognize that Mobutu h.~ any authority whatever? 70. Those are the questions which we are raising. Until now, we have been given absolutely unacceptable replies. Again and again we have been told that such considerations would cause us to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Congo. But we are compelled to point out that those very people who speak to us of intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo are ready to disregard the Congolese Constitution whenever there is any mention of the Central Government and the Congolese Parliament. Yet these very same people have, on several occasions, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, embarked on endless dissertations on the lo-i fondamentale of the Congo when there was a question of recognizing Mr. Kasa-Vubu's authority. 71. Mr. Kasa-Vubu represents one of the three main branches of the Congolese Government. In the present crisis, one cannot say: "Mr. Kasa-Vubu is the head of state-period." Moreover, if taking Mr. Kasa-Vubu, as sole head of state, were a sufficient basis for a practicable approach, that line of thought would be understandable. Unfortunately, it happens, at the present stage, that to see that fact only will make any United Nations action absolutely impossible. 72. We have seen that, at the 924th plenary meeting, ·during the debate on the Credentials Committee's report, the General Assembly refused to take account of a document which we asked it to consider. \iVhen we asked the Assembly to take account of that document bef()r~ proceeding to the vote, we sincerely thought that Its contents might change the preconceived ideas of some delegations. 73. The truth is that there wa.s and still is a plot against the Congo. Honesty compels me to say this. VVe have seen that, when it was sought to retard the ~ourse of events, delaying tactics were employed both 111 the Security Council and in the General Assembly. At the same time, we have also seen events being precipitated and the General Assembly brought into ~mergency session twenty-four hours before the open- Ing of its regular session when it was thought that D-Day and H-Hour had arrived to make us take the 77. But that is not all we have to say about Mr. Kasa- Vubu. If he holds undisputed authority in the Congo, he must shoulder his responsibilities; he is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the preservation of the Congolese Constitution. He cannot flout that Constitution with the tacit approval of the United Nations or claim that the Congolese Parliament is illegal. He cannot retain the confidence of the United Nations, to which he has obligations set down in the Charter, and allow Mobutu's bands to fire on United Nations soldiers and maltreat its diplomatic representatives at LeopoldvilIe, in disregard of all rules of international behaviour. Either Mr. Kasa-Vubu is the responsible authority or he is not. VIfe can no longer tolerate his being used as a screen for self-evident colonialist aggression. vVe cannot tolerate his continuing to be an instrument in the hands of those who have not the least concern for the fate of his people. We are firmly convinced of this and we wish to say so most solemnly. 78. During the last meeting of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo, the Secretary- General said that the United Nations had been called upon to re-establish law and order and personal safety in the Congo, but that it was not the guardian of the Congolese Constitution. He even said that, when he spoke of the United Nations, he meant the United Nations Force. 79. Permit me to say that this is enough to drive one mad. You come to a country with 20,000 armed men to establish law and order and security, but you say that the Constitution is no concern of yours. I should like 81. This approach, dictated only by the consideration, which could not be openly admitted, that Mr. Patrice Lumumba is an undesirable person, was vigorously defended at this table at the beginning of last September. It would certainly have led to the placing of the Republic of the Congo under direct United Nations trusteeship. Does the Secretary-General mean to tell us that this approach was inspired by a desire to respect the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo, in accordance with the United Nations Charter? Today, when chaos is spreading throughout the country, the Secretary-General is reluctant to consider any step which might allow the institutions of the Congo to function nornmlly, on the pretext that this would be interference in the country's domestic affairs. Yet in September, at a time when Parliament and the Government were still in a position to discharge their responsibilities, he did not hesitate to propose to the Security Council that the public affairs of the Congo should be managed directly by the United Nations. That was the real issue, because, according to all we had been told, there was no longer any way in which the Congo could be administered without the means which only the United Nations could supply. 82. The Secretary-General also told us on V.;rednesday that the mandate which he had already been given by the Security Council and the General Assembly must be respected, and that, in interpreting that mandate, the present situation must be taken into account. In the report he made yesterday he did not mention the recent events because of which the Security Council was convened, and I do not know whether the reason for his silence is that he really thinks these events unimportant. 83. I must express my concern on that score. Does the Secretary-General mean to ask the Council to do nothing when it has been called to decide on the urgent steps to be taken to counteract growing chaos? Are we to understand that he does not even believe this meeting to be necessary? That is the question in my mind. 84. The Secretary-General also told us, in the report he made yesterday, that the United Nations objective was the evacuation of Belgian troops from the Congo. I shall not go into an analysis of the various resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General 15 83. Je suis oblige d'e:x.-prill1er mon inquietude it cet egard. A un cOllseil reuni pour decider des mesures urgentes a prendre devant l'aggravation du chaos, le Secretaire general voudrait-il demander de ne rien faire? Doit-on comprendre qu'il ne croit meme pas a l'opportunite de la presente reunion? C'est la question que je me pose. 84. Le Secretaire general nous a dit egalement hier que l'objectif des Nations Unies etait l'evacuation des troupes beIges du Congo. Je ne voudrais pas me lancer ici dans une analyse des differentes resolutions adoptees, tant par le Conseil de securite que par l'Assemblee 86. The Belgians have come back to the Congo. Uncontrolled gangs fire on United Nations troops. These gangs are armed and maintained by foreign Powers whose identity is obvious. The countries which spontaneously offered their military assistance to the United Nations, to be used in the Congo, are beginning to withdraw their contingents. Mobutu, that usurper of power and apprentice dictator, by confirming the appointments of his "college of students", shows that he means to perpetuate his arbitrary rule. As regards the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo, the independence of Katanga becomes more of a fact every day. We hear that Tshombe is to take part in a conference of heads of state of the French Community, to be held soon at Brazzaville. Meanwhile Mobutu, his soldiers and the Belgian civil servants are all being paid from the United Nations budget. This is our summary of the present results of the United Nations action in the Congo. The Secretary-General must forgive me if I remark that only an incurable optimist could say that the United Nations has not failed in the Congo. 87. We accuse, because we have learned that the United Nations troops are fighting for Tshombe in Katanga, and this means that the United Nations Force is doing the exact opposite of what it was told to do, for its mission includes, among other things, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Congo. 88. We accuse, because we have learned that embassies at Leopoldville are organizing subversion, bribing deputies and putting undue pressure on Congolese political leaders. 89. We accuse, because Mr. Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Central Government of the Congo, has been imprisoned and ill-treated before the very eyes of the United Nations troops he had called to his aid to help him establish order in his country. I protest most strongly, on behalf of the Government and people of Mali, at the affront which has just been offered to the Congolese people, with the complicity of the United Nations, by the illegal arrest and detention of the head of the Central Government of the Congo. 85. Ma delegation est a la fois surprise et inquiete de voir que le responsable de l'action des Nations Unies ait cette conception de sa mission au Congo. En admettant meme que les troupes beIges soient parties, il est de notoriete publique que des milliers de fonctionnaires beIges sont revenus au Congo. Or nous savons tous ici que ce retour est, pour la situation interieure et l'ordre public au Congo, tout aussi grave que le stationnement des troupes beIges, car on sait quel est le role que jouent egalement les fonctionnaires civils beIges au Congo. 86. Les BeIges sont revenus au Congo. Des bandes sans controle tirent sur les troupes des Nations Unies. Ces bandes sont armees et entretenues par des puissances etrangeres dont l'identite ne fait aucun doute. Les pays qui s'etaient spontanement offerts pour apporter leur assistance militaire a I'ONU, pour servir au Congo, commencent a retirer leurs contingents. Mobutu, usurpateur de pouvoir et apprenti dictateur, fait part de son intention de s'instaI1er definitivement dans l'arbitraire en annonc;ant la titularisation prochaine de son "college de coltegiens". Pour ce qui est de l'integrite du territoire de la Republique du Congo, l'independance du Katanga se confirme chaque jour davantage. Nous apprenons que Tshombe \Ta participer a une conference des chefs d'Etat de la Communaute franc;aise qui doit se tenir tres prochainement a Brazzaville. Et tout cela pendant que le budget des Nations Unies paie Mobutu, paie ses soldats, paie les fonctionnaires beIges. TeI est le bilan sommaire que nous faisons, pour notre part, de l'action de l'ONU au Congo a l'heure actueI1e. Le Secretaire general me permettra de dire qu'il faut etre d'un optimisme demesure pour ne pas parler d'echec de I'ONU au Congo. 87. Nous accusons, parce qu'il nous parvient que les troupes des Nations Unies combattent au Katanga au service de Tshombe, c'est-a-dire que la Force des Nations Unies prend une part active contre la mission dont elle est chargee, car cette mission comporte, en bonne et due place, le maintien de l'integrite territoriale du Congo. 88. Nous accusons, parce qu'il nous parvient que des ambassades organisent a Leopoldville la subversion, soudoient des deputes, exercent des pressions inqualifiables sur les leaders politiques congolais. 89. Nous accusons, parce que M. Lumumba, premier ministre du gouvernement central c1u Congo, a ete incarcere et maltraite sous les yeux des troupes des Nations Unies qu'il avait appelees pour venir a son secoms, pour venir l'aider a etablir l'ordre dans son pays. Je proteste avec la derniere energie, au nom du gouvernement et du peuple du Mali, pour l'affront qui vient d'etre fait au peuple congolais, avec la complicite des Nations Unies, par l'arrestation et la detention iltegales du chef du gouvernement central congolais. ~5. Forgive me for using an expression which may be rather too familiar, but I must say that those who intrigue on behalf of colonialism have mocked the United Nations too long. The tragi-eomedy has lasted long enough; the United States television viewers have had their fun, if they enjoyed the degrading pictures of the arrest of Patrice Lumumba shown on their screens l:tst week. %. Th.: choice is plain. Either the United Nations is in the Congo to carry out a mission under the Charter-and, whatever the Secretary-General may say, this mission is very definite, and is clearly defined both by the Security Council resolutions and by the General Assembly resolution. I myself find them all very clear, especially the resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted at the 863rd plenary meeting on 20 September 1960. This resolution reads: 95. Passez-moi l'e:l\.-pression sans doute un peu trap fatniliere, mais je dirai que les intrigants au service du colonialisme se sont suffisamment moques de I'ONU. La tragi-comedie a assez dure; les telespectateurs americains se sont suffisamment amuses, s'ils trauvent a leur gout les images sordides de l'arrestation de Patrice Lumumba qui defilerent sur leurs ecrans la semaine derniere. 96. De deux choses rune: ou bien I'ONU est au Congo pour remplir une mission conforl11e a la Charte, une mission clairel11ent definie, quoi qu'en dise le Secretaire general, tant par les resolutions du Conseil de securite que par la resolution de l'Assemblee generale. Pour l11a part je les trouve extremement predses, en particulier la resolution 1474 (ES-IV) qui a ete adoptee a la 863eme seance pleniere, le 20 septembre 1960. On y lit: 17 94. Qu'un patriote aiIle en prison pour ses opinions politiques est une chose alaquelle les colonialistes nous ont habitues. Mais ici le drame est que M. Patrice Lumumba est prisonnier des Nations Unies. Il est prisonnier des Nations Unies, parce que les Nations Unies savent qu'il est le chef du gouvernement central congolais. Il est prisonnier des Nations Unies, parce que les Nations Unies sont convaincues que Mobutu est un usurpateur. Il est prisonnier des Nations Unies parce qu'ilne tient qu'aux Nations Unies de liberer M. Lumumba. Et il ne tient qu'aux Nations Unies que le Parlement congolais puisse sieger legalement. "2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security; " "4. Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Govemnlent ..." 97. When .this, the most recent resolution, was adopted, the Central Government existed and was firmly in power. The United Nations must take the necessary steps, and must restore the authority of the Parliament and the Government, which is to say the authority of the lawful institutions. These institutions exist and we know them. We are not convinced by any of the theories which have so far been put forward about countries in a state of revolutilon. If there is anyone to be judged, to be handed over to justice, it is these very usurpers who now defy the United Nations with impunity. They are the ones who should be handed over to the existing legal authorities, if the United Nations wishes to remain completely tnle to itself. 98. I was speaking of the choice which must now be made: either the United Nations must carry out its mission, or it must recognize that it cannot fulfil this mission in the Congo and must admit failure. This decision can no longer be avoided; we can no longer allow the United Nations to be a screen behind which a crime is committed against a young independent country, the most odious and bare-faced crime that any colonial system has ever succeeded in committing against a colony, that is the very thing we must prevent in the Congo. 99. The solution is really much simpler than it seems. We believe that it would be enough to reject arbitrary rule and simply to return to republican legality in the Congo. 100. I was very sorry, a moment ago, to hear a draft resolution containing a pious hope concerning respect for human rights. With the present tragic situation in the Congo; how can we be content with such a declaration? Let them tell us, let them try to give us an idea of the Congo's future, of what can be expected to happen in the Congo. If we are asked to refrain from all action, it seems only right to tell us what will happen at the end of our waiting. What are We to wait for? Untifwhat takes place? 102. The second simple and obvious step would be to convene the Congolese Parliament, so that it can freely decide who represents the Congo and what the Congo wishes to do. I do not think it would be unwarrantable interference to ask the officers of the Congolese Parliament-as Mr. Kasa-Vubu and even Mobutu are now asked to do certain things-to convene the two Houses of Parliament and to let them deliberate. This is the second specific step which my delegation proposes. 103. Lastly, because of all we have heard and because of the accusations ~ have made on behalf of my delegation, we ask, not that the United Nations should send a Conciliation Commission-there is no conciliation to be brought about at the moment because, whether we like it or not, Mr. Lumumba stands for something in the Congo, and, as long as this is so, no conciliation is needed between anyone-but that it should send a mission to make an inquiry and to submit an accurate report on the events of which I have spoken.

If there is no objection, I shall call on the representative of Yugoslavia, after which we shall recess until tomorrow. Since our meeting started somewhat late and we have therefore not yet completed our full three-hour working period, I feel that it would be useful to hear one more speaker today.

Mr. President, I would ask you to inscribe me last on the list of speakers. I shall take less than five minutes. It is for information, but also for a very brief exercise of the right of reply.

Since I hear no objection, we shall hear the Yugoslav representative tonight, after which I shall call on the Secretary-General in ;.r,,,, exercise of his right of reply.

First, Mr. President, I should like to thank the members of the Council for having allowed me to . take part in this debate on the situation in the Congo. 108. The serious events which have been taking place in the Congo these last few days and which are still going on, present the Security Council with the very difficult problem of deciding on the urgent and essential steps to be taken in order to put an end, once and for all, to the dangerous developments in that country, to restore law and order, to remove the dangers which threaten international peace and security and, for this purpose, to fulfil the precise obligations and responsibilities of the United Nations in the Congo. 109. The very future of the Republic of the Congo is at stake, as are international peace and security, and the authority and prestige of the United Nations, which have been seriously shaken by the unfavourable trend of events over the last few months. For these reasons we feel that this is not the time for academic speeches or abstract legal disputes, and still less for 110. I wish to state, at the very beginning of my speech, that the Yugoslav Government finds the situation in the Congo extremely disturbing, mainly on account of the part played by the United Nations Force and agencies in the Congo, which in our opinion runs counter to the mandate given by the Security Council and the General Assembly to the United Nations Command and to the representatives of the United Nations in the Congo. It was because of this that the Yugoslav delegation asked on 8 September [S/4485] that the Security Council should be urgently convened to consider the situation in the Republic of the Congo. 111. In giving the Yugoslav Government's views on this question, I should like first to emphasize that my Government is firmly convinced that the decisions taken so far by the Sec 'rity Council and by the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly have provided the United Nations with a solid foundation for the complete fulfilment of its task in the Congo. Nevertheless everything that has happened in that country, and everything which is happening there now, is the result of a succession of serious contradictions and, above all, the result of the execution of those decisions in such a way that the effect is the exact opposite of what the United Nations had in mind when it took those decisions. 112. May I briefly recall what are the decisions which must be our point of departure in seeking a settlement of the whole Congo crisis. 113. When the Congo was the victim of Belgian armed intervention, at the beginning of July, the Security Council, at the request of the highest lawful representatives of the Congelese State, and in particular at the request of the Central Government of the Congo headed by Mr. Patrice Lumumba, took action 'which was essential in order to ensure the rapid withdrawal of Belgian troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. For this purpose, it authorized the Secretary-General in resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks". 114. A little later, on 22 July 1960, the Security Council, in resolution S/4405, requested all States "to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Rep'lblic of the Congo". 110. Je tiens a declarer, des le debut de mon intervention, que It. Gouvernement yougoslave considere la situation au Congo comme extremement inquietante, en raison notamment du role joue par la Force et les organes des Nations Unies au Congo - role qui, a notre avis, est en contradiction avec le mandat que le Conseil de securite et l'Assemblee generale ont confie au Commandement et aux representants des Nations Unies au Congo. C'est precisement a cause de cette contradiction que la delegation yougoslave a demande, le 8 septembre dernier [S/4485], la convocation urgente du Conseil de securite pour examiner la situation au Congo. 111. En exposant l'attitude du Gouvernement yougoslave a l'egard de cette question, je tiens, en premier lieu, a mett.-e 1'accent sur la profonde conviction de man gouvernement que les decisions prises jusqu'a present par le Conseil de securite et par la quatrieme session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee generale ont fourni aux Nations Unies une base solide pour 1", realisation complete de leur tache au Congo. Cependl..lt, tout ce qui s'est passe dans ce pays et tout ce qui s'y passe aujourd'hui est le resultat d'une serie de graves contradictions et, surtout, le resultat d'une application telle de ces decisions que ses effets sont precisement contraires au but que les Nations Unies avaient en vue au moment ou ces decisions ant ete adoptees. 112. Permettez-moi de rappeler brievement ~n quoi consistent les decisions qui doivent nous servir de point de depart dans la recherche d'une solution de la crise congolaise dans son ensemble. 113. Lorsque le Congo a ete 1'objet d'une intervention armee beIge, au debut de juillet, le Conseil de securite a entrepris, ala demande des representants legitimes les plus haut places de 1'Etat congolais, et notamment a la demande du gouvernement central du Congo preside par M. Patrice Lumumba, une action indispensable pour assurer le retrait rapide des troupes beIges du territoire de la Republique du Congo. A cette fin, il a autorise le Secretaire general, par sa resolution S/4387, en date du 14 juillet 1960, a "prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo, les mesures necessaires en vue de fournir a ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et ce jusqu'au moment ou les forces nationales de securite, grace aux efforts du Gouvernement congolais et avec l'assistance technique de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, seront ameme, de l'opinion de ce gouvernement, de remplir entierement leur tache". 114. Un peu plus tard, le 22 juillet 1960, le Conseil de securite, par sa resolution S/4405, a prie tous. les Etats de "s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait tendre a empecher le retablissement de l'ordre public et l'exercice de son autorite par le Gouvernement congolais, et aussi de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait saper l'integrite territoriale et l'independance politique de la Republique du Congo". 117. But where do we find ourselves today, five months after the beginning of the crisis in the Congo brought about by the enemies of Congolese independence, who tried by every means to preserve their colonial privileges? Unfortunately the information reaching us from all sources, including the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Republic of the Congo, shows that the tasks set by the Security Council and the General Assembly have not been carried out and that the situation in the Congo has become extremely disturbing, fraught with the ~ravest danger not only for the Congolese people and for peace and security in that part of the world, but for the authority and prestige of the United Nations. 118. In the first place, contrary to the resolutions of the Seeurity Council and the General Assembly, which speak clearly and unequivocally of assistance to the legitimate Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, an entirely illegal regime under Mobutu has usurped power before the eyes of the United Nations Command, of the United Nations armed forces, which now number nearly 20,000 men, and of the political and administrative representatives of the United Nations. This regime is based solely upon the violence and arbitrary action of its armed units. The armed followers of the usurper Mobutu have set up so-called organs of government, whose illegal character and negative role are shown in all clarity in the Second Progress Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Republic of the Congo [S/4557]. 120. This absurd situation reached its height when Mobutu hunted down and arrested Mr. Patrice Lumumba, the lawful head of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo and the acknowledged head of the most important national political movement in the country, who also enjoys a parliamentary mandate and immunity as a lawfuliy elected member of the Congolese Parliament. All this has happenedand unfortunately is still happening-in the presence and before the tolerant eyes of the United Nations Force and the United Nations organs in the Congo. 121. As we have had occasion to see on American television screens, Mr. Patrice Lumumba was treated with inhuman and savage brut~iit] hy Mobutu's anned followers. At this very moment, hL health and his life are in the greatest danger. 122. At the same time, the Mobutu regime broke off diplomatic relations-as if such relations had ever been established with his illegal regime-with African countries friendly to the people of the Republic of the Congo, which had immediately made national contingents available to the United Nations for its Force in the Congo, at the invitation of the Security Council and the General Assembly and with a view to the fulfilment of the tasks set by those bodies. 123. A few days before these extremely serious events, the General Assembly, by a very unfortunate and forced decision, introduced into the United Nations, as representatives of the Republic of the Congo, a delegation which includes direct participants in the illegal system of the so-called authorities which the usurper Mobutu is setting up in the Congo. An objective observer cannot fail to notice the direct relation between this decision and the recent very dangerous deterioration of the situation in the Congo. 124. May I recall what the representative of Yugoslavia said in this connexion at the 9201h plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 21 November 1960: "Therefore, we have the most serious reservations with regard both to the motives and to the consequences that such a decision might have-even more so as a decision forced upon us in this matter may have the gravest and most far-reaching consequences in the Congo itself." Unfortunately his words proved all too soon to be right. Every day the situation in the Congo becomes more like a civil war, as is clear from the news reaching us from that country. 125. When we speak of all these matters, we should ask ourselves this question: where was the United Nations Force in the Congo while all this was happening and to what, in fact, has its role been reduced [- My delegation thinks-and I want to state this clearly and categorically-that the United Nations Command 127. What part has the United Nations played in this Congolese tragedy? The United Nations sent its forces and established its presence in the Congo. Why? To ensure the withdrawal of the intervening troops or simply to witness their further, and disguised, infiltration? To safeguard the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congo or to witness the dismemberment of the country? To restore the normal operation of political institutions or to stand by, as helpless spectators, at the manhunt organized by the armed followers of Mobutu and to watch the arrests and the savage treatment inflicted on the lawful representatives of the people, including-what a paradox-the head of the Central Government, at whose request the United Nations Force had been sent to the Congo? I shall try to answer these questions. 128. First and foremost, have the Belgians withdrawn from the Congo? It is clear from the second report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo that they have not done so. Belgian military personnel, in Belgian and other uniforms, have a free hand in the Congo. They are to be found in the ranks of the so-called separatist annies and security forces and in those of the anned forces under Mobutu's control. It is Belgian "advisers" who, in actual fact, direct the various organs of the so-called authorities which are being illegally set up by Mobutu. According to the findings of the Special Representative of the . Secretary~General, the activities in which all these Belgians engage conflict with and are hostile to the aims of the United Nations in the Congo. 129. What has been done to restore law and order and to help the Central Government of the Congo in the exercise of its lawful powers? The best reply to that question has been provided by the savage attacks on the premises of a foreign diplomatic mission and on the United Nations Force, to which we have just referred, and by the inhuman treatment meted out to Mr. Patrice Lumumba. It is a fact that the lawful ~ov~rnment bodies have been prevented from funct10nmg normally and that the Parliament of the Congo has ?een physically prevented from exercising its constltu,tional powers; the responsibility for this state of affaIrs lies with the foreign intervention which supports Mobutu's clique. The United Nations Command and the other responsible elements have taken no effective steps to alter that state of affairs, although 126. Simultanement, les evenements qui se sont produits tout recemment au Congo, et qui sont extremement inquietants, ont ete et restent en pleine contradiction avec les interets de la paix et de la securite et avec 1'autorite et le prestige de rONU. 11 se peut que 1es mots que j'emploie soient severes; mais les faits que je viens d'enumerer-et d'ailleurs bien d'autres dont je n'ai pas parle - ainsi que toute la realite actuelle et 1'emouvant drame humain et national qui se deroule dans ce pays, sont encore, a mon avis, beaucoup plus graves et beaucoup plus bnttaux. 127. Quel a ete le role de 1'ONU dans ce drame congolais? Les Nations Unies ont envoye leurs forces et etabli leur presence au Congo. Pourquoi? Etait-ce pour assurer le retrait des troupes interventionnistes ou bien pour etre presentes aleurs nouvelles infiltrations camouflees? Etait-ce pour sauvegarder 1'unite nationale et 1'integrite territoriale du Congo ou bien pour etre presentes au demembrement de ce pays? Etait-ee pour assurer le retablissenlent du fonctionnement normal des institutions politiques ou bien pour assister en spectatrices impuissantes a la chasse a 1'homme organisee par les partisans annes de Mobutu, pour contempler les arrestations et le traitement sauvage inflige aux representants legitimes du peuple, y compris - quelle absurdite! -le president du gouvernement central a 1'appel de qui la Force des Nations Unies avait ete envoyee au Congo? J'essaierai de repondre aces questions. 128. Tout d'abord, les BeIges se sont-ils retires du Congo? Le deuxieme rapport du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo demontre clairement que ce n'est pas le cas. Des militaires beIges portant des uniformes beiges ou autres agissent a leur guise au Congo. On les trouve dans les rangs des pretendues armees et forces de securite s6paratistes et aussi dans les rangs des forces armees controlees par Mobutu. En realite, ce sont des "conseillers" beIges qui dirigent les travaux des divers organes des soi-disant autorites que Mobutu est en train d'instaurer de maniere illegale. L'activite de tous ces Beiges, d'apres les constatations du representant special du Secretaire general, est profondement contraire et hostile a la realisation des buts des Nations Unies au Congo. 129. Qu'a-t-on fait pour retablir 1'ordre public et la legalite et pour venir en aide au gouvernement central du Congo dans 1'exercice de son pouvoir legal? La meilleure reponse a ceci nous a ete fournie par les attaques sauvages dont nous avons parle tout a 1'heure contre les batiments d'une mission diplomatique etrangere et contre la Force des Nations Unies, ainsi que par le traitement barbare inflige aM. Patrice Lumumba. C'est un fait que 1'on a empeche les organes legitimes de gouvernement d'exercer leurs fonctions de maniere nonnale et qu'on a physiquement empeche le Parlement du Congo d'exercer ses prerogatives constitutionnelles et que la responsabilite pour cet etat de choses incombe a 1'intervention etrangere qui appuie la clique de Mobutu. Le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies et les autres agents responsables n'ont pris aucune mesure 134. In view of the above facts, my Government felt obliged to clarify its attitude and to take certain decisions. Its attitude and decisions were communicated to the Secretary-General in a memorandum submitted to the United Nations by the Permanent Representative of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 7 December 1960, which reads inter alia: "The Yugoslav Government declares that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, as a Member of the United Nations, does not wish to bear or share, in any way, the responsibility for what is taking place at present in the Congo, in the presence of a United Nations Force and of other United re~ue de l'etranger, le fonctionnement normal des organes et des institutions legitimes du pays et qui ont, en n~alite, amene une telle situation au Congo. 132. Je dois ajouter aussi que ma delegation ne peut pas comprendre pourquoi la commission etablie par la resolution de la quatrieme session extraordinaire d'urgence de I'Assemblee generale n'est pas encore partie pour le Congo afin d'y entreprendre sous la protection de la Force des Nations Unies, le cas echeant, la realisation de ses taches, en conformite avec les decisions et les recommandations du Conseil de securite et de l'Assemblee generale. 133. Je dois constater, pleinement conscient du serieux et de la gravite de ce que je vais dire, que la situation constitutionnelle et politique au Congo a ete completement changee en presence des troupes et des organes des Nations Unies, par un recours aux moyens violents et grace a une aide militaire, financiere et materielle massive re~ue de I'Hranger. A cause d'une telle pratique dn Commandement et des organes des Nations Unies an Congo, le prestige de I'ONU a deja subi le coup le plus dur dans I'histoire de notre organisation. Si les evenements continuaient d'evoluer dans cette direction, nous pourrions nous trouver bientot dans une situation ou les buts positifs et le role meme des Nations Unies au Congo pourraient degenerer en un fiasco complet, non seulement politique, mais aussi malheureusement moral. 134. Tenant compte des faits que je viens d'enumerer, mon gouvernement s'est trouve dans l'obligation de preciser son attitude d'une maniere claire et de prendre certaines decisions. Cette attitude et ces decisions ont ete communiquees au Secretaire general de rOND, dans le memoire presente le 7 decembre 1960 par le representant permanent de la Republique populaire federative de Yougoslavie aupres de I'ONU. Dans ce memoire il est dit entre autres: "Le Gouvernement yougoslave declare que la Republique populaire federative de Yougoslavie, en tant que Membre de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, ne veut porter ni partager en aucune fa~on, la responsabilite de ce qui se passe actuellement an Congo en la presence de la Force et des autres orga- 137. In order to avoid all misunderstanding, I wish to be quite specific and to make it clear that when I say that Mr. Patrice Lumumba must be released, I am not addressing the International Red Cross, but the Security Council and the United Nations. We must not be under any misapprehension: the crisis in the Congo cannot be solved without the support of the genuinely national forces in the country, and a policy of disregarding, opposing or destroying such forces in the Congo can in no circumstances provide a solution. 138. Secondly, well-organized, complete and effective steps must be taken to insure the immediate withdrawal of all Belgians from the Congo. 139. Thirdly, responsible United Nations officials in the Congo must revise their attitude on the question of so-called non-interference and make energetic use of the forces and the resources at their disposal in order to attain the objective laid down in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.. 140. Such are the principles governing my country's attitude towards the grave and extremely critical situation prevailing in the Republic of the Congo. We are still hopeful that the Security Council will be able to take the appropriate positive measures. 141. My Government would be ready to help in . giving effect to a decision along the lines I have mentioned, just as it has always given its assistance in the past when important questions relating to the maintenance of world peace and security have been involved. 142. We have heard it argued here that the people who have made criticisms and so-called attacks on the part played by the United Nations in the present situation in the Congo are those who like to use: the Congo for promoting their own special interests. It seems to me that at least in so far as the specific case of colonialist intervention in the Congo is concerned, there is no shadow of a doubt as to where one should look for special interests and selfish designs. 143. As for Yugoslavia, the whole world knows that my country's approach to the question of the situation 2 Docmnents officiels de I'Asselllblee gcn-craZe, qlt1nzieme session, A1l11c:rcs, point 85 de l'ordre du jour, document Af4628, par. 6. 25 136. I1 est necessaire, en tant que condition prealable essentielle pour tout developpement ulterieur positif, de liberer M. Patrice Lumumba, de le remettre sous la protection de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo et de lui garantir, ainsi qu'aux autres representants legitimes du peuple congolais, independamment de leurs convictions politiques, la possibilite de poursuivre leur activite politique, en vue de resoudre le probleme congolais en conformite avec l'appel adresse a tous les Congolais par l'Assemblee generale et contenu dans le paragraphe 3 de la resolution de la quatrieme session extraordinaire d'urgence de l'Assemblee. 137. Pour etre plus precis, pour eviter tout malentendu, je dois souligner que, quand je dis qu'it faut liberer M. Patrice Lumumba, je ne m'adresse pas it la Croix-Rouge internationale, je m'adresse au Conseil de securite, je m'adresse aux Nations Unies. Parce qu'il faut que nous nous rendions clairement compte du fait que la solution de la crise au Congo ne peut etre realisee sans l'appui de forces reellement nationales de ce pays. D'autre part, une politique tendant it negliger, it combattre et it detruire les vraies forces nationales du Congo ne peut en atlcun cas fournir tlne solution de ce probleme. 138. Deuxiemement, il est indispensable de garantir immediatement et d'une maniere consistante, complete et efficace, le retrait de tous les BeIges du Congo. 139. Troisiemement, les agents responsables des Nations Unies au Congo doivent reviser leur position par rapport it la pretendue non-ingerence, et engager energiquement les forces et les ressources dont ils disposent afin de realiser le but enonce dans les resolutions du Conseil de securite et de l'Assemblee generale. 140. Ce sont les positions de principe de mon pays relatives it la crise grave et extremement dangereuse qui sevit it present dans la Republique du Congo. Nous esperons toujours qu'il sera possible de prendre ici les mesures positives appropriees. 141. Mon gouvernement serait pret it apporter son concours it la realisation d'une telle decision, comme ill'a d'ailleurs toujours fait dans le passe lorsqu'il s'est agi de questions importantes concernant le maintien de la paix et de la securite clans le monde. 142. Nous avons entendu ici des arguments selon lesquels le role de l'ONU au Congo est critique et soidisant attaque, dans la situation actuelle, par ceux qui vouclraient se servir du Congo pour promouvoir leurs interets particuliers. Je crois que pour tous, au moins dans le cas concret de l'intervention colonialiste au Congo, il n'y a pas l'ombre d'un doute quant au cote Oll l'on doit chercher les interets particuliers et les combinaisons egolstes. 143. En ce qui concerne la Yougoslavie, je dois declarer que le moncle entier se rend compte du fait que 144. It has also been said that the so-called attacks made by those critical of the activities of the United Nations Command and of United Nations organs in the Congo impair the prestige of the United Nations. Our reply to that is that the prestige of the United Nations is being impaired, not by well-meaning and constructive criticism, but by a mistaken and harmful policy and by the adoption of attitudes which have led to the present dangerous situation in the Congo. Wellmeaning and timely criticism should have enabled us to avoid such pitfalls, and they could have been avoided long ago if more attention had been paid to such criticism and such warnings. Since due attention was not paid to them, it is not surprising that the countries which voiced certain criticisms in the past are today obliged to enter reservations concerning a policy, which is plainly not in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 145. We neither can nor wish to bear or share the responsibility for such a policy. The countries which, from the very outset, pledged their forces and their resources for the implementation of the United Nations mission in the Congo, clearly have the moral duty to place the issue of future developments in the Congo and in the .role of the United Nations in that country fairly and squarely before the international community. 146. I think that members of the Security Council should give serious consideration to the fact that countries such as Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, Yugoslavia and others are withdrawing their military contingents and their technicians who have been engaged in fulfilling the tasks arising out of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and by the General Assembly, now that it has become obvious that the United Nations Command and the other officials responsible for the United Nations in the Congo are far from taking appropriate action to ensure the execution of these tasks. 147. My delegation believes that this would make it possible for the Security Council to decide upon the urgent measures which are necessary to ensure that the course of events in the Congo takes a different, and this time a positive, course.

I call on the Secretary-General in the exercise of his right of reply. 149. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. President, I wanted to take the floor in order to give the members of the Council certain information and also in order to exercise very briefly my right of reply. 26 j ~ J 151. I hope tomorrow to be able to circulate a report to the members of the Council on these developments.3 152. Some of the speeches to which the members have listened today must cause surprise to those who have -had to follow the developments in the Congo from hour to hour; it has been very difficult to recognize historical realities. But it is also a source of surprise to hear statements, demands and criticisms which are presented in such oblivion of the Charter. 153. This is no time to go into any detail on these various statements. Let me only note tonight, because I would not want it to pass without correction, that we have not "paid Mr. Mobutu", we have not "fought for Mr. Tshombe" and we have had no "complicity" in the arrestation of Mr. Lumumba. 154. Statements have been made about the mandate of the United Nations. On that point I said yesterday what I think had to be said. 155. I have really nothing to add, but I believe that I would be very useful if the earlier documents of the Security Council were studied again, because the question of whether the mandate extends beyond the protection of life and property into the realm of enforcement of this or that political solution--or enforcement of this or that constitutional rule-has been carefully studied and the subject of lengthy debates in the Security Council. I think the conclusions from those debates are obvious to all the members, and I need not remind you of them. 156. But all the same, we hear it repeated that actions of the Command or of my representatives in the Congo, and myself, are not in conformity with the mandate. Well, then you give to the mandate an interpretation which is not warranted by the history of the case. 157. But let us assume that your interpretation of the mandate is correct. Has the Council, have you gentlemen, ever given the Secretary-General or the Force the means-I mean now the legal means-by which we could carry out the wider mandate which you believe has been given to the Force? And if so, let me ask this last question: could the Council have given such means to the Force, through the Secretary- General, without acting against the clear injunctions of the Charter? May I remind you that it is even doubtful if the Council ever has acted under Chapter VII. The very most that can be said is that the Council's actions may have been under Article 40 of the Charter. Therefore I should like to ask again, could such actions as those we are supposed to have omitted have been taken by us, as the legal action of the Council has developed, or by the means given us by the Security Council as the Charter stands.

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak 161. That is why I think that it might be best to come to an agreement with the Chairman of the First Committee, possibly by asking him to postpone the meeting of the First Committee until evening; we could then hold the Council meeting in the afternoon and determine our further procedure. I do not exclude the possibility that, in the course of the afternoon, we might be able to hear most of the speakers, at any rate, and then decide how to complete the Council's work. If this is not convenient for the First Committee, we might decide that the First Committee and the Security Council should sit simultaneously, as has. already happened onee. Although I understand that this solution presents difficulties, I must say that I see no other way out. Either the First Committee meeting will have to be postponed until 8.30, or it and the Security Council will have to meet simultaneously. 162. I should like to ask the Chairman of the First Committee to give us his views once again, so that we might be able to take a final decision. 163. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French) : I should like to support the suggestion just made by the representative of Ceylon. Despite the importance of the Security Council's work and the significance of the question before it, which is one of concer.n to all del~ga­ tions, we should not forget that the FIrst CommIttee is now considering the question of a war that has been in progress for six years and that th~s questiot,l is of interest to all members of the Secunty CouncIl, and 160. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je voudrais, a la suite de l'intervention du representant de Ceylan, preciser que nous nous trouvons dans une situation assez difficile, surtout etant donne l'importance et l'urgence de la question que nous examinons. Je comprends parfaitement les difficultes de la Premiere Commission et de son president, mais je dois egalement tenir compte de la nature de la question inscrite a l'ordre du jour du Conseil. Cela, d'autant plus que le Secretaire general nous a annonce aujourd'hui de nouveaux evenements qui se derouleraient dans la Province-Orientale et nous a parte des contre-mesures qu'il entreprend deja; aussi me semble-t-il tout particulierement opportun d'entendre parler de ces contremesures et evenements au Conseil de Securite le plus tot possible demain. 161. I1 me parait donc judicieux d'aboutir, avec le President de la Premiere Commission, a un accord qui permettrait peut-etre de rel1voyer jusque dans la soiree la seance de la Premiere Commission, tandis que le Conseil siegerait dans la journee. Puis, nous deciderions de la marche a suivre, mais je n'exclus pas la possibilite, pour le Conseil, d'entendre dans le courant de la journee de demain la plupart des orateurs; ensuite nous aboutirons a une decision sur la fin des travaux du Conseil. Si cela n'est pas tres commode pour la Premiere Commission, peut-etre pourrions-nous sieger simultanement, comme cela s'est deja produit une fois. Bien que je comprenne les difficultes soulevees par une telle solution, en toute conscience, je ne vois pas d'autre issue, ou biel1 reporter la seance de la Premiere Commission a 20 h 30 ou bien sieger simultanement. 162. Je voudrais prier le President de la Premiere Commission de nous donner encore une fois son avis, afin que nous prenions une decision definitive. 163. M. SLIM (Tunisie): Je me permets d'appuyer la suggestion que vient de faire le representant de Ceylan. QueIle que sait l'importance des travaux du Conseil de securite et de la question soulevee ici, qui preoccupe toutes les delegations, nous ne pouvons pas oublier que la Premiere Commission discute actueIle: ment Une question qui est relative a une guerre qUI dure depuis six ans et a laqueIle tous les pays membres du Conseil de securite, de meme que ceux qui ont 165. In view of the importance of the question being debated in the First Committee-the question of Algeria, which I believe to be of direct concern to all members of the Council, with the possible exception of one-I believe it would be better to have an afternoon meeting of the First Committee, and to hold an evening meeting of the Security Council at 8.30 p.m., provided this is not inconvenient to any of its members.

Does the Chairman of the First Committee have anything more to say?

This is indeed a difficult situation for me because I would not like to press the matter too far as I, myself, appreciate the importance of the matter we are discussing here. But I agree entirely with the representative of Tunisia, and I know how important that discussion is in the First Committee because of the subject matter we ate discussing and the nature of the question involved. In fact, we have scheduled two meetings of the Committee for tomorrow, one in the afternoon and one in the evening, because of the importance of the subject and the desirability of finishing that subject as quickly as possible. 168. I should like to make this suggestion. I do not wish to put an extra burden on the Secretary-General, but if he feels that the information he has to offer tomorrow is of so urgent a character that a meeting of the Security Council at 3 p.m. would be required, then, with the agreement of my colleagues, I would agree to have an evening meeting. But if the information is circulated to us in his report, as he has promised, during the day or in the morning, then we might have time to study that report and the new situation and meet in the evening, unless he says that it is so urgent that we should meet, and I would bow to the view of the Secretary-General in a matter of that kind.

It is difficult to say exactly when this report may be circulated because it depends on when we receive the text from Leopoldville. However, I believe that it will be fairly early in the day, and that members will be able to judge for themselves if they feel the information received is such as to warrant an urgent meeting of the Security Council. If that would not be the case, I feel that, !f .the Security Council were to meet tomorrow night, It IS probable, under present assumptions, that it would be sufficient. 169. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (traduit de l'anglais): Il est difficile de prevoir exactement quand ce rapport pourra etre distribue, car cela dependra du moment Oll le texte nons parviendra de LeopoldviIle. Je crois cependant que nous le recevrons assez tot, dans la journee, et que les membres pourront juger par euxmemes si les renseignements en question sont de nature a justifier la reunion d'urgence du Conseil de securite. Si tel n'etait pas le cas, j'estirne, dans l'etat actuel des choses, qu'il serait suffisant que le Conseil se reunisse dans la soiree.

As I understand it, tomorrow afternoon we shall ;eceive information from the Secretary-General and, In accordance with that information,. we shall be able to decide whether a Council meeting is urgently needed. In the meantime, I think we can decide tentatively that the Council should meet on Friday evening. I would, 170. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je pense, si je comprends bien, que nous recevrons demain dans la journee les renseignements du Secretaire general, et qu'en fonction de ces renseignements, nous pourrons decider s'il y a urgence; pour le moment, je pense que nous pouvons convenir de reprendre nos travaux vendredi soir. Toutefois, je proposerais, si ce1a convient 165. Etant donne l'importance de la question qui est actuellement discutee par la Premiere Commissionla question d'Algerie qui, pour autant que je sache, interesse directement tOllS les membres du Conseil, sauf un peut-etre - je crois qu'il serait preferable de permettre a la Premiere Commision de sieger l'apres-midi et de tenir la seance du Conseil de securite le soir a 20 h 30, si cela ne gene aucun des membres du Conseil. 166. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le President de la Premiere Commission a-t-il quelque chose a dire? 167. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de l'anglaisJ: Je me trouve place dans une situation tres embarrassante, car je ne voudrais pas insister outre mesure. Je me rends compte, en effet, de l'importance de la question que nous discutons ici; mais, d'accord en cela avec le representant de la Tunisie, j'estime que la discussion qui est en cours a la Premiere Commission est, elle aussi, tres importante, en raison de la nature de la question traitee. En fait, il avait ete prevu deux reunions de cette commission pour demain, une dans l'apres-midi, l'autre dans la soiree, en raison non seulement de l'importance du sujet, mais aussi de la necessite d'en achever l'examen aussi rapidement que possible. 168. Je desirerais presenter une suggestion. Je ne voudrais pas surcharger le programme du Secretaire general mais, s'il estime que les renseignements qu'il a a fournir demain ont un caractere d'urgence tel que le Conseil de securite doive se reunir a 15 heures, j'accepterai, sous reserve de l'assentiment de mes collegues, que la Premiere Commission se reunisse dans la soiree. Mais si ces renseignements font 1'0bjet d'un rapport qui sera distribue, comme l'a promis le Secretaire general, dans la journee ou meme dans la matinee, nous pourrions alors etudier d'abord ce rapport et nous reunir le soir. Quoi qu'il en soit, je m'inclinerai devant la decision du Secretaire general. CL 1 h 15.